Now showing items 1-20 of 71
Next Page| Abstract: | Models of sequential bargaining under asymmetric information often exhibit equilibria which are characterised by the fact that agreement is reached only with a delay and that the final (period) solution is ex ante inefficient. The latter means that agreement is not reached though it is efficient (aggregate pay off exceeds aggregate costs). In this paper we analyse how intervention by a third agent in a sequential bargaining process, modelled as a durable goods monopoly, affects the (high path) equilibrium outcome. The effects of intervention crucially depend on how intervention is formulated. When the intervening agent and the seller decides the price and the subsidy (the intervening agent’s contribution) is decided in a Stackelberg game with the intervening agent as the leader the negotiations are always speeded up and equilibrium inefficiency reduced. When the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader the negotiations are only conditionally speeded up and the equilibrium inefficiency only conditionally reduced. For the same values on the reservation prices and discount factor intervention is more likely to take place when the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader. Also, both the seller’s price and the subsidy are higher when the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader compared to if the intervening agent acts as a Stackelberg leader. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1809 |
| Abstract: | Imperfect markets, asymmetric information and transboundary pollution are all characteristics that in most cases lead to inefficient “market” outcomes, and which thus are arguments for (public) intervention in the market. On the other hand, these characteristics also imply strategic behaviour by the economic agents, and then the effects of public intervention may be different from the traditional results of e.g. subsidies. The point of departure for this paper is the trading of an environmental project in a market with the above mentioned characteristics and where the pollution is transboundary. The trade is promoted by (foreign) authorities in that they offer a grant is trade takes place. We show that the effects of the grant strongly depend on the interests of the authorities, and that the subsidisation does not necessarily make the trading outcome more efficient. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/916 |
| Abstract: | The theme of this report is the regional socio-economic consequences of an extensive oil and gas development in the Barents Sea. The regional focus area includes Finnmark County and Murmansk Oblast. The introductory chapter explains the purpose of the study and the way the work has been done. The next two chapters provide a detailed account of the region and its basic characteristics. The general finding is that the region strongly needs a new stimulus to growth, but that it is badly prepared for receiving a coming oil and gas boom. The following chapter gives a brief overview of the oil and gas sectors in Norway and Russia and introduces the baseline scenario, which indicates the expected scale and scope of future petroleum activity in the Barents Sea. After this three scenarios are presented. They all have 2030 as their time horizon. The first scenario depicts the frontier - the Arctic vanguard – which is a flourishing region by 2030. The second scenario tells the story of the Arctic outsider; a region becoming more and more marginalized. The third scenario foresees a shifting balance, where oil and gas development mainly takes place on the Russian side of the border, leaving the whole region in the shadow of the new energy superpower. The final chapter sums up the key challenges of the region, discusses the scenarios, and highlights the basic preconditions for an extensive oil and gas development to benefit the region. |
| Description: | This report represents the views of the authors only and does not necessarily reflect the position of StatoilHydro ASA |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1242 |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the distributional effects of the implementation of a marine protected area (MPA) for the North-East Atlantic cod stock. A bioeconomic cohort model with two agents targeting different age groups is used to examine how the establishment of an MPA may affect the payoffs to the two main vessel types used to exploit cod, namely, trawlers and coastal vessels. Cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour between the management of the two vessel groups are used to describe the existence or non-existence of efficient management in the fishable area. The model includes a shock in the form of a recruitment failure. A key result that emerges from this contribution is that depending on the ex ante status quo and ex post management, we may observe win-win, lose-lose or win-lose situations as a result of an MPA implementation. For instance, when the ex post management is cooperation, both agents in our model gain, while ex post non-cooperative behaviour results in gains only to the coastal fleet with the implementation of MPAs. The study also shows that even without cooperation outside the MPA, both groups would prefer a 50% reserve to the non cooperative outcome in the absence of an MPA. This is an indication that a reserve may well be preferred to a badly managed non-reserve fishery even when management outside the reserve is non-existent. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/927 |
| Abstract: | This paper gives an overview of bioeconomic modelling of marine reserves, and illustrates how economists have responded to the modelling results found in the ecological literature. The economic analysis is shown to be far more pessimistic with regard to the potential of marine reserves as a fisheries management tool, than what one finds in the purely ecological analysis, the reason being the latter’s neglect of issues such as discounting and economic incentive behaviour. However, the economic analysis, despite some of it being relatively advanced with regard to spatiality, is still simplistic with regard to for instance ecosystem and habitat content. A simple expansion of the existing bioeconomic models with regard to positive habitat effects of area closures is presented and analysed, showing room for improved results from marine reserve implementation as compared to existing analysis. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/940 |
| Abstract: | A transferable quota system is analysed in a two-period model with market power. So far, the management mechanisms presented in the literature to remedy market power have either not succeeded in securing efficiency in the distribution of quota within and across time periods, or have resulted in only one of the two inefficiencies being eliminated. In this paper a new mechanism is introduced where allocation of quota is made dependent upon historic quota acquisitions. This opens for a trade-off between distributional and time efficiency, or under specific circumstances securing overall efficiency. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/913 |
| Abstract: | I sommer har konflikten om havområdene utenfor Lofoten-Vesterålen toppet seg, med sterke utspill fra fiskerhold om seismikkskyting på fiskefelt. Økende bruk av havet til ulike aktiviteter, det være seg fiske eller petroleumsvirksomhet, oppdrett, transport eller turisme, gjør at en bredere forståelse av hvilke verdier havet tilbyr er et viktig innspill i politiske avgjørelser. I dette arbeidet presenteres og kvantifiseres økonomiske verdier generert i territorialfarvannet utenfor Nordland fylke ved bruk av Total Economic Value (TEV) oppsettet. Studien viser at verdier vi vanligvis forbinder med havet, slik som fiske og turisme, kun utgjør en begrenset andel av de totale verdiene som havmiljøet tilbyr. |
| Description: | Dette er en omarbeidet versjon av utredningen Økonomisk verdsetting av havmiljø – Anvendelse på havområdene i Lofoten-Vesterålen gjort på oppdrag for Miljøverndepartementet i 2007-2008. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1810 |
| Abstract: | Biodiversity is today threatened by many factors of which destruction and reduction of habitats are considered most important for terrestrial species. One way to counteract these threats is to establish reserves with restrictions on land-use and exploitation. However, very few reserves can be considered islands, wildlife species roam over large expanses, often via some density dependent dispersal process. As a consequence, habitat destruction, and exploitation, taking place outside will influence the species abundance inside the conservation area. The paper presents a theoretical model for analysing this type of management problem. The model presented allows for both the common symmetric dispersal as well as what is called asymmetric dispersal between reserve and outside area. The main finding is that habitat destruction outside may not necessarily have negative impact upon the species abundance in the reserve. As a consequence, economic forces working in the direction of reducing the surrounding habitat have unclear effects on the species abundance within the protected area. We also find that harvesting outside the reserve may have quite modest effect on the species abundance in the reserve. This underlines the attractiveness of reserves from a conservation viewpoint. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/929 |
| Abstract: | A static bioeconomic model of a marine reserve is introduced, allowing asymmetric density dependent migration between the reserve and the fishable area. This allows for habitat or ecosystem differences within and outside a reserve not described in earlier studies. Four scenarios are studied; a) maximum harvest, b) maximum current profit, c) open access and d) maximum sustainable yield (MSY) in the reserve. These are all analysed within the Induced Sustainable Yield Function (ISYF), giving the relationship between the fish abundance inside the reserve and the harvesting taking place outside. A numerical analysis shows that management focus on ensuring MSY within the reserve under the assumption of symmetric migration may be negative from an economic point of view, when the area outside the reserve is detrimental compared to the reserve. Furthermore, choice of management option may also have negative consequences for long run resource use if it is incorrectly assumed that density dependent migration is symmetric. The analysis also shows that the optimal area to close, a detrimental or attractive ecosystem for the resource in question, may differ depending on the management goal. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/931 |
| Abstract: | Egenutvikling av spillere er god latin, men hvis ungdommene forlater klubbene gratis ved endt kontraktstid, slik stortalentet Mohammed Fellah i Vålerenga ønsker, settes klubbøkonomien sjakk matt igjen. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10037/4300 |
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