The Agencies of the ‘Co-opted’: Indigenous Peoples Organizations and Contestation of International Indigenous Rights Norms in Russia

The article untangles the relationship between Indigenous Peoples organisations (IPOs) and the Russian government in domestic and international political forums over the 1990s-2020s. It links two debates on co-optation and Indigenous peoples’ rights norms contestation, offering a more nuanced view of them as complex, incremental, and dynamic processes in the Russian authoritarian regime. By proceeding from the bifurcation of the contemporary IPO sector, the analysis identifies and examines two groups of IPO s – ‘operational’ and ‘advocacy.’ The article argues that each group of IPO s still preserves some limited capacity to contest the state normative behaviour in the given political environment, yet differently. While ‘operational’ IPO s opt for discursive contestation through appropriation, the ‘advocacy’ IPO s express their dissent by acting as nomads. Both tactics enable each group to create opportunities to effect some progressive, albeit modest, policy and legislative changes.


Introduction
" … In the 1990s and early 2000s, it was important for the officials to show that Russia also thinks about Indigenous peoples' rights.[…] We actively cooperated with regional officials, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076 the Presidential administration and received government grants.There were people in power who thought strategically and were listened to us, including our criticism.Then someone left, someone began to approach everything from the position "The boss is always right."Thus, I realized they no longer need me." 1 " ... Back then, Russia and the world were different.[…] Today, Indigenous interests are best promoted through quiet diplomacy rather than noisy confrontation.[…] Not all the suggestions we make have effects, but it's important we have constant dialogue with the state.And we have some tools to impact state policy." 2 These quotes from public interviews with two Indigenous leaders highlighting the complex and dynamic relationship between Indigenous peoples' organizations (IPOs) and the state in Russia have much to reveal.Over the last three decades, both the Russian state and the IPOs and their relations have undergone significant changes.During the period, Russia has moved from a postsocialist state to federal democracy and then to 'electoral authoritarianism.' 3 IPOs have arrived at their current position in global and domestic Indigenous politics in various ways, not least by using transnational political activism, international institutions, and language of Indigenous peoples' rights as tools to achieve their political goals.Their journey has encompassed institutionalization of the IPOs sector, its integration into global Indigenous politics, collaboration, modest policy changes, and co-optation.These days, the IPOs from Russia are legitimate participants in major international forums, including Arctic Council -AC, the UN Economic and Social Council -ECOSOC, and the UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues.
However, some of these IPOs are considered 'operating under tight state control.' 4 How local actors receive and contest the meanings and implementation of international Indigenous human rights norms in the Russian context has always been an enigma to scholars. 5nternational Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076Yet, the existing norm scholarship remains state-centric, saying that Russia has not ratified the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169 from the International Labor Organization (ILO Convention 169) and has abstained from endorsing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).That said, due to its stance on these primary international documents, Russia is showing less national responsiveness to the arguments stemming from international norms on the rights of Indigenous peoples. 6In contrast to these studies, this article joins a nascent debate that challenges the dominance of state-centric narrative by complementing it with a bottom-up perspective from Indigenous actors. 7The role of nationallevel IPOs in the socialization of international Indigenous rights' norms domestically and how these IPOs contest the non-compliance with these norms by their primary addressee, the Russian state, are the subjects of the article's interest.
Another topic that has attracted the attention of scholars is the co-optation of civil society by the Russian authoritarian political regime. 8Studies show that government cooptation of civil society organizations (CSOs) 9 and IPOs as their part has negatively affected the sector, limiting its pivotal role in promoting norms of participatory citizenship, human rights, and democracy. 10This article concerns a puzzle that we still know little abouthow, using what practices, IPOs express their dissent with the state's behavior towards Indigenous rights' norms in the given context?What social pressures and trade-offs do the IPOs face?What are the effects of the contestation practices on the IPOs?
The article contributes to both these debates, highlighting the agential and active stance of IPOs in contesting the normative behavior of the primary addressee of international norms International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076 in the field of the rights of Indigenous peoplesthe Russian state.Tracing the IPOsstate interactions at international and national levels, the analysis considers the IPOs and the government as participants in global Indigenous policy and sees them as civil and political entities of Russian society.Since the focus of the analysis lies not on the international norms of Indigenous peoples' rights themselves, these norms are seen rather as a 'norm bundle' that includes the norms of the ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP, as well as the general principles underlying and supporting their application in practice.
Drawing on similar observations about the growing level of government co-optation of IPOs in recent years, the article argues against the simplistic and negative view on the cooptation process.The analysis counters a naïve understanding of co-optation as a 'wholesale deal,' meaning that IPOs have ultimately 'sold' their critical ability to challenge the status quo of Indigenous policy.Instead, it offers a more nuanced look at co-optation as a complex, incremental, and dynamic process, marked by power asymmetry and bifurcation of the IPO sector.
The article also questions the conventional, Western conceptualization of Indigenous agency, which sees it as the capacity to act and, primarily, as a resistance.11My main contention is that by looking only for Indigenous actors' big and blunt actions, the researcher runs the risk of downplaying the complex, multifaced manifestations of Indigenous agencies in the challenging Russian environment. 12In contrast to this conventional approach, I use postcolonial lenses, which broaden my field of vision, equipping me to zoom in on practices that express varying degrees of Indigenous dissent that scholars often overlook.
The overall argument of the article is that studying a case of the IPOs from Russia can nuance our knowledge of Indigenous agencies in non-Western democracies and broaden our understanding of how IPOs express their dissent in non-democratic regimes.In order to push the envelope politically in the Russian regime that rewards conformity and punishes dissent, the IPOs are likely to be engaged in subverting existing normative order, by inventively tweaking and stretching its boundaries rather than openly confronting it.
The analysis identified two groups of IPOs that emerged due to the bifurcation of the sector over the last decade -'operational IPOs' and 'advocacy IPOs.'The analysis revealed that each group of IPOs still preserves some limited capacity to contest the state normative International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076behaviour in the given political environment, yet differently.While 'operational' IPOs opt for discursive contestation through appropriation, the 'advocacy' IPOs express their dissent by acting as nomads.Both tactics enable each group to create opportunities to effect some progressive, albeit modest, policy and legislative changes.
The article consists of six sections.Following the introduction, the second section outlines the theoretical framework for analyzing IPOs' contestation practices and agencies under the Russian regime.The third section provides a brief overview of research methodology and the IPO sector in contemporary Russia.The following section sketches Russia's duality stance on ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP and the IPOs' practices to contest the state's noncompliance with Indigenous peoples' rights norms.The fifth section examines two groups of IPOs that emerged from the sector's bifurcation and their norms contestation practices.The final section summarizes the main findings and discusses prospects for future research.(2005). 13Coy and Hedeen object to the dominant and overwhelmingly negative connotation of the term, arguing that for the social movement, the outcomes of co-optation are always mixed, including social control, institutionalization, and de-radicalization of the movement, but also changes, albeit negligible, in the policy. 14Instead, they depict co-optation as 'a complicated and dynamic process of relationships, marked by a power imbalance, between a social movement or challenging group opposes the practices, initiatives, or policies of more powerful social organization or political institutions.' 15 Coy and Hedeen emphasized the multifaceted and incremental nature of the co-optation process, dividing it into four interrelated and mutually reinforcing stages: inception, appropriation, assimilation, and response.The final stage of the processresponseprovides valuable insights for understanding the agency of the 'co-opted.'At this stage, the challenging International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076movement faces a substantial degree of co-optation through government funding and hiring its leaders as government employees.As co-optation reaches its highest degree, it reveals a dialectical nature of social control: the dominated (controlled) actor always has the capability (agency) to react, turning its weakness against the more powerful and dominant actor. 16Due to the bifurcation of the movement at this stage, some of its organizations may respond defensively to buffer and insulate the integrity of the movement's alternative culture, practices, and institutions. 17To counter the significant risks of co-optation while still working on their agenda, the challenging organization often acts as 'nomads.' 'Nomads' are those who are not located entirely within or outside the system they challenge.Nomads operate on the system's margins, and their nomadic character allows them to combine tactical interventions with maintaining relative degrees of independence from the system's hegemonic forces.The third model concerns agencies of international IPOs in norm contestation within Indigenous global politics and has been developed by Sheryl Lightfoot (2016). 24In the global arena of Indigenous politics, as Lightfoot argues, IPOs have played the leading role in developing international Indigenous rights' norms and contesting the state's dominance in the process.These IPOs played a crucial role in pressuring Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the USA (CANZUS states) to change their stance on UNDRIP using a variety of advocacy tactics that combined legal and political activism, working with, within, and against the state. 25 Lightfoot's analysis draws heavily on Indigenous methodologies 26 and postcolonial approaches, 27 taking a critical stance towards Western conceptualizations of the Indigenous agency.From a postcolonial perspective, Indigenous agencies reveal themselves as always existing, processual, dynamic, contextualized, and communicated (politically, socially, environmentally, physically, emotionally).Global Indigenous actors exert their agencies in the profound anti-colonial way, strategically and creatively, to challenge existing structures and The fourth model to deepen our understanding of civic engagement in policy-making under non-democracies is 'participatory authoritarianism' by Catherine Owen (2020). 29Owen argues that citizens in contemporary authoritarian Russia voluntarily participate in the polity as the government provides them with such an opportunity, but in ways that do not threaten the regime's legitimacy and status quo.Owen calls the government practices a 'participatory authoritarianism:' non-democratic states establish avenues for citizens to engage voluntarily in policy processes while simultaneously deliberately limiting, controlling, or undermining the extent and impact of this engagement. 30Providing citizens with limited opportunities to participate in polity allows the authoritarian government to mimic its adherence to global norms of participatory governance and active citizenship, thereby gaining the regime's political legitimacy and implementing some reforms in the public sector.Citizens and CSOs likewise receive some, albeit limited, leverage over the political process by channelling their constituents' demands through state-controlled channels, which sometimes and in some areas may even allow them to shape the overall direction of reform. 31Unlike other parts of the world, the mobilization and organization of Indigenous peoples in the late Soviet period did not occur in confrontation with the authorities but rather with their support. 38 Contemporary Russian IPOs are legitimate participants in major international forums, including AC (1995), the UN ECOSOC (1997), and the UNPFII (2000).However, back in 1994, they were among the last to join the global Indigenous movement, arriving in Geneva to attend the 12th session of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. 40Like other latecomers, the political agenda of Russian IPOs has undergone further changes under the influence of mature IPOs, whose mantra was the rights of Indigenous peoples.By 2007, when the UN General Assembly adopted UNDRIP and Russia abstained from it, these IPOs had strong vertical connections with federal authorities and international donors.At the same time, their ties with Indigenous constituents at the regional and local levels remained weak.
This article utilized a multiple case study approach that focused on analyzing the engagement of four associations of Indigenous peoples (IPOs) with the Russian policymakers at the national (federal) and international levels from 1990-2020.The sources for the analysis included primary and secondary data collected within the author's fieldwork in Russia

1 The Ambiguity of Russia's Normative Stance and its Dynamics
"There are universal values and norms, but no universal practices." 41These words by Alexander Zhuravsky, a senior official in the Russian Ministry of Regional Development who oversaw Indigenous affairs in 2007-2014, capture the essence of Russia's official stance on international Indigenous rights' norms, namely its ambivalence.Russia's ambivalence on these issues reproduces the position of its predecessor, the Soviet Union. 42 the mid-1980s, the Soviet authorities actively worked on the ILO Convention No.
169, demonstrating a keen interest and receptiveness to liberal ideals of democracy and human rights. 43 What were these objections?First, the authorities insisted that, unlike other nation-states with Indigenous populations, neither the Soviet Union nor Russia had ever had a 'colonial past.' 44 Citing the post-World War II 'salt-water doctrine' and 'blue water thesis,' the authorities dismiss any references to 'decolonization' and 'Indigenous self -determination' in the Russian context as inappropriate and groundless. 45Second, as one of the worlds' most ethnically diverse countries (with 194 ethnic groups), Russia insists on its own approach to recognition 'who is Indigenous,' which is different from those applied by the UN bodies and international Indigenists.In the heart of the Russian politics of recognition lies a category of 'korennyye malochislennyye narody' -KMN (translated into English as 'Indigenous smallnumbered peoples'). 46The law defines KMN as 'people living in the territories of the traditional settlements of their ancestors, preserving a traditional way of life and traditional economic system, while numbering within the Russian Federation fewer than 50, 000 persons and recognizing themselves as independent ethnic communities.' 47Third, as a successor of the Soviet Union, Russia does not recognize KMN's inherent rights to ancestral lands but only their usufruct rights for land tenure (the title remains by the state). 48Due to vast natural resources and paramount importance for the country's national security and its resource-based national economy, a significant part of the territories in which KMN live and maintain their economies has the legal status of 'public' (federal) property.
Although the country did not ratify ILO Convention 169, the legal provisions of this international document became the subject of extensive debates among Russian legal experts, high-level officials, and Indigenous politicians in the 1990s.These deliberations, in turn, positively influenced the development of the national legislation on KMN rights. 49The https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076legislator enshrined the rights of KMN in the Constitution of Russia (1993), where Article 69 guarantees KMN rights according to universally recognized principles and norms of international law and treaties signed by Russia.In addition, three federal laws were adopted, including FZ-82 'On guaranteeing of KMN' rights' (1999), FZ-104 'On Obshchiny' (2000), and FZ-49 'On Territories of Traditional Nature Use' (2001). 50The fact that these laws contain solid legal provisions on KMN rights, which to a certain extent comply with international norms of UNDRIP, has been a significant achievement. 51However, this does not negate the precarious character of the implementation of these norms in practice. 52 2007, Putin's speech in Munich designated the orientation of Russian politics towards 'national interests,' which led to a U-turn of good relations of cooperation with the West towards their complete opposite. 53The global financial crisis of 2008 and oil prices tumbling at the international markets hit the country's hydrocarbon-based economy very hard, further exacerbating tensions in Russia's foreign politics with Western countries.Human rights in this environment were declared 'Western' and 'alien' to Russian culture, threatening its 'traditional values' and national security. 54erefore, Russia's abstention from voting on UNDRIP came not as a surprise.The Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Ilya Rogachev announced the official statement on the country's position. 55 The duality of the official discourse on Indigenous rights issues during the study period has also manifested through two narratives.While these narratives have different messages and targets, they are not mutually exclusive but complement and reinforce each other.One tells about Russia's solid legal framework that reflects most international normative principles concerning the Indigenous peoples' rights. 57The narrative has signaled to the domestic IPOs and international community that the authorities intend to harmonize the existing national legislation and practice on Indigenous peoples' rights with their international commitments assumed.Another narrative concerns the role of Russia in the development and diffusion of international norms. 58Russia consistently asserts its active role as a developer and contester of global standards of conduct rather than their tacit recipient.Despite Russia's apparent discomfort about international norms on Indigenous rights, it has never openly rejected their universal validity or legitimacy.However, Russia has always claimed that some of these norms can be interpreted in different ways.

IPOs' Dual Strategy to Deal with the State's Ambivalence
As mentioned, IPOs in Russia began their organizational existence and gained recognition as participants in the policy-making process, not in confrontation with the authorities but with their assistance.The peaceful and cooperative character of the IPOs relationship with the state persisted even after Russia abstained on UNDRIP.Considering the paramount importance of law to the institutionalization of rights of Indigenous peoples, the IPOs focused on tapping the international Indigenous rights' norms into national legislation and policy documents.Paper),' 59 developed closely with the IPOs.This ambitious and comprehensive document defined the government policy on Indigenous affairs until 2025, proclaiming its shift from 'state paternalism' to 'partnership approach.' 60One of the main objectives of the Concept was to strengthen national legislation on the rights of Indigenous peoples to their territories and resources.In the following years, the IPOs and the authorities regularly participated in UN workshops and forums to present the Concept Paper as a promising step towards harmonizing national legislation and policy with international Indigenous rights' norms. 61terestingly, while the Concept Paper emphasizes compliance with international Indigenous rights law, the document does not mention ILO Convention 169, UNDRIP, or its normative pillars such as FPIC.Perhaps, to understand this order of Russian domestic discourse, one should consider its 'unwritten rules' or 'know-how' (rules about rules). 62According to Sergey Sokolovskii, one of the 'unwritten rules' in domestic policy concerning Indigenous peoples was a taboo on the use of Western concepts in Soviet legal documents. 63One such taboo term was the term 'Indigenous peoples,' which officials recognized as appropriate for use only in a colonial context and therefore not applicable to the situation in the Soviet Union. 64ese 'unwritten rules' and taboos did not disappear overnight after the collapse of the Soviet Union but continued to live in discourses and social practices.According to several of my IPOs informants, the 'noticeable absence' of 'UNDRIP,' 'ILO Convention 169' and 'FPIC' in Russian legal and policy documents is hardly accidental. 65Instead, their absence reproduces the legacy of the Soviet practice of distancing itself from international (Western) rhetoric about decolonization and human rights.
Meanwhile, due to the lack of political will and insufficient funding, the first phase (2009-2012) of the Concept paper failed.Because of government inaction and ineffective governance of mineral developments, large-scale projects in Western Siberia and the Far East have gradually turned into hotbeds of conflict and abuses of Indigenous peoples' rights by extractive corporations. 66The frustration of the IPOs with the state's behavior towards https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076 Indigenous peoples' rights grew as the gap between the government rhetoric and actions widened.To make it visible how the Russian government fails to develop and implement a policy that promotes Indigenous rights while paying lip service to the Indigenous rights' norms, the IPOs began to voice their dissent through international fora.
By then, Russian IPOs had learned a great deal from global Indigenist activists about the contestation strategies and their effects on state behavior.They used all the levers of the UN mechanism at their disposal to morally pressure the Russian government, calling out its failures and accusing it of not compliance with Indigenous rights' norms.The IPOs regularly used international forums such as AC and UNPFII and shadow reporting mechanisms to the UN treaty-based bodies to get their attention to the abuse of Indigenous peoples' rights and intimidation of IPOs in Russia. 67During his visit to Russia, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, called on the government to endorse UNDRIP and establish reliable ensuring its provisions, such as FPIC. 68ce Russia's behavioral contestation on Indigenous rights' norms became apparent, Russia came under (moral) pressure internationally to change its behavior.In response, the authorities initiated a wave of inspections and harassments against the IPOs and their leaders, which played a critical role in calling out the practices of Russia's non-compliance behavior.
In 2012, the authorities initiated official procedures to close RAIPON, prompting public outcry and diplomatic protest through AC and UNPFII.RAIPON received permission to continue its activities shortly before the VII RAIPON Congress (2013), whose delegates elected a new organization president. 69IPON and other IPOs were not the only targets of the government's repressive actions to limit human rights advocacy.The situation with IPOs was a part of a broader trend of closing civic space domestically, as the Russian regime consolidated as more authoritarian.
After the 'color revolutions' in neighboring Georgia and Ukraine and the Russian antigovernment protests in 2011-2013, the authorities tightened the control over CSOs activities.
The government supported the repressive turn in CSO policy with several laws restricting CSOs 67 M. The analysis shows that 'operational' IPOs opt for discursive contestation and do not engage in behavioral.While in media interviews, public statements, and reports, the leaders of these IPOs regularly urge the authorities to improve Indigenous peoples' lives and protect their rights, their criticism of government policies is lenient.The leaders of these IPOs argue that their moderate stance in public discourse speaks more of their diplomacy, which should not be mistaken for their complete obedience and lack of an agenda of their own. 71With access to the policymakers, they express their disagreements to their vis-à-vis face to face.They choose not to 'go public' but to use their seat at the policy table to change politicians' attitudes. 72As the opening quote to the article shows, these Indigenous politicians prefer to challenge the state's normative behavior backstage of the policy-making process and behind cabinet doors through more informal channels of negotiation and diplomacy.
Several factors play into how the 'operational' IPOs choose not to couple their modest critical rhetoric with actions.These include legitimacy and credibility from the authorities, access to the policy-making table, and funding source.In an environment where foreign funding is restricted, IPOs receiving government funding are unlikely to engage in behavioral contestation, as they will not bite the hand that feeds them. 73While funding is essential, it is as vital as securing and maintaining the organization's legitimacy and credibility granted to them by the authorities.The latter, in turn, provides these IPOs with a seat at the policy-making table where they can try to create opportunities to effect some progressive policy and legislation changes. 74All of these factors determine the pragmatic choice of IPO leaders to resort to discursive contestation as the only viable option and consider expressing dissent by actions as more risky, costly, and less effective.
Focusing on a discursive contestation of this group of IPOs leads us to look at the results of their legislative work, which they carried out in close collaboration with the authorities over the past decade.After a decade of legislative inactivity in Indigenous affairs, ahead of Russia's https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076gaining discursive power and using it to re-categorize the status of Indigenous peoples as a group in the process of governance, thereby trying to influence the policy tools applied to its governing.
The second observation refers to the limited agency of the 'operational' IPOs to contest the existing normative order within the dual logic of Russian participatory authoritarianism.As Owen (2020) shows, the authorities, while increasing CSOs' participation in political processes, concurrently try to play down its potential transformative results. 82All legal provisions recently introduced under the 'Arctic package,' including a corporate code of conduct for working with Indigenous peoples and communities, and compensation for losses caused to affected Indigenous communities, are not legally binding.By not opting for a lawfully binding form for these new regulations, the authorities downplayed the transformative potential of these norms to contest the existing relationship between Indigenous peoples and extractive corporations.
The legislation does not refer to international norms or relevant global standards of business conduct but uses the vague terms 'cooperation' and 'participation' (undefined) of Indigenous peoples in decision-making.The fact that the legislator removed all references to FPIC from the final official versions of these decrees 83 demonstrates the persistence of the 'unwritten rule' and the practice of state distancing from international discourse and norms of Indigenous peoples' rights.The closing of civil space and significant risks of co-optation under participatory authoritarianism forced this group of IPOs to act as nomads.In their dynamic model of cooptation, Coy and Hedeen (2005) describe nomads as organizations that are not entirely within or outside the system they challenge.Instead, the nomads are constantly looking for so-called 'oscillating spaces,' where they can operate on the margins of the system and combine their tactical interventions while maintaining a relative degree of independence. 85

'Advocacy
The 'advocacy' IPOs, being de-legitimized by the authorities, are excluded from formal participation in policy processes but continue to operate on their margins.Their main assets include expertise in international and Russian Indigenous politics, ties to global and domestic

2
Indigenous Agency in Norm Contestation under the Russian Participatory Authoritarianism: A Framework to Analysis Throughout the article, four theoretical models help to understand the dynamic, contextualized, and negotiated nature of IPOs' agencies in contesting the normative behaviour of the Russian state.The first model is a social movement co-optation by Patrick Coy and Timothy Hedeen the 1990s, during the initial stage of IPOs sector development, Western foreign aid from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Danish Environmental Protection Agency (DEPA), and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCMs) played a very instrumental role in its institutionalization. Projects with circumpolar sister-IPOs, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) and the Sami Council, have strengthened the organizational capacity of federal-level IPOs and shaped their agenda to include human rights of Indigenous peoples. 39One of the significant outcomes of institutionalization of the sector in this period was the establishment of new IPOs, including L'auravetl'an (1996), Сentre for the Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North/Russian Training Centre for Indigenous Peoples -CSIPN (2001) and Batani foundation (2004).The latter, in turn, contributed to the sector's expansion and diversification, as well as increased the democratization of its agenda and diluted the RAIPON's monopoly.
(2018 -  2021) and desk research.During the field visits to Moscow, Saint Petersburg, the Republics of Komi, and Sakha/Yakutia, and via Skype and Zoom calls, the author conducted 21 semistructured interviews and informal conversations with federal-level IPOs leaders, activists, scholars, and experts working on Indigenous issues.While some of my interlocutors have chosen to be identified, others have preferred to remain anonymous.Although the article does not cite all interviews, they informed its broader analysis and overall argumentation.The critical discourse analysis of the various text documents produced by officials and Indigenous representatives complimented the ethnographic part of the study.These documents included legislation, statements, programs, reports, and public interviews extracted from the IPOs websites and their social media, the national Indigenous journal 'Mir Korennykh Narodov -Zhivaya Arktika,' 'L'auravetl'an' newsletters, and open online archives of the Russian federal authorities and UN treaty bodies.All textual sources were analyzed in the original language -Russian and English.
networks of organizations, and digital technologies.The nomadic character of work of 'advocacy' IPOs, including their digital nomadism, serves them to alter their underlying capacities in the relations with the authoritarian state and circumvent the government efforts to silence them.Acting as nomads and capitalizing on different flows and resources, these IPOs constantly seek inventive ways, opportunities, allies, and so-called 'oscillating spaces' to contest the government's behaviour on Indigenous rights' norms and challenge Indigenous policy's status quo.'Advocacy'IPOs primarily express their dissent with government policy and its inconsistency with international norms in public discourse.In contrast to lenient and somewhat latent discursive contestation of the 'operational' IPOs, the 'advocacy' IPOs express their dissent manifestly and actively.Given the modern-day Media censorship and Internet surveillance in Russia, their discursive contestation of the state's normative behavior occurs primarily in cyberspace.'Advocacy' IPOs use their abroad-based websites, non-Russian social media platforms (Facebook and YouTube), and Russian and English languages to communicate their activism to domestic audiences and foreign allies.They very rarely go beyond online International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076Intheirmodel,Stimmer and Wisken distinguish between discursive and behavioural contestation.They argue that states tend to practice their normative dissent through behavioural contestation, and non-state actors rely heavily on discursive ones.23Whenactors express disagreement about the norm's meaning and its (relative) importance through words and arguments, they engage in discursive contestation.Statements, petitions, social media posts, and other types of public debate fall into this category.Behavioural contestation affects the norm's implementation and occurs through the actors' actions and can be of two kinds.The first is reflected in the way the international norm is implemented (or not and how) and therefore is open only to its direct addresseesprimarily to states.Examples of state's behavioral contestation include, yet are not limited to, tacit inaction, ineffective norm's implementation, 22ates are the primary recipients and developers of international norms, non-state actors also act as essential agents of norms development and contestation.Both actors may encounter and contest norms at any stage in the 'norm life cycle' and 'norm development.'22Theactors' institutional position to implement norms and their assets (political, financial) determines how actors engage in normative dissent.invocation of one norm instead of another.Many actors can practice the second type of behavioral contestation as it refers to actions taken by third parties to obstruct, interfere with, and influence norm implementation by the state.When CSOs engage in sabotage, pickets, and blockades, they express dissent through behavioral contestation.
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076IPOs to engage in discursive and behavioral contestation under the authoritarian regime.Finally, inspired by Lightfoot's research (2016), I use postcolonial lenses to scrutinize the agential stances of IPOs in Russia as negotiated and contextualized in their interactions with dominant discourses, actors, and institutions of Indigenous politics, both state and non-state, domestically and internationally.International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076Congress of Peoples of the North, these local organizations were merged into the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East (RAIPON).
The study links co-optation and norm contestation, viewing them as dimensions of IPOsstate relations in domestic and international political forums.It adapts the idea fromCoy and Hedeen (2016)to consider IPOs co-optation by the Russian government as a dynamic and multifaceted process that implies the dialectic character of social control.Due to the dialectic control, the 'co-opted' IPO sector, even if bifurcated, can exert its capacity to buffer and counteract the state's dominant power.The study applies Owen's conception of 'participatory authoritarianism' (2020) to outline the duality of the institutional environment in which contemporary IPOs operate in Russia.It shows how the institutional setting of 28 S. Lightfoot, supra note 24, pp.72-89. 29C. Owen, supra note 8, pp.415-434. 30ibid., p. 420. 31ibid., p. 433.
However, neither the Soviet Union nor Russia ratified this only legally binding 41 A. Zhuravsky, 'Indigenous Small Peoples and Industrial Development: Legal, Economic and Political Problems and Ways of Their Solution.Experience of Russia and the European Union,' 21:1 Mir Korennykh Narodov/Zhivaya Arktika (2008) p. 13. 42 L. Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015). 43ibid., pp.159-167.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076international instrument on the rights of Indigenous peoples, imposing several objections to its norms.A decade later, the Russian diplomats echoed these protests almost entirely but concerning UNDRIP.
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076 of the state.In conclusion, Rogachev assured that Russia, as ever, will foster cooperation in this direction.56 Rogachev emphasized that Russia has ratified most of the core UN human rights treaties, and it generally supports international standards development towards Indigenous peoples' rights.However, like the CANZUS states, Russia raised strong objections to the UNDRIP's provisions on Indigenous peoples' rights to selfdetermination, lands, and resources, and issues of redress and compensation.Further, Russia complained about a non-transparent forum chosen to negotiate the final text of UNDRIP, which turned out to be unbalanced, as it prioritizes the Indigenous peoples' interests over the interests To this end, IPOs in Russia, like other IPOs worldwide, have used a dual strategy, combining the practices of 'working with and within the government structures' with the methods of 'challenging the policy status quo from the outside.'In 2009, the government approved a 'Concept Paper on the Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (Concept 56Ibid.57Zhuravsky, supra note 38, p.13. 58 E/C.19/2009/4/Add.7.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076

5 Indigenous Contestation and Agencies under the Russian Participatory Authoritarianism 5.1 'Operational' IPOs: Discursive Contestation through Appropriation RAIPON
Todyshev, 'Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Activities of the UN Treaty Bodies on Human Rights,' in A.X. A. Abashidze (ed.), Actual Problems of Modern International Law (Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Moscow) pp.121-137. 68ort of the Special Rapporteur James Anaya, supra note 49. 69erezhkov, 'The Russian Government Shuts Down the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON),' <www.iwgia.org/images/newsarchivefiles/0710_Background_article_RAIPON.pdf>,visited on 27 May 2021.International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076activities,including the amendments to the 'CSOs law' (2006), the 'foreign agent law' (2012), and the 'undesirable organizations law' (2015).70heseprocesses have changed the legal environment for IPOs activities and transformed the IPOs sector.As the government restricted foreign funding and stigmatized human rights advocacy, alliances with global organizations, one of the powerful tools to pressure the authorities and extractive companies to uphold their commitment to Indigenous peoples' rights, became no longer a safe option.At the same time, the government has encouraged IPOs to participate in government-led programs and apolitical activities in education, youth, and social welfare as their operator.Under this dual logic of participatory authoritarianism, the IPOs have faced a significant risk of co-optation by receiving government funding and adjusting their activities according to the priorities set by the authorities.When the authorities blacklisted Batani and CSIPN as 'foreign agents' and then liquidated both as entities in 2019, it completed the bifurcation of the IPO sector into two groups: 'operational IPOs' and 'advocacy IPOs.' and L'auravetl'an belong to the first group -'operational' IPOswhich act rather as operators in developing and implementing projects of their only donor and primary source of their organizational legitimacy -the Russian government.The government grants both IPOs with organizational legitimacy to speak on behalf of the Indigenous peoples in Russia in domestic and international politics.Through their access to the State Duma of Russia, the Federation Council, the Presidential Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations (2012), and the Public Council of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (2020), both IPOs participate in the policy-making process at the national level.At the international level, RAIPONs is one of six permanent participants at AC, and together with L'auravetl'an they represent Indigenous peoples of Russia at UNPFII.The 'operational' group receives only financial support from the70Federal Law No. 18-FZ of 10 January 2006 'On Amendments of Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation'; Federal Law No. 121-FZ of 20 July 2012 'On Making Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial Organizations Performing the Functions of Foreign Agents;' Federal Law No. 129-FZ of 23 May 2015 'On Amendments of Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.' International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076Russian government through the Presidential Grants Program and the Northern Indigenous Peoples Support Fund.Regular government funding, in turn, encourages these IPOs to actively act as a service provider arm for government programs in culture, sports, education, and youth work, rather than advocating for universal Indigenous peoples' rights, which the authorities see much as political activity.

IPOs': Contesting the Status Quo as Nomads Another
group of IPOs that emerged due to bifurcation is 'advocacy' IPOs.The group includes Batani, CSIPN, and Aborigen Forum (AF), which continue to promote the rights-based agenda within the IPOs community in Russia.When the authorities closed Batani, its leaders left Russia and re-registered the organization as a new non-profit in the United States to continue advocating for Indigenous peoples' rights in Russia in exile.Since 2019, CSIPN has also been forced to move the organization's activities to cyberspace.AF -an informal group of Indigenous activists, IPO leaders, and experts from Russia and abroad organized to defend the 82 C. Owen, supra note 8, p. 431. 83urashko, 'The Standard for Arctic Resident Companies' Responsibility to Arctic Indigenous Peoples has been adopted!Unfortunately, not the One that was Expected,' iRussia, 06 February 2021, < https://indigenousrussia.com/archives/9795>, visited on 19 October 2021.International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 29, 2022, pp.849-876.https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10076humanrights of Indigenous peoples in Russia in 2014 -deliberately chose for an unregistered and networked form of organizational work to preserve some agency in the face of repression.84Due to informal, networked organizational structure, AF's configuration, size, and membership are in flux.The AF' members from different regions of Russia and abroad 'move in' and 'out' the network, combining the participation in the network with formal membership in other organizations, thereby comprehensively advancing the advocacy of Indigenous peoples' rights.