“Everybody recognized that we were not white”

Sami Identity Politics in Finland, 1945-1990

Jukka Nyyssönen

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor Artium
Department of History
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Tromsø
February 2007

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Foreword

This thesis could not have come about without the assistance of various people and institutions. I wish to thank the Norwegian Research Council and the research project The Challenge of Indigenousness: Politics of Rights, Resources and Knowledge, who provided the funding for my research. The project was led in cooperation with the Department of History of University of Tromsø, and the Centre for Sami studies; the former also provided my working facilities. My supervisor, Professor Henry Minde had to live through the whole process from the first drafts to the first version of the manuscript – he has pushed me forwards with his valuable comments and his grim way of encouraging me. Thank you. The staff and the research fellows who attended the Department of History research seminars, and those who attended occasional seminars arranged by the administrative body of the research programme, provided me with additional insights. Thank you all. Mary Katherine Jones carried out a linguistic proofing of the thesis, first the whole manuscript and then the corrections. This huge job has improved the thesis tremendously and it is the author who is to be blamed for any faults or shortcomings in the text.

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Tromsø, Norway, February 2007,

Jukka Nyyssönen

# 1. Introduction

1.1. The research theme, and preliminary setting of the research problems and restrictions  
1.2. Historiographical positioning: writing Sami history in the post-colonial age  
1.3. Some theoretical key concepts  
1.3.1. Identity as construction and the discursive contestation of self-representations  
1.3.2. Ethnic identity and identity politics  
1.3.3. From modernization to globalization – the possibilities offered by globalization theories  
1.3.4. Building indigenousness on a global scale  
1.4. Method  
1.5. Earlier research  
1.6. A specification of the research problem  
1.7. Sources  
1.8. Outline of the thesis

# 2. Situating Inari in the National, International and Global Community

2.1. Introduction  
2.1.1. Early phases of settlement history and the gradual erosion of Sami rights  
2.1.2. The formal integration of the Sami domicile into the national whole, and the mobilization of resources  
2.2. The Sami within the Finnish national whole – counter-imagery and praxis  
2.2.1. The project of Finnish identity building  
2.2.2. Sami imagery as a basis for Finnish minority policy  
2.2.3. The Sami position in state politics  
2.2.4. Encountering the “Ultimate Other” - the case of the Petsamo and the policies directed towards the Skolt Sami  
2.2.5. The first phase of Sami activism in Finland – the Finnish “Sami Friends”  
2.3. Conclusions

# 3. Sami Identity Politics in 1940s Finland

3.1. Introduction  
3.1.1. The socio-economic context  
3.1.2. Changing politics and contexts in the rebuilding of Lapland  
3.2. Sami imagery in the 1940s  
3.2.1. Counter-imagery: people under threat
3.2.2. Sami self-representations: an introduction 82
3.2.3. Negotiating self-representation: from thankful objects to more reflective identity politics 83
3.2.4. The radicalization of representation: a people under threat seeking isolation from the majority 86
3.3. The “official” identity politics of the first phase of Sami activism – Samii Litto 93
3.3.1. Introduction 93
3.3.2. Samii Litto – its establishment, aims and activities 94
3.3.3. The identity politics of Samii Litto 98
3.4. A comparison with ethnopolitical mobilization in Norway and Sweden 102
3.5. Explaining the mobilization of the Sami 112
3.6. Conclusions 120

4. The Era of “Modernizing Sami” Imagery 123

4.1. Introduction 123
4.1.1. National context 124
4.1.2. The shared process of modernization in Inari 127
4.2. Sami identity politics in an era of conciliation 135
4.2.1. Counter-imagery in the public sphere of Lapland in the 1950s and 1960s 135
4.2.2. Counter-imagery in the era of “liberalized” media in the 1960s 142
4.3. Sami identity politics from the early 1950s to the late 1960s – The rise and fall of the modernizing Sami imagery 146
4.3.1. Introduction 146
4.3.2. Sami identity politics: negotiating the distance between the Sami Friends and the state of Finland during the early 1950s 147
4.3.3. The identity politics of the Sami Committee of 1952 151
4.3.4. The Sami living on a borderline between tradition and modernity 153
4.3.5. The competing “primordialist” Sami discourse – building Saminess through traditional markers and by demonizing the “modern” 159
4.3.6. Case: reservoirs in Sompio, Sodankylä – national interests, a crisis in resource use and the displacement of Sami herders 162
4.3.7. Elevating the Sami language as a “primordial” marker 165
4.4. Taking the transnational option – Sami activists from Finland at the Sami conferences 167
4.4.1. General overview 167
4.4.2. The delegations from Finland at the Sami conferences – changes in imagery 169
4.5. Comparison with Norway and Sweden 177
4.6. Conclusions 179

5. The Sami Renaissance 182

5.1. Introduction 182
5.1.1. Finnish radicalism 182
5.2. New Sami associations and the generation gap 185
5.3. The radicalization of land use issues and local society in Inari 193
5.4. The Sami renaissance: constructing a more exclusive Saminess 197
5.5. Explaining the renaissance 201
5.6. A comparison with the Sami movement in Norway 205
5.7. Conclusions 208

6. Changes in the Sami Political Space During the 1970s:
Internationalization and Institutionalization 211

6.1. Introduction 211
6.2. Internationalization: entering the indigenous peoples' movement 211
6.3. The institutionalization of Sami politics: central organization or Sami Parliament? 218
6.3.1. The preliminary work and identity politics of the Sami Committee 218
6.3.2. The unfulfilled hopes of the central organization 220
6.3.3. The Sami Delegation is established 225
6.4. Conclusions 229

7. The Era of Exclusive “Natural People” Self-Representations
and Fragmented Identity Politics (the 1970s) 231

7.1. Introduction 231
7.1.1. The political and economic context 231
7.2. Sami identity politics in the 1970s 234
7.2.1. Counter-imagery 234
7.2.2. The early identity politics of the Sami Delegation: from primordial imagery to legal claims 240
7.2.3. Conclusions 244
7.3. Sami self-representations in the freer fields of representation 245
7.3.1. Changes in the Sami/Finnish public sphere 245
7.3.2. Self-imagery: enter the colonized Sami 246
7.3.3. The introduction of the most exclusive “natural people” Sami self-imagery 252
7.3.4. Practices, test-cases and canonizations 258
7.4. A comparison with Norway 260
7.5. International forums 262
7.6. Conclusions 264

8. Consolidating Identity Policies in a Fragmented Political
Environment (the early 1980s) 268

8.1. Introduction 268
8.1.1. The fragmented political contexts of the 1980s 268
8.2. The imagery of indigenousness in inter-Nordic and global forums 272
8.3. The era of the most positive counter-imagery 277
8.4. Self-imagery 279
8.4.1. The streamlined and matter-of-fact identity politics of the Sami Delegation during the early 1980s 279
8.4.2. “Free” expressions of collective Sami identity in an era of plurality (the early 1980s) 284
8.5. Conclusions 288
9. The Kessi Forest Dispute as a Forum for Sami Identity Politics

9.1. Introduction
9.2. Under-communicating the “natural people” imagery – statements made by the Sami Delegation
9.3. Constructing colonized and ecological Saminess – sharpened statements in unofficial forums
9.4. The Sami elite and the dispersed front
9.5. The reception of Sami self-representations
9.6. The pan-Sami context: Alta and Kessi
9.7. Discourses on Sami identity in Norway and Finland in the 1980s and early 1990s
9.8. Conclusions


11. Conclusions

List of abbreviations

Sources and literature

Appendix: Biographies of the political activity of Sami activists in Finland
Map 1. Province of Lapland, Finland
Map 2. Northern Lapland, Finland
1. Introduction

1.1. The research theme, and preliminary setting of the research problems and restrictions

This is a study about Sami identity politics in Finland, from 1945 to 1990. The focus is on self-representations of the Sami collective identity and the operationalization of these self-representations in the identity politics of post-war Finland. The key issue for this study is how the collective Sami identity was being constructed in a national context, as the Sami movement itself evolved at an international level and took part in global indigenous cooperation. The Sami mobilization is contextualized in national and global frames. The Sami were part of and acted within the Finnish economic and political modernization, and the relationship between them is discussed. The era itself experienced a globalization. Alongside the effects of a capitalist world economy, the Sami of Finland were encountered by two global movements as well: the indigenous peoples’ movement and, at the end of the 1980s, the environmentalist movement, both of which opened new venues and introduced new discourses for the Sami movement. The focus will be on the Sami of Finland entering the global arenas and choosing global representational strategies and self-representations of collective identities, and what consequences these elements had on the Sami strategy at a national level.

The research focuses on changing and competing notions of the Sami collective identity held by Sami activists but due to the availability and choice of sources, not so much on those cultivated at a “grass-roots” level. References to identity politics discussion outside the activist sphere are cultivated when sources allow this. Another restriction has been made in the choice of actors, or the emphasis placed upon them: the focus is on Sami identity politics striven for by the Sami, while an attempt is made to explain the absence of a clearly defined, specific Sami policy on the behalf of the state of Finland. The few moments when the state acted on the Sami case are examined. These, as well as other restrictions, are discussed further in the course of and after the theoretical discussion in the introductory chapter.

The focus is on continuity and change within Sami identity politics. Since self-representations are historical phenomena, I shall study the origins and how they were used in the economic and political contexts in which the Sami activists operated. Also, the basic features of the political space – whether taken, given, created or conquered – in the
construction of these self-representations has to be presented. In order to do this, the history of Sami domicile as well as aspects of the Finnish intrusion and nation-building are studied with a longer historical perspective. The main period of inquiry begins with the establishment of the first Sami(-run) association and the start of a more reflective form of common Sami policy and identity-building in 1945. The end of the period has been selected to coincide with the end of the Kessi dispute and emerging internal and external political opposition during the 1990s, which changed the Sami political space tremendously, making the 1990s a research topic in its own right in Sami history.

In studies of ideology, politics, ethno-political mobilization, and especially those applying discourse analysis, the geographical area of the study cannot be taken as too restrictive. This study focuses on various geographical entities: I start and end this study in Inari, since the first wave of Sami activism was to a great extent an Inari phenomenon. The first forest dispute in the Sami domicile, that of Kessi, centred on Inari. In addition, the contextualization concerning Sami history is undertaken within the shifting borders of Inari. This is not because Inari qualifies as the most representative example in Sami history, but because of the complexity of its ethnic encounters and economic developments. This complexity and various competing actors provide many topics worth studying. My previous work and expertise concerns the history of Inari. The history of Sami ethno-politics itself guides the geographical focus: Sami activism in other municipalities is followed when it occurs, not just as a point of comparison but in its own right. The reader will notice a disengagement from municipal boundaries as the Sami elite began to construct common Sami policies, for example, and to organize themselves across national borders. However, the borders were a constitutive fact relating to Sami ethno-politics in Nordic countries, so the geographical area of contextualization is the state of Finland, while the comparison in space is made between Norway and Finland (and to a lesser extent Sweden).

1.2. Historiographical positioning: writing Sami history in the post-colonial age

Historiographically, this study belongs to the history of minorities, or to the Sami history. I understand the Sami history as being a sub-category of the academic discipline of the history of minorities. The discipline has its roots in the democratization of historical inquiry and partly in the post-modern challenge (or crisis), where the demarcations between “lower” and “higher” culture, as well as “objective” and “subjective” knowledge, are grumbling, if not
already gone. Thus, for example, oral sources have been raised as valid sources in conveying indigenous, subjective knowledge.¹ A discussion of my historiographical position and epistemological premises is necessary in this case, for three reasons. 1) Because Sami history (in Norway) is one of the most administered branches of the study of history and there are voices demanding greater control for the Sami themselves in the knowledge production.² To discuss the post-colonial demand of practising a different epistemology and the indigenization of research. 3) To discuss the problems connected with “objectivity” and the lack thereof, a “problem” connected with what are sometimes highly politicized studies in this discipline.

The history of minorities has its ideological background in the decolonization of Third World countries and in indigenous anti-imperialist activism, where an “intellectual decolonization” was demanded in the wake of political liberation. A decolonization of national histories and historiographies began in the mid-1950s, rejecting the Western and Eurocentric universalizing premises of science. In order to abolish intellectual imperialism, “the monopoly of knowledge” (Keskitalo), a demand was voiced for a new conceptual vocabulary rooted in the local conditions of the marginalized groups, as well as doubt concerning the suitability of the application of Western models and social sciences.³

The motivation of the history of minorities was to make heard the voice of the “voiceless”, or “people without history”. Without the voice of the silent, yet potent actors in history, the history conveyed in the research would not be sufficient. Political history was insufficient to convey their side of the story. In the post-colonial study of history a more explicitly emancipating goal was voiced: the colonized indigenous lands, minds, intellect, resources, knowledge and power of definition were to be reclaimed and deconstructed. There was a growing opposition towards racist, out-of-date, essentializing and simplifying representations, and a demand to take the research into their own hands. Another motivation has been, as for Edward W. Said, to understand the operation of the cultural domination of the West. Research itself has been understood as an assimilative/integrative tool and part of the colonialist economic exploitation and discourse. The use of sources produced by

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¹ Helander and Kailo 1999, 23.
² Bull 2002, 10-12; Grenersen 2002, 14-15; this is a post-colonial demand, which has been made on a large scale. In the case of Australia, see Macintyre and Clark 2003, 46-47. I would like to make also one technical note: I use a reference technique that I learned at the University of Jyväskylä in Finland. If the footnote number is located before a full stop or inside brackets, it refers only to this sentence or to the sentence inside the brackets. If the footnote number is located after the full stop or outside brackets, it refers to the whole body of text as far back as the previous footnote number or the beginning of the paragraph.
³ Boroujerdi 2002, 40-43; on the political connotations of Western models in a Sami context, see Keskitalo 1976, 27, 35.
indigenous/subaltern groups and the establishment of indigenous counter-discourse, epistemology and grand narrative is called for. Without an epistemological shift, (Sami) history would be distorted. The critique has also been made in the case of Finland.\(^4\) However, the indigenous reception of this matter is still being marginalized in the academic world. This is due to epistemological and methodological disbelief in established “Western” academia.\(^5\)

The history of minorities has, in earlier times, been written from an oppositional point of view, creating parallels with early gender history and black history (i.e. the history of people of African origin in America). The demand was made for applicability, empowerment and “giving back” to the societies studied. This has led to criticism of a lack of scientific objectivity; from a “Western” viewpoint, the emancipated nature of the research is problematical. Post-colonial studies have typically been accused of obscurantism, atavism, militant particularism, anti-modernism and xenophobia\(^6\). Even though this may be justified criticism, in some cases, one relevant point is how the reconstruction of the past has been romanticized as the triumphal narrative of political activism in adversity, thus neglecting the passive/non-secessionist elements in the phenomenon studied and forms of co-operation between the colonizer and the aborigines.\(^7\)

Some post-colonial researchers assert that the right to do research on colonized people should be reserved for indigenous researchers. The principle of an ethnic group of people having the right to be studied by their own people is also stated in the Sami Political Programme of 1986\(^8\). Ole-Henrik Magga, a professor in the Sami language and chairman of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), has explicitly demanded an applicability to curing Sami social ills, the future orientation of Sami research, their identity building and autonomy, and Sami-controlled bodies for Sami research. Magga


\(^6\) This list is given in Boroujerdi 2002, 39-47.


\(^8\) The claim for Sami researchers to have the monopoly on researching the Sami history has been made quite recently by a number of Sami politicians in Norway. Berg 2004, 4; Gaski and Kappfjell 2002, 31; Indian history, for example, written and taught in schools by non-natives, was an issue for indigenous activists and the emerging Indian rights movement during the 1960s. The history was to be studied by indigenous researchers. In the 1960s, in universities in California, USA, for example, numerous Native American Studies programmes were launched, some of them with Native American professors, see Johnson 1996, 129, 143, 145; Sápmelaš 2-3/1987, Sámedigldigíkalš programma.
categorizes Sami research as being part of the Sami culture in terms of self-determination and knowledge production, thus limiting access to the research society.\(^9\)

In the academic production of knowledge and its social implementation, research monopolies have been perceived as problematical. Said criticizes them from an epistemological point of view: what guarantee is there that a researcher with an “emic” (insider) position within the culture studied will capture the essence of that culture? Is there an essence of culture to be found? Why practise the same epistemology as “Western” researchers, building their identity against the subjugated “Other”?\(^10\) In the same way, Lina Gaski refers to the strictness and inbuilt essentialist notion of identity that makes such claims rigid and difficult to follow in practice. The researcher and the object belong to various categories other than ethnic: gender, for example, or class, or profession. These different aspects of identity may be taken as “emic” or “etic” and used to legitimize the research situation.\(^11\) And why merely substitute the old Western monopoly with a new indigenous monopoly? The legitimate aim of making visible invisible groups and their history does not have to be an exclusive process\(^12\). At worst, the claim of taking history into one’s own hands leads to comforting “autohistories”, which do not have any impact on scientific or political discussion, and lack authority if they are not open to academic criticism and evaluation\(^13\).

Ethnic monopolies could be further commented upon, with the principle of freedom of research as a starting-point. Restrictions of access to certain research topics, monopolizing methodologies and using ethnicity as a factor in assessing results are questionable academic strategies. The principle of freedom of research does not need to violate principles of democracy, and indeed makes the research multivocal: both principles, that of democracy and that of freedom of research, also include the right to a choice of methodologies, radical representative strategies, self-identification and identity building. I recognize the political need for strategic essentializations when indigenous people are acting from a subaltern position and using writing as a political and self-identificational tool\(^14\). Why practise the dominant “anti-essentialist” epistemology of the West?\(^15\) Especially since Western historians

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\(^9\) Magga 2002, 132-137.
\(^11\) Gaski 2000, 9, 13, 18-22.
\(^12\) For a critique on monopolies and research as mere identity management, see Ryymin, Teemu: Kvensk historie – av kvener, for kvener? Noen grunnlagsproblemer i minoritetsforskning, doctoral lecture given in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Tromsø 14.11.2003.
\(^13\) Macintyre and Clark 2003, 47-48.
\(^15\) Sayyid 2000, 267.
cannot escape some forms of essentialism in their national histories either, and the crudest misuses of history can be checked in intra-disciplinary discussion?

One matter-of-fact, yet still controversial argument against the ethnic monopolies is the improved situation of many indigenous researchers (though not necessarily Third World researchers). Due to changes of paradigm concerning the value of indigenous knowledge, democratization and new traits in historical inquiry, as well as the devaluation of studying national political histories, the situation and appreciation of the indigenous angle has improved. There is no longer a majority monopoly on knowledge, but there is an emerging critique of the most radical post-colonial research. A consciousness is growing of the situatedness and political consequences of both majority and post-colonial positions. As Patrik Lantto writes, there are benefits and disadvantages to both emic and etic positions.

This study is written at a time when the Sami, especially in Norway, have succeeded in their claim to partial control of knowledge production and application. The administrative body for this specific study was chaired by Professor of Sami history Henry Minde, and several other Sami researchers were members. From the point of view of principle, the grievance of control is thus resolved. Another principle and ethical starting-point for this study is the principle of freedom of research.

Anthropologists and social scientists, often with a background in feminist-oriented studies, have been ready to reveal their ethnic background and ethnopolitical commitments. Historians have been reluctant to be explicit about their positions. Striving for objectivity in a historicist sense and a belief in contextualization as a key to value-free research would have rendered this process useless. Historians have become aware of the dangers of involvement, where history becomes a political tool. The post-modern challenge has questioned the possibility of attaining objective truth and knowledge, and there is growing sense that all research is socially situated/positioned, as the impossibility of “turning oneself totally off” in the Rankean sense has become apparent.

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17 On the moral sovereignty/untouchability of researchers of indigenous ethnicity doing and administrating indigenous research, see Bull 2002, 9.
18 Lantto 2003, 5.
19 See, for example, Brysk 2000, x; Smith 2001, 12-14.
20 One exception is an article by Bård A. Berg where, while disengaging from the demands of objectivity and practising outspoken post-colonial and emancipational methods, he studies reindeer herding in Finnmark with the desire to research subjects “relevant to the interests of my people”. Yet Berg appreciates the inevitable differences in interests within the Sami community. The main result is an absence of the alleged “tragedy of commons” and of blame for the Norwegian intervention into the pastures. Berg 1996, 71 et passim.
21 Kalela 2000, 58.
Theoretically, and more crucially, the problems are concerned with a disbelief in the possibility of objectivity in the study of history. In the history of minorities, the problematics of objectivity are two-fold: firstly, there is the problem of the power of definition, which will be dealt with briefly here. The second problem, that of cultural blindness – whether a historian from one (“dominating”) society can understand the culture of another (“colonized”) society – is bypassed here by ruling Sami culture out of the research focus.

The problem of the power of definition (as a misuse of “objectivity”) is most evident if the researcher chooses to look into the “authenticity” of the self-representation, understood here as its correspondence with historical reality and ethnic/cultural essence. To renounce all correspondence would also be an authoritative act and one based on current, dominant “Western” epistemological thinking. Epistemologically, if one practises extreme forms of constructivism, the question appears uninteresting, but the cultural boundness of this ambivalence and the marginalizing effect on post-colonial inquiries should be noted. If one allows a compromising premise that self-representations are strategic tools in ethnopolitics, and that because of their political nature they have a varying degree of correspondence to reality, the problem would be solved. Even though self-representations do not need to have a correspondence with reality, they (or rather the individuals/politicians drafting self-representations) have the aim of constituting reality by claiming status and agency.

Further pitfalls exist in “strategic essentializations”, which are defined critically by Said as an act where the real behaviour of the subject is reduced down and back to a small number of explanatory “original” categories. Sami researchers have also expressed doubts about the representativeness of the “natural people” imagery. As a non-indigenous researcher, I need to avoid essentializing remarks on the Sami on the following grounds: uttered by the non-indigenous researcher, they reproduce colonial power structures and tend to amount to a scientifically invalid and impossible summarization of a whole group of people. In addition, texts and sources do not offer insight into any “authentic” identity of the group or individual, but they are starting-points in perceiving different contexts where identities are constructed and representations acquire meanings. Accordingly, Sami ethnicity

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22 Compare Thuen 1995, 221.
23 On the discussion on strategic essentializations and denouncing them as invalid in a post-colonial study of history, see Berg 2004, 4, 7-10; on criticism of “synchronic essentialism” and its static nature and weak correspondence to reality, see Said 1995, 234-240 quotation, p. 234; on criticism on the “oversimplifying pre-political singular categories” that essentializations employ, see Somers and Gibson 1994, 40.
25 Alasuutari 1996, 34.
and ethnic identity, as well as the methods of “ethnosciences” aiming to understand these phenomena from an “emic” position, are marked off from the research focus.  

A more pragmatic and political critique of essentializations may also be voiced. In some cases, the Sami are represented as agents of sustainable resource use in an essentializing way, for example because of the traditional, tacit knowledge that indigenous peoples possess. From an ethnopolitical perspective these kinds of statements are problematical, in the sense that such essentializations are easy to denounce in the dominant anti-essentializing paradigm and thus they are not very efficient in claims for access to resource management, which are another systematic feature in the studies made from a post-colonial, indigenous perspective.

At the most rudimentary level, the problem of lesser objectivity is bypassed by avoiding moral judgements and presenting all the actors in the cultural contact/political process as active agents who jointly determine the outcome. Thus the traditional, “colonial” perspective of indigenous people as “people without history”, and as mere objects of Western colonization, could be bypassed. The question of whether the indigenous voice has really been integrated into historical accounts is irrelevant in this case, given the position that the Sami have in the research plan and the number of sources produced by the Sami in the most recent era. Obviously, my position hinders me from writing a pure, post-colonial history from an “emic”, insider’s viewpoint, but as a citizen of Finland, which practises minority politics towards the group I am studying, I am not an “outsider” either.

The legitimation for my position may be justified in many ways. One could deny the post-colonial indigenous monopoly of the history of the minorities by referring to the long tradition of studies of history carried out on foreign cultures. As the problems of knowledge production embedded in this tradition are one of the key arguments for the indigenous study

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26 Sami culture and ethnicity are in any case widely researched: see on the Northern Sami yoik tradition, Järvinen 1999, passim, and for the most recent ethnographic overview of the material Sami culture, see Lehtola T. 2001, passim; for a study on Sami ethnicity, see Pääkkönen 1995, passim. On methods and problems of ethnosciences, see Huuskonen 2004, 92-95 and Morantz 1998, 59-73.
28 This paradigm, for example in academic anthropology, is sometimes very normative, where the New Social Movements (NSMs) are considered “good”, and nationalism, racism and essentialism as part of the “redneck local” discourse. The same good/bad dichotomy is used in national/post-national dichotomies, in which the latter equals heterogenous, chooseable identities and individualism. Anti-essentialists also sometimes create the false premise of state and local boundedness being static states of being, which is an act of essentialization on the part of the researcher. Friedman 2002, 24-25, 29; Friedman 2004, 193, 195.
29 Lindgren 2000, 82; Lindgren is relying on a discussion of the term “outsider” by Vidgis Stordahl in her thesis: indeed, the division of “us and them” has became too sharp in the globalized conditions of constant cultural borrowing. Stordahl 1996, 13-17.
of history, that argument is not sufficient. It would be just as problematical to cast the traditional blame on the researchers of Sami origin for being purely subjective30. I do question the wisdom of closing off one branch of studies from a distinct group of people, and consequently from new impulses and inter-disciplinary discussion: it violates the principles of the openness of scientific research. My project may be justified by the expertise and education I have received31, as well as by my command of the Finnish language in which most of the sources are written. I present a new perspective on the theme by using an internationally inaccessible set of sources.

Patrik Lantto, identifying himself as a member of the majority researching Sami history, has resolved the problem of his situatedness by practising two “virtues”: that of humbleness and that of letting the Sami, the research object, become a research subject and, in a controlled manner, guide the formulation of the research questions. By “humbleness”, Lantto, with reference to Rangvald Kallaberg, signifies an understanding of his own restrictions and the adoption of an open attitude, eager to learn from different scientific milieux and different political cultures, and respecting the asymmetrical political space where Sami ethnopolitics is practised. Furthermore, Lantto is sensitive about letting the Sami have their say on Sami issues, choosing not to pursue some imaginary singular Sami opinion, but letting the Sami opinions be raised in the scope of his enquiry and dealt with using the same scientific vigour as that applied to other opinions.32

Lantto does not problematize the demands of objectivity itself, which is a culturally-bound claim and term33. The demands of objectivity can reduce the historian’s purpose to mere ulterior motives that influence the work of the historian in an uncontrolled manner. If one follows the old Rankean rule of “turning oneself down”, one risks becoming culturally blind: In other words, the demands of objectivity can result in not analysing one’s own cultural boundedness. The historian is both an individual and a product of the history and society in which he/she lives. A critical historian must be able to conduct a self-analysis in this light, trying to see the boundaries and connections that he/she consciously or unconsciously possesses.34 In the case of Finland and myself, I need to exercise care in not reproducing an unproblematized image of Finland as a Western democracy with lesser minority problems after the resolution of the status of the Swedish-speaking minority, which

31 Gaski L. 2000, 22.
34 Kalela 2000, 86.
was integrated into Finnish society\textsuperscript{35}. This problem may be avoided by re-evaluating the whole concept and task of the historian. Paul Ricoeur writes about how history as a construction means that the work of the historian is essentially one of reconstruction, and that the goal can thus be only to “do justice” to the people and phenomena of the past that are the object of the study. This is, according to Jorma Kalela, an ethical starting-point for the historian. From an epistemological point of view, a mere construction of events, carried out “objectively”, is not sufficient, and thus the aim of historian must be “reduced” to “fair description”\textsuperscript{36}.

A combination of these three strategies – pursuing humbleness, letting the subjects of discussion have their say and, by careful contextualization, trying to “make justice” for the historical actors – forms the “ethnohistorical” research policy I shall practise. The aim is to appreciate the epistemological cliff and avoid patronizing advice, ethnocentric misunderstandings and crude essentializing identifications of the Sami and Sami culture,\textsuperscript{37} but instead write out a history, previously only marginally studied, that has a value in itself. Just as anthropologists have to be aware of their role as reproducers of cultural representations,\textsuperscript{38} I need, in addition, to be cautious about reproducing political agencies. To put it another way, the aim here is mellowed down to charting the history of the production of a Sami agency in a Finnish political context.

The academic culture and science itself, which are cultural discourses, are far from free of problems of cultural blindness and in-built power relations.\textsuperscript{39} The professional culture and branch of study within which I have mostly worked is Finnish history. The metanarrative\textsuperscript{40}, which has been widely cultivated, is one of a “success story”, from poverty to well-off welfare state. The metanarrative, having the same narrative structure as the early modernization theories, has only been questioned quite recently by historians in Finland, for example because of the world-record rupture onto a recession in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{41} This problem is minor, since the theoretical frame used in this thesis problematizes the metanarrative.

\textsuperscript{36} Kalela 2000, 55, citing Paul Ricoeur.
\textsuperscript{37} Compare Kalleberg 2002, 151-152.
\textsuperscript{38} Ruotsala 2002, 61.
\textsuperscript{39} Brah and Coombes 2000, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{40} Metanarrative is a “grand narrative”, which individuals can attach to and make sense of history. Metanarratives are built through dichotomizations such as capitalism vs. communism or nature vs. society. Tuulentie 2001, 104.
\textsuperscript{41} Latest example: Kalela 2005a, 16, where the rise of “Nokia Finland” to the group of the richest countries of the world and simultaneous coming about of the safe welfare society is mentioned as a dry fact; an example of the questioning of the metanarrative is Massa 1994, 271, where Massa presents a new counter-narrative to the old dominant “from rags to riches” narrative. Massa views the history of Finland as a development from
Some Sami historians in Finland and elsewhere have challenged this metanarrative and claim that the history of the Sami is one of cultural and economic colonization and colonialism. The question has been debated, but the will to accommodate other cultures under the cognitive parameters of Western cultures, ranging from paternalism to imperialism, has only recently been problematized by Western societies. Whilst acknowledging the formal colonial traits in Finnish settlement history, I shall not take the metanarrative as a starting-point for this study. However, a critical light is shed on the use and politicization of the settlement history and rhetoric of colonization.

One problem remains: how to handle the task of the applicability of research in the social sciences, offering points of view on the discussion of the social ills in the Sami community. In the 1970s in Norway, when the field of Sami history was highly politicized, Alf Isak Keskiitalo set the task of Sami history “not reconstructing, but constructing”. Just as “Sami historical consciousness” is not linear, but “a symbiosis of the future, the present and the past”, so the task for the study of history and knowledge production must be a formation of “a foundation of the future” for the Sami. Keskiitalo criticizes the “Sami sympathizers” in their quest for the most suitable strategies for the Sami. At worst, research carried through by the majority can have a disturbing effect on indigenous policy formation.

I cannot pretend that I can fulfil such demands and categorizations. The problem could be resolved by stating that, traditionally, the potential for applicability in history sciences has been perceived as weak. However, this challenge has been taken up in new oppositional histories, in environmental history and in Sami history. I have to agree with the post-ecological economy to Raubwirtschaft, plunder economy, especially when it came to the use and management of natural resources. The new metanarrative is inspired by the environmentally-enlightened perspective practised by Massa.

Claims are made by, for example, Hirvonen 1999, 37-38; Harle and Moisio 2000, 107, 118-135; Helander and Kailo 1999, 17; Helander 2000, 178; Kuokkanen 1999, 97; Lantto 2003, 8-11; Lehtola 1996, 70-71; Lehtola 2000c, 213; Nickul 1970, 196-198; Otnes 1970, 17-29; Seurujärvi-Kari 1994, passim; Sillanpää 2002, 83. Matti Enbuske rejects the Sami accusation that the earlier settlement qualifies as colonization, because of the gradualness and slowness of the process. There was no sharp or disruptive colonization, but a process of erosion. Enbuske 2003a, 53; later on, Veli-Pekka Lehtola also highlighted the erosion of rights. Lehtola 2002a, 189; Jouko Vahtola problematizes the colonization from the point of view of state investment in Lapland. Vahtola 1991a, passim.

In Norway, the reception of colonialistic history has been reluctant. Gaarder 2004, 7-8; Thuen 1995, 12.


On Sami history’s task of producing empiric, factual historical knowledge concerning the relationship between the state and the Sami, see Pedersen 2006, 33-34; in the case of environmental history, see Crosby 1999, 13, and Myllyntaus and Saikkku 1999, 18; on scepticism, for example on possible solutions to ecological problems, see
colonialists on this point: in the post-colonial age, such a task would be patronizing and I have selected a less radical and non-normative goal for this study. Tove Bull, a professor in Nordic languages and literature, has formulated the term Sami research as “research that expands knowledge about the Sami and of the Sami societies”. This neutral (if there is such a thing) and descriptive definition avoids the normative and “applicable” approaches and is followed in this study. This study is carried through outside the Sami cultural sphere, but within and, as far as possible, under the premises, expectations and practices of the academic cultural sphere, where freedom of research is one prevailing principle. If anything, this study has its place in internal discussion within the discipline.

1.3. Some theoretical key concepts
1.3.1. Identity as construction and the discursive contestation of self-representations

In this section, I shall examine the newly-emerged interest in the study of the construction of identities in history, i.e. the constructivist, post-structuralist challenge and the criticism this challenge has recently encountered, and my own theoretical starting-points. I shall not participate in a discussion on the problems of constructivism or the discourse analysis at length, but I shall outline the emerging caution with regard to “uncritical constructivism”, as well as the disappearance of the historical actor under the omnipotent discourse. An alternative, mediating theoretical starting-point is also outlined.

The post-structuralist, constructivist approach and the blooming anti-essentialist attitude to identity, with its notions of constructed identities, has established itself firmly in academic disciplines. Old Hegelian, analytical concepts such as nation, national culture and the nation-state have been abandoned as too exhaustive, and replaced by concepts such as region, locality, tradition, culture and identity. Constructivists have criticized the traditional notion of identity as a ready, permanent and stable entity with an essential and authentic core. There was a “real” identity hidden in the consciousness of the personality of the individual, and this real identity was hostile to everything strange and to elements representing some “Other”. The notion of fixed identities offered legitimacy in separating, for example, the

Rossi 1996, 167, 169; the work of Elina Helander is consistent in its demand for the respect and application of traditional knowledge. This notion has been questioned from many angles. On scepticism concerning the applicability of traditional knowledge in solving the ecological crisis caused by the society at large, see Nils-Aslak Valkeapää to Elina Helander in Helander and Kailo 1999, 122-123.

Finnish identity from the Sami. Later on, in the social sciences, identity was formed and shared in accordance with class, nationality or belonging to an ethnic group. Identity was the sum total of the different roles an individual has to adopt in different positions in society, such as those of family member or colleague, and was formed by encountering, or in relation to, other groups.\(^{50}\)

After the post-structuralist turn, and as post-modern relativity gained ground, both the subject and society were set in motion. Identity was beginning to be perceived as fragmented. Constructivists believe that identity is an ongoing process, where the identity is constantly reproduced and constructed. The construction of meaning is achieved via a cultural attribute, hereafter referred to as a cultural marker,\(^{51}\) or a set of these, which are accorded different weight in different contexts. Identities may be multiple and contradictory, actualized depending on the context and on individual choice. There are no culturally unconditioned, totally chooseable identities. Cultural identities are historical but, like any historical phenomenon, identities are in motion: not allocated by a shared history or a cultural heritage, but in the re-telling of the past. Stuart Hall writes:

> Far from being grounded in a mere ‘recovery’ of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past.\(^{52}\)

The meanings are allocated and the identities are constructed within the representational system. Representations of the identities do not reflect the world as such but are given meaning as the representations are “unfolding in the verbal signs” (Foucault), thus becoming a discourse. The (self)-representations are, rather, active and influential mediators in the process of forming notions of ourselves and the world. Representations as cultural texts reproduce notions of the self, society and reality at the same time as they discursively restrict other ways of representing the identity.\(^{53}\) In accordance with the emerging fluidity in identity

\(^{50}\) Hall 1998, 223; Hall 1999, 22; Høgmo 1986, 12; Lehtola 1997a, 22-23; Räsänen 1989, 11.

\(^{51}\) Markers signifies chosen hallmarks from cultural traits, which are meant to identify objects or, as here, identities. After the process of choosing and identifying them, these processual traits (such as, for example, reindeer herding) evolve into “emblems”, which are culturized and politicized special signs of an identity. Hovland 2000, 155-156.

\(^{52}\) Hall 1998, 225.

construction, this study relies on the communication theory of culture, where the models of thought, habits and experiences that people share are what make communication possible. As identities, culture is formed dynamically and can be changed. The model is future-oriented, is based on situation-specific checks and can be transmitted.54

Discourse refers to the complex practices of conceptualizing reality as a mode of speaking. Discourses do not merely identify objects; they constitute them, which in turn moulds the discourse itself. In this study, representations are seen as normative descriptions of the desired state of being, through which the collective action or policy is produced. It is then a question of which mode of speaking is distinguished as the legitimate one and which one gets pushed to the margins (for example, referring to scientific official/legitimate knowledge as a “norm”, over local, particular knowledge). In this case, the Sami self-representations are negotiated against concurring self-identifications in a political process, and finally set against the representations of the majority, in an effort to block them out. The element of power is there as the chosen self-representation, in a chosen tactical discourse (of indigenousness, for example) that challenges the dominant discourse (that of equality, for example) by trying to reformulate the field of statements. For Foucault, power is both constraining and enabling, since power is relational and implies resistance. Power is enabling, since it offers room for new potential responses, reactions, inventions and strategies. Power is constraining in its normalizing capacity, blocking new modes of subjectivity and creating privileged and marginalized subject positions. When a new self-representation starts to gain recognition from different actors it becomes part of the social reality, through its acquired status and the practical consequences of the implementation of this status. The new self-representation moulds both the reality and the construction of the discursive system in which the action takes place. Discourse is a resource and context for the intentional action of a group, but also an outcome of the intention.55

This theoretical starting-point has two consequences for this study. Firstly, the relational nature of power means that there is the potential for both empowerment and subjugation in projects of governmentality (not counting the most violent forms of subjugation). As a consequence, reducing the Sami history to a narrative of colonization or empowering globalization grasps only one aspect of the historical process. This aspect is further elaborated in the chapter on globalization theories. Secondly, the dialectical nature between speech/discourse and reality restores the agency of the historical actor. The discourse

54 On theories of culture see, for example, Eriksen 1997c, 56-57; Friedman 1994, passim.
is not omnipotent and it does not overwhelm the historical actor. This study is written at a time when prevailing constructivism has encountered some criticism. Michel Foucault has been criticized for setting the actors under impersonal structural power, legitimized from below, which cannot be challenged under conditions in which each discourse produces its own “truth”. Because of this, there is no truth and only the possibility of moving on from one system to another, from one truth to another. The consequent war, both between individuals and between the individual and the omnipotent modern state, is a meaningless one, since there is no “truth” to be grasped. Furthermore, in a Foucauldian universe the struggle lacks logic, as Foucault bypasses the conscious, intentional and purposeful action of the individual in the process. For Foucault, this “death of the subject” contains the notion that human action receives its meaning only in given practices and institutions.\textsuperscript{56} At worst, and as a consequence, research raising language and discourse to an autonym lacks individual actors. The text produces not only the universe but also its writer – or writes itself, as Bruno Latour sarcastically writes. In addition, scientific objects circulate as subjects, objects and discourses.\textsuperscript{57} In his later work, Foucault came to recognize the role of the inner intention of the actor – some kind of inner mindscape might exist, and be constitutive as well, since there is a dialectic relationship between subjective and objective truth.\textsuperscript{58}

One point of the criticism is the underlying, non-rationalistic element of constructivism. The notion of fragmented identity, the fact that identity is in a constant state of instability (as opposed to being a consistent, or homogenous identity) denies the rationality of the individual, while taking away the possibility of conscious choice and action in shifting contexts. Paradoxically, the aspect of free choice in the identity construction process has also been criticized: the social frames more or less guide the process. Whether this process is one of linguistic and discursive reflection or a process of mute social structures with unconscious effect is a matter for discussion. The agent has disappeared under the omnipresent social institutions and discourses. Furthermore, the subjects are perceived as homogenous under an identity concept. A compromise is emerging: both free linguistic reflection and conditioning social structures are constitutive to the identity.\textsuperscript{59} The criticism goes to the core of the question of free will: structures vs. individual choice. Discourses and language have become, according to some critics, a ruling, “self-motored” force in history that takes away the

\textsuperscript{56} Taylor 2002, 288-297.
\textsuperscript{57} Latour 1996, 83-86, 88.
\textsuperscript{58} Länsman 2004, 27.
\textsuperscript{59} Bugge 2002, 136, 141-143; Stråth 2000, 23.
intentionality of the historical actor\textsuperscript{60} by perceiving individuals as driven, unconsciously and emotionally, by social and cultural forces.

When it comes to the methodology of history, the problem with explaining through language or cultural formulae is their monocausality, which, according to historian Juha Siltala, explains everything and yet nothing. There is no room for research if the theories are left to do the explaining\textsuperscript{61}. Siltala drafts a “compromise”, a “real constructivist” model, where history is seen as an open process in which different factors are allowed to have their own time-space and the outcome of the process is not pre-destined. This model allows the individual intentional action and political initiative: to be a potent actor. This brings non-linear features to the model, offering more freedom in the pursuit of explanation.\textsuperscript{62}

In order to sustain the possibility of intentional actors and of understanding the social conditions in the constitution of identities, a mediating theoretical and ontological starting-point has to be established. The constructivist starting-point, according to which social reality is constructed in social practices through the actors, is acceptable. To avoid the muting effect of discursive monocausality, the ontology of the “modest constructivism” offers potential. Modest constructivists renounce the most extreme ontological consequences and the overarching premise of the textuality of the linguistic turn and admit that there is an objective reality, which affects human society. However, the perception and interpretation of this reality is a complex act and there is considerable room for cultural and social variation in the interpretation. The social condition has its foundation in practice, but arises, is constructed and also changed in the communication between people. Discourses are here taken to be historical and ideological.\textsuperscript{63} they are not impersonal forces, but are initiated by historical actors. They can, however, have unexpected or non-existent practical consequences.

Identities are socially constructed as processes, but they are also embedded in, and interact with, historically specific social contexts composed of inter-subjective meaning systems, practices, institutional structures and material conditions. A subject chooses, or

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{60} Jørgensen 2001, 66.
\bibitem{61} The discourse analysis theorists are aware of this. See Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 5. When applying discourse theory to empirical cases, theorists are concerned to prevent the subsumption of each empirical case under its own abstract theoretical concepts and logics. “In other words, instead of applying a pre-existing theory on to a set of empirical objects, discourse theorists seek to \textit{articulate} their concepts in each particular enactment of concrete research.” The condition for this concept of conducting is that the concepts and logics of the theoretical framework must be sufficiently ‘open’ and flexible to be adopted, deformed and transformed in the process of application. Without this openness, there would be no possibility of developing the research organically. When used wrongly, discourse theory becomes a monocausal theoretical frame, like the essentialist theory of culture and reductionist theories of society.
\bibitem{62} Siltala 2001, 130.
\end{thebibliography}
practises, different identities in different situations and in relation to other identities. In addition, as Trond Thuen writes, a-historical, non-contextual view would hamper an understanding of the structural constraints of interpersonal (and inter-institutional) interaction. Thus, the study of identities must be historical, contextual and dynamic, asking not only how the identities are located in time and space, but also how they are (re)produced, resisted and reconfigured. Identifications bridge agency and structure, are multiple and sometimes contradictory, and may be understood as strategies. As Stuart Hall writes:

Cultural identities are the points of identification … which are made, within the discourses of history and culture. Not an essence, but a *positioning*. Hence, there is always a politics of identity, politics of position, which has no absolute guarantee in an unproblematic, transcendental ‘Law of origin’.

The change in these self-identifications may be explained by changes in the discursive field or by changes in different contexts, as in a new situation, when the need for a re-evaluation of the position and representation occurs.

It is a question of who gets to speak legitimately about the Sami identity: the difference between subjugated and normalized knowledge, attempts to portray “emic” knowledge as the “truth” and attempts to take charge of the power of definition. It is important to see who gets to speak and who gets to present representations.

Methodologically, it is not just the emergence of a new group of actors that is interesting; the social background of these representors and activists also has to be drafted. However, in this respect, the restrictions of the post-colonial situation are greatest: for political reasons and those of research ethics, the scope of inquiry is limited into political, public activities, which have been researched through public sources. Proper life histories à la Said are not written out, but the focus is most consistently on the place of origin, the occupation/education and the ethnopolitical activity of the actors. Obviously, the self-identification of ethnicity is a key factor and starting-point, but the private sphere of the actors is not intruded upon in this study.

At this point I should like to make a further point concerning the choice of actors. The decision to concentrate on the identity politics of the Sami has been made in order to not to reduce them to the position of victims of hegemonic minority policies and discourses.

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65 Hall 1998, 226.
Pursuing the theme from the more traditional point of view of analysing institutions and power relations would, if undertaken one-sidedly, have the same muting effect on the Sami agency. One would risk losing the Sami agency to an administrative silence and to procedures. A more open perspective on Sami ethno-politics and a wider choice of venues where it was practised needs to be made, in my view, in order to capture the Sami side of the matter successfully.

1.3.2. Ethnic identity and identity politics

Current research on ethnicity is vast, and here the focus is not so much on the discussion on ethnicity, rather than my own use of the term. In French, the word *ethnie* signifies an ethnic community with a common myth of origin, history, culture and territorial belonging. Two schools of thought may be detected in theories of ethnicity. Primordialists, who are blamed for static concepts and cultural determinism, link the ethnicity of the person to the origin and background of this person. It is an inborn and unchangeable part of a person’s identity. Instrumentalists renounce the historical and cultural explanation of ethnicity. Ethnicity is chooseable and obtains its meanings through political processes. Getting back to the aspects that bind the ethnic group together, the instrumentalist school offers greater sensitivity in doing research on creating and reproducing these common denominators. However, I find the extreme instrumentalist formulation unusable. Even though ethnicity is a construction, and indeed can be used as a strategy, it must contain something other than politics to be binding and legitimizing: theorists are once again starting to acknowledge the significance of the shared cultural background in creating ethnic communities.

I use the terms “ethnicity” and “ethnic identity” not as a product of significational processes, but as processes of identification in the competing discourses. Hence I use the term “ethnic identity” (which is a process), rather than “ethnicity” (as an end state). The production of cultural and ethnic identity is an argumental process of identification, linked to political and territorial loyalties, which sets the limits for the minority articulation of ethnic identity. The articulation is based not only on a recognition of the differences between the minority and the majority, but also on a deliberate attempt by the ethnic elite to launch a mobilizing ethnic identity. These elites operate at supra-local and intercommunal levels and have

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connections at a national level. The elite tries to incorporate the ethnic identity-building process at a local level, as well as negotiating the stereotypical imagery held by the public. Ethnic identities are reproduced in negotiation, in a social process, and thus are neither exhaustively based on biology nor totally chooseable. They are products of power, of hegemonic processes of articulation and are reproduced in discourses of power. Linked problematics in the process usually employ land rights issues, resource management, constructing historical continuity for the group, and geo-politics. In the same manner as cultural identity, ethnic identity is political identity and a weapon in the hands of a people lacking other kinds of power – electoral, economic and military.  

Ethnopolitics is usually understood as a process constructing a “simplified” (Anttonen) and homogenized collective identity in order to gain the greatest possible “coverage” at a grass-roots level. It is also been seen as a “modern” phenomenon, when it comes to the prerequisities that the actors must possess (e.g. literacy) and those concerning the political forums (especially concerning the institutional setting in the literary and political public sphere). Ethnopolitics is presented by Trond Thuen as not only a bargaining process with governmental authorities, but also a process of “changing the conditions framing the expression of a Saami identity”. The collective rights are, according to Ulf Mörkenstam, impossible to legitimate without a distinct concept of the group: The concept of the group is also a factor in defining the possible political options. The constitution of identities entails the creation of social power relations, which are in turn institutionalized by assigning special rights to the group.

Identity politics is more of a closed term and part of ethnopolitics. The identifications and self-representations are mobilized in the context of identity politics, which has been described as an assertion of a “sense of self”, privately and publicly. For Pratibha Parmar, identity politics is an assertion of the individual and collective identity, a self-conscious form of organization based on the political analysis of economic, social and cultural oppression. The struggle is based on the notion of shared subjectivity (separating it from mere individual ‘lifestyle politics’ employing cultural emblems and politicizing regions that were not traditionally political) and on objective common factors “out there”, such as racism and 

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70 Anttonen 1999, 398-399.
71 Thuen 2002, 284.
73 Länsman 2004, 18.
other kinds of oppression.\textsuperscript{74} Alison Brysk defines the term more strictly in the context of ethnic conflicts, which have become defensive responses to globalizing pressures. She defines the term as domestic and a transnational group mobilization based on ascriptive characteristics and “imagined communities”. In identity politics, the identity claims are increasingly voiced in global and transnational arenas, while disparate actors seek to frame their identities as “tribal” or indigenous.\textsuperscript{75} Thomas Hylland Eriksen defines the term as political projects that are founded on a shared identity, not on abstract ideologies,\textsuperscript{76} and launched in order to gain legitimitization and recognition as an ethnic group\textsuperscript{77}. When the oppressed represent elements of the self that are considered ‘other’ by the dominant, majority systems of representation, there occurs an act of reclamation, empowerment and self-identification.\textsuperscript{78} To concretize a little, identity politics entails a break from class-based redistribution and equalization politics. New factors for political mobilization have been found.\textsuperscript{79}

In addition to being part of the ethnopolitical space, identity politics take place and are studied here as a part of the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit, offentlighet, julkisuus). Public sphere signifies, in this study, the sphere of society in which the formation of opinions and an exchange of views takes place. Usually the public sphere is literary, as in this study, due to the choice of press sources, while I choose to use the term “public sphere” because the sphere studied here includes the ethnopolitical sphere as well. In Finland, an expansion and democratization of the public sphere has taken place from the nineteenth century onwards in the way that a larger number of people have gained access to an expanding amount of printed material (books, periodicals, press) circulating in the public sphere. These developments, the pluralization and the changes in political premises of the public sphere in Lapland (and, to a smaller degree, that of Finland as well) is one of the central themes of this study.\textsuperscript{80} These developments, as well as those in the ethnopolitical space (and, to a smaller degree, that of minority politics in Finland as well), are followed throughout this study. One central aspect of the study, especially on the Sami actor side, is who gets to be a sender,\textsuperscript{81} and how and to what extent they manage to change the public sphere and the political space.

\textsuperscript{74} Parmar 1998, 106-107.
\textsuperscript{75} Brysk 2000, 17.
\textsuperscript{76} Eriksen 1997b, 47.
\textsuperscript{77} Tuulentie 2003b, 74.
\textsuperscript{78} Parmar 1996, 116.
\textsuperscript{79} Hvinden 2002, 136.
\textsuperscript{80} Compare Ryymin 2003, 22-23; the term Öffentlichkeit originates from Jürgen Habermas, \textit{Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchung zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft} (Luchterhand, 1962).
\textsuperscript{81} Ryymin 2003, 33.
In studies carried out on ethnic issues at the University of Tromsø, Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth is one of the most widely-cited theorists. In the meeting of different ethnic groups, Barth highlights the boundary maintenance and the structuring of the interaction, which permits the persistence of cultural differences. His theory is based on a fairly old, role-based notion of identity, but he acknowledges the socio-cultural change within the ethnic boundaries.\textsuperscript{82} The model of Barth is suitable for modern periods, when ethnic boundaries were more rigid. In post-modern times, when there is more scope to borrow from other cultures and global trends, and homogenization is taken as constitutive to the ethnic group, as is ethnic fragmentation in intra-ethnic identity negotiations, the model of Barth is not so useful. It grasps only the defensive cultural measures of the indigenous group. I am practising a more open analysis of the Sami identity negotiation, with the premise that the cultural meeting in local societies is dynamic and goes through many phases, in which the “minority” could find itself in a numerical majority position and where minority cultural markers, such as language, are dominant. The cultural contact does not happen under equal conditions, but it can be one of equals. In local societies, the exchange between cultures is not a one-way exchange, but reciprocal.\textsuperscript{83} The process of constructing a collective identity is one of integration, as well as the exclusion of cultural markers offered by the majority imagery and local culture. A simultaneous act of creating similarities and differences occurs.\textsuperscript{84} In Harald Eidheim’s terms, contrasting, dichotomizing identities that maintain the ethnic boundaries are constructed simultaneously with complementary identities, which both maintain boundaries and enable actors to borrow “foreign” markers. The above-mentioned strategies offer the opportunity to experience both opposition and equality towards the majority.\textsuperscript{85}

1.3.3. From modernization to globalization – the possibilities offered by globalization theories

In the next two sections I shall discuss a set of theories to be used in the study. The focus is on formation, content and the usability of globalization theories. What is meant by globalization(s)? What kind of change does it entail for the identity politics of the “subaltern”

\textsuperscript{82} Barth (1969) 1994, 10, 14, 17, 21, 24-26, 35-36, 38; Tuulentie 2003b, 73-74.
\textsuperscript{83} Liebkind 1995, 40-41; Niemi 2004, 92-93, 100-101, 116-117.
\textsuperscript{84} Kramvig 2002, 125-126.
groups and the political space in which the state and the minorities find themselves? Are globalization theories at all usable in historical inquiry?

When viewed in the continuum of modernization theories building on rigid dichotomies (primitive-modern, etc.), globalization theories provide a greater sense of fluidity. Alongside changes in the notion of territoriality, there is a greater caution displayed towards the traditional notion of modernization being a change from the traditional to the modern through industrialization, urbanization, commodification, rationalization, differentiation, bureaucratization, the expansion of the division of labour, the growth of individualism and state formation processes. Another traditional notion that is questioned in globalization theories is that these Western signs of modernity had a universalizing force and Western history was a universal world history. Modernization equalled development, which by an inner logic in history, or a directional impetus, led to a good society.

Modernization theorists have not been capable of deciding whether modernization boosts or hinders the rise of ethnic-based identities. The theorists have been blamed for being paternalistic in their use of the popular Western imagery of indigenous peoples as victims of “development” and in need of protection, as well as making proclamations of cultural diversity. In addition, the imagery used, of passive victims living at one with nature and beset by unwelcome modernity, is misleading as a general account of the practices and aspirations of many of the groups participating in the indigenous peoples’ movement. Most of these groups are active agents and practitioners of “development” and “conservation”, and they vary considerably in their practices and attitudes relating to resource management.

Whereas in modernization theories the world is perceived as partitioned, globalization theories highlight the integration and interdependency of the world as the very process at the heart of globalization(s). Nor is industrialization any longer the key to what is “modern”. A new phase in the industrial revolution has shifted the focus to banking, information

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86 One version of this list: Heiskala 1993, 42-44.
87 Featherstone 1993, 170-171; Roberts and Hite 2000, 8-11.
88 Kingsbury 1998, 440; with regard to colonialism and the history of indigenous people after contact, see Morantz 1998, 72, et passim; Tuulentie 2001, 65; modernization theories have subsequently undergone a revision. Instead of one homogenizing, universal modernization, there are numerous asynchronized modernizations going on in different spheres and at different levels. The constellation of these levels and dimensions makes each modernizing society unique. The asynchronicity is particularly highlighted in the reception of modernization, where there are numerous choices in the direction from which and the pace at which traditional society receives and develops modernization impulses. Tjelmeland 1995, 10; see also Latour (1991) 1996, 59-60, where Latour discusses modernity as not the only possible existing force in society, “med myndighet å representere, akserlere og resymere” (“with the authority to represent, accelerate and summarize”). Tradition was a constitutive factor in the process of modernization in some cases, where “modern” and “pre-modern” features existed side by side, as in Inari.
technology, etc. Globalization theories take the post-modern epistemological and normative challenge seriously by admitting “failures” in the “development” process. The process is not led by growing Western rationality, and this is not the only goal for the rest of the world. Modernization theories do not offer tools for understanding non-state actors, whereas the new forms of organization are widely studied by globalization theorists.89

Daniele Conversi has referred to globalization studies as a “… gray, undefined, and chaotic area … where the very word ‘globalization’ still lacks a minimum standard of clarity and definition.”90 Ian Clark writes: “About all that can be said with confidence about globalization is that it represents a major site of contestation.”91 This has led scholars to doubt the usability of the term as a theoretical concept. For an unusable concept, however, globalization has been used extremely widely. The term enjoys a high profile and is used in many meanings and contexts. What theorists seem to agree on is that globalization is multi-dimensional, diversified by its very nature and there is no single globalization, but many ongoing ones. In everyday use, globalization usually refers to economic globalization, in the sense of emerging interdependent and homogenizing global markets, but the process has social and cultural effects, which co-exist and interact with the economic sphere.92

What is characteristic of globalization, and bestows legitimation in referring to it, is the abolition of restrictions set by place, location and distance in communication. One cliché concerning globalization is that “world has in many ways became a single place”. The connections have grown in number and are almost instantaneous: for those who have access to the new information technology, that is. On a socio-political level, globalization has resulted in the proliferation and growth of transnational corporations, associations and regulatory agencies, such as global companies, global civil societies and global regimes.93 The Sami belong to a minority of the world population living in (more or less) open societies with access to, and a readiness and willingness to adopt, the new communications system offered by new information technology. In addition, they have been able to launch educated activists.94

Although globalization and post-modernity (a term often paired with globalization) are problematical and certainly do not provide an exhaustive description of the era in which we live, there is unanimity of thought that there are certain truly global phenomena, most notably

89 Roberts and Hite 2000, 16-21.
91 Clark 1999, 33.
92 Clark 1999, 33-36.
93 Scholte 1996, 45-46.
in the economic sphere, and a global, cosmopolitan elite that provide legitimacy for using the term. Furthermore, globalization may be viewed as a discursive system, which is used to legitimate and/or label certain things as positive or negative – thus, talk of globalization moulds the social reality in which we live, for example through legislation. On the other hand, the usability of globalization theories is greater in the post-modern era than the old modernization theories, thanks to a greater awareness of the genuine unpredictability of this still-ongoing process. The aim of this study is not to see what globalization is, although I use the term globalization critically as an inductive generalization with reference to the processes of change in society.95

Theoretical writing on globalization is so extensive that three emerging schools may be identified. Conservatives deny the trend, and prefer to speak of modernization instead. Liberals celebrate its presumed fruits and often have a neo-liberalist ideological background96. The liberal vein in globalization studies has been criticized as unproblematising and too positive with regard to this phenomenon. In the third vein, critics decry the alleged disempowering effects of globalization. Conservatives and liberals represent orthodox views, whereas the critical view emphasises both the importance and the dangers of globalization, and points to the need for reflective knowledge in conjunction with political mobilization.97

Because of globalization, the state, which many globalists wish to renounce, has entered the same state of fluidity, in the same manner as identities. The identities, in turn, are constructed at all levels, also increasingly with reference to the “universal”, or global. Both the state and the new globally-organized communities have embarked on the shared process of re-identification, which is one of interaction and redefinition, not one of exclusion.98 In practice, this means that globalized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have established

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96 On the liberal school, see, for example, Aghion and Williamson 2000, 107. Jeffrey G. Williamson’s theory of convergence is largely discussed by economic historians. Williamson states that through the rise of the Atlantic Economy, those countries that first experienced industrialization and are now members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have entered a phase of slower growth. Convergence signifies the process by which poorer countries grew faster than richer countries and by which the economic distance between these countries was eroded, if not totally eliminated.
97 The literature on globalization critique and the alternatives provided is also extensive. The genre is varied in its organizational background, scientific clarity and openness concerning political intention. One of the most translated is “The Post-Corporate World” by former researcher David C. Korten, who “was converted” and became a globalization critic. The work qualifies as semi-scientific: the book has a scientific starting-point in his criticism of reductionism, but it advocates matters with no scientific foundation, such as alternative medicine. Korten 1999, 13-15 et passim; on the categorization of genres, see Scholte 1996, 43-44, 52.
alternative networks of communication\textsuperscript{99}, and in stating their claims and protests they can and do bypass the political state bodies to communicate directly with transnational and international bodies, such as corporations and the UN Human Rights Council.\textsuperscript{100}

In spite of numerous disputes within the theoretical discussion, globalizations are seen as a series of processes that have set in motion old traditional dichotomies such as subject/object, public/private, political/economic and domestic/international. Post-modern veins of thought, sub-national and transnational political identification and local/national/global links all challenge the role of the static nation-state-based spatiality. Globalization has significantly challenged dominant conceptions of political time and space. Decreasing territorialization, or the diminishing political significance of traditional territorial divisions, is one common point of emphasis for theorists. The (patronizing) monopoly on security offered by the state has been challenged and its freedom of action and autonomy in the spheres of economy, politics, law and defence is increasingly limited in a globalizing world. More cautious theorists are not ready to state “the end of geography”, or a total disconnection of politics and territory: some forms of international relations are still firmly rooted in (state) territory. When it comes to the politics of identification, the Eurocentric model of the modern subject – as unitary, autonomous, interest-maximizing and rational – is replaced by a variety of new possible identities, organized, for example, in virtual non-space. Sub-national and transnational social movements break territorial boundaries in favour of identities ‘grounded’ in ecological, anti-nuclear, ethnic, feminist, religious, and other non-state-based commitments. Supranational forces alter state power and sub-national conflicts expose the illusion of homogeneity promoted in nationalist narratives.\textsuperscript{101} Indeed, globalization theories build on the growing post-modern sense of fraction, the diminishing power of mass organizations and the decreasingly legitimizing power of the grand narratives (of progress and the national “common good”), since objective knowledge, by its disappearance, has out-dated the national rationale.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{99} Neumann 2002, 167.
\textsuperscript{100} Alasuutari and Ruuska 1999, 177-180; Niezen 2000, 135.
\textsuperscript{102} Lyotard 1985, 7-10; in the case of Finland, see Virtanen 1994, 63-64.
1.3.4. Building indigenousness on a global scale

The indigenous communities and globalization constitute quite a large sub-category in the theoretical discussion among globalization theorists. The question at the heart of the genre is the interaction between the local indigenous community and globalization: is it one of the destruction of indigenous lifeworlds, or can globalization be used to reinvigorate declining indigenous identities? The one-sided analysis, where indigenous communities and contact (or collision) with globalized economic intervention is perceived as hostile and destructive, is now disappearing. These old interpretations relied on an essentializing notion of an unchanging ethnic, indigenous identity, which was perceived positively in the contrasting light of the ‘evils’ of modernization, capitalism and Westernization. The studies take their starting-point in risk society and centre/periphery theories, which have a critical perspective on modernization and globalization, amplifying the economical, social, cultural and ecological risks. The key concepts are erosion, dependency and colonial relationships.

Another possible new narrative is that of indigenous peoples breaking away from the futile effort of advocating indigenous issues in a national frame and entering the field of internationalized indigenous politics. This is presented in research as a liberating and empowering experience, with some justification. In Norwegian research on Sami history, the strengthening Sami identity through their participation in the indigenous peoples’ movement has been celebrated in this way. From the Alta dispute onwards, a partially successful use of the global rights discourse in landownership cases is evident. The state autonomy of law has been challenged by global trends. I do not take this standpoint as a starting-point in my thesis. My aim is to understand and explain why the Finnish Sami experience does not fit this pattern.

The analysis has acquired a new dimension. The potentially destructive aspect of contact is still appreciated, but so is the potential for indigenous initiative and strategic choice within the process. The mobilization and the localization response of the tribal or indigenous

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103 This dichotomy neglects local actors other than the indigenous. However, the nationalistic, regional or local – and often chauvinistic – counter-reaction has been explained with regard to globalization, and how it brings different groups of people closer to each other. Eriksen 1997a, 19; on the positive side, the globalization process may be viewed as a moral homogenization, where no nation, facing the challenge of universal rights stated in various statements of human rights, may remain culturally self-contained and isolated. The nation-state is also rendered obsolete as a moral unit. Parekh 2000, 8.


105 Case studies on Lapland and the Sami, practising notions of the destructiveness of modernization in the peripheries: Helander 1996, 1 et passim.

communities to the marginalization processes, which are often connected with globalization, are studied with a new sensitivity and often with an interdisciplinary approach. There is evidence of both violent collision and the successful use of global organizations and communication, but in recent globalization research these tendencies co-exist: there is a dialectic of continuous globalization and localization, as well as heterogenization and homogenization. There are a series of more or less local identity-building processes, borrowing from different contexts and constructing a sense of awareness of the speciality of the place in question. Methodologically, no unified theory is sufficient to grasp the multiplicity of indigenous reaction; a contextual, historical and socio-cultural analysis is required. Furthermore, there is a need to link the levels of analysis, ranging from local to global, in a study of indigenous communities’ self-conscious cultural self-identifications.

One of the numerous paradoxes of globalization is that the new social movements (NSMs), such as the indigenous peoples’ movement, not only question globalization but also contribute to it in providing a new strategy for survival for the oppressed by trading across borders. The homogenous and convergent aspects of globalization are resisted, whereas means and markers of globalization such as global communications are used. Many globalization theorists appear to be uncritically positive concerning the possibilities offered by globalization to indigenous peoples. The lessons provided by the neo-realist school on the growing role and authority of state actors in international relations and the poor results obtained by NGOs to date should be kept in mind. In spite of this, when it comes to identity politics, theories open up possibilities for understanding new forms of Sami organization and the nature of the new political forums that the Sami have entered. Furthermore, the tension between the global and the national makes the case in hand more exciting: how have the spatially different modes of political actions been tackled by the Sami? The way the state has framed the histories and experiences of the Sami within different “national” histories is one

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108 Anttonen 1996, 30-31; Boroujerdi, referring to modernization in the Third World, denies the possibility of “nativism” or the revitalization of indigenous cultural customs or belief values as a viable solution for marginalized societies. He also concludes that particularism, as a response to the universalizing tendencies within Western social sciences, cannot accomplish this, or at least only in an intolerant and arbitrary fashion. Boroujerdi 2002, 41, 45-46; Eidheim 1992, 2-3.
110 Kingsbury 1998, 421.
111 Osherenko 1993, 55-57.
consequence of the still-potent force of the state. Thus, in the modern era, the Sami histories must be studied in their national contexts.\textsuperscript{112}

Globalization, in spite of its shortcomings in explaining allegedly over-arching global macro-processes, offers greater potential for studying identity-building in the post-modern age. As Jonathan Friedman has stated, globalization cannot successfully be taken as a description or theoretical perspective of the contemporary world. Globalization is the expression of a positional identity within the global system, which offers more space and freedom for cosmopolitanization, and for truly global elites to shop around for identities.\textsuperscript{113}

With regard to the older theories on global forces and indigenous peoples, globalization theories offer the potential for a more flexible analysis. Globalization theories handle changes in the nature of relationships, although the unequal terms in the exposure of the margins to the global economy are appreciable. Some forms of globalization are selective in their integrative grip, not over-arching, re-structuring forces on a global scale, and there is room for local intention. It is relevant to the case in hand that globalization offers openings for actors not fully subsumed under nationhood in its modern conception. First Nation people, indigenous people, come into this category.\textsuperscript{114}

The Sami mobilization, or the disputes over resource management, did not originate from globalization as such and cannot be explained causally by globalization.\textsuperscript{115} In spite of the global actors involved and the claims made in the global arenas, a single forest dispute is not in itself a global matter. Furthermore, globalization is too broad a term. Too many attempts have been made to link conflicting groups with contradictory goals, and varying ideological backgrounds and logic with globalization. This is not possible, due to the multiplicity of globalizations themselves. “Global” refers to the mode of action, to the strategy obtained, where the actors aim their grievances at political institutions other than traditional ones and/or state their grievances with reference to international conventions and principles. As Sidney Tarrow points out, globalization has the secondary effect of facilitating the formation of international regimes and these regimes offer a more observable process than the master process of globalization itself.\textsuperscript{116} However, the globalization of the process itself

\textsuperscript{112} Another way would be to study the Sami as “one people”, from a pan-Sami perspective. Länsman 2004, 15; Seurujärvi-Kari 1996, 173.
\textsuperscript{113} Friedman 2003.
\textsuperscript{114} Grant and Short 2002, 194-196; Sassen 2002, 15; Koivumaa 2003, 166.
\textsuperscript{115} There are numerous studies establishing a direct connection between local mobilization and the global indigenous movement. This connection, which evidently exists, has become a catchword in studies where the possible dysfunctionality of this connection, inbuilt and created, is not recognized. See, for example, Anttonen 1999, 41, 128.
\textsuperscript{116} Nieminen 2003, 176; Tarrow 2002, 233-234, 236; Valkonen 2003, 159-160.
may be studied: how, when and why were the global arenas entered and global discourses obtained, and how successful were they when applied?

Not surprisingly, theorists do not agree on whether the NSMs or the NGOs representing indigenous peoples, either globally or on a trans-border basis, are a viable alternative to territorialist and statist approaches to social integration. New forms of socio-political organization have been perceived as a somewhat dysfunctional solution.\(^{117}\) Traditionally, the question of ethnicity and the nation-state has been seen as a question of reinventing ethnicity, so that states have been “forced” to respect multiculturalism and rising ethnic “imagined communities”.\(^{118}\) In this study, the focus is on the Sami process of establishing the imagined community, using global discourses and reinventing their ethnic identity. The globalization theories are used to understand the (dys-)function of global discourses, identity markers and categories in local and national discourses. The physical, natural and social environments are organized at a local, national and, indeed, global level as arenas for global discourse and choices. In times of conflict, the globalization aspect actualizes in quite a concrete way, as representations adopted from global forums or international conventions are launched in national disputes, which the state would prefer to reduce to regional or local issues\(^ {119}\). Hence, the forest disputes offer a good opportunity of looking at the clash or co-operation of operationalized collective identities. The growing notion that the (nation-)state is diminishing in significance, becoming a demonized source of essentialisms, nationalism and racism, even unsuitable – at least in itself – for providing democracy or answering to the challenges set by globalized, transnational actors\(^ {120}\) is not, however, taken as a starting-point in this study: I belong to the sceptics in this sense. The state, as we shall see, is still a potent actor with a set of restricting/empowering tools in use.

During my period of inquiry (1945-1990), the Sami movement went through various changes in terms of activated generations and institutional forms. The ethnic awakening has been defined as a process of inventing ethnic selfhood by contrasting it with the majority identities. The new, positive Sami identity has been further contested, constantly renegotiated in local discourse and communicated in the national discourse. Borrowing elements and status from global discourses has become a celebrated motif in studies of indigenous ethnicity. In

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\(^{117}\) Scholte 2000, 227-229.

\(^{118}\) Benedict Anderson devised this term, which is widely misused and, on occasion, misunderstood literally as a social organization “existing only in the imagination”. Perhaps another term used by Anderson, “a community imaginable”, constructed and invented in print and shared by other people, conveys the idea better. Anderson 1991, 42-44; Featherstone 1993, 181-182.

\(^{119}\) Tuulentie 2001, 53-54.
Norwegian studies, the ethnic awakening is seen as a process of inventing and communicating a more positive self-image and Sameness after a long period of assimilation due to the Norwegianization policy.\textsuperscript{121} I would argue that in case of the “Finnish” process of ethnic mobilization/awakening, such a starting-point is valid only with reservations. Thus, the concepts of the “Sami movement” and “ethnic awakening” and “ethnic mobilization” must be left open. These, and their “Finnish peculiarity”, are defined in the course of this study. Theoretically, and keeping the ontological starting-point in mind, I study the Sami movement as a “reconstructive” movement. This perspective views indigenous groups as culturally (and in many instances geographically) distinct and as sharing a number of cultural markers, which can be used to make acts of self-representation. The aim of this “ethnic reorganization” is to “reconstruct”, to “reclaim” the position in socio-economic/political arenas of the nation-state that have undergone similar processes of nation-building. The model also presupposes that there have been forced and externally-imposed aspects of ethnicity and ethnic change, to which the movement reacts. There is no stable social unit reflecting the primordial set of cultural markers, but changing conditions in which the very idea of ethnic identity is developed. The identity has changed character and outlook during history, partly due to the changing social purposes that the identity is supposed to serve.\textsuperscript{122}

The aim of this study is to see how the people, the Sami, have entered, activated, adopted, applied, used, reacted to, assessed, reconsidered and revised global modes and arenas of action. When did the global option arise? When was it adopted? What motivated this decision? Was the introduction of global discourses at a national level successful?

1.4. Method

I shall be studying the ethnic identifications, representations of ethnic identity and the construction of collective Sami identities on the part of the Sami movement in the Finnish public sphere using historical discourse analysis, concentrating on the continuity and change in the discourses and self-representations. This is a study of politics and language, but the language and representations are not merely used, constructed and reproduced in the cold, lonesome void of the linguistically constructed universe. As in political discourse analysis,

\textsuperscript{120} Castells 1998, 11; ethnification and ethnic movements can be sources of the same evils for which the modern state has been blamed, see Friedman 2004, 181, 187; Scholte 2000, 266.
\textsuperscript{121} Eidheim 1992, 1-7.
language is here taken to be an instrument of power, control and inequality, a way of constituting status and roles on which people base their claims to exercise power; a “reality-creating social practice”,123 but not the only form of social action. Since I am not making the premise of complete textuality there must, accordingly, be other forms of social ordering, legislation, governmental and institutional authority, practices, procedures and actions.124 The institutional, national and political settings and contexts offer frames for what is sensible and strategically wise, and a pragmatic choice of words. Therefore contextualization, which is the second method practised in this study, is needed in order to understand why different actors employ different possibilities of defining reality.125

The potential for the contextualization of the constitution and the production of meanings and identities are limitless. They can be achieved within the local, national, transnational and global spheres, as well as using political, economic, cultural and historical imaginations.126 Fredrik Barth has presented a widely-used three-tier analysis to study the ethnic processes, which occur in a complex interaction between the micro (local), mediating (ethnic elites) and macro (state) levels. My analysis concentrates on the mediating level, where the ethic elite operates, and negotiates the collective, sometimes aggressive, but in any case simplified and somewhat homogenized identities/identifications, contesting them with the local (micro) and national (macro) levels. In this study, references are made to the micro level only when sources permit this. At a micro-level the markers and identities can be chosen more flexibly (“both/and” identities, in contrast to “either/or” identities) and they sometimes challenge the ethnic identities and the alleged “will of the people” constructed by the ethnic elite. The national level is studied as a “testing-ground” for the identities launched by the Sami elite, but light is also shed on the unique possibilities the state has as an actor in creating ethnic categories.127 The global level is studied as a source of markers and a new political forum for the Sami movement. Its limiting power in relation to the state is also a matter of concern.

The third method used to point out the speciality of “Finnish” developments in Sami history is a comparison over time and space, in synchronic and diachronic contexts, looking at

126 Anttonen 1996, 32.
the change and continuity of self-representations. Comparison in space, seeking both similarities and differences between the Sami history in Northern Norway and in Finland (with some references to Sweden), has been carried out to identify research problems (heuristic use) and explain the mobilization (analytical use of comparative method). The focus is mostly on the differences, offering tools to find out the special features in the main object of the study, the process that took place on Finnish soil. A criticism of previous explanations, especially the colonialism paradigm, is undertaken through comparison.128

When it comes to the use of theories in historical inquiry, globalization has sometimes been understood as a faceless, impersonal force that, as a reductionist sole motor for change in history, has destroyed the basis for livelihood of the indigenous people. This globalist position is not the starting-point in this study. What is noticeable in globalization theories in general is that they do not describe a state of things, not to mention an order of things, but are blurred and often contradictory in their quest to describe the many parallel, simultaneous and still-ongoing globalization processes129. When it comes to applying these theories, this limits their usability in explaining the Sami mobilization itself (as if it were a global phenomenon): where the globalization theories are usable, in addition to raising new research problems, is in an understanding of the frames, conditions and new organization of the Sami mobilization. The success of the application of spatially differently-organized discourses can be also studied within the frames offered by these theories.130

The text analysis has been picked up from Edward W. Said, who used the terms “strategic location”, to signify the author’s position in a text with regard to the material he/she is writing about, and “strategic formation”, which is a way of analyzing the relationship between these texts. The first methodological tool is the more usable. Writing, or creating self-representations, is perceived as a strategy, where the writer locates him/herself to the object. When transferring the object into a text, what kinds of narratives, imagery and motifs does he/she use? What is the self-representation that is offered to the reader? This is carried out within cultural, textual and, indeed, political discourses, reflecting them and recreating and reconstructing them with regard to numerous possible audiences. “The ensemble of relationships between works, audiences” (Said) and the object of self-representation is an analysable formation or process.131

129 Clark 1999, 41-44; Scholte 1996, 47.
The variables that I am looking for are the qualifiers, or definitions, that place the Sami in the social field (as a tribe, minority, people, indigenous people) and in the economic/ecological field (the extent to which the means of living practised by these people are ecologically sustainable). In the case of self-representations, it is more fruitful to look at the positions, contexts and groups in which the Sami as a group are placed. On many occasions, the most forthright self-representations qualifying the Sami are unusable. Pekka Lukkari, for example, characterized the Sami as “short-tempered and rude”. Here, rather than trying to dig out meanings in the self-representation itself, it is more useful to try to observe the position of the self-representation in inter-ethnic hierarchies between the Sami Friends and the Sami activists, which were handled by the latter. Lukkari described the work of the SfPLC\(^\text{132}\) as groundbreaking and reported the genuine respect that the work of the SfPLC enjoyed, for example in saving the Sami language, whereas the “short-tempered and rude” Sami had failed to do this. In the same letter, Lukkari made a third self-representation, the traditional representation of a people under hardship, which gives more to grasp, since it positions the Sami with regard to the unfinished Finnish economical modernization.\(^\text{133}\)

The constructivist and discursive approaches constitute a larger frame of inquiry, and provide a theoretical base for understanding the formation of identity in history. The construction of collective identities and the act of self-representation are perceived as discursive acts of power. Contextualization is another method, carried out in order to understand the hierarchical setting of power in which the discussion of identity politics and the construction of identities took place. The economic and political modernization, in relation to which the Sami identity was constructed, forms the contextual background for the study in itself. The actors of the study, the Sami activists in Finland, are studied as intentional individuals, reflecting their surroundings as active creators of representations.

Henry Minde has written that the existence of such an ethnic category as the Sami could actually be questioned, since the group referred to lacks a shared ethnonym (compare “a Lapp”, “Lapp”, “Finn”, “lappalainen”) or a shared language understood by all its members. However, it may safely be said that there has been a distinct group calling themselves Sápmelaš (with its etymological root in an age-old Finno-Ugric word\(^\text{134}\)) and categorized as

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\(^{132}\) The Society for the Promotion of Lappish Culture (Lapin Sivistysseura), est. 1937.

\(^{133}\) KA, AKN, file 3, correspondence 1945, Pekka Lukkari to Karl Nickul 24.1.1947.

\(^{134}\) Lehtola 2005c, 320; see also Aikio, Brenna, Gjerde, Helander, Niemi and Aarseth 1990, 16, where the ethnonym Sápmelaš, used by the Sami of themselves, is mentioned as known by other groups from the Middle Ages onwards.
different from the majority population. Given my theoretical starting-point, there is no need for me to label “the Sami” or “Sápmelaš” as a mere ethnopoliical innovation, or as a tool in constructing ethnicity and/or claiming rights. Indigenous communities and ethnic groups do actually in many cases have a detectable historical continuity, even though their status may vary in the course of history. The changing statuses are conditioned by colonization and the history of the modern state.

It may, however, be noted that the ethnonym Sápmelaš is not all-inclusive either and that there have been other possibilities of identification as well, such as kin and village of origin. In addition, in the newly-emerged challenge set by different identity movements (especially in Enontekiö), this concept and category has been contested. This was not the case during the period of enquiry that I am researching. At a local and national level, in spite of fluctuating ethnic borders, it was known who was a Sami, and identifying oneself as a Sami was more or less possible, depending more on access to the media than on the stigmatization of this ethnicity. In choosing my actors, I am letting the Sami themselves carry out the ethnic identification. Self-identification is confirmed by the Sami community by their inclusion in activist organizations/institutions. My use of the ethnonym is legitimate with regard to the era prior to the dispute concerning access to the electoral register in the Sami Parliament elections.

1.5. Earlier research

The Sami have been widely studied as a group. The way in which the Sami have tired of being researched and interpreted research as a colonialistic act on the part of the majority

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136 Friedman 2004, 184-186.
137 The identity movement that conquered the old ethnonym “Lapp” enjoyed very low legitimacy by the time of its emergence into the public sphere during the 1990s. The group, mostly concentrated in the municipality of Enontekiö, had a partial background in the old, assimilated settlement in the area, which practised a combined subsistence and, on many occasions, reindeer herding. The organized “Lapp” associations took part in heated disputes over Sami legislation during the mid-1990s, in which the first-corner status of the Sami was denied and Sami identity and the alleged economic gain attached to this identity was claimed. This “in between” group, of whom by no means all belong to the organization, is usually labelled as Finnish, but many of them can point to Forest Sami ancestors. Many inhabitants of the area practise means of living that do not differ from those of the Sami. This group varies in its aims and identifications and can often claim both Finnish and Sami ethnic identities. These people have been denied access to the electoral register of the Sami Delegation, since they do not fulfil the Sami legislation criteria. Lehtola 2005a, 147-151; Ruotsala 2002, 382-384; Stoor 1999, 72-76.
society is well-recorded. On the other hand, scientific research focusing on Sami history, rather than on a majority aspect of the history of the Sami domiciles, is rare.

In the historiography of Finland, neglecting the Sami history has its roots in the nationalistic nation-building project. To begin with, the Sami were set outside the sphere of the Finns on the basis of their separate history in the Fennoman nation-building project during the nineteenth century. The philosophical foundation was the Hegelian notion of the nation being a precondition for national history, whereas a people without a nation formation had only a prehistory. Hence, the Sami were regarded as a people without a culture or a history. The Sami had a place within a new science, ethnography, which sometimes adopted a racial view of the Sami. Väinö Tanner and his study of the Skolt Sami (1929) should be mentioned as an exceptional early attempt to study the Skolt Sami rationality, history and culture, as well portraying their society as developing and non-static, rather than condemning them to a low position in the racial hierarchies. In most ethnographical studies, however, the notion of a people in danger of extinction was entertained: the Sami were regarded as a people in a process of disappearing, or being assimilated, unable to resist the development and the superior peasant society of the Finns. The result was a series of studies on “Lappology”, with the ethnological overview of the material Sami culture “Suomen Lappalaiset vuoteen 1945 1-2” (1948) by T. I. Itkonen as the most prominent example. Lappologists were criticized early on by the Sami themselves. In retrospect, Itkonen was criticized for studying the Sami as a primitive society that was being acculturated and assimilated, as well as providing an inventory of natural resources and efforts to integrate the people into the nation-state.

As a discipline in its own right, the history of the Sami emerged during the 1970s in the Universities of Oulu, Umeå and Tromsø. The Finnish focus has mostly been on the Crown policies, taxation and settlement history of the Lappmarks during the Swedish era, studied using traditional historical sources and methods. The Sami history in Finland was mostly studied by the Finns and the post-colonial edge was non-existent in the studies pursuant to objective knowledge of the settlement history of the region. The role reserved for the Sami in

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138 On constant research and subjugation to the level of a research object as a cause for uncertainty and sense of inferiority, see Saamelaiskomitean mietintö, 1973:46, Liite: Tutkimusraportit, 318; on the case of the Skolt Sami, see Ingold 1976, 11; Järvinen 1999, 214; on asking who benefits from the research on the Sami and recording one occasion where the Skolt Sami Sobbar refused to assist yet another research programme, see Sabmelaš 2/1975, Dukit duktet – geasa ävki?
139 Aikio 1998, 8.
140 A name given by contemporaries to the Finnish nationalist movement.
141 On criticism concerning the antiquarian imagery of a non-evolving people and the consequences this kind of imagery had on the Sami policy, see Sara, Isko: Aate ja ihminen, Kaltio 4/1966.
theses narratives was that of indigenous people ceding to settlement pressure as the wild deer population decreased, to assimilate or make way for the “Finns”, an interpretation questioned in later research. The Sami were sometimes represented as the underdog in court procedures.143

In Norway, there have been references to an academic post-colonial movement, sometimes part of the Sami ethnopolitical mobilization, which raised marginalized groups as subjects/actors in their own history. The first period of Norwegian Sami history collided with the anchoring of social sciences and social anthropology in the academic field. Social sciences provided methods and theories, as well as researchers on Sami history.144 In Finland, *The Lapps in Finland* (1977) by Pekka Aikio and Eino Siuruainen has been regarded as the first work belonging to this genre (the work is used as a source in Chapter 7.3.4.). However, the sociological research project led by Erkki Asp, which mostly relied on statistical approaches, was methodologically closer to the social sciences. Asp discovered both the increasing “tribal” orientation and the acculturating intention within the Sami community, and the consequences of his thesis are studied in the chapters that follow. This new phase of scientification did not always mean putting aside the traditionalistic attitude towards the Sami with regard to the modern. As with Norway, the Skolt Sami in Finland, especially, have served as highly exotic cases for anthropologists to study concerning the modernization impact on local societies.145

In Finland, the Sami history written by outsiders has increasingly studied the Sami history from a Sami perspective; the thesis of Kaisa Korpiaakko is the most prominent example of this. She has a “programme” of placing the Sami as intentional actors in history. In the Korpiaakko-Labba case, the Sami are actors as landowners, defending their lands like any other landowner and breaking down the myth of the Sami not being capable of owning the land. I do not have the competence to discuss the theses of Korpiaakko-Labba, but it should be mentioned that although her arguments have been recently met with criticism146, the

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143 Vahtola 1991b, passim; Vahtola 1991c, passim; Virrankoski 1985, passim; The media has been eager to construct “natural” connections to the national history through links with the contemporary situation, and explanations concerning movement on the part of different Finnish tribes. This pursuit diminished the cool “objectivity” of the research and simplified the history of the ethnicities of Lapland. Lapin Kansa 4.6.1976, Muinaisuuden tutkimus Lapissa vasta aluillaan; Lapin Kansa 10.10.1976, Kemijärvi ja Kittilä suomalaisasutuksen kärrjessä 1600-luvulla; Pohjolan Sanomat 10.10.1976, Lapin historiassa riittää tutkimista.


use of her work in the rights struggle of the Sami has been extensive, making her one of the most influential researchers in Sami history in Finland. This is the focus on her thesis in this study.

The Sami activists themselves had a clear programme of writing against the Lappologists’ views, although they shared the image of the Sami being victims overrun by the majority population. The activists introduced the notion of Sami history as a history of conflict and one-sided oppression. The work of Samuli Aikio falls into this category. His studies, first distributed as the handout Sami id historja (1980) are a radical re-reading of the Lappologists’ work. Aikio depicts the Sami as active actors consciously maintaining the social balance of the Sami society.¹⁴⁷ In his main work, Olbmot ovdal min (1992), Aikio has toned down the rhetoric of oppression somewhat, but undertakes a comparison of state politics in an inter-Nordic context and a discussion of Sami modernization and mobilization. The work has the clear task of raising the historical consciousness of the Sami people, representing the correct historical image from an emic point of view and writing the national history of the Sami. Aikio goes beyond identity building: he states that history itself gives people their identity through the images of the people produced by historians. The work ends with the demand that promises of special rights, made in the committee reports, be fulfilled. With regard to my work, there is no overlap: Olbmot ovdal min has been supplemented by two short overviews of Sami history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹⁴⁸ The work is of value both as a source of information and as a source of Sami intellectual history. The first perspective on this book is undertaken here.

Some sections of the Sami researcher community, though not including any historians, have utilized post-colonial theories in studying the Sami. In Finland, Elina Helander is the most consistent post-colonially-oriented Sami researcher. The research tradition may be criticized for oversimplifying the Sami/modernization relationship and for essentializing the implications of both actors: the “Western” and the indigenous. The Sami identity explicit in these studies is the indigenous people as agents of sustainable development practising a warm relationship with nature and (the remnants of) their traditional way of life.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ I have not managed to get hold of the aforementioned handout. Lehtola 2005b, 90-91.
¹⁴⁸ Aikio 1982, 43; Aikio 1992, passim.
¹⁴⁹ Helander 1999, passim, is a good example of “writing back” and reconquering the Sami regions through research. See also Helander 2004, 90-93; in studies of nature conservation and Sami culture, the representation mentioned has significant consequences in viewing conservation and other local actors as colonizers. See, for example, Torp 2001, 100-104.
There are not many historians working on Sami history in the same period of focus as mine. Professor Veli-Pekka Lehtola has on many occasions dealt with the Sami history in Inari, as well as Sami political history, and his work is dealt with here as a corpus and from a point of view of the kind of theories that Lehtola cultivates of the indigenous encounter with modernization; this is because of the inspiration his perspective has provided to the study in hand. Lehtola is an advocate of reciprocity, or crossroads theories, which provide a more nuanced picture of the interaction between modernization and the indigenous peoples. Just as ethnographers perceived modernization as degenerative to the Sami and to ethnicity in general, the new vein, inspired by social anthropology, looks at cultural activism and collaboration. The northern region becomes an area not of conquering and colonization, but of meeting, exchange, reciprocity and mutual contacts, although mostly culturally. When it comes to the representations of the Sami, they evolve from being recipients or “accommodators” to actors in the exchanges. The research process becomes more open as the actors seek their own roots in a new light and disengage from the majority perspective and metanarratives.

Modernization has two sides, integrating and empowering. It introduced to the public sector new channels of influence, political parties and national movements, one of which, according to Lehtola, was Sami activism. Methodologically, in contrast to post-colonial interpretations – the nineteenth century being a period of racism and social Darwinism, for example – Lehtola presents the opportunity of studying Sami strategies for normalizing the most disruptive situations and living their daily life. To the representation of the accommodating Sami Lehtola adds the capability of changing and transforming their culture. The newly-published local history of Inari is a manifestation of this new perspective regarding the Sami initiative (another manifestation made by the book is one of settlement history: Inari is presented as a land originally occupied by the Aanaar Sami.)


150 There has been a relatively wide interest in various aspects of earlier Sami history among historians (Aslak Aikio, Ritva Kylli, Seija Nahkiaisoja and Anu Vahtola) at the University of Oulu.
151 See, for example, Lehtola 1994b, passim; Lehtola 2000b, passim; Lehtola 2000d, passim; Lehtola 2003, passim; the latest and most eloquent, Lehtola 2005a, passim.
152 Connor 1994, 28-39; on the “crossroads” perspective on the northern regions and the history of Sami, see Lehtola 2000a, passim; Lehtola 2002a, 184-185; the representation of the Sami living between cultures and between tradition and modernity is canonized in Lehtola 2002b, 9-10 et passim; Lehtola 2005a, 94; on reciprocity theories and methodological grip, see Nordin 2002, 23-29.
153 Lindgren 2000, 71.
154 Another example of emphasizing the encounter, interaction and Sami agency in history, Kylli 2005, 21, 27 et passim; Lehtola 2002a, 192-193; Lehtola (ed.) 2003, passim.
of view of environmental history, focusing on forestry and conservation issues. This study belonged to the pre-linguistic turn of research: the focus was on the ideological background, argumentation and ecological consequences of the forestry projects in Inari. Greater emphasis was laid on the role of Forest and Park Service, while the Sami reception of and participation in the project of mobilizing the forest resources in Inari was also illustrated. The reasons for the Sami disengaging themselves from this national project were to be found in the fragmented ideological atmosphere, in the new issues that the Sami movement itself took up before the disputes, and in the crisis in the use of natural resources in Inari. In addition, the democratization of Forest and Park Service, the fact that the institution entered the disputes, was a cause of prolonged disputes. The archival sources used in the licentiate study were produced mainly by the Finnish actors; the situation in the work in hand is different, although the same kind of criticism may be posed on this occasion as well: now it is the majority that does not get to have its full say through primary sources. A thorough, scientific study on Finnish Sami policy in the twentieth century is in fact missing to this day. A study of Sami identity politics that has a long historical perspective and systematic use of sources is also lacking. In addition to this, my contribution lies in the fresh perspective and new questions posed to the sources, as well as the focus on the interplay of the global indigenous movement and the national perception of the indigenous claimant, a theme that has not been studied using a longer historical perspective.

1.6. A specification of the research problem

The case of Inari provides the possibility of studying the ethnopoltical mobilization and the identity politics, as well as the construction of the collective identity, of a “hybridized”

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155 Historians have studied the majority policies of earlier periods, but the 1930s is also a blank spot in Sami history in Finland. Korpiaakko-Labba 2000, passim; Kylli 2005, passim; Lehtola 2005a covers the institutional political history of the Sami; Tuulentie 2001 is an in-depth analysis of the increasingly hostile discourses on the Sami rights in the 1990s.

156 Hybridization is a catchword in post-modern theory and writings on culture, which tend to deconstruct the grand narratives and grand dichotomies (traditional/modern, global/local) as well. Post-colonialists have pointed to the strategy of finding “in between”, hybrid spaces that can be an empowering experience to the subaltern people. The term has its roots in the racial mixing (mestizaje in Spanish) that occurred in the colonized world, but has been expanded to cover cultural, political and economic mixing. Hybridity has not totally disengaged from the notion of the racial foundation of cultures, so the term is not used as a central analytical tool in this study. Aboul-Ela 2004, passim; Brah and Coombes 2000, 12-13; on hybridization relying on the “Western” observer, rather than the “hybridized” native, see Friedman 2002, 23-24; on creolization, a “true blending” of cultures, and mestization, rejecting the indigenous culture, see Wright 1992, 157-158.
indigenous people, who were 1) partly modernized, at least economically, and politically in the sense that a multiplicity of voices was gaining ground and being heard, 2) partly integrated into the majority society and its modes of production, and citizens of a Nordic welfare state, and 3) already supranationally organized (in inter-Nordic organizations) in a social and political sense. With such a background, what could be utilized from global discourses? For example, was the self-representation of indigenous peoples as agents for sustainable development mobilized in identity politics disputes?

I shall study the main theme of my thesis, the formation and outlook of Sami identity politics, with the question of how and against whom the ethnic boundaries were built among the Sami elite in Finland. Which representational strategies and identity markers were used/activated as symbols in the identity politics? By whom was this done and for what purpose? Which strategies and markers were abandoned? Why was this? Which statuses were claimed? Which contextual/national factors influenced Sami identity politics? An international comparison is made to the Sami movement in Norway.

In what follows I present a number of sub-questions, which are used to address the main problem.

In the first, supranational phase of the Sami movement (from 1945 to c. 1965):

- How were the Sami represented by the activists? What kind of Sami was mobilized?
- What were inherent characteristics of the first phase of the mobilization?
- Which external, contextual factors guided the construction of Sami identities, and how? How was the national modernization perceived?

In the era of the radicalized Sami movement (c. 1965-1973):

- How did the self-representations of the collective Sami identity change? What were the reasons behind these changes?
- What kind of influence did the generational change in the Sami movement have on the identity politics?

In the era of institutionalized and internationalized Sami politics (1973-1990):

- What was the impact of the institutionalization of the Sami movement on the identity politics?
- How were global discourses applied in official Sami politics? What about in unofficial politics?
- How successful were the policies resulting from these two traits in the first test-case, the Kessi forest dispute?
1.7. Sources

In the histories of minorities sources are not usually plentiful, but are produced orally and conveyed in memory. As I have already explained, the sources used in this study are different: they are produced in “modern time” and they are written sources. The source material is divided into two main groups, the archives of formal and informal Sami bodies and press material. The archives of the informal body, Samii Litto (SL), constitute the main source material before the era of institutionalized Sami politics. The archival source apparatus does not cover the whole period of inquiry:

I did not obtain a response to my inquiries for access to the archive of Johti Sabmelažžat. This gap in the archive material has been filled using material I found in the archive of the SfPLC, as well as the archive of Karl Nickul, located in the National Archives of Finland. The archive of the Sami Delegation in Finland provides the main source material in the thesis for the period after institutionalization. Here I was refused access to the correspondence, due to ongoing work in writing the history of the Sami Delegation. This constituted only a minor set-back, since the history of the Sami Diggi itself is not the focus, but rather the public activities and the identity politics practised by this body. The archival sources are used to discover the processes of negotiating self-representations, the representational strategies and the contesting representations. The limitations of the source group are most evident here: they shed light on the elite processes and politics. Their representativeness concerning other parts of the Sami community is weak. If I had chosen to focus more closely on grass-roots notions, the correspondence would have been a valuable source (and a more serious loss concerning this work).

Press material is a natural, yet problematic source for the study of identity politics. The press is used in three ways: as a source of historical information, as a political tool in Sami ethnopolitics and as a forum for building and contesting possible Sami collective identities, as well as building Sami communion. *Lapin Kansa* and *Sabmelaš* are both products and creators of the politico-cultural space in which they operate. These are complex arenas, amplifying the claims of other actors in their favour and launching projects of their own: *Lapin Kansa*, especially, promoted a variety of undertakings in the context of Lapland and there are clear

157 See, for example, Pentikäinen 1995a, 33.
tensions between the construction of national, provincial and various local identities, as well as Sami fellowship and identity. In *Lapin Kansa*, it seems that the greatest tension was between the national and the ethnopolitical.\footnote{Heikkilä 2004, 143; Tjelmeland 2003, 157-158, 161, 163, 172.}

Methodologically, some forms of political discourse analysis have built-in sharp expectations of racism and class distinction. Discourses are seen exclusively as a site of struggle. The language has been divided between executions of power and their “necessary antithesis, solidarity”.\footnote{Quotation from Fowler 1980, 66; Seidel 1980, 44, 55.} This is, I would argue, too simplistic in the case of the press sources I have chosen to use. As we shall see, these strategies – expressions of power and solidarity – are occasionally practised by the same actor. By not acknowledging this, the theories/methods are indeed allowed to manipulate and distort the image of the history conveyed in the sources.

The press is mostly used as an arena for contesting representations of Sami identity. When it comes to self-representations, the exogenously-produced *Lapin Kansa* is problematical: who actually represents who when the self-representation is printed in the newspaper? How authentic is the voice of the representative? Has the content and meaning of the self-representation changed underway? This problem also relates to the counter-imagery voiced by the majority, although *Lapin Kansa* is a primary source for the counter-imagery and categorizations of the Sami. These are questions that may be partly resolved by thorough source criticism, by referring to rare presentations of journalistic principles in *Lapin Kansa* and by comparing different sources. The most traditional and crucial question concerning press material is how the different contexts and different time-worlds of the sender and the receiver (the reader) change the meaning of the self-representation. I shall not aim to solve this problem. The reception of different self-representations may be grasped to some extent from the same source-group in the rare contemporaneous debates.\footnote{Ryymin 2003, 30-31.}

Published in Rovaniemi, *Lapin Kansa* was a newspaper of the Agrarian Union (Maalaisliitto) from its establishment in 1928 until the 1950s. From the late 1950s onwards the newspaper may be labelled as an independent right-of-centre newspaper. *Lapin Kansa* is the only newspaper that I have gone through year by year for the period between 1945 and 1973, after which I have consulted the newspaper clippings collection in the archive of the Sami Delegation/Parliament. The choice of this as the “main” source is due to the regional orientation of the newspaper. Another regional newspaper published in Lapland, *Pohjolan
Sanomat, has a more southern orientation and deals with matters in the Tornio River valley, whereas Lapin Kansa writes more about matters concerning Northern Lapland and Inari.\footnote{Valkonen 2003, 37.}

The problem of representativeness concerning the Sami press as a source material is evident. It is an obligatory source group to examine when researching Sami identity-building, but definitely not the voice of the Sami community of Finland as a whole. The press, especially the periodical Sabmelaš, is the voice of the active, political Sami. Sabmelaš is thus not a fully reliable source concerning grass-roots Sami ethnicity (it had a wide circulation, though, being distributed free to every Sami household in Finland). In the periodical, the cultural markers were over-communicated and the language policy, especially, of Sabmelaš (and Teänupakti as well\footnote{Morottaja, Matti: Nubbi samekielalaš pladdi, Teänupakti 2/1964.}) was sometimes almost conformist. In addition, the crisis situations may have been (consciously or unconsciously) magnified. During the period of inquiry, the periodical evolves from a Sami-interest media outlet to a Sami political media outlet and a watch-dog for Sami politics – both those aimed at them and those they pursued – thus becoming more clearly a pluralistic site of contestation. It is definitely a better source than Lapin Kansa for Sami notions, for intra-Sami discussion and as a source and instrument of Sami identity-building.\footnote{On the problem of representativeness and the Sami press, see Lantto 2000, 19-20; Saamelaiskulttuuritoimikunnan mietintö 1985:66, 330; chief editor Jouni Kittti stated in 1984 that the periodical had the task of manifesting the ecologically sensible way of life of the indigenous people. Sapmelas täyttää 50 vuotta, PS 6.4.1984; the periodical seems to have been widely read by the Sami community. In a survey carried out by Erkki Asp in 1965, from a sample of 219 people, 66% answered that they read Sabmelaš. Sabmelaš 3-471965, Sabmelaš-pladi lohtkam. Eight years later, in a new survey with a sample of 225 people, the figures were still high. 82% of those speaking Northern Sami and 74% of the Aanaar Sami, but only 27% of the Skolt Sami, said that they read the periodical. Rantala, Leif: Vuot leï tutkijuuvvom, Sabmelaš 1-2/1973; on the periodical as a watch-dog for the Sami Delegation, see Sápmelaš 6/1986, Mo sapmelačcaid ässit leat dikšojuvvom odne and Parlamenta lea doaiman däkkäraš äsšiin.}

Sabmelaš was first edited by the SFPLC, but SL took over the editing of the periodical in a friendly coup in 1949, as Johan Nuorgam began to practise more conciliatory politics towards the SFPLC.\footnote{Lehtola 2000b, 148.} At times, members of the SFPLC dominated the periodical, but from the 1950s onwards Sami writers did get more space in the periodical. Among the Sami editors were Johan Nuorgam (1951-1957), Isakki Paadar (1957-1967) and Samuli Aikio (1967-1974). During the 1980s the chief editor Jouni Kittti (1980-1998)\footnote{The Saami – A Cultural Encyclopaedia, entry on Sápmelaš.} dominated the publication. Before this, the writings in Sabmelaš varied from numerous religious writings and letters from the readers to reports of meetings and fictional stories. In order to limit the scope of enquiry and methods used, I have limited my interest to items that are 1) written by the Sami and 2)
non-fictional, and which can be labelled as statements of contemporary (political or otherwise) issues, since my command of Northern Sami is only tolerable.\footnote{I do not have any formal training in Northern Sami: I taught myself, while working on my licentiate thesis in Finland. My command of the language is passive: I can read Sami, with the aid of a dictionary, but I cannot write or speak Sami, except for a few phrases.}

Other periodicals in the Sami language are few. Nilla Outakoski published a short-lived Sami periodical, \textit{Sabmi}, in 1948. The periodical aimed to present a non-romantic picture of the Sami area but, strangely enough, the editorial material consisted of old tales and travel descriptions that were mostly traditional in their enchantment with Lapland’s nature and the people struggling to survive in it. There is, in the same way as in early Sami periodicals in Norway,\footnote{Gaski 1999, 32-33.} a task of enlightenment and modernization evident in an article dealing with nuclear energy. The paper was edited by Outakoski and Pekka Lukkari.\footnote{Lukkari, Pekka: Suomen Pohjoisin..., Sabmi, Lappi esittäytyy suomeksi ja lapiksi, N:o 1, 1948, 13, 16-18; Miltä lappalaiskysymys näyttää lappalaisten omilla silmillä. Sabmi, Lappi esittäytyy suomeksi ja lapiksi, N:o 1, 1948.} Lukkari also edited the short-lived newspaper \textit{Tunturisanomat} during the early 1950s, which was published in Finnish and established by Johan Nuorgam. The newspaper was not in opposition to the SFPLC and less of a political venue than \textit{Sabmi}. It had the task of spreading information on local issues and legislation concerning the Sami.\footnote{Lehtola 2000b, 149; Nyyssönen 2005c, 231.} In the same manner as \textit{Sabmi}, \textit{Teänupakti} was in (some kind of) opposition to the established Sami media \textit{Sabmelaš}. \textit{Teänupakti} was published briefly in the late 1960s by the association for the younger Sami of the same name, with Matti Morottaja as the most active editor. I have managed to obtain five volumes of \textit{Vuovjoš}, a periodical published during the 1970s by people close to Johti Sabmelažžat, and Karesuando and Soppero Sami Societies. The first cross-border periodical, with Veikko Holmberg as editor-in-chief, had an exceptionally aggressive language policy, as well as one of building ethnic borders. The periodical was a venue for co-operation and cultural exchange in pan-Sami and global contexts.\footnote{Teänupakti 1964, passim; Vuovjoš 1976-1978, passim.}

Henry Minde has expressed suspicion concerning traditional research in the history of minorities. In his article on the Sami experience concerning the Norwegianization policy in schools, Minde uses life interviews and raises methodological and ethical questions about them. A familiarity between the interviewer and the interviewee is required to gain the information and establish the discussion and, given the intimate and ambigious nature of the information, the utmost caution is needed in its use.\footnote{Minde 2003a, 125.}
is public instead of private – it has either been produced by official institutions or, in case of correspondence, stored in archives that allow access. The material used raises other kind of ethical problems. Great efforts must be made to analyse who is representing whom. In addition, what kind of right does a researcher have to open up, reveal and analyse the self-representations made by the “Other”? One solution for this is to limit my choice of Sami actors to those who produced texts and Sami activists, whose activities were public, at least in part. Thus the problem raised by Minde can be bypassed. Sensitivity and common sense must be followed in writing, personification and documentation.

1.8. Outline of the thesis

The thesis is organized chronologically. The second chapter is meant to shed light on the political and economic contexts and various aspects of the Finnish nation-building process. The focus is also on the north and on the consequences and impacts these processes had on the Sami domicile. Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter where the identity politics are studied. Here a research strategy is followed, where first the political and economic contexts are studied and thereafter the counter-imagery. The identity politics are then studied, chronologically and contextually, and set in an international/inter-Nordic context as well. Comparison between the Sami movements in Finland and Norway is undertaken in each chapter. Each chapter ends with a conclusion, where the identity politics and the political space are analysed. This strategy is followed in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. Chapter 6 covers the most important shifts in political structure and concerning the field of representation during this period, and the choice of prioritized political venues by the Sami is studied here as well. The final empirical chapter is organized a bit differently. Here, the Kessi dispute is followed from the point of view of various actors and the main focus is on the reception of the Sami resistance. The thesis ends with a concluding chapter where developments in Sami identity politics are summarized and analysed in the light of the theories.
2. Situating Inari in the National, International and Global Community

2.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to draft the changes in the diminishing political space in which the Sami found themselves during the course of the settlement history of the lappmarks. This political space needs to be drafted, if not established, before going on to study the identity politics of the Sami. There follows an initial, brief focus on the diminishing economic space and the assimilation\(^1\) of the southern siidas. The focus then shifts to Inari and developments in the remaining area of Sami domicile. How did the economic and legal position of the Sami change during the last periods of Swedish rule and during the period of autonomy in the nineteenth century? Lastly, the history of the Sami as a minority in the state of Finland is illustrated with the additional aim of shedding light on the premises of identity politics and praxis of minority politics in the young nation-state of Finland. Inari is chosen as a case, because the siida/municipality was/is a meeting place for all three Sami groups and the ethnic Finns. In addition the encounter with forestry and nature conservation took exceptional forms in Inari that included the Sami in the national project of modernization to start with, but also paved way for Sami ethnic mobilization.

This chapter, and the thesis as a whole, is written in critical opposition to the “colonization” paradigm entertained in certain aspects of research into Sami history in Finland. Bearing in mind the relational nature of power (see Chapter 1.3.1), one premise for this thesis is that there was a Sami political space, not merely a disempowering process of colonization. As we shall see, the Sami began to act in political and administrative institutions, both imported and intragenic, before and immediately after the Second World War and ethnopolitical mobilization.

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\(^1\) In the following, I observe the definition of assimilation provided by Einar Niemi. Niemi defines assimilation as an integration that occurs within the premises of the majority society. Consequently, this definition is most applicable to the modern era. Finnish national integration and the introduction of welfare systems fall within this category, as does any other modern nation-building project that stresses a shared language and culture. Niemi 2004, 96-97.
2.1.1. Early phases of settlement history and the gradual erosion of Sami rights

The Sami had been in trade and taxation contact with other people and other cultures from the Viking period onwards. The national borders remained unclear as the upcoming state formations, the kingdoms of Norway and Sweden and the merchant state of Novgorod, established their spheres of influence in areas inhabited by the Sami. The first boundary was drawn in the Treaty of Teusin in 1595, dividing the Sami culture into eastern and western spheres. Lapland became part of the history of modern European nations during the sixteenth century, when the Swedish Crown began to tax the area. This taxation remained undefined until the seventeenth century and during this time the siidas were taxed by two, and in some cases three powers. In more recent interpretations, this taxation has been seen as a sign of the wealth of the siida system. The siida’s role as a political and legal actor has been highlighted, instead of the old interpretations of passivity and being a victim of taxation. Accordingly, the boundaries are seen as privileges, the most significant of which was the Lapp boundary, setting limits to new settlements during the fifteenth century and separating the Sami settlements from the farming settlements (transgression of the Lapp border was punishable by a fine) from 1549 onwards. The Lapp border was reinforced at the beginning of the seventeenth century, awarding Kemi Lappmark a letter of security for its borders and rights. The boundary was confirmed again in 1638 and in 1673, reflecting growing settlement pressure. At this point, the officials reinforced the boundary in favour of the Sami. The Sami were active in protecting and maintaining these privileges.2

In earlier research, the total assimilation of Kemi Lappmark has been explained by the exhaustion of fishing resources, the slash and burn economy of the settlers and the Sami strategy of clinging on to the old means of living.3 The assimilation of the southern siidas began with the awarding of settler placations (uudisasutusplakaatti) in 1673 and 1695. Placations were intended to allow settlers and Sami subsistence to co-exist but, in practice, Sami subsistence in the southern siidas was marginalized by an expansive slash-and-burn economy. The settler movement progressed slowly northwards, eroding Sami fishing rights and resources, but more decisive was the Sami’s own settlement movement. However, in many places the Sami established fixed housing only in official records. This resulted in “statistical assimilation”: a former hunter/fisher was marked in the records as a settler and the

2 Koivumaa 2003, 158; Lehtola 2002a, 184-188; Vahtola 2003, 128.
3 Tegengren 1952, 57-88.
name of the estate was marked in Finnish; in some cases this ended up as the surname of the estate holder. This resulted in a gradual setting aside of Sami place names. 4

The most current historical comprehension of settlement in Inari is that there was a population that practised a culture resembling that of the contemporary image of Sami culture from approximately the ninth century onwards. 5 In historical period terms, Aanaar Sami (sämmilaš/Inari Sami or anáráš/Northern Sami, nowadays 900 in population) subsistence was based on deer hunting, and later on fishing. Nowadays the Aanaar Sami are credited as the bearers of the most original Sami culture in Finland. Like other Sami in Kemi Lappmark, the Aanaar Sami were categorized as Forest Lapps by officials and priests. According to Matti Enbuske, life in Inari was based on annual settlement between fishing sites and thus it is more correct to refer to them as fishing Sami. Nowadays, Aanaar Sami are categorized as part of the eastern Sami group. Inari Siida was the Aanaar Sami’s core area. The siida system traditionally consisted of autonomous territorial areas, with more or less strictly controlled borders. The property rights exercised by the siida over this area are a disputed matter. Estimations vary from Crown-acknowledged ownership to the right to yield. The Sami comprehension, according to Jouko Vahtola, was that they had an exclusive right to the hunting and fishing. This ownership-like situation was fortified as the Crown applied the law based on peasant landownership during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Now the hunting grounds and fishing areas of individual Sami could be separated. According to Vahtola, the Sami owned hunting, fishing and reindeer pasturing in certain lands and waters by inheritance, whereas the Crown claimed ownership of the land in the lappmarks, just as it did in the case of peasant lands leased against land tax. In Inari, land was not taxed during the sixteenth century, and taxation was based on an individual ability to pay taxes. 6

In Inari, state control increased during the seventeenth century, as missionary work and the conversion of the Sami served to renounce Sami property rights and taxation privileges. A collective tax was set on the Lapp villages, which resulted in a tightening of the state’s grip in Inari. The region was exceptional, due to its peripheral location: reindeer nomadism was absent and the first church was erected in Pielpajärvi as late as the 1640s; religious institutions were more firmly organized only during the eighteenth century. 6

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4 Aikio, Brenna, Gjerde, Helander, Niemi and Aarseth 1990, 44-45; Lehtola 2005c, 308; concerning place names, see Niemi 2004, 110-112.
5 The first signs of human activity in Inari have been estimated to originate from the period 8000-6000 BC. Archaeologists are cautious about giving archaeological periods ethnic labels, but there are theories about groups populating Inari with a different ethnicity and language, prior to the “Sami” invasion to the north. As I have no expertise in the subject I shall not elaborate this issue further. Carpelan 2003, 33, 60, 63.
6 Enbuske 2003b, 144; Lehtola 1997c, 64; Pentikäinen 1994, 135-136; Vahtola 2003, 122-123, 128-129.
Temporal rule was established, as the traditional tent-courts were replaced by courts after the Scandinavian model that took place at the markets, setting royal bailiffs in power instead of village elders (siidaisid). This was a major change in Crown-led integration. The old Aanaar Sami way of life encountered growing pressure from the 1750s onwards, as Christianity gained a stronger foothold and priests and officials introduced the Swedish and Finnish languages into the everyday life of the Sami, and resettlement in Inari began in earnest, exacerbated by wars and famines during the eighteenth century. The settlers reached Inari in 1757-1758. The Strömstrand Treaty between Sweden and Denmark of 1751 denoted changes in taxation: Danish taxation ceased and the national territories in Finnmark were established. Sami rights concerning migration, hunting, herding and commerce were articulated in the Lapp Codicil. The aim of the codicil was a “preservation of the Lapp nation” by guaranteeing freedom from military service and awarding rights to cross-border grazing, while the state tightened its grip by means of taxation, demanding the recognition of nationality linked to one country and establishing national borders. The Church was using the Finnish language, although not consistently. Due to more frequent contact, priests reported that the Aanaar Sami had a better command over the Finnish language than the reindeer-herding Sami in Utsjoki. This was in spite of periods advocating the use of Sami languages in church, during the 1820s and 1830s.\footnote{Enbuske 2003b, 146, 160-163; Church building and the Christianization of the Sami occurred during the Middle Ages as a part of the integration/colonization of Sami core areas. See also re. the two functions of the Lapp Codicil Hansen and Olsen 2004, 150-151, 279-280, 296-297; full nomadism was practised in Enontekiö from the seventeenth century onwards, Helander 1991, 13; Kylli 2004, 155, 157; Kylli 2005, 154-175; Lehtola 2002a, 184-190; Lähteenmäki 2004, 226-228; Pentikäinen 1995, 269.}

According to Veli-Pekka Lehtola, Sami rights were not eroded through legislation but by slowly-evolving practice, as settlement spread in Swedish Lapland, with exemptions from taxation and military service. Reindeer herding rights were extended to farmers. As Finland became a Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire, in 1809, siida privileges and traditional Sami rights were not fortified, and were finally forgotten as the annual district court sessions ceased in “unsettled” parts of Lapland. At the sporadic court sessions, the judicial personnel were not familiar with local common practice. Borders between Sweden and Finland and, in 1826, between Norway and Russia divided the siidas and dissolved Neiden Siida. The Strömstrand Treaty was abrogated in practice as traditional rights were neglected and migration was made more difficult. In Finnish official circles during the 1850s, the only element of the 1751 treaty that still had any legal binding was the border – fishing rights and reindeer pastures could be renegotiated. The closure of the state borders (between Norway and Finland in 1852, and
between Sweden and Finland in 1889) meant an end to the circulatory system. There was a mass displacement of herders, as they lost their winter pastures almost overnight: in Finland, many herders from Kautokeino settled in Sompio, Sodankylä, whereas in Inari the void left by the reindeer Sami from Norway in Western Inari was filled with reindeer Sami from Utsjoki seeking summer and winter pastures. Expansive reindeer herding was practised in Finland, and in Inari the remaining winter pastures constituted an example of a forced, yet successful adaptation. The better-off, reindeer-herding class of Sami was thus introduced to Inari.

Lapland became more tightly integrated with the interests of nation-states and the international system. International politics began to influence the region. In a positivist light, cultivating the land provided firmer rights to the land than hunting or nomadism. Ivalo was connected to the Finnish road network in 1914 and the building of the Arctic Sea Road to Petsamo modernized the region. A mixed economy, obtaining a livelihood from reindeer, fishing and service as a maid or reindeer-hand, was typical of Sami households in Inari during the nineteenth century. Trading contacts with the markets in Varangerfjord were frequent.

Faced with increasing Finnish expansion, a new Sami strategy emerged: that of establishing a fixed settlement. The land rights situation in Inari began to change from the 1830s onwards, when the Aanaar Sami started to convert their fishing areas into fishing or settlement estates (kalastustila, uudistila) and establish fixed settlement on Crown lands. Once the estate was established, the Sami could prove their fishing rights better than by appealing on the basis of customary right. Alongside the first phase of settlement of the Aanaar Sami, which reached a peak in the 1850s, there was an introduction of stock raising, which in many cases constituted an ending to the annual settlement pattern typical of the Aanaar Sami. Another resettlement phase began after a proclamation from the Tsar in 1877 concerning the establishment of “Crown Forest leaseholds”. From 1876 onwards, Forest and Park Service began to lease land. Leaseholds were granted to the Aanaar Sami and, in growing numbers, to the reindeer Sami as well. Renting leasehold was in many cases the only subsistence option still affordable to Sami who did not have access to reindeer herding. Leasehold granted access to fire-wood, for example. The reindeer Sami who had moved from Norway to Inari caused some disputes between herders and settlers over hay damage. According to Seija Nahkiaisoja,

9 Lähteenmäki 2004, 233-234.
10 Arponen, 42-45.
these disputes were few and, according to Maria Lähteenmäki, the disputes did not follow ethnic demarcation: settled Sami were involved in disputes against nomadic Sami.

The Lapp village or siida system was abolished in 1924, as personal taxation was introduced. In the “Great Partition”, which began in Inari in 1925, all leaseholds could be claimed as independent estates. Throughout this period, there were no ethnically-based measures of exclusion in land-lease policy. The “ethno-national” process in Inari was integrative, not one of exclusion. The Sami intention was not to integrate, but merely to secure the basis of their subsistence while maintaining their way of life, based on many sources of income. There were no institutional assimilative constraints, but a need to adapt to new circumstances in order to maintain one’s family. On a cultural level, however, fixed settlement, marriage or simply proximity to settlers entailed, in some cases, an integration of the Sami into the Finnish culture and language. This was evident in the village of Kyrö (now Ivalo) with established agricultural settlement. Finnish settlement in Inari increased from the 1870s onwards.\textsuperscript{11}

During the pre-war era there was no coherent “Sami nation”: identity was kin- and village-based.\textsuperscript{12} The Sami domicile gained its “mixed” characteristics: in early periods, when the Finnish population was low, different ethnicities mixed at a local level as the Finnish settlers adopted Sami forms of subsistence and boundaries became more flexible, yet recognizable at a local level. Flexibility of choice, as well as a multiplicity of sources of livelihood, remained a basic strategy for both groups in this relatively barren environment. The landownership of the Finnish settlers was guarded by marriage arrangements, ensuring that the estate remained within the kinship group. Sami who married into this group became Finnicized, while those Aanaar Sami who married within their ethnic group sustained their Saminess. Utsjoki remained a Sami region and the first signs of ethnic sentiment and policies of safeguarding the Sami language among the educated Sami elite emerged in the 1880s. Those belonging to this elite had received their higher education in teachers’ seminaries in Finland proper, and had returned to their old schools in Utsjoki in order to sustain the Sami culture and language. Remote areas in Inari and in Utsjoki functioned as hindrances to assimilation.\textsuperscript{13} Even though it has to be acknowledged that the integrating force of the


\textsuperscript{13} The assimilation of the Finns into the Sami community and Sami forms of subsistence was strongest in Utsjoki, with its Sami majority. The Finnish population grew, especially due to an increasing number of Finnish
majority culture, which practised social (or vulgar\textsuperscript{14}) Darwinist ideas and an assimilative policy,\textsuperscript{15} was overwhelmingly strong, and the Sami had in many respects already lost the possibility of developing their own way of life according to their own premises, niches of Sami activity and Sami way of life were still to be found. The reindeer herding trade was a niche dominated by the Sami that assimilated the Finns.\textsuperscript{16} There was also the ongoing establishment of new Sami niches through adaptation mechanisms. “Colonization” was far from total.

Early taxation and the establishment of national boundaries integrated Lapland into a Eurocentric international system and to that of the Northern Powers. As a consequence, power was transferred into the centres: Stockholm, Helsinki and St. Petersburg. As the modern international system was established, Lapland became a periphery at a national and international level.\textsuperscript{17} In spite of this, there was access to all the emerging Finnish institutions, as well as room for local and, to a lesser extent, regional identity building, although national integration challenged the trans- and multinational regionalism characteristic of the Arctic areas in Nordic countries.\textsuperscript{18} The Finnish nation-building process in Lapland, on the other hand, was integrative and propelled by investment and modernization impulses. However, the process did not lack elements of expansionist/colonial processes that were typical of the time, most obviously in the annexation of Petsamo in 1920.\textsuperscript{19} The nation-building process contained elements that were both empowering and inclusive, as well as others that eroded and assimilated, depending on the factors examined.

\textsuperscript{14} This radical formulation provides, in fact, a more accurate formulation in many vernacular cases. The term is used by e.g. Aikio 1991 and Magga 2004, 349.

\textsuperscript{15} Lindgren 2000, 34.

\textsuperscript{16} The Sami herders from Angeli who were interviewed by the Sami Committee of 1973 commented that in reindeer work, the Finns were judged to be worse herders than the Sami. Saamelaiskomitean mietintö, 1973:46, Liti: Tutkimusraportit, 269; Aikio 1998, 83.

\textsuperscript{17} Koivumaa 2003, 160. Koivumaa is substantially right, but his use of centre–periphery models oversimplifies the emerging power constellations and strips the periphery of its intention. Criticism of the core–semi-periphery–periphery model, Grant and Short 2002, 194-196.

\textsuperscript{18} Lehtola 1997a, 33-35.

Both of these elements were visible in the Finnish school system, the most effective institute for assimilation. During the pre-war era the Finnish school system was patriotic, aiming to educate nationalist citizens and create national unity.\textsuperscript{20} As Sami languages had no official status in Finland, they were not counted as a native tongue and they had no place in school legislation, either: there was no need to teach in Sami until 1957, when teaching in Sami became possible.\textsuperscript{21} In Northern Finland, however, there was some variety in practice and aspiration that does not fall within the narrative of greater assimilation. In Outakoski, in Utsjoki, teaching was offered in Sami for certain periods of time, in spite of the fact that the books were written in Finnish. There were periods when teachers of Sami origin were asked to teach in Finnish, in order to provide the children with a good command of the Finnish language. In Suonikylä, according to the wishes of the ideology of cultural protection, the teacher had a command of the Sami language, but it is not known to what extent this was used in teaching. Both of these exceptional cases have been estimated to be, in practice, bastions of Finnicization. It was common among the Sami in Enontekiö, Utsjoki and in Petsamo not to demand an education in the Sami language during the 1930s. The reasons for this were the small number of Sami, the increasing number of Sami who had a command of the Finnish language, their poverty, their desire to increase their ability to cope with Finnish society, the significant differences between many dialects/languages, and because gaining subsistence was dependent on a command of the Finnish language. Among Finnish officials, there was great variation in the will to arrange teaching in the Sami language in the Sami home area. There were both officials who were concerned about this matter, for example in Utsjoki, and officials who were totally unwilling to do anything about it, most notably in Petsamo. On the other hand, the schools were centres of civil society: they were used as libraries and in many places the teachers took care of the supply of culture in regions described as barren in a cultural sense.\textsuperscript{22}

A debate on the language of education (Sami or Norwegian) took place among the Sami in Norway in the early years of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{23} It was rare for such debates to take place in Finland, but in 1928-1929 Tuomo Itkonen had to defend the Sami language against local officials.\textsuperscript{24} After the war, Sami activists managed to monopolize the Sami media

\textsuperscript{20} Tuomaala 2004, passim.
\textsuperscript{21} Saamelaisten kouluopetuksen kehittämistoimikunnan mietintö 1971:B63, 13-14.
\textsuperscript{23} Jernsletten 1999, 7.
\textsuperscript{24} Saamelaisten kouluopetuksen kehittämistoimikunnan mietintö 1971:B63, 11.
with their own language politics, where they criticized the grass-roots for not sharing the elite purism.

In 1916, 265 pupils out of a total of 407 received an education in Folk Schools with halls of residences that had been established in Inari in 1902. Approximately a third of the pupils, especially Sami children living in remote areas in Inari, received a three- to eight-week elementary education from peripatetic catechist teachers. In Inari, the peripatetic catechist school system had established firm structures and practices from the 1870s onwards. The system was organized by the congregation and had its roots in the missionary work of the seventeenth century, hence the emphasis on education in religion. In 1919 there were four catechist teachers, of whom two provided education in Aanaar Sami and at least one in Northern Sami. Sami languages were taught, for example, on the summer courses arranged by Josef Guttorm in Outakoski during the 1920s. It is not necessary to agree with the theorists who claim that isolation “preserves” ethnicity to say that such a level of education, however sufficient it may be, is not assimilative. Most children in Inari received education at the Folk Schools, where the bilingualism of the municipality was appreciated: the language of education was Finnish until teachers capable of teaching in Aanaar or “Utsjoki Sami” (Northern Sami) and teaching materials became available. However, in practice this was never accomplished before the war. There was local resistance against the schools, with a non-ethnic argument on the part of the locals, who feared that schooling would turn a child into a lazy “gentleman” (herra), who would lose the will to work. During the 1920s and 1930s the number of pupils within the catechist teaching system decreased. The catechist teaching system was dismantled after the war.25

The integration resulted in a simultaneous dependency on the state and on local natural resources. Christian morals and an ideology of being subject to the state emerged. This was exacerbated by low political mobilization and low support for radical leftist ideologies that questioned the status quo and the hegemony of the state. Events such as national and local strikes at logging sites south of Inari at the turn of the century, which radicalized people in south, were distant in Upper Lapland.26 Modernization changed the Sami way of life: the last remnants of Northern Sami nomadic reindeer herding survived in Inari until the 1930s. The seasonal move between the summer and winter habitats of the Aanaar Sami ended more

or less with the Second World War, although there were still some families practising this migration into the 1950s.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{2.1.2. The formal integration of the Sami domicile into the national whole, and the mobilization of resources}

The Crown, or the state after 1809, had become the biggest single landowner in Finland in the “Great Partition” (Isojako), which began in the 1770s and aimed to simplify the parcelling of estates throughout Finland. The value of state-owned forests rose when steam sawing was deregulated in the 1860s. The sawmill industry played a fundamental role as the biggest export industry and was in the vanguard of modern industrial organization and production in Finland. The establishment of steam sawmills in 1862, 1874 and 1912, and of a pulp mill in 1916 in Kemi, resulted in an industrial and economic push northwards and the mobilization of the vast state-owned forests of Lapland. This era saw the introduction of a discourse about Finland’s reliance and dependence on the wealth to be found in timber and forestry. This strong discourse may be reckoned to have prevailed until the 1960s, when the ecological consequences of an efficient forestry and timber industry were beginning to be more widely criticized. As the water and steam sawmills became more usual, the timber of Lapland was mobilized and logging reached Kittilä and the upstream River Kemi water system in Sompio, in Sodankylä. The telegraph wire reached Rovaniemi in the 1890s and the railway by 1915, making it the new timber trade and processing centre of Lapland. Lapland was now connected to the modern industrial age and the forests were exposed to an expanding global economy. In terms of economic geography, Lapland had become a resource base for industry, with a huge number of temporary workmen making their living and spreading socialist ideas, for example.\textsuperscript{28}

The breakthrough for industrial capitalism in Finland was a combination of three ideological currencies: the old settler mentality, nationalism and a belief in industrial progress. Those in the agrarian population and industry with an “old settler mentality” shared a conquering attitude towards nature. However, it was the alliance between nationalism and industrialism that caused the discourse of the timber and wood-product industries as a bringer of national wealth to predominate. The poor “forest nations” of the North were converted into

\textsuperscript{27} Halinen 2004, 40; Jefremoff 2001, 19, 24-27.
\textsuperscript{28} Ahvenainen 1984, 211-212; Kuisma 1993, 118-119, 192, 199-201, 212, 216, 234, 277, 282, 318, 420.
modern, socially balanced welfare states. Progress in the timber industry equalled national progress, which became a legitimation for the use of the forests, including those in Lapland: there are references to a peaceful “inner imperialism”, by which the Nordic countries of Finland and Sweden, instead of acquiring overseas territories, penetrated the northern regions of their countries and conquered the natural resources. This dominant discourse was challenged by two forces: the old, agrarian anti-capitalistic and anti-liberalistic currency, as well as the rising working-class criticism of industrial landownership. This challenge was met in industrial circles by organizing and building alliances with the state and with the Fennomans – the establishment of a Finnish-owned timber industry, working for the good of the Finnish state, revived and strengthened the discourse of national progress based on wood. Expressions of concern about the devastation and over-use of the forests were swept away in the process, and led instead to a discourse on rational forestry that secured the regeneration of the forests. Following independence, the timber industry became increasingly state-owned out of a desire to protect the industry from foreign capital; the state-owned forests were now linked to the imagery of national wealth. Indeed, the timber industry had given birth to an emerging working class in Finland and Lapland, as well as modernizing the country and increasing the well-being of the people.29

Neither the road nor the loggings had reached Inari before 1914. The mountains of Saariselkä would protect the forests for decades after that. A municipal government after the Finnish model was introduced in the 1870s and had become established by 1893. Sami men, as well as the Finnish official “nobility”, including state foresters, entered the municipal administration from an early stage. Antti Aikio (later Avaskari) made an outstanding career for himself as chairman of the municipal board (kunnallislautakunta) in the years between 1919 and 1951. This process of becoming part of the Grand Duchy (valtiollistuminen) involved closer ties at a national and international level, although the ties southwards were – at least in the case of commerce – weaker than the traditional routes to Norway. Forest and Park Service took over the lands in Inari in 1866, when the district of Inari was established. State ownership was cemented in the 1886 Forest Law, in which the lands outside the private estates were declared to be state-owned. Forestry in Inari remained minimal during the nineteenth century, with a nominal amount of timber sold to Norway. Paid labour was accepted by the Finns and the Sami as the concession loggings began in earnest in Inari during the 1920s. There was short-term employment and a modernizing effect that was

enhanced by a road connection to exotic Petsamo. In Finnish research I have not encountered any signs of discrimination against the Sami entering the paid labour market, as was evident in some parts in Norway and in Northern Sweden. Substantial economic “sanctions”, due to being a Sami, were presumably lower than in Norway.

The late introduction of “Western” industrial forms of land use in the Sami domicile in Finland is one reason why the Sami ethnic awakening took place later in Finland than in Norway and Sweden. In Northern Sweden the harmful effects of forestry, hydropower constructions, mining and the railways were evident to the reindeer herding Sami from the late nineteenth century onwards. Accordingly, the matter was taken up by the Sami movement as early as the 1940s, notably earlier than in Finland. Agricultural expansion, which caused trouble for the Sami in both Norway and Sweden, had a greater impact on Sami areas in the south or near the Arctic Ocean, not in subarctic Inari. In addition, the Sami themselves were part of this process.

The peripheral location of Inari had protected the natural resources from being used and the local people, who did utilize these resources, from competition from more powerful users.

The settlement process of the Sami continued: the “Great Partition” had resulted in 306 independent estates being established by 1943. This process was supported by the strong agrarian spirit within the municipality. Integration during the inter-war period was not total: the monetary economy was introduced and a larger integration to this occurred in 1941-1944 when German troops were stationed in Inari; their presence resulted in modernization impulses and employment for the Sami. Contact was mostly based on trade and on numerous work opportunities. The concept of the “Lappish mark” was introduced in Inari: the wages that the Germans were able to pay have sometimes been characterized as “out of proportion". According to research by Marianne Junila, the relationship between the locals and the Germans was good, casual and beneficial to both parties in both its regulated and unofficial forms throughout the war. The work input from prisoners of war resulted in improvements to the infrastructure and the road network.

31 Minde 2000c, 78, 96-97; Nordin 2002, 74.
2.2. The Sami within the Finnish national whole – counter-imagery and praxis

2.2.1. The project of Finnish identity building

During the autonomy in the nineteenth century, a distinct Finnish national identity was being built and manifesting itself under shifting pressures of Russification. Finnish identity building was based on the partly mythical, partly historically correct imagery of a free peasant, an ideal defined by Lutheran nationalistic feeling, seriousness and a high ethical sense of duty,\(^\text{34}\) which was presented as the sole matter-of-fact model. Finnish nationalism was seen by nationalists as an integrating factor through which emerging new classes could identify with the nation-state. In practice, the ideal picture of Finnish identity, cherished by the Fennoman Movement, was restrictive and non-inclusive on a class basis: the landowning class was defined as Finnish, whereas the majority of the population, i.e. those not owning their lands, as well as the main enemy, the Swedish-speaking upper classes, were excluded. In retrospect, Finnish nationalism had a political aim: due to the landownership structure and a lack of feudalism there was no means of subjugation through landownership, and nationalism was thus a means for the upper classes to secure their position. In spite of this exclusivity, the ideal was reproduced by strong institutes such as schools, the Church, research and the arts, and the achievement of this ideal in penetrating the national imagery has been considered a success.\(^\text{35}\)

The Hegelian and increasingly racially-inspired discussion practised the ideal of an ethnically homogenous people in Finland: that of sharing the same culture and language. Thus, in Finnish nineteenth-century thinking, people and nation (kansa, kansakunta) became almost identical, and the term citizen (kansalainen) had the same constructed etymological basis: a citizen was a part of the nation, after the German tradition. This was because of a weak liberalistic influence (highlighting the sovereignty of the people, representational politics, equality and civil society) and a strong Hegelian tradition, combining language, culture and ethnicity as a basis for the state and emphasizing the nation as a cultural unit. Citizenship was defined by the possession of rights, which included every citizen, the whole nation. An ideal was also entertained of each citizen, not just the elite, participating in the political life of the nation. A contesting ideal was that of a citizen contributing to the building of the nation through his or her education, to a greater extent than as a political actor. The

\(^{34}\) A British diplomat presented another set of Finnish characteristics: the Finns appeared to him as stubborn, grim and hard-headed. Vares 2003, 257, 260, 262.

\(^{35}\) Alapuro 1995, 12-13, 47-49, 57-63; Alasuutari 1996, 185-186; Räsänen 1989, 17; Tuulentie 2001, 64.
national process was one of building mutual understanding, where citizens took their place as part of the nation and its history. Both notions of citizenship practised cultural holism and the vertical communication of these ideals to those lower in the hierarchy. The nation was bound together as a single mind (based on the Hegelian national Geist, meaning the values and norms of the community), according to the language, beliefs, norms and customs of the people. J. V. Snellman has summarized this theory in the slogan “one language, one mind”. Hence the history and political culture of Finland has a number of conformist veins and periods (most notably the language disputes with the Swedish-speaking minority) but, as in the post-colonial situation, nationalism has functioned as a liberating factor.

During the eighteenth century in general the Sami were seen as close kindred to the Finns. At a local level, however, the priests working in the Sami area despised the Sami culture. The Sami language was connected to shamanism. In this context Jacob Fellman, the minister of Utsjoki during the 1820s, is mentioned as an exception, but during the nineteenth century a typically paternalistic and downgrading way of depicting the Sami became the norm. The Sami were regarded as uncivilized, carefree children of nature who were in need of civilization and education. Priests in the Sami home area spread the reputation and constructed the imagery of the drunken Sami in their scorn of market-time drunkenness, not realizing that this was a rare occasion for drinking for the reindeer-herding Sami, who spent most of their time in the mountains. Before the breakthrough of the nationalistic dogma described above, the educated Finnish classes identified with the Sami minority and the oppressed state of the Sami languages, similar to that of the Finnish language. Devoted experts of Fenno-Ugrian and Uralian languages Elias Lönnrot and M. A. Castrén studied the Sami languages. Lönnrot, especially, was concerned about the increasing command of Finnish among the Sami and a policy followed that favoured the cultivation of the Sami language in church. A decree from 1804, imposing fines on Sami parents who did not teach Finnish to their children, was abolished in 1851. Ritva Kylli has not found any systematic programme of Finnicizing the Sami; books were translated into Sami and priests working in Inari and Utsjoki felt that they should have a command of the Sami language, which many of them tried to learn. The Finnish language was advocated once again from the 1880s onwards.

The term political culture is here defined as the “political knowledge, ideas and sentiments” in a given period of time and their transmission from one generation to another, a process called “the political socialization”. These processes are seen as strengthening the values of existing societies. See Burke 1998, 77.


Tuulentie 2001, 94, with reference to the licentiate thesis by Pekka Isaksson (not on the reference list).


Later on, the existence of minorities became more problematic. One way of dealing with them was to deny their part in the nation. As was sometimes the case with the lower classes, the Sami were categorized outside the sphere of the nation. From the late 1860s onwards, Sakari Topelius and Yrjö Koskinen perceived the Sami as lower in a Hegelian sense because they had not been capable of establishing a state. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ideas concerning race were constitutive social facts in Finland and elsewhere. In the racial hierarchy, the Sami were perceived as lower than the Finns. Means of livelihood was seen as an ethnic marker and separating factor: the “wandering Lapp’s” practice of reindeer nomadism was perceived as lower than agriculture. This had practical consequences, as the notion of landownership was connected to agriculture alone. Thus, legal scholars of the period constructed the notion of the Sami as a people who had never been capable of being landowners. In discussions concerning Petsamo, a more racially hierarchical representation of the Sami emerged. Väinö Voionmaa accounted for the annexation of Petsamo in part because of the race struggle between the Finns and the lower Sami. The settlement history was a history of a racially stronger Finnish tribe pushing the weaker Sami northwards. The Sami had two alternatives: to step aside or be assimilated.41

The Finnish identity was also built by negation, by questioning who the Finns were not. The Finnish collective identity was reflected in a series of “Others”. Sweden was sometimes seen as a model, the civilized “big brother”, but at times there has been a reluctance to include the Swedish-speaking minority within the Finnish national sphere. Russia represented a threat and the traditional enemy, and Russians were perceived as morally lower and “primitive”. The inter-war period was one of deep mistrust against the Soviet Union in Finland, as well as an era of sharpened language disputes with the Swedish-speaking population. On the other hand, Finnish identity has been built as an “in-between” identity between East and West, where “East” represents freedom, individuality and “primitive power”, by contrast with the civilization and orderliness represented by the West. The identity-related political strategy of the Finns in relation to the Sami has been to exclude them from “Finnishness” and to distinguish themselves from the Sami, in order to represent the Finns as European. As a response to race theories categorizing the Finns as Mongols, Finnish discussion and research concerning racial theories was begun. The physical anthropologist Yrjö Kajava and the geographer J. E. Rosberg, for example, defined the Sami, the nomad who did not cultivate the land, as “lower”. The period of strictest separation was at the end of the

nineteenth century, when even linguistic kinship was renounced. These attitudes prevailed and gained ideological and political weight in the project of (European) nation-building during the 1920s and 1930s.\textsuperscript{42}

Following independence and the Civil War of 1918\textsuperscript{43}, Finland had the task of securing the country as a young, “White” nation-state. Huge, patronizing disappointment concerning the “Red” uprising against the establishment, and a notion of how close the victory of Bolshevik “chaos and barbarism” had been, led to a conservative reaction and rhetoric of a strong state and governmental authority. The projects of territorial expansion are one indication of this. These projects, mostly aiming to unite the “Finnish” kindred peoples in and mobilize the forests of Eastern Karelia, have been labelled imperialistic/colonial only with great reservation. The weak attendance in the campaigns and their low popularity among the Finnish people, as well as variations in governmental commitment, were typical of the kindred expeditions. The most successful campaign, leading to the annexation of Petsamo and the Skolt Sami into the Finnish national whole, was the result of diplomacy in the Tartu peace negotiations when the troops were thrown out of Petsamo. The rhetoric of claiming the occupied lands and natural resources (e.g. in Karelia) and the geopolitical ponderings resemble colonial attitudes, but in the contemporary discussion, the security of the young nation-state against Russian/Soviet aggression was used as an argument for expansion and annexation. The disengagement of the push to the East after the Treaty of Tartu, in 1920, led to an economic orientation towards and connectedness with the West.\textsuperscript{44}

An era of national reconciliation followed in internal politics, after the collapse of conservative efforts to establish a monarchy, which resulted in an “agrarian nationalistic” state after a bitter struggle concerning the direction of modernization that was occurring simultaneously on different levels. In spite of this element of conflict, a belief in the blessings of modernization penetrated the whole of Finnish society and a rise in the standard of living legitimized industrialization.\textsuperscript{45} Finland had just undergone a profound development in its political system, a shift from the traditional peasant, rural society based on estates to an era of


\textsuperscript{43} There is not sufficient space to go into the complex origins of the conflict, for the nature of which there is no unanimity among researchers. The conflict goes by many names, of which “Civil war” is the most neutral. The Reds fought a “Class War”, while the White element fought a “War of Independence”, a “Struggle for liberty” or a “War of liberation”. They were about to suppress a Red “insurrection” as well as to liberate the country from the remaining Russian troops, which were only partly interested in supporting the Reds. Even though it is typical to talk about the “Peasant-army” (the Whites) or the army of small-holders (the Reds), the social set-up of the troops was complex and did not follow any class borders. Jutikkala and Pirinen 2003, 394-403.

\textsuperscript{44} Kaarninen 1999, passim; Kuisma 1993, 489-483, 554-556; Vahtola 1997, passim.

\textsuperscript{45} Haapala 1997, 12-15, 49, 62-63.
the most modern form of politics, based on representative democracy. This development has been described as the fiercest in Europe.\textsuperscript{46} Despite the violence at the turn of the century and the violent counter-revolutionary reaction, extreme political currencies and rebellions never received majority support in Finland. The representative democracy was questioned at times, but pre-war political life was in fact marked by very low levels of support for totalitarian movements, a brief crisis of democracy that was soon resolved, and parliamentarianism was sustained. A long tradition of legality and loyalty still held sway in Finnish political culture. The legalist discourse stems from the pressures of Russification, where the rational policy, in order to secure the status of the nation, was to stress the infallibility of existing law, rather than creating new laws. In the Finnish institutions, justice has been created through existing legislation and legal tradition, not through common moral values.\textsuperscript{47} Political slogans have occasionally been violently anti-Bolshevik and pro-Finnish, but also ones of conciliation, consensus and the avoidance of conflict.

The Finnish Constitution affirmed the rights of Finnish citizens, and citizenship was based on ethnic and cultural roots in Finnish soil. Thus, both the Sami and the Swedish-speaking minority became citizens of Finland, with the same basic rights and responsibilities. After the Civil War, the semantic binding of nation and citizenship and the rhetoric of citizens devoting themselves to the nation grew stronger. Ethnic exclusivity increased, whilst at the same time the remaining strategy of including oneself within the dominant debate of national affiliation involved smaller groups being excluded: the intensity of practical measures concerning political extremes and ethnic/religious minorities grew as these groups became smaller. The tradition continued of a vertical communication of ideal citizenship lower down in the hierarchy. National organization was based on the correspondence of nation and state, with expectations of national solidarity and ethno-linguistic homogeneity. This assimilative vein was strongest and most audible in the 1930s, and led to a policy of exclusion towards foreign nationals, e.g. the exclusion of Jewish refugees. The socialist movement (which was included in the hegemonic debate on belongingness within the Finnish national whole) constitutes the most obvious exception to this mentality: it was a product of a growth in civil society, and partly the outcome of political mobilization against the Russification measures at the end of the nineteenth century. Both were elite undertakings, unexpectedly resulting in the rapid growth of a mass class-based movement and the introduction of a more challenging

\textsuperscript{46} Alapuro 1995, 141-142, 149-151.
concept of citizenship. The position of the elite was questioned as well.\textsuperscript{48} The question of whether the Sami were included in this “the hegemonic debate on belongingness” is the theme of the following two chapters.

\subsection*{2.2.2. Sami imagery as a basis for Finnish minority policy}

Finnish representations of the Sami fall within the scope of this study, in order to understand the nature of the political space in which the Sami presented their self-representations and the kind of counter-imagery to which they had to relate. There is no study of this issue that covers the whole of the research period. The doctoral thesis of Pekka Isaksson on racial notions about the Sami glances at views of the Sami in academic circles during the period between the Middle Ages and the 1930s, whereas the doctoral thesis of Seija Tuulentie concentrates on Sami politics during the 1990s.

As I have already explained, the image of the Sami acquired more negative connotations during the nineteenth century, due to the Finns’ own identity and nation-building process: in the most extreme representations, the Sami had neither history nor culture, and in any case they were separate from the Finns. In broad terms, the Sami were stereotyped by the Finns in, for example, the vernacular interpretations of the \textit{Kalevala} and of the mythical battle between Väinämöinen and Joukahainen, where Joukahainen, identified as the ruler of the Lapps, was the opponent of the creator-God and responsible for bringing evil into the world. According to Juha Pentikäinen, this kind of imagery has been long-lived.\textsuperscript{49} Sakari Topelius represented the Sami as racially different, passive, child-like “children of nature” in his patriotic-Christian \textit{Maamme-kirja} (first published in 1876, followed by numerous reprints), a book aiming to construct a civilized Finnish national(ist) identity. The book was widely read in Finnish homes and schools until the 1950s.\textsuperscript{50}

As far as Finnish imagery was concerned, a conquest, cultivation and civilization of the untamed wilderness and the “lower” and “weaker” Sami occurred as Finnish modernization entered Lapland. The modernization of the wilderness and the Sami was inevitable, as in Norway, but at the same time undesired and destructive. In Finnish literary publicity, there were certainly depictions of the Sami as vulnerable, weak, “collapsing”

\textsuperscript{49} Pentikäinen 1995, 35.
\textsuperscript{50} Kuokkanen 1999, 95; Tuomaala 2004, 301, 308-309.
people who were encountering modernization. However, within this neglectful and down-
grading view there was a hint of compassion and romanticism, especially in relation to
nature, which had moulded the people, Finnish and the Sami alike, into honest, unaffected
and trustworthy people. The “lower” features of the Sami could also be, and were, taken to
be positive, as they had the same origin as those of the Finns. Another example comes from
Samuli Paulaharju, who held the notion of the Skolt Sami as a dying people, but at the same
time advocated research on them in order to prevent this from happening.

In Norway, the rhetoric concerning the modernization of the northern regions appears
to be harsher. Civilization, which equalled modernization and becoming Norwegian, would
advance unharnessed, sweeping away the uncivilized, the lower. Among Norwegian
politicians and officials, for example, the Swedish “Lapp shall remain Lapp” policy was seen
as “an effort to turn back development and an artificial effort to uphold nomadism”. Social
modernization and Sami enjoyment of the benefits of the welfare state were also used to deny
the legitimacy of claims for special treatment.

In Sweden, in the light of the new research on physical anthropology inspired by scientific racism, there was a need to deny the first-comer status of the Sami and their racial kinship with the Swedes. In the light of the new racial paradigm, seen through the notion of hierarchies between cultural stages, the Sami could not have been the indigenous population in Southern Sweden. There was the need to build a sharper distinction between the Swedes and the Sami through a clearer categorization of authentic Lapps (a dominating reindeer herder imagery, resulting in intermittent friction within the Sami community) and their status (not the original population, but immigrants). Here, the Sami were more deeply encapsulated by “Otherness” than in Finland. In the same way as in Norway, modernization was seen as destructive to the (mountain) Lapp. The need for clearer policies, and the way these policies have been implemented (the “Lapp skal vara lapp” policy, the Lapp village system) is striking. In Finland, pondering the question of Sami origin resulted in another kind of dynamics: the racial and linguistic kinship was denied, with varying degrees of success, in order to deny accusations of the Finns belonging to the Mongol race, but the originality/first-comer status of the Sami was a given premise in narratives of settlement history and the way in which the weaker Sami were pushed northward.

51 Lehtola 1997a, 55-58, 61-62, 244-246; compare with the Swedish discourse on valuable Sami culture, Mörkenstam 2000, 272; the same dichotomizations were used in argumentation in Norway. See Niemi 1997, 75.
52 This representation comes from 1950s and has survived in the wilderness literature. LK 28.8.1957, Inarin ihmisille.
53 Vahtola 1999, 487.
2.2.3. The Sami position in state politics

The political commitment on the part of the state, and the identification of Lapland within the larger national whole, has been perceived as weak. In that respect, the policy towards Sami may be seen as neglectful. This question has been topical when the Crown or state has tried to establish power or sovereignty in the northern regions. The agricultural and settlement invasion during the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century is an example of this. The policy towards the Sami was twofold: protecting their rights whilst at the same time encouraging Finnish settlement, which eroded Sami rights and exhausted the resources in the southern siidas. When Finland became part of Russia the division of the siidas deepened, due to national borders.

In addition, the Finnish view of minorities and marginal groups at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries was at least in part dependent on a kindred bond. The Romany people were scorned and their cultural “destruction” (Nygård) desired for moral and religious reasons. No active measures were taken, but the control amounted to persecution. Jews and Russian refugees were under threat of deportation from the young nation-state of Finland. Karelian and Ingrian refugees were officially more warmly welcomed. The Sami ranked higher than these aforementioned groups as a kindred “brother” to the Finn. However, he was the “weaker brother”, who was not in need of any special or radical measures. Maria Lähteenmäki has not found any (institutionalized) mechanisms of oppression that were intended for or directed solely against the Sami. The authorities were equally suspicious of both the Sami and the Finns in the Finnish North. The nomad Sami were shunned, though this was due to their mobile way of life, not their ethnicity as such. In terms of racial ideology, the less mobile fishing Sami rose in the hierarchy in the eyes of the Finns.

The Sami in the independent state of Finland had, by definition, the equal rights and responsibilities of a citizen, as well as the right to equal treatment, but no rights dependent on ethnic status that could be defined, categorized or taken away by the government. The official Sami politics in Finland entertained no negative categorization or reversal of these

57 Lehtola 2002a, 184-190.
58 Nygård 2001, 105-126.
60 Kylli 2005, 475.
rights from the settled, non-nomadic Sami, as in Norway and in Sweden. Thus, there was never any need to change racially-based Sami politics, as there was in Sweden after the Second World War. The Finnish Sami policy has been categorized as silently neglecting and assimilating the Sami, but Finnish officials did not practise the crudest modes of neglect, i.e. of minimum effort backed by a notion of a dying people. It is more appropriate to talk of an equalitarian, even ruthlessly equalitarian policy. The Committee of Lapland (1938) stated that since the welfare measures and improvements in the infrastructure on behalf of the state of Finland were also intended for the Sami, “…there is no need to put the Sami in an exceptional position (“poikkeusasema”) in economic and social development work….” According to Veli-Pekka Lehtola, the committee also stated that the Sami were in the process of adaptation and had already adapted to Finnish society. Agricultural expansion and fixed settlement was advocated strongly, for example in Petsamo and among the Skolt Sami. This notion was retained in Finland until the 1960s. However, the committee took a more positive, though patronizingly inclusive standpoint on Sami culture: it was “a valuable addition to the cultural capital of Finland”, so the preservation and development of Sami culture was thought to be desirable. Educational measures, and even teaching in Sami language, were demanded in the report. This last move resulted in no action, only expressions of goodwill, until the 1960s.

The nationalist movement in Finland during the pre-war era entertained a stricter policy. The language policy outlined by the nationalist movement in Finland has, in its turn, been labelled exclusive and monocultural. Bilingualism was deemed to be unpatriotic, a disintegrating and harmful factor for a young and small nation like Finland. Cultivation of the Sami language entailed risking the defence of the state.

The Finnish policy was based on equality between individuals, with an equal pool of rights and a low tolerance of claims for group rights. Inclusion of the Sami in citizenship terms may be seen as both an inclusive and exclusive act. It is a constitutive, discursive categorization, offering a status to the Sami that preserves the hierarchy and status quo in society. Even though the status of the first-comer has not been contested in Finland, the individual rights offered and inclusion in the welfare state has resulted in the exclusion of alternative forms of citizenship and rights claims based on collective forms of social

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63 Aikio-Puoskari 2002, 96-97; Hirvonen 1999, 244; despite the ignorant policy, assimilative pressure was high, according to Jernsletten, because of the small size of the Sami minority in Finland. Jernsletten 2002, 148; Pentikäinen 1995, 331, 334.
65 Lapin taloudelliset olot ja niiden kehittäminen, Lapin Komitean mietintö No 8:1938, 169-170; Lehtola 1994b, 222; Lehtola 2000b, 75.
66 Lehtola 2004, 299.
organization, such as indigenousness.\textsuperscript{67} The Sami therefore had problems gaining any special rights before the 1970s.

The critique of the nation-state being non-neutral towards cultural identities and neglecting the special interests of (transnationally-organised cultural) minorities may be applied to Finland. In practice, as in Norway or any multi-party democracy, universalist and particularist values exist simultaneously and are practised in different combinations at different times. Since the war, strong, right-wing, expressive nationalism has been substituted for the more instrumental ideology of national solidarity, which highlights unity in principal issues concerning the survival of the state. Each citizen is expected to contribute, on a pluralistic basis, to developing society and securing the international competitiveness and political status of the nation. This, as well as a subject-like orientation towards a traditionally strong bureaucracy, eased up in the late 1960s, when a more customer-like orientation towards the state emerged and nationalism was questioned in some parts of society. Since then, the equalitarianism practised by the state has been confronted by thinking that emphasizes competitiveness.\textsuperscript{68} From a purely legal point of view, Finnish minority politics does not fully meet the requirements of international law, especially as the state of Finland has not ratified ILO Convention 169.\textsuperscript{69}

\textbf{2.2.4. Encountering the “Ultimate Other” - the case of the Petsamo and the policies directed towards the Skolt Sami}

The minority politics concerning the Skolt Sami in Petsamo (annexed in 1920) may be taken as an extreme example of Finnish minority politics before the Second World War. This period was one of high Finnish investment in Lapland and consequent modernization in Petsamo. The Skolt Sami became citizens of Finland, but social policy measures were an odd mixture of neglect, leading to disintegration, and a highly progressive segregation policy. To begin with, in the case of the Skolt Sami, the kindred bond was weaker and they were categorized lower than other Sami groups. Their way of life, with its suspicious Russian elements, was defined, for example, as lower, “worse” than the Finnish, primitive and “deficient”. Finnish anthropologists defined the Sami in the 1920s as a stunted race or primitive relic of

\textsuperscript{67} Fowler 1980, 64; Lawrence 2005, 103-107.
\textsuperscript{69} Hannikainen 1996, 325 et passim.
development. In Finnish travel books the imagery was negative and racist. The Skolt Sami were represented as ugly, unintelligible, stupid, lazy and primitive. In literature, modernization was perceived as harmful to the Skolt Sami. The official view was no better: Samppa Luoma, a teacher, estimated in 1923 that at secondary school age \(^{70}\) Skolt Sami children had become “human enough” (“ihmistynyt”) to follow teaching with other children. Veli-Pekka Lehtola stresses that these racist views (“work-shy reindeer thieves”) were widely shared among Finnish settlers.\(^{71}\)

The Finnish view was a condescending and scornful one of a racially lower people who were primitive, spoilt by their contact with the Finns and weak in character. This attitude led to a harsh policy. The siidas located near the road, Padzjavuvd and Peädsamsijdd (in Finnish, Paatsjoki Siida and Petsamo Siida), with the “degenerate” Skolt Sami, disintegrated and were partly excluded from welfare measures, as well as from campaigns for better housing. The peripatetic catechist teaching system existed for only a short period of time in the siidas located near the road and the children were eventually sent to Finnish schools, but only when there was room in the halls of residence. The only school exclusively for Skolt Sami children was erected in Suonikylä. It has been estimated that the school was a de facto fortress of Finnicization in the midst of the Skolt Sami, even though the teacher, Anni Tattari, had a command of the Skolt Sami language. The nomadic way of life seems to have been sufficient reason to consider the Skolt Sami children in need of institutionalization. Most of the children in the children’s home, where they received a Christian-moral upbringing, were Karelians or Skolt Sami.\(^{72}\) The Finns were not alone: in Norway, the Skolt Sami were regarded as a lower people who were dying out. Their distrustful look was racially inspired and racial blending was feared in some statements. Neiden Siida was nearly annihilated during the marginalization process.\(^{73}\)

The Skolt Sami in Suenjel were considered unspoiled and “authentic”, and therefore in needs of protection from outside influences. To avoid the threat of a vanishing authentic culture, a protected area in Suenjel was to be established. The initiative came from the Skolt Sami themselves. The Skolt Sami wrote a letter in 1930 to the Ministry of the Interior, asking...

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\(^{70}\) In Finland, voluntary secondary school was for children who were between twelve and fourteen years of age.


for autonomy and confirmation of their hunting and fishing rights. The Skolt Sami referred to the old privileges awarded by the Tsar of Russia.\footnote{Lehtola 2000c, 211.}

The Ministry of Interior took the initiative of denying agrarian settlement in Suenjel in 1932. The municipality of Petsamo, with no Skolt Sami as officials, offered the strongest resistance to this initiative. Other officials were more positive about the idea, as long as state landownership and rights to the natural resources were not questioned and reindeer herding management was not offered exclusively to the Skolt Sami. Forest and Park Service also took a strongly resistant stand in the discussion: as the natural resources in the area were discovered and utilized, the Skolt Sami culture would mix with the majority and adopt a basis of fixed settlement. The Society for the Promotion of Lappish Culture (SfPLC, Lapin Sivistysseura), a “Lapp-friendly” organization in Finland, demanded a more comprehensive solution for the entire Sami population, in addition to protecting the Skolt Sami of Suenjel. The project was criticized: attempts to isolate and “museolize” the culture did not seem a reasonable solution. The process was reminiscent of segregationist reservation ideology.

By comparison with Swedish “Lapp shall remain Lapp” segregationist ideas, the contemporary critique seems unreasonable. In Sweden, the initiative came from a majority that practised the power of definition and expertise in reindeer herding, resulting in a lowering of standards of schooling for the Sami. The starting-point was the same in both countries: the people who had integrated with nature in the most intimate way were under threat of annihilation by modernization. Nickul and the chairman of the SfPLC, Väinö Lassila, took the initiative of the Skolt Sami themselves and a respect for Skolt Sami culture on its own premise as their starting-point, rather than the national imagery of a lower people under threat. Another difference in the segregationist reservation policy was that protection was not meant to prevent the cultural or educational development of the Skolt Sami. Living in contact with other cultures had to be respected as well. A further difference was that the protection plan was based on a more precise knowledge of Skolt Sami subsistence than the Swedish social Darwinist notion of reindeer herding as the only appropriate subsistence for the Sami. Nickul was aware that Sami culture was based on interaction with other cultures and that the settlement could not be stopped: the need for protection could be achieved through changes in the settlement legislation. The Committee of Lapland took a positive stand on settlement restrictions, but insisted at the same time on the promotion of agriculture and cattle herding in Skolt Sami areas, which Nickul and Lassila resisted. The Ministry of Agriculture was more
worried about the traditional way of life, which could be protected by arranging property rights in the region. The outbreak of the Winter War in 1939 halted this project.  

The extent of the inclusion of the Sami into the national whole varied. The Skolt Sami were met with the lowest will to include. Bilingualism was a problem for some nationalists, who worried about the unity and security of the young nation-state. In theory, the situation had been solved by the formal status of citizenship. This was an ideal imposed without negotiation from above – it contained the potential for Sami claims to be renounced on the basis that they already had sufficient rights but, on the other hand, the various rights and services that accompanied citizenship had not yet been fully implemented. In the national ethos of the inter-war period, political inclusion was more of an inclusion that related to the responsibilities of citizenship. The extent of their exclusion was strongest in imagery: the question of whether the Finnish policy of difference towards the Sami, the “weaker brother”, was achieved to its full potential in the 1930s is a matter for further research.

2.2.5. The first phase of Sami activism in Finland – the Finnish “Sami Friends”

As the protection plan for the Suenjel Sami hints, there were Finnish scientists and authors with positive views of the Skolt Sami who tried to understand them on their own premise and correct negative representations and views of them. Samuli Paulaharju’s attitude towards the Skolt Sami was mostly understanding and romanticized, although he also saw them as a disappearing and dying people, sharing a view that was held of the whole Sami population. In science, one of the aims of the extensive research into Skolt Sami traditions, legal practices and society was to hinder them from the alleged risk of disappearance. The writer of a seminal work on the Skolt Sami, geographer Väinö Tanner, for example, put forward an initiative to improve the poor conditions of the Skolt Sami. His research aims were twofold, and not totally free from suspicions of the “Other”: to correct erroneous notions of the Skolt Sami as degenerate and a people of low morals, and to prove that Russian influence on the Skolt Sami was only superficial and the Lappish element dominant. He proved that the Skolt Sami had a history of their own, and he discussed in depth the social order of the siida system. Karl Nickul introduced two notions in his writings on the Skolt Sami. First, the Skolt Sami

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75 Väinö Lassila was a physical anthropologist and the chairman of the “Lapp-friendly” society. This was consistent, as demonstrated by a large contextualizations by Isaksson, because he strongly criticized the racist undertones in physical anthropology during the 1930s. Isaksson 2001, 302-306; Lantto 2000, 40-45; Lehtola 1999a, 159, 161; Lehtola 2000c, 211-213; Vahtola 1999, 504.
place-name system, not known to Finnish settlers, was added to maps of the area. Second, Nickul introduced the notion of the Skolt Sami way of life being adapted to nature, which would become the competing Sami representation in post-war Finland, alongside the old representation of primitive people.\textsuperscript{76}

For Veli-Pekka Lehtola, the background of emerging ethnic activism in Finland was a growing national interest in and pressure on the Sami regions, expressed in the will to secure the young nation-state of Finland with its newly-established northern borders in Petsamo. The efforts of a few nationalist activists were not carried through by the official bodies and the consistency of the Norwegian process of linguistic homogenization seems to have been lacking in Finland. During the 1920s there was a cut in funding for the Sami in the state budget and an effort was made to halt the peripatetic catechist teacher system. The rural police chief of Utsjoki E. N. Manninen, for example, argued against teaching the Sami their own language as being disunifying for the “small” nation of Finland. Manninen also attacked the establishment of a common orthography for the Northern Sami as a dangerous inter-Nordic, separatist undertaking (by Josef Guttorm). According to Lehtola, this was the background to the Vicar of Inari, Tuomo Itkonen, coming up with the idea of the SfPLC and starting the first period of Sami political activism. Itkonen had a history of promoting Sami education and literature.\textsuperscript{77}

The SfPLC, the “Sami-friendly” organization of Finland, was established in 1932, in the Department of Anatomy at the University of Helsinki. The purpose of this Finnish-dominated association was research, giving courses and issuing publications on Sami issues. The most important of these publications was *Sabmelaš*, the longest-lived publication in the Sami language in Finland, established in 1934. The SfPLC wanted to promote the educational and material prosperity of the Sami. The leading figures of the association, physical anthropologist Väinö Lassila and geologist Karl Nickul, tried to base this work on knowledge of the Sami, past and present. The work of revitalizing the Sami language was one of the association’s main concerns. The association was active in trying to get the state to promote Sami language and culture, demanding, for example, Sami language courses for the officials working in the Sami area. The Skolt question – first the plan to protect the Skolt Sami of Suonikylä and then, after the war, re-settling them – was one of Karl Nickul’s main concerns. The SfPLC was a “southern” (Aikio) cultural association, the members of which came from academic circles. The association had numerous Sami members and the SfPLC had

\textsuperscript{76} Lehtola 1997d, 273-275; Lehtola 1999b, 516; Vahtola 1999, 487, 493, 495, 501, 503-504.

\textsuperscript{77} Aikio 1984, 29; Lehtola 2000d, 155-158; Lehtola 2004, 299.
subsections in Lapland, where it also promoted activities. When it came to Sami identification and power of definition before and immediately after the war, the SfPLC sometimes presented itself as an authority on Sami identity. The post-war period marks the first efforts to disengage from this practice as the Sami began, increasingly, to embark on self-representations.\textsuperscript{78} Samuli Aikio sees the association as one sign of the easing of assimilative ideas and fears of Sami secessionism that had existed in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{79} The significance of the SfLPC was greatest during and immediately after the Second World War. The aid, international and otherwise, that was channelled specifically to the Skolt Sami, was significant. The SfPLC also launched a census of the Sami people in Finland. This project was led by archivist Aslak Outakoski.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{2.3. Conclusions}

In assessing Finnish Sami policies before the Second World War it is necessary to differentiate between conformist national(ist) rhetoric and ideals and real, practised policies. There is no total correspondence between ideals and practice, nor any dominance of ultranationalist, racist discourses. Of course there was the full-blown “politics of difference”, practised in the building of the young nation-state, and the state of Finland had to cope with ethnic diversity in Northern Finland. This small minority was never an issue of major importance and the Sami mostly encountered political ambivalence, at worst leading to policies of neglect. Inclusion within the state of Finland involved both inclusive and assimilating, erosive factors. The Finnish school system, as the most important assimilating institution, and encounters with the Skolt Sami, which amounted in some cases to racism, are the most obvious examples of Finnish assimilation policies.

Citizenship and access to Finnish institutes and welfare measures makes the Finnish policy not one of marginalization. The erosive developments occurred in the land rights constellation, where the property rights regime of the Sami was disregarded and replaced by a Finnish state ownership and land regime. In addition, resource management was “ethnonationalized”. Again, this process did not merely marginalize but also included the Sami within the new hierarchies, at a low level in Forest and Park Service and at a high level in local reindeer herding management (see Chapter 3.4). During this period, the Sami became

\textsuperscript{78} Aikio 1984, 27-33; Isaksson 2001, 302-306; Lehtola 2000d, 157-158.
\textsuperscript{79} Aikio 1992, 222.
\textsuperscript{80} Lehtola 1994b, 226.
active in Finnish civil society, in Sami-friendly associations and in the Finnish administrative hierarchy, as there were only a very few purely Sami institutions. The profound change in the Sami way of life that took place during this period cannot be denied. This change was mostly imported to the Sami domicile, but the inclusive features of this process and the access to services restored a space for Sami intention and initiative. This also applies to the political sphere and to Sami ethnopolitics, which is the theme of the next chapter.

Before embarking on this, it should be noted that the “political Sami” of the pre-war era are still waiting to be researched. Even though what political space existed seems to have lacked the “Sami” as a claimant for the Sami collectively, there were individual actors and initiatives, which unfortunately remain outside the scope of this study. As we have seen, the prevailing notion is that the Sami as a political, collective community did not exist. It also seems that there was seldom any ethnically-based sense of community, and this had a very limited field of inclusion.
3. Sami Identity Politics in 1940s Finland

3.1. Introduction

This chapter deals with the construction of a collective Sami identity and the identity politics of the Sami during the first phase of Sami activism in Finland. This phase was marked by a close, yet not unproblematic co-operation between the “Sami Friends” and Sami activists who initiated their own organization during this period. This relationship evolved from one of benefactor and recipient to a more equal level, where representational strategies were sometimes negotiated. In some cases, statements were made renouncing the authority of the Finnish friends and disengaging from co-operation. This increasing tension is outlined in the chapter that follows. National and regional contexts will be discussed initially, followed by the rebuilding of the Sami home area. I shall then look at the opening phase of Sami identity politics and the formation of ethnopolitical space in different fora: in correspondence with the Finnish “Sami Friends”, and in the public sphere and press. The construction of a Sami collective identity and the contesting representations of different actors is illustrated. It is also important to establish whether, with regard to some of the previous research done on this subject, the identity politics and representational strategy were thoroughly thought out and successful. A pre-hypothesis is that a Sami collective identity was used, constituting an effort to pursue identity politics, but that it had to compete with representations made by other actors. The activities and identity politics of the Sami Litto, the first Sami organisation in Finland, are studied in a chapter of their own. Finally, an effort will be made to explain Sami mobilization in Finland. This will be achieved by means of inter-Nordic comparison, through which the inter-Nordically late phase of the mobilization is examined, as well as by means of commentary on earlier theories concerning this matter.

3.1.1. The socio-economic context

The post-war era had a number of favourable aspects for the minorities and indigenous peoples. The need to protect minorities was recognized in a wave of anti-racist thinking. The same need was observed when industrial and technological modernization, as well as the
construction of the welfare state, reached the peripheries inhabited by the minorities. State-centric positivist dogma in international law eased up a bit; prior to this, it had disqualified indigenous actors from negotiations concerning international law. Now a growing concern for human and individual rights emerged, and non-state actors began to shape international law. Structures created by classical colonialism began to be viewed negatively as they stripped various peoples of self-government. The legal category of indigenous peoples, a product of colonial encounter, emerged in UN conventions after the Second World War. These new ideological changes emerging from the struggle against Nazism culminated in the ILO Convention 107 in 1957 for the protection of tribal and indigenous people.

In Finland, the post-war period was marked by a persistent belief in progress, industrialization and modernization. In a national context, a notion of Finnish people and the Finnish nation was in motion. During the 1930s, national borders were seen as cultural barriers, an expectancy of national unity and unanimity was established and cultural variation was perceived as negative. In post-war Finland, the shift towards a more relative and positive view of cultural and national differences was on its way, but the shift was far from complete. There were the beginnings of many traits of thoughts: trying in earnest, for example, to build positive relations with neighbouring countries; perceiving patriotism/nationalism as a more personal choice; and an emerging criticism of the nationalism of the 1930s, all of which were completed in the 1960s. This should not, though, be over-exaggerated: during the 1940s, class distinctions were regarded as unbridgeable in Finland and a similar kind of “parallel mentalities” must surely have been thought to exist regarding ethnic groups.

The sharpest racial attitudes towards the Sami were fading in the new post-war ideological atmosphere, where the strong nationalism of the 1930s was seen as the cause of the lost war. Human dignity and the rights of minorities were highlighted in a new manner and formalized in the UN Charter that was implemented by the Nordic States. A political, ideological and cultural crisis, which expressed itself in a collective shame due to the choice of sides in the lost war, led to a national project of proving that Finland was a Western, civilized state. However, this led at first to a low political commitment on the part of the

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1 This is a positive formulation: the welfare state was a substitute for the indigenous institutions and power was shifted to the remote South: this was the experience in the peripheries. Ingold 1976, 8.
3 Kahelin 1991, 251.
5 Peltonen 2002, 124.
educated, literary class, at least when it came to the party-political scene, rather than a systematic re-evaluation of minority politics.

After the Continuation War and the signing of the peace treaty on 19 September 1944, the presence of a Soviet-dominated Control Commission resulted in direct Soviet influence in Finnish political life. At a political and ideological level, the re-orientation and shift to “democratic” values was fastest in political circles, carried through because of the need for a fast reaction to the shifting political constellations. Political re-orientation in wider circles of society was not total: this is evident, for example, in the revanchism concerning the Karelia question, now ceded to the Soviet Union. Prevailing nationalism found new venues and organizations replacing the banned organizations in the peace treaty.

Racial attitudes, which perceived biology as a determinating factor, and racial hierarchies did not vanish for a quite a long period of time. They were not relinquished when Germany lost the Second World War, but were a central part of modern Western thought (in academic circles, for example), and evident in the absence of anti-imperialism. Racial hierarchies still existed in the nations that had fought against Hitler. These same nations were also happy to curb collective rights thinking in the UN. Only the Anti-Racist Declaration of UNESCO in 1951 changed these attitudes, when the term race was replaced by heredity. As in Norway and Sweden, where race-biological hierarchies were argued for in economic instead of cultural terms, the hierarchy did not necessarily vanish in Finland either, but it may have become less sharply expressed. There is no doubt that this affected the Sami. The Sami mobilization was carried out in a muzzled, still-nationalistic political environment. Sami policy was in a state of stagnation. There were no significant new signs of solidarity or of

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9 In the case of surviving racial views towards the Sami in Sweden, see Axelsson 2005, 63; in Norway racial views of the inner minorities, the Kven and the Sami, was toned down to perceptions of the threat of “ethnocommunists”, but it resulted in a continuation of “Finnish menace” thinking until the 1970s, see Eriksen 2001, 145-146, 150-158; Mazover 1999, 79, 197-202, 212-214; Peltonen 1998; 10-15; Peltonen 2002, 50-62; as late as 1964 an anthropological study, with financing from the World Health Organization, was carried out on the Skolt Sami. Here Dr. Aldur W. Eriksson stressed that the aim was to find out whether the Skolt Sami were remnants of a separate group of people. Eriksson also stressed how the blood group studies disprove the claims of the Skolt Sami being of Mongol origin. Many anthropometric measurements were taken. LK 7.4.1964, Koltatähtien antropologinen ja lääketieteellinen tutkimus foreign Kittilä; in 1969 a group of 60 researchers carried out an extensive study of the Sami people in which, amongst other things, their features were photographed. The Sami, who were interviewed in a newspaper, expressed their thanks for the opportunity of getting a free health consultation. LK 2.8.1969, 60 tiedemiestä kahdeksasta maasta tekee Saamelaitutkimusta Inarissa; according to studies made on the colour of their skin (“not more yellow than among other Nordic people”) and fingerprints, it was proved that the Sami belonged to the European rather than the Asian “human species” (ihmislaji). LK 2.9.1969, Koltat ja saamelaiset eurooppalaisesta rotua; see also Müller-Wille 1991, 158, who refers to the project lacking control over the conduct and purpose of the studies.
moving away from the typical egalitarian policy of the pre-war era until the 1960s, when the new post-war “baby-boom generation” came to power and started their own questioning of the old modes of thought, of which more later.

3.1.2. Changing politics and contexts in the rebuilding of Lapland

At a practical minority policy level, there were signs of goodwill towards the language question in schools. According to the Report of the Education and Culture Committee of the Finnish Parliament, it would be fair to offer Sami children teaching in the Sami language in elementary school but, for practical reasons, education in higher classes ought to be given in Finnish. Thus, the Sami would not be alienated from their “home and nationality” and their culture would be preserved. The concrete results of the parliamentary reports were non-existent, since the era of highest assimilation pressure followed in the schools. The goodwill was based on a representation of a “peculiar people living in nature” (“Omalaatuinen luonnonkansa”). Even though the term “peculiar” did not have a negative connotation in this period, the representation is a classic example of a “Noble Savage” trap, with no concrete results. The representation was backed up by a representation of “people in distress”. This goodwill was evident in relation to “soft” issues and from organs that had no power of decision over minority policy. As in Sweden, hardcore Sami politics in vital issues such as landownership and resource management remained solid. In practice, interest in the education language issue soon ceased in the Ministry of Education and the new decree concerning Folk Schools of 1958 worsened the situation, as the Sami were to be given only oral teaching in Sami by removing the requirement of a written education.

The Sami question and many other issues were buried under the pressing importance of rebuilding Lapland. The retreating Germans had mined Lapland heavily, and had burned almost all the housing north of Rovaniemi. Inari was a municipality with one of the highest percentages of burnt housing in Lapland. Estimates vary between 80-90% of buildings. The population was eager to return but the mine hazard hampered the resettlement. By the autumn

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11 Compare Minde 2003b, 106. By “Noble Savage” trap, Henry Minde means a representative strategy building on primordial imagery, distance to modernity and victim representations. The strategy appeals to the paternalism of the majority actors, but opens up possibilities of guilt-tripping the indigenous actors for opting into modernization.


of 1945 some of the municipal infrastructure, for example the hospital, the office of Forest
and Park Service and the police, was present at Ivalo. Municipal offices were concentrated
there later on, which deepened the Finnish outlook of the village. Forestry was one of the first
means of living to begin anew, as Forest and Park Service began to clear the unfortunate
loggings of the retreating German troops and provide wood for the rebuilding of Inari.¹⁵
Reindeer herding was another form of subsistence to recover fast from the war. From 1943
onwards the absence of reindeer owners, now sent to the front, began to influence this trade
and the expropriation of reindeer is mentioned for the first time, but after the war the herders
were in a tolerable position; even though the stocks had diminished, there was a ready-made
food supply dispersed in the forests.¹⁶

The rebuilding of Inari was completed in 1950, whereas in the province of Oulu the
process of resettling Karelian refugees had already finished by 1948.¹⁷ The resettlement
process in Finland was aimed at men who had served in the war, as well as refugees from
Karelia and Petsamo, in compensation for lost landownership and agricultural settlement. The
process aimed at a more justifiable compensation for personal losses in the war, and was in a
class-conciliative vein. The establishment of small-scale farms was as much a matter of social
policy as of agricultural policy. A rhetoric of “healing the wounds of the nation” was used.
The peasant ideal thus survived into the 1960s, when the small-scale farms proved to be an
economically unsound choice. Rebuilding burnt Lapland changed the socio-economic context
in northernmost Lapland the most, as cattle-raising was introduced to the region.¹⁸

From the perspective of social history, this Finnicization was amplified by the upsurge
of a “loose” population of Finnish extraction in search of employment and gold in the
Lemmenjoki region. In Inari there had been a Finnish majority from the 1920s onwards, but
this became more significant after the Second World War.¹⁹ On a cultural level, the evacuee
and resettlement period has been labelled by Samuli Aikio and Veli-Pekka Lehtola as a period
of Finnicization of Inari and the Sami home region. The evacuation period familiarized the
Sami with Finnish language, dress codes, agriculture, food, plays, getting up early in the
morning, improved hygiene, etc. Everyday use of the gákti was diminishing and it became a
mode of dress for formal and church occasions. Lehtola stresses the significance of

¹⁴ Lehtola 2000b, 189-190.
¹⁶ The Provincial Archive of Oulu, The archive of the reindeer herding co-operative Kyrö, Ca:1, minutes 1938-
1954.
¹⁷ Ursin 1980, 298, 300.
¹⁸ Alasuutari 1996, 54, 60, 62.
resettlement, with Finnish standardized housing, which entailed privatizing and restructuring the living space of everyday life and work. The architectural change and improvement in living conditions modernized and homogenized the burnt landscape. The process and assimilative pressure varied from region to region, according whether the region had been burnt by the retreating Germans or not. On many occasions, Saminess was hidden and there was ethnic shame, but the Sami language and way of life survived in many, mostly remote places. Mixed marriages caused Sami women to assimilate and there were conflicts over the fishing resources.  

The introduction of southern means of agriculture, and especially cattle-raising, was not always successful and led to a profound shift in the subsistence economy, with various means of living in one’s own annual cycle. The demands of economic efficiency were met by concentrating on mechanized and intensified cattle-raising, which was preferred to the old subsistence economy. Agriculture was reckoned to dominate in some places, for example in Utsjoki, whereas the old means of living were perceived to disturb it. The change in economy was backed by cultural and ideological change. Opportunities for paid labour continued to be taken up. This choice diminished the possibility of sustaining a subsistence economy, but could not provide a certain livelihood because of its sporadic and uncertain nature (the length and availability of the loggings varied during this period). In Sami fiction and biographies a new strategy is consistently described. In particular, if the head of the family did not own a sufficient stock of reindeer and the family had many children, only a few of them could carry on herding. The rest of the children were sent to school, in the hope of getting a trade. Sometimes children, mostly boys, preferred the herding option over school and chose to take a traditional Sami education with father and the stock.  

However, there were cases that do not fit the narrative of assimilation. As Ludger Müller-Wille has shown in the case of Utsjoki, after the war there were “self-sustaining” Sami niches of ethnicity and a far from complete “colonization”. This Finnicization process proceeded furthest in Sodankylä and Ivalo, where the municipal officials of Inari were concentrated. The village of Inari – where ethnic relations have been referred to as good and

19 Compare Northern Norway, where the Norwegian population already exceeded that of the Sami by the middle of the nineteenth century. Balsvik and Drake 1994, 94-103; Paine 1958, 168.
21 Magga; Miettunen 2002, 189, 259; on agriculture see Siuruainen and Aikio 1977, 33-37.
22 Müller-Wille 1996, 40, 82-86.
the Finns were not excluded, for example, from the activities of SL – remained a Sami centre\textsuperscript{23} and a place for meeting and exchange. In Inari, there were still remote regions and villages with a Sami majority. Even in Vuotso, located in Sodankylä, which had had the longest contact with the majority, Sami ethnicity has been referred to as strong, in spite of the language change.\textsuperscript{24}

In post-war Inari a Finnicization took place, but the process, if anything, left room for adaptive mechanisms that improved subsistence possibilities in conditions where the niche of a traditional means of living was beginning to be invaded or questioned. At this stage, the potential for independent Sami identity politics would appear to be small. On the contrary, however, and in the last analysis, it was the Finnicization process itself that made Sami identity politics possible. A whole new political space for organization and debate was created and entered upon by the Sami. In addition, a majority “Other” could be now more effectively constructed and contested. This process and the beginnings of Sami identity politics are the themes of the following sections.

3.2. Sami imagery in the 1940s
3.2.1. Counter-imagery: people under threat

\textit{Lapin Kansa}, a newspaper with an Agrarian Union background and patriotic substance, was a very Sami-friendly forum. For example, the newspaper systematically used the ethnonym “Sami” instead of “Lapp”. This was exceptional for that time: the leading Sami Friend in Finland, Karl Nickul, had to be introduced to the term, for example. Having said this, throughout the rebuilding process the newspaper was systematic in its imagery of a unified Finnish people rebuilding Lapland;\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Lapin Kansa} was a predominantly Finnish forum, with a programme of provincial progress. The journalistic treatment of the Sami was established when Martti Suontila was chief editor during the years 1943-1947, and again in 1954-1967.\textsuperscript{26} Sami representations in \textit{Lapin Kansa} were two-fold during the rebuilding period. The Sami as reindeer herders got to represent themselves as equal, professional members of an interest

\textsuperscript{23} Lehtola 1997b, 59-60; Lehtola 2003, 448.
\textsuperscript{24} Aikio M. 1988, 309; Lindgren 2000, 42-43.
\textsuperscript{25} Here are a few examples of heroicizing rhetoric: on reindeer herding LK 20.12.1946, Porotaloutemme osoittaa jo elpymisen merrkejä; on rebuilding LK 5.9.1946, Kolttien sijoituskysymystä pohdittiin Ivalon neuvottelukokouksessa.
\textsuperscript{26} LK 5.12.1968, Lapin Kansan päätöimittajat.
group. On the other hand, representations of a people under threat were also cultivated. A number of examples follow, firstly of a member of an interest group.

According to Lapin Kansa reindeer herding had suffered during the war, and with the resettlement loggings reindeer herding had to be established anew. The wartime mass-slaughter regulations of reindeer were dismantled in 1946. Erkki Jomppanen, a reindeer owner, was interviewed on this matter. Jomppanen thanked the Ministry of Maintenence for the dismantling and stated that it created a belief in the continuation of reindeer herding. Even though there is a strong sense of subsistence under hardship, the press offered Sami reindeer herders the possibility of representing themselves as experts and as equal members of their occupational group. This was more evident in annual interviews, where Jomppanen spoke about the reindeer herding year to Lapin Kansa.28

The “people under threat” representations were mostly cultivated about the Skolt Sami.29 To begin with, their resettlement history was different. The resettlement of the Skolt Sami from the three siidas ceded to the Soviet Union from the Petsamo era proved to be difficult. The Skolt Sami had lost all their belongings and reindeers and, unlike other people in Lapland, their fishing waters and hunting and pasture lands. The evacuation period was traumatic in many ways, as the Sami, among them especially the Skolt Sami, were met with suspicion by the Finns in Ostrobothnia. After giving up plans to settle in their old siidas in the Soviet Union the Skolt Sami, on their own iniative, settled in the area near Lutto-joki, in south-eastern Inari. This area proved to be unfruitful with regard to traditional means of living. Finally, the state of Finland managed to plan the settlement and the Skolt Sami from the Paatsjoki (Padzjavuvd) and Petsamo (Peädsamsijdd) Siidas were settled either in Nellim or near Ivalo, in Akujärvi, Keväjärvi and Pikku-Petsamo. The Skolt Sami from Suenjel Siida

27 Kansanhuoltoministeriö was a war-time ministry responsible for the rationing and distribution of foodstuffs in Finland.
29 In majority languages there is no good translation available for the ethnonym “Sä`mmlaž”, meaning simply “the Sami”; the self-definition used by the Skolt Sami of themselves. The term “Nuortalan”, pl. “Nuortalažžat” (a direct translation, “one who lives in east”, “itäläinen” in Finnish) is Northern Sami and a term used by other Sami groups of the Skolt Sami, and thus cannot be used to legitimate the term “Eastern Sami”. “Eastern Sami” refers to the larger language group and is thus imprecise. The term “Skolt” (“kolta”) or “Skolt Lapp” (“kolttalapalainen”) is given by the majority and can be used pejoratively, like the term “Lapp”. All the terms mentioned are known among the Eastern Sami as well. The term “Eastern Sami” is used by the (language) group to refer to themselves and to express their affinity, and it has its advocates among researchers. I use the term “Skolt Sami” (“kolttaaamelainen”) because the term is the most precise of those available. The term “Skolt Sami” is recommended by Veli-Pekka Lehtola and Jelena Sergejeva. The most precise way would be to refer to the old siidas, the way Matti Sverloff does with “Suenjel Sami” etc, but as the Skolt Sami Siidas do not exist as such any more, this might be problematical as well. Lehtola 1999a, endnote 1, 714; Niemi 2002a, 97; Sammallahti 1994, 154; Sergejava 2000, 7, 28; Sverloff 2003, 6.
(following annexation to Finland, Suonikylä) were settled near Näätämö, in Sevettijärvi. The resettlement caused the end of the annual circulatory system. The resettlement was not finished until the beginning of the 1950s and difficulties in subsistence continued.\textsuperscript{30}

The notion of a need to protect the Skolt Sami from modernization was still affecting the policy towards the Skolt Sami.\textsuperscript{31} In the press, the representation of the Skolt Sami as a people under threat of “destruction” and “extinction” was cultivated. This was backed up by population statistics (only 72 Skolt Sami were under the age of eighteen, while the population as a whole had reduced by half). This “picturesque” people had a hard time adjusting and were in need of help, as they had lost their reindeer and fishing equipment. International help was anticipated when the French author Robert Crottet had made the cause internationally known. By comparison with the inter-war period (see Chapter 2.2.4), the destiny of the Skolt-Sami, trying to adapt to the new modern conditions, was still inevitable, but it was also regrettable.\textsuperscript{32} The Skolt Sami seldom got to make self-representations in the press. When they did, they represented themselves as people suffering hardship and asking for help.\textsuperscript{33} The difference in comparison to the way the reindeer-herding Sami were represented, and how they represented themselves in the press, is striking. The racist view is not explicit in press material on the Skolt Sami, but the notion is, it may safely be said, a continuation of the widely-held pre-war essentialist notion of the Skolt Sami as a dying people (in contact with the majority and modernization) that was common in Finland and in Norway\textsuperscript{34}, even though there had been a change in the perception of the “destiny” of the Skolt Sami.

3.2.2. Sami self-representations: an introduction

When two cultures meet and the minority begins to voice demands for special, protective or emancipatory rights, there is a meeting of two groups of unequal power. The cultural contact does not happen under equal conditions.\textsuperscript{35} In inter-ethnic communication, the mutual

\textsuperscript{30} Holsti 1990, 32-37, 43; Lehtola 1999a, 161-169; Lehtola 1999b, 509, 516-517, 523; Nyyssönen 1999, 651-653; Pelto 1973, 20; Tuominen 2003, 104, 111; the names from the siidas were taken from Sverloff 2003, 12, 30.

In Skolt Sami, siida vuvvd means the area controlled by a kin, a siida.


\textsuperscript{32} LK 5.3.1947, Koltille apua Englannista; LK 11.3.1947, Uusi talvikylä ja poroja Suonikylän koltille. Kolttalapalaiisten kohtalo ulkomaisen huomion kohteena.

\textsuperscript{33} LK 5.9.1946, Koltten sijoituskysymystä pohdittiin Ivalon neuvottelukokouksessa.

\textsuperscript{34} Andresen 1989, 141-142, 148; on essentialist premises of the dying people imagery, see Anttonen 1999, 437; Lehtola 1999b, 516.

\textsuperscript{35} Liebkind 1995, 40-41.
representations of the self have to be adjusted and readjusted by the bargaining parties, according to what they perceive the conceptualization of the other party to be. In a symmetric relationship this is reciprocal, but in asymmetric conditions the weaker party has to rely to a greater extent on the imagery of the dominant party. In mobilization, members of the weaker group have to adjust their self-representations strategically and comply with the hegemonic codification of the politically and legally possible. Sometimes this results in the need to renounce various modern adaptations carried through by the people. The act of self-representation is restricted by the imagery and patronage of the majority.\(^{36}\) Traditionally, the power constellation has been seen as unfavourable to the Sami and the state of Finland has been seen as the stronger, indeed colonizing power. The situation was different in identity politics and in inter-ethnic communication. Unlike the downright assimilative conditions in Norway, the Sami in Finland were partly in a position to influence inter-ethnic communication: they held partial power of definition in their own media (see Chapter on SL), and they had access to the Finnish media, which was at least not openly hostile to their cause.

In addition to the task of presenting the field of representation, this chapter goes on to chart the first phase of Sami identity politics. Which markers were chosen, which demands were made, and by whom?

### 3.2.3. Negotiating self-representation: from thankful objects to more reflective identity politics

The correspondence between the Sami and the SfPLC and its secretary, Karl Nickul, offers the possibility of following the drafting of identity politics and the choice of markers. Two things emerge in correspondence. Firstly, the Sami, who did not have any inhibitions in identifying themselves as Sami, built their identity in this correspondence in relation to the “Other”, in this case the Finnish. In this series of sources, the inter-Nordic connection was absent, even to other Sami, and in fact it was Karl Nickul who recommended the Sami to establish contacts with Sami movements in other Nordic countries.\(^{37}\) Secondly, this period was one of economic distress and most of the correspondence is about asking for funding or material help, and thanking the people in the SfPLC for their help. Economic distress caused

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\(^{36}\) Thuen 1995, 183-185.

\(^{37}\) Whether this was the decisive initiative is not known, due to a lack of inter-Sami correspondence in the series. KA, AKN, file 3, correspondence 1945, Karl Nickul to Petteri Lukkari 28.2.1945.
the Sami to cultivate victim representations and the construction of a collective identity was made against the counter-imagery of a disappearing people in distress, cultivated, for example, by Karl Nickul, who sometimes argued for the expert advice provided by the SfPLC using this representation. Thus, there was little possibility of actual identity politics during the earliest phases of correspondence, but a distinction can be drawn between identity political claims targeted at the SfPLC and Nickul and the discussion concerning representational strategies that was aimed at society at large.

During the evacuation period and the earliest resettlement period, pleas from the Sami to the SfPLC for material help and funding, for example for studying purposes (Eino and Pekka Lukkari, as well as Matti Sverloff, received funding for their studies as a part of the SfPLC policy of promoting the schooling of the Sami) were numerous. Pleas for fishing nets are most numerous, as well as thanks for the nets received. This has a background in personal ties between Karl Nickul and numerous Sami individuals. In the correspondence, the quite inactive agency of the thankful object is to be found, amplified by the Christian values and codes of conduct of the period, but this is foreshadowed by straightforward acts of ethnic identification.

Women occupied this inactive agency and they appear in most cases as wives of the Sami activists or as receivers of help. One example is a letter from Jouni A. Guttorm in January 1945, where he reports on the distribution of hymn-books, sent by the SfPLC to women evacuated to Alavieska (in Ostrobothnia). Women get to have their say in the correspondence more often than they do in press material. Karl Nickul corresponded with Laura Lehtola, a peripatetic catechist teacher (katekeetta), a devotedly religious woman of Finnish extraction, who had a command of the Sami language. In the letters she wrote, the religious aspect is highlighted, which she reflects upon as a prevailing discourse for Sami women as well. Karl Nickul corresponded with another peripatetic catechist teacher, Agneta Walle, as well. She identified herself as a Sami, while thanking Nickul on behalf of the Sami tribe. She describes the joy felt by the people when the priest Itkonen, from Inari, arrived in Ylivieska (in Ostrobothnia) to greet his evacuated congregation. However, Walle did not dare to go and speak to the priest, as he was surrounded by “influential believers” from another

38 KA, AKN, file 3, correspondence 1945, Karl Nickul to Laura Lehtola 15.6.1947; on Nickul’s opinion of the role and task of the SFPLC, see also Nickul, Karl: Kolmekymmentä vuotta saamelaistoimintaa, LK 28.11.1962, where he outlines the task of developing Sami culture from its own premises. However, society felt better qualified than “the small minority” at pointing out the problems and solutions in modern society.

39 The funds resulted in the emergence of Sami teachers. Lehtola 2000b, 98-100.

40 KA, AKN, file 3, correspondence 1945, Jouni A. Guttorm to Karl Nickul 17.1.1945 and Petteri Lukkari Karl Nickul 3.3.1945.
This last-mentioned detail may not qualify as a representative example of Sami women’s position in Sami society, but it reflects Walle’s identification strategies. Religiousness, at least as much as Sami ethnicity, seems to have been a constituent factor in identity and to have influenced how other people were represented.

Even though Walle and Lehtola were the only women to have contact with Nickul, they were surely not the only women to be involved in Sami organizational life and matters. However, the role of the Sami women seems to be traditional and their position, accordingly, seems to have been in the background, at home. Walle had more time for ethnic-based engagements, as she was not married, whereas Laura Lehtola complained about other engagements. The correspondence between both women suffered from long breaks.

There are only a few indications of outright ponderings on how the Sami should be represented. In June 1949 Eino Lukkari wrote to Karl Nickul about how the Lapps should be represented in the right light, i.e. not merely as tourist attractions. He continued: “But making the need for spiritual and material help of the Lappish people in Lapland known among the educated classes of our country is a task that could bear results in relation to the efforts.”

I interpret the writing of Lukkari as a suggestion of applying victim representation, since he seems to present the picture of a “people under economic hardship” as more effective than representing the Sami in the “right light”. In his reply, Nickul is sceptical about representing the Sami as “pitiful”, which seems to back up my interpretation.

As the example of Walle shows, the national status of the Sami at the end of the 1940s was that of a tribe. Whether the “tribe” was enclosed within the Finnish national whole, as one of the tribes that constituted the state of Finland, is a difficult question. Jooseppi Lukkari (probably a peripatetic catechist teacher and a verger from Utsjoki) wrote about Sami history and education to Nickul in two letters written in 1949. For Lukkari, the Sami had been an uneducated tribe that was just beginning its quest for (Western) knowledge. The history of the Sami tribe had been difficult in the same way as that of Finns (which is a rare reference to
their common, binding history). Where their histories differ from one another is in the gaining of independence, where the Finns “were ahead” of the Sami. Thus, the work of the SfPLC represented for Lukkari a “towing” of the Sami people, for which he thanks Nickul. This combination of a desire for (historically predetermined) mobilization, written from a “lower”, weaker position (thanking the SfPLC), was quite typical of letters written to Nickul. There were many letters written from an equal position as well. In a later letter, the hierarchical dichotomy between state and tribe is also evident, but states and tribes have an equal opportunity for development and civilization is universally shared. However, Lukkari stresses that each nation and tribe possesses unique manners, conditions, ways of thinking and language, due to its different history. It is self-evident to Lukkari that the state should consider both the spiritual and the material needs of its “subjects” (Lukkari). It seems that for Lukkari the “topical and justified” mobilization would result in a Sami nation. In the end, Lukkari did decide to separate the Sami tribe from the Finnish national whole. This is also a rare example of a positive horizon of expectancy and a Sami effort to envisage the Sami society of the future. As we shall see, there were Sami who entertained more grim prospects for the Sami people.

3.2.4. The radicalization of representation: a people under threat seeking isolation from the majority

In the sources there are numerous examples of support for co-operation between the Sami and the SfPLC. However, the first distinctive identity political undertaking was to construct a separate Saminess by disengaging from the SfPLC. Here are some examples from the late 1940s where the ethnic identification is achieved through building ethnic boundaries and differences ever higher and by demonizing the majority “Other”. During the 1940s the most radical Sami advocate was Nilla Outakoski, who was studying theology at the time (see also the chapter on SL and the appendix). Outakoski renounced the authority of the SfPLC and Nickul in Sami matters, which had to be decided by the Sami themselves. Outakoski made a distinction between Sami and Finnish ultra-nationalism (“kiihkokansallisuus”) with regard to

\[48\] KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Jooseppi Lukkari to Karl Nickul 6.4.1949.
\[49\] KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Jooseppi Lukkari to Karl Nickul 11.6.1949.
teaching the Sami language: the plan to teach children in Finnish was ultra-nationalistic, whereas Sami nationalism was more positive and healthy. Outakoski had stated the claim of teaching Sami children only one Sami language. He was consistent, in his quite sporadic correspondence, in representing himself as separate from Finnish discourses. He advised Nickul to use the term “Sami” instead of “Lapp”. In addition to segregation, conformity and radicalism were expected of the Sami by Outakoski. Karl Nickul, in turn, reacted to the demands for a separate Sami region and the demand that all Sami should be taught one Sami language. Nickul demanded respect for democracy, the home language and the different dialects of the Sami language spoken in Lapland. He also stated that Sami families would prefer to send their children to schools where teaching was given in Finnish than to a school where teaching was offered in a different Sami dialect.

Nilla’s brother, the archivist Aslak Outakoski, expressed doubts as to how Finnish participants on the Sami Committee (see Chapter 4.2.3.) might act as advocates for the Sami. Nilla Outakoski had called Karl Nickul “a foreigner” in a newspaper article. The teacher Hans Aslak Guttorm also distrusted Nickul for resisting the free development efforts of the Sami. In Sami activist circles, one disunifying factor was the question of how close a relationship was appropriate with regard to the SfPLC. The activists mentioned perceived the power held by the Finns to be problematic. The period during which Nilla Outakoski was chairman of Samii Litto (SL) was one of turmoil between the SfPLC and SL: Outakoski resisted hard the allegedly patronizing attitude of the SfPLC as well as the orthography of Sabmelaš, which he found too closely bound to written Finnish. The conservative substance of the periodical was also a matter of complaint – after an effort to establish a competing newsletter, Nilla Outakoski founded a short-lived periodical Sabmi in 1948, but the disputes were settled only after the resignation of the Outakoski regime in 1950, when Johan Nuorgam became chairman of SL.

The Finnish settlement of Utsjoki, which still had a Sami majority, was a perceived threat that precipitated Sami demands for voluntary isolation. H. A. Guttorm reported to Karl

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51 This was also a pre-war concern for Sami activists in Norway, see Minde 2000c, 136.
53 KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Aslak (Outakoski) to Karl Nickul 5.2.1949.
54 Neither the date nor the newspaper is mentioned in the source. KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Karl Nickul to Eino Lukkari 17.6.1949.
55 KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Karl Nickul to teacher Hans Aslak Guttorm 25.5.1949.
56 Lehtola 2000d, 164-166; Nickul 1957; see a shift in attitude and a new stress on co-work between the SfPLC and SL, Pârgu samii puorrin, Sabmelaš 2/1952.
Nickul that support for SL was growing and even old enemies were being converted into advocates of the Sami cause. The reason for this was, according to Guttorm, the threat the Finnish settlement imposed on traditional means of living and old traditions. This source is a valid indicator of a feature of Sami history discussed, for example, by Veli-Pekka Lehtola. The resettlement may indisputably have Finnicized the Sami home area, as Lehtola stresses, but the alleged threat of Finnicization was the cause of ethnic mobilization, as argued in this correspondence. H. A. Guttorm does not specify what kind of policy the “old enemies” advocated, nor who they were. 57

As the case of Utsjoki shows, cultural encounter is dynamic and goes through many phases, in which the “minority” might find itself in a majority position and where minority cultural markers, such as language, are dominant. In local societies, the exchange between cultures is not a one-way exchange but reciprocal, and has many sources. 58 Ludger Müller-Wille writes about the negative attitude that the Sami in Utsjoki had towards the Finns. This attitude, together with the absence of a road, and consequently few contacts, protected the Utsjoki Sami from majority impulses. In addition, the war and the experiences of downgraded handling during the evacuation period fed this negativity. As late as the 1960s some Sami in Utsjoki resisted road constructions, fearing a further Finnish influx and change in ethnic constellation. 59 By comparison, Bård A. Berg explains the low ethnic mobilization of the Sami herdsmen in inner Finnmark as being due to a lack of contact with the Norwegian officials and autonomously-governed herding. 60 After the war, stricter separationism seems to have been mostly an Utsjoki phenomenon, according to the evidence from H. A. Guttorm. Inari seems to have been a more peaceful place, even though contact was more frequent and resource utilization was underway. In any case, the ethnic boundary was already there before the organization of the Sami, while the scale of the threat was perceived as greater in Utsjoki in circumstances of less contact and as yet unrealized threats. The Sami movement in Norway was a movement defending its members’ threatened interests, as the majority society intruded upon Sami subsistence niches 61. In Finland it was more of a reaction to an alleged threat and a

57 KA, AKN, file 3, correspondence 1945, H.A. Guttorm to Karl Nickul 12.11.1947.
59 Müller-Wille 1996, 28, 35, 37; Miikelä 2000, 57. The road reached Syysjärvi, in Utsjoki, in 1938, but construction was halted for many years, due to a lack of funding; see also Aikio, Sammel: (a letter to the editor with no title in) Sabmelaš 8/1955, where Aikio blames Forest and Park Service for renting land to outsiders, with a consequent decrease in space for Sami means of subsistence. A law hindering outsiders from moving to Utsjoki is demanded by Aikio.
60 Berg 1997, 164-165; the Sami language also survived in these areas. Magga 2004, 350.
61 Minde 1986, 90.
movement that wanted to secure welfare measures from the state (the Sami delegation of 1947 is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter).

Outakoski was a disputed individual within the Sami activist front, regardless of ethnicity but eventually, and especially after the generational shift, his programme of self-containment held sway in the Sami movement, which became more independent of the SfPLC. Outakoski was significant in creating political space for an independent Sami policy, as he was one of most consistent opponents of the leading Sami Friend Karl Nickul, whose identity politics were sometimes quite purist: as has been mentioned, victim representations were to be avoided as being insufficiently matter-of-fact. The Sami were expected to build on their own ethno-politics and cultural heritage without political upheaval. The extreme forms of Sami nationalism, as expressed in the politics of Nilla Outakoski, were banned by Nickul. The strategy offered by Nickul was to appeal to the benevolence of society at large.\(^{62}\) The Sami movement in its first phase had to relate to the authority of Nickul and his policy. Nickul was conscious of the need for the Sami to bargain from their own stand-point: especially in his later career, he retreated increasingly into the background from the negotiation processes of Sami ethno- and identity politics.\(^{63}\)

Nilla Outakoski made representations of “a people under threat”; this built up into an isolationist/segregationist trait on the Sami front, which was not shared by most of the activists. The starting point for Outakoski was that the Sami were under threat of “vanishing”. This was because of the lack of and insufficient and passive “nationality policy” (kansallisuuspolitiikka) practised by the state of Finland, which did not promote “possibilities for existence” for the Sami. Outakoski advocated the establishment of a “protection area” (suoja-alue) for the Sami language and traditional means of living. This area would not be an autonomous territory but an area where reindeer herding and thus, in consequence, the Sami language would be protected. Outakoski also demanded teaching in the Sami language, in order to avoid the danger that “Lapps would not become Finns.” Instead of using the status of the tribe or minority, “nationality politics” implies a more radical self-identification. The solution for Sami matters was an active state policy in the form of cultural protection.\(^{64}\) In the press, a demand for the Sami’s own territory, made in the name of Samii Litto, had been reported in November 1946.\(^{65}\) This was denied by Outakoski and later on, in a preliminary

\(^{62}\) Nickul 1957, 294-295, 300.
\(^{65}\) LK 29.11.1946, Lappalaisterritorio olisi Samii Litton mielestä perustettava Lappiin.
meeting of the Sami delegation, SL referred to this effort as an “avoidable misunderstanding”. 66 The writer of the demand is unknown.

The Sami delegation of 1947 may be seen as the culmination of the early co-operation between the SfPLC and SL, given the publicity and visibility of the delegation and the breakdown in co-operation right after the delegation (which will addressed later on). The Sami delegation of 1947 was initiated by members of SL Erkki Jomppanen and Niilo Magga. The delegation visited President J. K. Paasikivi and the Finnish Parliament at Easter in 1947. In the claims of the delegation, one obvious duality was present in the representations: the Sami traditional way of life, based on nature, was to be protected at the same time as the Sami were advocating a modernization that threatened this traditional mode of life. In the same way, the Sami had tried to civilize themselves at school whilst also “trying to remain true to themselves”. The state had not provided “rational accommodation”, but the Sami had been left on their own. 67

The demands of the delegation varied, from saving reindeer herding, fishing and the Sami language to establishing an official state organ to take care of matters concerning the Sami and the construction of more roads. Regarding the Sami way of life and culture, reindeer herding was presented as “one of the most important” and most influential means of living. The demand is quite radical: the right to practise herding, as well as the right to provide access for the herding community, was to be reserved for the Sami. This right was in danger as Finnish settlement became denser. Sami landownership was referred to as an immemorial usage right (nautinta). Agriculture was presented as being harmful to reindeer herding, turning the contemporaneous notion of this relationship on its head 68. Fishing was represented as an important means of living, and a primary means of living for the Skolt Sami. In addition, fishing was to be reserved solely for the local people. In the question of roads, one of the supporting arguments was that the road would cross a vast wilderness area, not densely populated, which was an important pasture area (also not a problem). Further individual road initiatives were frequently made by the Sami 69. Telecommunications and tourism would also

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66 This demand led to a rephrasing of the principles of Samii Litto. Unfortunately, there are only newspaper sources available concerning this matter. LK 9.4.1947, Saamelaijen kansanopiston saamista Lappiin tulee kuluvan kuun lopulla Helsinkiin lähtevä lappalaislähetystö esittämään muun muukana opetusministeriölle.
68 The 1950s was the last decade during which positivity about possibilities concerning agriculture in Lapland reigned. In spite of this, even the reindeer herders themselves discussed the harm to hay growing and agriculture caused by the reindeer at this time. Halonen 1977, 39-41; Hustich 1946, 214-216.
69 One available source for this is the supportive response from the SfPLC to Jomppanen. KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Karl Nickul to Erkki Jomppanen 14.1.1949.
be needed – tourism, however, was not to cause the Sami harm but would become a business venture. Modernization regarding health services, trade across the border to Norway and the promotion of Sami activities in society were to be extended to the Sami home area without disturbing the traditional Sami means of living and identity. Further Finnish settlement was seen as a threat to the foundations of the subsistence of this people who were dependent on nature.

Lehtola perceives the involvement of both associations in the preparations of the delegation as a cause of the multitude and mildness of the demands, quite rightly, but in addition, the involvement of many Sami groups at the open meeting in Inari prior to the trip to Helsinki widened the spectre of demands and representations. The Sami were represented as a people threatened by the very modernization they promoted, if this was undertaken in an unplanned fashion and without caution with regard to the Sami. As a practical consequence of lobbying the delegation, the settlement of the Skolt Sami, which was on the agenda, received more attention.

The representation was two-fold: a vulnerable people dependent on nature, under threat from majority, and a modernizing people disengaging from primitiveness. The “primitive” markers were presented as dichotomous to modernization. This was overshadowed by the variety of the demands and the distinctions made between the different Sami groups. Not all Sami were reindeer herders, though this was presented as the dominant Sami means of living. Later on, Karl Nickul would say that the claims were radical. In their time they were indeed, with claims touching on the territorialism of the state and exclusive rights for a minority.

The duality in the demands of the Sami delegation of 1947 and the seeming contradiction of the many fields of representation reflected the Sami conditions of economic distress. The Sami elite held the view that their position was “weak” and threatened and, because of this, collaboration with the majority was necessary. This collaboration did not mean state dominance: the Sami communicated horizontally with the addressees in state

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70 Nickul was worried about the cultural stress caused by tourism. KA, AKN, file 3, correspondence 1945, Karl Nickul to Aslak Guttorm 21.9.1947; Nilla Outakoski demanded a reliance on local initiative in tourism. Thus the local Sami people, under economic hardship, would gain from tourists. Curiously enough, Outakoski did not present tourism as a threat, as Nickul eagerly did. LK 29.4.1947, N.O-ki (Nilla Outakoski): Perä-Lapin matkailumahdollisuudet ja niiden kehittäminen.
73 LK 9.4.1947, Saamelaisen kansanopiston saamista Lappiin tulee kuluvan kuun lopulla Helsinkin lähtevä lappalaislähetystö esittämään muun mukana opetusministeriölle.
74 Lehtola 2000b, 135-136.
76 Siida-Museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, annual report 1948.
hierarchies. The acknowledgement of Sami premises was taken as given by the Sami. The duality of their claims resulted in an effort to build Sami modernity, where all aspects of life, culture and subsistence were to revitalized. There was no need to revitalize all cultural markers, such as the language and gákti, since they were used, though not by all, but not only by the elite either. Hence, also, the mildness of the first wave of Sami activism.\footnote{Nyyssönen 2005a, 107.} By comparison with the Norwegian Sami societies, Saminess was not seen as a stigmatising hindrance to modernization or a choice leading to primitiveness.\footnote{See re. “miserable self-image” and “impression management of the identities” by hiding Saminess in the coastal Sami societies Eidheim (1969) 1994, 40-44; see re. Norwegian discourses of this period e.g. Stordahl 1993, 4, 8-9.}

The Sami delegation publications triggered further Sami opposition to the SfPLC. Hans Aslak Guttorm (see appendix) reacted against the way in which the SfPLC and SL were represented in the publication. SL was not presented as an initiator, whereas the role of the SfPLC was over-exaggerated.\footnote{KA, AKN, file 3, correspondence 1945, H.A. Guttorm to Karl Nickul 18.11.1947; Lehtola 2000d, 168.} According to a report in Lapin Kansa, however, co-operation with the SfPLC at a preliminary meeting in Inari was seen as positive\footnote{LK 9.4.1947, Saamelainen kansanopiston saamista Lappiin tulee kuluvan kuun lopulla Helsinkiin lähtevä lappalaislähetystö esittämään muun mukana opetusministeriölle.} and the delegation was joined in Helsinki by Karl Nickul. In any case, the Sami were beginning to emerge from under the protecting and suffocating umbrella of the SfPLC. Even though the association was meant as a collaborative and supportive organization for the Sami cause and Sami initiative, there were debates over mandates and territories.\footnote{Aikio 1984, 28.} In the self-representative strategies, this led to a break with their old mode of self-representation as thankful objects and, in some cases, a break between the Sami activists and Nickul (see next chapter).

The first phase of Sami identity politics did build ethnic barriers ever higher, but only the most radical leadership of the elite wished to maintain these boundaries; this is evident in the way in which the Finnish state was relied upon in the end. There was a need to disengage from the purity of Nickul, from whose ethnopolitics sections of the Sami elite consistently disengaged. The self-representation of a people under economic hardship was used to bargain for material help and welfare measures from the state of Finland. The politics of seeking isolation is one example of the demonizing of Finnish penetration. Constructing Sami collective identity through threat perceptions may be the most consistent representational strategy of this period. Both isolation and cultural protection were demanded in response to many threats: that of vanishing, for example.
This last-mentioned strategy also qualifies as a loan from the grim Finnish discourses on the vanishing Sami and a forced adjustment of self-imagery, carried out in order to relate to the majority imagery. The example is rare: the state itself remained mostly silent, which made boundary building more difficult. There was not much to build on. This applies to the contexts as well. Instead of “Finnicization” or “colonization”, one might talk about a reorganization of knowledge about (and thus political notions of) minority-majority relations,\(^\text{82}\) which sustained the Sami intention. The threat perceptions vanished from imagery, while the other strategy, that of disengaging from the Sami Friends, influenced the Sami agency more. The shift from being an object of help to claiming authority in defining Saminess and renouncing the rationalities of the majority “Other” led to an agency that was obviously more active and, more decisively, was never relinquished. The occasionally out-of-date imagery entertained by “Sami Friends” was de-legitimized by the Sami actors.

3.3. The “official” identity politics of the first phase of Sami activism – Samii Litto

3.3.1. Introduction

In this chapter I shall concentrate on drafting the identity politics of Samii Litto, the first Sami organization in Finland. SL had an identity political agenda, but certainly, as we shall see, this theoretical term was not applied to the vague ponderings on the strategic use of collective Sami identity markers. To begin with, the term “identity” had not been used yet. Some aspects may be grasped, however. Litto’s ethnopolitics may be studied by focusing on the relationship with the Finnish majority and the consequent building of ethnic boundaries. The Sami collective identity was characterized and the markers attached to the “tribe” may be detected. An identity political goal was drafted by the activist. These traits are followed in this chapter with an awareness of the great variety of contesting policies – SL has had a history of conflict, and not just with the outside world. SL had varying success with its identity politics. Its biggest success was in conquering the media. SL was not swallowed up by “colonization”, but the organization and the identity politics it pursued suffered from problems of institutional hindrance and low levels of legitimacy in many fields.

\(^{82}\) Eidheim 1995, 75.
3.3.2. Samii Litto – its establishment, aims and activities

The evacuation period in Ostrobothnia resulted in the first phase of Sami political organization and awakening. This was possible because the different Sami groups were gathered together for the first time. With the notion of being the “same people”, a whole new social field was born. As Karl Nickul put it, there was a growth in “intra-Sami” solidarity and a newly-emerging appreciation of the value of their own culture. This growth in the sense of community, solidarity and concern regarding the influence of the war led to the establishment of the first Sami association in Finland, Samii Litto, on 2 April 1945. SL concentrated on economic issues to secure Sami interests during the rebuilding era. Another point of interest was to promote traffic connections. The strategies of SL were integrative: the aim of SL was to promote the economic and educational conditions of the Sami, as well as establishing and maintaining contacts and providing information for political leaders in Southern Finland and for the media. As the SFPLC was busy with the Skolt Sami question, SL concentrated on matters elsewhere in the Sami area. Interestingly, SL argued in Sabmelaš to receive help from the state following the Sami contribution to the war. Representatives and board members were sought from each municipality, but in practice the centre of this first stage of Sami activity was Inari and the activity consisted mostly of entertainment, reindeer contests and Sami festivities, as well as educational occasions. Membership was open to all Sami, regardless of their means of living.

The founders of SL were in most cases politically modest. Johan Nuorgam (see appendix) was active in the SFPLC and worked as an informant and language advisor for members of the association. Nuorgam acquired organizational and PR skills whilst in Helsinki. Politically, Nuorgam was a moderate. Nuorgam was one of the few Sami to obtain employment, at least for a while, from the Sami movement itself. Nuorgam also edited the periodical Sabmelaš. Other moderates included Hans-Aslak Guttorm, for example, who was a teacher, author and sub-editor of Sabmelaš. Head of the herding co-operative (poroisääntä) Erkki Jomppanen (see appendix) was a representative of the association in Inari. A student at the teacher training college in Kajaani, Pekka Lukkari (see appendix), who came from an educated Utsjoki-based extended family of teachers and servants of the Church (parish clerk =

83 The first Sami organization was the juvenile association (nuorisoseura) of Iijärvi (in some articles by Lehtola, Syysjärvi), established by Johan Nuorgam with the aid of the SFPLC. It was shortlived, as Nuorgam lived in Helsinki. Hence it is still correct to refer, as Lehtola does, to SL as the first Sami association initiated by the Sami themselves. Lehtola 2000d, 158-159.
lukkari), radicalized later on, becoming a teacher and prominent Sami journalist. The first chairman of the association was Aimo Nilla Outakoski, who was, as we have seen, not as moderate as Nuorgam and Jomppanen. Outakoski was the only Sami officer during the Second World War. He radicalized the association and adopted a critical view of Sami politics practised by both the Finnish State and the Sf LPC. Johan Nuorgam and the Outakoski family were the most influential members of the Litto in its first years. The supra-locally organized ethnic elite consisted of people who obtained political experience in municipal administration and the pre-war Sami Friend movement. In addition, education – both obtaining one and coming from an educated extended family – and reindeer-herding management paved the way to the elite.

For SL, the years 1946-1947 were marked by internal quarrelling, reported eagerly in Lapin Kansa, and by problematic contacts with the Sami Friends. According to Lapin Kansa, the disunity was because of segregationist territorial claims made by Sami living in Southern Finland. This may refer to Nilla Outakoski, who denied such claims. The activities were mostly of an economic nature, both with regard to resettlement and to Sami trades. The leadership of SL was dissatisfied with the role of benefit organization that was attached to it during the resettlement years. By 1948, ethnopolitically-orientated activities were considered more correct. At the same time, the scope of action became wider: the language question, the establishment of Sami media and concrete claims of improving the Sami environment entered the agenda. In addition, the emerging transnational organization of the Sami was considered important.

At a time of economic distress, the Finnish state was relied upon, rather than demonized. Restoring the collapsed reindeer stocks, reorganizing transport conditions, offering the most remote Sami areas equal opportunities that compared with those of other areas and channelling state benefits and subsidies to the Sami means of living (reindeer herding and fishing) were among the aims. On the other hand, the organization stressed the significance of the adaptation of Sami culture to Finnish society. One of its aims was to bring commerce under Sami control and a co-operative, Osuuskunta Saamentuote r.l., was established in 1952, led by Sami members. SL also stressed the development and marketing

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87 Siida-museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, annual reports 1945-1946, 1948.
of Sami home industry, but efforts to establish a standard for Sami products and courses could not be carried out. The aim was to benefit, as well as to prevent false products, constituting at least an implicit effort to protect Sami culture, as well the aim of providing the “right” information about the Sami. This qualifies as unreflective identity politics and a claim to a power of definition. SL improved the distribution of internal information among the Sami, on the radio for example. Nilla Outakoski contacted YLE, the Finnish Broadcasting Company, and a news broadcast as well as religious programmes began to be aired once a week. The organization lost out to the SFPLC in its efforts to establish a newspaper in Sami. However, the periodical Sabmelaš was edited from 1949 onwards in Inari, with Johan Nuorgam as chief editor; he also established Tunturisanomat, a newspaper with material in Finnish.  

A number of Sami activists and members of SL, for example Nilla Outakoski, dissociated themselves and SL strongly from party politics. Such anti-party-political ideology was shared, according to Lapin Kansa, by a great number of the Sami. There were numerous expressions of concern, for example in Sabmelaš, about how politics had caused disunity and differing opinions among the Sami in Finland. This anti-party-political thinking may be explained by the non-party-based organization of politics that was still dominant in municipal politics in some parts of Lapland at this time. Religion, or a lack thereof, was a strong demarcating factor in the political field. Official measures were not used: political mobilization after the Finnish model was quite low, evident in the low, yet rising polls of the period. Parties were at first non-existent, because they were regarded as harmful to advocating the common interest of the municipality. Political parties had no ongoing lists of candidates: they were for socialists or social democrats, or non-socialists. The candidate’s village of origin was a decisive factor, while the significance of political standpoints was increasing. Amongst other Sami representatives, Antti Aikio continued and Erkki Jomppanen began a long career in municipal administration. The long distances were a factor in the low mobilization, but there were no official hindrances to Sami participation.

The years 1949-1952 were the most fruitful for SL. The association established an office in Inari and had “paid clerical workers in each village”. Moderate Johan Nuorgam put an end to the quarrel with the SFPLC and activities were concentrated in Inari. As the

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88 Sami radio has been reckoned one of the most important institutions in sustaining the use of the Sami language. Gaski and Kappfjell 2002, 40; Kokkonen 1996, 145-146; Lehtola 1997b, 9-11; Lehtola 2003, 448; Salokantas 1996, 305.
90 Suoma Sabmelaš, Sabmelaš 3/1952.
orthography in Sabmelaš changed and its contents were in the hands of the Sami editorial board, the media politics of SL enjoyed success.92

SL did not totally live up to its aim of being a “national” association for the Sami. One aspect in which SL failed was in overcoming the cultural boundary between themselves and the Skolt Sami. This boundary was based on religious, linguistic and cultural differences, as well as long-standing disputes over reindeer herding and reindeer theft. The Northern Sami reindeer-herding expansion into the Skolt Sami pastures in Norway and in Petsamo had caused friction, for example. As the Skolt Sami established their reindeer herding in resettlement areas in Inari after the war, new disputes emerged.93 Another example of the shortcomings in intra-ethnic solidarity was a decision made in November 1950. The Skolt Sami had made several pleas for financial help and SL decided to ask Karl Nickul to act in this case. The decision was made on a Finnish initiative, by Sami Friend Erkki Itkonen, who was present at the meeting, and carried out by another Sami Friend, Nickul.94

SL suffered from internal disputes in the early 1950s, from which the association never recovered. The disputes concentrated on the Folk High School and resulted in SL’s disintegration and the establishment of a competing Sida association in Inari in 1959. SL was reduced to a “two-man organization”, consisting of Jomppanen and Nuorgam. The final blow to the SL monopoly in Sami matters came with a change of generation, in Sami activist terms, for whom the SL represented corruption and conservatism, “favouring the Finnish” and toothlessness. Lehtola points out that SL had taken up the same vital issues as the new generation did – language, media and Sami organization.95 Many activists remained active in Sami and municipal matters, but the monopoly in Sami politics was gone.

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92 Siida museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, annual report 1951-1953; Lehtola 2000d, 171-173; another medium that was conquered during this period was the Sami exhibitions or “reindeer weeks” held in Finland proper, which had earlier had a shady reputation for representing the Sami in a romanticizing light. SL and the SiPLC alike were organizing these weeks at the beginning of the 1950s. See e.g. S. P-r (Porsanger, Samuli): Požuvahku sladdarak, Sabmelaš 3/1951.
93 One example of this was an incident in Samii Litto, where Nickul criticized other Sami for downgrading the “discreet” (Nickul) Skolt Sami. SKA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Karl Nickul to Pekka Lukkari and Juhani Nuorgam 27.5.1950.
94 Siida museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, minutes, meeting 17.11.1950.
3.3.3. The identity politics of Samii Litto

The emerging Sami use of the public sphere resulted in the “true” beginning of SL identity politics; however, SL made only a very few explicit self-representations. On many occasions, the Sami were simply defined as “different in their cultural basis” (“kulttuuripohjaltaan erilaisiksi”). Given the disinformation on which the equalitarian Finnish minority politics was based, highlighting the difference was important. Another set of qualities attached to the Sami people requesting cultural protection was their isolation and the smallness of the group.

SL practised identity politics on an ad hoc basis and in an unreflective fashion. In fact, the claims negotiated had not been agreed and there was a lack of unity as to how radical a break should be made in relation to the Finnish state and modes of living. However, some defining features may be detected in the construction of a collective Sami identity. The self-representation of a people under threat was used to gain economic aid and cultural protection. The ethnic barrier, against which the Sami ethnic identity was built, was Finnish. The paternalistic Finnish “natural people” imagery (see earlier chapter on the response from the Finnish Parliament) was avoided. Here SL appears at its most independent.

On some occasions, as in the annual report of 1948, the self-awareness of the mentioned threatened position resulted in apparent loans from the Finnish discourses of “lower” and “weaker” Sami in Sami self-representations. This was not the overall policy – in the same annual report, it is probably Antti Outakoski who refers to the Sami delegation as “Sami men of the people and of intelligence” (“älykkäisiin saamelaisiin kansanmiehiin”). The rhetorics of self-help, self-identification and ethnic pride were practised in parallel with the dominant Finnish modes of speaking of the Sami. The discourse of weakness was the reigning discourse in the Sami movement in Norway during the 1920s, when Per Fokstad and

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96 See Nilla Outakoski to the chapter, where he argues for separate Sami Sunday Schools with a different cultural background. Siida museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, documents 1946-1953, replica of a letter to the chapter, no date, no signature,1948, document no. 23.
97 Nilla Outakoski made this self-representation in a letter to Yleisradio, the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation, in which he demanded more informative substance in the Sami broadcasts. A programme director Koskiluoma from Yleisradio responded bluntly that the Sami broadcasts were only a “symbolic” gesture and therefore the short airtime was sufficient. Siida museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, documents, Nilla Outakoski to Yleisradio 1.9.1949, document no. 143, Jussi Koskiluoma to Samii Litto 25.11.1947, document no. 99.
98 Nyssönen 2005a, 106.
99 Siida Museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, annual report 1948.
Henrik Kvandahl entertained grim discourses of the Sami Folk soul being in a process of vanishing. The “Finnish” Sami discourse entertained more positive horizons of expectancy, due to a friendlier discursive field and more positive and active notions concerning modernization.

How were ethnic boundaries drawn? The mobilization and the worry over Finnish resettlement in Utsjoki were partly due to the notion of a fixed identity coming to a crisis point. The post-war period was one of growing contacts with the Finnish population and culture. There is evidence of disapproval of the adaptation of the Finnish cultural markers, and discourses of “neo-Birkarlianism” ("uuspirkkalaisuus", referring to the old taxation and economic losses due to Finnish expansion) were cultivated at a local level. The firm, yet on many occasions unfounded belief in Finnish means of living was also criticized, for example by Karl Nickul and by Johan Nuorgam in Sabmelaš. Officials responsible for agrarian counselling entertained the idea of an agricultural Lapland. Many organizations, such as the Committee for Lapland (1938), had been highly suspicious of the potential for agrarian colonization in the northernmost parts of Lapland. For Nuorgam, this meant neglecting reindeer herding, the “true subsistence of Lapland”. (SL did, however, donate cows to the Sami in Utsjoki, where cattle-raising had become a Sami means of living of major importance.) Agriculture was harmful to the case of the Sami, as it entailed Finnish settlement, which Nuorgam represented as harmful. Nuorgam was worried about exhausting pastures and fishing resources for old “Sami” subsistence forms. This statement is a not-so-rare example of boundary building on an ethnic basis among the Sami elite in Finland: self-identification is sharpened and reindeer herding raised as an ethnic marker, although this is done in the context of the whole of Lapland. More radical is the discursive act of seeing the Finns as a threat, entering the Sami heartlands. It was typical to present these kind of statements in intra-Sami forums, in the Sami language.

In the Sami home area, and especially in Inari, there was an ongoing process, described by globalization theorists, of cultural barriers becoming more relative, flexible, blurred and hybrid. As a consequence, spatial structures and territorial identification became more relative and fluctuating. Some Sami activists clearly had trouble with this, and political acts of a more radical ethnic and territorial identity emerged, as well as demands for preserving isolation and establishing segregation. A simultaneously discursive and

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100 Minde 2000c, 145-147.
101 This was reported in Saamelaisasiankomitean mietintö, 1952:12, 16, 44.
categorizing act occurred, of building boundaries (in Sami identity politics) as well as crossing ethnic and cultural boundaries (at an everyday level).\textsuperscript{103} The first phase of Sami activism had the sense of a protectionist attitude towards the Sami identity and some of the criticism of the Finnish markers was motivated by religion. Dancing and (abandoning Sami) clothing were criticized, not only on an ethnic basis\textsuperscript{104}. In addition, many Sami activists had a religious background. Nilla Outakoski was not the only one protesting about dancing arrangements at the educational events organized by Litto.\textsuperscript{105} Hence the non-radical, even conservative outlook of the movement.

The ideal Sami of the SL may be outlined. Members of the “national” organization were not afraid to make representations of a shared “national” Sami identity – this was implied in many statements, and characterizations were made with the utmost ease and considerable inclusiveness. SL was active in school issues and promoted the recruitment of Sami-speaking teachers. In these statements both Outakoski brothers stressed the significance of the Sami language and of conveying national Sami sentiment through a command of the native language, which would create “a common ground” for the Sami. The notion of collective identity was based on a shared culture, manifesting itself in and conveyed through language. The ideal Sami had a command of the Sami language, recognized the virtue of a command of the Sami language, was religious (this was mostly Nilla Outakoski’s contribution) and entertained national feeling. This ideal was very strict in its expectation of purity in ethnic and spiritual sentiment. Another driving force in SL was a notion of the poor, degrading state of the condition of Sami cultural markers, such as Sami handcrafts, which was a matter of concern.\textsuperscript{106}

SL also organized popular enlightenment activities (kansansivistys), lectures and film evenings. The venue was typical of the period: in post-war Finland, the state and numerous

\textsuperscript{102} Siida museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, annual report 1948; Nuorgam, Johan: Eänukilvim ja poazutikšum, Sabmelaš 5/1948.
\textsuperscript{103} Anttonen 1996, 16-17, 20-21.
\textsuperscript{104} Lehtola 1994b, 205-211.
\textsuperscript{105} See for example Siida museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, documents 1946-1953, document no. 145, Nils Vuolab to SL 24.9.1953.
\textsuperscript{106} KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Oula Aikio to Karl Nickul 15.11.1949; Siida museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, minutes, meetings 25.8.1947, 6.9.1952, 25.10.1952; on dancing, see the archive of Samii Litto, documents 1946-1953, J.E.Jomppanen and Juhani Nuorgam to Nilla Outakoski 20.5.1950, document no. 83; this specific case lends support to the theory of Mikael Svonni that Sami language is elevated as an ethnic identity marker in times of linguistic crisis. See Svonni 1996, 119; Sabmelaš was a forum for propagating the need for a command of the Sami language, even though modernization had made headway in other fields of life, and the language was spoken by few and had a thin literary tradition. See Outakoski, Aslak: Eäändikiella, Sabmelaš 3/1946; pseudonym Meres: Sadni Sami nuoraidi, Sabmelaš 3/1949; pseudonym Sievä sabmelas, Samikiella ja sabmelašvuotta, Sabmelaš 4/1950; pseudonym Poaran: Sami kultur ja samekiella, Sabmelaš 5-6/1951.
organizations used the growing entertainment industry for campaigns, which were intended explicitly to improve the behaviour of the Finnish people, characterized as uncivilized and rough-edged. Subjects varied from civilized ways of consuming alcohol to proper conduct during the Olympic games in Helsinki in 1952. The language was Sami in most cases, at least in 1952. Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate the manuscripts for lectures such as, in 1951, “Who was the great Sami poet Isak Sabba?” (Johan Nuorgam); “Which are the most valuable factors in our culture?” (J. E. Jomppanen); and “The history of the Sami, that is the migration of our people towards the north” (unknown), which would have been priceless in seeking self-representations. Not much can be said on the basis of the titles alone, but they do not convey the typical rhetoric in Finnish enlightenment, that of Finnish people being less civilized than European people. Enlightenment was the most continuing mode of activity and SL had contacts with national institutions responsible for popular enlightenment. As enlightenment ceased in the whole of Finland, so it did in Inari – television re-organized this activity socially anew during the early 1960s and SL concentrated on the Sami museum, established in Inari in 1959, funding Sami students and reindeer contests. This entailed losing a more dynamic forum for self-representation. Before this, SL used its power in the media – in 1954, the personnel was changed in Sami radio after complaints concerning the poor command of the Sami language amongst the staff, influencing the content of the broadcast material. SL demanded control over the broadcasts from the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation, which they did not obtain at this point, as the leadership in YLE guarded their power over the broadcast material and personnel politics.107

The last manifestation of power executed by SL was a short-lived quarrel in 1959 over quotas of representatives at the Nordic Sami conferences. The Finnish section of the Nordic Sami conferences had suggested quotas where SL and the SfPLC would both have had eight delegates and the Reindeer Herders’ Association two. This would have lead to a Finnish 10:8 majority, whereas the proportion should have been 9:9. SL protested publicly108 at the patronizing attitude of the Finnish section and the fact that the Sami were not consulted in this matter. The Finnish section, where Nickul sat, gave in instantly and awarded nine delegates to

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107 Siida museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, annual reports 1951-1960, minutes from a meeting in 11.10.1954 documents, H. A. Guttorm and Johan Nuorgam to the programme leader at Oulu radio station 25.10.1954, document 15/1954; Kokkonen 1996, 147; see on popular enlightenment activities in Finland that aimed to change the behaviour of people and raise Finland to the status of a civilized nation, Peltonen 2002, 14, 16, 76; the reindeer contests were significant in the sense that they were eagerly reported in the Finnish media. They were a Sami venue where Sami cultural markers were worn. LK 17.3.1959, Suikki maailman nopein poro, Loistavat kuninkuusaajot Ivalossa; Sápmelaš 1-2/1980, Sámiid Lihttu huuke doaibnaviesu Anarii.

108 It is not known who contacted the media. LK 22.5.1959, Samii-Litto vaatii tasavertaisuutta Inarin saamelaiskonferenssissa.
Litto. This case is an example of the power that a minority could exert by guilt-tripping the majority. The case is also interesting in another sense: one woman, Laura Lehtola, was nominated to the conference, together with the deputy Elli Aikio. This was exceptional. Litto was a male-dominated association.\textsuperscript{109}

3.4. A comparison with ethnopolitical mobilization in Norway and Sweden

The Norwegian Sami history from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards differs in many respects from that of Finland. The beginning of Sami activism in southern areas of Sami settlement in Norway and Sweden was marked by a clash of interests between reindeer herding and the majority agricultural settlement, which was backed up by government intervention in the herding legislation. The ethnic mobilization of the Sami in Southern Norway started with the formation of Sami associations around 1906-1908. The movement gained most continuity in Finnmark, where the first Sami association was formed in 1911. The Sami press emerged and vanished quite early. The milestone of the first wave of Sami activism in Norway was a series of national meetings, beginning in Trondheim in 1917. These meetings were politically and symbolically rather modest, amounting to “a slight common Sami element”, at which no Sami from Finland were present. Norwegian Sami friends, especially priests, were initiators of the movement. The movement, led by a small, educated elite, tried to establish itself within the party system and was mainly socialist in outlook. Efforts to establish one single nationwide Sami organization have been unsuccessful in all countries.\textsuperscript{110}

In Finnmark, the closing of the national borders led to a diminishing space for the traditional Sami means of living. Sami pastoralism and fishing encountered Norwegian and Kven tillage and permanent farming settlement. In the Finnish Lappmarks this conflict was already over and the southern siidas were assimilated. The settlement of Inari was an inter-ethnic effort, as we have seen. In Norway, the different groups could accommodate each other on an everyday level, but the difficulties the Sami faced in the process and the consistent support of Norwegian agricultural colonization are acknowledged by researchers. The nation-building process in Norway, boosted by fears of national security and “fifth columns” within

\textsuperscript{109} Siida museum, Inari, the archive of Samii Litto, minutes, meetings 21.5.1959, 1.7.1959, documents, E. Jomppanen and Johan Nuorgam to the Finnish section of the Nordic Sami Council (?) 22.5.1959, documents 111, 113; LK 2.7.1959, Sami Littosta 9 edustajaa saamelaiskonferenssiin.
the national borders as strongholds of Russian expansionism, led to a effective and long-lasting assimilative policy, which was deliberate, funded by the state, formalized by legislation and set in action extensively in various venues in the provinces of Troms and Finnmark. According to Einar Niemi, the Sami and the Kven in Northern Norway encountered both the social democratic emphasis on class struggle and social equality and the Norwegianization expressed in Northern Norwegian regionalization, both of which neglected the ethnic question. For advocates of the Norwegianization policy, modernization equalled Norwegianization. This negative association (from a Sami point of view) was lacking from Sami rhetoric on the Finnish side of the border.

The southern mobilization in Norway succeeded in intrastate and international network-building terms, in the establishment of organization and the distribution of publications. The northern mobilization was a coastal Sami undertaking and not very much concerned with reindeer herding. It has been labelled as Sami nationalism, radicalized by the Norwegianization policy. Trond Thuen, however, claims that separationist voices in the Sami movement in Norway have been rare. Like the southern mobilization, the “Finnish” Sami succeeded in establishing a national association with a vaguely-expressed economic and ethnopolitical programme, but it lacked the network necessary to succeed. When it comes to the premises of mobilization, a rise in the level of education and the democratization of political institutions, the Finnish development falls short. There were Sami who did not fall within the Folk School system and the level of education has been described as low. Political modernization, dealt with elsewhere, was also incomplete at a municipal level. It was completed at a national level, but the Sami had only limited access to this. There is at least one similarity to Norway and Sweden here: the disintegration of the movement, a low level of support and problems with organizational matters. The “Finnish” Sami movement was not able to mobilize women, for example, whereas female activists were active in the early phases of the “Scandinavian” mobilization.

By comparison with Norway, the Sami mobilization in Finland lacked even the vaguest groundwork, from the beginning of the century; nor did it have the newly-established continuity apparent in the national Sami organs of Norway and Sweden after the war. Finnish Sami mobilization was, in its first phase, short-lived and not very crisis-conscious. What it does have in common with the Norwegian development is a dependence on the initiative of a

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small elite. In relation to the assimilative pressure, “Finnicization” was gaining a most powerful momentum, while the “Norwegianization policy” was already being re-evaluated in Norway. The features of Sami mobilization in Norway, the emergence of a new paradigm of Sami self-understanding, the recognition of Sami culture and distinctiveness, the identification of a “common cultural estate” (Eidheim) were only partly shared in Northern Finland, as the Sami communities were only just beginning to be sucked into processes that threatened to erode Sami cultural self-esteem. The Finnish Sami were less visible in official venues: M.P. Isak Saba had been elected to the Norwegian Parliament as early as 1906 with the intention of promoting a Sami political agenda. The Sami in Finland lack an M.P. of their own to this day. The Sami voting population in Northern Lapland as a whole has been insufficient to launch an M.P. and no M.P. has been appointed, unlike in Åland.

The “Norwegianization” policy has been seen as the cause for cultural deterioration in coastal Sami societies in Norway. According to Henry Minde, this government-led “massive downgrading” of the Sami, supported by the everyday racism then in existence, led to a period of apathy and powerlessness and to a low ethnic mobilization before the Alta dispute. Minde also emphasizes continuing elements of the Norwegianization policy, at least in notions and ideologies. This has been seen to lead to ethnic passivity, where the Sami have had to act through majority/citizen status and institutions, since being a Sami did not offer any basis for group or individual action, except in inner Finnmark where the Sami formed a majority. In Finland, however, this was possible. Why?

In Finland, the assimilating pressure was weaker than and certainly not as consistent as in Norway and Sweden. In the following section I shall go through the forums of Norwegianisation policy and discuss them in a Finnish context. In the sale of land, there was no ethnonationalism, no exclusion of ethnic others from landownership, as in the Norwegian Land law of 1902, which reserved settlement rights to those who spoke Norwegian. In Finland, the Sami had access to land. Road construction was not part of the explicit assimilative argument: on the contrary, roads were advocated by sections of the Sami community and built by the Germans as part of maintaining the troops in their push to the east. The integrative pressure had an egalitarian outlook and did not hit the whole

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113 Aikio 1984, 34; on the success of the movement, see Eidheim 1992, 11; Eidheim 1997, 29-33; Niemi 1997, 70-77; on the reception of the movement in Finland, see Paltto 1973, 84-85, 98; Thuen 1995, 103.
115 For example, the road from Lakselv via Karasjok to Ivalo was built by the Germans. Jokipii 1977, 251-252, 256-257, 262.
population in Sami areas before the war. It was inclusive in its grip, rather than discriminating. In this respect it differed from certain industry sectors in Norway and various nominating processes for official posts there. Another bastion of linguistic assimilation in Norway, the Church, cannot be accepted as such in Inari without supplementary comment. The minister Tuomo Itkonen (based in Inari 1924-1942) was a Sami Friend who advocated the Sami language and published an ABC-book in Sami. The motivation behind this was that the Sami would embrace Christianity better in their own language. By supporting the Sami language and culture, Itkonen was also making a cultural statement: Sami culture deserved the full support of the state of Finland. Itkonen was an exception, since the language in churches was mainly Finnish, even after the war, when Sami was used sporadically in the “Sami Church” in Inari. The assimilative, imperialistic, racist grip was tighter before the war in annexed Petsamo, not in Inari, which already belonged to the “Fatherland”. There was modernization in southern parts of Inari, most notably as the road to Petsamo was constructed, with growing employment possibilities and such services as the telephone and post. The Finnish civil society was introduced during the pre-war era. Reindeer herding remained a significant source of subsistence and a Sami niche, with Sami men of wealth possessing large stocks and the Finns as bystanders. This last-mentioned factor was typical of the state of things in Utsjoki until the 1960s.

The assimilation policies of both Norwegianization and Finnicization were most persistent in schools, reaching almost an entire generation. As we saw in Chapter 2.1.1., there cannot be said to have existed such a systematic effort of assimilation as in Norway. Instead, bi-lingualism was acknowledged in principle. This principle did not, however, become practice in the pre-war era. After the war, advocation of the teaching language issue was the rule for a long time, with no real results, and teaching in the Sami language was organized sporadically within the framework of existing legislation that was still insufficient, and against a background of a low number of badly-placed teachers with a command of the Sami language. The main language of teaching has remained Finnish, but the Sami language domain has extended within the school system, for example in classroom communication. Before the 1970s, the imagery of the Sami conveyed in Finnish teaching material has been mentioned as being small in amount, coloured, and sometimes prejudiced and misleading, especially concerning the Sami means of living. It was stated at an official level that the low

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116 Compare Minde 1986, 84.
social status of the Sami language resulted in “numerous” cases of individuals denying their cultural background, and ethnic shame. In 1971 the committee working on this matter demanded full teaching in Sami during the first two years for Sami pupils.\(^\text{119}\)

When it comes to resource management, in an earlier work I have emphasized that the establishment of the reindeer herding management system based on herding co-operatives involved the “ethnonationalization” and “Finnicization” of reindeer herding management. When it comes to management structures, spatial changes in herding and management areas, neglect of Sami experience and modes of herding and, to some extent, juxtaposition with agriculture, this emphasis is still valid. As Veli-Pekka Lehtola wrote, Sami reindeer herders chose to adjust to and integrate with the system.\(^\text{120}\) In the light of archive material produced by the herders, I should like to continue where Lehtola stops and argue that the integration was a great success, and that the Sami did not merely integrate, they established a concurrent land regime in Inari.

To begin with, even though the Sami-dominated co-operatives were formally part of the Reindeer Herders’ Association, the old forms of herding could be sustained, such as tethered calving (hihnavasotus) and the practice of their own organizational form of herding the stocks (tokkakuntamalli).\(^\text{121}\) In the additional light of the archives of the Kyrö reindeer herding co-operative, this institution could be seen as a competing land regime and also as a forum for manifesting Sami intention (as one might wish to avoid the term institution in power). To begin with, the co-operative was the underdog. It lacked the tools to exclude non-owners and other stakeholders from its land-base, which was governed and owned by a more powerful land regime. Even though the Forest and Park Service held institutionalized power and possessed the true property rights for the land, it had not yet begun to utilize the lands and forests fully.\(^\text{122}\) However, in the herding co-operative there were measures and at least a willingness to ban the influx of Finnish settlers to access herding, as the co-operative began to control and restrict access to co-operative membership and reindeer herding. If surnames are

\(^{118}\) Müller-Wille 1996, 82-86.
\(^{119}\) Saamelaisten kouluopetuksen kehittämistoimikunnan mietintö 1971:B63, 14, 16-17, 37-38, 50-51, 68; the Sami proposed teaching in Sami as early as elementary school and had ministerial contacts from early on. See Samii oahpateădijı’ coahkima birra, Sabmeläš 7/1952.
\(^{120}\) Lehtola 1997c, 42; Nyyssönen 2003, 254-255.
\(^{121}\) On the still surviving Sami modes of herding, see Heikkilä 2003, 116; Tynys, Tapio: Erätä kehityslinjoja ja 1900-luvun tapahtumia, Vätsäri - erämää järven takana, Tapio Tynys (ed.), Metsähallitus, Ylä-Lapin luonnonhoitoalue, s.p., s.a., 70.
\(^{122}\) Nyyssönen 2003, 266-267.
taken as a reliable source of ethnicity – which they are not – this strategy was at least a partial success: the Sami majority persisted all the way up to the 1960s.\(^\text{123}\)

In addition, and not surprisingly, Sami activists were also represented in herding management, in the case of Kyrö through Erkki Jomppanen. In fact the herding co-operative covered, for example, travelling costs for Jomppanen in Sami matters, and the reindeer races in Inari were subsidized by the co-operative. The relationship with the other power centre, Forest Government, may be described as ambivalent and so sporadic that this quite insignificant example has to be taken up here: the chief forester Mikko Jaakkola was present at one meeting in 1949, discussing “dog discipline”, and presented the requirement that dogs should be tethered in the terrain. When the secretary of the co-operative wrote up the minutes of the meeting, he added that this did not apply to the reindeer dogs within the area of the co-operative.\(^\text{124}\) More formally, Forest and Park Service rented round-up areas to many co-operatives, but there was space for informal expressions that questioned the hierarchy. When it comes to the Sami women, most Sami women in the meetings were representing their husbands by proxy. It must also be said that these women did not leave many marks in the sources, so nothing certain can be said of their real position within the co-operative.\(^\text{125}\)

The co-operative(s) also took the initiative in the encounter between herding and competing land use forms. During the post-war period, especially from the beginning of the 1950s onwards, the co-operative became more involved in building fences: firstly on the Norwegian border (because of alleged reindeer thieves), secondly to keep the reindeer off cultivated land and hay pastures in order to avoid damage payments and finally, as the number of reindeer rose, between themselves and other reindeer-herding co-operatives. Before the (voluntary) division of the Hammastunturi and Sallivaara co-operatives, payments for hay damage disappear from the archives.\(^\text{126}\) This was due to the fences and diminishing agriculture in Inari. Hence, as the other hindrance to reindeer herding was in decline, herding experienced a short favourable period, before extensive loggings encroached onto the pasturelands.


Harald Eidheim has discussed the identity political side of the Sami mobilization in Norway. There was an ongoing shift from contrasting the Sami identity with that of the majority counterpart to a more overarching conception of Sami identity as complementary, equipping the Sami to experience equality in relation to the same counterpart. Along with complementariness, the Sami showed an increased sense of peoplehood, which they expected the majority people to accept. 127 This process of complementarization was further extended, and indeed taken as a starting point in the state-minority relationship for certain Sami activists in Finland.

The condescending way of regarding the Sami as linguistically and culturally handicapped citizens, and as a cause of the backwardness of their domicile, 128 which was typical of Norway, was substituted in the Finnish public sphere by the Sami accusing the welfare state of not having invested enough to enable their domicile to break away from its backwardness. This difference in political space and, if you like, political climate, is one important reason for the complementary outlook adopted by mobilization. The Finnish Sami were, by definition, citizens of Finland with the same set of rights (yet with no recognition of their ethnically-based special needs, and thus insufficient rights), whereas the equal status of the Sami as citizens of Norway was expressed as late as 1963 by the Norwegian Parliament, in response to the Sami Commission’s report 129.

With regard to the discourses on the Sami identity, the discussion concerning “how to be a Sami in the modern world” was already possible and underway in Finland, but the alleged poles of modernity and tradition were not mutually exclusive, 130 as Finnish discussions at this time lacked the strong juxtaposition of the “Norwegian” discussion between the realms. For the Sami activists in Finland, it was literally possible to be a Sami and to be part of the modern world.

Due to Finnish access to the herding, the Sami movement in Finland could not concentrate on the rights of reindeer herding in the way that the Norwegian and especially the Swedish movements did. On the other hand, identity politics were not so tied to the imagery of reindeer herding. Demands for self-government, which were already evident in the early phases of the Sami movement in Norway, were also lacking. The Finnish strategy, with its demands for cultural protection, state commissions and establishing an official responsible for the Sami cause, and even the segregational plans of Outakoski, was not taken so far. In

129 Stordahl 1993, 4-5.
formulating its demands, the Norwegian Sami movement was more consistent, whereas the Sami activists in Finland tried to embrace every question, making it extremely pluralistic. The political moderation of the Finnish activists is again different to that of activists in Norway, where the socialist element was more dominant.\textsuperscript{131}

In Sweden Sami mobilization, which culminated in the establishment of a national Svenska Samernas Riksförbund (Sámiid Riikkasearvi, Swedish Sami National Association, hereafter SSR), in Jokkmokk in 1950, also suffered from the same lack of continuity, geographical dispersion and low level of mobilization among the people as in Norway and Finland. However, the mobilization was on totally a different level to that in Finland. In Sweden, the relationship between agriculture and reindeer herding was one of the most important mobilizing factors. In addition, the strong national policy, with its segregational aims and consequent lowering of schooling standards, forced migrations on the part of the reindeer-herding Sami, as well as agricultural penetration into the pasturelands, created space for a reactionary Sami movement. In terms of identity politics, most notably in the work of Elsa Laula, the Sami movement tried early on to disengage itself from the dominance of the reindeer-herding Sami imagery. This did not succeed, since Swedish national Sami politics was based on Sami herding imagery and the Sami were forced to reduce Sami issues to reindeer herding issues. In turn, Sami activists in Sweden tried to establish a movement on ethnic solidarity and not on subsistence. In Sweden, there was real, state-powered resistance to Sami mobilization; the Lapp bailiff system was in a strong position and reindeer herding was in decline, due to state intervention and attempts to “museolize” and protect.\textsuperscript{132}

In Finland, the state attitude was neither patronizing nor segregationist (with one pre-war exception) and it offered room for Sami reflectivity and adaptation to a greater extent than the Swedish variation. In addition, the “neglectful” aspect of the Finnish policy worked for the Sami cause, resulting in isolation instead of actively discriminating against the Sami. This is stated bearing in mind the assimilationist vein in education policies. There was no active hindrance to the Sami mobilization, and no active state participation in or advice regarding the Sami meetings. Neither in the SL sources nor in any earlier research are there any signs of state interference, not counting the state funding to SL.\textsuperscript{133} The alleged

\textsuperscript{130} Stordahl 1993, 9-12.
\textsuperscript{131} Jernsletten 1999, 12-13; Minde 1980, 88-95; Minde 2000c, 143.
\textsuperscript{132} Lantto 2000, 214, 269-271, 275-287; Stien 1999, 37, 39.
\textsuperscript{133} See Jernsletten 1999, 19, 22-25, on the history of the early Sami meetings in Norway and the Sami Sentralsearvi, which was bypassed by the authorities and thus silenced; Nickul 1970, 213-214; Stien 1999, 35. The accusation by Stien of the state being unwilling to give funding to the Sami movement does not apply to
assimilationist vein did not undermine the rise of the Sami movement, but instead the Finnish Sami Friends were “pacified” and guilt-tripped by the Sami (see the chapter 3.3. on SL). Reindeer herding was not protected and “museolized”, as in Sweden, but merely formalized after the Finnish model, leaving room for variation and Sami adaptation to the system alongside the Finnish herders.

By comparison with Sweden, there was a lower sense of crisis. The Sami living in fixed settlements were not stigmatized by the authorities in the same manner as those in Sweden. Not counting the gold panners, there was no extensive industrial mining in Inari. There was definitely no “pervasive” crisis in the pastures, but “only” a sense of threat, formulated with some difficulty around the theme of Finnish settlement. There was also a will to gain from modernization and a desire on the part of the state to intensify its welfare state-building process in the Sami home area, alongside a self-proclaimed will to sustain traditional Sami culture. In Sweden, internal differences within Sami society began to disappear, due to, for example, the notorious nomad schools, and differences grew up in relation to the majority population. In Finland, such developments are hard to pinpoint. In parts of the Sami community the situation was progressing to the opposite direction, towards greater integration with Finnish society, as the assimilative pressure was just beginning to grow.

Yet, one significant difference may be indicated. The traditional counterpart in these conflicts, agriculture and tillage, was experiencing the last campaign of national investment in estate structure and the start of its downfall and dismantling in Inari at this time. The 1950s denote the last phase of state-run agricultural effort in the region before the national dismantling of the estates. In addition, subarctic Inari was poorly suited to tillage and a growing consciousness of this was emerging. Keeping in mind the hay damage, the relationship between agriculture and reindeer herding seemed to be in crisis but, due to the status of the herding regime and the miniscule area used by the stock raisers in a municipality the size of a small province, the agricultural menace to herding serves as only a partial explanation of the mobilization. During this period there were many efforts to promote agriculture in Inari, which provoked writing highlighting the “Saminess” and productivity of reindeer herding in northernmost Lapland, as well as its power to preserve culture/language

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among the Sami. Promoting agriculture, a means of living poorly suited to Lapland (Nuorgam), equalled a growing Finnish settlement.¹³⁷

Trond Thuen has presented a theory of an integrative (ethnic) movement. An integrative movement has the goal of stopping discrimination and securing social and economic benefits, individual rights and equal participation provided by the greater society. Minority traditions are practised, but in the limited sphere of cultural practice. An integrative movement resembles “an interest group” rather than a separationist force in society. This movement, labelled as ambivalent in the performance of the ethnic identity by Trond Thuen,¹³⁸ or apathetic and powerless by Henry Minde,¹³⁹ did exist in Finland, but only in relation to economic and modernization strategies. Modernization created employment opportunities and was not perceived as an assimilating force by all the actors. Forestry was perceived as a problem, in the sense that there were no loggings or employment available. The geographical situation and the closing of the sea-route to the Arctic Ocean lessened the economic attractiveness of the region and consequently halted its modernization (and the possible harmful consequences thereof). In the Lappish and Sami press, a process of advocating logging, road construction and welfare measures was launched.¹⁴⁰ The greatest difference was the unproblematic communication among the activists of Sami ethnicity. It was politicized, not limited to the cultural sphere.

¹³⁷ In the article in Sabmi, most probably written by Nilla Outakoski, the co-editor of the periodical, the contents and the self-representation are almost exactly the same as in an earlier article by Outakoski in Lapin Kansa. The Sami, the “native population of Finland” (“alkuväestö”) are facing destruction as the command over Sami language vanishes. This is because of an influx of Finnish people and insufficient state support for the language. Sole rights were to be granted to Sami in their home region. The article ends with a direct plea for help from the Finnish people. The article has another ending in Sami:

“Mii sabmiladčak! Sabmiladčak galpat muittit doallat iečamek giela arvus. Mii galpat muittit sadnivadja mi gulu naa: Iečas veihki lei buorismu veihki.” (We the Sami! The Sami should remember to value their own language. We should remember the proverb that goes like this: our own help is the best help. Translation J.N.)

¹³⁹ Minde 2003b, 88-89.
3.5. Explaining the mobilization of the Sami

Researchers have not been very eager to explain the first stages of mobilization. By way of explanation, colonization is offered as the new dominant narrative. Establishing state sovereignty in Lapland had eroded the traditional forms of Sami territoriality and spatiality. One common feature in the narrative is the exhaustive force of the state entering the Sami domicile and thus undermining the adaptive strategies and intentions of the Sami. The Sami are often represented as people living close to nature, and as victims. This “settler theory”, pushing the weaker Sami northwards, still reigns in research imagery even after the bankruptcy of Finnish nationalism during the post-war era. Even though it is true that state intervention and the introduction of reindeer-herding management based on Finnish models caused a disruption in the territorial organization of the herding, the will and the means to adapt to the system was there and was taken by the Sami.¹⁴¹ In this chapter I shall examine, using a number of theories, how Sami mobilization in Finland can be explained and what was ultimately special about it. In addition, using contextualization, I shall try to illustrate the premises of mobilization and explain the uniqueness of the movement through the Sami community’s different starting-point in Inari.

Lennard Sillanpää is one proponent of the colonization paradigm. The Sami, according to Lennard Sillanpää, “had neither the information nor the means to protect their essential interests”; they were isolated from the national and provincial decision-making centres, and from each other. In addition, internal divisions between reindeer-herding Sami and other forms of subsistence were partly due to administrative and legislative practices implemented by the authorities. Sillanpää refers to the special treatment of reindeer herding in the legislation that hunting and fishing (which are regulated in Northern Lapland, for example by nature conservation legislation) did not enjoy. Sillanpää explains the mobilization as a result of colonization, the same process that had imprisoned the Sami in passivity.¹⁴² This kind of starting-point strips the Sami of their intentions and does not provide the tools to understand either the Sami community before mobilization or the mobilization itself. The Sami were handicapped by both their peripheral location and a lack of understanding of their needs. The origin of the Sami intention, which surfaced suddenly during the 1940s, remains unclear.

When it comes to the lack of contacts, Sillanpää was not familiar with the non-party-based, quite pre-modern organization of municipal politics that was still dominant in some parts of Lapland at this time. Political mobilization after the Finnish model was quite low. In municipal government, a non-ethnically and non-party-politically organized “common good” policy was the rule. Nor were the Sami representatives in the municipal administration known to Sillanpää.143

Sillanpää makes a further distinction between the first stage of Sami mobilization and the later mobilization in the 1960s, and categorizes only the latter as an identity-political movement, since the first phase of mobilization made only demands for recognition as a distinct cultural group, not as a people. A further argument for this distinction is the adaptation of the term Sami (also renouncing the term Lapp) that would have been the policy of the 1960s generation.144 The distinction between an ethnic group as a cultural and a political claimant does not render the application of the collective Sami identity in claiming protection/rights any less of an identity political undertaking, at least from a technical point of view. Further on, as we have seen, the term “Sami” was in full use and the Sami tried to establish a new ethnonym in the Finnish language as well: when writing in Finnish, some Sami activists used the term “saamit” as a plural form of the word Sami. The correct version in Finnish would be “saamelaset”, as Nickul pointed out. Matti Sverloff later presented this term as the original name for the Sami people. It comes from the Sami language, perhaps from the term (in new orthography) Sápmi or Sápmelaš (plural form Sápmelažžat), or the adjective Sámi.145 The term was shortlived but it was used by the association in the 1950s; as a strategy it refers to the group’s originality and distinction. On the other hand, Sillanpää was right to say that the Sami in Finland have lacked a strong national organization, in reindeer herding as well as in other matters. The lobbying did not result in any legislation on Sami matters146.

The connection between Laestadianism and the Sami identity and mobilization has been widely researched. In Norway, the connection has been perceived as close and the movement as “Sami”. In Finnish research, the connection has been perceived as weak. Even though the beginning of the movement was marked by support on the part of the mountain Sami, in Finland the movement never achieved a strong foothold in Sami areas and the

145 KA, AKN, correspondence in various places; compare Lehtola 2000b, 135 and Lehtola 2000d, 159, where Lehtola discusses the origin of the term “saamit”, giving the impression that this was a term devised by Nickul. It was, however, presented by Nilla Outakoski and only commented on by Nickul; Sverloff 2003, 12.
movement had already lost its Sami character by the 1860s. I shall not go into depth about the
history of Laestadianism in Finland, but there are Sami practising the Laestadian faith,
whereas the core areas of the movement are outside the Sami home area. In Finland the
movement has been described as religious opposition, but also as an agrarian reaction to
modernization. From a Sami perspective, Laestadianism is nowadays connected to the Finnish
dominant culture and the Sami community is less coherent from a religious perspective; this is
also true in Norway. The movement has practised mostly conservative, conciliatory policies
towards the state and stresses peaceful assimilation within society. If the movement had any
emancipatory aspects in Finnish Lapland, they seem to have been gone by the 1940s.
Laestadianism, with its strict divisions into competing sects in Finland may, on the contrary,
have had a disintegrating effect on the Sami community. Having said this, Nilla Outakoski
made a self-representation in 1959 in which he labelled Laestadianism as the cause of the
moral superiority of the Sami and the Finns by comparison with the Norwegian population in
the Sami area.

If colonization and religion do not exhaustively explain the mobilization, then what
does? As a contextual explanation for the mobilization, post-war humanist ideals in the field
of the human and political rights of ethnic minorities should be recognized. In Finland, as a
result of the choices made during the Second World War there was, in addition, a bankruptcy
of nationalistic ideas, which may have contributed to the most racist notions about the Sami
being replaced. The emerging assimilative pressure in the school system, however, is proof
that some nationalistic attitudes survived the war.

Given the low engagement in and dislike of the party political arena, there is no point
in using the model on Sami strategies that has been used by Regnor Jernsletten, where three
possible strategies are distinguished: the ethnopolitical strategy seeks recognition of
autonomy, ethnically-based organization and the putting-forward of ethnic demands. Two
more advanced strategies – an integrative party-political strategy and complementary
strategies – differ in the ethnically specific level of the demands made within the existing
party system. This last-mentioned option was used in Norway, but in Finland the Sami
movement could only cling to its ethnopolitical strategy. Hence the “shortcomings”,

146 Compare the lobbying of the NRL in the reindeer law committee in Norway in 1966, Berg 1997, 81-85.
147 Ihonen 2003, 84, 86-87, 90-91; Lehtola 2002b, 38-41; Minde 1998, 8, 11, 21; Myrvoll 2002, 46; Outakoski
148 Outakoski, Nilla: Saamelaiskysymyksestämiemme, LK 25.7.1959; see also the foreword to Outakoski 1991,
where he presents Laestadianism as his “reference group”.
mentioned by Sillanpää, are understandable. Political modernization was incomplete, so the context and channels were not finished. The Sami had, however, access at a national level.

Veli-Pekka Lehtola has further developed the factor, which Sillanpää also mentions, that the Sami were living in isolation, in terms of time and space, from each other. The inter-war period is marked by a regionally-organized, village-based and remote Sami culture and identity. While the remoteness and the unique regional organization protected the Sami from assimilation, the division into localized communities also hindered the rise of ethnic consciousness and unity, even among Sami intellectuals. In Inari, the deepest internal divisions occurred between Eastern and Western Sami languages and Orthodox and Lutheran religions. Lehtola also discusses colonization and provides a more dynamic picture than Sillanpää. The total integration of the Sami in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was blocked by their own strategies of accommodation and integration, as well as the reciprocal accommodation of the Sami and settler cultures, as we have seen.

Veli-Pekka Lehtola explains the ethno-political mobilization and beginnings of the Sami organization by the fact that the Sami were for the first time gathered from remote villages to Ostrobothnia during the evacuee period. Here it was possible to establish and build ethnic fellowship. The main areas of interest to Litto and the need for mobilization may be found in the socio-economic situation of the Sami in the burnt areas of Lapland. The number of reindeers had collapsed, houses were burnt and the infrastructure was destroyed. Families, with a growing number of children, were in economic distress. The Sami delegation was also motivated by these conditions.

Now we move on to examine the contexts and Finnish peculiarities of the Sami ethno-political mobilization. According to Sidney Tarrow, ethnic mobilization has four prerequisites, which are here placed in a Finnish political context. There was political opportunity, a new ideological situation and a shift towards pluralism in post-war Finland.
Secondly, there was a new mobilizing structure, the very fact that ethnic fellowship had came into being and an everyday social network was being built. SL represented the formal side of this new structure. A collective action frame was dominated by the Finnish national and cultural frame, which checked radical forms of ethnic resistance. This occurred both through the cultural constraints that the Sami constructed themselves and through those outer politico-cultural codes that frame the politically possible. SL was responsible for drafting the still quite preliminary repertoire of contestation, especially when it came to the formulation of demands and constructing collective identities.156 None of these factors alone explains the mobilization, but the shortcomings experienced at each stage explain the difficulties in the “Finnish” mobilization. Ideological change was just underway in Finland; the everyday social network did not mobilize the whole group, since people were struggling in terms of their everyday subsistence as evacuees and adhering to traditionalistic political/religious views. In part, this world-view hindered the SL from becoming successful in its politics and choice of repertoire. There is clearly a notion of being under threat, sometimes taken as an opportunity to make claims, such as the segregational efforts of the early Sami movement. There was concern over herding becoming more Finnish. The majority influx would erode Sami subsistence, their shared collective cultural identity and their control over the resources in the Sami home area, practices that had so far been almost undisturbed. This sense of threat also triggered the most radical self-representations.157

Sven Tägil has also drafted a theory on the origins of the ethnic mobilization. Before mobilization, the question of ethnic identity has to be politicized. The ethnic group has to conceive its position as threatened and critical. The ethnic group starts to react to this real or imagined threat. The politicization may have its background in various structural circumstances of a social, economic, cultural, political or territorial nature. Centralization and discrimination have been seen to provoke the most forceful reactions from ethnic groups. An example from Inari is the centralization of the municipal administration to the “Finnish” power centre of Ivalo after the war, which provoked a reaction from the Sami community. Centralization was interpreted as a measure diminishing the group’s power and influence, whether that was the state’s intention or not.158

155 Lehtola 1994b, 226.
157 Later on Nilla Outakoski took the threat created by the Finnish settlement as a starting-point for Sami mobilization. Outakoski, Nilla: Saamelaiskysymyksestämme, LK 25.7.1959.
In Inari, the 1940s was also an era of eroding Sami position and growing pressure of assimilation. One important specification must be made here: it hit the younger generation more severely as they entered the new school system and a modern, institutionalized childhood\textsuperscript{159}. Assimilation does not explain the mobilization of the first, older activist generation, which encountered the full force of Finnish intrusion through longer delays in resource management. As far as the second generation was concerned, there is no doubt that the school system was the most powerful assimilator and here the cultural sanctions of being a Sami were strongest. The dismantling of the peripatetic catechist teacher system was decisive. After the change in legislation in 1946, compulsory education was extended to those living over five kilometres from a school. As a consequence the Sami, finding themselves already in a minority position, were placed in schools with halls of residences, which have been widely criticized in Sami fiction and biographies. Many Sami pupils found themselves in a situation where they did not understand the language used in education. This led a poor command of Finnish and of reading and writing in Sami. Teaching was given in Finnish, and the command of the Sami language was eroded. Another consequence was that the remote Sami culture came into closer contact through modernization and the schooling system. If there was a collision between modernization and the ethnic minority, it was possibly harshest in the schools, where the Sami children were met with hostility: bullying of the Sami has been presented as more or less systematic, at least in the case of the Skolt Sami, who were bullied by Finns and by other Sami children as well. In consequence, many felt a sense of shame about their ethnic background, causing alienation from the Sami culture: learning or switching to the Finnish language, or even changing one’s name, was a strategy for survival in the school environment. Cultural contact had practical consequences. When returning home for summer from the halls of residence, heating the house with wood and a lack of running water felt backward and laborious. A downgrading assimilation was accompanied, in some cases, by ethnic radicalization. The situation improved a little during the 1960s as Pekka Lukkari began to teach the Sami language in 1959. As school transport improved, halls of residences were not used from the late 1960s onwards. Sami children could choose the Sami language as a voluntary subject from 1960 onwards in Inari and the teaching was given in Sami from the 1970s onwards.\textsuperscript{160} In addition to this, the Christian Folk High School, an institution for the

\textsuperscript{159} Tuomaala 2004, 301.

support of Sami culture and manifestation of Sami ethnicity, was established at that time (described in more detail in Chapter 4.3.2).

In the worst cases, Sami children in Finland encountered the same problems as Norwegian Sami children: in order to learn anything at school, they had to first learn the language used by the teacher. The halls of residence are recalled with a shudder. Oula Näkkäläjärvi, with personal experience of halls of residence, mentions “a constant sense of fear” under which the children lived. The children were separated from their home language for long semesters, in many cases hindering the conveying of traditional skills needed for reindeer herding and handicrafts. The children were constantly in touch with Finnish regulations, values and manners.\footnote{Marjut Aikio has shown how the Folk School system in the 1940s and 1950s resulted in a firmer grounding of the Finnish language in the Sami area. With this exception, it may be stated that in Finland, as elsewhere in countries with school programmes that aimed to assimilate the indigenous population with mainstream society, the intention failed: the school experience became a radicalizing key experience for the “dormitory” generation, and for the new Sami elite educating themselves and entering the same system demanding and using the Sami language and a Sami curriculum.}{\footnote{161}}

Schooling serves as an example of negative equal treatment where a legally-secured equal right (to education) contained elements of indirect and institutionalized discrimination. The Finnish language used in schools was based on an unnoticed discriminatory bias working systematically to the disadvantage of the minority. Positive equality would contain a set of cultural rights: rights for expressing, maintaining and transmitting a cultural identity.\footnote{At least one school – a school for household economy in Ivalo, established in 1960 – had the explicit aim of integrating Sami girls into Finnish society by teaching them the principles of Finnish household economy. The number of Sami students was exceeded by that of Finnish pupils, due to the location of the school.\footnote{The intention was good, assimilative and pragmatic in argumentation: it would be easy for the Sami if they could use Finnish language in their everyday contacts, for example with the authorities, who were mostly of Finnish extraction.\footnote{Veli-Pekka Lehtola also discusses the parents’ intentions. Educating children in}}{\footnote{164}}

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{In 1973, a state forester in Inari stated that only a command of the Finnish language provided the Sami with equal opportunities. See Nyyssönen 2000, 221; for one reporter in Lapin Kansa, the problem was that Sami children did not have a command of the Finnish language. This had led to truancy from school. The fact that the}}{\footnote{165}}
\end{itemize}
Finnish was prioritized (the same was correspondingly the case in Norway) so that children could cope with the school system. Results varied: as in Norway, teachers sometimes had to correct mistakes in the Finnish taught by the parents. The parents wanted to help their children, having suffered as evacuees, linguistically handicapped in a Finnish-speaking environment. On the other hand, learning the Sami language was neglected. This was because of a belief that children could only learn only one language perfectly.\textsuperscript{167}

In searching for a power shift in Inari, when the majority assumed the power to facilitate a process of change,\textsuperscript{168} the post-war period is the most obvious candidate. Even though there was a subsequent recovery in reindeer herding, Inari became more Finnish. There are indications that the attitude of Finnish officials became harsher: reindeer herding was viewed as a lower, pre-modern means of living that was giving way to newer and more significant means of living. One state forester maintained during the 1950s that reindeer herding was a degenerate means of living. What is absolutely clear is that agriculture and, especially from the 1940s onwards, forestry were favoured throughout the twentieth century by Finnish officials. However, forestry was only beginning to increase the area of loggings.\textsuperscript{169}

Hence the reindeer herding co-operative could hold its position for a little while and no herder protests were heard. This was different in Sweden, where the notion of reindeer herding being lower status led to a paternalistic policy and legislation, but in Finland it was merely left to degenerate in peace, and later on led to welfare measures. There was thus more room for adaptive Sami measures and initiatives, in spite of the hierarchies within many discourses.\textsuperscript{170}

The unproblematic continued use of Sami cultural markers on behalf of the Sami elite does not convey any sense of shame felt by their Saminess. Their use dated from the pre-war era and, in what appeared to be quite a Sami-friendly media environment, it was not a problem to continue their use. The first wave of Sami mobilization was achieved by a generation with a less problematic relation to these markers. What was about to change was, as the second generation took over, the relation to modernization, which was beginning to be perceived as destructive. What was not about to change was the fact that this option continued to be taken, but the choice was increasingly criticized by radical activists.

\textsuperscript{167}Lehtola 1994b, 219-222.
\textsuperscript{168}Brochmann 2002, 28.
\textsuperscript{169}Nyyssönen 2000, 204.
3.6. Conclusions

The post-war period signifies the beginning of the construction of a collective Sami identity on the part of the Sami themselves in public fora: this creation of Sami collective identities was carried out “in opposition to”, “as a reversal of”, but in this case especially “in relation to” the majority “Other” – the Finnish – as well as by and for themselves. The self-esteem shown by Sami activists challenged the binary hierarchy of centre and margin. The “Other” – here the Sami – refused to be the other, and created its own discourses, trying to break away from the margin,¹⁷¹ or rather, safeguarding the isolation provided by what appeared to be a marginal position from a majority point of view. This conscious and rather aggressive effort was preceded by a period of being a “thankful object”. I make this categorization to highlight how the Sami evolved from an object-like situation to citizenship, which at this point resulted in a “dual citizenship”, where both “Saminess” and “Finnishness” were an option. It seems that in Inari, due to minor damage caused by modernization, there was a lack of inner radicalization and a smaller socio-cultural stigmatization on which to build a “true”, radical, community-forming “resistance identity”. The Sami identity was positioned in both realms and constructed through both difference and conjuncture. Even though on some occasions the ethnic barriers were built aggressively, the break from the Finnish domains and discourses was not total¹⁷² – indeed, they were relied upon and their establishment demanded in northernmost Lapland. Modernization was already perceived as a threat by the Norwegian Sami in the 1950s and this threat to Sami distinctiveness, caused by any intrusion into their isolation, was discussed.¹⁷³ In Finland, isolation was still desired, but in conjunction with the welfare services, while the perceptions of modernization as harmful and of isolation as a necessary shelter for remnants of the reindeer-herding Sami culture were not cultivated until the 1970s.

The ethnicity was politicized, but conflicting obligations to both the ethnic group and the greater national whole mellowed down the policy, and internal quarrelling handicapped the movement. All of this resulted in incoherent identity politics. The first wave of Sami mobilization was based on a notion of threatened culture and interests, and this resulted in the most coherent representative strategy of that era, building a Sami collective identity through

¹⁷² Castells 1998, 8-9; Hall 1999, 16.
perceptions of threat. This representation was used to demand cultural protection or, in more
dynamic statements, voluntary isolation from the majority.

In Norwegian research on Sami ethnicity, assimilation due to the Norwegianization
policy is consistently seen as an explanatory factor, both in the favouring of majority ethnic
markers and in ethnic mobilization. In a Finnish context, this explanation does not apply in
the case of the first activist generation. For them, the very fact that ethnic fellowship came
into being was the most decisive thrust towards creating a new ethnopolitical space and Sami
initiative. The conquering aspect of the ethnopolitics was most obvious in the fractile
quarrelling between the SfPLC and Karl Nickul and in direct denials concerning expertise on
Sami issues on the part of the Finnish actors. The Finnish “Sami Friends” became an obvious
problem for (parts of) the Sami elite, once the identity politics began on the Sami’s own
initiative. In addition to a mostly silent national discourse, the Sami in Finland had to relate to
a benevolent, yet restrictive Sami Friend discourse on Saminess, sometimes practising
“essentialist” expectations, together with ample portions of ethnopolitical purity. The Sami
elite of the first generation conquered the representational field, which was the most
empowering trait in the early history of the Sami movement in Finland.

SL had no real means of guilt-tripping those in power. There were vaguely-articulated
identity politics, which were legitimized only among Sami Friends, not in the higher ranks of
Finnish political life. The most significant result of the first phase of the Sami movement
(including the SfPLC) was that Sami representation in policy-making that concerned them
was secured to some extent (see also the Chapter 4.3.3. on the Sami committee). However,
this was not yet a guarantee of any concrete results. The possibilities for advocating the
Sami cause were also very few.

The persistence in making claims for the establishment of the welfare state, as well as
the unproblematic use of prevailing Finnish discourses in the Sami movement and by SL has
traditionally been taken as evidence of the integrative forces of the modern state and its
welfare system. The Sami movement was seemingly “pacified” and Sami culture was codified
by the state organs. Alternatively, Sami deference might be the reason for “allowing this to

\[173\] Stordahl 1996, 54; on the other hand, the Sami movement in Norway has been explained both as a reaction
from pressures from the “south” and as a movement working for the allocation of welfare measures. Drivenes
and Jernsletten 1994, 212.

\[174\] Thuen 1995 is one of the most elegant examples of this.

\[175\] Compare Lantto 2003, 219: SSR obtained permanent official status in Sami policy-making in Sweden during
the 1950s. In Finland, there was no such organization that could have enjoyed such status and legitimacy as SSR
did in Sweden.
happen”. This would reduce the Sami mobilization to merely a reaction to state integration/colonization, neglecting Sami reflexivity and intention. Another interpretation of the Sami welfare process would be to perceive the Sami dislike of questioning Finnish influences as an effort to build their own Sami modernity, thus making the mobilization more dynamic. The eager use of existing and conquered political space backs up the notion that the self-identification was not exclusively state-codified, but also Sami-codified.

When it comes to the qualifiers that place the Sami in their socio-political field, the Sami evolved from “a tribe” to “a nation” during this period. Or to put it more precisely, these qualifiers were used side by side. “Tribe” was used in vernacular circles to mark the hierarchy between the Finns and the Sami. It was used, it appears, without shame, as the “tribe” was on its way to becoming a “nation”. There seem not to be any explicit cases where the tribe would have been included within the Finnish national whole by the Sami. Being a member of the Sami tribe was a separate and distinctive ethnic category, and this constitutes an illustration of the differences between political cultures in post-war Finland and Norway. In Norway, the term tribe had no positive connotation, even among the Sami (see Chapter 4.1.1), whilst in Finland it conveyed no sense of stigma but a state of belonging to the ethnic group. The political, programmatic use of the term “nation” in the rhetoric by SL had the same function of ethnic distinction as the term “tribe”. It had a double function in creating the elevated ethnic category of the Sami and in legitimizing the position of SL as the leading national organization. The political praxis on behalf of the SL (not counting that of Outakoski) lowers the challenging function of the term. Even if the term “kansa” used by the activist may be translated as both “nation” and “people”, its use with the term “nationality” (kansallisuus) refers to “self-contained” identity politics, i.e. the act of elevation was meant to be empowering for the nation, not a challenge to the integrity of the state of Finland.

176 Quote Lewis 1998, 8; Lewis 2002, 41.
177 Nyyssönen 2005a, 107.
4. The Era of “Modernizing Sami” Imagery

4.1. Introduction

This chapter goes on to discuss Sami identity politics in the era between approximately 1952 and 1969. In earlier research, the period between the withering away of the most active SL initiative and the Sami renaissance has been seen as a silent period for the Sami movement in Finland.\(^1\) It was a period of the strongest assimilation, collective ethnic shame\(^2\) and abandonment of the Sami language. This is well documented, and partly true. The era contained features that were both positive and negative to the Sami movement. The economic modernization accelerated during this era and resource use began in earnest. These processes, and Sami participation in them, are studied in the contextualizing chapters. One culmination was reached in the perceived legitimacy of the modernization, which was only just beginning to be eroded during this period. The Sami movement experienced a series of victories during the early 1950s, as we saw in the chapter on SL, but the era was marked by changes in the movement and the beginnings of a generational shift. Another important change also occurred in Sami ethnopolitics during the 1950s, when demands for cultural protection (which, on the other hand, included exclusive rights to reindeer herding) were gradually replaced by demands for linguistic and land rights. The significance of Karl Nickul and the Sami conferences in this process is discussed in the chapter that follows.

While the dominant strategy of this period was to represent the Sami as a modernizing people, both a radicalization of representation and an increasing variety of strategies and claims are noticeable in relation to the Finnish intrusion to the domicile/modernization. How was this reflected in Sami ethno- and identity politics? The questions I shall try to answer in this chapter are as follows: how did self-representations and identity politics change during this era? How, in turn, did Sami thinking concerning rights/cultural protection and equality change during these two decades? Were the self-representations legitimized and were the claims accepted by the majority?

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\(^1\) One argument for this is that there were no ideological local Sami organizations until the end of the 1960s. See e.g. Lehtiranta and Seurujärvi-Kari 1992, 145 and Morottaja 1984, 329.

\(^2\) In *Sabmelaš* there are references and first-hand evidence of people hiding markers that revealed Saminess and shifting language in everyday situations. These articles, in their turn, are proof of another kind of attitude, cherishing and taking pride in Saminess. Both attitudes were evidently prevalent among the Sami in Finland. Lehtola, Ånni: Albmoglaš heāhpunaddamgo? *Sabmelaš* 2-3/1956; Nuorgam, Johan: Sami Karvvuk, *Sabmelaš* 7-8/1956.
4.1.1. National context

There were positive developments in the status of minorities/indigenous populations in international law. However, in retrospect, the major achievement of the period, the ILO Convention No. 107 (1957) on tribal and indigenous people, has been criticized. The convention was based on the premise of indigenous people being “stagnated…in economic destitution and…cultural…backwardness” and it had an explicit assimilative and integrationist purpose. The indigenous peoples were excluded from negotiating at the convention.\(^3\) Demands for ethnic-based autonomy and self-government were not on the agenda anywhere in a global context and the decolonization movement did not at this point challenge the nationally-based spatial organization of the Third World. Self-determination was reserved for the established states.\(^4\) Internationally, the indigenous resistance evolved during this period from calls for action to maintain the cultural and linguistic identity to land rights claims in the traditional territories. The claim for self-determination was a later phenomenon on the indigenous agenda.\(^5\)

In Finland, the nationalistic rhetoric of equality persisted: ILO 107 was not ratified by Finland (which had just entered the UN and the Security Council) because, it seems, of pure neglect: in Finland there were no tribal people mentioned in the convention, “not counting the smallest Sami tribes”\(^6\). Regarding ILO 107, the Norwegian policy was to deny the existence of tribal people altogether, since this thought was unfamiliar to Norwegians who entertained the idea of a homogenous nation state. Per Fokstad also found the idea of the Sami as a tribal people insulting. Finnish officials recognized their existence, but did not draw any conclusions from this.\(^7\) The Finnish culture was still seen as coherent and unifying.\(^8\)

During the 1950s in Finland a belief in modernization and industrialization (equalling development) prevailed. The starting point for the industrialization process of Lapland was the 10% cut in forests and 25% cut in the paper and pulp industry, due to the annexation of Karelia and Petsamo to the Soviet Union in 1944. Northern resources rose in value and their wisest use was believed to be an efficient, industrial use. The programme included a state-run mobilization of natural resources, industrialization, introducing more state-owned industry to

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\(^3\) Anaya 2000, 44-45; the quote is from a 1946 study on indigenous populations quoted in Niezen 2000, 127.

\(^4\) Anaya 2000, 43, 84; Oskal 2002a, 1-2.


\(^6\) Scheinin 2001, 42, quote end note 9, p. 80.

\(^7\) Minde 2000a, 27; Thuen 1995, 174, 193-194.
Lapland and a strong regional policy. The rapid process that Lapland experienced has been characterized as “welfare colonization” (Heininen) and “ecological colonization” (Massa).\(^8\)

In the 1960s, a new phase of national integration dawned with the beginning of a “planning economy” (“suunnittelutalous”; not a planned economy) and corporativism. Social problems could be solved by means of scientific planning and organization. The welfare system was beginning to be built up in the 1960s as the dominance of foreign politics ceased, with a recognition of Finland’s neutrality on the part of the UK, the USA and the Soviet Union. This relieved the tension in internal politics, as there was no longer a compulsive need to engage the communists in governmental responsibility. The Nordic option could now be taken. Especially during the 1970s, a tendency to build up the welfare system into an all-encompassing mechanism was evident. In the 1950s the national ideals had been decency, honesty, a constructive attitude towards society and social conciliation, while in the 1960s these changed to equality and democracy.\(^9\) During the whole period the national discourses lent no legitimacy to ethnic-based claims.

During the 1960s the national economy continued to grow, amplified by structural change, as agriculture could not employ the “baby-boom generation” brought up on small-scale settlement farms in Finland. There was a simultaneous crisis of profitability, together with over-production and a decreasing need for labour in agriculture, which resulted in an influx of people into the cities, as well as growing urbanization, service domination and improved welfare services. Following modernization and specialization, farms became cattle-farms in Northern Finland. The problems with agriculture in Northern Finland were made worse by the small size of the farms. During the 1970s, agrarian production was actively reduced.\(^10\)

Forestry could not employ the surplus population in the countryside, since this was also being swiftly mechanized, modernized and rationalized in Finland. Even though the employment power of the forest sector was sinking, the amount of timber logged did not diminish, since it was logged by modernized means, and the demand for timber in the wood-processing industry increased. On occasion, the amount of timber logged exceeded the annual growth, but at the same time a national silvicultural project of efficient forestry was launched.

\(^8\) Peltonen 1996, 7.
to secure the forest resources. The 1960s was an era of large-scale clear-cutting, forest cultivation, artificial fertilization of the forests and the mechanization of forestry.\textsuperscript{12}

In the province of Lapland, this era was marked by the beginning of a “golden age” of regional policy and this was argued in order to achieve a reformist social policy aiming at progression, modernization, the equality of citizens and an equitable development of the regions. This policy replaced the old way of viewing Lapland as a poor, peripheral, even problematic and threatening region, when national security and integration had been the policy aims.\textsuperscript{13} One consequence of this national and provincial process of industrial drive was a neglect of competing land users. In the 1960s, in the paper-mill entrepreneurial circles of Southern Lapland, which were working to mobilize timber in the whole of Lapland, other land-use forms, including reindeer herding, were totally neglected. This is evident in efforts to build a pulp-mill in Kirkenes. The raw material was meant to be timber supplied from Inari. This effort was negotiated by Prime Ministers Gerhardsen and Kekkonen in 1956; it was widely discussed and hoped for in Lapland’s media, but it met with resistance in forestry and industrial circles. This effort was ultimately buried\textsuperscript{14}, due to calculations of profitability and the withdrawal of international funding, and because industrial circles in Southern Lapland with heavy wood-processing centres wanted to reserve the Inari timber for their own use. The director of Kemi Oy, Aulis O. Kairamo, was most persistent in this matter. In my earlier archive work I did not locate any documents where the matter of reindeer herding would have been dealt with.\textsuperscript{15}

At the end of this period, modernization was beginning to be criticized by a larger audience. The first protests were voiced against the harsh environmental consequences of the efficient forestry project.\textsuperscript{16} Among the critical voices, the working committee of the Nordic Sami Council made a statement concerning the Kirkenes plan in 1961, which was published

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Pihkala 1987, 286-287.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Koikkalainen 2003, 114-115, 129-130.
\item \textsuperscript{14} As no help was forthcoming from Norway, an ally was found in the east. President Urho Kekkonen (from 1956 onwards) was active in the industrializing project, which was connected to changes in the Finnish political culture: foreign politics became a dominant branch and President Kekkonen a personal guarantor of friendly relations with the Soviet Union (and thus, in the new political culture, a guarantee of the neutrality and independence of Finland). This meant that Finnish governments became presidential governments and the Soviet Union had some influence over Finnish internal policy. On a number of occasions, Kekkonen tried to engage the Soviet Union in the industrialization of Northern Finland. The central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had granted a substantial loan for this purpose in 1958. Loggings came closer to the pastures of Inari with Soviet funding. Haataja 1992, 11, 21, 23-24, 35-37, 39; Nevakivi 1996, 83, 126.
\item \textsuperscript{15} A neglectful attitude towards this Sami issue and means of living, and the prioritizing of industrialization, were common features in Nordic majority societies and forces behind this process. In the case of Sweden, see Nordin 2002, 71, 75; Nyyssönen 2000, 83-88; Veijola 1998, 85-86; Virtanen 1993, 267-268; LK 13.5.1961, Inarin puutavarat riittämättömät Kirikkoniemen tehdesta varten.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Leino-Kaukiainen 1997, 184.
\end{itemize}
in *Poromies*. This statement is problematic from the point of view of its representativeness. From Finland, Sami Friends Erkki Itkonen and Karl Nickul sat on the working committee. In the statement, the Kirkenes process was referred to and discussed only from the perspective of allocating the gains from this process. The Sami were to gain from the plant and the consequent modernization as well. The area from which the raw material was to be logged, Inari, was mentioned vaguely as “disputable”, which may be a reference to the question of landownership.\(^{17}\)

### 4.1.2. The shared process of modernization in Inari

During the 1950s, Finnish exports were almost totally reliant on timber and timber products, which sustained agrarian forestry in an otherwise swiftly modernizing economy. In Lapland an immense project of efficient forestry took place, which was severely criticized in retrospect. The economic modernization of Lapland was based on the need for timber, a national shortage of energy and the consequent river construction in Lapland;\(^{18}\) the latter had consequences in the southern regions of the Sami home area from the late 1950s onwards. Economic modernization in the northern regions and in Inari was delayed until the 1960s, as the timber could not profitably be transported south from Inari: hence Norwegian trade was for a long time striven for in vain by Finnish officials, and this deepened the forestry recession.\(^{19}\)

The belief in modernization and industrialization was shared in Inari, and there were Sami who were active in industrialization projects. Agricultural projects were replaced by industrialization and forestry projects. The forests of Inari were surveyed and evaluated in 1955-1957 and a project of conquest over the remaining “zero areas” outside profitable forestry was underway in Forest and Park Service and in *Lapin Kansa*. The only wealth that the municipality had was the forests, said Antti Avaskari in 1956.\(^{20}\) There was an endless flow of delegations from Inari, in which Erkki Jomppanen participated, demanding employment from the government, and a series of committees recommending the industrialization of Lapland and a more efficient use of raw materials, which contributed to the growing timber

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18 Pihkala 1992, 271-272, 276-278.
industry in Kemi, Tornio and, a decade later, in Kemijärvi. The process was delayed by a lack of money. Like inner Finnmark, the peripheries of Finnish Lapland remained mostly undisturbed by industrialization. What was also shared with the modernization plans in Northern Norway was that the Sami and Sami interests were not considered worthy of discussion.21

In the delegations to various ministries in Helsinki, the interests of the non-ethnically organized regional entity of Inari, which suffered from unemployment and a budget deficit in the late 1950s, were advocated by introducing employment and, ultimately, modernization to the municipality. This led to an under-communication of ethnic-based interests. The background for these demands was unemployment and economic distress, amounting, according to the press, to hunger in unemployed families. The representative strategy of the delegations, when visiting ministries, was to represent the region as poor, stricken by unemployment and in need of help. The help consisted, for example, of loggings in the state forests in Inari and road construction. The promotion of a modern means of living did not (fully) contradict the Sami programme during this period.22 Forest and Park Service, which was frustrated at not being able to launch a silvicultural project in Inari, demanded a subsidy from the state to fund road construction and logging. A shared feature of these demands and parallel projects was the demand for equal treatment, victim representations of those Sami groups living outside the road network (in Angeli, Lisma, Menesjärvi, Sevettijärvi) and the belief that modernization would contribute to all the interest groups: local people, the Sami, the unemployed, tourism and forestry. Reindeer herding would also be rationalized, since road connections would be improved.23 During the late 1950s there were still defects in access to health care in remote areas, most notably in Sevettijärvi.24

Rationalization in many fields of life continued. Fishing in Lake Inari was to be rationalized and fish farming had to be undertaken in the poor lakes allocated to the Skolt

24 LK 24.9.1958, Hävintä heimon kylä Inarin Sevettijärvi II.
Sami. At the same time as the agricultural project was already fading away in Inari, it continued in *Lapin Kansa* and in Utsjoki, where it was a substantial source of Sami income. Industrialization was also desired in Utsjoki, in the absence of forest income. The modernization/rationalization-friendly atmosphere meant that reindeer herding was seen as a degenerating means of living (hopefully) giving way to modern land use forms. This attitude, originating from the pre-war notions of reindeer herding as harmful to and giving way to “Finnish” means of living, was shared in the district of Inari during the 1940s and 1950s, and among scientists. The attitude was not shared by the municipal bodies of Inari, where a recovery and growth of herding in the Sami home area was witnessed. Thus, in spite of inclusory talk in the demands made by the municipality, the modernization discourse contained features that were hostile to Sami discourses, most notably the notion of herding as a lower means of subsistence.

In spite of this, the rhetoric around herding was not as crisis-conscious as in Sweden. Nor was Sami identity politics as dependent on reindeer-herding imagery as in the Swedish Sami movement in the 1950s. There are two reasons for this: modernization had not yet diminished pastures (only in Sodankylä), and Sami self-imagery was dominated by a greater diversity and inclusivity than in Sweden. This did not always mean greater group coherence and inclusion than in Sweden, where the non-reindeer herding Sami were excluded from the claims made by SSR. The case of the Skolt Sami shows that intra-Sami uncrossable borders still existed and there was a deepening conflict between Finnish part-time herders and Skolt Sami herders in Muddusjärvi co-operative, due to differing modes of herding. (According to Pertti Pelto, the Skolt Sami were victims of institutionalized discrimination in the co-operative.) Nor did the Sami need to publicize the notions of a disappearing subsistence that were typical of the pre-war Swedish movement. This was done by some of their opponents,

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26 Organizational activities on the part of the farmers were not in decline in Inari. Maamiesseura (a farmers’ association) consisted mostly of Finnish settlers in the area. Activities included courses in agriculture and trotting races. The local association for landowners, called manttaalikunta, was more influential and advocated openly for fencing to check hay damage by reindeer. LK 18.12.1955, Inarin manttaalikunta esittää kunnollisten poroiarvojen rakentamista maatalouden suojaamiseksi; LK 4.1.1956, Inarin Kyrön maamiesseuran.
27 As a newspaper loosely connected to Agrarian Union, *Lapin Kansa* had its eye on a project concerning agriculture in Lapland. In spite of the difficulties, new areas for cultivation were still being cleared during the mid-1950s. The area cleared for cultivation was low: 730 hectares. LK 4.12.1955, Inarin pelttopinta-ala on nykyisin n. 730 ha; LK 8.2.1956, Ivalon seudun isännät innokkaita hevosmiehiä; LK 5.2.1959, Maatalous kannattaa Ivalossakin.
but in spite of them, herding flourished. It should be noted that in a Finnish context, referring to the traditional means of living still appeared to be referring to weakness, to a lower position. The effectiveness of such a self-identifying strategy may be questioned – cross-ethnic solidarity, which might have reflected upon such a self-representation positively, was still rare.

Inari experienced the impact of the beginnings of an economic globalization, not understood as an overarching macro-level process but rather as localization and emerging ties between the local and the global markets. People emigrating from Inari, getting a paid job on the payroll of Forest and Park Service, in the national parks and in services were part of a demographic transition typical of globalization. Households, indigenous and otherwise, were beginning to be perceived as economic spaces as well, as they became part of an increasingly unregulated economy. Typically, in globalization terms, an increasing number of professional Sami women was beginning to emerge, as those involved in reindeer herding were traditionally not keen to employ women and the profession was passed on to the son of the family. This policy led, eventually, to an “education explosion” among the Sami. This change applies to both strata: the more traditionally-oriented economy, including reindeer herding, and the non-indigenous work sector. The year of the herdsman was organized anew, with sporadic working opportunities emerging in the environment closest to home or on logging sites/construction works somewhere in Inari.

In the 1960s in Inari, faith in forestry and the industrial use of timber was soaring and an era of continuous logging was dawning. Forestry assumed a more regular form and became one of the biggest employers in Inari as a consequence of many years of lobbying on the part of Forest and Park Service and the municipality, a rise in the price of timber, a new pulp-mill in Kemijärvi, increasing profitability and improvements in transport conditions. However, modernization in logging techniques soon resulted in reduced labour needs. Talk of unemployment dominated the media in Lapland as this problem began to become chronic in

31 Lantto 2003, 108; on pastures in the Sami home area in Finland, Nyyssönen 2003, 256-258.
32 Kalela 2005b, 212; Sassen 2002, 17-19.
33 Ruotsala 1999, 43-44.
34 Jernsletten 1997, 293; in 1962, Karl Nickul stated that numerous Sami had graduated from teacher training colleges and started as Folk School teachers, and there were six Sami students currently studying at a teacher training college and one Sami student at the pedagogical high school, precursor of the University of Jyväskylä. Nickul 1962; in spite of this “explosion”, the education level remained lower than that of the rest of Finland. This was discovered in the census published in 1972. LK 7.10.1972, Saamelaisten ikärakenne ja koulutuksellinen taso poikkeavat suomalaisista.
Inari and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{36} The industrialization of Inari and forestry mobilization were seen as a solutions to this problem.\textsuperscript{37}

Erkki Jomppanen, now the chairman of the municipal council, representing the Agrarian Union\textsuperscript{38}, took part in a series of meetings about industrializing Inari. Present at the meeting, which took place on 17 June 1962 in Ivalo, were Forest Councillor (metsäneuvos) V. Pohjanpelto from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; Carl Axelsson from the regional division of Forest and Park Service; Yrjö Siitonen, the chief forester for the district of Inari; K. Tumme, municipal manager of Inari; and Jomppanen, in the role of head of the municipal council of Inari. The discussion of local grievances (raised by Jomppanen, for example), of prioritizing the wood-processing plant in Inari instead of exporting the timber south in its unprocessed state, did not lead to any concrete results. Jomppanen justified the processing plant in employment terms and yet another delegation was sent under the leadership of Jomppanen to Helsinki.\textsuperscript{39} In the meetings that followed, Jomppanen was consistent in his demands for the industrialization of Inari. Jomppanen also demanded that representatives from the municipality of Inari should have access to decision-making in this matter. The forests needed to be mobilized and, if anything, a small-scale wood-processing industry should be established.\textsuperscript{40} Sami interests, for Jomppanen, were perceived more as a matter of regional policy, and not exclusively as ethnic-based interests.\textsuperscript{41} Among the Sami themselves there was no unanimity on this matter; the work of the Sami Council at that time, for example, was inspired by the dangers of modernization and industrialization for the Sami\textsuperscript{42}.

The economic modernization and growth in Inari was stunted by a high proportion of primary industry, which counted both reindeer herding and forestry as one, and low

\textsuperscript{37} LK 28.5.1963: Pitäjänneuvos Antti Avaskari: Inarin puuvarojen käyttö.
\textsuperscript{38} LK 9.12.1958, Inarin työllisyyssasioita selvitetty keskusvirastolle.
\textsuperscript{39} The Provincial Archive of Oulu, The archive of the provincial body of Forest Government in Lapland (Metsähallinnon Perä-Pohjolan piirikuntakonttori), Hp:24, documents concerning the Kirkenes plant, minutes of the meeting on industrializing Inari 17.6.1962; Nyyssönen 2000, 86-88; LK 13.5.1962, Inarin puuvarojen hyväksikäyttö edellyttää puunjalostustehdasta; LK 23.9.1962, Inarin teollistamisesta käytti neuvottelija eilen; Lapin Kansa expressed its support of Inari’s own manufacturing plant in the editorial Puunjalostuslaitos Inariin, LK 29.9.1962.
\textsuperscript{40} LK 25.5.1963, Inarin teollistamiskysymys oli monipuolisesti pohdittavana; LK 7.8.1964, Inarin tulevaisuus riippuu ratkaisevaltia teollisuudesta.
\textsuperscript{41} On another occasion, during the Sami conference in Kiruna in 1962, Erkki Jomppanen used this forum to thank the conference for contributing to building co-operation between municipalities in Sami areas and advocating both cultural and economic issues. Jomppanen mentioned both the modernization and the improvement of the Sami condition as important contributions. LK 21.8.1962, Saamelaivästö odottaa myöntäisiä tuloksia konferenssiltä.
\textsuperscript{42} LK 12.11.1958, Saamelaisten pulmat Pohjoismaiden neuvostoon.
industrialization; efforts in this field were mostly failures, with the exception of a number of small-scale sawmills. Following the combined efforts of the District of Inari and municipal officials, Inari became a producer of raw materials, in the form of timber that was sent to manufacturing plants in Southern Lapland. The sawmill in Nanguniemi (established in the mid-1950s) was not sufficient to cope with the timber from the forests of Inari. Following the combined efforts of the District of Inari and municipal officials, Inari became a producer of raw materials, in the form of timber that was sent to manufacturing plants in Southern Lapland. The sawmill in Nanguniemi (established in the mid-1950s) was not sufficient to cope with the timber from the forests of Inari. Following the combined efforts of the District of Inari and municipal officials, Inari became a producer of raw materials, in the form of timber that was sent to manufacturing plants in Southern Lapland. The sawmill in Nanguniemi (established in the mid-1950s) was not sufficient to cope with the timber from the forests of Inari.

Fishing experienced a serious decline, with problems connected to the regulation of Lake Inari, and it was reckoned that forestry could provide a more secure income.

Jobs provided by the Finnish state for unemployed people, for example in road construction and maintenance, began to form a big source of employment and a reason to abandon the traditional means of living during the 1960s. Many Sami chose to move away to study or to obtain paid labour in towns outside the Sami area as a part of the “great removal” (“Suuri muutto” – an unusually extensive emigration from Lapland to urban Finland and Sweden in the late 1960s, which led to a temporary and steep decline in the population of Lapland). This was part of a larger structural change in Finland from which the urban Sami societies emerged as a late phenomenon in a Nordic context. Young Sami women were the most eager to leave Inari. The Skolt Sami villages were reported to be “emptying” of young women; this also resulted in a more eager use of the Finnish language, as reported by the Sami Committee in 1973.

In spite of the negative attitudes amongst the officials in the 1950s, reindeer herding did not vanish: it still attracted youngsters, but the influx to other modes of employment and production had begun in earnest, as service industries also began to act as serious employers in post-war Inari. During the late 1960s, herding underwent profound change and an accelerating modernization with the introduction of the snowmobile. Over a ten-year period, Sami reindeer herding had experienced an almost total, extremely fast mechanization, known as the “snowmobile revolution”. This entailed changes to herding, as the periods spent gathering up the herds in the forests were shortened and gathering techniques changed, as well as a period of crisis, with a decrease in income and number of reindeer for some owners.

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44 Turunen, Tauno: Miten Inarin kalastajan toimeentulo ryöstettiin, LK 1.7.1969; this decline was also experienced among the Skolt Sami, see LK 24.9.1969, Sevettijärveltä hyvää tie Näätämöön, Turistivirta alkanee jo keväällä.
45 Pelto 1973, 151-152.
46 Haveri and Suikkanen 2003, 162-163.
Costs increased, due to the mechanization of the trade. There was also an accumulation of wealth to large-scale owners in a number of co-operatives.  

In spite of the snowmobile revolution, reindeer herding enjoyed a rare moment of positive publicity from the early 1960s onwards, which was backed by research, welfare measures and by a notion of herding being the ecologically best-suited type of subsistence in the Arctic and subarctic regions. Of all the welfare measures the most significant, including cultural by-products as well, was the Reindeer Estate Law (1969), which was intended to improve the living conditions of the herders and the profitability of the trade by establishing small-scale farms for full-time herders. The notion of a means of living giving way to industrial forms of land use was abandoned as agriculture in Lapland found itself in the midst of a severe crisis, and criticism of efficient forestry gained momentum. In parts of the Finnish public sphere it was now reindeer herding that was the core of the Sami culture and a means of living that kept the peripheries populated. A change of paradigm occurred in research and management: in earlier times, the focus was on damage done by the reindeer, but this changed to a focus on the harm done to herds, for example losses caused by predators and traffic.  

In the 1960s, Inari became more closely connected to the state through improved road networks, electronic media and welfare services. Telecommunications improved, more villages were electrified, money transactions and savings increased, the Red Cross in Inari received an ambulance in 1961, and a department store and health centre were opened in Ivalo in 1962. In 1963, national standard time was introduced by radio to Sami home areas. From 1965 onwards, both Finnish radio channels could be heard throughout the entire Sami area and there was reception for national television from 1968 onwards. Electronic media and welfare services were Finnish language domains. The modernization of a peripheral region was, according to Heikki Kerkelä, simplified and shortened, yet accelerated.  

The above-mentioned “education explosion” led to a growing differentiation within the Sami community. Following modernization and a consequent change in the socioeconomic structure of the Sami society in Finland, a great diversity of strategies was  

50 Ingold 1976, 34-38; Pelto 1973, 8-9, 12, 76-75, 97-138.  
53 Kerkelä is quoted in Lindgren 2000, 31-32.
embarked upon, which accelerated change. In the Sami domicile, the village-based identity survived, to some extent, but underwent a change as communications improved. Terhi Kurttila has studied the identity of the people living in the village of Lokka, in Northern Sodankylä, the position of which has always been on the periphery. Following the modernization of communications and means of living, their identity is still based on their peripheral position, which is understood as a positive, safe feature. The outside world has entered the village, according to Kurttila, in the form of electronic and printed media, as well as services and road connections. This has created a mixture, a peripheral position with access to the outside world. This and the introduction of a monetary economy and paid labour, for example in forestry, has to some extent challenged the nature-based livelihood and labour structure based on an annual cycle of reindeer herding.\(^54\)

This also applies to the remote villages of Inari. *Lapin Kansa* published a report from Guhttur, Kuttura, which found itself on the border between tradition and modernity. Children had gone to school via the newly-built road and the oldest ones were already studying at university. Elderly people living in Kuttura lived mainly from reindeer herding. Willow grouse were trapped, whereas fishing and gathering was reported to be in decline.\(^55\) If one wished to categorize the phase of modernization in Inari, the concept of *truncated modernization* might offer some assistance. Truncated modernization occurs in terms of hybridity, where political, cultural and economical hybridity produce modernity in the conjunctive intersection of different historical times (and generations, for example). Tradition is also perceived as a functioning force in producing the “modern” situation.\(^56\)

In local interest groups, the ethnic demarcations were blurred and co-operation was practised, at least on an *ad hoc* basis. The association of (Finnish) landowners sent their employees to the herding co-operatives to discuss hay damage during the early 1960s (at least). The association was to become active in the fishing rights issue, and protested against the power held by Forest and Park Service concerning the fishing waters in Inari. Among the members of the association was Erkki Jomppanen.\(^57\)

A period of transition seems to have taken place in municipal government in Inari in the late 1950s. A rhetoric and expectancy of promoting the common good in Inari was

\(^{54}\) Kurttila 1993, 21, 23-25.
\(^{55}\) Lk 4.10.1976, Kuttura – kylä Ivalojoen keskijuoksulla; the same applies to the “southernmost Sami village” Purnumukka (nowadays this would be Vuotso). Lk 18.1.1969, Purnumukka - eteläisin saamelaiskylä.
\(^{56}\) Kraniauskas 2000, 247-248.
\(^{57}\) Nyyssönen 2003, 249, 254; Lk 21.9.1960, Inarin manttaalikunta.
established, but left-wing groups had begun to disengage from this project. A “true” political modernization reached Inari in the mid-1960s, if one takes the emergence of quarrelling over party demarcations as a proof of this. This process undoubtedly integrated the municipal body and its Sami representatives more tightly within “Finnish” discourses and modes of political activity. The 1960s denote a power shift in Inari: with the perception of land regimes as constitutive to reality and producing meaning and discourses in Inari, the era resulted in a firmer establishment of the power of Forest and Park Service, which maintained a self-representation as the bringers of modernization. The legitimacy of the institution was now quite high, especially at a local level. After launching forestry in Inari, it overruled the power of the herding co-operatives and revealed their weaknesses at the most concrete level, in the forests/pastures in Inari. It took a little while before a counter-discourse from the reindeer-herding Sami emerged. As in the case of reindeer herding, the era of forestry enjoying a positive reputation proved to be short-lived in Inari. Discourses concerning development, modernization and employment were soon questioned by younger generations; this highlighted the other aspect of the power shift, the opening up of the generation gap (which will be dealt with later on).

4.2. Sami identity politics in an era of conciliation

4.2.1. Counter-imagery in the public sphere of Lapland in the 1950s and 1960s

In Finland, due to the kinship between the Finns and the Sami, inclusive imagery was cultivated in which Lapland and the Sami were seen as an integral part of Finnish nation-building. The Sami were integrated into the Finnish national whole as another “tribe” in Finland alongside, for example, the Savolax and Ostrobothnians. This was done solely from the Finnish point of view. The Sami were both an exotic indigenous people and “our minority”, as Seija Tuulentie has formulated. In addition, in post-war Finland, the Sami were seen in a more positive light than the Roma, for example. The national public sphere of the

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59 See, for example, LK 10.7.1964, Inarin sähkövoima kovassa kurssissa; traces of resistance towards the emergence of party politics are to be found. According to “P”, party interests were liable to constitute a hindrance to wise municipal policies. LK 25.11.1964, Kerrotaan Ivalon kuulumisia.
60 Tennberg 1998, 23.
61 Tuulentie 2003a, 34-35.
1960s concerning the Sami has been referred to as stereotyped and uninformed. This does not apply to the media of Lapland. Lapin Kansa continued to be a modest Finnish publication with both regional and national orientation. This is evident in its interpretations of equality, which are dealt with later on. In the majority imagery of the Sami in the 1950s and early 1960s, two veins may be detected: 1) the dominating imagery of the period was of a people living on the borderline between tradition and modernity; 2) later, victim representations were cultivated with occasional expressions of solidarity towards the “Indians” suffering from racial problems.

The Sami did not vanish from the public sphere of Lapland. Lapin Kansa was still a Sami-friendly platform with its own Sami “celebrities”, such as Jouni Aikio, (also known as Kaapin-Jouni). The Sami were represented as clients of the welfare state and equal citizens demanding equal services from the state. “Titles” such as “Sami”, “reindeer man” (“poromies”) or “reindeer herder” were attached to them. During the early 1950s, the most usual platform for representations was in pleas for improvement in living conditions. In Lapin Kansa the crudest representations were made of the Skolt Sami. The resettlement had been finished, but Skolt Sami subsistence was in crisis and demands for better living conditions were numerous. This created space for patronizing imagery, representing the Skolt Sami as poor and primitive, the weakest of the minorities in Finland. All this was done with patronizing warmth, altering the perception of the Finns to that of benefactor. When the Skolt Sami themselves were allowed to speak, pleas for state funding and improvements to the infrastructure were numerous, but demands for their own Skolt Sami reindeer-herding cooperative and restriction of access to fishing waters were also made. The Skolt Sami were an exceptional group in another sense as well: they were granted special rights and treatment in the resettlement and in special “Skolt legislation” (“kolttalainsäädäntö”, regulating land use and access to land), yet at the same time they suffered from the same, or even worse

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64 LK 8.3.1955, Kaapin-Jouni täyttää 80 vuotta; there are examples of more unfortunate representations as well. In a report from the Sami conference in Karasjok in 1956, Lapin Kansa wrote: “The Sami are educated people. Many replies were made (at the conference) and many rather matter-of-fact opinions were expressed. There were many women present as well, although they settled into their role of listeners.” LK 22.8.1956, Kolmen vallan saamelaist koolla.
66 For example LK 11.11.1956, Sevettijärvi ilman sairashuoltoa; LK 8.1.1957, Koltat - tarujen kanssa Lapissa; LK 1.2.1957, Kolttakiertue Varejoella.
shortcomings of access to welfare measures and services compared with all the other ethnic
groups in Inari.\footnote{Ingold 1976, 243-244.}

The different treatment of the Skolt Sami continued in the 1960s. In most cases, the
Skolt Sami were represented as poor and in need of help from the state of Finland. This was
because of defects in the resettlement and housing projects,\footnote{LK 23.10.1964, Kolttaheimolla edessään ankara puutteen talvi.} difficulties in reindeer herding\footnote{In Sevettijärvi, difficulties were concentrated on gathering the calves and marking them: there were numerous unmarked calves belonging to the co-operative of Muddusjärvi. \textit{LK} 20.3.1964, Sevettijärven kolta-alue olisi erottettava omaksi paliskunnaksi; in Nellim, the reindeers were reported as having flocked to the Skolt pastures from neighbouring co-operatives, and even from Hammastunturi, where the pastures were already reported to be in a poor condition; \textit{LK} 2.9.1965, Inarin kasvot, IV: Kolttaväestön elinvälineen hoidon puutteen, talvi.} and, especially, an insufficient number of fish in the resettlement area, which was beginning
to have an impact on Skolt Sami subsistence. Their standard of living was lagging behind the
average in Finland, emigration was continuing, unemployment was high and “passivity” was
widespread.\footnote{See, for example, \textit{LK} 20.2.1964, Kolttien elämän parantamiseen valtion puuttuttava pikaisesti; \textit{LK} 29.8.1965, Kolttien elinvahduttavaan ja elinvahduttavaan elämään.} There was a pitfall in these representations: on numerous occasions, the Skolt
Sami were blamed for lacking initiative and being supported by the state. These instances of
blame were denied in the press.\footnote{LK 31.8.1965, Inarin kasvot, IV: Kolttaväestön elinvahdin puutteen, talvi.} \textit{Lapin Kansa} followed the activities of the Farmers’ Society
of Sevettijärvi (maamiesseura); the farmers’ societies were centres of the traditional peasant
elite in Finland, with a programme promoting agrarian education, Christian morality and
social activities. “Skolt adviser” Heikki Uusihannu was active in the society, which had
numerous Skolt Sami members. The society concentrated on advocating small-scale
agriculture and there was progress with this, at least in the short term. In the press, Heikki
Uusihannu used the term “Congo of Finland” with reference to Sevettijärvi, in order to stress
both the backwardness of the region and the role of the association as a modernizer of
society.\footnote{Alapuro 1995, 12-13, 47-49, 57-58, 61-63; \textit{LK} 20.5.1961, Inarin Sevettijärven maamiesseuran toiminta on vilkasta; in 1963 a cultivation contest was held. The winner, Eljas Fofanoff, received a Finnish flag and a flagpole. This symbolic gesture speaks for the role of society in Sevettijärvi. \textit{LK} 15.10.1963, Maatalous voittaa alaa Sevettijärvellä.} This is an interesting case of national integration: during the pre-war era, farming
societies were conquering and utilizing the former lands of the Skolt Sami in Petsamo, who
were now working in their own society to promote cattle-raising in Sevettijärvi and Nellim.\footnote{Nyyssönen 2006a, 218.}

The Sami way of using gákti as formal dress at festivities and in \textit{Lapin Kansa}
continued. Reports from herding co-operative meetings continued, with the same
representation: Sami professionalism was raised in quite a matter-of-fact manner and the term “Sami” was still more or less consistently used.\textsuperscript{75}

As a competing representation, the notion of the Sami living in a warm relationship to nature emerges. In retrospect, and from an anti-essentializing perspective, one of the crudest examples comes from Gustav Sirén Ph.D., one of the architects behind the mobilization of the forest resources of Inari. Sirén gave a lecture at a meeting of the SfPLC on the history of the timber line in Inari, stressing its fluctuating nature. The timber line was now apparently moving northwards, which meant an improvement in the living conditions of the “people living in a relatively immediate relation to nature”. “The Lapp people still have a living contact with nature”, and if those responsible for the “future of the Sami living areas” could grasp the value of nature, “the Sami can happily maintain their closeness to nature”. Sirén admitted that the Sami had little say in the silvicultural process that he himself, for example, was launching, but he did not mention that the same process endangered the natural base for the representation he was making. It is ironic that on the same occasion Professor Erkki Itkonen made a speech about the Sami Council, where he stressed the significance of the Sami Council in making known the Sami condition among those making plans for resource management in the Sami area. Itkonen mentioned that the information in these circles was not always sufficient (look no further than the subtleties of the statement made by Sirén, J.N.).\textsuperscript{76}

The war denoted a break in the way that the Sami were perceived by the majority. Karl Nickul practised “applied anthropology”, aiming to understand the character of the people, their traditions and way of thinking, rather than evaluating them by Western standards. The policy of avoiding patronizing and romanticizing representations, and instead taking the Sami premise as a starting point, led Nickul and the SfPLC to sustain the imagery and notion of the Sami as a modernizing or “actively adapting” people. Nickul had detected an increasing Sami will to modernize, as well as a will to disengage from the language, which was not taught to them and was of no real use. The modernization was not to violate “the right of domicile” (kotipaikkakoikeus) held by the Sami. The Sami had to have “permission” even to assimilate, if they wanted to. Nickul denied the power of definition both to himself and to the SfPLC, and this led him to practise an “open” imagery of the modernizing Sami.\textsuperscript{77}

Karl Nickul presented a more positive representation of the “lower” and “weaker” Sami. For Nickul, the Sami were a viable people, growing in number and in cultural

\textsuperscript{75} For example LK 3.1.1956, Jutavien lappalaisten porojen lukumäärä nousee nyt lähes 5.000 yksilöön; LK 29.1.1957, Inarin Kyron paliskunnan.
\textsuperscript{76} Both lectures in LK 25.11.1958, Saamelaisneuvostolla on tärkeä tehtävää.
A plurality. An interpretation of Sami history as a “Lappish retreat” to the north was introduced. The representation was stripped from its connotation of hierarchy between the Finns and the Sami and the “preservation of Sami self-esteem” was highlighted. Nickul based his representation on a notion of a “basic attitude on the part of a natural people”, who were not willing to change their environment but were willing to adapt their way of life to it. This new, positive representation combined the notion of accommodation with the representation of a people living close to and accommodating their way of life to nature. This concurring discourse nevertheless challenged the Finnish interpretation of adaptation as weakness and experienced at least a partial success as the Sami entered a brief period of positive publicity.

Another common feature in the Finnish post-war representations was a (sympathetic) view of the Sami as the victims of Finnicization and Westernization. In spite of this, racially-inspired views survived. The short stature of the Sami was quite often referred to, for example, in geographical studies of Lapland, even in the 1960s.

The representations made by Nickul were not totally free from “essentializing” elements. He was on a quest to disprove the majority imagery of a disappearing/assimilating people. This was achieved by means of long introductions to their close, personal relationship with the land, as well as their high capability of adapting to the natural conditions and outside influences. The dynamic of this representation stems from the requirement of getting rid of the dominance of reindeer herding in the Sami culture and mobilizing under the leadership of their own Sami elite. The Sami had to evolve from passive adaptation to active adaptation (current sociological terms also used in Sweden by Israel Ruong), a stage the Sami had not yet reached, according to Nickul. Nickul was not totally able to avoid using the power of definition. In addition, Nickul thought that the conditions of such a small number of people were dependent on the goodwill of the majority. At an everyday level, in spite of the

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77 Lehtola 2000b, 161-162; Nickul 1957.
78 Lehtola 2000b, 187-188.
79 See Isaksson 2001, 184-206, 218-221; Lehtola 1997d, 273-275; quotes from Nickul, Karl: Saamelainen sopeutumisongelmat on saatava eri näkökohtina valoikkeilta, LK 8.8.1959 and Nickul 1984, 46-47; on later occasions, Nickul labelled the retreat as passive and demanded more active forms of adaptation. See Nickul 1962; Nickul 1970, 198; Seija Tuulentie writes about the process of how imagery, even if essentially based on the same expectation – here the Finnish longing for original and untouched – may be seen at different times as either negative or positive. Tuulentie 2003a, 11.
81 The “assimilationists” doomed the Sami culture to disappear in assimilation, whereas Nickul sustained the Sami with some possibility of reflection and intention in the process. Compare LK 25.9.1958, Häviävän heimon kylä Inarin Sevettijärvi.
82 Lantto 2003, 73.
83 LK 21.9.1958, Saamelaisen vanhat nautintaoikeudet turvattava; See also LK 21.4.1959, Saamelaisen oikeudet esillä saamenneuvostossa.
efforts of the Finnish Sami Friends, reindeer-herding imagery and the image of Sami men being greedy for alcohol have survived in the Finnish public sphere.84

One might say that Lapin Kansa participated in the industrialization process vigorously. Here, reindeer herding was presented as a good means of living, but not sufficient to employ the people of Upper Lapland. The newspaper was more than willing to act as a venue for voicing statements made by municipal officials in Inari, to promote the mobilization of the forests of Inari and the establishment of a wood-processing plant, of whatever kind, in Inari. This was justified by the threat of unemployment, as hydropower construction work in Paats River came to an end in the mid-1960s.85 This project became a dominant one in the newspaper and channelled the venue in a slightly more modernization-friendly direction.

In spite of continuing talk of modernization, the media and the discursive field in Lapland in the 1960s remained Sami-friendly,86 respecting the variety and diversity of the group, although sometimes in a condescending manner, maintaining a strong emphasis on agricultural issues.87 A cautious shift in the use of ethnonym is apparent: “Lapp” was beginning to be more widely used, although the term ”Sami” was still the dominant one. The

84 The work of Jorma Lehtola on the representations of the Sami in Nordic films must be mentioned among the studies of Sami imagery held by the majority. Even though Lehtola does not carry out a systematic analysis, his resulting assessment of reigning reindeer-herding Sami imagery, with its “primitive” and exotizing features, may be taken as trustworthy. Lehtola J. 2000, 39-40 et passim; Länsman 2004, 106-109, 115.
85 See a growing “offensive” promoting the industrialization of Inari after the Kirkenes project was abandoned, LK 28.1.1965, Inarilaiset eivät hellitä puunjalostustehdashankkeesta.
86 A few examples of matter-of-fact and positive journalism on the Sami: layers of meaning in yoik were presented in 1960, yoiks were recorded by YLE in 1961 and material was gathered for the Sami museum established in Inari in 1961 with funding from the Ministry of Education. What was probably one of the last seasonal moves (jutaaminen) in Northern Enontekiö was mentioned in 1961. The “Lapp” placenames in the Finnish Sami area were catalogued from 1962 onwards. The research programme of Erkki Asp, which aimed to chart current problems in Sami society due to contact with the Finnish population, was reported. In 1963, in an article promoting the Sami language and handicrafts courses in Inari, the newspaper stated that the officials working in contact with the Sami should have a working command of the Sami language. The continuing construction of the Sami museum was followed up. The emerging, schooled Sami elite got to present their research in the newspaper, for example Samuli Aikio on yoik literature and Johannes Helander on the census carried out among the Sami in Finland. The Kildin and Ter Sami people and languages were “discovered” and introduced in the newspaper in 1965 by researchers Mikkko Korhonen and Erkki Itkonen. LK 13.11.1960, Saamelaisen jout; LK 11.5.1961, Saamelaiset jutaavat; LK 6.8.1961, Joikuja tallettettu Inarissa yleisradion ja tieteellisiin tarpeisiin; LK 24.10.1961, Saamelaismuseo Inariin Juutuanjoen suuhun; LK 29.10.1961, Saamelaismuseo Inariin vielä tämän v:n aikana; LK 24.12.1961, Kylä vaarojen keskellä; LK 31.5.1962, Tunturilappalaisten paikannimistö keräilyn kohteena; LK 30.5.1962, Saamelaisväestö ja kulttuuri kesän tutkimuksen kohteena; LK 9.5.1963, Saamen kielen ja saamelaisten kotiteollisuuden kurssit; LK 18.8.1963, Saamelaismuseo kohaa; LK 22.4.1964, Saamelaisen ylioppilaiden ilta; LK 10.7.1965, Kuolalanlapalaiset jakautuvat Kildinnin ja a turjan heimoihin; it seems that after 1965 the Sami way of life, with its seasonal moves and living in a lavvo in northern Enontekiö, had changed. Cars had replaced reindeer and only men followed the reindeer, whereas families spent most of the year at fixed settlements or at school. LK 12.6.1964, Uusi aika ja uudet tavat saapuvat tunturi-Lappiin; LK 7.10.1969, Karesuvanto – huomattava taajama ja kalottiliikenteen keskuspaikka; the language courses referred to were funded by the Ministry of Education and were intended for the teachers and carers working in halls of residence in the Sami region. Many young Sami also took part in this form of education, which proved not to be long-lasting. Lehtola 2000b, 190-191.
status given to the Sami was that of a “minority” and the original inhabitants of the country. Their first-comer status was not disputed in the Finnish public sphere.\(^88\)

The newspaper mostly employed imagery of a modernizing Sami people living on the borderline between tradition and modernity. The Christian Folk School provided a natural venue for such representations, where traditional arts and crafts were taught to Sami students aiming towards higher education and paid labour.\(^89\) Sometimes, such as in an article promoting the correct use of gákti (it was to be used by the Sami, not by the tourist industry), the newspaper, curiously enough, used images of a Sami culture in a speedy process of being destroyed.\(^90\) This “borderline imagery” was handy for supporting the modernization process that was ongoing in the newspaper and in Lapland. The cohesion of this Finnish identity political undertaking was beginning to be undermined by *ethno*-political modernization in the Sami community, as a result of which the modernization process itself, as well as self-imagery that utilized borderline markers, was increasingly questioned.

In the 1950s and the early 1960s, the counter-imagery was not totally hostile to the Sami. Reporting was mostly matter-of-fact, the Sami had access to the media and they were referred to and presented as Sami. There were pre-war relics and the dominant discourse on modernization as a project of national common good, but in the light of the sources this ethos was shared by some of the Sami as well. The era is also marked by the persistent work on Nickul’s part to legitimize the new paradigm of thinking concerning the Sami. This meant that in the counter-imagery there was not much to build or comment on. In Finland the Sami movement was not encapsulated by “Otherness”, but it was included in the national project and in the Sami’s own project of securing the fruits of the national project. This modernization-friendly trait was contested later on, as we shall see in the chapter on the “primordial” strategies.

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\(^{87}\) See, for example, a heroicizing article about the first Finnish agricultural settlers in Inari, the Kyrö kin, who introduced crop-growing in Ivalo. LK 9.9.1965, Inarin kasvot X: Kyröjen suvun nykypäivää.


\(^{89}\) LK 21.11.1962, Saamelaiskulttuuri elpyy Inarin opiston suojissa. The headline for this report, “Sami culture revives within the shelter of the school”, reveals the perception of a threatened, vulnerable culture that was in danger of becoming extinct.

\(^{90}\) LK 8.8.1963, Lapinpuku saatettava uudelleen kunniaansa.
4.2.2. Counter-imagery in an era of “liberalized” media in the 1960s

In the Finnish public sphere, a freer, more competitive and non-conservative journalistic atmosphere was introduced during the course of the 1960s. Journalism was politicized and the media – no longer just party-owned newspapers – took part in political debate. The prevailing, respectful attitude towards politicians was abandoned.\(^{91}\) Liberalization was seized as an opportunity and knowledge of the Sami was politicized and spread in different media forms. Sulo Aikio was an agent of this liberalization with a radical ethno-political angle to his radio journalism. The majority medias voiced a number of expressions of “anti-imperialistic” concern towards the Sami. Another development that characterized the discourses on Saminess in the public sphere of Lapland was the revival of the old notion of a dying people at the end of the 1960s, as the discussion evolved into a more scientific dialogue, stripped of its romanticizing features.

There are a number of indications of solidarity with the Sami issue. When Sami issues were discussed in Parliament, terms such as oppression were used in the landownership question and the Sami were referred as a “stem residents” ("kanta-asukkaat", a botanical metaphor signifying the first-comer status of the Sami settlements).\(^{92}\) Some efforts were made to introduce the radical discourses of the period in the public sphere of Lapland. A provincial newspaper in Central Finland, *Keskisuomalainen*, published in Jyväskylä, published an editorial headed “The Sami Question” in July 1965. *Lapin Kansa* published the editorial without comment. According to this editorial, the destiny of the Sami had been similar to that of the Indians. They had had to retreat further into the wilderness in the face of a larger and more developed people. “Finland has also a race problem of its own”: a small one, but unsolved. The Sami stemmed from a different race to the Finns, but the languages were distantly related. The indigenousness of the Sami was highlighted, as well as their integration within Finnish cultural modes and dissatisfaction among members of the tribe with their condition. The editorial made some updated demands and practised the typical anti-imperialistic rhetoric of the time. In case of the Sami and the Finns, in order to make the anti-imperialistic rhetoric work, the Sami had to be encapsulated within a distant racial otherness. Alongside the use of such rhetoric, the editorial reflected a great unwillingness to declare Finland as a colonial power. The discourse was not, it seems, totally legitimized by its users.

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\(^{92}\) See the statement given by Pirkko Aro and written by Heikki Hyvärinen in LK 1.5.1969, “Saamelaisten erillislaki tarpeen”. Lehtola 2005a, 21.
and it contained alienating elements (an unbridgeable difference between the Indians/Sami and the majority).\footnote{LK 14.7.1965, Saamelaiskysymys.}

The difference in both the level of inclusion in Finnish nationality and in the level of radicality in provincial discourses becomes clear when the radical editorial is compared to the editorial about building the road to Sevettijärvi, published in Lapin Kansa later that year. The editorial repeated familiar arguments: the improvement of the standard of Skolt Sami living needed to be achieved by integrating Sevettijärvi within the national community via the road. Its radicality was more down to earth, as Lapin Kansa blamed the state of Finland for failing in its welfare state project, not for being a colonialistic oppressor. Unlike Keskisuomalainen, Lapin Kansa used the Skolt Sami as a source in its editorial.\footnote{LK 12.9.1965, Inari-Sevetti-Niätämö; see also editorials with the same kind of demands, LK 22.12.1967, Kolttien olot and LK 31.12.1967, Muistakaamme KaukoKLappiakin.} In an editorial published in December 1967, Lapin Kansa repeated the “governmental principles” of providing the same rights for every citizen, including minorities living in Finland, not a separate government. Thus, the newspaper was sceptical about the initiative of its own Sami M.P. Sami history was represented as the colonization of land and the Sami mind, as well as the root of bitterness. The Sami were a marginal and dying people, but the Sami’s own help and initiative was called for.\footnote{LK 9.12.1967, Mitä saamelaiset haluavat?} Towards the end of the 1960s an understanding of the special rights of the Sami began to emerge, especially with regard to the language question, but the equality aspect was what was highlighted in the newspaper.\footnote{LK 26.1.1969, Inarin-Utsjoen nimismiehelliä etelän parin liänin piiri.} Lapin Kansa promoted Sami membership as a monitor in the Nordic Council in 1969 because “it would not harm anyone”.\footnote{LK 16.8.1969, Saamelaiset ja PN.}

In counter-imagery terms, Karl Nickul appears again as the most radical figure. In a lecture meant to given at the “Summer Round-Up of 1969”, organised by the student organization “Herding Co-operative Lappi” (Lapin paliskunta) of the University of Oulu, Nickul compared for the first time the pre-war, “harmonious” Skolt Sami society with communism, especially in their neglectful attitude to ownership.\footnote{Nickul, Karl: Koltat saamelaisuuden tallettajina, LK 1.7.1969; this representation, or notion, survived in Finnish public sphere and was also used in official venues as a premise for special measures to secure Skolt Sami ways of living that were closely connected to nature. The Sami Committee of 1973 spoke of “… (safe) patriarchal-communistic form of society…” Saamelaikskomitean mietintö, 1973:46, Liite: Tutkimusraportit 306; on the bad Skolt Sami reputation, see Kännö 2002, 50-51; the formulation on Nickul’s part was unsuccessful, since traditionally the “neglectful relation to ownership” in the Skolt Sami society was represented as reindeer thefts and was the cause of disputes and outright violence against the Skolt Sami. This was “documented” most notably by the author K. M. Wallenius. On criticism and deconstruction of the Sami institution of reindeer thefts,} In the most recent research,
myths about communist features of the siida society and economy have been problematized and their variation highlighted, especially after the introduction of reindeer herding based on private forms of ownership.  

One of the Sami discourses that still survives was launched during the 1960s. The shame felt concerning the Sami language and the hindrance it constituted in obtaining an education was mentioned in a positive and worried manner in 1969 by Eljas Kytömäki from the Kristalas Nuoraiskuvla. The shame felt about Sami ethnicity and ethnic markers was mentioned for the first time in the Finnish media. One might dismiss this as nothing but construction and myth-building, which was introduced to the public sphere and thus began its textual existence. This would be insufficient, however, bearing in mind the almost uniformly documented, ethnic-based systematic bullying within the Finnish school system. There are two sides to this question: it marks the launching of a discourse on ethnic shame, used to guilt-trip the majority, whilst building on the subjective experience of being exposed to ethnic-based stigmatization.

Erkki Asp published his sociological dissertation in 1965 on the Lapps and Lapp culture; his pessimistic results, showing the Sami in a speedy, irreversible process of acculturation, influenced the counter-imagery of the Sami. An editorial in Lapin Kansa showed a change of paradigm and a more negative view of the fate of the Sami. The “statistical” viability of the Sami was acknowledged, as they were growing in number, but, in the same manner as Asp, cultural assimilation in conditions of accelerating modernization was perceived as a threat. The process could only be slowed down and some cultural features be “saved” through the teaching of the Sami language. The Sami were still a vanishing people, even though the significance of their culture and “Lappishness” was acknowledged.

see Lehtola 1994a, 83-89; Lehtola 1999a, 156-157; Matti Sverloff also writes about the “misconception” of the Skolt Sami as reindeer thieves. He supports his argument by referring to thefts from the Skolt Sami stocks carried out by other groups, and the upbringing and honesty of the Skolt Sami. He does not analyse Skolt Sami practice. Sverloff 2003, 74, 104-105; on the uncritical repetition of tales of Skolt reindeer thefts as late as 1972, see Tikkanen and Tikkanen 1972, 38-45.


99 See, for example, Lehtola 2005a, 15. During the 1960s there was no overwhelming willingness (“ei liiallista hinkua”) to identify oneself as a Sami, according to Lehtola.


101 Siiri Magga gives a lively and multi-angled picture of her school-years. She went on to be a teacher, so the experience cannot have been totally negative. Magga-Miettunen 2002, 186-187; for a negative encounter with the Finnish School system causing “justified hate”, see Paltto 1973. Paltto also writes about experiences of being a member of a “lower” and “worthless” culture in the 1960s and 1970s. Paltto 1973, 7-9, 64, 72, 77-82; Valkeapää 1971, 73-74.

102 Sociology, based on American sociology and interviews, became the leading branch of the social sciences in Finland in the 1950s. Sociological studies gained the position of “social technology”, reflecting the Finnish post-war “democratization” of academia, the introduction of social dilemmas in research projects and a belief in science in the service of social planning. Tarkka 1992, 199.
Accordingly, modernization meant that the still-prevalent imagery of the reindeer-herding Lapp, with all its associated pre-modern accessories, was condemned as outdated. This was replaced by a similarly essentializing imagery of a dying language, people and culture and was entertained by the most surprising people, such as Dean Tuomo Itkonen, who had just finished a hymn-book in Sami.

A governmental body for obtaining information and advice on matters affecting Sami well-being, the Advisory Council on Sami Affairs (Saamelaisasiain neuvottelukunta), was established in 1960. The Sami organizations SL and the SfPLC were allowed to nominate their representatives on the council, but only the Nordic Council had an institutional connection and the right of initiative. Among the Sami and Sami Friends on the council were J. E. Jomppanen, Jouni Helander from Utsjoki, Oula Näkkäläjärvi, Jouni Magga (deputy), Oula Aikio (deputy) and Karl Nickul, who had initiated and lobbied for this body. Sabmelaš was cautiously hopeful about the council. The goodwill of its Finnish members (3:3) had to be won and the activity of the Nordic Council on Sami rights was relied upon. Like the Norwegian Norsk Sameråd (1964), the council is said to have achieved very few concrete results, and its work was hampered by the chairman, the Governor of Lapland Martti Miettunen. Miettunen resisted the idea of the council becoming a governmental body with a specific Sami political programme. Instead, the council concentrated on practical matters, mostly relating to reindeer herding. Nevertheless, the Sami now had a permanent access and representation in the Finnish administrative system that were based on expertise, conveyed by Sami ethnicity. Critics have also stated that this inclusion within the state system increased the distance between the grass-roots and the elite.

The imagery of the Sami entertained by the council was one of a small, modernizing minority. In their existing state, the minority was threatened by that very same modernization. The council stressed, in a very warm-hearted manner, that the Sami were socially passive and in need of education as well as state and municipal action, in order to be lifted from this state of backwardness. The reason for the passivity was their “earlier dependence on nature” and “their historical destinies”, which were not defined more closely. One consequence of this condition of the minority was that the municipal offices were in the hands of the Finnish

104 Asp 1966, 32-34, 133-135; LK 18.5.1965, Lappalaisuus.
105 LK 29.1.1966, Elämäntyönä saamenkielen kehittäminen.
106 The Sami Council of Finnmark (1953) and the national Norwegian Saami Council (1964) are parallel advisory institutions in Norway. Henriksen 1999, 35-36.
population. To ease the problem, the council wanted the schools to adopt schooling in the Sami language, if possible, and the municipalities would consider a command of the Sami language as an asset in recruiting people. Nowadays, this “recommendation” seems crude and lacking in both insight and the power of execution. Later on, the Sami members and Karl Nickul managed to clean up the imagery and the demands were re-evaluated: in a letter to the Ministry of Education, quotas for Sami students were required at the teachers’ seminary in Kemijärvi and the council began to follow the recommendations of the Sami conferences.

The liberalized multi-vocal media finally offered something upon which the Sami could build their collective identities. A rare, yet firm discursive offensive was launched against the “dying people” imagery, which did not match their self-perception, especially that of the first-generation Sami activists opting into modernization. Success was achieved in cleaning up the imagery used in institutional forums. There began to be signs of “anti-imperialist” goodwill but, at the same time, the public sphere of Lapland was prone to react to claims violating the national doctrines of equality.

4.3. Sami identity politics from the early 1950s to the late 1960s – the rise and fall of the modernizing Sami imagery

4.3.1. Introduction

In this chapter I shall go through the developments in Sami identity politics during the era from the early 1950s to the late 1960s. There will be overlaps in chronology, due to the thematic approach of the three distinctive phases during this era. The first phase is marked by the negotiation of distance from the Sami Friends, where aggressive expressions of boundary-building were stated. This evolved into an era in which the most distinctive feature of identity politics was the imagery of the modernizing Sami, or the Sami living on a “borderline” between “the traditional” and “the modern”. Lastly, from the late 1950s onwards, a radicalization occurred in relation to the state of Finland and industrial intrusion into the living environment of the Sami. The “traditional” markers of Sami ethnicity, their means of living and the Sami language, increased in value. The questions addressed in this chapter are:

108 Ingold 1976, 213-221.
109 LK 2.6.1962, Saamelaiset mukaan kunnallishallintoon.
what characterizes these representative strategies, and why have they came about? Which Sami actors were behind the changes in strategy? Were the strategies legitimized?

4.3.2. Sami identity politics: negotiating the distance between the Sami Friends and the state of Finland during the early 1950s

In the Sami home area an indisputable break occurred in the identity-building process: road constructions and the connections southwards (ultimately also in Utsjoki), (mostly printed) mass media and school teaching changed the context in which the Sami identity was constructed and reflected. A greater national Finnish fellowship was introduced, not for the first time, but now the contact was more comprehensive and deeper, reaching, most notably and most notoriously, whole generations within the school system. The national context also re-defined the Sami position in international contexts, through the ponderings of Finland’s position in international forums\(^\text{111}\), as a Nordic state ruled by law, of which the Sami were citizens.

As we saw in the chapter on SL, there was a genuine conciliation between the “official” associations working for the Sami cause and a readiness to perceive “contact” as a possibility. There was also angry opposition. At the beginning of the 1950s, the gap between the Sami Friends and some parts of the Sami activist front became wider, as Pekka Lukkari also became suspicious of the Sami Friends and joined forces with the radicals Aslak and Nilla Outakoski. In a letter to Nickul, Lukkari praised a new phase in SL, under Juhani Nuorgam’s chairmanship, as the Sami’s “own” movement, under its “own” leadership.\(^\text{112}\) On another occasion the Finns were blamed by the moderate Juhani Nuorgam for underrating Saminess and only pursuing their own interests.\(^\text{113}\) Nuorgam was also worried about whether young Sami people were tough enough and whether “valuable Saminess” could resist the new habits introduced in the Sami area.\(^\text{114}\) By now both ethnicities had been politicized and boundaries were still being built against the Finns, who were represented as uninformed and therefore a hindrance to the construction of the Sami identity, expressed in language and

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\(^\text{110}\) On the seminar issue, see Lehtola 2000b, 191; LK LK 6.4.1962, Saamelaisasiain neuvottelukunta koolla Rovaniemellä; LK 3.10.1962, Saamelaisväestön maanhankinta oli pohtimisen kohteena Inarissa.

\(^\text{111}\) Saukkonen 1997, 337.

\(^\text{112}\) KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Pekka Lukkari to Karl Nickul 26.1.1950.

\(^\text{113}\) KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Juhani Nuorgam to Karl Nickul 20.5.1950.

\(^\text{114}\) Albmogii aldarak, Salmelaš 6/1951. The article is signed by J.N., most probably Johan Nuorgam, who was a member of the editorial staff at the time.
traditional means of living. The break was painful, at least for Nickul himself, who had fought severely against any hint of a patronizing attitude towards the Sami in the SfPLC, even though on one early occasion he had wanted all the Sami to join the SfPLC\textsuperscript{115}. (Nickul may have meant the local branch of the society, which had mostly Sami members.) Nickul promoted Sami organizations very soon after that.

The Christian Folk High School was established in Inari in 1953 as a compromise, after an unsuccessful effort in 1947 to establish an elementary school in Inari that would provide an education in the Sami language. Niilo Magga came up with the idea, which was presented by Erkki Jomppanen. The model for the proposal was taken from Norway. Jomppanen wanted to see Sami children gathered in one school with a teacher who had a command of the Sami language. This effort was resisted by Inari Council on economic and practical grounds (long distances and a poor infrastructure; one opponent, Minister Aho from Inari, reasoned that the majority of the Sami wanted to go to a Finnish school with Finnish children). The radicality of the applicants and the “Saminess” of the undertaking seem to have worried the municipality. Many provincial actors withdrew their support for the undertaking. The idea was reduced to a folk high school to take care of preserving the Sami “home language”. The municipality did not back the proposal, on the grounds of unfinished planning elsewhere in school administration. Actually, none of the proposals to give the Sami special rights – the Sami school district and a school for the Skolt Sami children in Sevettijärvi – were put into action\textsuperscript{116}.

The issue led to a sharp division within the Sami activist front, but also provided an opportunity to air ethnic sentiments. During the 1950s a group of Sami activists stressed ethnic fellowship and established the inter-ethnic demarcations more aggressively. “A Society for the Promotion of the Sami Nuoraiskuvla” (Sami Folk High School), consisting of Erkki and Birit Jomppanen, Oula Aikio, Antti Outakoski, Isisaki Paadar, Yrjö Aikio, Juhani Nuorgam, Matti Fofanoff, Nilla Outakoski and Pekka Lukkari, gave a statement (probably in 1950, given its place in the archives). In this statement they demanded a non-Christian school, since a Christian school, advocated by Finnish actors, would discriminate against non-Christian and Laestadian Sami, as well as Orthodox Skolt Sami. The association stressed that the school must be exclusively for Sami students, because they suffered from weak “tribal

\textsuperscript{115} KA, AKN, file 3 , correspondence 1945, Karl Nickul to Petteri Lukkari 28.2.1945.
\textsuperscript{116} Lehtola 2003, 449-450.
sentiment”. The school would thus follow the Nordic model practised in the folk high schools in Alta, Kautokeino and Jokkmokk.117

The issue was ethnicized: the school was to become either “Finnish” or one promoting “Sami language and thinking”. There were also Sami texts, where (justified) suspicions about the Finns not promoting the Sami good in this process were expressed. This question was connected to demands for and ideas of cultural protection and building ethnic boundaries against the Finns, as the “Finnish” model was represented as destructive to the Sami culture.118 The issue was also personified by a dispute over who would become the headmaster: Nilla Outakoski, with whom many of the Finns had a problem, or a Finnish Sami Friend, Dean A. I. Heikinheimo (who was a member of a different Christian sect to Outakoski).119 Pekka Lukkari supported Nilla as headmaster at the Sami Folk school. According to Lukkari, Outakoski possessed a knowledge of the Sami language and traditional Sami means of living, while the southern candidates did not. Furthermore, a teacher of Finnish extraction, with no knowledge of the Sami language, would not be able to supervise the teaching. This was a question of the Sami aiming “to protect and cherish their self-esteem and enterprise”. The Sami were represented as a politically active people.120 In years to come the school became an institution manifesting Sami ethnicity (in annual reports in Lapin Kansa, for example) and teaching about Sami culture in Inari. In spite of its Christian (conservative) mission and aims, the school became a meeting place for the emerging young activist generation as well.121

There was inconsistency about whether to represent the Sami as a nation, a people or a tribe. SL’s regulations stated that the function of the association was to support and promote Sami “national culture” (kansalliskulttuuri) and economic well-being. The unresolved tension between nationalities and national identifications was inbuilt in the regulations: membership of Litto was reserved for citizens of Finland who were of Sami origin.122 In Finnish thinking on nationality, a nation of homogenous origin qualifies as a nation without territorial recognition of sovereignty. It seems that the Sami were, according to SL, a “potential” nation enclosed within the very inclusive Finnish nationality. This blocked pan-Sami and cross-

117 KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, a statement by the Society for the Promotion of the Sami Nuoraiskuvla, 1950?; Lehtola mentions another group, led by Laura Lehtola and Dean A. I. Heikinheimo, who advocated a more religiously-oriented school. Lehtola 2000b, 150; Ovddos figgam, Sabmelaš 7-8/1951.
118 Prääivva Ochijogast, Sabmelaš 7-8/1951; Ovla Oheejohkalaš (pseudonym), Jeäraldak Samii Lihttu, Sabmelaš 6/1952.
119 Lehtola 2003, 450-453.
120 KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Pekka Lukkari to Karl Nickul 26.1.1950.
121 Lehtola 2003, 450-453.
122 Siida Museum, Inari, Finland, the archive of Samii Litto, the regulations for Samii Litto.
border identifications, since the separateness, the Sami nationality, occurred within the Finnish national frame. The hardship of representing the Sami as a people might have its explanation in its Finnish context, in the widely-shared ideology during this period about the individual being subject to the society, where the common good restricted individual interests. There is also a hint of conformity in the activist demands; the wisdom of obtaining an education in the Sami language and of a wider ethnic awakening, for example, may be explained by this ethos: the common Sami good regulated what the people had to be subjected to and engage with. In the correspondence, both aspects (an emerging Sami ethnic solidarity and an unwillingness to challenge the national binds) are present. The state was relied upon as the solution to hardship and economic distress. Furthermore, the hardship was made worse if the state did not interfere, as Nilla Outakoski stated in the press. Having this said, there were demands, rhetoric and projects that relied on self-help. During the 1950s there was a more consistent use of the term tribe, which was used with pride by the Sami in certain kinds of alliance with the radical Sami, such as that of Pekka Lukkari.

The local newspaper, the Sami-run Tunturisanomat, provides a glimpse of the ponderings of the state-minority relationship at a local level, where the relationship was straightforward and unproblematic. The representation of the Skolt Sami was as a people whose subsistence was in severe crisis. According to the paper, the Skolt Sami were “on the brink of destruction” and all the means of living in the Skolt Sami community – reindeer herding, hunting and fishing – were in crisis. The compensation gained from the state of Finland during the resettlement phase had been used up. The solution, according the paper, lay in work opportunities provided, for example, by road construction. Compared to the grim victim representations in Lapin Kansa, Tunturisanomat provided more space for Skolt Sami intentions. In December 1950, Skolt Sami and reindeer herder Matti Fofanoff was interviewed in the paper. Fofanoff told the paper about an idea which had emerged among the Skolt Sami community, of introducing agriculture to the area, in addition to the traditional Skolt Sami means of living from fishing and reindeer herding. The representation differs from Lapin Kansa in the way in which the Sami press presents their hardship as not crushing: the modernization would save them, rather than causing the Skolt Sami to disappear.

126 Siida Museum, Inari, Finland, the archive of Samii Litto, annual report 1948.
127 KA, AKN, file 5, Correspondence 1949, Pekka (Lukkari) to Karl Nickul 18.5.1950.
128 Kolttasaamelaiset tuhon partaalla, Tunturisanomat No. 8, 12.9.1950.
4.3.3. The identity politics of the Sami Committee of 1952

In a national context, the 1950s opened with the work of the Sami Committee. The duality of self-imagery and Sami demands, already evident in the Sami delegation of 1947 (see Chapter 3.2.4), and in the identity politics in the Sami press (see paragraph above), was canonized in the committee report: the Sami, eager on the one hand to hold onto their traditional means of living were, on the other hand, modernizing their own community and claiming access to the “Finnish” realms of economic life.

The Sami delegation of 1947 gained publicity and created political pressure for action on the part of government bodies. The committee was preceded by an unsuccessful effort to establish an official responsible for Sami affairs. The idea of a Sami committee was presented by Permanent Secretary Mantere of the Ministry of the Interior. The set-up of the committee was the responsibility of Nickul. The chairman of the committee was Judge L. I. Itkonen, suggested by the provincial governor of Lapland, Uuno Hannula, who declined the chairmanship. The Sami members of the committee were Antti Outakoski, who died shortly after the committee was set up, Oula Aikio and J. E. Jomppanen. The representative from the section responsible for settlement from the Ministry of the Interior was Jussi Lainioranta. The peripatetic catechist teacher Laura Lehtola was a representative of the Aanaar Sami and Karl Nickul was a secretary of the committee.130

The work of the committee aimed to secure the cultural and economical situation of the Sami. The committee’s report on the Sami cause (of 1952) is one of the most radical and progressive expressions of Sami ethnopolitics published in the 1950s. The representation was one of viable people under economic hardship and social threat. Nickul himself reckoned that it conveyed an image of a neglected people, which is true of the parts discussing the insufficient/neglected benefits to the Sami, but in addition Nickul’s voice is heard in a short settlement history, where the Sami are represented as a people giving way to an “unnatural” and threatening agricultural expansion. One of the starting points in the report was to prove that the Sami were not a vanishing people, but a viable people living on the brink of modernization. In order to avoid racial definition, the committee raised a command of the Sami language as a criterion for being a Sami. The committee’s suggestions followed two

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130 Saamelaisasiain komitean mietintö 1952:12, 3; Lehtola 2000d, 169-171.
separate paths: firstly, the committee was worried about the survival of nomadic Sami reindeer herding if it came into contact with reindeer herding on the Finnish model, in which the stocks were smaller in size and the mobility lower. This was presented as a “disturbance” to Sami nomadic reindeer herding. Secondly, the committee wished to break the “social backwardness” and the “distorted” distribution of the Sami means of living. The Sami had to embrace a Finnish means of living, with services and administration. Forestry was not presented as problematic. When it comes to minority rights and the earlier Sami demands for cultural protection, the report stands out as progressive: for Nickul, for example, cultural protection was not enough: the Sami condition had to be secured by special legislation and by raising the level of education. The report included a proposal for a new Sami Law concerning land rights, as well as a law on reindeer herding and another providing a Sami fund, in addition to the establishment of a special Sami area, which encountered the most severe criticism.\footnote{Saamelaisasiain komitean mietintö 1952:12, 17, 29, 44-45, 49, 55, 58-59, 64-65; Drivenes and Jernsletten 1994, 261; Lehtola 2000b, 143-144; Lehtola 2000d, 170-171; Lehtola 2003, 449; Nickul, Karl: Sabmelaš aššii komitea oddasak, Sabmelaš 4/1949.}

The Finnish Sami Committee report was exemplary for the Norwegian Sami Committee in 1956-1959. By comparison with the Norwegian report, which concentrated on the development of Sami culture, improvements to and the protection of reindeer herding and living standards, the Finnish committee stands out as ethnopolitically radical. An area for the cultural survival of the Sami, with restrictions in economic use, was suggested and ultimately toned down in the Norwegian Parliament. In Finland, the practical consequences were few: two Sami schoolbooks were published and a series of seminars were held for Sami teachers. The report was actively forgotten, according to critical Sami researchers, whereas in Norway, in spite of hard resistance, the political procedure was carried through. No real debate ever went on in Finland, even of the most radical demands.\footnote{NRL, which was represented in the Norwegian Sami Committee, was not a radical organization. It demanded “only” recognition for the immemorial usage right of the herders in 1960. Berg 1997, 70, 74-76; Drivenes and Jernsletten 1994, 262-265; Lehtola 2000b, 146; Lehtola 2003, 449; Stordahl 1993, 7-8; Stordahl 1996, 58-59.} The Finnish report is both outstanding in its practical suggestions and straightforwardness and typical of this era for its view of combining a traditional means of living with a rise in the standard of living, here presented as embracing the Finnish modern means of living, with its services and administration. The imagery of the committee may be seen as a bridge back from aggressive boundary-building to the imagery of the Sami occupying a realm in both spheres, the modern and the traditional.
During the 1950s, the Sami community became increasingly frustrated about the lack of results from the Sami Committee, as well as the non-existent changes in legislation. A rhetoric of self-help emerged, and growing mistrust towards the state of Finland, which was a significant departure from and competing discourse with the rhetoric of relying on the state of Finland that was still practised by the Sami.\textsuperscript{133} In 1959 the Sami Council criticized the state of Finland for neglecting the Sami in its legislation, and for providing insufficient rights. The Finnish settlement, continuing “like a flood”, was fatal to Saminess. The state of Finland was blamed for a lack of consistency between its promises and action.\textsuperscript{134} The Finnish Government reacted by asking the Sami Council to suggest measures that would promote the Sami cause.\textsuperscript{135}

**4.3.4. The Sami living on a borderline between tradition and modernity**

Eino Lukkari wrote to Karl Nickul in 1950 with a comment on the work of the Sami Committee and demanded that the official responsible for handling Sami issues should be of Sami extraction. Lukkari reveals a peculiar strategy of appealing to the weakness and oppression of the Sami. He argues for the ethnicity of the official using the experience of Norway, where Sami initiatives had been hindered by Norwegian officials\textsuperscript{136}. Lukkari wrote:

> Usually a Sami is such that he submits, because in history he has been knocked out so many times that he does not dare to rise in resistance, but rather suffers injustice … I believe that you think so too, and I rejoice that there are such members of the stronger tribe who understand the fate of the Sami.

\textsuperscript{133} Jouni Aikio hastened SL’s action on grievances and legislation planned by the Sami Committee. He referred to the obstruction of seasonal moves to the Arctic Ocean as a proof of a need for the Sami to act on the case, rather than relying on the state of Finland. Aikio, Jouni Sp.: Samik čuvvok aššiidešek ovdanemäi, Sabmelaš 8/1955; On self-help see Lehtola, Anni: Albmoglaš heāhpanaddamgo?, Sabmelaš 2-3/1956; the Finns had to be made to view the Sami cause more favourably (which, according to Samuli Porsanger, was not yet the case) in order to work more efficiently for the Sami cause. S. P-r (Samuli Porsanger): Oktasaš pārgguin sabmelaš aššii puorrin, Sabmelaš 7-8/1956.

\textsuperscript{134} Sabmelaš 3/1959, Sabmelažžai peälist.

\textsuperscript{135} Sabmelaš 4/1960, Viššalis toaibma sabmelašašši pirra.

\textsuperscript{136} This might be a reference to the “Lapp bailiffs”, who were perceived as a hindrance to Sami efforts in Norway. Berg 1997, 30-31.
Because of this inferiority, a member of the majority could not represent the Sami. The self-representation of “a conciliatory accommodator” emerges and the imagery of a colonized and assimilated people is used in vague terms. However, it is peculiar that Lukkari actually reproduces the colonized position in his self-representation. This borrowing from Finnish discourses of the weaker, inferior Sami (see Chapter 4.2.1) overpowers the radical angle of Lukkari’s self-representation.

Such a representation as Lukkari’s was rare: colonization talk was not yet practised and a need to disengage from the imagery based on threat perceptions was evident during the 1950s. The 1950s was an era of transition at least in two senses: efforts to produce a more independent imagery resulted in the fragmentation of Sami identity politics. This was amplified by the beginning of a generational shift in the Sami movement, the coming of age of the “dormitory generation”. Two strategies may be seen to emerge: representations of the Sami as modernizing and yet holding onto their culture, and a more challenging, more primordial strategy that highlighted the traditional means of living and cultural markers.

Whether Finnish social modernization, in the form of the welfare state, resulted in such ethnic exclusivity or the same trade-off situation as in Norway, where modernization equalled becoming Norwegian (an attitude shared by many Sami as well), is hard to say. The modernization-friendly politics were not shared by all the Sami, and the modernization certainly paved the way for Finnicization, at least in the form of language change, as the welfare state was a Finnish language domain. However, the Sami in Finland practised, from quite early on, the imagery of a people living on the borderline between tradition and modernity. A rise in the standard of living and sustaining Sami ethnicity at the same time was a real option in the Finnish Sami area, since the Sami movement in Finland was certainly not an advocate for backwardness. The rhetoric of the impossibility of combining modernization and tradition, or of being captured in a state of “primitiveness” is lacking. Sometimes counter-imagery based on stereotypical and “primitive” markers did provoke a reaction. For example, a piece published in Itä-Savo on the Skolt Sami of Sevettijärvi was criticized for representing the Sami as “heathens and witches”, as well as giving the impression that there were no kinds of Sami other than Skolt Sami in Lapland.

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137 KA, AKN, file 5, correspondence 1949, Eino Lukkari to Karl Nickul 1.5.1950.
138 Grenersen 2002, 80-82; Jernsletten 1997, 282; compare the policies condemning the Sami movement as an advocate of backwardness Minde 1980, 102-105; the Karasjok meeting renouncing special treatment for the Sami was known in Finland as well: LK 17.4.1960, Norjan saamelaiset eivät halua aivan liikaa erillistä.
The “borderline” Sami self-representations of the 1950s were mostly related to educational matters. In the topical issue of the Sami Folk High School\(^\text{140}\), the municipality of Inari sent a delegation in 1951 to discuss the matter at government level. The youth of “a splinter of the nation” (kansansirpale), as Erkki Jomppanen put it, was eager to be allowed to fulfil its willingness to gain an education.\(^\text{141}\) Rav dna Laakso wrote that education need not threaten Saminess.\(^\text{142}\) Pekka Lukkari cultivated the imagery of a living, “viable” and evolving people explicitly to comment on a dying people, which was held by the Finnish majority and by some eminent Sami Friends\(^\text{143}\) as well. The smallness of the tribe led Lukkari to demand unity in trying to advocate the Sami cause. According to Lukkari, the Sami desired “to remain Sami and develop both their material and spiritual culture.”\(^\text{144}\) These are examples from the prevailing “open” discourse of the time. A more “politically incorrect” version of the representation was to represent them as not having been involved with the services of a civilized country\(^\text{145}\). A typical statement concerning the condition of the Sami was that their self-consciousness was on the rise and they wanted to maintain their Saminess.\(^\text{146}\) An evolving, modernizing Sami, in touch with his/her cultural tradition had entered the discursive landscape.

The “borderline” imagery was used continually in the 1960s. This imagery was to some extent politicized and added a component representing the Sami as lacking access to welfare measures. The imagery, in an organic relation to the “borderline” imagery in term of the actors involved, was extremely clear in its aim: equal access to welfare measures and full rights of citizenship for the Sami. The premise for this quite matter-of-fact imagery – the unproblematic relationship with Finnish modernization – was, however, beginning to weaken;
the new Sami activists were attaching more radical angles to self-representations and paving the way for a Sami renaissance. What these generations seemed to share was an unproblematic relationship with Sami culture itself.

The Sami Culture Fund (formerly Sami Kulttuuruhtakassa) received its first donation in 1963. Pekka Lukkari pondered the tasks of the fund, which were to promote, secure and maintain the culture of the local people. Promoting reindeer herding was one important area, as well as “saving the old handicrafts and proto-industry from destruction”. The introduction of manufacturing industry was welcomed by Lukkari, whereas the ways in which the “tourist industry, managed from the south, ruthlessly assaults the local, genuine Sami range” were condemned by Lukkari. In addition, the fund promoted intellectual education and scientific research “contributing to wide circles of citizens”. The Sami were truly living on a borderline between tradition and modernity. These poles were still not mutually exclusive, an attitude sociologist Erkki Asp had also noticed and categorized as active adaptation. This matter-of-fact self-representation was based on observable facts: the young Sami were obtaining higher education and were modernizing and changing Sami society. Life had become more “hectic”, but the process had provided new chances for “our small nation”.

The modernizing Sami imagery contained an implicitly “primitive” or “backward” element. Iisko Sara made the “primitive” features explicit in his speech on the tenth anniversary of the Sami Christian Folk School. According to Sara, Sami history showed that the Sami were weaker and had not been capable of creating “any great and permanent culture”. However, the Sami had managed to maintain their cultural uniqueness in history, “our own language, national costume, way of life and national hymn”. The position of the Sami had been one of ongoing “death throes”. The point Sara wished to make was that this threatened position of a “minority nationality” (“vähemmistökansallisuus”) had been sustained by ongoing cultural exploitation in the tourist industry and the way that the state had been neglecting Sami schooling conditions. Even though Sara also stressed the primary role played by cultural self-esteem for the survival for the people (“When the people begin to despise their own culture, they have read their own verdict to themselves”), the speech calls for tools and the means to survive in accelerating modern times. The Sami had been held back, were not fully capable of participating in modern society, they had fallen behind in their standard of living, whilst at the same time they took pride on their cultural markers. The Sami

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147 LK 29.6.1963, Saamelaisten kulttuurirahasto - sillä on tärkeää merkityksensä.
148 LK 15.11.1964, Fil.lis. Erkki Asp: Saamelaisten tulevaisuus II.
149 Holmberg, Volmar: Sabmelažžak jà siin eällimkeäinnuk, Sabmelaš 1/1963.
were indeed living on the borderline between tradition and modernity. Modernity appears in the speech at another level as well, in the sharpened demands Sara makes for the improvement of the social and economical conditions of the Sami. This was a typical form of expression in the radicalizing 1960s and this speech reflects the new way of seeing the state, no longer from the perspective of a subject but from the more active and critical standpoint of a citizen. A more critical position is also entertained in the way that the Sami position resembles a colonized position. The editors of Lapin Kansa wished to disengage cautiously from the speech by Sara: “Not everybody might agree” with Sara, but as an important indication of “Sami youth’s belief in its future” they published it in its entirety.150

In the 1960s in the Sami society, accelerating modernization was perceived in at least two ways and a differentiation occurred in self-representation. The increasing criticism by the younger generation will be dealt with later on. The older activist generation continued its work of promoting modernization and representing the people of Inari, including the Sami and especially those living remotely from centres, as simply poor and in need of governmental action and legislative intervention. A Sami with no access to municipal services was one of the dominant self-representations of this time.151 Reindeer estate laws and water district boundaries were needed. Grass-root demands continued for road connections, for example from Angeli.152 At this time, the rationalization, modernization and mechanization of reindeer herding caused similar differences of opinion across the generations, as young herders were more eager to mechanize herding, while the older herders were more suspicious of snow scooters. Later on, the older Sami blamed the younger Sami for lacking the will to embark on herding subsistence. The surprisingly high costs of snow scooters were later used to construct victim representations: the state should subsidize the price of petrol for the Sami.153

There were explicit self-representations, where the modernizing Sami-imagery was used in demands for the improvement of Sami living conditions. In a report in Lapin Kansa Johannes Holmberg from Sevettijärvi was interviewed. Since there are no quotations in the article, it is hard to say who is making the representations. Holmberg (or the newspaper) repeats the usual demands: a road connection, either to Inari or to Norway, must be established. In addition, the forests of Sevettijärvi need to be logged, for silvicultural and

150 Sara, Iisko: Työ saamenkansan hyväksi ei ole mennyt hukkaan, LK 27.3.1964.
employment reasons. A new feature in this article is the concern over the young Skolt Sami who have begun to move away from Sevettijärvi. The “axe period” (meaning the resettlement era, J.N.) in Sevettijärvi is over and there is no return to the “lasso period”, either.\textsuperscript{154} This kind of pragmatism was not exclusively a grass-roots strategy, but the modernization project was widely shared in the Sami movement. Forestry was still not seen as a problem. In a Nordic perspective this was exceptional.\textsuperscript{155}

The modernization (see above in this chapter) and the growing differentiation, in its turn, led to changes in the discourses and public sphere in another sense: the Sami were increasingly assuming the role of the official. In this context, as Inari suffered from structural change and migration, the Sami were presented in public sphere as deciding to deconstruct the municipal services that they had earlier demanded should be built. This aspect of public sphere was earlier dominated by Erkki Jomppanen. The identity political aspect may be seen to be giving way to socio-political argumentation.\textsuperscript{156}

A representation of a growing people was made by Juhani Nuorgam from SL in 1965. Whether this was a loan from Asp or a critical comment on this and on the prevailing imagery of a dying people is open to discussion. Nuorgam pointed out that the Sami language was a viable home language but with insufficient status within the school system to be used there.\textsuperscript{157} In 1968 Nuorgam returned to the same themes, with a mild radicalization of the self-representations. To begin with, recent archaeological research had shown that Lapland was the “homeland” of the Sami, who were an indigenous and viable people. Another radical aspect of the text by Nuorgam was the way in which the legitimacy and suitability of Finnish reindeer-herding legislation was denied by Nuorgam, especially in relation to the older, traditional modes of herding management, which checked thefts more efficiently. Nuorgam also elevated the Norwegian Sami example and experience, as well as the nomad way of life, as a guarantee for sustaining the Sami culture. According to Nuorgam, contact with the Norwegian Sami meant that there “had never been as many people speaking Sami as there were now”.\textsuperscript{158} This chapter ends with the observation that even among the older generation the “primordial” identity markers rose in value at the cost of the “modern” ones. This

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{154} LK 4.3.1962, Teitä, työtä ja rahaa kaivataan Sevettijärvellä.  
\textsuperscript{155} LK 8.9.1965, Tiekurjuus tekee Sevetin kolttien elämän vaikeaksi.  
\textsuperscript{156} For example LK 18.11.1969, Parakkolaiset huolissaan koulunsa lakkauttamisesta; LK 18.11.1969, Porotila- ja kolttien maanjärjestelylait Sevettijärven kyläkoukksen ruodittavana.  
\textsuperscript{157} LK 8.9.1965, Inarin kasvot IX: Samii Littolla vilkasta toimintaa.  
\textsuperscript{158} Nuorgam, Johan: Saamelaisten asema ja tulevaisuus, LK 5.12.1968.
\end{flushleft}
4.3.5. The competing “primordialist” Sami discourse – building Saminess through traditional markers and by demonizing the “modern”

There are signs of a competing, more “primordial” discourse on Saminess, alongside modernizing Sami imagery that most likely had its background in the ponderings of individual Sami, but maybe even more in the generation shift that was underway from the late 1950s onwards. A few words concerning changes in the organizational field that were undertaken by the younger generation are therefore appropriate. Saami Nuorat (Sami Youth) was established immediately after the Inari conference in 1959 and Pekka Lukkari was the only representative of the “first” generation on the executive committee. The new generation – Samuli Aikio, Siiri Magga, Kaarin Laiti, and deputies Airi Guttor and Nils-Aslak Valkeapää – took over the association. The generation shift was more total than the gender shift. It seems that for Laiti and Magga, their careers in the Sami movement were short; Maggas’ career as a teacher seems to have taken up most of her time. Of the first generation, Elli Aikio and Laura Lehtola continued their work at the Sami conferences. The Sami movement was still male-dominated and the most visible activists of the new generation were men. A more radical gesture was that membership of Saami Nuorat was reserved exclusively to the Sami. The association promoted the material and educational aspirations of the young Sami, and thus used “modernizing Sami” imagery. There was, in many cases, only a theoretical opportunity to obtain an education in the Sami language, which the newly-educated Sami teachers were aiming to change. These people also participated in courses in the Sami language arranged by the SfPLC.

The Sami in Utsjoki established the Sámi Siida Association out of mistrust towards the two-man SL association. The aims of the new association offered new platforms: the

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159 Magga-Miettunen 2002, 272-276; Aikio-Puoskari 1984, 332; LK 12.8.1959, Saamelaisten
sopetumisongelmat keskeisena aiheena eilen Inarissa; LK 19.8.1959; Saamelaisnuoriso koolla Inarissa leirin
puitteessa; LK 23.8.1959, Ailu Oto: Samii Nuorak; LK 1.10.1959, Saamelaisilla henkista vireyttä ja valppautta,
Saamelaisen kulttuurirahasto perustettu Inarissa; Sabmelaš 4/5/1959, “Samii Nuorak”-nämmasaš searvi
ordnijuuvom Anarii.


association wished to support and advocate the cultural, social, legal/judicial and common economic aspirations of the Sami, as well as cross-border co-operation. Matters such as a Sami kindergarten appear on the agenda and the association arranged cultural and sports events.\textsuperscript{162} The void left by SL was filled fast, and new associations were established with a totally different level and scope of activities. The focus on Sami rights was to become an especially major issue for the widening Sami organizational field and this reflects the overall change within the Sami community towards updated rights claims.

In 1956, “Tenon saamelainen”, (A Sami from the River Teno) from Utsjoki, with a knowledge of the current political developments on resource management issues, wrote to \textit{Lapin Kansa} before the Karasjok conference. He presented reindeer herding, fishing and hunting as primordial and “primitive” means of living, but with pride – these were means of living developed furthest by the Sami and taught to the Finns, who had entered the “land of the Sami” and pushed the Sami to the margins. The result had been that Sami had had to rely on paid labour and move away from their home area. The solution must be to secure better rights for the Sami in reindeer herding and fishing, “the basis of our culture”. Co-existence with the Finns was possible, but only if the Finns started to respect the immemorial usage rights of the Sami.\textsuperscript{163} These kinds of rare expressions of ethnic identity with primordial markers were highly exceptional in the prevailing modernization-friendly discursive field. This statement was made outside of, maybe even in opposition to, the imagery cultivated in municipal organs and Sami conferences (see Chapter 4.4 on conferences).

Elsewhere as well, in the late 1950s, traditional means of living were being dealt with in a more positive light. Reindeer herding was elevated as a decisive cultural marker by Hannu Mattus. He was interviewed in \textit{Sabmelaš} about why young Sami people did not choose herding as an occupation. Mattus blamed their upbringing and an overlong school education taking place at a time when the future herder should be in the forest and mountains learning the trade.\textsuperscript{164} A more pragmatic example dealt with the unemployment of non-reindeer-herding Sami, which was a new phenomenon among the Sami in the 1950s. \textit{Sabmelaš} entertained ideas that the traditional means of living – reindeer herding and fishing – were in fact more feasible and provided a better income than paid labour.\textsuperscript{165}

The student Oula Näkkäläjärvi, a young Sami from the village of Lisma in Inari, who entered many Sami and Finnish arenas at that time (see appendix), gave a speech on the

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{162} Saamelaiskulttuuritoimikunnan mietintö 1985:66, 165-166.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{163} Tenon saamelainen: Saamelaiset ja heidän elinkeinonsa, LK 23.2.1956.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{164} Mânne kärvek nuorak poazopärugu, Sabmelaš 1-2/1958.
\end{footnotesize}
occasion of the 25th anniversary of the SfPLC, in November 1957. The starting points for Näkkäläjärvi were the vulnerable situation of the Sami, growing pressure from the majority population and the breaks in the Sami way of life that these changes towards modern society had created. He claimed that this vulnerability came from a lack of Sami literature, tradition of higher learning and intelligentsia: an oral tradition could not replace this shortcoming, which was amplified by the teaching of Finnish culture, language and customs in the schools. On the other hand, getting an education was a must – no single means of living, not even reindeer herding, could alone guarantee the survival of the entire culture. There were three alternatives for the future of the tribe. It could abandon the way of life of its forefathers and assimilate, it could hold on to the traditional ways and means of living of their forefathers, or the Sami could modernize and run things “in the modern schools, factories and office buildings”, rising from the midst of the wilderness. Näkkäläjärvi did not recommend any of these options – he himself and the whole tribe lived on the borderline between tradition and modernity. Näkkäläjärvi was studying law in Helsinki and planned to participate at the “spring tending” this year. He elevated reindeer herding as the most important means of living and young people connected with herding as the “healthiest” element of the Sami people, although there was also an increasing need to seek employment elsewhere.\(^\text{166}\)

Whether the primordialist strategy was only undertaken exclusively by the younger generation cannot be said, as the age group of the “Tenon saamelainen” is not known.

Nils-Aslak Valkeapää also began his career as a writer during the early 1960s. Valkeapää provided the Sami movement with, among many other things, the most thorough ponderings on the Sami relationship to modernity and tradition. Among the literary themes in his earliest works was the dichotomy between the traditional Sami way of life and living in “civilization” (“sivistys”), which he more or less demonized. For Valkeapää, civilization meant loneliness and solitude.\(^\text{167}\) A few years later, Valkeapää would appear as the greatest cultural relativist among the Sami, with statements such as “if culture does not live, it is unfit for human measure” (Jos kulttuuri ei elä, se on sopimaton ihmisen mitoille); “culture may die” (kulttuuri saa kuolla); because of that, all kinds of support, for Sami culture for example, would be artificial. Valkeapää disengaged himself from the contemporary protest movements as being too patterned and bound. He experienced difficulties in being recognized in conservative fields of Sami culture: in a competition in Jokkmokk, in 1967, he was not


\(^{166}\) Näkkäläjärvi, Oula: Saamelaisnuoriso vastaa heimon tulevaisuudesta, LK 28.11.1957.

allowed to perform his modern yoiks. The same relativity was entertained towards reindeer herding by Valkeapää: before, it had been a means of living based on nature; nowadays it was a costly subsistence with limited access, as the quotas were met in pastures. Without state subsidies, herding would “die”, but if rationalized it would be a viable and growing means of living. In 1971, Nils-Aslak Valkeapää also denied the representation of the Sami as a “dying tribe”. The Sami culture would die only if it was encapsulated into (majority expectations of) authenticity: this was impossible, since the Sami culture was a developing, flexible culture and living in one of its strongest periods. Nils-Aslak Valkeapää was to become the key actor, “the Sami ambassador” in the Sami movement, but he was also a man who refused to be categorized.

4.3.6. Case: reservoirs in Sompio, Sodankylä – national interests, a crisis in resource use and the displacement of Sami herders

In this section of the chapter I shall look at the discussion concerning hydropower projects in Northern Sodankylä, and the eventual, and only displacement (if one does not count the effects of the war as such) of the Sami people in Finland. This illustrates a more general shift in the Sami movement – the developments in Sodankylä resulted in a new radicalization of the movement, but only partially and in certain circles. The consequences of the project meant a more serious questioning of “Finnish” and “modern” in the context of resource utilization. The question is how was the plan reflected upon, and what consequences did the realization of the plan have on the Sami community? What about in ethnopolitics and identity politics?

This section is based on newspaper sources, and thus the normal source critical precautions must be taken by the reader: it is the newspaper that chooses the statements and, strictly speaking, carries out the representations. However, the article by Oula Aikio, dealt with later on, is credited to him. I do not know whether it was edited by the newspaper’s editorial staff or not. Lapin Kansa had a policy on Sami matters, which was to allow discussion, but explicitly to disengage themselves from published personal statements that

170 For a widely-quoted manifesto of Sami culture as a developing, borrowing culture that condemns the majority will to preserve and “museolize” “authentic” Sami culture in primitive forms, see Valkeapää 1971, 22, 61-63, 120-126.
171 See also Lehtola 2002b, 129.
were interpreted as provocative. Thus there are grounds for believing that the article was not edited, even though there was no readers’ column in the newspaper at that time. *Lapin Kansa* allowed Aikio to have his radical say in the future as well.

The rights issue was topical in Finland at the end of the 1950s, as the drastic consequences and the resettlement plans of the planned hydropower projects in Sodankylä were already known – five villages with Sami and Finnish populations would be partially drowned.172 During the 1950s, the Lokka and Porttipahta reservoirs were not seen as problematic – the state needed power in order to employ people, and as long as the compensation for the six hundred people who had to move was sufficient, the effort was legitimate. Towards the end 1950s, however, the voices of the local people and in the media grew more critical concerning the possibility of compensating the loss, as it became known that the houses would be drowned underwater. In these statements, the project as such was still not criticized. Nor was this the case during the 1959 protest against clear-cutting outside the reservoir area, which would reduce the remaining pastures in the reindeer herding cooperative of Lappi.173 Typically of that time, a non-radical demand was made by the Sami Council in this matter: the Sami were to receive compensation for damages, with reference to the Sami Fund in Sweden.174 Nor did the herding co-operative of Lappi, which was struck hardest by the reservoir, resist the project itself, although there was genuine concern about the future of reindeer herding in the area. The co-operative expressed its concern about, for example, how resettlement of the villages in the reservoir area was to be achieved in the co-operative’s pasturelands.175 Oula Aikio was quoted, commenting on the desire to get hold of the land and the peasant spirit among young Sami people in the reservoir area. Seemingly, the only matter of complaint had been the postponement of the settlement. There had been efforts to establish an estate and reindeer herding was becoming a subsidiary means of living.176

In the Swedish Sami movement, in the early 1920s, there was a similar unproblematic relationship towards economic modernization. The hydropower construction met with no

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174 LK 18.4.1957, Saamelaisiliekii niiitä korvaus vesistöjen säännöstelyvahingoista.

175 LK 21.10.1956, Lapin palkinen tyytymätön laitumien menetyksestä; LK 28.5.1957, Lapin paliskunnan alueita ja keinoalueilta.

176 LK 27.5.1952, Saamelaisten vaikeuksia Sodankylän pohjoisosassa.
resistance from the local Sami or from the Sami press. It took some time for the reduction in pasture to become evident and pressing enough to be taken up by the Sami activists, for example by Gustav Park. It seems that in Finland, the belief in modernization was stronger and the tradition of resistance lower than in the neighbouring countries – in the 1950s, in Sweden, there was a certain routine to protests and negotiations concerning loggings and reservoirs, and immaterial losses, not compensational by any government, were discussed. What was common to both the Finnish and the Swedish processes was the neglectful attitude or lack of understanding from the state. As in Sweden, the goodwill of the state bodies was increasingly doubted.\footnote{Lantto 2000, 71, 115, 272; Lantto 2003, 96-106.}

One might argue whether there is such an automatic connection between economic modernization and ethnic mobilization, but as a point of comparison, the hydropower construction in Sumpio was the first major reduction in pastures in the Sami home area and the first major crisis in the issue of resources.

In March 1959 Oula Aikio wrote an article entitled “Prospects for reindeer herding” in \textit{Lapin Kansa}. This represents a break with the modernization-friendly articles written by the Sami and reports predicting Sami assimilation in the newspapers. A Sami reindeer herder was expressing his distrust and dislike of the majority action, in this case with regard to the massive reservoir loggings that had begun in Sumpio. The accusations in the article are sharpened: because of the logging, stocks had been dispersed and pastures had been “logged, raped, destroyed”. This attitude was new. Victim representation was used, herding was represented as being in deep distress and Aikio demanded restrictions on logging, which constitutes one of the first direct demands against the majority action. Aikio did not demand access to the resource management, but the oppositional position and attitude had been sharpened. In the conditions of an actual, ongoing crisis, modernization had also begun to be problematical.\footnote{Aikio, Oula: Poronhoitonäkymiä, LK 11.3.1959; the rhetoric around reservoirs sharpened among the Finnish population as well. See LK 20.3.1959, “Rannalle muuttoa” valmistellaan haitkein mielin Yli-Kitiselläkin.} Oula Aikio was to become one of the most environmentally radical Sami activists in Finland.

In Inari, the regulation of Lake Inari caused problems for fishing and played downright havoc with the banks of the rivers. This does not seem to have amounted to such a radicalizing factor as in Sodankylä: the scale of disturbance was smaller, but there are references to the immemorial usage rights of the waters “many fishermen possess” that the

\textit{Lapin Kansa}.
international conventions (with the Soviet Union) were violating, as Heikki Sarre formulated in 1958.\textsuperscript{179}

In Sodankylä, but to a lesser extent in Inari, a major change had occurred in the way the nation-state of Finland was viewed. The state, and the modernization it stood for, was now truly demonized and victim representations were constructed. One vein of Sami ethnopolitics in Finland is particularly worth noting. It was practised by demonizing the effects of the industrial majority action. The focus was as much on its effect on people as on the harm to the environment. The various constellations of representing the connection between the Sami, the majority intrusion and the environment were to become one of the continuities in Sami identity politics in years to come.

4.3.7. Elevating the Sami language as a “primordial” marker

In the 1960s the emerging policy was built on “primordial” markers and concentrated not so much on means of living but on the education language issue. The Sami language was now politicized in the Finnish public sphere as an issue of equal rights and of saving a language under threat of vanishing. The “primordialists” also applied a new strategy, that of demonizing the counterpart, the modernization. In 1966, Oula Näkkäläjärvi wrote an article demonizing schools and halls of residence (“even the army was cosier”) in a Sami-themed edition of Kaltio, a periodical published in Oulu with cultural editorial substance. These institutions were in the process of destroying Saminess, but a change had occurred: until recently, the Sami had only waited for change, but now improvements were being demanded. Näkkäläjärvi referred to research on child psychology and on the connection between the mother tongue and the earliest developments of the personality of the child, also revealing the roots of “essentialist” thinking on the identity of the era; language was a constituent part of the deep structures of personality, not just a means of communication\textsuperscript{180} so, accordingly, the Sami could express their emotions only in Sami. There were unbridgeable culturally-based differences in ways of thinking that were based on language.\textsuperscript{181} Nils-Aslak Valkeapää compared the halls of residences to a “graveyard” as the most efficient institution for “rooting

\textsuperscript{179} LK 30.9.1956, Ivaljoen hiekkatörmät olisi nopeasti sidottava; LK 18.7.1958, Inarinjärven ajopuut aiheuttavat suuria vahinkoja kalastajille. The surname Sarre is an old Aanaar Sami surname, but the ethnicity of Heikki Sarre is not known.

\textsuperscript{180} Näkkäläjärvi, Oula: Epäinhimillinen koululaitos, Kaltio 4/1966.

\textsuperscript{181} KA, the archive of the SiPLC, received letters 1970, JS to SiPLC, 23.4.1970.
out Saminess”. Pekka Lukkari took part in a topical and increasing criticism of the education language issue. The problem was one of equal treatment and of having equal rights, in this case having the opportunity, like Norway since 1959, to obtain an education in the Sami language from the first class onwards. What is remarkable in the statement by Lukkari is the way that the ethnic aspect is totally absent; the problem is one of legislation and of not being an equal citizen of Finland. The school issue was still a practical matter for Jomppanen and the municipality of Inari, for example: the distances were too great and family lodgings, to which the children of Utsjoki had to resort, was inadequate. The statements of Jomppanen and Lukkari reveal some difficulty in viewing the state of Finland as problematic or in using this as a counterpart to building resistant imagery.

A partial radicalization had occurred, both in relation to education and the Finnish school system itself, as well as in the thinking on equality. The state was blamed, for example, for neglecting education in the Sami language and an appeal on this matter was sent to the Advisory Council on Sami Affairs. The rights discourse began to influence Sami self-imagery in a more systematic fashion, no longer in a merely “spontaneous” way. The state of Finland was represented as being uninterested in the Sami issue and was blamed for neglecting the “forgotten corner” of Finland, as Nilla Outakoski formulated it in 1965.

One example of the criticisms of the Finnish school system and other institutions comes from a large report on the education language issue in Lapin Kansa in 1970, in which Isko Sara, Isko and Inka Palojärvi and Heikki Hyvärinen were interviewed. I do not know to which generation the Palojärvis belonged, but their critical angle is the same as those of Sara and Hyvärinen, who represented the second, radical generation. The risks of a vanishing Sami language and culture were raised systematically, both in relation to their own experiences in the halls of residences (Sara) and as a handicap, since pupils obtained a poor command of both languages. School was alienating the Sami from Saminess (Hyvärinen) and everything was turning Finnish (“Kaikki lantalaistuu”, Inka Palojärvi). The Sami were being discriminated against by the municipal government, which chose the teachers. The sharpest disengagement from earlier statements was made by Heikki Hyvärinen, who compared the

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182 Valkeapää 1971, 73-74.
183 Aikio, Brenna, Gjerde, Helander, Niemi and Aarseth 1990, 132-133.
185 LK 18.4.1964, Utsjoki ja Inari kiirehtivät Pohjois-Inarin kansalaiskouluu.
186 After changes to the education policy in Norway, the reputation of Finland in relation to this matter became worse. The situation itself was worse and equality thinking in Finland was later criticized as insufficient in securing Sami rights. Aikio M. 1991a, 111; the appeal was published in Sabmelaš 5-6/1966, Täm tihte ko; LK 15.9.1968, Pseudonym sabmelaš: Minne menet, saamenkieli.
reindeer estate system to serfdom, where the Sami could not sell the estate without a permit from Finnish officials. In many statements the neglect of immemorial usage rights was mentioned. All the interviewees were introduced in a matter-of-fact manner as teachers and legal claimants.  

Two continuities in Sami identity politics were now being established. Firstly, ethnic boundaries were again built high by the elite; this strategy was not abandoned, and to this day the Sami movement has driven ethno-politics in opposition to the welfare discourses of Finnish society at large. Secondly, the Sami language, too, remains a field of contestation to this day, in intra-Sami terms as well. Numerous linguists who acquired their schooling at Seminars later became a cultural and political force. This had consequences: a distinguishable strategy of representing the Sami (language) as a disappearing and threatened (people) emerged. Before going into that, the platform that served as an immediate genesis for the early radicalization of the Sami movement in Finland will be examined – the Sami conferences from 1953 onwards.

4.4. Taking the transnational option – Sami activists from Finland at the Sami conferences

4.4.1. General overview

Not counting kinship and marital ties in the border regions, the experience from history of Finnish Sami activism does not exclusively support the notion that interaction across the borders was “usual and … natural”. The Finnish Sami entrance into the transnational, inter-Nordic Sami movement was at least partly an SfPLC initiative. It seems, especially in the case of Sami from Inari, that there was no strong transnational ethnic fellowship. Indications of pan-Saminess are extremely rare and it was Karl Nickul who wrote in 1946 about national borders and causes of friction among the Sami, whom he described as “one people”. Another example is provided by Pekka Lukkari in a travel account in Sabmi in 1948: “Saame is the same on the Finnish bank (of the River Teno, J.N.) as it is on the Norwegian. And the

\[^{188}\text{LK 27.2.1970, Saamelaiset vieläkin ilman äidinkielistä opetusta.}\]
\[^{189}\text{Lantto 2003, 68; during the time before the closing of the state borders, these contacts are mentioned as natural among the Sami, with their seasonal wanderings to the Arctic Ocean. See, for example, Outakoski 1991, 26-27.}\]
\[^{190}\text{Nickul, Karl: Sabmalažžai oktiikullam, Sabmelaš 1/1946.}\]
The next example of unofficial cross-border fellowship in my sources comes from the year 1964, as Oula Näkkäläjärvi actually crossed the border. He gave a presentation to the SfPLC on his trip, from Enontekiö via Tromsø, Vadsø and Utsjoki back to his home in Lisma, during which he met different Sami groups. The way in which he managed to communicate with these people in Sami led to a realization of how the Sami language connected these people together. Näkkäläjärvi was overwhelmed by a “romantic Sami national enthusiasm”. He presented his work on the same occasion, charting old deer-hunting traps and Sami placenames.

On the contrary, however: inner divisions within Finnish Sami territory were by no means hidden. The Sami stressed on many occasions that the Sami in Finland spoke three different languages. In practice, for example in the question of a teaching language, Northern Sami, with the longest literary tradition, was favoured and this led to its actual dominance.

In an official context, the transnational option of organization emerged quite soon after the war. “Sami Ädnam” from Sweden is mentioned as a partner alongside the SfPLC as early as the first annual report of SL in 1946. SL sent its first representatives to the “general convention of the Sami” in Tromsø in June 1948, to the founding convention of Norske Reindriftsamers Landsforening (Norwegian Reindeer Herding National Association, NRL; from 1978 onwards Landsforbund, National Federation). Nilla Outakoski and Pekka Lukkari brought greetings from SL to the convention. A similar Sami reindeer-herding organization was never established on the Finnish side of the border.

In practice, the national Sami movements were behind the organization of the conferences and, in the case of Finland, both SL and the SfPLC were active in their efforts and participation in the conferences. In my view, both Regnor Jernsletten and Samuli Aikio exaggerate the role of the Sami Friend organizations in placing the starting-point for Nordic co-operation at the preliminary talks in 1952 for the Jokkmokk conference the following year. In Finland, the initiative to enter the international arena was taken earlier and simultaneously by both associations. Aikio also uses as evidence the fact that the Finnish delegation in the co-operative committee of the Jokkmokk conference consisted only of members of the board of the SfPLC. One of the members, J. E. Jomppanen, also represented SL at the time and, as

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192 Lehtola 2000b, 175; LK 23.4.1964, Saamelaisen ylioppilaiden ilta II.
193 See, for example, Samekielalaš skuvlaaappatusa pirra, Sabmelaš 4/1947.
194 “Sami Ädnam” is written according to the older orthography used in the source. Siida Museum, Inari, Finland, the archive of Samii Litto, annual reports 1945-1946, 1948; on NRL, see Berg 1997, 33-37; Pentikäinen 1995, 328, suggests another year for the conference, 1947; however, the first report on Nordic contact in Sabmelaš handles the NRL-meeting in 1948. Sabmelažžai čoakkim Troamssast, Sabmelaš 4/1948.
Lehtola shows, Nickul tried to engage SL as a convener (this was hampered by yet another tantrum on the part of Nilla Outakoski, who felt that SL was being kept outside the preparations). Nickul’s existing Scandinavian network was of significance. He knew Gustav Park and Ernst Manker in Sweden, for example. As Aikio writes, the role of Nickul as chairman of the Finnish branch of the Sami Council was important, but also perceived as a problem by the Sami, as we have seen. Nickul was also a secretary of the Sami Council until 1972, until this was eventually perceived as a problem by the SfPLC, which was dominated at the time by Sami members. When the Sami Delegation was founded in 1973 and proved to be a permanent representative organ for the Sami in Finland, the SfPLC withdrew from its role of official representative to that of monitor during the 1970s.  

The Sami conferences of the Sami Council have been characterized by Regnor Jernsletten as an academic, common plenum for Sami and Sami Friends alike, and therefore apolitical and non-radical. The political activity and debates took place at night and engaged few. The social and cultural meaning for the Sami is highlighted by Jernsletten. Patrik Lantto has a somewhat more positive view of the conferences as a platform for emerging ideas of pan-Saminess as one nation, but this was a later phenomenon. If anything, the contacts made at the conferences were of significance, and the same kind of self-representation, of being a small and threatened but still developing nation, was used by the Swedish Sami activists. At least one direct contribution to Sami ethnopolitics in Finland is evident from the Nordic co-operation: in the Finnish public sphere the Sami rights and conditions in Finland were compared and found wanting by comparison with other Nordic countries.

4.4.2. The delegations from Finland in the Sami conferences – changes in the imagery

During the early 1950s, the attitude at the conferences was constructive towards the nation-states and the attitude at the Jokkmokk-conference of 1953 was that support for Sami culture must contribute to society as a whole as well. The Finnish lecturers in Jokkmokk did not totally live up to the demands of constructiveness at the conference, but a more radical vein is

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197 Jernsletten 1997, 286.
198 Lantto 2003, 65-70; see also Minde 1995b, 21-22.
199 For example LK 16.4.1957, Saamelaista kansakoulua toivotaan Pohjoismaihin.
recognizable. Erkki Jomppanen held a lecture on reindeer herding in Finland. Strangely, he did not present herding as a cultural marker, but as a modernizing means of living under hardship. This was a typical way of dealing with this matter among the Sami, since it was the “…oldest means of living in Finland”, not an exclusively Sami means of living. Finnish access to herding spoiled efforts to attach Sami identity markers to herding, yet the problematic aspect of the matter was appreciated: in the Sami home area, herding was to be reserved for the Sami.\footnote{Jomppanen 1957, quote p. 280, 285.} Pekka Lukkari pondered the possibilities of education for Sami mobilization and a revival of the “tribe spirit” (“Heimohenki”). Teacher Lukkari was confident about the schools’ potential, as long as teachers committed to this tribe spirit and the curriculum was changed. He also stated explicitly the grievance of ethnic unity, in spite of the diversity “in languages, means of living and clothing”. The goal of “love of the Fatherland” was too narrow for Lukkari, but a goal of awakening love for the native place, the Sami home area, was an element of the awakening of tribal feeling. The vagueness of the criticism of the school system itself was partly because of Lukkari’s belief in education as such. He blamed the low educational level of the Sami for the lack of interest in social matters. Education was the key to the activity and “survival of the small tribe”.\footnote{Lukkari 1957, 291-293, quote p. 291.} A modernization-friendly vein is detectable in Lukkari’s contribution. It should be noted that at this point the assimilative school policies had not yet been discussed in the Finnish media.

Aslak Outakoski represented the modernization, or “influences”, as “negative and positive”.\footnote{Outakoski 1957, 302.} The same kind of duality and a newly-emerging representation is visible in the lecture on the Sami and social services given by Samuli Porsanger, a municipal manager in Raisio, a municipality in the south-west of the country, in Finland proper. The Sami were equal clients of the social services of the state of Finland and held the same rights as the majority. Defects in this principle were due to practical reasons and a lack of information. Porsanger set a goal for the Sami as clients of the welfare state: passive adaptation was not enough, but developments in social services needed to be followed cautiously. The goal was the independent steering of social development. Porsanger saw schools as an important institution in this sense, and he shared the optimistic view of the Finnish school system that was prevalent at the conference. There are signs of modernization criticism as well. Porsanger was worried about possible psychological damage that the Sami might suffer in their
encounter with the bureaucracy, thus the social policy had to be adjusted to Sami needs.\textsuperscript{204} The discourse of the welfare state, social services and unemployment began to dominate the Finnish public sphere from the 1950s onwards. This way of describing the Sami as clients of the Finnish system could not amount to a very radical self-representation. Porsanger states a fact, rather than making a representation: the Sami were full citizens of Finland. The early conferences were not a platform on which to build exclusive ethnic boundaries against the majority. A conservative atmosphere was present: young Sami people’s way of spending time on entertainment was frowned upon\textsuperscript{205} and the conference closed with a cheer for the three Nordic countries. It may be said that the Sami delegation from Finland at the Jokkmokk conference was the only one with a Sami majority.\textsuperscript{206}

The resolution of the conference was based on the notion of a vital, growing people struggling with new challenges. The Sami were people adapted to nature, which they used in a versatile manner, at the same time as actively adapting to new conditions.\textsuperscript{207} In an inter-Nordic context, “borderline” self-representation was widely used and had a positive, inclusive horizon of expectation: both options could be taken.

Due to ponderings by Nickul on the almost colonial relationship between the Sami and the democratic Nordic states, the conference in Karasjok (1956) concentrated on Sami rights to the natural resources of their home area. In addition, the convener on the Finnish side was the SFLC, not SL.\textsuperscript{208} The resolution of the conference reflects the modernization-friendly thinking of the era. The ideas followed those of cultural protection: demands were made for the state to secure the education of the Sami in order to provide Sami culture with the same tools to secure equal position and competitiveness with other nations. This had to be done at the same time as guaranteeing Sami children an education in their own language, thus sustaining the Sami cultural tradition. This right had to be guaranteed as a right belonging equally to other Nordic citizens as well. Sami education was on the agenda of the Sami organs at this time, with the encouraging example of Norway, where changes in the education of the Sami were underway.\textsuperscript{209} The same kind of duality was evident in the discussion on tourism.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{204} Porsanger 1957, 308-312.
\textsuperscript{205} Wallmark 1957, 332.
\textsuperscript{206} Lehtola 2000b, 163.
\textsuperscript{207} Päätoslauselma, Sámiid dilit, Föredrag vid Den nordiska samekonfrensen Jokkmokk 1953, Kalle Nickul, Asbjörn Nesheim, Israel Ruong (eds.), Oslo 1957, 344.
\textsuperscript{208} Lehtola 2000b, 164-165; LK 2.8.1956, Pohjoismainen samealaiskonferenssi Karasjoella; LK 17.8.1956, Saamelaiskonferenssi Norjan Karasjoella aloitettiin eilen; LK 18.8.1956, Saamelaisten oikeudet asuma-alueensa luonnonsuojauksiin kokouksen aine eilen Karasjoella.
\textsuperscript{209} Aikio, Brenna, Gjerde, Helander, Niemi and Aarseth 1990, 133; LK 21.8.1956, Saamelaisten kulttuuripyrintöihin kiinnitetävä tarpeeksi huomioita.
The Finnish representatives of the Sami Council, which was established at the Karasjok conference, were Karl Nickul, Oula Aikio and H. A. Guttorm, with deputies Samuli Porsanger, Erkki Jomppanen and reindeer herder Uula Morottaja.\textsuperscript{211}

The Inari conference of 1959, with its focus on the Sami right to share the natural resources of their home area, stated that the Sami were in many ways stepping into the realm of the majority society, “but still maintaining their own culture and traditions”. In spite of this continuation from Karasjok, and modest representation, a radicalization occurred. The conference began with a quarrel over the language to be used at the conference. The Sami language was beginning to emerge as a marker of more radical Sami activists. Another point of tension was between national efforts in the improvement of the Sami condition and an effort to establish a definition for pan-Sami identity, with similar rights in the Sami home area. The former was presented by the Governor of Lapland, Martti Miettunen, and the latter by the Sami Council. Oula Aikio used the occasion to talk about the consequences of the reservoirs. After the loss of their pastures, the reindeer herders should be treated in a justifiable manner, demanded Aikio. Karl Nickul gave his lecture, representing the Sami as modernizing/adapting and disproving the reindeer-herding Sami imagery held by the majority.

The resolution, dominated by subsistence questions, reflects a breakthrough in rights thinking. The legal foundation for several of the rights, for example those relating to logging, were questioned by all three countries. Language was also dealt with as a right, not merely as a cultural issue, and a programme was drawn up with demands for the production of teaching material and the education of Sami teachers.\textsuperscript{212}

According to Regnor Jernsletten, the work of the Sami Council was dominated by SSR, the Sami organization with the broadest recruitment basis. SSR brought conflict issues with the Swedish administration to the agenda of the Sami Council.\textsuperscript{213} This may explain the more conflict-conscious and modernization-hostile climate at the conferences, which was shared by some sections of the Sami community in Finland. A competing discourse to the dominant discourse of modernization was emerging in the public sphere of Lapland: that of

\textsuperscript{210} The conference made both positive demands about profiting from tourism and expressed opposition towards the use of Sami culture in luring tourists to Lapland. LK 12.2.1958, Saamelaiset ja turismi.
\textsuperscript{211} LK 19.8.1956, Pohjoismaiden Saamen neuvosto asetettiin eilen Karasjoella.
\textsuperscript{212} For an earlier example of reflecting on the teaching of Sami as a cultural issue and a gauge of Finnish respect for Sami culture, rather than a right, see Nuorgam, Johan: Samikiella, Sabmelaš 6-7/1954; Sabmelaš continued its policy of demanding a command of the Sami language, Sabmelaš 1/1955, Kii kadju kielamek?; Sabmelaš 1/1959, Elomanust Änarii!; LK 11.8.1959, Saamelaiskonerenssi Inarissas pohtimassa monia Lapin ongelmaa; LK 12.8.1959, Saamelaisen sopeutumisongelman keskeisenä aiheena eilen Inarissa ja Saamelaisneuvostolla ansikasta toimintaa; LK 13.8.1959, Saamelaisen koulu- ja kansanvalistustyöoimikunnan ohjelma; Sabmelaš 4-5/1959, Samekiela peäläst; Sabmelaš 4-5/1959, Änar konferenssia loahpačilgetus.
modernization shrinking the potential for the Sami’s existence. SSR had protested at the way that mining and power production had penetrated the Sami areas. The matter was discussed in Stockholm in 1959 by the Sami Council, linked to the Nordic Council, with Samuli Porsanger as the only Sami member (the Finnish delegation consisted of Finnish M.P.s and Nickul). Whether the case of the reservoirs in Sompio was discussed is not revealed by *Lapin Kansa*. This platform was not entirely hostile to modernization, since Nickul lectured on the Sami having to have the potential to modernize if they desired. Sami culture had to survive the modernization or assimilate to it on its own premises. Modernization and resource utilization had to be carried out cautiously (not stopped) and the Sami had to have their say in the matter. In addition, the Sami Council demanded that Sami rights to the natural resources of the Sami area be protected in the process. On the other hand, the Sami Council had similar aims to those of the Sami Friends, (merely) to inform the states of the Sami condition (also an SL aim). At any rate, the Sami Council criticized legislation based on reindeer-herding questions and demands were made for the Nordic states to make decisions concerning rights, including native land rights (ruovttueädnamvuogadvuohta) that concerned the native people (Algo-assai).

The Sami conferences were eager to take the credit in a growing consciousness among the Sami of the significance of the need to “defend the rights and the culture of the tribe”. In accordance with the conferences, Karl Nickul saw the education of a Sami intelligentsia who would be able “to take control of their ‘land’” as the key to this defence. There are signs of rhetoric being borrowed from the Sami conferences, but Nickul may have been exaggerating the role of organizations to which he was deeply attached. On another occasion, Nickul even expressed caution about awarding special rights to one particular group: even if the (immemorial usage) right was not in doubt, the issue was “sensitive” with regard to other groups living in the region. From the late 1950s onwards, the Sami Council practised consistently up-to-date international rights rhetoric. Thanks to their inter-Nordic contacts, the Sami in Finland replicated the Swedish development in the Sami rights discourse. The arguments evolved from use immemorial to the status of an indigenous population living in a region threatened by other land use forms. The latter was adopted, following a delay. By

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214 | LK 18.4.1959, Saamelaisten asemasta neuvottelu Tukholmassa; LK 21.4.1959, Saamelaisten oikeudet esillä saameneuvostossa.
216 | Sabmelaš 3/1959, Sabmelažžai peälist.
219 | LK 12.3.1959, Saamelaisille myönnettävä alueillaan erikoisoikeuksia.
comparison with the Swedish rights discourse of the 1950s, which was preoccupied with reindeer herding, the Finnish Sami practised a more inclusive rhetoric: rights had to apply to the whole population.\textsuperscript{220} Accordingly, all the Sami, not just the reindeer herders, appeared as legal subjects in Oula Näkkäläjärvi’s article from 1966, where he demanded clarification of the Sami immemorial usage rights in Lapland.\textsuperscript{221}

Other organizations were active as well, but a generation gap was beginning to emerge. In 1959, SL sent a letter to the Sami Council in which SL did not speak of rights, but of the protection of Sami “means of living and nationality” through legislation and compensation for the damage and pasture losses in Northern Sodankylä. The state was the target of their reliance, rather than of their demands. A rather more radical angle is found in the attempt to ban “southerners” from fishing and shooting wildfowl.\textsuperscript{222} Even the SfPLC was more up-to-date, when it made a plea for Sami privileges in the Sami area with regard to motorized traffic.\textsuperscript{223}

But, eventually, a change took place, even in SL. Johan Nuorgam was interviewed by \textit{Lapin Kansa} concerning the Inari conference, where he had made an extended self-representation. The Sami were a small tribe, but if they were united they would grow strong enough to require the state to fulfil Sami demands concerning special rights. The distinctiveness of the Sami people, already recognized by the state, gave a legitimacy to the special rights demanded.\textsuperscript{224} Earlier on, this distinctiveness would have been connected to cultural protection and isolation.

A generational shift occurred at Sami conferences as well, but this was not as complete as in other venues. New representatives took part in the Kiruna conference of 1962, such as Aslak Högman from Sevettijärvi, Laura Nuorgam from Inari and Matti Jomppanen from Menesjärvi.\textsuperscript{225} At the conference, cautious radicalization occurred. Tomas Cramér, an ombudsman for the Sami, gave a speech about the Sami rights to land in Sweden. He stated in his historical overview that the Swedish Crown had taken over the Sami right, which was not to landownership of taxed land but a “general right” to the land above the Lapland border. This land was categorized as the “land of the Sami”. The Sami appeared as legal subjects, both in minority politics and in history, rather than demanding material gain from the use of

\textsuperscript{220} Lanitto 2003, 92-95.
\textsuperscript{221} LK 22.3.1966, Oula Näkkäläjärvi: Saamelaisten ikimuistoiset nautintaoikeudet.
\textsuperscript{222} Sabmelaš 1/1959, Sabmelasäätiö: Tikšum puohtattuvuost.
\textsuperscript{223} LK 12.8.1959, Nykyinen saamelaistilanne Suomessa, Norjassa ja Ruotsissa.
\textsuperscript{224} LK 8.8.1959, Samii Litto on mukana konferenssin järjestelyissä.
\textsuperscript{225} LK 21.8.1962, Neljäs pohjoismainen saamelaiskonferenssi alko eilen Kirunassa.
“their land”. The Sami movement in Sweden, in particular, had become more professional: the SSR had employed a legal adviser as early as 1962.226

The Sami Council formulated the closing statement of the conference, which reflected Swedish criticism concerning the dominance of the reindeer-herding Sami imagery and managed to combine all the elements of Sami self-imagery. The statement took as its starting-point the multiplicity of the Sami identity. This was formulated as a multiplicity of cultural problems, which could not be solved merely by solving the problems of reindeer herding. In demands concerning reindeer herding, victim representation had been used most openly: the numerous potential damages were so severe that many Sami herders had encountered poverty. On the other hand, the Sami were modernizing: development was needed in different segments of Sami life and education was the key issue. The Nordic Sami conference demanded, for the first time, a judicial account of the Sami right to “land and waters and other natural resources”, but only inclusion in the international “delegations” negotiating matters concerning the Sami.227 A self-representation of a modernizing judicial subject demanding land rights occurred, alongside the self-representation of a victim. Rather than serving as an institution that provided premises for national identity politics, the conference acted as a venue where national discourses seem to have been contested and mixed together in the closing statement.

The Tana conference of 1965 concentrated on the future of the Sami and became a forum for the socially and politically active younger Sami generation (at least six out of the sixteen delegates from Finland represented the “second” generation). Oula Näkkäläjärvi used this forum and Lapin Kansa to express the dissatisfaction of the young Sami generation concerning the non-existent results of the activities of the earlier Sami (and Sami Friend) movement. Those interested in the Sami issue “lacked a real faith in the Sami future as Sami”. Näkkäläjärvi himself was fairly positive about the groundwork achieved by the movement, but he stressed the need for a “programme” and a greater amount of “freedom” to guide the work for the future of the Sami. The new Sami generation found themselves in the midst of continuing development, which was getting faster and could lead to either a strengthened national feeling or to its destruction. The Sami culture had an acknowledged “right to live”,228

227 LK 24.8.1962, Saamelaisten kulttuuriongelma laaja ja monitahoinen kysymys.
228 This statement by Näkkäläjärvi is gathered from two sources: from the conference proceedings and from Lapin Kansa. It seems that Näkkäläjärvi gave two lectures at the conference, since there is a poor correspondence between the two sources. A greater emphasis is laid on the statement in the proceedings. First
which meant a more positive representation and a more positive interpretation of the viability of Sami culture than the prevalent ones of a dying culture. It practised a positive horizon of expectancy and showed a new orientation towards politics and a disengagement from traditional party politics to ethnically-based political organization. It is possible to discern a tension between Näkkäläjärvi’s discourse on Sami nationality and the discourse on tribal orientation cultivated by Erkki Asp at the conference. Asp presented his view of Sami acculturation, which was generally more pessimistic than that of Näkkäläjärvi.229

Samuli Porsanger introduced another, yet more traditional angle to the politicization of the Sami issue. In the context of the democratization of the Nordic societies, Porsanger demanded a new kind of organizational activity with regard to the nation-states, in order to improve the economic and social condition of the Sami. The Sami problem was a societal problem, shared with the rest of the people. They needed to be made known and the positive trend in the climate of opinion had to be used. The Sami needed to recognize their position and work actively to improve it. Samuli Porsanger widened the field from the cultural to the political. Sami problems were the same as those of other groups, and could be solved politically.230 It is safe to say that he borrowed from the emerging, politicized discourses of the time, shared and reproduced in Finland by the majority. He did not disengage from the national mode of operating politically. It is also worth noting that Harald Eidheim gave a lecture at the conference, in which he referred to the need for special rights for the Sami.231

Although there were sometimes obvious delays, the first phase of the internationalization of the Sami movement was decisive in bringing about changes to the Sami movement in Finland – the rights demanded and the scope of these rights widened significantly. Demands for cultural protection were abandoned and rights concerning natural resources and land appeared on agenda. This may be said to have pushed the Sami movement into the 1960s. At this point in time, internationalization remained a supplementary internationalization, i.e. building societal networks across boundaries as an extension of the state. In the Finnish context, at least, the option of building networks at the expense of the state – a substitutive internationalization – was never really striven for. The geographical frame of identification and the area of political action for an emerging transnational civil


230 LK 2.7.1965, Saamelaisongelman ovat samalla yhteiskuntamme pulmakysymyksiä.
society was still a region defined by national boundaries.\footnote{Femte nordiska samekonferensen i Tana den 30 juni-3 juli 1965, Berättelse från Nordiska samerådets sekretariat, Stockholm 1965, 16-17.} This phase was undertaken by the generation of Oula Näkkäläjärvi, those born in the 1930s. Things would be taken further in the near future.

### 4.5. Comparison with Norway and Sweden

According to Norwegian research the 1950s were not an entirely unfruitful era for the Sami movement. The basis for the future Sami movement was laid through a growth in recruitment. In the same manner as in the ethnopolitics in Finland, the focus was on the distribution of social goods, natural resources and, increasingly, special rights. This meant a re-evaluation of the equality discourse evident, for example, in the demands of the Sami Council. The shift from “formal” equality to “resultative” equality was not total, but there are signs that the distinctive character of the Sami was beginning to be used in demands as an argument for special treatment, to which Nickul sometimes reacted. The demand for social development according to Sami premises was to some degree dampened by the “primordial” representations. One aspect that differed from the “Norwegian” Sami movement was the longer delay in making demands for the rights to land and water use in Sami areas, which had already been voiced in Norway throughout the 1950s.\footnote{Minde 1980, 100-101; Minde 1985, 420.} It was the inter-Nordic co-operation in the Sami Council, as well as the generation shift, that brought new paradigms to the Finnish movement; the rights issue was widened from the means of living to a landownership issue later on\footnote{Rights, vuoigadvuodat, were seldom mentioned in Sabmeläš. A rare example comes from an article reporting the meeting of raddi in Inari in 1957. Legislative measures were demanded by the Sami, but talk about rights vanishes from these sources after the Sami delegation of 1947 and the committee of 1952. Tävvieädnamii samiraddi, Sabmeläš 3/1957.}. Radicalization had not yet increased the lobbying – that was a future undertaking. The rise in education and the fixing of the elite character of the movement was a later phenomenon in Finland. The movement recruited many teachers, especially in the 1960s.\footnote{Compare Minde 1986, 90.}

By comparison with other Nordic countries, the Sami movement in Finland lacked a heavyweight national organization to negotiate with state bodies, such as the criticized meetings between SSR and the “Lapp bailiff” (lappfogden) in Sweden. The Sami conferences
and the Sami Council were not perceived as such, while SL was concentrating on working in the Sami area and trying to balance the influence of the SiPLC. The Skolt Sami had Sobbar, but this had no real status outside the Skolt Sami society. Forest and Park Service had not yet begun to negotiate with the Sami. By the late 1950s, the Sami movement had, to some extent, lost touch with the state bodies. In addition, contact with the state and the delegations was dominated by the propagation of municipal organizations that succeeded in modernizing Inari. This is a partial explanation for the low radicality: there was no media to voice the most challenging statements. This also meant that the role of the Nordic contacts at the conferences was significant in providing political premises for Sami ethnopolitics in Finland. The state bodies did not have an imagery based on means of living, like the Swedish equivalent, but the most topical language question might have led the government to practice a more open, culturally-based imagery. Thus the rights of the Sami could, at least in theory, have been applied to a larger group than the reindeer-herding Sami. In the eyes of the Finnish officials the modernizing Sami may still have been backward, marginal, even primitive, but he/she was a Finnish citizen with equal rights that the state and municipal bodies worked to fulfil. There was also progress: Oula Nääkäläläjärvi was the first jurisprudent about to enter the Sami movement. The Sami movement in Finland lacked the longer political work and experience in acting in opposition to the authorities that the movement in Sweden had.

The reception of Sami issues and claims by the state bodies was poor – this was an inter-Nordic experience. One way in which Finland differed to Norway was that the Sami issue was actually discussed there in the wake of the Sami Committee of 1956-1959. Bearing in mind that the results were poor, and hampered by a strong grass-roots resistance to “reservation thinking”, the Norwegian political system could only just be bothered to give the report a thorough procedure. At the same time, the Norwegian policy has been labelled as patronizing, where “experts” were allowed to decide on Sami policies without listening to them, Sami activism was monitored and accusations of “un-Norwegianness” were easily made. The Finnish experience is different. Being a marginal political issue, not taken care of, but allowed to have a say in the drafting of policies is not, if anything, patronizing. Double

236 Sobbar, the village assembly, was the centre of societal and political activity in the Skolt Sami siida. According to Karl Nickul, the sobbar (a term originating from the Russian), or norraž (a native Skolt Sami term that sobbar replaced) was where the affairs of the community were managed by the representatives of the families (households). The chief function of the sobbar was to divide the territory of the siida among the families. It has been stated that the sobbar would have functioned as a court of justice as well. The institution was established anew in Sevettijärvi after the evacuee period and has an official status in Finnish legislation concerning the Skolt Sami settlement. In addition, Forest and Park Service had a duty to listen to the sobbar.

Lehtola 1999a, 151, endnote 11; Nickul 1977, 2, 6-7; Nyyssönen 1999, 653.

standards, evident in Norway – beautiful words but no actual deeds – were at least less obvious in Finland, due to this marginality. The Norwegianization policy, which the report of 1956 had aimed to dismantle, was abandoned in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{238} It was less possible to air accusations of unpatriotic attitudes in Finnish political culture, which was occupied with maintaining a friendly relationship with the “anti-imperialist” power of the Soviet Union that had caused a bankruptcy of nationalistic ideas in Finland. In a Finnish context, the rare accusations were formulated differently. They were not based on alleged lack of patriotism, but to the duties of a citizen. The special rights of the Sami could be seen and were sometimes presented in the light of the possibility of failing to fulfil one’s national duties\textsuperscript{239}, a strong discourse in Finnish national thinking.

One issue where the Sami began to be more reactive than the Swedish movement was the school issue, where positive Sami voices were heard concerning the preservation effect that the “nomad” school had in relation to the Sami culture. The importance of education in the coming about of the new Sami elite was still appreciated but, as with Norwegian language politics (and most probably the experiences of Sami children in Finnish schools), criticism was on the increase concerning the effects of the devastating modernization.\textsuperscript{240}

4.6. Conclusions

The era discussed here was not merely a silent period, but a transitory period containing many developments and paving the way for deeper changes in the ideologies and structures of the Sami elite. The political climate did not actively marginalize but was, at best, concerned about Sami access to welfare measures and the fate of the dying “Indian” tribe. In counter-imagery terms, there was not much with which to construct resistance identities, due to the positive climate in the public sphere. New actors entered the movement. New ideas were adopted from the inter-Nordic movement. One persistent factor during the mid-phase of this period was a low crisis-consciousness and an ethos of avoiding conflict. Not counting the territorial fighting with the SfPLC at the beginning of the 1950s, ethnic barriers were not built aggressively and the Sami’s own ethnic modernity was constructed, a process that partly relied on national projects. The conciliatory “borderline” imagery was an expression of this

\textsuperscript{238} Minde 2003b, 90-93, 97-98.
\textsuperscript{240} Lantto 2003, 76.
and was institutionalized in the various official forums of the time. The identity politics of the era were exceptionally coherent and conscious in relation to the desired welfare modernization. There was also an identity political offensive against the re-emerging “dying people” imagery that was practised by the majority, following the scientification of minority political discussion in the public sphere of Lapland. There was a need for images of an evolving, viable and modernization-friendly people. As a consequence, the non-radicality of the movement was cemented.

Equality was perceived as an equality of access to identical welfare services. On the other hand, the relationship was beginning to emerge as problematic as well, but the most dominant trait in ideas about the Sami collective identity during this period was the potential for dwelling in both spheres, “the traditional” and “the modern”. Both spheres were constitutive to the Sami identity. This made the imagery very inclusive, in the sense that imagery focusing on exclusive means of living was avoided and this reached the grass-roots level, opting into welfare services and employment possibilities.

By the end of this period, the rights thinking had gained a firmer grounding and the prevailing belief in modernization had received a severe blow. A more challenging form of ethnopolitics could once again be practised. The radicalization of the movement was, it seems, an imported development: it had its origins in the Finnish penetration, the flooding of the pasturelands that caused chaos for Sami herding, as well as the inter-Nordic connection, all of which had caused a change in attitude. The most radical Sami had now already begun to practise the more challenging talk of a citizen demanding linguistic and land rights, not merely calling for protection and relying on the state.

Another important change occurred during this period: nature, or the environment, appeared in Sami discourses. Saminess was increasingly reflected upon in relation to the fate and sustainability of the use of natural resources. The strength of this relation varied, but it was seldom as strong as in the imagery of Nickul. In Sami self-imagery, a greater amount of flexibility remained, as more representations were made of the majority land use forms, and not so many of the Sami themselves.

Towards the end of this period, modernization was beginning to be demonized in relation to resource use and language change. This appeared to happen in step with the rest of the radicalizing world and Finnish society at large. Whether this or the change in the activist generation can be accepted as an explanation for the radicalization is discussed more deeply in the chapter on the Sami renaissance, but it is clear that during this phase, and for the Sami generation born in the 1930s, it was the inter-Nordic connection that provided more critical
tools of representation for the Sami movement in Finland. In theoretical terms, the option was once again taken of building dichotomizing identities and the era of complementary identities proved to be short (see Chapter 1.3.2).

When it comes to qualifiers concerning the national status of the Sami during the era of research there was a great deal of fluctuation, due to the ponderings on the inclusive nationality of the state of Finland. The separateness of the Sami “nationality”, and especially that of the “minority nationality”, a term used by Iisko Sara, occurred within the national frame of Finnishness, but sometimes the Sami were represented as part of the state and of Finnish nationality. This was done for pragmatic reasons, when bargaining for national services (see Erkki Jomppanen and “the splinter of a nation”). The use of the term “tribe” is an important exception to this policy. As a Sami strategy, it was used to create a deeper feeling of separation from the national whole. It was an expression of a tribal feeling of distinction, used with pride, and it did not convey the stigmatizing connotations that were perceived in Norway. The distinctiveness of the term increased, particularly when Pekka Lukkari used the term in the international, pan-Sami forums. The clearest example of the great fluctuation in the use of terms was that offered by the same actor, Pekka Lukkari, who used the most inclusive term of them all, that of “citizen”. Especially in this respect, the era was one of transition – the Sami were not yet a “full” people, but the next generation would take things further.
5. The Sami Renaissance

5.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapter I studied the earliest signs of the Sami movement in Finland becoming “primordialized”. In this chapter I intend to go deeper into these developments and study them in relation to the deepening generation gap and the Sami renaissance. In Norwegian research, the ethnic mobilization during the 1960s has been celebrated as combining and empowering experience of cultural awakening and the revitalization of many stigmatized Sami cultural markers. This chapter discusses the Finnish Sami renaissance, the likewise celebrated, “true” ethnic awakening of the Sami and the change in the identity politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Was the renaissance a combining or diversifying experience? How inclusive did the collective identities constructed manage to be? These questions are studied using a comparative method, both in relation to the grassroots in Inari and to Sami revitalization in Norway. Both the intra- and inter-ethnic barricades were built higher during this era and “enemies”, who were rebelled against, were chosen in a way that demonstrated flexibility in front-building and revealed the limitations of resistance identity-building in the conditions of silent majority discourses. The origins of the renaissance have been explained in Sami research in Finland and these explanations are also now studied and commented upon. How fundamental, for example, was Finnish cultural radicalism to Sami radicalism? What effect did the continuing modernization have on the movement?

5.1.1. Finnish radicalism

The Finnish version of the radicalism in the late 1960s did not severely challenge the nation-building process, but it introduced more flexible value systems and was fed by accelerating modernization. The intellectual liberalism and radicalism was aimed at the ideological basis of Finnish society, its Christian values and the traditions practised by the middle class, evolving to a more challenging political movement. The movement or crisis between two generations challenged the power held by the pre-war generation, more so than the economic basis of Finnish society. Finnish electronic media were one forum for radical expression. The left-wing hegemony continued for longer in cultural venues, but was inflated in political venues, for example by binding sections of the extreme left to governmental responsibility.
The response from those in power was not to provoke the radicals. Just as radicalism had been channelled and mellowed down into numerous alternative movements during the 1960s, in the 1970s it was channelled into a faction of the Communist Party of Finland, influenced by the Soviet model of socialism. This radicalism was motivated and inspired by class interests and inter-class solidarity, its aim was equality and it sustained an inner tension between the value of the individual and his/her dependence on the state. A more dominant change in Finnish society was the growth in standards of living and consumption. The strength of the trade unions rose immensely, both in terms of membership and influence. Finland during the 1960s has been characterized as a society of wage-earners and trade unions, where class interests actually connected the wage-earners to both class and national fellowship, by channelling the wishes of the citizens with national decision-making.1

When it comes to Finnish and Sami radicalism, the latter was actually more radical in its non-national argumentation. However, little understanding was to be expected from Finnish radicals concerning ethnically, rather than class-based, organized resistance. Nils-Aslak Valkeapää stated to the radicalizing youth of Finland, as early as 1966, that “Africa is important, but the Calotte is nearer”2 and Jorma Lehtola stated in retrospect, referring to the non-existent majority support, “There was no class struggle in the mountains”.3 In addition, the radical demands of solidarity were aimed mostly at romanticized struggles against imperial powers in the Third World. This solidarity was more of an awareness of the cultural and economical oppression imposed upon decolonized countries. The radical movement was busy securing civil rights,4 which offered the chance to represent Sami civil rights as insufficient, falling short of those of the majority. The age was still highly modern, state-bound and growing up to be highly conformist. The Sami case remained marginal. Changes in the Finnish political space were not only positive for the Sami.

There are Norwegian Sami testimonies about being seized by impulse and being part of the youth and student radicalism of the time.5 Henry Minde connects the Sami identity policy, entertaining imagery of a colonized people, to the neo-Marxist jargon of the time and to inspiration from Third and Fourth World struggles. Radical literature was read and parallels

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3 Lehtola J. 2000, 173.
5 Sara 1995, 58.
to the Nordic situation were drawn.\textsuperscript{6} Were there such dialectics in Finland? I have encountered only a very few direct references to the notion of being influenced by (national) radicalism. Nils-Aslak Valkeapää perceived connections to the civil rights movement in the USA and the crisis in the Third World: the oppressed position was similar to those mentioned\textsuperscript{7}. Valkeapää presented his views, resembling the most progressive Finnish thinking on equality and rights at the “Summer Round-up” (“Kesäerotus”) in 1969. To begin with, the Sami were a minority people, the rights of whom were connected to equality. Valkeapää compared the condition of the Sami to that of alcoholics and juvenile criminals (who were among the groups who were made visible and whose rights the radicals demanded should be recognized). Like any other small, powerless group, their condition would be improved by resolving the inequality stemming from their origin and local conditions. In the case of the Sami, Valkeapää demanded improvements in education, the establishment of central organisation and a deepening of the inter-Nordic cooperation.\textsuperscript{8} As noted earlier, however, Valkeapää disengaged himself from these movements a little later for being too restrictive (see Chapter 4.3.5).

Lehtola stresses the break from the earlier generation: the younger generation was more idealistic and did not respect the authorities. Nils-Henrik Valkeapää has mentioned the Nordic Sami movement and described the rights demanded concerning the status of indigenous people as inspiring.\textsuperscript{9} Lehtola’s sources are the activists themselves, so both the “copyright” to the new ideas and the break from the early Sami movement may be exaggerated, keeping the first signs of the primordialism of the 1950s in mind. In any case, a focus on societal issues and adapting the politicized discourse of the time was shared by the Sami. In addition, the challenging attitude across generational lines was obviously shared by both Finnish and Sami radicals (see the following section of this chapter). The state of Finland was criticized by the Sami, from the Sami’s own ethnic premises; Sami radicalism was a notably and willingly separate movement. Sami radicalism did not live up to the growing sensitivity to cultural pluralism\textsuperscript{10} that was evident in the Finnish cultural radicalism of the 1960s – markers of Saminess became more exclusive, a critical distance was established from Finnish radicalism and the state of Finland was demonized.

\textsuperscript{6} Minde 2005, 4.
\textsuperscript{8} Valkeapää, Nils-Aslak: Saamelainen yhteistyö, LK 29.6.1969.
\textsuperscript{9} Lehtola 2005a, 18-20.
\textsuperscript{10} Anaya 2000, 110.
5.2. New Sami associations and the generation gap

Finnish radicalism has been explained by the power struggles over the generation gap. A change in generation as such was not sufficient cause for the changes in history. A social generation re-evaluates a number of chosen issues in a social and cultural context that appeals to the younger generation. This new interpretation forms this group into a distinctive group or generation. It is also common to seek key experiences for each generation. For the older generation, this might have been the war and evacuation.\(^{11}\) For the younger generation it might have been living in halls of residences, while the emerging indigenous issues and radicalism in general contributed material for the re-evaluation of the deeds of the older generation and the Finnish state alike.

The emerging new Sami generation continued to voice a more critical attitude to both the Finnish state and the modernization it imposed in the Sami domicile. The new generation was far from unanimous – different self-representations were constructed and different aims striven for. The era also denotes the opening up of the generation gap, in both the Finnish and Sami societies; because of this, in very crude terms, the ethos of being constructive (albeit sometimes frustrated) with regard to the Finnish state was replaced by the rhetoric of working for the good of the Sami people’s future\(^{12}\). This chapter follows these trends: the identity politics undertaken in new arenas and by new actors, and how this challenge was taken up by the “first generation”. What consequences did these processes have for the increasingly fragmented “Sami movement”?

The Sami Council had established its position in providing initiatives and premises for ethno-political discussion. In 1960 the Sami Council held a meeting in Inari where, for example, H. J. Henriksen from Norway gave a critical lecture on the oppression of the Sami language in the Norwegian school system and Karl Johansson from Sweden held a lecture on the difficulties encountered by Sami children within the Swedish school system. In 1964 Erkki Asp presented the Finnish school system as the most effective mediator of Finnish

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\(^{11}\) Alapuro 2005, 102; the key experiences of the older generation, in a Finnish context, were the two wars fought against Stalin and the Soviet Union. What kind of effect this had on the Sami generation has not been widely studied. The “brothers-in-arms axis” and the “national, political and cultural autarchy” created by the war may be an important explanatory factor in the ideological build-up of the older Sami generation. See Vihavainen 1998, 279-280; there are references to the duties carried out and sufferings experienced during the war with regard to bargaining rights from the state, which were defended by the Sami. Lehtola 2004, 300.
culture in the Sami areas, and Oula Näkkäläjärvi did the same regarding the Sami language in 1965 at a Sami conference in Tana. This represented a break from the earlier, education-friendly attitudes, whilst a positive image of schools and halls of residence was still cultivated in Lapin Kansa. The Sami Council was also a spokesman for the need for growing differentiations among the Sami, in order to avoid the marginalization of the Sami in an era of accelerating modernization.

The Utsjoki-based association Teänupakti was established in February 1964. The association concentrated on culture and had plans to establish an orchestra, its own newsletter, and a library for the study group studying Sami literature, the history of Lapland and the Sami language. The association encountered some difficulties in establishing all its cultural aims. The members were mostly Sami and the association was led by a teacher, Kaarin Laiti, who had to give up the post to Hans Kitti the following year. Of all the members, Iisko Sara and Matti Morottaja probably had the longest careers in the Sami movement, whereas the career of Laiti resembles the typically short career of Sami women in the movement. The newsletter Teänupakti was edited by Laiti, Heikki Lukkari, Matti Morottaja and a student, Olavi Paltto. The newsletter contained mostly literary contributions, but also ponderings about society becoming more complex and the role of the Sami people as agents in this change (the term Oktasaškoddi was thus introduced to the Sabmelaš). In 1964, the association organized the sixth youth camp in Karigasniemi and had plans to produce radio programmes. For members studying outside the Sami home area, the association had branches in Rovaniemi and Kemijärvi. The association published Siela I, a collection of translations from world literature in the Sami language, in 1965.

In a meeting negotiating the development of Sami culture, which took place in Inari in December 1964, Matti Morottaja, representing Teänupakti, presented the most radical statements. According to Morottaja, the association had noticed that the historical Finnicization process was still going on with regard to the Sami and that the measures taken by the state of Finland were insufficient. According to Morottaja, Teänupakti aimed to

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support Sami material and spiritual culture, and to sustain Sami language skills with folk school teachers of Sami extraction.\textsuperscript{16} This combination of the notion of language as a tool for cultural survival and the otherwise modernization-friendly imagery was typical of this era.

After the meeting, Heikki Lukkari wrote a “letter to the editor” in \textit{Lapin Kansa}, which exposed the generation gap within the Sami community. Lukkari made a new self-presentation, one of a dissatisfied, critical Sami youth “…which sees no more pictures taken by others of ourselves, but observes their environment critically and latches on sharply to problems, demanding their removal”. The older generation and organizations were not interested in either sustaining Sami culture or in Sami youth issues. The SiPLC had a history of thirty years of inactivity. It had promoted personal benefit and caused downright harm to the Sami by its stubborn orthography policy, which had hampered inter-Nordic Sami contacts and the spread of Sami literature. The voice of young Sami people was not heard in the Sami media, as it was edited by the old associations. SL was similarly idle and corrupt. Both associations were close to reaching their “…‘goal’. One moment longer, and the Sami will not want to be Sami anymore.” The impact of these associations was, according to Lukkari, that the eyes of the Sami youth had been opened: they had to act for themselves in order to sustain their Saminess.\textsuperscript{17} Shortly after writing this, Teänupakti convened a meeting to discuss the contemporary problems of young Sami people. The Vice Chairman of the Research Association of Lapland, Jorma Ahvenainen\textsuperscript{18}, was present, together with Karl Nickul, representing the SiPLC, and Secretary Otto Timonen, representing a provincial body for youth work. At this meeting, chaired by the headmaster of the folk school in Northern Inari and Utsjoki, Olavi Kallio, Teänupakti (or \textit{Lapin Kansa}) disengaged itself from the writings of Lukkari and very conservative platforms were suggested for youth action.\textsuperscript{19}

The older actors were still trying to dominate the Sami field of activism. In addition, SL, “the association of the Sami”, still saw itself as a joint association for the Sami, working for Sami “national culture, language, economy and the problems of Sami young people”.\textsuperscript{20} SL still held actual power, since it was able to propose Sami members to the Advisory Council of Sami Affairs.\textsuperscript{21} SL also safeguarded its power, and Erkki Jomppanen is said to have hindered an early effort, by Erkki Nickul in 1962, to establish a representative body for the Sami.

\textsuperscript{16} LK 22.12.1964, Saamelaisväestön kulttuurin kehittämisestä neuvoteltiin Inarissa.
\textsuperscript{17} Lukkari, Heikki: Saamelaisuus - illusioko?, LK 24.1.1965.
\textsuperscript{18} Later professor of economic and general history at the University of Jyväskylä.
\textsuperscript{19} LK 2.2.1965, Saamelaisnuoret pohtivat tänään päivän ongelmiaan.
\textsuperscript{20} LK 8.9.1965, Inarin kasvot IX: Sami Littolla vilkasta toiminta; see also on the same attitude Nuorgam 1968 and Norjan saamelaisliitto: Pohjoismaisen saamelaisinstituutti tarpeellinen, LK 7.7.1970.
\textsuperscript{21} LK 29.10.1968, Samiit Lisot kiirehtii poromiestilstalain eduskuntakäsittelyä.
because this threatened the leading role of SL.\textsuperscript{22} SL let itself be restricted to the national frame, due to its desire for national monopoly, while the younger generation had already entered pan-Sami arenas: In 1958, a teacher named Johnsen had collected models for Sami artefacts from Finland for a museum to be established in Karasjok. Johan Nuorgam thanked Johnsen for this initiative but at the same time justified and prioritized a decision to set up an independent Sami museum in Finland, a demand that was placed on the SL agenda. Police officer Tauno Lakomäki from Utsjoki was more positive about the museum in Karasjok, since “the national borders are not the borders for the Sami area. The Sami share, although in different dialects, the same language.”\textsuperscript{23} Such transnational representations of a collective Sami identity were nearly unthinkable for the members of SL. The legitimacy of SL was denied by the younger generation, but also by older rival Sami actors such as Nilla Outakoski and Jouni Kitti (see appendix)\textsuperscript{24}. SL also co-published \textit{Sabhelaš} and the toothlessness of its editorial content was criticized.\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Teänupakti} was a periodical for those on the other side of the generation gap: Matti Morottaja blamed \textit{Sabhelaš} for being too matter-of-fact and scientific, unappealing to young people and out of touch with the progressing times (on Morottaja, see appendix).\textsuperscript{26}

Heikki Lukkari also used another opportunity to attack the SfPLC. A minor debate followed the Sami edition of \textit{Kaltio} in 1966, when Lukkari blamed the SfPLC for monopolizing control of Sami issues and concentrating on cultural issues. The Sami issue was not merely a cultural issue, but first and foremost a societal issue.\textsuperscript{27} The writings of Heikki Lukkari reveal the adoption of the national and international dynamics of opening the generation gap and politicizing discourses of the radical youth of the 1960s. The Sami discursive field became a contested field. The Sami renaissance was as much a generational movement as it was a cultural/ethnic movement. The Sami issue was elevated to a societal and political level. At certain times, the intra-ethnic field was more conflict-ridden than the inter-ethnic field, where the Sami were met with, if anything, mild and positive interest or

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\textsuperscript{22} Lehtola 2000b, 188; Lehtola 2005a, 16, where the estimation is given by Oula Nääkkälälärvi; according to Veli-Pekka Lehtola, Erkki Jomppanen saw the new organ as a threat to the position of the SL. Lehtola 2005d, 164-165.
\textsuperscript{23} LK 26.8.1958, Yhteinen saamelaismuseo tarpeen koko Pohjolaa varten; LK 5.3.1959, Saamelaismuseo Inariin, Tonttikysymys vielä avoin.
\textsuperscript{24} Paltto 1973, 97-98; Outakoski, Nilla: Jouni Kitti ja Samii Litto, LK 16.7.1970.
\textsuperscript{25} Paltto 1973, 101.
\textsuperscript{26} Morottaja, Matti: Nubbi samekielaš pladdi, Teänupakti 2/1964.
\textsuperscript{27} Lukkari, Heikki: K. Nickulille saamelaisuudesta, Kaltio 6/1966.
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neglect and silence (which in turn, may be interpreted as institutionalized discrimination, denying the worth of Sami culture). Erkki Jomppanen widened the generation gap from the older activist side in 1968. Jomppanen blamed the Sami radicals for “wrangling about nothing”. He mentioned the herding co-operatives of Lappi (a student organization at the University of Oulu, of which Pekka Aikio was a member, responsible for arranging the summer round-up) and Jyväskylän kesä as examples of useless protest. For Jomppanen, there was no oppression and no apartheid policy, but the existing defects in the Sami and Finnish society could be corrected with work. The Lapps (probably a term chosen by Lapin Kansa) were free citizens, they could express their concerns freely and decide their own issues. Since the Lapps were “cautious and not used to national co-operation”, others had to take care of their issues. Jomppanen shared this notion with Martti Miettunen who, earlier that year, had said that “the individuality developed in the wilderness” meant that the Sami were not used to organizational work and co-operation. The generation gap opened up for the older generation as a youth problem. In Ivalo, the new temptations of film and theatre, bars and “common dances” worried older people and teachers. Younger people were not using their time in an appropriate manner, as defined by older people.

Young, educated Sami established a new cross-border venue as teachers of Sami extraction began their meetings. The meetings presented suggestions to the inter-Nordic Governmental Co-operation Board (Raddetusai oktasašpârgovalljokoddi) within the Nordic Council. Teachers concentrated on language material production and language-teaching issues. In Masi, in 1966, concern was expressed that Sami parents needed to be made aware that learning Sami would not hamper learning the majority language. In 1969, teachers noted at a meeting in Jällivaara, Sweden that teaching in Sami was in the poorest condition in Finland, of all the Nordic countries. Pekka Lukkari characterized the situation created by the

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29 Jyväskylän kesä was a cultural venue, which was radicalized by the end of the 1960s. During this period, the venue had the aim of building global understanding, with visitors and themes from oppressed peoples from Africa, Latin America and the USA. However, the venue is remembered for its demonstrations and “happenings”, which broke taboos of a sexual nature. Tarkka 1992, 210. The Sami were also a topic in 1968.
30 LK 27.8.1968, Lappalaisten asioita pohdittiin.
31 LK 17.8.1968, Romanticointi ei enää riitää saamelaiskysymysten hoitoon.
32 LK 12.10.1965, Etelä-Inarin kansalaiskouluun vanhempainkokous Ivalossa.
ambivalence of the authorities as being fatal to the Sami younger generation. This condition meant that linguistic assimilation continued in the schools.

Veli-Pekka Lehtola perceives these new associations as part of the wider radicalization of the Sami movement, expressed in an increasing dissatisfaction with the conservative SL. Johti Sabmelažžat (JS) proved to be most visible of these new associations (and the longest-lived; by 1970, Samii Nuorak and Teänupakti were no longer functioning) concentrating most explicitly on land and water rights issues. JS was established in January/February 1969, due to a fear that the landless Sami of Enontekiö would gain nothing from the Reindeer Estate Law (porotilalaki). This radical association was based in Enontekiö and designed to cherish the culture of the Enontekiö Sami, as well as advocating their economic and legal rights and reviving Sami handicrafts. The first chairman of the association was Heikki Hyvärinen (see appendix), a teacher who later became a lawyer for the Sami Digi. JS was active in many fields, including municipal politics and cultural platforms.

Right after its establishment, Hyvärinen organized a hearing in the Finnish Parliament, where he presented the problems of the “landless Sami”, who constituted half the Sami population in Enontekiö. The nomad Sami of Enontekiö received worse protection from Finnish legislation than the other Sami groups, which Hyvärinen distinguished from the nomad Sami of Enontekiö. The “settled” Sami, living in Inari and Utsjoki, “identified themselves as equals” with the rest of the population. The demand for better rights for the nomad Sami under the Reindeer Estate Law or, better yet, a separate Sami law, reflects updated special rights thinking, the exclusive nomad Sami self-imagery and the cultural purity practised by JS. On the same occasion, Hyvärinen compared the establishment of state lands to a “crime”. Landownership based on agriculture was condemned as unsuitable, especially for Enontekiö, which was located north of the agricultural areas in Finland.

As the Sami movement became radicalized, the conservative character of statements made by the older generation became more obvious. On the tenth anniversary of the Sami Folk School, Dean A. I. Heikinheimo stated that the flourishing Sami culture and nationality

35 This process may be seen in action in Sevettijärvi, where Lapin Kansa reported that the Skolt Sami pupils were gradually overcoming their difficulties in expressing themselves in Finnish. LK 25.9.1969, Pohjanmaalta koltia opettamaan Sevettiin.
40 LK 19.3.1969, Enontekiön saamelaisten asemaa haittaa puute omasta maasta.
41 LK 15.5.1969, Valtiovallan suhtautumisesta paimentolaissaamelaisten maan ja vesien omistukseen.
had not vanished under pressure from east and west. The Christian Church had evened out the relationship between the tribes, the Dean concluded. Erkki Jomppanen was still the most visible Sami in Helsinki, continually leading delegations to meet the government and demand, for example, more efficient forestry in Inari. He was working with the “colonizer”, if you like, since the chief forester Yrjö Siitonen was among his colleagues in municipal government. In 1964, SL made a statement about establishing fixed estates for Sami reindeer herders through changes in settlement legislation. Since this statement reflects the most modernization-friendly Sami thinking, I refer to it at length. The Sami, “a national minority”, needed reindeer-herding estates on the following grounds. The Sami could not retreat any further north, so their position had to be consolidated in Upper Lapland. Even more importantly, the legislation on agrarian settlement did not apply to the Sami home region, so very few Sami had gained from the settlement plans of the state. Reindeer herding was no longer sufficient for employing the Sami, due to fixed quotas, a growing Sami population and mechanization. Reindeer herding was further represented as part of a “special agriculture” (erikoismaatalous) that relied on forests and forest ownership in cases of herding failures. (In a Finnish context, it is not possible to become more “Finnish” than Samii Litto with this last argument. Its categorization and argument reflect a shared belief and scientification undertaken in agriculture, and its close connection to small-scale forest ownership. In a nutshell, agriculture in Finland consisted of small-scale crop-raising or cattle-raising, with small forest patches providing employment during the winter.) Further on, SL justified the settlement of the Sami by the fact that this would not hinder the industrialization of the region or logging by Forest and Park Service. On the contrary, the fixed settlement of the Sami would provide a labour force for loggings and for maintaining industry in the region. The statement was sent to the Advisory Council on Sami Affairs and the Finnish delegation of the Sami Council. At the meeting to draft the statement those present included, at least, the chairman, Erkki Jomppanen, Samuel Guttorm and Johan Nuorgam. On another occasion, Jomppanen justified the proposal as a means of improving conditions for reindeer herding and the herders. The forum for this was a lengthy report in Lapin Kansa promoting the

42 LK 24.3.1964, Kymmenenvuotisjuhla Saamelainen kansanopistossa.
45 This is a reference to pre- and post-war settlement and landownership legislation in Finland, which was an attempt to establish a landowning rather than land-leasing peasantry.
46 LK 20.3.1964, Samii-Litton hallitus esittää: Saamelaisille poronhostotiloja maankäyttölain muutoksella.
industrialization of Inari.\textsuperscript{47} There was no contradiction between these two projects, at least in the eyes of Jompannen.

Another forum that opened during in 1960s was summer camps for Sami youth. According to Regnor Jernsletten, the camps were initiated by the Sami Council and intended for recruiting politically promising, active Sami young people to engage them politically. The Sami youth gatherings had also a social and even a romantic function.\textsuperscript{48} The Finnish representatives active in organizing the camps were Siiri Magga, Samuli Aikio, Josef Antti Lukkari, Johan Högman, Oula Nääkäläjärvi and Nils Aslak Valkeapää. Many of the youth activists carried on in Sami politics. At the first camp, in Abisko in 1951, 51 people participated from Finland alone. The venue practised a modest imagery of modernizing Sami who wanted to hold on to their ethnicity. The activists stressed how the “maintenance” (säilyttäminen) of Saminess was possible by raising the material and spiritual culture of the Sami. Sami young people had to develop themselves in order to maintain the Saminess in their own country. The youth camps were also a venue for manifesting pan-Sami sentiments, in the recognition that the problems for the Sami were the same in the three Nordic countries. It was also stressed that the Sami were not working against the majority population in any country. The construction of a Sami sense of communion across borders was mentioned by Siiri Magga as the most important task of the camps, and at the Karigasniemi camp of 1964 cross-border youth organization was discussed. Young Sami people carried on meeting at the conferences during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{49}

Younger people were not afraid to see reindeer herding as an evolving subsistence. At the Nikkaluotka youth camp of 1967, Oula Nääkäläjärvi was positive about rationalizing traditional means of living, even though this required the activation of the Sami youth to participate in them. The camp discussed how herding was a plagued and adapted means of living, whereas there had been progress in other fields of life with regard to employment possibilities and social welfare. A wandering way of life (jutaaminen) resulted in social harm, as people could not guard their interests. “Letting the reindeer guide people” would only hinder rationalization. Reindeer entrepreneurship, which was presented as the latest trend in Norway, would also be hindered. Helvi Nuorgam-Poutasuo (see appendix) and Tuomas

\textsuperscript{47} LK 7.8.1964, Inarin tulevaisuus riippuu ratkaisevasti teollisuudesta.
Magga made their first excursions into the public sphere at this camp. The younger generation was not always tied to monolithic notions of culture. The break from demands for protecting herding is obvious. “Saminess” was changing and evolving. For the “first” generation, modernization meant mainly employment and economic modernization, whereas for the younger generation it also meant the possibility of cultural modernization.

5.3. The radicalization of land use issues and local society in Inari

The topical reservoir projects, with their unexpected results and poor planning, as well as their radicalizing effect on the public sphere in Lapland, have been highlighted in research in this field. This issue resulted in the introduction of alternative values and discourses in the public sphere, which entertained a more negative attitude towards modernization and industrialization. During the late 1960s, criticism of and problems in resource management also began to radicalize at a grass-roots level. In Inari, this happened following a delay, but during this period there were issues and interests at stake that caused inter- and intra-ethnic friction.

The water district boundary process (vesipiirirajankäynti), the final phase of the “great partition” (Iso-jako), the establishment of a Finnish mode of landownership in Upper Lapland and fishing rights connected to (both Finnish and Sami) landownership, began in 1961 in a peaceful manner. _Lapin Kansa_ wrote about the preliminary meetings as a matter concerning landowners, without ethnic specification. The challenge soon emerged: the association of landowners sent a statement to the water border committee (vesirajatoimikunta), in which they justified the recognition of fishing rights for the estate holders. The older settlement, from the eighteenth century onwards, had been granted wide fishing rights. These rights had been practised carefully, respecting the boundaries to other fishing areas. According to the association, fishing rights constituted a full ownership right.

The fishing boundary dispute generated a land rights discussion and radicalized rights demands. In May 1968 a meeting was held in Utsjoki where the chairman, Uula Guttor,
demanded that the state should carry out research and clarify the “old Sami rights and the ownership of the fisheries”. If anything, this proves that the ongoing dispute had had a mobilizing effect and that the rights discourse had reached the grass-roots level by this time. The representation of the weaker position of the Sami, due to defects in the legislation, returned to the Sami claims. In the water district dispute, the advisory council was used to advocate the Sami cause in this dispute. The dispute proved to be long-lasting and created many intra- and inter-ethnic splits in local communities in the north. As there were Sami both gaining and fearing to lose their rights, fronts could be built most coherently only against the “winners” of the process, the Finnish landowners and Forest and Park service. (See on the water district boundary process Chapter 7.3.4)

In September 1965 Lapin Kansa reported the first critical voices against forestry on the part of the reindeer herders. Not from Inari, though, but from the co-operative of Lappi in Sodankylä where, according to the meeting, “the reservoir loggings” along the River Luiro had spoiled the pastures. The Kemijoki company was asked to compensate the rebuilding of the fence separating the Lappi and Kemi-Sompio co-operatives. Kemijoki Oy, and southerners in power in general, were also condemned in Sabmelaš for drowning the pastures and providing too little compensation. Nor had the compensation yet reached the Sami herders whose reindeer herding had been severely disrupted, which angered the Sodankylä Sami and caused bitterness across co-operative borders. Sabmelaš presented the reservoirs as the reason for establishing a Sami association in Sodankylä in 1971. The Soadegilli Samii Seärvi focused on both the Sami culture and Sami rights, and a policy to take part in the public debate of issues concerning the Sami. Such an ethnopolitical association was still lacking in Inari. Tauno Turunen, a young student from Inari, criticized the behaviour of Forest and Park Service as “unyielding” in the Lokka “reservoir scandal”, and for its unwillingness to clear the shores of Lake Inari, where dead timber was hampering

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54 LK 17.7.1963, Inari olisi käsitteltyä yhtenä ainoana selkänä.
55 LK 19.5.1968, Saamelainen vanhat kalastusöikeudet turvattava.
56 LK 1.8.1968, Saamelaiset jääneet muita heikompaan asemaan.
57 LK 7.9.1963, Saamelaisasian neuvottelukunta koolla Rovaniemellä.
60 "Poja Soadeelis" (pseudonym): Måid råssa Kemijoki oy?, Sabmelaš 4/1966; Sabmelaš 5-6/1966, Tävvi-Suoma čahcevuogadvuohta leå tådjam samis; the compensation issue was brought up in the Advisory Council on Sami Affairs as well, Sabmelaš 6-7/1968, Sabmelažžai tili Suomast.
fishermen.\(^{62}\) The dissatisfaction towards the regulation of Lake Inari and the unsatisfactory compensation were criticized in Inari in 1972.\(^{63}\) In Inari, a greater variety of opinions on forestry was still being entertained than in Sodankylä. Among the critical voices were Aatos Alava, who complained about the destructive effects of the logging waste at logging sites\(^{64}\) (this was to become a major cause of Sami and pasture research complaints\(^{65}\)). Matti Saijets, from Nellim in Eastern Inari, expressed thanks for the employment offered by the logging sites. He had also detected the first reindeer in a poor condition, which he attributed to frozen pastures, not to the logging. Forestry was the biggest source of employment for the Sami in Upper Lapland\(^{66}\) and from the mid-1960s onwards, reports and complaints about the worsening employment situation began to appear in *Lapin Kansa*; against this background, the forestry-friendly features may be understood.\(^{67}\) J. E. Jomppanen mentioned forestry mechanization as a cause of increasing local unemployment for the first time in 1967.\(^{68}\)

The reservoir was filled in 1967, the Sami were resettled in the village of Vuohčču, Vuotso and the damage was evident quite soon, as the unlogged tree-tops were visible from the reservoir. The villages of Laiti, Silmävaara, Rovanen, Korvanen, Kurujärvi, Lokka, Mutenia and Riesto were totally or partially drowned,\(^{69}\) reindeers were drowned\(^{70}\) and herding in the Lappi co-operative experienced a massive displacement of reindeers northwards to Inari.\(^{71}\) A total of 10% of the co-operative’s land area was drowned and the surrounding forests were logged by efficient forestry means.\(^{72}\) Even *Lapin Kansa* reacted sympathetically to the Sami, and suggested dismantling the co-operative.\(^{73}\) This criticism continued as fishing proved to be suffering from severe difficulties. The fish population had collapsed and the

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\(^{62}\) Nils-Aslak Valkeapää summarized the criticism in his pamphlet *Terveisiä Lapista* (1971). Valkeapää 1971, 44-48; Turunen 1969; the critical writings about Forest and Park Service and Kemijoki Oy, the company responsible for the regulation of the River Kemi, become more frequent during the late 1960s. In addition, the editorial policy of the newspaper was questioned as being too friendly towards the state bodies. See LK 22.3.1970, Herra Toimittaja, Metsähallituksen mustaa demokratiaa.

\(^{63}\) LK 29.3.1972, Inarilaiset panivat pataluhaksi Inarinjärven säännöstelykorvausta koskevan esityskokoelman.

\(^{64}\) LK 23.4.1966, Inarin porotalousparlamentista.

\(^{65}\) For example at an official level: Saamelaiskomitean mietintö, 1973:46 itself and in the appendix, Liite: Tutkimusraportit, 299.

\(^{66}\) Asp 1966, 78-79.

\(^{67}\) LK 7.5.1966, Vähän työä nellimöläisillä – mutta porotalous voimaperäistä; LK 2.11.1966, Töitä vähän Inarissa.

\(^{68}\) LK 16.8.1967, Vesien piirirajankäynnin ja porotilalain viivytäminen estää Inarin vaurastumista.

\(^{69}\) Saamelaiskomitean mietintö, 1973:46, Liite: Tutkimusraportit, 323.

\(^{70}\) Tikkanen and Tikkanen 1972, 113.

\(^{71}\) LK 13.10.1968, Tekojärven aiheuttamaa: Lapin paliskunnan porot menneet vieropalkisiin; LK 20.5.1969, Lapin paliskunta tahtoi hoitaa poronsa omalla palkisellaan.


\(^{73}\) LK 15.10.1968, Lapin paliskunnan kohtalo.
privileged fishing enjoyed by Kemijoki Oy and Forest and Park Service was perceived by the Sami in Vuotso as “incomprehensible”.

The early 1970s were marked by increasing criticism towards forestry. In 1971 the SfPLC focused on the processes and condition of the northern forests and demanded that the board take steps to ensure that the Sheltered Forest Act (Suojametsälaki) should better protect the needs of the Sami. A closer look at the relationship between reindeer herders and forestry officials in Inari shows considerable variation. In 1966, the first protest about clear-cutting was sent to the District of Inari by the reindeer herders in Inari. This was a modest protest, concerned about access to fuel wood if the logging continued and spread to larger areas. One has to wait until 1977 for a “true” protest, where the reindeer herders demanded the end of logging in certain pasture areas because it was harmful to herding and the pastures. Before this, there were no signs of protests against Forest and Park Service, but a wide variety of notions concerning forestry. It may be said that negativity was on the rise and this matter was being discussed in reindeer-herding circles; the demand in 1977 is proof of this. But at the end of the 1960s, Inari falls short of the angry radicalism that was evident in Sodankylä. Here, one could easily muster a case of “false consciousness”, of the Sami herders not knowing their true needs. There were Sami who were eager to list the “objective”, given needs of the Sami, but in many cases, especially dealing with a differentiated social group, these efforts did not receive wide support or become part of the nuanced socio-cultural reality of the group.

However, the economic and ecological aspects mentioned above radicalized sections of society at a grass-roots level, where modernization was encountered. Local societies had produced some active people, who stayed outside the ethnic elite but appeared in a public sphere; this group would grow bigger in decades to come and increase the pluralism in Sami identity politics. Acknowledging the politically non-engaged sections of the local communities that left no traces in the sources, it is almost impossible to say whether the life-worlds of the radicalizing elite and local societies moved closer or further apart from each other, because of the simultaneous pluralization in both spheres. I am inclined to say that the life-worlds grew further apart, because of the continuing opting-in movement relating to modernization (from the necessity of gaining subsistence) and the continuing disengagement

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74 I have not discovered any other information about fishing privileges. Saamelaiskomitean mietintö, 1973:46, Liite: Tutkimusraportit, 326.
75 Sabmeläš 3/1971, Çuvgetusseärvist tahpatuvvam.
77 Minde 2000c, 4-6.
from modernization by the elite. In addition, the source of local criticism had different, practical causes and was channelled through different means, sometimes directly to Forest and Park Service. In these contexts, there was no practical use for ponderings on the latest developments in elite political circles, the premises of which were not by any means shared by all actors.

7.4. The Sami renaissance: constructing a more exclusive Saminess

The increasing effect on inner group cohesion of the utilization of a rights discourse is celebrated by many theorists, as well as the increase in the persuasiveness of claims relating to long-neglected interests. The rights discourse was a rational choice, as international law was becoming more effective and the sanctions thereof were beginning to be recognized by nation-states, the “natural” unit of identification in the Western world. The global process of diminishing the legitimizing force of the state had begun. For its part, the indigenous peoples’ movement was contributing to this “social revolution” (Wilmer). The rights discourse also had consequences for the self-image of the indigenous claimants concerning their historic and contemporary mistreatment and lack of rights. The rights discourse offered a more active, demanding agency than the old one of cultural protection. The rationality of rhetoric of unity and the use of “strategic essentialization” may have been partly imposed, since the rights sought were collective, and both the claimant and the challenged counterpart were collectives. The contemporaneous representative field was dominated by stereotypical “truths” about the aborigines as a group and the perception and talk of identity did not, therefore, cast doubt on the potential for shared collective identities in the same way as in (academic) culture nowadays. The imagery on the part of the Sami in Finland was sometimes “essentialist”, using positive images of aboriginality. Did the movement manage to generate increased internal cohesion, as might be expected in the light of these theories?

By the end of the 1960s, all the Sami venues had been radicalized. Ottar Brox called for a “Lapp power” movement at a conference in Hetta in 1968. The first demonstrations were held in Stockholm, with slogans demanding “Sami power in Sameland” and informal arenas were established for the Sami youth at the beginning of the 1970s, when the youth camps run by the Sami Council ceased. The thinking and rhetoric on Sami rights was changing by the

beginning of the 1970s, as well. The dominant minority politics paradigm was being discussed and gradually replaced by demands claiming indigenous status for the Sami. The conference in Jällivaara in 1971 was decisive in this respect.\textsuperscript{79} In Finland, the new Sami leadership of the SfPLC also took part in a shift from support and progress rhetorics to a more radical discourse on rights, and it remained an influential association in Sami issues during the 1960s, especially as the activity of SL faded away.\textsuperscript{80} Rights were no longer merely economic rights, and the problems were no longer those of not having identical rights as a citizen.\textsuperscript{81} Kirsti Palto documented the paradigm change from the demands for cultural survival to the demands for economic action to save the existence of the whole Sami population. She connected the Sami struggle to both the struggle between nations and minorities and to the struggle of the working class for their rights, thus presenting a Marxist-inspired interpretation of the indigenous struggle.\textsuperscript{82} Jouni Kitti issued threats of an “underground organization” fighting for Sami rights in 1970.\textsuperscript{83}

There are signs that the rights discourse did not unite the Sami generations: at the Hetta conference of 1968, with a focus on the judicial status of the Sami, the generation gap was widened further by Heikki Hyvärinen pointing out the problems that the water district boundaries had created for the Sami in Enontekiö. He reprised the fate of the non-landowning nomad Sami of Enontekiö, who were in the process of losing their fishing rights, since the right to fishing was tied to ownership of an estate. Erkki Jomppanen gave a more modest reply, pondering the possibility of the Sami becoming landowners. The state of Finland was working on this case as part of the preparations concerning the Reindeer Estate Law. The statement by Hyvärinen did not convey as much trust in the state as the one by Jomppanen.\textsuperscript{84} (In international venues, as well, the monopoly of the Sami conferences was challenged by the end of the 1960s: The Sami younger generation and students from Oulu University held a second Nordic youth conference in Inari in 1969, with Odd-Mathis Hætta as a representative from Norway.\textsuperscript{85})

What about identity politics, then? In his study based on interviews with 334 Sami individuals in Finland, Erkki Asp noticed an emerging “tribe-orientation” among the

\textsuperscript{79} Jernsletten 1997, 288-289.
\textsuperscript{80} Aikio 1984, 36; Lehtola 2000b, 194; see a petition to pay attention to the condition of the forests of Lapland by the SfPLC, Čuvgehusearvist tahapatuvvam, Sabmelaš 3/1971.
\textsuperscript{81} For an example of the old rights claims, see Paadar, Isakki: Samii vuogiadvuodain, Sabmelaš 3/1968.
\textsuperscript{82} Palto 1973, 9, 11.
\textsuperscript{83} Lehtola 2005a, 17.
\textsuperscript{85} Sabmelaš 3/1969, Ratka! – keässeg?
dominant, integrating vein.\textsuperscript{86} In 1966 Susanna Valkeapää, who was not introduced in the newspaper, was quoted as saying that “moving from Lapp hut (kota, Lavvo) to house is the beginning of the end for the Lapp tribe”. Fixed settlement had caused the old Sami “order of living” (“elämänjärjestys”) to degenerate. Valkeapää saw teaching the Sami language as a possible way of saving the Sami way of life from degenerating on contact with Western modernity.\textsuperscript{87} The “Lapp tribe” was obviously in the process of losing its cultural core and had begun to construct its own ideas of authenticity. Adopting strict reindeer nomad imagery entailed making the movement more exclusive. This exclusiveness backfired; the intra-ethnic testing of the new ethnic borders and the intensive incorporation of the Sami under strict categories failed in Finland,\textsuperscript{88} as we shall see.

A firmer foundation of victim representation occurred. Sami representations of history and national politics became more radicalized and the matter of colonization was addressed (this theme will be discussed later in the thesis). The Norwegianization policy was mentioned in a negative light in \textit{Lapin Kansa} for the first time in 1970.\textsuperscript{89} The SPFLC raised settlement history as a problem, where settlers of Finnish origin had “conquered the best lands” and caused economic distress to the Sami. The distress was deepened by a lack of societal consciousness among the Sami and neglect on the part of the state, which was evident in the non-existence of supportive political measures. The future of a developing and independent Sami culture was at stake. The Sami were a marginalized minority, living in difficult conditions, who had been forced to give up their history. Because of this retreat and lack of consciousness, they had become passive. A new, emerging mobilization was greeted with pleasure.\textsuperscript{90}

Oula Aikio constructed a victim representation of the Skolt Sami and other Sami people in 1968: they were vulnerable people, basing their subsistence on means of living that were based on nature. In addition, the Sami had been stripped from their rights. Aikio mentioned the reservoir and the regulation of Lake Inari as further violations of Sami rights.\textsuperscript{91} This self-representation was radical compared to earlier examples (see Chapter 4.3.6 on reservoirs), as Aikio connected the greater vulnerability of Sami culture and identity to their dependence on nature. Thus, violations of nature became violations of the Sami. Using the same kind of rhetoric, Jouni Kitti began his campaign, relating to Sami culture, building

\begin{footnotes}
\item[86] LK 3.7.1965, “Miten Suomen saamelaiset käsitävät tilanteensa”.
\item[87] LK 13.7.1966, Saamelaiskysymys tallä hetkellä.
\item[88] Gaski L. 2000, 92, 95-96; Stordahl 1996, 82-83.
\item[89] LK 27.2.1970, Saamelaissuus ‘pinnalla’ Norjassa, Asenteet muuttuneet täydellisesti.
\item[90] LK 11.5.1967, Lapin Sivistysseura: Saamelaisten taloudellinen tilanne pahenee jatkuvasti.
\end{footnotes}
ethnic borders and challenging numerous actors, both local and national. In the writings of Kitti, some themes are consistent: the Sami representation is one of a people obtaining (most of) their livelihood from traditional means of living, based on nature. The Sami are also oppressed and the resource base of their livelihood is weakened by loggings, hydropower projects and the bodies responsible for industrial land use forms in Upper Lapland. By the beginning of the 1970s, a new feature is accusing the local Finnish population of compromising and corrupting the old Sami rights.  

As a short conclusion to the question of the inclusiveness of the new representational strategies, the essentializing strategies and radicalism of Kitti were not widely shared in the Sami community. In particular the hostility towards modernization expressed by Kitti was problematical for the Sami opting into a modern way of life. Kitti pondered the pros and cons of building a road to Angeli in his article in Sabmelaš in 1971, where forestry was represented as harmful to reindeer herding (in Paadarskaidi) and to other traditional means of living. Tourists would reach distant lakes via the road. The state of Finland was tapping Sami resources and destroying pastures, either though loggings or by drowning them under reservoirs. Kitti entered into a long debate on the consequences of modernity to remote Sami areas: he saw the conservation of nature as a guarantee of sustaining the traditional means of living. In the sources I have gone through there are numerous indications that the local people and the reindeer-herding co-operative saw the road as essential for the village. Kitti represented, quite alone, the most progressive nature conservation thinking in Inari, but his criticism of forestry provided an example for many other activists in years to come. It also meant that the horizons of expectancy remained backward-looking.

The “ecologization” of Sami statements and identity politics, most coherent in the thinking of Oula Aikio and Jouni Kitti, has, in part, its national roots in the increasing consciousness and exhaustive media coverage of environmental issues in Finland during the 1960s. The nature conservation movement was one of the non-party-politically organized alternative movements and there were a series of environmental issues, such as concern over toxic waste, that penetrated the Finnish public sphere. For example, the Finnish political parties came up with environmental programmes, and the environmental administration was beginning to be organized anew in the late 1960s. This breakthrough marks a growing

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91 LK 4.9.1968, Oula Aikio: Saamelaisten ja kolttien ongelmat.
international, national and local disbelief with regard to industrialization and modernization, the motor of which in Finnish imagery was the timber industry. Finnish discussion concentrated to a great extent on conservation and the use of the forests, a matter that concerned the Sami as well, though the latter were mostly by-passed in the discussion of the ecological soundness of silvicultural means. The environmentalist discourse became more exhaustive than many others in the Finnish public sphere, because it challenged the most dominant discourse: that of the welfare brought about by the timber industry. The environmentalist discourse challenged the very basis of the industrialist discourse: the timber industry was not producing welfare – on the contrary, the timber industry was undermining the welfare of the people by exhausting the ecological base, both for the industry itself and for the rest of humankind, by over-using and polluting natural resources.  

5.5. Explaining the renaissance

Samuli Aikio attributed the new Sami mobilization during the late 1960s solely to the assimilative pressure that had grown up as contact with the majority had increased through the improved road and communication contacts. In addition, the state had tightened its grip through schools and economic life, to which the Sami had reacted strongly. According to Aikio, there was no longer any possibility of living totally outside the state system, and there was a compelling need for collective action. While we can acknowledge the experience of increased assimilation pressure as an immediate factor, it is doubtful that this was the only reason. In addition to the mono-causality of this explanation, Aikio speaks with a voice of a Sami activist and exaggerates the binding force of the ethnic awakening – it was there, but so was the prevailing passivity and the opting-in movement with regard to modernity. Matti Morottaja additionally attributes this mobilization to the perceived majority threat, and constructs even longer roots for the Sami movement, stressing the threat to Sami culture from the resettlement era onwards.

Anna-Riitta Lindgren emphasizes the Sami thinking on democracy: the Sami demanded to be treated as equal citizens, which resulted in demands for “advanced democracy”, pluralism and multilingualism, which in turn meant respecting the Sami right to

95 Nyyssönen 2000, 249-251.
97 Aikio 1984, 36-37.
their culture. The Finnish principle of individual equality was challenged with demands for cultural integrity and securing equal rights for groups of people. Such argumentation and interpretation of equality was already being expressed in the 1940s in Norway, for example by Per Fokstad. On the Finnish side, a growing disbelief in ethnocentric modernization, and the emerging risk society posed by environmental threats, paved the way for ideas of pluralism. Lindgren also stresses the activity and innovation of the Sami studying outside the Sami area during the late 1960s and early 1970s, both for the Sami renaissance and for the birth of an urban Sami culture in Finland. This explanation captures many sides of the process but in my view, and in the light of the sources I have gone through, it seems as though Lindgren over-exaggerates the change in equality thinking: it was not as thorough as Lindgren states. Lindgren is right to raise this factor as a partial explanation, though.

As far as democracy is concerned, the inspiration from the radical currents of that time is evident and the growing political engagement of the Sami younger generation in the Nordic countries is highlighted by Regnors Jernsletten. Whether the generation gap was as deep as Jernsletten implies, with reference to the older generations captured by the social democratic welfare project, is hard to estimate. There was a greater variation on both sides of the generation gap than is stated by Jernsletten.

Veli-Pekka Lehtola has explained the renaissance on many occasions. Usually he connects the Sami renaissance to the cultural sphere, where a re-evaluation of Sami cultural markers, yoik and handicrafts was undertaken and a rise in cultural activity took place. Lehtola connects the renaissance to the global awakening of the minorities. According to Lehtola, the renaissance was a product of the introduction of the new Sami intelligentsia and Sami arts, literature and culture, which reflected new, more radical attitudes. Sami radicalism clung increasingly to its own cultural modes, as well as to the modes adapted from other radicalized “Finnish” or international contexts. Indeed, the whole Sami way of speech – the Sami discourse – changed in the course of the 1960s, as I have explained. In that sense, the Sami renaissance was part of the radical political activity of that era. Lehtola also stresses the role of Sami modernization in the awakening: the Sami had entered the modern society, there was a rise in the level of education and standards of living, a technologization of the means of living and better means of communication to the outside world, all of which had

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98 Morottaja 1984, 329.
100 Jernsletten 1997, 282, 288.
101 Lehtola 2002b, 70.
broken the village-based Sami identity. There was a new space for building a common and “general” Sami identity, striving for greater inclusiveness. There was also a new kind of political space in which to build oppositional and exclusive Sami identities, as in the case of JS. As a more immediate reason for the Sami renaissance, Lehtola sees the renaissance as a reaction on the part of the younger generation to the assimilative tendencies of the post-war Sami community and its abandonment of Sami culture.

Anna-Riitta Lindgren points out that, by comparison with other Sami generations, the “dormitory generation” (in this presentation, the second generation), which had encountered the strongest assimilation, linguistic and otherwise, turned out to be the most radical. The generation that followed them found themselves in a more pluralistic society, with an already revitalized ethnic identity where there was not such a strong need for a radical “resisting identity”. Indeed, the aims of JS and the Susanna Valkeapää quotation reflect such attitudes.

Even though both Lindgren (“the City Sami”) and Lehtola (Sami authors and culture as a whole) stress the role of their research informants and/or objects in their explanation of the renaissance, their explanations are valid in their multi-causality and their way of seeing the context not as one of overarching “colonization” but as a more open, pluralistic process. As explained earlier, all the Sami venues became radicalized, which may be an indication that the Sami renaissance was not an overwhelmingly cultural movement, as Lehtola stresses. I should like to bring two features into the discussion here: traditionalism in Sami statements, and the way in which the Sami were actually building a higher boundary along intra-ethnic generation lines, rather than along ethnic borders against Finnish society.

Some theorists explain the ethnic awakening as a retreat from or denial of modernization/globalization, modernity and the multiculturalism of the time, in the same way that fundamentalists do. At least on a rhetorical level, the Sami renaissance was indeed a traditionalistic, ideologically anti-modernist movement, or, as Stuart Hall writes, a movement practising defensive identifications by returning to ethnic absolutism in its construction of “primordial” counter-ethnicities. However, traditionalism or a “return to the local” and the celebrated revival of a spiritual and emotional relationship with the land are not the only options when ethnic minorities are exposed to “foreign” impulses and policies that are perceived as hostile. In the Sami community in Finland, there was no extensive “opt-out”

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103 See also Aikio-Puoskari 2002, 98-99; Lehtola 1997c, 7, 57, 70; Lehtola 1999c, 22.
104 Lehtola 2002b, 70.
movement. This type of explanation has been criticized because it reproduces the strict and unsuccessful dichotomies between pre-modern/modern by offering the pre-modern or disappearance of the minority identities as the only suitable option. Awakening can be a dynamic process, where ethnicity is more fragmented and constitutes only part of the identity. The Sami identity-building very closely resembles the hybrid strategies of “translation” (Hall, with reference to Homi Bhabha), where a return to tradition is not the only option. Identity markers can and must be chosen more freely over and above natural borders. In the case of the Sami in Finland, the markers chosen were sometimes “purist” and “primordial”, but also those of ecological threat and of being agents of sustainability. The environmentalist discourse, from which markers were partly chosen, was a global discourse, which cut right across the ethnic and national borders of identification. It was still a competing discourse with the option of “tradition” and it contained a strong “primordial”, backward-looking element. In addition, critical attitudes to modernization effectively hindered constructions of forward-looking horizons of expectation.

The generation gap and the power struggle between the pre-war generation and the younger, “baby boom generation” has been used to explain Finnish radicalism (see the discussion of Finnish radicalism, above). There are clear indications of such tendencies in Sami statements as well, and I take this to be a more successful partial explanation of the awakening than the “opt-out” movement. Renouncing the value of the work of the previous generation was a typical strategy in cultural radicalism, adopted, for example, by Heikki Lukkari. The identification with Finnish discourses that had been undertaken by the “first” generation was also strongly criticized. The empowerment occurred in organizational matters (see Chapter 5.2 and 6.3.2) and in the field of identity politics. Rather, the highly purist, traditionalist and exclusive reindeer-herding imagery may be seen as an effort to reclaim the power of definition from both the first generation – which, from the point of view of the JS generation, had “sold out” – and from the state and majority, at which the more hostile offensive was aimed.

On closer examination, the challenge set by the new, exclusive JS representation was more radical across the intra-ethnic boundary. For a start, the reindeer-herding imagery reorganized the Sami ethnic, imagined community, since SL had previously depicted itself as a representative for a not-very-closely-defined general Saminess. Secondly, the Enontekiö reindeer Sami, practising the last remnants of a nomadic way life, in practice also represented

a totally different set of needs, which SL obviously could not fulfil. The new intra-ethnic border managed to be exclusive, not positive and shared, as had been the ideal,\textsuperscript{107} and there was no central body, unlike in Norway, where young radicals could gather forces.\textsuperscript{108} An act of de-legitimization occurred in the intra-ethnic field. The inter-ethnic process was more complex: a representational act of demonizing, empowerment and opt-out occurred. As far as the majority society was concerned, the borders were closed in hostility and increasingly radical demands were made. The Sami renaissance definitely resulted in empowerment for certain parts of the Sami community and a throwing-out of the old, accommodating attitude. Iisko Sara stretched this vein of thought furthest in his thoughts on Sami cosmopolitanism. This was an opt-out strategy since, for an individual who was in fact a Sami and a Nordic/Scandinavian citizen, there was no option other than assimilation into the majority cultures, as “the Sami are by nature flexible and prone to influence”. Instead of nationalism, national modes of thought and tribal sentiments, the Sami had to aim higher, to cosmopolitanism, which Sara does not define more closely than stating that it already existed in other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{109}

5.6. A comparison with the Sami movement in Norway

During the 1950s in Norway, according to Harald Eidheim, there occurred a re-assessment of the “self-depreciating self-understanding, which the majority/situation had forced upon the Sami population.” The Sami viewed themselves as a people with equal rights. The picture that Harald Eidheim offers, of an ethnopoliitical awakening during the 1950s and 1960s, is one of a shared, yet elite-bound awakening that, at its height in the 1970s, contributed to the organization of knowledge on a global scale in the permanent contact that the (Norwegian) Sami established with indigenous peoples’ organizations. Eidheim claims that the aboriginalization of Sami ethnopoliitics, representing the Sami as indigenous people, was conventionalized in the 1980s in Norway, and only after that did it become a contested idea and self-representation within the Sami society in Norway.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{107} See Stordahl 1996, 82-83.
\textsuperscript{108} Drivenes and Jernsletten 1994, 268.
\textsuperscript{109} Sara, Iisko: Aate ja ihminen, Kaltio 4/1966.
\textsuperscript{110} Eidheim 1995, 76-77; Compare Minde 2003b, 102-105, where the grass-roots notion on global impulses is presented as more questioned and problematical, and respect for global organization as low.
In Finland, the development appeared to be much the same. Equal rights were demanded, but the aboriginalization, appearing in this phase as a rhetoric of “tradition”, radicalized the demands. In Finland the conflict was immediate: following the aboriginalization of self-representation from the late 1960s onwards it appeared as a generational conflict, but the conflict was not about the status of indigenous people. This is because, for example, the status of first-comer had not been denied in Finland (before the 1990s) and was a known fact among the Sami themselves. In addition, Finnish activists have been reluctant to boast about their contribution to international discourses, even though they were active in this respect.

A conflict arose in Norway on ways of expressing identity and the way in which Sami cultural markers were incorporated into these expressions. The Norwegian ČSV generation, living its youth during the 1960s and 1970s and launching the Sami renaissance, was very eager to revive traditional Sami cultural markers and take back everything that had been taken away from them, to “take command over their destiny” and claim an equal position in relation to the Norwegians. In Norway, land and water rights issues were raised and a better society, Sápmi, was desired. In Finland, the discourse about a better society had not yet been introduced to Finnish Sami discourses and there were not yet any references to Sápmi in Finnish public sphere. In addition, although the ideal society among the Norwegian Sami was equal and self-governing, according to the ideals received from international agreements and struggles in Third and Fourth World countries, it seems that the Sami movement in Finland was beginning to choose other markers, looking back to an ecologically sound, self-sustaining Sami society. This was mostly a rhetorical tool, used to display Finnish penetration in a bad light; as I have already stated, ecological imagery was poorly suited to constructing forward-looking horizons of expectation.

Another difference in Finland was the level of stigmatization of cultural markers: there was not as strong a need to revive yoik, gákti or reindeer herding – these were not stigmatized in the public sphere of Lapland in the same way as had been the case in the

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111 Sápmi is both a contested and a celebrated term. Recently, it has been celebrated as a (primordial, newly-emerged) sign of transnational ethnic, cultural and geographical fellowship of the Sami, whereas many scientists refer to its constructed, recent, anachronistic and political nature. Sápmi is indeed an “imagined community”, used to bargain statuses and rights. The historical legitimacy for a shared Sami nationality and culture has been denied by referring to the local organization of Sami societies and their great cultural variety. Berg 2004, passim; Eriksson 2002, passim.

112 Minde 2003b, 99.

113 Yoik was seen as sinful by Laestadian believers, so an intra-Sami revitalization of yoik took longer. Saamelaiskulttuuritoimikunnan mietintö 1985:66, 67-68; Valkeapää 1971, 61; Sápmelaš 1-3/1989, Makkár lea sámiid boahdteáigí?
circumstances of the Norwegianization policy. The stigmatization of Saminess was seldom
given as a reason for moving out of the Sami areas, as was the case in Norway. According
to Tim Ingold, the Skolt Sami of Sevettijärvi did not migrate to avoid zones of stigma, but rather
because of the attraction of zones of opportunity.\textsuperscript{114} In the census on Sami demographics in
Finland, carried out from 1962, where a command over Sami language and one’s own opinion
as to whether one felt one belonged to the Sami people were established as criteria, 78% answered that they were Sami, whilst only 2% answered that they were not.\textsuperscript{115} In the same
way as in Norway, identification with majority cultural modes and markers, which had been
undertaken by the earlier generation, was criticized but, as we have seen, this identification
was far from being exhaustive, as had allegedly been the case among the Sami in Norway. In
Finland, it was the poor results and the wrongly-directed policies of the earlier Sami
movement, rather than the non-existence of policies, that was criticized. This was because
Sami ethnicity had already, strictly speaking, been invented, revived and politicized by the
“first generation” in Finland. The “second generation” did not “invent” Saminess, but took
things further; they did not get to start things from Norwegianized scratch. This struggle
proceeded on two fronts, against the majority society and the older generation (this factor was
shared with the Norwegian process). The difference was that resistance on the intra-Sami
front was stronger than on the inter-ethnic front, where the discourse of equal rights as
citizens reigned that renounced the alleged oppression of the Sami, and where occasional
paternalistic expressions of goodwill were practised.\textsuperscript{116} However, I cannot make
generalizations concerning attitudes among the Sami, only concerning the scope and level of
intention of the stigmatization practised by the state.

The same paradox was evident in both Finland and Norway: the external world was
perceived as a threat to Saminess (landownership was perceived as Finnish, modernization
was demonized), but it was entered by the “second” activist generation and by more or less

\textsuperscript{114} Drivenes and Jernsletten 1994, 259; compare Ingold 1976, 12, 79-80, 126-127, 191. Ingold mentions
degrading perceptions of the Skolt Sami on three occasions. Firstly in an ethnocentric, anthropometric research
project by the Scandinavian International Biological Programme – Human Adaptability Section that perceived
the Skolt Sami as childlike and irrational. This research enjoyed, according to Ingold, very low legitimacy
among the Skolt Sami themselves. Secondly in conflict-ridden herding co-operative matters, where heated
disputes were reciprocal and eventually led to the establishment of the Skolt Sami’s own co-operative. Thirdly in
connection with Norwegian male youths coming to Sevettijärvi for sexual purposes. Stigmatization and victim
representations of the Skolt Sami are denounced by Ingold as politicizing in the self-promoting and pompous
writings of “M”; see also on causes for migration Lindgren 2000, 87-89.

\textsuperscript{115} The census did not cover the numerous Sami living outside the Sami home area, so the picture given of
the sense of belonging may be overtly positive. Lehtola 2000b, 187-188; Kii lēa sabmelš samist? Sabmelaš 6-7/1968.

\textsuperscript{116} On cultural side of the Norwegian awakening, see Drivenes and Jernsletten 1994, 268-269; Stordahl 1996,
83-88; Stordahl 1997a, 143-145.
the whole of Sami society. It also seems that an “essentializing” notion of the potential for a shared Sami identity was shared between Finland and Norway, which led to a later crisis in internal discussions concerning the Sami identity. Nor did ethnic incorporation in Northern Norway, which was undertaken as a project to overcome Norwegianization by claiming a shared Sami identity, totally manage to overcome the quarrelling and smooth out the exclusiveness of the collective Sami identities. NSR, for example, has been a site of heated debates.

5.7. Conclusions

The late 1960s was marked by radicalizing imagery that became increasingly exclusive and bound Saminess closer to nature. This process reached many sections of the grass-roots level as well. Radicalized and more exclusive self-representations were made in relation to the state of Finland, but also and especially in intra-ethnic fields, as a response to the political modesty of the “first” generation. There was a reaction to erroneous premises and aims (“modernization improves the living conditions of the Sami”) and to integrated modernization rhetoric. The first generation was perceived as having not truly worked for the Sami good. The Sami renaissance was, to a great extent, a process of claiming power from the older Sami generation that was undertaken by the younger generation. Saminess and the needs of the Sami were defined anew, and clinging onto Sami traditions emerged as an option.

Having said this, there were voices opposed to the increasingly primordializing imagery. “A group of young Skolts” wrote a letter to the editor in Lapin Kansa in June 1967, commenting on a plan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about moving the Skolt Sami back to their old areas, which were now in the Soviet Union. The younger generation of the Skolt Sami no longer spoke either Russian or Skolt Sami, nor did they possess the old reindeer-herding skills, nor access to the existing herding community. They already had an education and a place elsewhere in society. Whether it is possible to move a whole nation should be asked of the Skolt Sami themselves, who were no longer nomads or a fishing people. This was not the only exception to self-imagery becoming more primordial. There

117 Compare Stordahl 1997a, 148-149.
118 Drivenes and Jernsletten 1994, 265.
119 LK 22.6.1967, “Joukko nuoria koltia”: Koltaheimon siirtohankkeet; this statement may be a response to the initiative that Matti Sverloff had made to the Finland-Soviet Union Association (Suomi-Neuvostoliittoseura). Sverloff proposed that the old Suonikylä area should be rented to the Skolt Sami as pasture land. LK 23.8.1967,
were critical voices about decision-making and politics being based on assumptions that all Sami were reindeer herders, and a group of Sami demanded a more conciliatory policy on the part of the Sami towards the Finnish society.

It has become typical to present the Sami history of the late 1960s in a positive manner, as a revitalization of the Sami culture and a reclaiming of political space and power. This was another aspect of the Sami history of the 1960s, in which an empowerment of the “dormitory generation” occurred. The Saminess was revitalized, but in part using the tools of the majority: exposing the generation gap and adapting new, critical modes of speech that concentrated on societal issues, which were foreign to the older generation. In Finland, another process was the continuing process, stemming from the 1950s, of a growing gap between primordializing self-imagery and a more conciliatory modernizing Sami imagery. This gap continued to widen during the 1960s and reached its limit in the quarrels across the generation gap during the late 1960s. The Sami renaissance was undertaken by an already factioned Sami society. In addition, many of the new self-representations were partial efforts: in many cases they were intended for specific parts of Sami society (for example, “the landless Sami of Enontekiö”). Efforts to build an inclusive, collective Sami identity were not successful.

The gap between the generations was also wide in terms of the qualifiers concerning national status: as the SL sustained the statuses of “national minority” and “free (Finnish, J.N.) citizen”, both of which signified direct inclusion within the national whole, this kind of inclusion was frowned upon by the young radicals. The “minority nationality”, used for example by Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, also implied belonging to the national whole, but it additionally implied political, social and economic marginality, and blamed the including nation for this. The international status had still not broken through, but there was a firmer grounding for and wider use of the term “Sami people”, with an explicit sense of separateness.

Kolttien elämän turvaamisesta lausunto maatalousministeriölle; the Skolt Sami regions suffered from extremely high unemployment and the younger Skolt Sami were moving out. The rise in the standard of education was also mentioned by the aforementioned research group doing a study on the Skolt Sami “living in primitive conditions”. There were only a few “primitive Sami” left, so the research group had to hurry to study them. LK 11.8.1967, Kolttatutkimuksen kohteena tänään Kesäni Ivalon-Virtaniemen alue; in general, the representation of the Skolt Sami society in Sevettijärvi became more matter-of-fact after the road connection was finally established in 1969: the bargaining for the road stopped and the modernizing, yet emptying village, with its own local government, Sobbar, was revealed. See LK 10.10.1969, “Sobbar” – kolttien kyläkokous and LK 16.10.1969, Raskas oli eräänä mäennän päivätöö kolttamökissä.

See also Asp 1966, 84-85, according to whom 24.3 % of the Sami had reindeer breeding as their main occupation; LK 30.8.1967, Mast lea ñaizdak I.

Lehtola 1997b, 48-49.
Different aspects of economic and political modernization, out of which the Sami modernity and renaissance grew, increased the gap between and within the local Sami communities and the ethnopolitical elite. These gaps, resulting from different policies towards them (obtaining employment/denouncing them as hostile to the Sami culture), were never really bridged. The gap was also widened by two strategies in the elite identity politics: demonizing modernization and ecologizing the movement and Saminess. These strategies created stable and backward-looking agencies that could not be used to build positive horizons of expectancy. The modern Sami exits the representative field.
6. Changes in the Sami Political Space During the 1970s: Internationalization and Institutionalization

6.1. Introduction

This chapter charts the changes that took place in the institutional setting of the Sami political space during the early 1970s. The Sami movement became internationalized and acquired major impulses from the globalized indigenous peoples’ movement. In Finland there were great hopes that the new Sami committee would resolve Sami issues, and work was carried out for the national Sami organization. The partly unexpected outcome of this was the establishment of the Sami Delegation in 1973, the first Sami Parliament in the Nordic countries and an institutionalization of the Sami movement. These two developments resulted in a simultaneous opening-up of the movement to global forums, as well as a closer proximity to national politics as an integral part of the Finnish administrative and political hierarchies. In this chapter I shall examine how the political space changed and which venue – the national or the global – was perceived as the more important by the Sami. The way in which the movement coped with the fragmentation of their political space in their identity politics is the theme of the chapters that follow the one about to begin.

6.2. Internationalization: entering the indigenous peoples’ movement

Leif Rantala, secretary of the Nordic Sami Council, has explained the Sami involvement in the indigenous peoples’ movement as coinciding with a growing awareness of their own status and position. The perception of common problems facing the “Fourth World”, concerning nature, culture, economy, subsistence and self-determination, was an influencing factor.¹ The Finnish Sami may have been informed about the initial phases of the international indigenous peoples’ movement from the unofficial contacts with indigenous peoples’ organizations that the Sami in Norway had during the early 1970s. There were some indications of global indigenous consciousness during the late 1960s, but public discussion among the Sami about joining the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) was not comprehensive. At any rate, the Nordic Sami all became affiliated to the emerging global

¹ Rantala 1984, 93-96.
indigenous NGOs simultaneously. What also seems to be a common feature of the international organization of the Sami was that it was an undertaking on the part of the younger, radical generation who were seeking organizations that were sufficiently radical compared to the old, established ones. The Finnish Sami were not as active in the founding phases of the WCIP, where initial contacts were established between George Manuel and his staff at the National Indian Brotherhood, Aslak Nils Sara (with whom Nils-Aslak Valkeapää had studied in Oslo²) and Tomas Cramér.³

The first sign of a new global bond in the Finnish public sphere emerged in June 1972, when Samuli Aikio and Kaarlo E. Klemola (representing the SfPLC and Forest and Park Service) participated in the Environment Forum, which was a shadow meeting of the UN conference on environmental conservation in Stockholm. Present were Sami from Sweden and Norway, as well as representatives from two Indian tribes from North America, among them George Manuel, who met Aslak Nils Sara on the trip. One of the themes was the right of a minority people to their own culture, and the Indian participants compared the Sami situation to their own. There were many parallels: both of the minorities were oppressed, their resources had been tapped and their land polluted. Neither of the minorities aimed to dominate nature, but rather to live in harmony with it. The consequences of logging and the Lokka Reservoir were presented in a photo exhibition at the forum, which enjoyed wide coverage in the Finnish public sphere.⁴ The self-representation of the Sami as an ecologically sustainable people was beginning to be more widely cultivated as a result of these growing contacts.⁵

The first meeting of indigenous peoples’ organizations with Finnish Sami participation took place at the Arctic Peoples’ Conference in Copenhagen in November 1973. The Finnish Sami who were present, Pekka Aikio, Sulo Aikio, Oula Näkkäläjärvi and Nils Henrik Valkeapää, were all from the second generation. Pekka Aikio and Nils-Henrik Valkeapää are quoted as saying that they had no trouble feeling a sense of brotherhood with the other Arctic peoples, since they were connected by the same kind of problems.⁶ One of the themes of the conference was to find a definition of the indigenous people and the indigenous identity. Pekka Aikio talked about “original inhabitants”, Tomas Cramér about “national indigenous

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² LK 20.9.1967, Oslossa asuu noin pari sataa saamelaista.
⁴ The issues dealt with in the conference were pollution, and demographical and ecological problems facing developing countries. Leino-Kaukiainen 1997, 201-202; Minde 2003b, 101; LK 13.6.1972, Aikio ja Klemola saamelaisten puolestapuhujana; Sabmelaš 3-4/1972, Pirasforum.
⁵ See, for example, Sulo Aikio in LK 10.6.1971, Valtakunnallinen keskusjärjestö välttämätön saamelaiskysymyksissä.
⁶ Lehtola 1997b, 50.
minorities”, while Aslak Nils Sara used the term “autochthonous peoples”. The last-mentioned term ended up in the resolution, which stressed the integral and firm connection between the autochthonous identity and the lands and domiciles of the people. The term also possesses the potential for use in both kinds of representational strategies – those building on legal strategies and those building on primordial imagery and discourses. The demands in the first resolution constructed the indigenous, or autochthonous, peoples as legal claimants: they had to be acknowledged as equal with the dominant cultures, and the indigenous peoples’ collective ownership of their domiciles had to be recognized as well.

Pekka Aikio utilized both strategies in his lecture: “Even today the Lapps still get their main income in livelihoods closely connected with nature.” He continued by pointing to the work of the Sami committee: “The draft law on Lapp affairs includes regulations that secure the position of these tradings”, and implicitly pointed to the representation of a Sami lacking full rights in the context of the nation-state of Finland. The legitimation for these rights was the status of the Sami as “original inhabitants of their area”. It is significant that Aikio talks in the context of Finland, which reflects the positivity prevalent at that time concerning the ongoing work of the “Lapp Committee”. A Fourth World discourse was non-existent in the speech; Aikio actually referred to the rights situation in the Nordic countries as exemplary and corresponding to Sami law (which never in fact came into being), as followed by the Sami in Finland. The indigenous identity was used to legitimize the “indisputable” rights to resources in the area explicitly, but the contexts that were referred to reflect the difficulties in throwing themselves into Fourth World discourses.

The first meeting of the newly-established WCIP, with Aslak Nils Sara on the founding committee, took place in Port Alberni, Canada in November 1975. The Sami conference in 1974 had chosen Pekka Lukkari, Nils-Aslak Valkeapää and Esko Palonoja as Sami representatives for Finland.

After the first World Conference, a discussion followed as to which body, if any, should represent the Nordic Sami. The Nordic Sami Council was chosen, in order to get away from nationally-based representation. Even though the Sami were credited with supporting the new organization, it failed to live up to the expectations of unity set by George Manuel.

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7 Compare Paine 1984, 212-213. Paine defines the autochthonous peoples in relation to the majority peoples in the context of colonized first-comer domiciles within the nation-states (a legal potential). The autochthonous people are colonized and marginalized, and yet keeping alive their own particular cultures and identities.

8 The archive of Professor Henry Minde, programme and lectures from the Arctic Peoples’ Conference, Copenhagen 1973, lecture “A report on Lapp Committee work in Finland” by Pekka Aikio, lecture “Sámi Institut`ta, Kautokeino” by Aslak Nils Sara and lecture “National Indigenous Minorities” by Tomas Cramér.

9 Minde 2000b, 34.
addition to quarrels over the policies practised and the levels of co-operation with suspicious majority governments, it was found that colonization, which had encapsulated the indigenous people into the frame-work and interests of nation-states and marginality, was not an exclusively unifying experience. Radical Indian groups set out to form a more successful NGO, the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) in 1974, which created a long-lasting tension between the Latin and North American groups. The Sami in Nordic countries were partly suspicious of the benefits of international action.10

The discourse of indigenousness itself and the perception of the Sami as part of the world’s indigenous community led to difficulties in efforts to accommodate the Sami within the “Fourth World”. The first aspect was their culture, which had been modernized and taken up “Finnish” modes and markers. Two strategies were chosen: either that of demanding a return to the traditional way of life, or that of perceiving Sami culture as evolving and therefore viewing traditionalist tendencies as unwanted or representing majority actions. Both of these strategies were backed up by a notion of the destructiveness of modernization towards an indigenous culture and livelihood, which were based on preserving and respecting nature. The second difficulty was history: even a superficial reading of the violent and racist history of contact and colonization in the “New World” demonstrated that the fate of the Sami in Finland was not, comparatively speaking, as cruel. During the 1970s, Sami activists witnessed the difficulties and persecution of indigenous organizations in various South American countries while participating in WCIP congresses.

The third problem concerned doubts on the part of the other indigenous groups. The Sami had trouble getting access to the organization, since their status as indigenous people, despite a wide, including definition, was suspected on the grounds of their “lacking” a colonial history and of the Sami being “white and rich”. The yoik of Nils-Aslak Valkeapää is credited with obtaining access to the Fourth World, as well as the historical overview by Helge Kleivan from the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). On a later occasion, Nils-Aslak Valkeapää could rejoice: “Everybody recognized that we were not white.” To overcome this problem of identity categories and internal scepticism, the Finnish Sami sometimes used the same argument as the Norwegians: staying in the organization represented an act of solidarity towards indigenous people with harsher destinies, as well as

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safeguarding their own interests. The common features of having a distinctive, marginalized culture, their own language and an absence of power were highlighted.\textsuperscript{11}

The fourth problem was in fulfilling the discourse of unity that was prevalent in indigenous co-operation, for example in the statements of the first chairman, George Manuel. WCIP practised an ideal of non-nation-bound, non-class-based, unifying indigenous policy, which was a hard thing to accomplish throughout the relatively short existence of this organization. All the participants, including the Sami in Finland, were many times more deeply involved in their own national bargaining processes.\textsuperscript{12} The Finnish Sami had just entered a long-lasting and deeply disunifying dispute over water district boundaries (see Chapter 5.3). Especially in Utsjoki, this process was marked by continuing disputes between the Badjeolbmot (reindeer-herding Sami living in the mountains who did not own land), the Cahceolbmot (river Sami who practised fishing and agriculture in fixed settlements by the River Teno) and the non-landowning Sami from Enontekiö. Landownership, or rather discrepancies concerning the property rights situation and alleged modes of landownership, were thus an influencing factor not only in ethnopolitics but also in everyday life and subsistence, since fishing rights were connected to the estate one owned. The water district boundary triggered a latent class division between the Sami living in fixed settlements and the nomadic Sami.\textsuperscript{13}

“Statism” had shown its silent power by forcing the Sami to appear as landowners after the Finnish model, in an effort to safeguard their rights to water and fishing. This happened before the change in thinking introduced by research on judicial history (see the following chapters). This resulted in a clear break from identity politics claiming collective rights and positive discrimination for the “landless Sami”, which was a legitimate policy in the eyes of progressive sections of the public sphere as well. The dispute had a dispersing effect on Sami ethnopolitics since, in addition, some of the most exclusive nomadic Sami authenticity rhetoric obtained a legitimization of the dichotomy between the Badjeolbmot and the Cahceolbmot. The split also reflected the work of the Sami Delegation. The drafting of Sami policy and consequent expectations of unanimity were especially hard to achieve during this period.

\textsuperscript{11} Archive of Professor Henry Minde: interview with Rodrigo Contreras, interviewer Henry Minde, 13.9.1999; Minde 1995b, 9; Minde 2000a, 35-37; Rantala 1984, 94, 96; Seurujärvi-Kari 1994, 172-177, 180; on the vast body of literature on the colonization of the “New World” see, for example, Wright 1992, passim.

\textsuperscript{12} Archive of Professor Henry Minde: interview with Rodrigo Contreras, interviewer Henry Minde, 13.9.1999.

\textsuperscript{13} Saamelaiskomitean mietintö, 1973:46, Liite: Tutkimusraportit, 238; Palitto 1973, 17; Saressalo 1982, 64, 100.
In the Sami community there was scepticism towards Sami activism as a whole, as well as towards international co-operation; a rift was emerging between the radical young, intellectual Sami and the public-minded, conservative vein of thought, and this was evident in Norway as well.  

I have encountered a few traces of the discussion concerning internationalization. Claims of practising ethnopolitics in a solely Nordic context are mentioned in *Sabmelaš*, without reference to the origin of the critique. The most evident example, for instance in the water district boundary dispute, emanated from the older generation (of landowning Sami in Utsjoki), who were mostly worried about securing fishing rights and scornful of “Marxism” and the radicalism of the younger generation.

In spite of this scepticism, the significance of the global co-operation has been reckoned to be great. Henry Minde credits the WCIP for Norway’s change in attitude and the declaration of the Norwegian Sami as indigenous peoples, and points to two future presidents of Sami Parliaments, Ole Henrik Magga and Pekka Aikio, being involved in international forums. Irja Seurujärvi-Kari raised the negotiations on the Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous People as the most important issue. The global indigenous network provided the Sami with access to the UN and to the renegotiating process of the ILO conventions, resulting in ILO Convention 169. There is no doubt that the concentration on land rights issues influenced Sami ethnopolitics and identity politics in Finland. The claim of landownership was to become dominant in Sami discussions and claims, where there was still an emphasis on immemorial usage rights and adherence to the status of a national minority, yet an ongoing shift to the status of indigenousness. The notion of an equality that had to be based on a development from their own premises also influenced the Sami movement.

*Sabmelaš* became a media outlet for indigenous co-operation, where identifications were voiced of first-comers to lands in common use who nevertheless lacked rights. Sami culture and subsistence forms were represented as part of nature. The experience of a lack of borders between participants at the WCIP conferences was celebrated and the periodical advocated collective rights to land and waters. Globally-shared problems were introduced to
the Sami discourse through media coverage of the movement: indigenous nations were vanishing, suffering from racism and from political, economical and social problems, in some cases greater than those experienced in Lapland. The demands that the WCIP made at the beginning of its existence, for more extensive rights to natural resources and access to land management, were easily agreed upon. Rhetoric of unity in the global struggle was voiced through *Sabmelaš*. The difficulties experienced in entering the movement were not reported.20

This marks the beginning of a paradigm change in Sami identity politics. It was part of the indigenous use of global rights discourse and litigation processes. The native reaction to the Canadian Federal Government’s White Paper (1969) has been mentioned as being inspirational to Sami resistance. The White Paper aimed to dismantle special legislation and treatment for the native tribes of Canada by establishing standards of (formal) equality and “non-discrimination” in the relationship between the natives and the new liberal Trudeau government. Direct participation, equitable treatment, and honouring the special rights and grievances concerning lands and resources were demanded from the native side. In addition, a nativist cultural re-awakening occurred that stressed cultural uniqueness. In the USA, under conditions of outright racism, the Red Power movement took action and many tribes reasserted their claims to their ancestral lands and resource use, and made claims for self-government and autonomy. In the USA, indigenous lawyers were pioneers in litigation processes against the majority as early as the 1960s. Many Sami activists were inspired by this struggle, which was communicated through personal contacts at the conferences and through literature.21

This empowering new discourse resulted in coherence for the new generation, as well as transformations in identity political claims. The new global bond called for a sustaining of “primordial”, radical imagery, whereas the paradigm change towards landownership claims entailed the beginning of a long process of disengagement from identity politics based on primordial imagery. The need for a firmer legal foundation for rights claims was demanded. Here, the radicalizing global brotherhood of indigenousness was beginning to emerge as problematic for the Sami in Finland, especially in relation to the question of landownership in the past, which, in the case of some indigenous communities, was denounced as unknown. The quest for a firmer foundation took almost two decades and there were always more radical, more “primordial” identity politics pursued alongside this quest, as we shall see.

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6.3. The institutionalization of Sami politics: central organization or Sami Parliament?

6.3.1. The preliminary work and identity politics of the Sami Committee

When the Sami Committee was nominated, Sami activists believed that this body was a compromise, set up in order to avoid the enactment of a special Sami Law, which was being discussed at the time.\(^{22}\) Granting the Sami a committee, which would, again, have no actual results, was seen as an easier solution than awarding the Sami special status and special treatment based on legislation. When the Reindeer Estate Law (porotilalaki) was passed, similar doubts were expressed: this was intended as a substitute for the Sami Law. The radical Sami believed that the committee had been set up in order to check the increasing power of the Sami radicals, and that there had been fears of secessionism on the part of government officials. This was denied by Paavo Väyrynen, then a secretary to the Prime Minister and active in the process. Later on the positivity increased;\(^{23}\) this will be examined in later sections of this chapter.

The task of the Sami Consultative Committee in 1973 was to give an account of the economic, social, cultural and judicial status of the Sami. The chairman of the committee was Asko Oinas from the provincial government of Lapland. The Sami members of the committee were teachers Nils Henrik Valkeapää and Isko Sara; spokesman for the Skolt Sami, Matti Sverlof; a student, Pekka Aikio (the secretary of the committee); and reindeer herders Oula Aikio, Uula A. Länsmann and Aslak Magga. As permanent experts, the Committee also heard from Oula näkkäläjärvi and another teacher, Pekka Lukkari. Comparing the membership and the grievances in the committee report of 1952, there had been an almost total shift in personnel and a radicalization of the demands, while the issues that were to be taken up had remained the same. The Sami criterion was widened by extending the home-language requirement to grandparents. The status claimed reflects the incomplete process of claiming the status of indigenous people: “The Sami are the original population of our land…”, but they were also an inter-Nordic, politically mobilized minority with a sense of mutual association. Self-representation was sharpened for a (colonized) people living under the threat

\(^{22}\) In everyday Sami understanding, the Sami Law was meant to settle the landownership question in the Sami home area. Lehtola 1997b, 92.
\(^{23}\) Lehtola 2005a, 28-29.
of assimilation, since the “Finnicization politics” of the 1950s had threatened Sami livelihoods. The colonialism rhetoric was strongest in the landownership and forestry question: the logging carried out by Forest and Park Service diminished pasturelands in the Sami home area, the Sami did not gain anything from the loggings and the efficient means of forestry impoverished the pastures. Land rights rhetoric had entered the report, as well as a representation of the Sami having insufficient rights. The report was linked to ideas of equal rights, falling short of “citizens plus” thinking: the problem was that the similar rights enjoyed by each citizen of Finland had not materialized in the case of the Sami. Reindeer herding as a cultural marker was in decline. Its significance was still great, but it had evolved from a way of life into a livelihood. It was considered a mechanized, modernizing and expanding means of living that was threatened by Western means of living. The Committee ensured that the Sami had the right to enter other professions as well. Compared to a slightly earlier committee report on Sami education (1971), the status had changed. The committee of 1971 used the status of a “racial, linguistic and cultural minority”, with no reference to indigenousness or first-comer status. The aim of the committee was to provide “true equality between Sami and Finnish pupils”.

This professional, pragmatic and modernizing vein in the work of the Sami Consultative Committee took the sharpest edge off self-representation. The criticism of viewing reindeer herding as the (only) material basis for Sami culture was already being discussed in Finland at this point, and this influenced the committee. The report was written just before the breakthrough in the status of indigenousness and clarification of the Sami status. The first-comer status was clear, and the state ownership of “land areas in Sami use” was denied. Curiously, the radical imagery of that era was used to take the edge off land rights claims: the old concept among the Sami that these areas belonged to the Sami was expressed, but the report hastened to add that this “belonging” was not perceived as landownership. Immemorial usage rights to waters were expressed. In one sense, the report is coherent: the change in and difficulties of Sami subsistence were due to external, Finnish encroachment. The report utilized numerous markers: the Sami were living socially and

culturally on the borderline between tradition and modernity, but the majority encroachment had broken “the Sami culture’s firm connectedness to the ecosystem of nature”. 26

The report recommended the adoption of a Sami law, recognizing and codifying the status of the Sami as an indigenous people with their own land base. A linguistic criterion was set on Sami identity, but Saminess was also categorized by territorial and subsistence practices: a special Sami homeland area would be established to protect Sami resource rights and reindeer herding. The Sami language would receive special status and a Sami assembly would be established to represent Sami collective interests. 27 Of all these topical discourses, the colonized Sami self-representation was the one used most consistently. The colonization imagery was constructed through the demonization of the majority land-use forms. The claims had been radicalized and become broader, so using a clear identity policy might not have been possible. The significance of the report is discussed in the chapters that follow, but it may be mentioned at this stage that the Sami home area, consisting of the three northernmost municipalities and the reindeer-herding co-operative of Lappi in Sodankylä, was established according to the wishes of the Sami Committee 28. With regard to status, the tribe was abandoned and the judicially clearer and more binding status of a minority and original population was introduced.

6.3.2. The unfulfilled hopes of the central organization

In addition to the Sami Committee and global networking, a third venue for advocating the Sami cause existed in efforts to establish a central organization, in the same manner as the Sami had done in Norway and Sweden. The voices lobbying for a more efficient promotion of the Sami cause and for a central, national Sami organization were numerous. The general frustration at the slow progress in minority politics at a national level may be mentioned as an early impetus. 29 In the mid-1960s there was an attempt to resolve this deadlock through inter-Nordic Sami co-operation via national sub-organizations. This never came about, for reasons

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28 Goldschmidt 1994, 81.
29 This frustration was a cause of the establishment of NSR in Norway. Goldschmidt 1994, 47-48; the hopes attached to the Sami representation on the inter-governmental board established by the Nordic Council on Sami and reindeer herding issues may also qualify as an early attempt to solve the ineffectiveness of minority policy. See Sabmelaš 1-2/1964, Sabmelašaššii tikšum; Sabmelaš 7-8/1965, Meärretidolaš sabmelažzaai poahttevuoda kalggadeäbmi.
unknown, but at least the organizational will and effort were there. The whole Tana conference of 1965 had concentrated on this matter. Erkki Asp gave a lecture at a Sami seminar in June 1971, in which he demanded a more consistent and organized Sami policy, led by a central Sami organization. Until now, Sami issues had been dealt with by various organizations in a random manner. The internal Sami pressure for this establishment was decisive. Oula Nääkkäläjärvi linked the need for such an organization to an increasing doubt among the Sami concerning the legitimacy of the landownership rights situation and the need to reclaim ownership rights.

Sabmelaš, with Samuli Aikio and Pekka Sammallahti as editors, advocated a central organization on the basis of the need for efficiency, official procedures and a centralized body to voice demands that would improve the Sami condition. Nils-Aslak Valkeapää and Oula Nääkkäläjärvi were the most audible advocates of a central organization. Pekka Aikio also seems to have been an advocate of the national organization, since this need was expressed at the founding meeting of the Sami Association of Sodankylä, to which Aikio was elected as chairman. This effort met with Sami opposition that feared the organization would stir up controversy against the Finnish society. A conciliatory policy towards the majority was called for. The first meeting took place during Sami Culture Week in Rovaniemi, on 27 February 1971. Representatives were present from sixteen out of forty Sami organizations, varying from the municipality of Utsjoki to JS, and from the small-holder association in Nuorgam to the SFPLC. SL was not represented and the meeting rejected a proposal to change the SL rules and turn the old “organization of the Sami” into a new national one. The meeting concluded that SL had not become a national Sami association, “due to long distances to the meetings”, so a totally new association was needed. The meeting stated that the association was

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33 Nääkkäläjärvi is quoted at length in Lehtola 2005a, 25-26.
35 Valkeapää 1971, 81.
36 Sabmelaš 2/1971, Odda sabmelašseärvi.
37 Lehtola 1997b, 49.
38 The Culture Week was organized by Finnish organizations such as Kalevala Society (Kalevalaseura), the Provincial Union/Federation of Lapland (Lapin maakuntaliitto) and The Finnish Association for Local Culture and Heritage (Kotisituliitto). Other organizations are mentioned as well, but it remains unclear whether there were any Sami bodies among the organizers. LK 3.2.1971, Saamelaiskulttuurin viikko 21-28.2.1971; LK 20.2.1971, Saamelaisviikolla 21.2.-28.2. keskustelua, juhlia, näyttelyitä.
important and must be established immediately. Matters concerning the regulations were also discussed.\textsuperscript{39}

SL resisted this proposal and before the meeting, on 25 February 1971, a letter to the editor was published in \textit{Lapin Kansa} from Toivo Suomenrinne, a member of SL from Sodankylä. Suomenrinne lobbied against the proposal to establish a central organization, and elevated SL as such. The letter reveals an evident fear within SL of losing power over Sami matters – the proposal was labelled a majority undertaking, claiming power in the “social field”. The knowledge that SL possessed concerning the “pulse of the nature of the Sami tribe” was highlighted by Suomenrinne. The Finnish state, and collective Sami bargaining through SL, would guarantee Sami rights through existing bodies and procedures.\textsuperscript{40}

A rare debate began some weeks after this meeting. Johan Nuorgam from SL, trying to denounce its representativity, labelled the proposal an undertaking by Sami “radicals” from Enontekiö. He linked the proposal to reindeer herding in Enontekiö, where the herders had allegedly tried to take over pastures from Inari. He denounced plans for a Sami Ombudsman (who would be independent of state bodies and state control, for which he said there was no real need) and a central association (“the Sami cannot afford one”). A Sami Parliament, supported by the state, led by the Governor of Lapland and in receipt of funding from the state would be a more suitable solution. Nuorgam disapproved of the “coup” by radicals that had occurred on Sami radio. In this very complex text, two things are most evident. Firstly, for Nuorgam, the enemy was the “radicals” from Enontekiö, and secondly, a state-controlled body was needed to keep this element in check. He referred to the association as an “unknown road”.\textsuperscript{41} The “first generation” still relied on the Finnish state, and from their point of view, the intra-ethnic demarcation line was the more conflict-ridden. The self-representative strategy was to dispute the alleged threats that faced the Sami society. It has been mentioned that a number of Utsjoki Sami also resisted this idea and feared that the central organization would become only a reindeer-herding organization.\textsuperscript{42}

Jouni Kitti responded to Nuorgam and began his text by constructing an image of a Sami culture living in a vulnerable ecosystem that was threatened by the majority society and industrialized land-use forms. The rights to the threatened resources had to be secured by the central organization, which was also supported by the Sami younger generation in Inari.


\textsuperscript{40} Suomenrinne, Toivo: Saamelaisille – Sabmelaccaidi, LK 25.2.1971.

\textsuperscript{41} Nuorgam, Johan: Saamelaisasian nykytilanne, LK 11.3.1971.

\textsuperscript{42} Paltto 1973, 105.
according to Kitti. Disregarding their special rights would lead to undesirable acculturation, rather than development from their own Sami premises. Kitti called for education in the traditional Sami means of living and organized resistance to the loggings that threatened the pastures. Means of living and the Sami wealth – the land and the waters – both had to be secured. The Sami portrayed by Kitti were threatened, yet active people.\(^{43}\)

In his highly ironic text, Nils-Aslak Valkeapää blamed Nuorgam for lying. Central association was a precondition for taking care of Sami matters, not for finishing the Sami museum (which was an SL undertaking at the time, J.N.). Valkeapää concluded by demanding a more unifying Sami policy.\(^{44}\) Oula Aikio denounced the positive imagery used by Nuorgam: Sami subsistence was threatened by the majority. He also disapproved of the conciliatory, fearful attitude on the part of Nuorgam and SL towards majority institutions. Many of the “radical” Sami constructed boundaries by demonizing both SL and the majority land-use forms, especially forestry, which threatened the Sami “gaining most of their livelihood from traditional means of living”, as represented by Oula Aikio.\(^{45}\) Sulo Aikio from Sami Radio also attacked both Nuorgam and the majority institution, Lapin Kansa, which had taken Nuorgam’s side in this matter and presented his views as being widely shared by the Sami.\(^{46}\) Iisko Sara posed a strong critique of the position of thankful object from which Nuorgam was writing. Sara stressed the opposite: the Sami could take care of their own issues and did not need to be thankful for the goodwill of the majority. There were Sami who possessed a higher education than that of the Governor of Lapland, who Nuorgam hoped would be president of the future Sami Parliament. Sara lobbied for a more independent position as a citizen and he revealed most clearly the difference in attitude between the Sami generations.\(^{47}\)

Lehtola claims that the idea of a Sami Parliament was “picked up” from what Nuorgam had written. The letter Nuorgam had sent to the Advisory Council on Sami Affairs, suggesting the establishment of Parliament, is proof of his initiative. Nuorgam’s idea was forgotten by the Council for a half a year. Nuorgam would have advocated his idea in order to curb the idea of a central organization. Reidar Suomenrinne and Paavo Väyrynen were also lobbying for the Sami Committee, at the same time as ideas of a Sami Assembly were also

\(^{46}\) Lehtola 2005a, 28; Aikio, Sulo: Vihdoinkin arvostelua, LK 16.3.1971.
\(^{47}\) Sara, Iisko: Selvyyttä saamelaisasioihin, LK 19.3.1971.
being considered. The source material I have used does not credit the establishment of a parliament to Nuorgam. Indirect proof of Nuorgam’s key role is that it was only Sara who referred to the Sami Parliament when the critics lobbied for a central organization. The model of the parliament that Nuorgam drafted was unacceptable to the radicals, since it was integrated with Finnish institutions. There is also the question of whether there was any subsequent, internal discussion on this matter to which my source material does not extend.

The Sami continued to work to establish a central organization parallel with the Sami Committee, which was now active and had proposed the establishment of a parliament immediately after its inauguration. When the preliminary work on the regulations relating to the central organization was finished, a new meeting gathered in Inari on 19-20 September 1971. Oula Nääkkäläjärvi acted as the chairman of the meeting and JS was the convener. Suoma Samii Riihikaseärvi (SSRS; the organization has no English name, but translates as “The Sami Association of Finland”) was established on 20 September 1971, with an unexpectedly narrow margin of support. Forty associations had been invited, thirteen associations participated in the meeting and eventually six of them, four of which were herding co-operatives, signed the founding documents. Enontekiö-based organizations were dominant among the founding members, while SL had not sent a delegate. Oula Nääkkäläjärvi was elected as chairman of the organization, Reidar Suomenrinne as vice chairman and Nils Henrik Valkeapää as secretary. The Skolt Sami joined the organization. The aims of the organization were to secure economic, administrative, social and cultural rights, and take care of Sami issues in national and international arenas. Of the most topical issues, the water district boundary issue and the cultural programme of the Sami in the Nordic co-operation were mentioned (global indigenous co-operation was not mentioned). Lapin Kansa welcomed the organization, but expressed concern about the narrow margin of support and the use of Sami language in the documents (it would be too difficult to establish co-operation if all the documents had to be translated from Sami to Finnish). The need for such an organization in public relations terms, to spread correct information about the Sami, was

48 Lehtola 2005a, 28, 168.
49 Lehtola 2005a, 31.
50 LK 19.9.1971, Saamelaisten keskusjärjestö perustetaan tänään Inarissa.
51 Tim Ingold uses the grass-roots Skolt Sami ambivalence to the central organization as proof of his claim of distance between the protagonists of the ethnic movement and the grass-roots, as well as the failure of easily-recognisable “M” to act as a legitimate representative of the Skolt Sami. Ingold is right, at least regarding the central organization: it was an elite undertaking. Ingold 1976, 213-221, 240-241.
evident, although the editorial pointed out the difficulties in establishing a similar Finnish national organization.\textsuperscript{53}

The organization held a meeting in December 1971\textsuperscript{54} and was mentioned in the committee’s report of 1973\textsuperscript{55}, but the central organization was never active. Lehtola credits the “failure” to establish a central Sami organization to the establishment of the Sami “experimental” Parliament (Koeparlamentti), which was able to take care of Sami matters. Already, the trial election, proposed by the committee in 1972, re-directed Sami enthusiasm and inflated the idea of a central committee. The Sami Delegation was the second major outcome of the work of the Sami Committee.\textsuperscript{56} Ludger Müller-Wille perceives the reason for failure to be political modernization, and the consequent variability in political orientation, as well as competition for state funding and power among the state bodies.\textsuperscript{57} The outburst provoked by Nuorgam sharpened intra-ethnic divisions, without a doubt, and the intra-ethnic and generational demarcations almost dominated the debate. I am inclined to emphasize, in the same manner as Lehtola\textsuperscript{58}, the rupture of the plans and the need to revise the whole project following the introduction of the optional plan of a Sami Parliament. Müller-Wille’s explanation grasps many sides of the matter, but it entertains a rigid horizon of expectancy and does not grant the actors the possibility of re-orientating their goals, as apparently became necessary after the failure to mobilize most of the Sami within the central organization.

When the establishment of a national Sami body failed, the expectation of uniformity that had been entertained by the majority in the 1970s led to accusations of internal disputes.\textsuperscript{59} This reaction demonstrated the paternalistic undertone of the stereotypical counter-imagery and the traps in the romanticizing imagery, with its expectations of pre-modern solidarity. The counter-imagery was suspicious of and hostile towards Sami capabilities for a short while.

\section{6.3.3. The Sami Delegation is established}

The setting-up of the Sami Committee and the establishment of the Sami Delegation in the same year has been taken as a sign of the changed attitude towards minorities in Finnish
However, an equivalent change of attitude was not apparent in the minority policy of Finland. To begin with, the Parliament was stripped of its power for fear of its encroachment upon the equality paradigm of the nation. The Delegation had restricted powers, exclusively the right of initiation and only an advisory mandate, with no true nominating rights or sanction of statute, and no control over the funding or disbursement to the people they represented, making it the weakest of the Scandinavian Diggis (this situation has changed since a change in legislation and the establishment of the Sami Diggi in 1995). This was a disappointment to many Finnish Sami. Already, in the Committee’s preliminary phase, decision-making powers were demanded for the Parliament, but these were denied, fearing the establishment of an autonomous, regional governmental entity that would check the rights of other groups. Among those institutions that resisted were Forest and Park Service, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education and the municipality of Enontekiö. The Parliament was replaced by a Delegation, which had no jurisdiction, self-governmental status or rights. Continuing complaints about the poor funding of the Parliament began at the first meeting of the Delegation. According to radical criticism, both the self-governing governmental organization (GO) and the minority were thus “encapsulated” in a complex web of institutions, rules and regulations determined by the dominant society.

In the trial election of 1972 a teacher, Elias Aikio from Inari, was elected with the highest poll of 130 votes, whereas female candidates reached only deputy seats in the first Parliament. The first Parliament was dominated by reindeer herders (eight) and teachers (six). Reidar Suomenrinne was the first chairman, but he was lost in a plane accident in Bodø later the same year, together with Parliament representatives Jouni Aikio, Arto Sverloff and Jouni J. West. Matti Sverloff, another vote-puller in the trial elections, was chosen as the replacement chairman.
The Sami Parliament convened unofficially on a number of occasions in 1972. The Finnish Government established the Delegation by decree on 9 November 1973. The Delegation was authorized to make statements and take initiatives in land use and nature conservation issues, as well as in hunting, fishing, reindeer herding and Sami school issues. Once established, the Sami Delegation, the highest advisory body on Sami issues, was accepted by the Sami as the institution taking over the work of the Consultative Committee because the Parliament was introduced as the body taking over the preparation of the Sami Law, and it actually organized meetings of the Committee. However, great hopes were soon attached to the Delegation and the official status it possessed in securing Sami rights.

The Parliament was set up in such a way as to shun the Finnish political and spatial organization: the municipal and party-political organization of politics was scorned by the young radicals. The secretary of the Sami Committee, Seppo Anttila, expressed concern over the regional representativeness of the new body. This was secured by relying on personal votes, by banning electoral pacts and by not establishing the municipalities as electoral districts. Each municipality had a minimum quota of three representatives in a Parliament of twenty members.

This anti-party-political aspect was introduced to the Delegation from an early stage as well. The ethnopoltics of the Sami Delegation were to be a clear Sami policy, shared by the whole group. The Delegation practised majority-democracy voting. Language divisions, formerly taken as a sign of diversion, were under-communicated. Party politics were not desirable: they would create a dependency on the outside society, influence politics and hinder the achievement of goals. Instead, the majority bodies were to be influenced and made to support the Sami cause. In addition, Sami affairs were perceived by the Sami as official, administrative issues, advocated in the ministries and not in political venues. Sami issues were perceived as so important that tactics on voting and personal disputes were to be kept outside, whilst in practice it was a parliament, in the sense that it was a forum for political factions and debates as well. The intra-ethnic divisions, along the generation gap, for

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64 Mynnti 1997, 81–82.
65 Sabmelaš 6-7/1974, Odda sameparlamenta jienastuvvo poahtte jägi.
66 Lehtola 2005a, 37.
67 Sabmelaš 3-4/1972, Jienastit!
71 LK 1.3.1971, Prof Erkki Asp Inarissa: Erikielisyys hajoittaa saamenkansan yhtenäisyyttä.
example, affected the Sami Delegation and were taken eagerly as a sign of the Sami being incapable of governing themselves in a number of majority statements. One talked about “kuntat” and “gánddat”, the “municipal men” and the “boys”, divided by age and frames of reference: the “municipal men” had political experience, for example in municipal government, most notably Erkki Jompanen and Uula Guttorm from Utsjoki, while the educated “young boys” wanted to witness the birth of ethnically-based Sami politics. Modesty and compliance with Sami rights were also dividing factors.  

Amongst other things, the Sami renaissance resulted in empowerment for Sami women in the Sami society, as well as in society as a whole. The voice of Sami women was heard, especially in the field of literature, and Kirsti Paltto began to appear in the public sphere. It has been stated that before this, Sami women were marginalized in three ways: as Sami, as women, and as Sami women. However, gender issues were taken up in the Sami movement only in the late 1970s and Sami feminism emerged in the 1980s. Whether this delay was in part due to the institutionalized expectation and imagery of the intra-ethnic solidarity is, in my view, a possibility.

Kinship became an influential factor in the election of candidates. In the organization of the Diggi, there was a flavour of a “direct democracy”, with grass-roots relationships with the members. In practice, the municipality from which the member was elected was a decisive factor for the Delegation, but the “boys” and, indeed, younger women as well began to gain a stronger foothold in the Delegation from the elections of 1975 onwards. The first years of the Delegation were marked by attempts to set procedures in place, a certain inefficiency and long meetings. This aroused criticism: JS demanded stronger co-operation between the different Sami associations to overcome the ineffectiveness of the Delegation. The identity politics were influenced by Matti Sverloff (see Chapter 7.2.2), a Skolt Sami politician with a background in sobbar as well as in the Labour movement. In 1978, at the Arjeplog conference, Pekka Aikio was forced to admit that the Sami Delegation had not managed to define a clear Sami policy. In the Sami public sphere, the Sami Delegation was sometimes


73 See in more detail the notion of the role of women in Sami society in Hirvonen 1999, 18, 40, 90, 100, 202, 217, 242. Hirvonen perceives the old attitudes against girls’ schooling and Laestadianism as hindrances for the emancipation of Sami women in a quite patriarchal Sami society.  

74 KA, The archive of SiPLC, letters received, JS to other Sami organizations 31.5.1974.
referred to as a “secret society”, with poor publicity within Sami society. The Delegation itself blamed this on a lack of PR personnel and funding.75

Long distances were still a hindering factor for efficient action on the part of the Delegation, as the representatives had to pay for transport costs themselves: these were not subsidized by the state. The action taken by the Delegation was predominantly reactive, in the form of statements about initiatives taken elsewhere. One field of activity was international activity (in a Nordic context), but this never became as important as other fields: Sami rights, the Sami means of living and cultural and educational activities. National orientation was also practised in the project of getting the state to legislate a special Sami Law, re-introducing the Lapp village system as the legal claimant. Due to this, politics were addressed in national, rather than international forums and the international branch was turned into a social and health branch in 1978.76 The possibility of deeper internationalization was lost, as the central organization never came about. Following the establishment of the national Sami Parliaments, the Sami Council took over global co-operation, after a period of seeking its own role.77

6.4. Conclusions

The national political forums were prioritized over the global brother- and sisterhood. This was done out of necessity, as the institutional setting forced the Sami to concentrate on bargaining in national forums. In addition, the higher status of a democratically-elected body guided the prioritization and increased the legitimacy of the Delegation. A vote from the Sami people compelled the representatives to make serious efforts to work for the Sami cause. An analysis of the pros and cons has also been made: what is revealing is the way in which the legitimacy of the Sami Delegation was sometimes constructed through its official status in

75 Pekka Aikio’s presentation on the Finnish Sami Delegation in the Samernas X konferens, Arjeplog 20-22.1978, Nordisk Sameråd, Hangö 1979; the Sami Digg in Norway had a different aim, in seeking to gather the Sami under a representative umbrella: this was meant as a political forum for internal dialogue, not as a forum for expressing unity and under-communicating internal division, like the “Finnish” Parliament. Nevertheless, both parliaments have become forums of inner division and intra-ethnic contestation. Goldschmidt 1994, 41; kinship is said to have been an influential factor in election behaviour among the Sami in Norway as well. Hovland 2000, 169; Lehtola 2005a, 43, 52, 63; Sabmelaš 3/1983, Sámi Parlaameantta vålgat bokhite čavčča.
77 Henriksen 1999, 29-30.
Finnish administrative hierarchies. There was more to be gained here, and the national institutions enjoyed higher status and higher legitimacy than those of the semi-official international co-operative channels.

This inclusion within the national frame is also visible in the status strived after. The status used in the Sami committee report, one of (indigenous) minority, was more feasible and suitable for the new position in the political hierarchies than the polito-romantic “tribe”, which now implied global, rather than the “primordial” Finnish-national brotherhood. In addition, the national(istic) tribe-rhetoric was one of the old pre-war dogmas loathed by the new radical generation. The minority concept appeared judicially binding, and the status with which most effectively to bargain rights from the state.

Having said this, access to the UN processes of negotiating the conventions on indigenous rights had a profound long-term effect on Sami politics. This was a later development, however, which really began to dominate ethnopolitics only in the late 1980s. In addition, the status that was sought was still unclear, as we saw on the chapter on the Sami Committee – it would still be a while before the potential of the global indigenous identity was grasped by the Sami elite in Finland. During the earliest phase of global co-operation the cultural markers of the indigenous community, which were popular at the time, were chosen and attempts were made to use them within the national frame. This is the theme of the next chapter.

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7. The Era of Exclusive “Natural People” Self-Representations and Fragmented Identity Politics (the 1970s)

7.1. Introduction

As institutionalization has been carried out and internationalization has begun, it is time to view the changes of self-representational strategies at different levels. This chapter will chart two contradictory changes that took place in Sami identity politics. After a short look at the political and economical context and the counter-imagery, the identity politics of the Sami Delegation will be studied first, while the freer forums will be studied later on. Markers were chosen from the global indigenous movement and attempts were made to incorporate these in identity politics in national forums. The 1970s was marked by radicalizing “natural people” imagery and a growing dissatisfaction with this among the elite. There was an effort to streamline identity politics with a more legalistic approach, but the other side of the global indigenous discourse – seeing Saminess in relation to nature – was not totally replaced.

7.1.1. The political and economic context

The “progressive” ideological atmosphere of the 1970s, as well as a new phase in the Cold War, marked by “bilateral” blame for the violation of internal human rights, somewhat eased the access of indigenous NGOs, for example in the UN system. The rights had not yet been implemented.\(^1\) The prevailing image of the “progressive” 1970s in Finland is one of political uniformity around the figure of President Kekkonen and a dogmatic and friendly relationship with the Soviet Union. The era is also remembered for the ultra-conformist politics and organizational modes of the radical left. On closer examination, the 1970s is marked by a growing variety and diversity in political contexts. A growing differentiation in Finnish society meant that class position was no longer decisive for political views or voting behaviour.\(^2\) The 1970s were also, in Lapland and elsewhere in Finland, an era of blooming regionalism and regional identities.\(^3\) The rights of the minorities were an issue in Finnish political culture, where defending the weaker and speaking from an oppositional stance was a

\(^1\) Minde 2000b, 234; Minde 2002, 67.
\(^2\) Kontula 2004, 238.
\(^3\) Suopajärvi 1999, 16-17.
strong and popular position. State-boundedness was still dominant; this was evident in the welfare project, which was, in retrospect, reaching perfection. This had consequences for the national discourses of equality and citizenship, which still went hand in hand.

There were important changes in the environmental discourse as well, adding up to the “progressive” image of the era. Modern environmental consciousness was introduced in the early 1970s, shifting the focus of academic nature conservation for the purposes of science to the problems of human intervention and the use/protection of the environment. Modern environmental consciousness resulted in the politicization of nature conservation issues, which, from being merely ecological and ethical issues, were now also considered as social and political issues. Coupling a concern over the disappearance of untouched nature and an increasing concern over the destiny of humankind made the new movement desirable and accessible to the people. Natural resources had to be protected in order that life should go on – human connectedness to surviving nature replaced a belief in technological progress, at least in parts of the public sphere. The environmentalist discourse had practical consequences, with the environmental administration becoming more exhaustive and an increasing number of grass-roots movements reacting to local environmental damage, especially at the end of the 1970s. With regard to the continued opting-in to the national project of growth in the personal and household economy that was occupying people in general, there was also the introduction of new formal and informal actors in environmental issues, which made the political space and fields of representation very fluid. The Sami were among the new ecological claimants, acting in both informal and formal venues.

In the province of Lapland, this era was marked by national investment through the regional policy, inspired by the “great move”, which led to a temporary and steep decline in the population of Lapland. The regional policy launched to cope with this population loss was based on the welfare state project and old-fashioned equality thinking. Each Laplander was to have equal opportunity and access to the welfare services, which employed an increasing number of women, Sami and Finns alike. The public sphere in Lapland and Inari was dominated by talk of unemployment.

In Inari, parallel developments occurred concerning emigration and modernization. Services were growing, whereas agriculture and industry were in decline. Reindeer herding

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remained the most vital branch of agriculture, although it had its own fluctuations and there was a steep decline in stocks in Inari during the early 1970s. The periodic nature of logging resulted in the combination of seasonal and structural unemployment. The local discourses were thus critical and concerned about unemployment. This resulted in the domination of class-based interests, as well as clinging on to the national project of building a welfare state. Ethnic-based projects were of secondary importance, although not yet openly questioned by the ethnic Finns.

Sami issues were advocated, with actual results. The Sami were beginning to gain access to organizations concerning decisions that affected them: in 1969 an exclusively Sami working group was nominated, working under the art committee of the province of Lapland. Among the members were Pekka Aikio and Tuomas Magga, representing the younger student generation. Sami kristalas nuoraskuvla continued to be an institute sustaining Sami identity markers, or at least Sami handcrafts. Sabmelaš and Vuovjoš continued their campaign of advocating for the Sami languages. There were gradual improvements to the school system and all the Sami languages spoken in Finland experienced a revitalization during the 1970s, when there was a noticeable increase in language cultivation, following a dramatic decrease during the 1950s. A Sami ABC primer by Siiri Magga was published in 1968. Education in Sami language and culture at undergraduate level started in 1970 at the University of Oulu. The first teacher was Helvi Nuorgam-Poutasuo. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was used in Finland in education language discussions and was credited for the nomination of a working group to research the situation in the schools in the

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9 LK 26.3.1969, Saamelaiskulttuurin koordinointi työryhmäle.
10 See, for example, LK 5.5.1971, Kansanpiston työ päätti Inarissa.
11 Sabmelaš 1/1971, Kulturtiella vâi i? The article was an angry reaction to a study by Tore Modeén, where he denounced the Sami minority status on the basis that the status required a “cultural language”. According to Modeén, Sami, lacking a literary tradition, was not such a language and thus the Sami did not qualify as a minority. The case is a not uncommon example of research being condemned by the Sami as harmful and inaccurate; the language issue remained topical throughout the 1970s. See Holmberg, Veikko: Čoahkkingiella, Vuovjoš 2/1978.
12 See on this change of attitude Asp 1966, 34; language of education was the first sector where the Nordic states “gave in” and significantly improved education in the Sami language, especially in Finland from the late 1970s onwards. Pääkkönen 1995, 100.
13 Helander 1993, 33; during the early 1970s, worried reports about the poor command of the Sami language were numerous. There was a great regional variety in the use of the Sami language, which the older generation was more eager to use than their children, who had gone through the Finnish school system. Kii leä sabmelaš samist? Sabmelaš 6-7/1968; LK 6.9.1970, Kirkkohera Antero Niva: Saamenkielisen vähemmistön sielunhoidon mahdollisuuksista.
During the 1970s, the yoik was lifted from the oblivion into which this tradition had fallen during the post-war years, when people “dared not” yoik. Sami Radio is credited with this revitalization. A Sami-speaking teacher was appointed to the first and second classes in Enontekiö in 1971 and a special course in Sami could be taken in schools in Inari. A reader in the Sami language, Lohkamusak, was compiled by Pekka Lukkari and published in 1972 by the SFPLC. Later that same year, a Skolt Sami ABC primer came out. Sápmelaš Duodjarat, a central organization for handicrafts, was established in 1975. Identity politics were pursued in various forums, such as the correct ethnonym of the Skolt/Sääem, correcting translations of Sami placenames, and in handicrafts, where the distribution of authentic Sami products and control over this trade was required. A new pan-Sami forum, Sami instituhta, was established in Kautokeino in 1973 and a politico-cultural association, Mii, was established in 1974 for Sami living outside the Sami home area.

7.2. Sami identity politics in the 1970s

7.2.1. Counter-imagery

In most cases, the Sami were represented in a matter-of-fact manner, pointing to their diversity and the various occupations the Sami had taken up, in the public sphere in Lapland. The Sami were in the midst of change and modernization, which had to be accepted as part of contemporary Sami culture. According to the most enlightened views, presented for example by Erkki Asp, the right to identification and the choice of cultural markers was left to the Sami themselves. The right of the Sami to choose modernization and/or learn the Sami language, for example, was stressed in a new way, reflecting ideas of

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17 Lehtola 1997b, 56-57.


19 LK 28.3.1972, Saamenkielen lukukirja valmistumisvaiheessa.


22 LK 28.3.1972, Kolitta-sana ei kerro totuutta - tilalle SÄÄEM.

23 This was an inter-Nordic effort, undertaken by a committee nominated at the Jällivaara conference. LK 18.4.1972, Saamenkielisä paikannimiä käännetty väärin.

24 LK 25.2.1971, Saamelaiskäsittöille kaivataan laaduntarkkailuorganisaatioita.

25 Mii was active until the beginning of the 1980s. Lindgren 2000, 101-102; Sabmelaš 4-5/1974, Odda sameseärväy - Mii.


cultural pluralism during this period. This seems to have been the case in forums of self-representation as well: the same kind of recommendations of “desirable” cultural markers as SL had made in the 1940s and 1950s were now sometimes questioned by the Sami.28

Alongside these matter-of-fact representations there are two detectable traits in the counter-imagery of this era. Firstly, there was a wide vernacular cultivation of the rhetoric of a dying and vanishing Sami culture. Sameness was something that had to be kept alive, and yet which was developing in a confusing way.29 Sometimes this confusion was expressed in demands that the Sami should be checked from obtaining Finnish livelihoods by supporting and educating Sami in reindeer herding, hunting and fishing.30 The Sami were lagging behind the development of the rest of the society, in the same way as the Romany people. Erkki Jomppanen took the opportunity of listing Sami occupations in 1970 to prove this kind of imagery wrong.31 In addition, the vernacular imagery seems to have cultivated reindeer-herding imagery. Samuli Aikio, at least, described such imagery as inaccurate in 1971, by remarking that even if reindeer herding did sustain “Lappishness”, it was practised by only a minority of the Sami.32

Secondly, the stereotypical, idealized and primordial indigenousness was introduced to counter-imagery. One sustained marker that ended up in the Sami Cultural Committee report (1985), for example, was of the Sami not having any perception of landownership.33 The core of the Sami problem was that they had never aimed for landownership, but only the use of the land, wrote Armi Harju in 1971. Earlier on, the Sami would have been represented as being incapable of landownership. This element of Finnish imagery was well-meaning and romanticizing.34 The Sami also began to appear as agents of ecological sustainability. The Sami practised means of living that were based on nature and did not harm nature, as the Minister for Social Affairs and Health, Anna-Lisa Tieko, stated in 1971.35 In research, too, especially in the natural and social sciences, the first signs of a new ecological paradigm began to emerge. This new trend was applied to anthropology, for example, where negative stereotypes were replaced by an understanding of indigenous rationality and sustainable life-forms. Sami adaptation was represented as a success in an unfruitful natural environment.

28 LK 3.3.1971, Toimikunta tutkimusmatkalla saamelaisten kouluasioissa.
29 See, for example, LK 6.9.1970, Kirkkohera Antero Niva: Saamenkielisen vähemmistön sielunhoidon mahdollisuuksista.
30 Eino Siuruanen in LK 28.4.1976. The headline is missing.
32 LK 3.10.1971, Vaasan kulttuuriviikko, Saamelaisuus ei ole vain joikuja.
33 Tuulentie 2001, 89-90.
35 LK 2.3.1971, Saamelaisen kulttuurin säilyttäminen edellyttää pääväestön ja valtion tukea.
Accordingly, Western land use forms were represented as harmful to nature: the new reservoir plan in Sompio, for example, was criticized by Erkki Asp, who carried out research on the reception of the plan. Asp practised an explicit representation of the Sami as a “natural people”.\textsuperscript{36}

The editorial in \textit{Lapin Kansa} on 21 February 1971 sums up these trends. The Sami, who had earlier obtained their subsistence mainly from reindeer herding, and who had not harmed the nature from which they gained their livelihood and to which they were totally adapted, were experiencing a violent collision with modernity and the modern means of living. The Sami strategy was and had been retreating “geographically as well as socially”.\textsuperscript{37}

One consequence of both these imageries was that the Saminess represented in counter-imagery became more exclusive. Yet at the same time, greater inclusivity was being demanded. This was evident in connection with plans to establish a central organization for the Sami, when the unity of the Sami community was explicitly demanded in the press. When the central organization did not come about (see Chapter 6.3.2), the expectation of unity was directed at the Sami Parliament: this had to become an institute representing the whole of Sami society. The newspapers expressed quite explicit mistrust of the legitimacy of the Sami Parliament at the time of the experimental elections in October 1972.\textsuperscript{38} A trial election was being held in order to prove the disbelievers wrong and to test the functioning of the electoral system.\textsuperscript{39} One might argue whether the newspapers were concerned about the democratic foundation of the parliament or practising the old mistrust concerning the capability of the Sami in governing themselves.

The Sami rights issue was discussed and U. V. Halonen, for example, presented the need for special Sami legislation in his historical overview in February 1971.\textsuperscript{40} There were also exceptions. Dean Tuomo Itkonen published an article with a title “A Sami ‘Genocide’?” in \textit{Lapin Kansa} on 15 July 1970. The article concentrated on education issues and attributed considerable blame to certain officials and to the SfPLC for neglecting the Sami education language issue. I shall not go into detail concerning the article itself, since it is more interesting to discuss the reception of the article by Itkonen in \textit{Lapin Kansa}, which reveals the

\textsuperscript{36} Massa 1998, 159-160, 164-168; Wilmer 1993 is a not uncommon international example of dealing with indigenous groups as agents for alternative values and sustainable resource management; LK 6.5.1970, Tunturi-Lapin tutkimuspäivänä: Lapin luonto ja saamelaiskulttuuri merkittävä tieteelliselle tutkimukselle.
\textsuperscript{37} LK 21.2.1971, Saamelainen elämänmuoto.
\textsuperscript{38} LK 4.10.1972, Saamen kansa uurnille; LK 6.10.1972, Saamelaisparlamentti on vielä outo käsite Lappalaisten parissa.
\textsuperscript{40} Halonen, U. V: Saamelaisten ja poronhoidon oikeushistoriallisesta asemasta, LK 27.2.1971.
paternalistic undertone in the counter-imagery. *Lapin Kansa* published an editorial, “Getting the Sami issue on the right track”, on 17 July 1970, where this impertinent discussion was frowned upon. The newspaper stated: “…our Lapp population is only a part of the whole Finnish people, and feels itself as such in its rights and duties.” Blame was attributed to the Sami, who had not sufficiently valued their “special features, own language and other cultural traditions” and had not studied the possibility of guarding their culture using existing legislation. The Sami culture was defined as “the valuable treasure of all the people of Finland”, but the work to develop it was in the hands of the Lapps themselves.\(^{41}\) The emergence of the Finnish rhetoric of “our minority”, on which Seija Tuulentie has written her thesis, is noticeable for the first time, as is the paternalistic inclusion of the Sami within the Finnish political whole, followed by an instant “abandonment” of the Sami struggle for their special rights. These rights were denied the Sami by their inclusion in the citizenship of Finland, with the implicit idea of equal rights. *Lapin Kansa* was a Finnish venue, with a limited understanding of the radical rhetoric of negative discrimination experienced by the Sami.\(^{42}\)

As the Sami began to claim exclusive, ethnic-based rights, the discursive field reached a crisis. Nils-Aslak Valkeapää documented this kind of attitude in 1971, during the Sami Culture Week. Radical demands, especially those representing the state of Finland as a racially discriminating country, were scorned as provocative and bound to end the goodwill of the majority, as Valkeapää was allegedly told by Tapio Siikala from *Pohjolan Sanomat*. Race was still a category used by both groups. The Sami, like Valkeapää, used it to guilt-trip the state of Finland. Valkeapää perceived direct parallels between racial hierarchies in colonized Africa and between the Sami and Finnish societies. This was both a rhetorical tool to build distinctive Saminess and a statement in opposition to any kind of racial discrimination.\(^{43}\)

The Mii association held a Sami seminar in Helsinki in 1975, where a number of Finnish MPs were present. The Finnish politicians held on to the idea of minority status, with a series of rights relating to obtaining an education in Sami, while the Sami Law and especially the land-use questions were rejected by some as “economic questions”.\(^{44}\) A claim to restrict the use of snow scooters exclusively to Sami reindeer herders was made by the co-


\(^{42}\) Compare LK 2.3.1971, Saamen kansan oikeudet: It would be difficult, it would take time to establish the post of a Sami Ombudsman, stated Lapin Kansa cautiously a little later; compare also Uusi saamelaiskomitea, LK 31.3.1971: the Sami might have been not treated equally, but the case needed further enquiry.


\(^{44}\) Sabmelaš 10-12/1975, MIIN – maddasamii pirra.
operative of Käsivarsi in Enontekiö. This claim, made especially in order to restrict tourist use, which was out of control, led to a dispute and accusations concerning the greediness of Sami herders in excluding others from the hunting grounds. This dispute was a not uncommon example of the fear of losing fishing and hunting rights, which was a popular discourse in Lapland, shared by all the ethnic groups.\(^{45}\) In addition, there was a pragmatic grass-roots discourse on social welfare equality. People living in Angeli, Lisma and in Eastern Inari demanded road connections and electricity, without which there could not be true “constitutional” equality.\(^{46}\) The same kind of imagery, portraying the Sami in distress and lacking services, was used very systematically concerning the Skolt Sami.\(^{47}\) On some occasions the term “Skolt tribe” (kolttaheimo) was used,\(^{48}\) which, in the new ideological atmosphere and post-kindred policies of the post-war era, distanced them from the national community.

The poor reputation of Forest and Park Service, on the other hand, was cemented by the increasing number of articles about ecologically unsound loggings and the institution’s overbearing attitude.\(^{49}\) Matti Sverloff attacked Forest and Park Service in 1971, accusing one unnamed official of dictatorial measures (which were not more closely defined) although, according to Sverloff, it was the Landowner Association of Inari that was the Skolt Sami’s main opponent.\(^{50}\) One high point of criticism was published in a 1970 issue of *Suomen Luonto*, a periodical for Suomen Luonnonsuojeluliitto, the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation; this was a full-on attack on Forest and Park Service. On the behalf of the Sami, Oula Aikio wrote about efficient forestry destroying the forests, which provided shelter for the reindeer. Aikio pointed to the logging as harmful for winter grazing, and especially to ploughing as the most harmful land-use form for pastures.\(^{51}\) The harmful impact of these aspects of forestry were repeated in articles written by Finns and Sami alike in the years that

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\(^{45}\) LK 16.11.1971, Poromiehet: Moottorikelkka ei käy kaikkien käteen; in Inari, the discussion dealt with the construction of the Saariselkä tourist centre. As the restriction claims were aimed against tourist use, the dispute was milder at a local level. Comparisons were made between reservoirs, Saariselkä and loggings by Forest and Park Service, and no distinction was found regarding the effects on reindeer herding. LK 30.12.1971, Porotalousvahingoit korvattavat ennen Saarisen rakentamista; LK 13.1.1972, “Suariselästä tulossa kolmas tekoallas”.


\(^{47}\) LK 10.9.1972, Kolttien taloudelliset pulmat moninaiset.

\(^{48}\) LK 10.10.1972, Koltten luottamusmiestä koskeva esitys valmisteilla valtionelukuvostossa.


\(^{50}\) Sverloff, Matti: Tämä olisi selvitettyään, LK 2.4.1971.

followed. When it comes to identity politics, the demonization of Forest and Park Service meant that the Sami activists had finally found an opponent against which imagery could be constructed. Forest and Park Service was a better opponent than the silent state, which saw no need to react, whereas Forest and Park Service was physically very present and doing damage to the pastures of Inari. This had consequences: the imagery of an ecologically sound people appeared to be the most feasible representative strategy, since the criticism of Forest and Park Service was mostly ecologically oriented whereas the institution itself was (in imagery terms) anything but.

An example of the breakthrough of the “natural people” rhetoric and the problems in applying a legal discourse to Sami issues comes from an editorial in *Pohjolan Sanomat* after the ninth conference in Inari, in June 1976. The editorial contained favourable representations of the sparing use of nature on the part of “the Sami of Finland”. Typically for the 1970s, the rhetoric concerning indigenous rights was non-existent and the main focus of the editorial was unemployment, the biggest problem in that era and in Lapland. Employment was possible through the industrialization of the province, which also constituted the greatest threat to the Sami traditional means of living. However, industrialization helped the Sami as well, since unemployment was also a problem among the Sami, the newspaper concluded.52 The discourse on unemployment was dominant in the provincial and national public sphere, and the rejection of the importance of international status for the Sami was one of the continuities in minority politics in Finland.

The ethnic demarcation lines were neither absolute nor exclusive. When it suited them, reindeer herders joined forces with Forest and Park Service against a common southern enemy, the nature conservation movement, from the early 1970s onwards. The protection plan relating to Koilliskaira, resulting in the UKK National Park in 1982, covered wide areas of Inari and Sodankylä. The fear of losing usage rights was shared by a broad local front, including foresters and herders.53 Nature conservators, however, were consistent in referring to pasture damage in the protests against loggings in the Sami home area.54

52 PS 15.6.1976, Saamelaista taloutta.
54 LK 20.2.1971, Lapin luonnon-suojelu-yhdistys ja metsähallitus kiistelvät Inarin metsien hakkuista.
7.2.2. The early identity politics of the Sami Delegation: from primordial imagery to legal claims

Generally speaking, education and education language issues were the dominant fields of interest during the 1970s. The following provides an example of this. Education was perceived as vital and empowering: schools offering an education in the Sami language had to guarantee access to all forms of secondary education and the teaching had to support the development of all aspects of the pupils' personalities. A functioning bilingualism was demanded. It was noticed that an education in the Sami language had strengthened the identity of the Sami pupils. This is an example of the thinking of Sami teachers and linguists, who were numerous among the Sami politicians at the time. The imagery used was one of the Sami already living in the modern world, while still lacking rights. The teachers were worried about the personalities and identity of the Sami pupils, as well as the low respect accorded to Sami culture. This concern may have been shared by others, but the self-representational strategy was, as we shall see, exceptional, although one of the continuities of Sami identity politics in Finland. One consequence of this was that the Sami language was the most systematically used cultural/ethnic marker of the Sami in Finland, although the low inclusiveness and “reliability” of the marker was also sometimes mentioned.

The first phase of the identity politics of the Sami Delegation relied on two premises. The first premise in the statements was that, historically, the Sami lands (Saimaa) belonged to the Sami. Another premise, here concerning recreational areas and tourism, was that the Sami were people dependent on nature, of which they were an integral part. The possibility of gaining subsistence in traditional ways had weakened, for reasons beyond their control: “The Finnish society, with its thinking based on maximizing profits, has altered and raped the nature of the Sami home area with loggings, ploughing, building reservoirs, regulating the waters, etc.” Tourism in the Sami home area constituted a similar threat as the tourists trampled on the pastures. This affected the Sami, who would be forced to change their way of

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58 This was claimed in a statement demanding access to the administration of hunting in the Sami home area. Sabmelaš 8-9/1974, Samik tahttok farrui pividdu stivremii.
life unless areas were reserved for their use.⁵⁹ The Sami agency was weak, conditioned by nature and threatened by Finnish modes of production.

Two years later, a change had occurred. In a statement concerning trekking routes, issued in May 1977, the rhetoric was toned down and identity political tools selected more carefully. The Sami were the original population of the land (here meaning the state of Finland, J.N.), who gained their livelihood mostly from traditional means of living. Nature was essential for their means of living as it sustained their viability, both of which (nature and the traditional means of living, J.N.) formed the material basis of the Sami culture. What is being witnessed here is the birth of the tool of identity politics with the greatest continuity and broadest use in the years that followed⁶⁰. In this representation, nature was still the basis of the Sami culture, but it was not the only one: the Sami were cultural subjects, as their traditional means of living contributed to creating their culture and identity as well. The Sami culture and identity were no longer conditioned by nature, nor awaiting fatal Finnish penetration: this representation allows more room for the Sami agency. This in spite of the fact that “[T]he Sami culture had through the whole of its development been attached firmly to the ecosystem of nature.” The societies they had created had sustained the possibility of an appropriate use of a minor production of nature. The Sami culture was developing and they had created societies that were not conditioned by nature, although nature was one factor in their organization. A deep connection with nature and the perception of Sami trades as cultural markers resulted in disturbances to nature being viewed as causing disturbances to Sami trades, and therefore Sami culture, forcing them to change their way of life.⁶¹ This resulted in the beginning of an extensive identity political and ethnopolitical project to introduce a wider concept of culture into Finnish legislation, which would include material culture. This was done in order to widen the legislative protection to the Sami traditional means of living.⁶² The process succeeded, but resulted in fears that the Sami would


⁶⁰ The image is reproduced, for example, in Helander 1991, 64-65.


⁶² K.A, The archive of SfPLC, Kansainvälinen toiminta, Lecture by Heikki J. Hyvärinen “Saamelaisasiain hallinnosta ja hoidosta erityisesti Suomessa”, given in the seminar “Kenen käsissä saamelaiskulttuuri?” in Hanasaari, Espoo, in March 1985; this was also an international indigenous project. See Smith 1995, 67-68.
monopolize the traditional means of living in discussions about Sami cultural (economic?) autonomy.63

The identity politics of the Chairman of the Sami Delegation, Matti Sverloff, were deeply integrated with “natural people” imagery. Sverloff’s policy constitutes an exception to the emerging self-representation dealt with above. I have not detected such a radical and exclusive imagery used by other actors: rather, he seems to have produced the imagery by himself. In a statement for the committee report on reindeer-herding legislation from 1977, he intertwined reindeer herding, “the oldest mode of human functioning”, and Saminess: reindeer herding had always been “inseparable from the Sami way of life” and “a constituent economic factor for the Sami culture”. Reindeer herding was based on an “almost equal relationship” between reindeer and man. “Reindeer to man is a social partner, a source for nutrition as well as for many-sided production, a means of transport, etc. Human beings have supported reindeer in many situations important to the animal, such as preventing the predator menace, digging for nutrition under the snow and regulating the use of reserve pastures, etc.” The way in which Sverloff places human beings in the life sphere and social life of the reindeer is unique in Sami self-imagery. Sverloff also referred to the increasing problems in the pastures, the reason for this being that they were becoming part of the market economy, which threatened the means of living “traditionally stable and secure, a means of living intertwined with a way of life”. He stated his concern over winter feeding and how the reindeer might lose their ability to gain their nutrition from nature during the winter. In order to secure the productivity of reindeer herding, the Sami Delegation demanded conservation and the maintenance of the winter pastures,64 the condition of which was beginning to be viewed as the most vital pre-condition of reindeer herding.

Sverloff referred to the studies by Heikki Hyvärinen, rejecting the Finnish state’s legal claim to the lands of the Sami home area. Because of this, and because of the exclusive Sami usage rights, the right of reindeer herding should be reserved only for the Sami (these kinds of demands were later given up). Legislation did not sufficiently take into consideration Sami reindeer herding as a part of Sami culture but saw it, rather, as a secondary occupation giving way to other land-use forms. Sverloff may have been essentializing, but he was not romanticizing: he admitted that part of the reason for the weakening pastures was the changes

63 Tuulentie 2001, 184.
to the (Sami) way of life and reindeer herding, and the consequent deterioration in the professional skills of the herders, which had led them to neglect the condition of the pastures.65

The latter, judicial part of the statement shows a typical strategy in the identity politics of the Sami Delegation. The integration with nature was not referred to in the statements based on judicial reasoning. This strategy could be a sign of tension between two groups in the Delegation, the “primordialists”, led (and dominated) by Matti Sverloff, and the more legally oriented Sami politicians, who were suspicious of the “natural people” imagery. This group consisted, at least, of Pekka Aikio, Heikki Hyvärinen and Nils Henrik Valkeapää.66 The two last-mentioned had been active in researching the judicial aspect of the settlement history of the Lappmarks. Pekka Aikio presented his views on the tasks and judicial strategies of the Sami Delegation at an unknown event in Ivalo in 1981. He drafted the possibilities for Sami claims in two ways. The first was based on being a legal claimant and heir of the “Lapp” population, which was the judicial term used in official records. On the other hand, the Sami as an ethnic group were provided with protection via the international conventions ratified by Finland.67

The rights discourse was put into practice with regard to the water district boundary issue (vesipiirirajankäynti) from the mid-1970s onwards, where the state claim to lands was denied, on the basis that the collective and non-divisible common property rights of the siida had never been handed over to the state. The conquering of these lands on the part of the state was based on an erroneous assumption of terra nullius. The Tax Mountain case from the Court of Jämtbygden was mentioned, which, according to the Sami Delegation, acknowledged the removal of Sami property rights.68 In these statements, “natural people” imagery was not used.

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66 See for example Sápmelaš 5/1984, Sámi Parlameanta lahtuid válgasagat.
68 The archive of Sami Parliament, Inari, Esitykset/aloitteet 1974-1986, lausunnot 1975-1980, Annual report 1975, appendix, Saamelaisvaltuuskunnan lausunto pohjoisten karttujen kunten vesialueiden rajankäynnin tarkastustoimikunnan mietinnön (1975:45) johdosta, 8.11.1975; on Sami research concerning Sami rights giving a premise for these claims, see Helander 1991, 122; the historical and judicial research programme on Sami rights was also followed in Sabmelaš. Sabmelaš 2/1975, Sámi vuogiadvuodat dutkujuvvuvit; on some occasions, the right to the waters held by the Sami was represented as a “collective private ownership right”. Sabmelaš 9/1975, Samik eää tarbba šahcejuohkima.
During the 1980s, in statements concerning reindeer herding, man and reindeer are once again separated from each other: a more scientific discourse concerning reindeer became prevalent, which may have been a contribution from Pekka Aikio, a reindeer researcher. By 1980, reindeer herding was no longer the only Sami means of living (“pääelinkeinon luonteinen” elinkeino) and the focus was on the legislative and social organization of this subsistence, rather than the ecological organization emphasized by Sverlof. In addition, the goal of political resistance had become clearer: Sami distrust of the Reindeer Herders’ Association (Paliskuntain yhdistys) was expressed concerning the management of Sami reindeer herding, which was represented as different, in need of special protection and poorly protected. The Finnish officials were stripped from their status as experts: they had no understanding of the numerous functions of Sami reindeer herding besides meat production and subsistence. The statement, signed by Erkki Jompanen, made only a short reference to the relationship between the Sami culture and reindeer herding. 69

7.2.3. Conclusions

The early identity politics of the Delegation were deeply inspired by “natural people” imagery. Whether this was a direct loan from the global discourse of the time or just a one-man contribution from Sverlof is a matter for speculation. The national identity politics, however, were practised on an *ad hoc* basis; naturally, the most exclusive reindeer-herding imagery was practised in statements concerning reindeer-herding legislation. If any coherence or development among the shifts of radicality concerning natural people imagery is to be found, it may be just an increasing disbelief in it. The rhetoric of Pekka Aikio began to dominate the representations and there are clues that the exclusiveness and the content of the most radical self-representations was a problem – the only consistency in the identity politics during this era was the way in which the two potential representational strategies, “judicial” and “primordial”, were always used separately. In addition, the ineffectiveness of primordial imagery and yearning for scientifically-based argumentation was beginning to become apparent. The re-orientation of Sami identity politics took place in a “friendly vacuum”, under conditions in which the majority were not sufficiently bothered to want to challenge Sami self-imagery. Information in the public sphere in Lapland was mostly positive and kept alive

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the “natural people” image of the Sami. The well-intentioned cultural pluralism of this era apparently sustained the imagery and prolonged internal Sami negotiations concerning identity politics.

One continuing feature of the identity politics was the avoidance of direct economic claims, which appeared as judicial claims of rights, not economic gain. Such claims had been made in the 1950s, but they were now under-communicated and raised as claims for access to resource management, or transformed into accusations of tapping the resources southwards as part of the colonization process. I have found no information to indicate whether or not this was a conscious choice, but the strategy was to be adhered to systematically in the years that followed.

7.3. Sami self-representations in the freer fields of representation

7.3.1. Changes in the Sami/Finnish public sphere

In Finland, the media had undergone a rapid shift towards more open and radical politics concerning material that was aired and printed. The media became a field of contestation. Sometimes non-pluralistic, radical “propaganda” – mostly ideologically inspired by the far left – was criticized at the time but, on the other hand, many formerly invisible groups managed to have their say in electronic and printed media, and thus began to conquer a greater negotiating space in the public sphere. This also affected the Sami. In printed media, the early 1970s marked immense growth in Sami activity in the public sphere and, at least in the Lappish media, news coverage became more frequent and debates about matters concerning the Sami emerged in the readers’ columns.

In addition, Sami protests about obtaining the means to produce programme material began in the late 1960s and the use of PR was discussed in international Sami forums. The aim was to lift Sami Radio to the level of a truly influential Sami media serving the political needs of the Sami. A position in the Sami media had to be available where “free

70 Nils-Aslak Valkeapää referred to this “spirit of the times” in his pamphlet. It was a factor that worked for the Sami cause. Valkeapää 1971, 126. The problem, however, was that there were sometimes “essentializing” limits within this “pluralism”: the stereotypical indigenousness was accepted, while the developing indigenousness was not.
identification” was possible. Later on, the aim was to present a Sami perspective, raise the 
Sami from object to subject on the radio and introduce a socio-political current affairs programme – Sami Sagat was introduced in 1968 by Oula Näkkäläjärvi and Jukka Häyrinen from the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE. JS protested in 1970 about Sami affairs being reported on YLE by journalists of Finnish extraction. The association took its starting point with the Sami language: Sami journalists would provide a better way of reaching a Sami population that was reluctant to speak to Finnish reporters, and they would understand better the different cognitive worlds of a Sami culture practising a means of living based on nature. The protest and the discussion that followed led to the establishment of Sami Radio in Inari. Sulo Aikio had established a pirate radio, “a rucksack studio” in Ivalo, as early as 1972. The broadcasts became more frequent and a programme in Skolt Sami was started in 1974. The leadership in YLE entertained occasional suspicions towards the radical Aikio. Sami Radio became an independent radio station in 1985 (and in Norway in 1978). It was still affiliated with YLE, but had its own organization. The reporter courses arranged by YLE had attracted many of the Sami activists from 1965 onwards.

This was a major victory, bearing in mind the scarcity of Sami media platforms in Finland. Sami Radio became a pan-Sami media with inter-Nordic programmes and a conscious, transnational identity-building project. In addition, contact with the indigenous peoples’ movement was reported on Sami Radio.

7.3.2. Self-imagery: enter the colonized Sami

To begin with, as a result of international contacts and an increasing knowledge of international conventions during the 1970s, the Sami movement began to represent themselves as a people. This was a pragmatic choice, according to Elina Helander. The new Sami movement had become professionalized as the educational level of the activists had risen. To mention just a few, Oula Näkkäläjärvi was a lawyer, Pekka Aikio a reindeer

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71 This was a demand by the head of regional radio in Lapland, Jukka Häyrinen, who based his grievance on the representation of a people in need of unification, who were struggling for cultural autonomy and “people basing their means of living on nature and on gathering”. The demand for “free identification” was based on highly essentializing imagery. My translation of a quotation in Lehtola 1997b, 25.
73 Lehtola 1997b, 49-50.
researcher and Nils-Aslak Valkeapää had studied the Sami language for a short time in Oslo before studying at a teachers’ seminary in Kemijärvi and beginning a career as an artist. Teachers were numerous among the Sami political elite.

The discussion of Saminess was heated indeed. Nilla Outakoski was asked, in 1970, about his relationship to violence with regard to the Sami question. Outakoski stated as his “theoretical” standpoint that an oppressive and godless society could be resisted with arms, and that the Sami were “disappearing”, due to increasing economic oppression by the state of Finland. Outakoski also mentioned the godless hindrance of the Sami people hearing sermons in their own language as a form of oppression. Erkki Jompanen referred to the discussion, during Sami Culture Week in 1971 (see Chapter 6.3.2.), as being colourful and containing mistaken views, exaggerations and “miserable mistakes”. At a grass-roots level, more down-to-earth sentiments were heard. The education language issue was widely discussed and suspicious voices concerning the wisdom of teaching children in Sami were numerous. This was, for example, because of the numerous Sami dialects/languages, which were perceived as a major problem for the cultivation of the language. According to sceptics, the Sami language also lacked the vocabulary for many modern, “Finnish” phenomena.

The Sami identity was constructed and the claims were made mostly within the national borders and in a Finnish context, but increasingly disengaging from Finnishness and constructing a distinctive Saminess. Heikki Hyvärinen stated that the Sami were first and foremost Sami through their language, culture and way of thinking. They were Finns as well, but conscious of how the Finns had oppressed the Sami, taken their lands, their power and “the right to their native country”. In the same year, Finnish MPs put forward an initiative to establish a shared Sami policy for all the Nordic countries. This initiative was made in relation to membership application to the Nordic Council. The student organization Lapin paliskunta supported this initiative. In their statement to the Ministry of Education they used the opportunity to draft an international Sami policy and construct a cross-border Sami identity. A victim identity was constructed: due to encroachment on the part of the Nordic states, eroding the immemorial usage rights on fishing and pastures, the Sami subsistence economy had disappeared. Typically, the geographical and linguistic diversity of the Sami, as well as the diversity of the national Sami policies, were presented as a cause of the deprived

See on Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, Lehtola 2002b, 130.
LK 2.3.1971, Taka-Lapin juhatilaisuudet Inarissa ja Karigasniemessä.
See, for example, LK 18.10.1970, Pseudonym ”Lappalainen”: Koulu ja saamenkieli.
“state of the Sami and Sami culture”. This deprivation would be resolved by giving the Sami their rights back.\textsuperscript{80} Victim representations were practised in various forms and increasingly by demonizing the state of Finland, as for example in the report of the Sami Committee (see Chapter 8.3.1).

The global connection radicalized Sami self-imagery. An editorial in \textit{Sambelaš} in 1976 commented on Sami criticism of the idea of entering the global WCIP. Similarities were identified between the histories of colonization in the domiciles of American Indians by Colombus and that of the Sami by the Crown and Church of Sweden. Scarce resources were being tapped from indigenous people, who had been chased away, robbed and killed\textsuperscript{81} by the majority. In order to fight this “ghost”, the struggle had to be global and the front had to be united.\textsuperscript{82} In the same edition, Nils-Aslak Valkeapää published an inspired text that borrowed heavily on global discourses and mixed the Indian and Valkeapää’s own mythology (The Great Spirit, Mother Earth and Father Sun), finding similarities in the colonization history and robbing of the lands of the people, who were part of nature and the land, which could not be sold to the white man, as they did not own it. In the same way as the Indians, the Sami had been masters of an ecologically sound resource use.\textsuperscript{83} The Inari conference of 1976 also inspired such self-representations: the Sami, in the same manner as other indigenous people, had mastered the wise use of the delicate environment in which they lived.\textsuperscript{84} Common histories of colonialism with America, Australia and Asia were constructed, with evidence from subjugation to a foreign church through internal mission, military service in foreign armies, subjugation to foreign legislation and the school system. “Eatnamiid rivvet”, exploiting/plundering the lands, was offered as translation for colonization in \textit{Vuovjøs}.\textsuperscript{85} In addition, writings from participants from the WCIP Kiruna conference cultivated a rhetoric of peoples bound together through their experiences of colonization.\textsuperscript{86}

The most radical Sami activists, for example Johti Sambelažžat, began to represent landownership as being “foreign to the Sami conception of justice”. The Sami striving for landownership during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the result of worsening

\textsuperscript{79} KA, The Archive of SfPLC, Box 30, Miscellaneous, Heikki Hyvärinen: Saamelaisten ystäväät, lecture given in “Syyserotus” in Ostrobotnia, Helsinki 18-20.11.1970.
\textsuperscript{81} The verb \textit{goddot} also has other, milder meanings.
\textsuperscript{82} Sambelaš 1-2/1976, Mannin mælmiÃ¤rvi?
\textsuperscript{84} Sabmelaš 3/1976, Sábmlažžat mállmi álbmogiiid joavkus.
\textsuperscript{86} Klassen 1978.
subistence, due to Finnish settlement. The Sami settlement was labelled as “Finnish”. 87 The radicalization of the Sami movement also resulted in the radicalization of interpretations of the settlement history of the Lappmarks and a challenge to the prevailing representation of settlement history as “conciliatory adaptation” by Nickul. 88 To begin with, historical consciousness of the settlement history of the Sami, acknowledging them as the first settlers in the whole of Finland, was cultivated among the Sami, at least from the 1940s onwards. 89 This imagery radicalized during the 1970s: the colonization process of the Lappmarks was portrayed as one of plunder, rape and the burning of villages. In the process of Christianization, many aspects of the vernacular culture were totally destroyed. 90 Kirsti Paltto, with reference to JS and Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, represented the settlement of the Lappmarks as a history of plunder and violence, causing hunger and poverty. It was not a retreat but a matter of deportation and conquest, resulting in a colonialistic policy during the seventeenth century, as spheres of interest were negotiated between the states and national borders were set in an arbitrary manner. The narrowing niche for a traditional means of living meant that the Sami had to adopt forms of agriculture. Paltto shared Johti Sabmelažžat’s notion of landownership being foreign to the Sami. The adoption of agriculture led to an increasing gap in wealth and disputes between the Dalolas (Sami living in fixed settlements) and the Badjeolmmos (reindeer-herding Sami), as well as between the reindeer-herding Sami and the settlers. 91

Kirsti Paltto created a self-representation of an oppressed, colonized and exploited Sami. The Sami were not treated as equal citizens in Finland. The reservoirs in Sodankylä provided the Sami with proof of the colonial attitude of the hydropower company Kemijoki

87 The term for Sami settlement was “suomalaismallinen talostelu”, which means to maintain a house, dälostallat. The statement of Johti Sabmelažžat is quoted in Isotalo 1994, 78-79; the dichotomization only along the property rights situation between the landowning settlers and non-landowning indigenous populations has blurred the recognition of various land use organizations on the part of the indigenous peoples. These land use organizations recognized territorial borders and divisions. See Müller-Wille 1998, 49-50; Valkeapää 1971, 98.
88 The settlement history is not the contested branch of study that it seems to be in Norway. The indigenousness of the Sami is not questioned and the 1970s were a period of active research in archaeology. For example, the first signs of the Komsa culture, preceding the Sami arrival, were found in Utsjoki, by the River Teno, in 1972. On settlement history, see Nyssönén 2006b, passim; the indigenousness was later questioned in the disputes of the 1990s, see Tuulentie 2003b, 284-285; LK 23.8.1972, Komsa-kulttuurin jälkiä: Maamme vanhimmat asuinsijat ovat löytyneet Utsjoelta.
89 Sabmelažžai vuostamuš assamsajik, Sabmelaš 4/1948; Porsanger, Per Olav: Samii pirra veåha, Sabmelaš 3/1951.
91 Paltto 1973, 13-18, 41; Sabmelaš began to publish quotations from Native American tribes, where the perception of not owning the land was cultivated. See Sabmelaš 4-5/1977, Guldal vilges olmmoš.
Oy and accusations were heard of alcohol having been used to lure people to sell their homes below their real value. In addition, efficient forestry was eroding the ecological balance of the Sami domicile. The Sami and their ecosystem were being over-exploited. The Sami were the underdogs in a meeting of minority and majority cultures and the adaptive measures (for example, those of the Dalolas Sami) were perceived as assimilation. Isolating the reindeer-herding Sami from majority impulses was the only guarantee for the Sami culture to survive.92

Jouni Kitti blamed the settlement and the governmental restrictions in land use for the break in Sami relations with nature and the crisis in resource use. The Sami could no longer choose their place of settlement according to the needs of their livelihood and their close relationship with the resource, for example reindeer, was in danger of being broken.93 Nils-Aslak Valkeapää came up with a more radical colonialistic interpretation. The Sami had been evicted, chased away and marginalized in an area that could not provide them with a livelihood. Westernization had corrupted “…the Sami way of thinking and the realities of life … and the Sami have had to adopt many things foreign to their culture”. There occurred both colonization and a “rape” of the lands and the Sami mind. Adapting to and operating according to these new features was an option for Valkeapää, but it was not a conciliatory act, rather an act of fitting the new features to the Sami way of thinking. Thus it became an act of cultural survival, part of “a struggle for their own different culture”.94 Nils-Aslak Valkeapää probably had the closest ties to the indigenous peoples’ movement, at least to the cultural exchange that went on between indigenous people during the 1970s. He also presented his own theories concerning the shared cultural, folkloristic and racial backgrounds of the circumpolar indigenous people95, which were cultivated in Finnish publicity, and of the Finns as well, constructed through the Fenno-Ugric linguistic bond. Valkeapää’s representations leaned heavily on colonization discourse and on the economic consequences of imperialism. The dogma of settlement history as a constant giving way and pressure imposed from the majority was cultivated in numerous statements, scientific and otherwise.96 The imagery of not having any conception of landownership, which was integral to the colonization rhetoric, was rather short-lived and did not survive when research results on the judicial and settlement

93 Kitti 1984, 72-73.
94 Rhetoric of colonization as rape, Valkeapää 1971, 17; Valkeapää 1984, quotes p. 52.
95 Valkeapää 1971, 11-16.
96 Lehtiranta and Seurujärvi-Kari 1992, 126.
history of the Sami were began to be published during the 1970s. Colonization rhetoric was sustained in other forms in the years that followed.

Another example, borrowing from colonization discourses, demonizing the state of Finland and praising traditional indigenous knowledge, comes from Oula Aikio in 1971. “The people from the wilderness” no longer trusted the promises of the masters (“herra”) from the south, since these promises were only promises. Indigenous knowledge was appreciated and southern knowledge was condemned in a discussion on predators and reindeer herding. Aikio renounced the southern notion that predators were scarce in Lapland. Instead, they were effectively reducing the stocks. A rare representational act occurred, renouncing the hegemonic system of knowledge and raising indigenous knowledge (traditionally viewed as lower) as the more appropriate one. This resembles the strategy of turning the stereotypes inside out by attaching positive meaning to formerly “primitive” features.

The self-imagery of a colonized people and the cultivation of an indigenous brotherhood and pride continued within the cultural sphere, in Finland’s case most notably in the cultural exchange with other circumpolar peoples during the 1970s. The Finnish Sami sent cultural delegates to Alaska, Greenland and Canada. In Finland, the Davvi Suvva festival (North Hums, or North Whistles) was a venue for expressions of indigenousness and an Arctic sense of community. The festival, with its uneven cycle, was intended as a forum for traditional expressions of circumpolar indigenous cultures; festivals were arranged by the WCIP and the Finnish branch of the Sami Council, as well as the Karesuvanto Sami Society (Gárasavvoná Sámíid Searvi) and JS. It also stood in opposition to the “standardized technical culture” and majority political institutions: a poem “Sábmelaš ieš” (A Sami Himself), by an anonymous writer, stated in Vuovjoš, a leaflet for the festival in 1977:

“Iì ák’ta ærä vuoje sábmelažža ášši gà sábmelaš ieš
Sábmelažža ávdasta buoremusat sábmelaš”

No one champions the Sami cause like a Sami himself
The Sami are best represented by a Sami (translation J.N.)

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97 Nyyssönen 2006b, 77-79.
100 Vuovjoš 1/1977, passim; see also Sábmelaš 4-5/1977, Tâvvivielljak teäivvadit.
The identity politics struggle entered the literary field. Anni Saara Magga, chairman of Johtti Sabmelažžat, claimed the power of definition by criticizing the image of the Sami in schoolbooks, in *Maamme Kirja* as well as in history textbooks. In a quoted extract from a history textbook written by Ora and Eino Jutikkala, the notion of the Sami having been slaves to other tribes in the wilderness economy was presented. Eino Jutikkala, an academic and a historian, had presented his view on the matter in his canonized work, “The History of the Finnish Peasant” and in his lectures at the University of Helsinki. The point in Magga’s article was that the Sami were not treated as equals. This was written as a response to an earlier article denying the racial discrimination against the Sami.\(^\text{101}\) Another act of reclaiming the power of definition was undertaken by Matti Sverloff, who renounced the validity of the Skolt Sami ABC primer by Pekka Sammallahti as a piece of work by a researcher with no command of Skolt Sami.\(^\text{102}\)

7.3.3. The introduction of the most exclusive “natural people” Sami self-imagery

The increasing differentiation of the Sami society made the identity politics and the identification of the Sami more difficult. Of all the identity markers, language and heredity were both highlighted, but a weakening of the command of the Sami language and cases of unwillingness to identify oneself as a Sami were recognized. The organization of the Sami was no longer a simple issue. However, there was a sharp rise in exclusivity at the beginning of the first explicit phase of the discussion on the collective Sami identity, which is discussed in this section.

Veli-Pekka Lehtola has drafted the phases of the Sami renaissance. During the 1950s, Finnish cultural markers were something of a Sami fad, but in the 1960s the Sami movement entered its most radical phase. The new generation understood, according to Lehtola, that the construction of a whole and sound (“ehjää”) Sami identity could only be achieved by recognizing their own background and tradition. The Sami renaissance was hostile to outside, majority influences.\(^\text{103}\) This consciousness led to a more firmly founded Sami movement, with

\(^\text{101}\) In addition, “Sami Friend” U. V. Halonen took it upon himself to prove Jutikkala’s notion of the Sami as a movable property in his studies as wrong. The twelfth-century “privilege” of the master towards his “own Sami” was merely a privilege relating to trade with the Sami. Halonen died before his study on the judicial history of the Sami was finished. Halonen 1977, 22; Jutikkala 1958, 32; Jutikkala 1978, 22-23; Magga, Anni Saara: Lappalaisetko ahtaalla?, LK 18.6.1972.

\(^\text{102}\) LK 3.1.1973, Koltankiel ja aapinen.

\(^\text{103}\) Lehtola 2000a, 194.
a new notion of Sami identity. It was typical of the movement that the Sami identity was operating and being constructed on many cultural levels. Sami participation and renewal occurred in the arts, literature, music, Sami media and Sami politics. This attitude prevailed in various statements during the 1970s; it is evident, for example, in the representation of the cultural, political and national borders. The collective Sami identity was still seen as threatened by the majority, situated on the periphery and “border areas” and slashed by these borders. There were fewer possibilities for crossing the borders and less room for preserving the originality of the people. The act of marginalization had been one of stripping the Sami of their power, which was evident in the unwise use of the natural resources.

The negative attitude towards Finnish modernization, added to what was, in retrospect, an “essentialist” notion of identity, transformed the possibility of acculturation, adaptation, integration or the borrowing of cultural markers as a negative, unwanted option. This had a two-fold effect. Rhetoric of losing one’s identity could be practised. Satu Moshnikoff, a primary school teacher in Sevettijärvi, welcomed the recent changes in Skolt Sami legislation, since they offered Skolt Sami families an improved economic possibility for living in their own cultural sphere. This was vital for “survival for the whole tribe and for the survival and development of the culture.” The ongoing change and crisis in traditional livelihoods had caused insecurity, resulting either in moving to a Finnish means of living away from Sevettijärvi or in personal crisis. Moshnikoff blamed this on being separated from both the Skolt Sami and the Finnish identity, as schools were raising children to be Finnish whereas they were receiving a Skolt Sami upbringing at home. The result had been rootlessness and indifference. Moshnikoff had noticed in her work that being taught the Skolt Sami language and learning about their culture had had a positive effect on the personality of the pupils. An analysis of Moshnikoff’s notion of identity is made difficult by the fluctuation in her use of the terms identity/personality, which she seems to use almost as synonyms. Tampering with the Sami cultural core appears harmful, according to Moshnikoff. As Moshnikoff stated, “Human beings, who know their roots and dare to recognize them, will survive as a tribe and grow as people!” The only option, a return to the traditional, was questioned later on in internal Sami identity discussions.

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104 Lehtola 1997b, 48.
105 Sammallahti 1984, 9.
106 Changes in Skolt legislation improved access for the young Skolt Sami to land and reindeer or Skolt estates. Sverloff 2003, 137.
Nils-Aslak Valkeapää used imagery with nature-bound premises: “A human being, who lives in nature and from nature, is an essential part of nature; one has had to adapt to nature, usually nature has forced one to adapt; the law is simple; if one does not adapt, one does not live.” Thus, as a second point, the emerging crisis of resource management and identity management could be explained by outside intervention. The alienation from nature brought about by Westernization had made it impossible for the Sami to practise their lifeform, which integrated deeply with nature, taking it as its starting point. In 1980, Nils-Aslak Valkeapää drew the greatest distinction between the Finns and the Sami in his representation based on the differences in their “philosophy of life”. The Sami did not own the land, since this was not possible: nature ruled over human beings and reindeer herding was “not work … (but) a part of life, part of nature”.

Iisko Sara also represented the Sami as a small, subjugated, politically insignificant, marginalized people, who had been neglected. Thus the “basic element of our culture, a life form based on the ecology of nature” was in the process of disintegration. Pekka Aikio used the fortieth anniversary of the SiPLC to express the hope that the seriously-threatened traditional Sami livelihoods, hunting and fishing, should be reserved for those who “base most of their livelihood on the use of land and water without actual ownership”. The encroachments and growing dispossession of land for recreational use had occurred without compensation. Another example of the strategy of blaming the majority for the resource management crisis: Oula Aikio wrote an article in 1975 about the reservoirs and the destiny of the traditional means of living, based on nature, before and after the filling of the reservoirs. The article shows a continuation of the self-representative strategy on Aikio’s part (see Chapter 5.3 on reservoirs). Happy people, basing their living on nature and cattle and living mostly outside the monetary economy, they considered the pastures as their own. A gentleman from Helsinki (“heärra…Helssegist”) came along one day and a long, eroding process began, ending in a sharp disruption as the reservoirs were filled and Sami saw their lands drowned, causing chaos for the herding, which continued in shrunken pastures. Aikio ended the article by pointing out the insufficient protection offered by Finnish legislation for the traditional means of living, practising the imagery of “the Sami lacking rights”, but another strategy seems to have been chosen by the Sami: in later years, when using traditional

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108 Valkeapää 1971, 36.
109 For the same kind of rhetoric of the Sami society not being able to develop from their own premises, see Nickul 1969; Valkeapää 1984, quote p. 51.
110 Sara 1984, 41.
111 LK 28.11.1972, Saamelaisuus myötätuulella vaikka ongelmia riittää.
means of living and its sustainability as a cultural marker, rather than making direct representations of the sustainability of Sami subsistence, it became typical to compare these with Finnish industrial land-use forms, speaking of sustainability as a vanished option, eroded by Finnish penetration/colonization.\textsuperscript{112}

A similar development, but not as consistent, occurred in the rhetoric of smallness/weakness: it was sometimes reversed, blaming the way in which the majority underrated the Sami.\textsuperscript{113} It may not be a coincidence that Aikio’s rhetoric is introduced at almost the same time as the break in counter-imagery: the first accusations of pasture damages caused by an excessive number of reindeer are voiced. This part of the public sphere was occupied mostly by forestry officials and scientists, and was sternly renounced by Sami herders. According to them, it was forestry that was responsible for the problems in the pastures.\textsuperscript{114}

The exclusiveness of the representation offered legitimacy in distinguishing between and talking about Sami who had lost their identity and those who had sustained their identity. According to Iisko Sara, embracing the Finnish features in one’s identity was possible, whilst a total change was not. The Sami were forced into a role that was allocated, maintained and moulded by Finnish society, and thus artificial. In order to maintain the true Sami identity, a struggle and return to the true Sami identity, based on nature and a traditional means of living, was needed. Sara also connected (a newly-found research result) the right to land with the Sami identity.\textsuperscript{115} Emphasis on the Sami language as an identity marker and the language shifts experienced led to a resuscitation of “dying people” representations. The professional fishers and hunters of Utsjoki (Utsjoen ammattikalastajat ja metsästääjät) reasoned in 1971 that since the dominant home language in Utsjoki was Sami, the Finnish school policy, with its neglect of the needs of the minority culture, had driven Saminess “to the brink of destruction”. Juhani Järvensivu, Aslak Järvensivu and Aslak Uula Lukkari were among the members of this association, which was an economic interest group rather than a political association.\textsuperscript{116} Such extreme, yet grimly logical, victim representations and the construction of threat perceptions

\textsuperscript{112} Aikio, Oula: Luonndueilatusa pirra, Sambmelas 3-4/1975.
\textsuperscript{113} This blame was attributed to Matti Morottoma at a Sami cultural evening arranged by Sami Siida (Utsjoki), at which Jaakko Numminen from the Ministry of Education was present. Kittii, Jouni: Ságastallan sápmelaškultuvra birra Ohcejogas, Sápmelaš 5/1982; see also, concerning the Sami language and continuing bullying in schools, Kerttu Vuolah on LK 27.4.1984, Mitä on kieli-imperialismi?
\textsuperscript{114} LK 5.11.1975, Professori Kuusela syytti poromiehiä: Yhilaiduntaminen vie katastrofin; PS 5.11.1975, Luonnon tasapaino järkyy porojen yhilaiduntamisella; Pohjolan Sanomat 6.11.1975, Poromiehet eivät ymmärrä Kuusela.
\textsuperscript{115} Sara 1984, 42-43.
\textsuperscript{116} Paltto 1973, 101; LK 18.9.1971, Saamelaisuus ajautunut tuhon partaalle.
were diluted in official statements. For example, a committee working on improvements to the education of the Sami saw the main problem as a lack of equality in education, and the aim was to secure “bilingualism of the highest quality” through the education provision for the Sami.\textsuperscript{117} On the other hand, a less radical rhetoric of the “existence of Sami culture” and “preserving the Sami culture” was practised in claims to securing teaching in the Sami language\textsuperscript{118} and the use of the Sami language in Sami organizations\textsuperscript{119}. Issko Sara made the connection between traditional means of living and Sami survival in 1971.\textsuperscript{120}

Statements expressing dissatisfaction with the protection provided by Finnish legislation (and, implicitly, the whole equality paradigm of the state of Finland) were numerous in the early 1970s. The problem was that the Sami were only formally equal before the law: they did not have equal possibilities of guarding their rights. The law favoured Finns and was based on Finnish demands, which were different from those of the oppressed minority.\textsuperscript{121} A usage right \textit{and} control over the land (hallintaoikeus) for the Sami in the Sami area was called for at a meeting in Enontekiö in 1971.\textsuperscript{122} Special measures and a special Sami policy were demanded from the state to preserve and develop the Sami culture in the Proclamation of Sami Rights in 1971.\textsuperscript{123} One of the dominant self-representations of the era was the Sami, who had been stripped (centuries ago) of their rights.\textsuperscript{124} In addition, the most enlightened representatives of the majority began to echo the new “citizens plus” special rights paradigm. Professor Erkki Asp gave a speech during Sami Culture Week in March 1971 on the “future prospects of Saminess”, where he stated the fact that the Sami were Finns living in Finland. However, because of their different culture and means of living, special concern and treatment were needed. This was evident in the school system, which had so far has functioned under majority premises and was thus assimilative. If the Sami language, although a problematic cultural marker not shared by all the Sami, was desired to be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Saamelaisten kouluopetuksen kehittämiestoinikunnan mietintö 1971:B63, passim; LK 30.6.1971, Mietintö saamelaisten koululojen kehittämisestä opetusministerille.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Lukkari, Eino: Utsjoen yläasteen sijoituspaikka, LK 24.10.1972.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Holmberg, Veikko: Čoahkkingiella, Vuovjos 2/1978.
\item \textsuperscript{120} LK 27.2.1971, Saamelaisten elinkeinolliset oikeudet esillä Enontekiöllä; see also LK 14.4.1972, Ympäristönsuojelun neuvottelukunta: Saamelaiskulttuurin pelastamiseksi pikaiset toimenpiteet tarpeen.
\item \textsuperscript{121} LK 27.2.1971, Saamelaisten oikeusturvasta, “Ei saa puhua noin - nehän hävittävät”.
\item \textsuperscript{122} LK 27.2.1971, Saamelaisten elinkeinolliset oikeudet esillä Enontekiöllä.
\item \textsuperscript{123} LK 2.3.1971, Saamelaisen kulttuurin säilyttäminen edellyttää pääväästön ja valtion tukea.
\item \textsuperscript{124} LK 24.2.1971, Tiedotustoiniminnan merkitys vähemmistööksäällisuuudelle.
\end{itemize}
maintained, then special treatment would be needed. Similar treatment before the law was not enough.125

During the 1970s, expectations of the authenticity of Sami culture became more prevalent. Jouni Kitti continued to write about roads as part of the Finnish democracy/colonialism, as being corruptive to the Sami culture and way of life based on an ecologically sound, organic means of living and cultivation of the cultural markers. The majority societies were also “essentialized”: Kitti wrote a series of articles on the economic imperialism of the Western world, mostly about the USA, but also about Finland and how resources from the Third World and Sami domicile were being tapped to the south and to the Western world.126

Nature conservation was, in most cases, interpreted by the Sami as protection of the traditional means of living from the loggings of Forest and Park Service, as well as from tourism. The national park of Lemmenjoki was established in Inari in 1956. This resulted in a ban on industrial land use forms, whereas the “rights of the Sami to practice their ancient means of living” were not to be violated in the national park area, as Reino Kalliola, the supervisor of nature conversation in Finland, stated.127 In practice, and by the law, the numerous nature reserves were also reserves for the grazing reindeer, and the Sami mostly favoured their establishment. In the 1950s and 1960s, they were not yet seen as restrictions on Sami rights, as in Sweden, nor was there any need to react to any serious efforts in restricting usage rights. These conflicts were ongoing in Sweden as early as in the 1950s, where the image of the Sami evolved from part of nature that was in need of protection to a hindrance to the aims of conservation. The difference in procedure under the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture, in comparison to the more exclusive procedures in Forest and Park Service, and a more profound consideration of the Sami question in nature conservation also dampened conflicts, regardless of whether the imagery was patronizing or not.128 On later occasions, the legitimacy of establishing numerous nature conservation areas in the Sami home area was questioned: conservation was not a problematic issue as long as the rights of the locals were not at risk. The consistency was most solid regarding the loggings: in the Sami literary public sphere, before the Kessi dispute, positive remarks were no longer being made about the

125 On Sami language as a marker for ethnic identity, see Svonni 1996, passim, where Svonni claims that the Sami language has in some areas lost its practical, communicative meaning, although it is raised as an identity marker in spite of this; Asp, Erkki: Saamelaisuuden tulevaisuuden näkökulmat, LK 2.3.1971.
128 Lantto 2003, 130-134; Nyyssönen 2003, 266; Ruotsala 2002, 159.
loggings, and grass-root demands by the herders to protect the diminishing pastures were reported. Pictures from logging sites were frequent in Sápmelaš during this period.\footnote{Kitti, Jouni: Guohtuneatnamat gáržot Sámis, Sápmelaš 3/ 1979; Sápmelaš 7/1978, Muhtun biedggus jurdagat luondduráhttema birra Sámis; Sápmelaš 3-4/1981, Suoma ráдdehus viiddida luonduðsuodjalanguovuulluid; Sápmelaš 7-8/1981, UKK-vuovdi geavahanevvtohtus gárvanan; Pekka Aikio was more critical about exposing Sami reindeer herding to tourism in the UKK Conservation Park: Aikio, Pekka: Álbmotmeahccci ja säpmelaččaid boazodoallu, Sápmelaš 1/1984.}

In conclusion, it is noticeable how the split began to emerge, between official politics evolving into a more matter-of-fact attitude, on the part of the Delegation and more radical imagery that was cultivated in unofficial Sami forums. There was a greater freedom of manoeuvre in the unofficial forums, while institutionalization was beginning to affect the identity politics of the Delegation.

7.3.4. Practices, test-cases and canonizations

During this period, a purely ethnic-based Sami politics was drafted. In an uncredited editorial in Sabmelaš in 1976, “Sami politics” was examined. The very term had been introduced only a few years before (see Chapter 6.3.3) and had previously simply been referred to by the Sami themselves as “advocating the Sami cause” (“sãblemáš ássiid vuoddjin”). The editorial continued that the old “non-policy” had led nowhere, as the basic shortcomings were still in place. What had to be done was to mobilize overarching Sami politics, with an ideology based on the “wisdom” (viisot) of how the Sami had arranged their life, which had remained the same over thousands of years. Sami politics was needed to create strategies in coping with modern impulses that were formerly unknown in Sami society. The editorial echoed the old anti-party-political trait of the Sami activists (see Chapters 3.3.2 and 6.3.3): the idea of “Sami politicians” was scorned and the editorial was concerned that Sami politics should not simply deal with the (economical) interests of different means of living but also define the substance/goal of a more holistic Sami politics. This task was given to the Sami Council, which was working on the political programme of the Sami.\footnote{} For the writer(s), institutionalization had not changed the premises of the political organization of the Sami very much. As we saw, the Sami Delegation also entertained these kinds of ideals of unity and ethnic purity. The expectation of unity and idealism were global loans. Representations of Sami culture were quite static. Ethnic barriers had been built high against the majority people, while there was a desire that internal divisions should be non-existent. This anti-party-
political thinking and expectation of ethnically-based consensus policies was one of the continuities in Sami (political) history in Finland, and was also introduced to the Finnish political realm, to municipal politics. There were Sami lists in the municipality elections in both Enontekiö and Inari\(^{131}\).

The water district boundary dispute continued into the 1970s. Compared to the Sami statements of the 1960s (see Chapter 5.3), a more radical angle was practised in ethnopolitics: state action was considered unlawful, as the old lands of the Lapp villages were shared out. This question was political for the elite, whereas many of the Sami were merely concerned with securing the economic consequences of the operation: in the “great partition”, not all the estates were granted water rights, and these received no rights in the operation. The association for the landowners (manttaalikunnat), with “district technician” Mauri Tanskanen as chairman, was active in the dispute, opposing the Sami elite.\(^{132}\)

At the height of the dispute, in 1979, Johtti Sabmelažát demanded that the process be stopped as unconstitutional.\(^{133}\) The dispute may be viewed in a Sápmi context, as both the Tax Mountain case and the Alta disputes were underway, but it has never received a comparable aura or heroic place in Sami history. The Sami were both claiming their ancient lands back and, in many cases, claiming their legitimate fishing rights, attached to the estate, like any other Finnish landowner.

The concept of siida as the exclusive holder of the collective landownership right was used for the first time in the dispute concerning the fishing ban imposed by Forest and Park Service in 1975. This concept was consolidated and canonized later within the Sami political programme and in preparations concerning the Sami Law. There has been extensive research on this theme, by Heikki Hyvärinen, Nils-Henrik Valkeapää and Kaisa Korpiaakko. The basis for the exclusive right was the taxes paid by the Lapp villages, and the immemorial usage right (ylimimuistoinen nautinta). The creation of Lapp village-based social and reindeer-herding organizations was one formulated aim of the Sami Delegation.\(^{134}\)

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130 Sabmelaš 4-5/1976, Maggar sámipoliitika?
132 Lehtola 1997b, 52-53.
133 Lehtola 1997b, 65.
134 The archive of Sami Parliament, Inari, Esitykset/aloitteet 1974-1986, Saamelaisvaltuuskunnan lausunto pohjoisten kuntien vesialueiden rajankäynnin tarkastustoimikunnan mietinnön (1975:45) johdosta, 8.11.1975; Heikki Hyvärinen referred to the decrees of 1671 (?) and 1673, which confirmed the Lapp border in favour of the Sami, as a proof of Crown-acknowledged landownership. This form of landownership did not differ from the typical full peasant landownership, according to Hyvärinen. He also denied the legal acquisition of the lands by the state of Finland. KA, Archive of SIPLC, box 30, Miscellaneous, undated draft by Hyvärinen: “Oikeudesta maahan ja veteen Saamelaisten kotiseutualueella”; Lehtola 2005a, 58-59, 68; Nils Henrik Valkeapää had, for example, studied the Lapp Codicil and emphasized their extensive rights to their own regions and the principle
The representational field had fragmented. There was an attempt to canonize impulses from global networking, legally-orientated discourses and new representations in various academic fields in the book “The Lapps in Finland” (1977) by Eino Siuruainen (then a scientist, later governor of the province of Oulu) and Pekka Aikio. For the first time, the Sami, though almost “indistinguishable from the Nordic majority populations”, were represented as part of the circumpolar indigenous community. The book sustains a tension between images of the Sami relying on nature and gaining their livelihood from modern sources. The book opens with an introduction to the Arctic ecosystem, in which, however, the Sami are represented as legal claimants, rather than an organic part of the ecosystem. The warm and close relation to nature is stressed in relation to the pre-Christian belief world and the old means of living prior to the impulses of the majority population. Especially in remote areas, nature is still – though increasingly less – relied on, and reindeer herding still constitutes a major source of subsistence and the backbone of Sami culture. In addition to this, the Sami are a people moving away from their domicile, with their increasing level of education and decreasing command of Sami languages. In a chapter on Sami culture, the successful adaptation of the Sami and utilization of numerous and scarce resources, while maintaining the balance of nature, is celebrated. Accordingly, the balance is tipped because of the economic expansion of dominant cultures. When it comes to the rights of the Sami, they are represented as the original inhabitants of their domicile, having a hereditary right to their traditional means of living and clear ownership of the land they occupied, acknowledged and enforced by the courts of law. These rights were eroded from the eighteenth century onwards. If anything, the authors managed to capture the increasing multiplicity of the Sami community.

7.4. A comparison with Norway

The Norwegian-educated Sami radicals had established Norske Samers Riksforbund (NSR, the National Alliance of Norwegian Sami) in Kautokeino in 1968. The association made claims for landownership, alongside the more traditional demands for compensation and

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135 Siuruainen and Aikio 1977, 3-11, 17-30, 33.
protection for the traditional means of living. Industry, modernization and the welfare state were criticized and feared (Minde) among a number of Sami activists. In the wake of NSR, the older Sami organizations radicalized as well. The negative consequences of this modernization were discussed in NRL, and mining and the planned and executed hydropower projects were discussed throughout the 1970s. The Alta/Kautokeino waterway plan became a symbol for Sami mobilization in Norway (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9.6). The critique evolved from demanding compensation to a critique of the harm done to traditional means of living, and finally to the harm done to Sami ethnicity and culture.\textsuperscript{136} The Norwegian process was followed by Sami activists in Finland: the ČSV symbol, for example, was introduced to Finland from Norway shortly after its introduction there in 1972.\textsuperscript{137}

The Sami movement in Finland had to adjust to the majority political style in an early phase after the establishment of the Sami Parliament. The Sami began to exploit the political opportunity created by the pressure applied to the nation-states by international conventions (or at least they had the opportunity to do so); this took place in an institutionalized framework. Many indigenous claims had already had to be taken seriously. The Sami were emerging as not merely a group oppressed by the majority, but a group seeking recognition as an independent group, with a special position.\textsuperscript{138} This happened at roughly the same time as the NSR published its demand for special treatment, based on aboriginality. A shift from an integrationist to a more clearly separationist movement occurred,\textsuperscript{139} though in Finland without the freedom of action possessed by the NGOs. It seems that the old, freer modes of action from the pre-institutionalized era were used in the first phase of the history of the Delegation. After a while, however, institutionalization produced the most successful Sami politician, Pekka Aikio, son of Oula, with his more cautious imagery and legally-based argumentation. The differences between father and son illustrate the shift before and after institutionalization.

In Finland there was less to react to: there was no front questioning first-comer status, nor was there any need to make the Sami people conscious of their first-comer status.\textsuperscript{140} Rather than being occupied with historical and/or political issues, colonization continued, in a Finnish context, to be an ecological/environmental and resource usage rights issue. This aspect of the past, present and future of the Sami domicile was the most conflict-ridden and it

\textsuperscript{137} The symbol has many meanings, but is mostly used to express Sami opposition and dissident thought. Lehtola 2005a, 31.
\textsuperscript{138} Compare Tuulentie 2001, 65, 67, 97-98.
\textsuperscript{139} Thuen 1995, 3-4, 14-15.
\textsuperscript{140} See Minde 2003b, 106, on the late breakthrough of a consciousness of being indigenous among the Sami in a “Nordic context”, until the Alta case.
mobilized the most powerful actors in Finland. The construction of first-comer history was rare, and was typically only implied as an unspoken and mutually shared premise, as there was no need to contest that part of the Sami collective identity. There were, however, strenuous efforts to construct an ecologically sound past and a historical society that had been spoilt by colonization and industrial land-use. This also meant that the issues were not ethnic issues: they were issues of (un)employment and conservation. The strong unemployment discourse included the Sami at a local level and was not yet hostile to the Sami cause: the Sami were still not the cause of unemployment, nor a hindrance to “development”. Probably the only undertaking on the behalf of the majority, in terms of identity politics, was renouncing the rhetoric of racial discrimination as too far-fetched. It was out of place in both the progressive ideological atmosphere of the 1970s and in terms of actual minority politics, which, by comparison with many other countries, were perceived as sufficient.

7.5. International forums

The Sami conferences evolved from “adult education” to “political workshops”, as the Sami took over the Sami conferences. The programmes radicalized as well, and absorbed influences from the emerging international forums. In 1971, the Sami appeared as an ethnic group seeking the right to self-rule, “a people with their own territory, culture and social structure”,\(^\text{141}\) anticipating the Sápmi idea. As we have seen, the Sápmi idea was only faintly expressed by Sami activists in Finland, especially as this was a foreign term for the older generation and the younger generation was more eager to refer to alternative territorialities. In addition, the drafting of a new, radical settlement history and colonization implied a Sami society that had been conquered. Official venues were another matter: Pekka Aikio was cautious of other people living in the administrative area and avoided secessionist rhetoric. Instead, co-operation was sought in resource management.\(^\text{142}\)

At the Jällivaara conference in 1971, it became obvious that the Finnish rights discourse lagged behind that of the Swedes. The emphasis on usage rights fell short of Israel Ruong’s demands for a special legal position and “a certain kind of autonomy”. After the

\(^{141}\) Minde 2005, 4.
\(^{142}\) Aikio, Pekka: Mii lea sámi párldamenta? Sápmelaš 4/1979; Sami Raddi was more open about territorial wishes, for example in the Sami political programme. Sápmelaš 4/1979, Sámikonferensu Romsii 1980.
conference, Samuli Aikio raised autonomy as the main issue.\textsuperscript{143} The greatest conference contribution – whilst appreciating the (pan-)Sami Cultural Political Programme – was the disbelief expressed by Professor Veikko O. Hyvönen concerning the use of immemorial usage rights in the rights claims. Its juridical tenability was found to be weak and it was in the process of vanishing completely from the legislation of Finland in the re-allocation of the fishing boundaries in Upper Lapland. A solution was sought by establishing the position of Ombudsman, suggested by Oula Aikio.\textsuperscript{144} Otherwise, lectures in the conference were limited and so there was more room for the informal exchange of information. At the conference, national solutions were sought for pan-Sami issues. These were perceived as unproblematic issues, as long as the Sami managed to organize themselves at both an international and a national level.\textsuperscript{145}

From 1974 onwards, the Sami Delegation represented the Sami of Finland at conferences,\textsuperscript{146} ending the formal influence of the SFPLC and SL in Sami international cooperation. The change of paradigm became more evident at the 1974 Snåsa conference, which marked a transitional period: rather than being a people bound by their borders and their own national bodies, the Sami appeared, for the first time, as an indigenous people bound together by a Nordic context. Ethnopolitics was beginning to be pursued in this context. In the first place, the conference was represented as the Nordic Parliament of the Sami. The many practical demands included inter-Nordic measures, for example a common Sami Law to secure the particular needs of the Sami people. The conference selected its representatives to the Port Alberni conference of the WCIP.\textsuperscript{147}

At the Inari conference of 1976, the Sami represented themselves as an indigenous people.\textsuperscript{148} The land rights claim, as Henry Minde points out, was based not on the irrevocable and inborn rights of an aboriginal/indigenous people, but still on the Nordic legal procedure of use since time immemorial.\textsuperscript{149} In spite of this, with George Manuel present, the conference became a manifestation of the new identity, with markers of ecological soundness,

\textsuperscript{144} The legal argument was used later on in the WCIP, but not so much in Finland. LK 14.8.1971, Ruotsin saamelaisten oikeudet turvatuimpia kuin muissa maissa; LK 14.8.1971, Tri Veikko O. Hyvönen: Vesisirajankäymneistä saamelaisalueilla.
\textsuperscript{145} LK 15.8.1971, VII saamelaiskonferenssi Jällivaarassa työskenteli autonomia johtotähdenään; LK 15.8.1971, Reidar Suomenrinne: Tähän mennessä työtelään saamelaiskonferenssi.
\textsuperscript{146} Helander 1991, 123.
\textsuperscript{148} Minde 1995b, 21-22; Sabmelaš 3/1976, Anar konferenssa looppaärvalusat.
\textsuperscript{149} Minde 2005, 4.
unrecognized rights to the land and the harmful external penetration of industrial land-use forms. In the Inari resolution we find these elements in a most perfect harmony. The Nordic context, which bound the Snåsa resolution, is gone: the political field is de-nationalized, with claims for a Sami political programme, a common Sami labour market area and references to the Sami region that was first inhabited by the Sami. The Sami territory is perceived as both constitutive to their identity and as a base for Sami subsistence: the traditional means of living practised there were to be secured, as well the possibility of Sami women obtaining paid labour there.\textsuperscript{150}

The 1978 Arjeplog conference became a manifestation of pan-Saminess due to projects concerning Northern Sami orthography and Sami culture, and a Sami political programme, all of which stressed the Sami unity as one people. Pekka Aikio resolved the “problem” of national borders by defining the Sami as one people with “the same historical background, approximately the same language tradition…” Thus, the notions denying the existence of a special Sami land were an “illusion”. However, the national borders were an actual political fact: Aikio took the floor to present the role of the Sami Delegation and took the opportunity to explain that the Sami Council was not to be the highest Sami political body. The borders were a fact that had to be taken into account when drafting Sami policy. This was to be undertaken by the Sami Delegation, a true parliament, receiving its legitimacy from the people it represented and who elected it, as well as from the Finnish administrative hierarchies. The Sami cultural programme also entailed the politicization of cultural issues, seeing them as rights and status issues, not so much a phenomenon in need of protection any more. This positive, forward-looking element was evident in the way that means were sought to protect, stimulate and develop Sami culture. The programme practised a wide definition of culture, where all spheres of life were included.\textsuperscript{151}

7.6. Conclusions

As the first phase of Sami activism held the notion of a shared, yet disappearing tribal feeling, the radical generation launched a discourse of indigenousness, cultivating markers of being


\textsuperscript{151} Pekka Aikio’s comment in the discussion on the rules of the Sami Council and a presentation on the Finnish Sami Delegation at the Samernas X konferens, Arjeplog 20-22.1978, Nordisk Sameråd, Hangö 1979; Morottaja 1979; Nuorgam-Poutasu 1979.
connected with nature. What is common to both is their belief in a shared collective identity. The crisis consciousness in the ponderings of the Sami collective identity had increased with the accelerating Finnish industrial penetration, to which the more consistent use of “natural people” imagery was a reaction. A great paradigm change occurred in status terms: “the small minority” was now striving to obtain the status of indigenous people. In spite of the including efforts of the most radical members of the elite, the 1970s was a period of change, with an increase in the exclusiveness of representative strategies in both free and institutionalized forums. The representative field became more fragmented, or pluralized, with regard to the markers selected. Plurality, or utilizing numerous identity policies side by side, was evident in a number of statements from the Sami Delegation, and especially in the report of the Sami Committee. This may be an indication of dissatisfaction with the most exclusive imagery, and a genuine undertaking by the elite to include as much as possible of the grass-roots level in the struggle for rights. Another strategy was to choose markers on an ad hoc basis.

The changes were due to two changes in the political space: institutionalization and internationalization. The global brotherhood at that time offered representational tools with a high legitimacy among the most progressive audiences, that is to say, indigenous people using the land collectively and sustaining its ecological balance. This harmonious way of life had been disrupted by violent colonization, which bound together the indigenous people of the world. The problem was that the parallel development of institutionalization had bound the Sami movement to the national political frame. Due to this concession on the part of the state of Finland, the Sami were forced to attempt a “politics of embarrassment” from within the national bodies, instead of using the oppositional tools of international law against the state. The Sami themselves were part of the state machinery, which was not receptive to radicalizing demands. Thus the “globalization”, or rather internationalization, was not such an empowering experience for the Sami in Finland as it was for many other people using international law and institutes in effective litigation, lobbying and rights claims from national governments.  

The greatest change in identity politics was the firmer use of a colonized “natural people” imagery, as well as incorporating the emerging rights discourse into the “Sami lacking rights” imagery. The popular imagery of the 1950s and 1960s, with the Sami founding themselves between tradition and modernity, appeared matter-of-fact, harmless, even useless

during a period of turmoil and resistance in the Fourth World (but also in the First one).\textsuperscript{153} This change had the premise of a demonized colonizer, the state of Finland, and perceived Finnish legislation as hindering or insufficient, if not downright hostile and harmful to the Sami cause. The modernization-friendly thinking, explicit in the old imagery, was abandoned and Finnish penetration was now seen as a factor diminishing the Sami domicile and subsistence. The “Sami lacking rights” imagery entertained a more purist ground vision of Saminess\textsuperscript{154} than the imagery entertained by the first generation — even though the Sami were still finding themselves in actual fact on the borderline between tradition and modernity, the last-mentioned option was hostile to the primordialised and politicized element of tradition.

The most radical “inventions” of the period — 1) colonization and the demonized colonizer, and 2) cultivation of the image of not having any conception of landownership — were chosen from global impulses. These impulses left a transitory mark on the Sami movement in Finland, while the marker with its own “Finnish” pre-history – Saminess being integrated to and by nature – continued to be cultivated on a longer basis than the most radical imagery. However, institutionalization was beginning to guide the identity politics of the Sami Delegation and “natural people” imagery was beginning to be “ghettoized” into the sphere of unofficial cultural co-operation, inspired by global co-operation. The connectedness to nature was now at its deepest, which would be partially dismantled and de-romanticized in the decade to come. The actors chose different strategies and the hegemonic struggle over representative strategy, as well as cementing the gap between official and unofficial forums, continued during the 1980s.

The results were poor and this was the root of increasing dissatisfaction. One emerging feature in the Sami movement of Finland may be seen to reveal itself: the movement was re-envisioned after a period of growing dissatisfaction with non-existent results and/or ineffective

\textsuperscript{153} Samuli Aikio continued to cultivate the “matter-of-fact” imagery. The Sami were a developing people with a long history of change and choice of impulses. The Sami had thus shown remarkable flexibility and “an ability to assimilate”\textsuperscript{5} outside impulses. The Sami had come up with its own societies, such as the medieval hunting society. The colonization process was there, but it had not destroyed the Sami culture, the authenticity of which could be judged by the level of successful assimilation of the majority cultural markers into the Sami culture. Aikio used a slogan “A Sami is a Sami even without reindeer”. KA, Archive of SiPLC, box 30, Miscellaneous, A lecture by Samuli Aikio Saamelaisen kulttuurin vaiheista, given in “Syyserotus”, Ostrobotnia Helsinki, 18.-20.11.1970.

\textsuperscript{154} Aikio, Pekka: Ovttaiduvvi sabmelažžak, Sabmelaš 7-8/1972 is an early example of this and shows the continuity in the identity politics of Pekka Aikio; Kitti 1974 is also a good example of this. Kitti sees the Reindeer Estate Law as stripping the Sami from power. It was a harmful law that showed, in its continuity from the Forest Law of 1886, how the Finnish state took the land. The law would benefit only Finnish reindeer herders. Kitti also introduced the idea that the law was intended to mobilize the forests of Inari protected by the Sheltered Forest Act of 1922 that restricted the logging in the forests located high on the slopes of the mountains.
strategies. The silent state, trying to appease the Sami with partial concessions, was thus partly responsible for having to deal with an increasingly hostile and professionalizing minority not giving up the claims that were beginning to be made of ownership of the very “Finnish” soil itself.
8. Consolidating Identity Policies in a Fragmented Political Environment

(the early 1980s)

8.1. Introduction

The early 1980s constitutes an era of its own because of numerous breaks in political space/time. Political contexts were becoming increasingly fragmented. The same processes were beginning to be felt in the Sami movement as well. The strategies in building the Sami collective identity were, as a consequence, in the process of differentiation. In this chapter I shall look into the further contestation of the two representational strategies, the legalist and the primordial, that were pursued in the Sami political space in the process of differentiation. Firstly, I shall study how “official” Finland treated the Sami question and what kind of counter-imagery was upheld in the Finnish public sphere. Exceptionally, in order to illustrate the increasing gaps within and peculiar strategies of the Sami society in Finland, I shall initially examine the developments in the international forums: there we find an effort to incorporate WCIP discourses in the various declarations, which, I shall argue, was an exhausted option in the Finnish context. After that, changes in the identity politics of the Sami Delegation and unofficial actors will be followed. The tension between the two representative strategies, the legalist and the primordialist, is of especial interest here. In the wake of the institutionalization and the parallel internationalization, “free” constructions of collective Sami identity had radicalized and “primordial” imagery continued to be applied. This was met with increasing dissatisfaction on the part of the hardcore Sami elite in their quest for a firmer legal foundation to identity politics. Finally, I shall endeavour to indicate the global and national factors that influenced identity politics.

8.1.1. The fragmented political contexts of the 1980s

Global examples of litigation against nation-states began to occur, that of the Cree people against the state of Canada in the 1970s, for example.¹ In international law, there were minor positive developments. The notorious, assimilative ILO Convention 107 was never ratified by the Nordic states. The limitations of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political

¹ Niezen 2000, 133.
Rights Article 27 of 1966 were becoming clear, as it was usable only in matters of cultural and linguistic rights. (This was not the case in Norway, though. A broader interpretation of the covenant was applied to the Norwegian Constitution following the NOU 1984:18 committee report.\(^2\)) The indigenous issue gained a firmer and more positive referential foundation in the Cobo Reports (1981-1983), which extended the scope of inquiry from matters of a cultural and economic nature to treaty rights between states and indigenous peoples.\(^3\) In Finland, legislation continued that recognized a distinct Sami cultural community and its claim to positive action, mostly concerning educational questions. This renders Finnish Sami minority politics not merely one of “neglecting” the issue or of “official indifference”, as the Swedish equivalent has been described.\(^4\) A policy of cautious concession might be a more appropriate conceptualization. However, the Sami issue was still a marginal issue in Finnish political life.

The 1980s denote a break in the Finnish process of welfare state-building and changes in the political field. Pertti Alasuutari, a professor of social sciences, locates the shift from a planning economy (see Chapter 4.1.1) to a competition economy in the early 1980s. This new societal policy was not a product of the process that formed the welfare state of Finland. The competition economy (kilpailutalous) highlighted the individual and the markets. Citizens had become buying customers instead of clients of the welfare state and the social services needed to be made more cost effective through customer choice and competition. State intervention was scorned in many circles of influence and the rhetoric of eliminating and cutting down the welfare system was introduced to the Finnish public sphere. Power was transferred from the experts to the customers. This new discourse was always contested: the basic premises and legitimizing principles of the welfare state, the moral duties of society towards its citizens and the need to avoid measures that would render them passive were still voiced. In fact the welfare state, with reduced services, stood the test of globalization, which has been taken as a manifestation of resistance to the new liberal ideas in Finland.\(^5\)

The Finnish political space began to be fragmented and a process labelled as post-modern began, replacing the grand narratives with individualism and atomized life projects. One consequence of this atomization, as well as an increase in wealth and decrease in class differences, was that the frames of identification based on class position were considered out-of-date. Class identities were replaced by a multiplicity of possibilities for “identity

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\(^2\) The Norwegian title of the committee report is Om samenes retstilling.

\(^3\) Anaya 2000, 49-51; Henriksen 1999, 50-51.


\(^5\) Alasuutari 1996, 112-121; Kalela 2005c, 244; Kalela 2005d, 272-273.
shopping”: the 1980s denote a reorganization of the political map, as people found the actions and message of the traditional parties less acceptable. In addition, there were two new traits/issues that did not respect the traditional left-right division in Finland. The first one is mentioned only briefly, since it had not yet had any impact on the Sami issue: this was the discussion on Finland’s integration into Western Europe, which divided people not along party lines but, in rough terms, along those willing to internationalize Finland and those against this. The political map was reorganized according to an agrarian-urban and south-north dichotomization.

The second new feature was the introduction of new political power, in the form of the environmentalist movement and the Green Party, into Finnish political life. Environmentalist thinking challenged class-interest politics by pointing out the global, non-class-based and non-nation-based nature of environmental problems. This global and national discourse had direct consequences in the Sami political space. The environmentalist discourse brought new actors and ideas to the Sami home area. This discourse was based on Western hegemonic scientific practices; it shook the legitimacy of national actors and institutions at a local level and partially marginalized local indigenous issues by introducing competing ecologies and problems judged to be more important than those of a marginal minority. Environmental discourse and thinking appeared in Finland during the 1970s, but gained their full momentum during the 1980s. Finland in the 1980s has been characterized as a thoroughly ecologized nation in which the discourse created everyday practices and national policies. This statement has some legitimacy, but the era is also remembered for extravagant consumerism. The dominance of the environmentalist discourse is evident in the way that the Green Party remained small, but all the other parties had to adopt ecological issues on their agendas. I shall return to the consequences of the ecologization of Sami issues in the chapter on the Kessi dispute.

It can be already be stated that even though traditional party politics were losing their legitimacy, the ethnic-based organization of politics achieved only a limited success. As we shall see in the next chapter, the willingness to acknowledge the Sami as a serious political/legal actor was low and dependent on the radicality of their demands. On the other hand, post-modern value relativity, with its greater freedom to question the legitimacy of

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6 Kalela 2005c, 247, 256; Mazover 1999, 358, 390, 396-399.
7 Kalela 2005c, 259; Paavonen 2005, 240.
Sami rights, was not yet hampering the Sami claims: the progressive and politically correct atmosphere from the 1970s blossomed fully in the counter-imagery.

Political fragmentation began to influence the political climate in Lapland as well. In retrospect, it has been stated that Lapland was not industrialized but mechanized. Industrialization did not develop on the scale that the state had wished, due to a lack of private funds in Lapland. Modern industrial society had already begun to dissolve during this process, and partly because of it: mechanization left thousands of people unemployed in the traditional means of living and neither the growing services nor industry could employ them. It was chiefly a belief in development and industries that made Lapland an integral part of the modern industrial society. During the 1980s this belief began to erode and criticism of the ecological consequences of the process began to extend to Lapland. This was contested with talk of unemployment and the division has remained since in numerous disputes on the use of natural resources, since the province is dependent on primary means of living to a greater extent than the rest of the country.\(^9\)

When they succeeded in gaining access, the Sami were met in official circles with a patronizing and uninformed attitude that reflected the marginality of Sami questions in Finnish politics. On 10 October 1981, at the time of the Alta struggle, a deputation from the Sami Delegation met the Minister for Agriculture and Forestry, Veikko Saarto, in Helsinki. Saarto welcomed the deputation by saying that the Sami were a “great wealth” (Stuorra riggodat) for the Finnish majority people and that he hoped that the Sami would have the “same kind of possibilities for their own culture as the majority had”. Matti Morottaja answered that beautiful words were not enough for the Sami: deeds were required instead. It was typical of the Sami ethnopolitics of that time that the Sami had to give lengthy lectures about their aspirations and answer questions about their means of living and everyday problems.\(^10\) Sometimes unanimity was explicitly required of the Sami: at a Sami cultural evening in Utsjoki, in 1982, Irja Seurujärvi stated that if the Sami language domain was not expanded, the Sami culture was not going to survive. Jaakko Numminen from the Ministry of Education said that there was a good possibility that the Sami language could be made official in Finland, but the process was advancing slowly and it would be important to receive a

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\(^9\) Suopajärvi 2003, passim.
unanimous demand from the Sami associations.\textsuperscript{11} The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs funded WCIP for the first time in 1983, many years after the other Nordic countries.\textsuperscript{12}

With regard to the Sami movement, the 1980s was marked by the preparation of Sami laws at a national and inter-Nordic level. This process employed the Sami Delegation and, from 1978, the Advisory Council on Sami Affairs, which studied the potential for a change in legislation concerning land and water rights. The legislation processes employed the entire Sami elite. The results of these processes are discussed in the chapter on the Kessi dispute and in the epilogue, but it should already be mentioned that the preparatory work on the Sami Law had a profound impact on representational strategies and ethnopoltics in general. The processes mentioned were prioritized and they cemented the scientific and legal approach to Sami issues. They also bound the Sami movement to the national frame. In the end, the whole process was questioned by the addressee, the state.\textsuperscript{13} It should also be mentioned here that the preparatory process itself is a topic that has not been researched.\textsuperscript{14} As has already been stated, the same kind of processes went on in parallel in the Nordic countries and this constitutes an interesting and important research topic on its own right. Here, however, the focus lies on the impact of this process on ethnopoltics and identity politics, using the example of the Kessi dispute.

\section*{8.2. The imagery of indigenousness in inter-Nordic and global forums}

Disappointment over the WCIP Kiruna conference (1977) was evident in \textit{Saameläš}, where the absence of North American Indians was commented on bitterly by Sulo Aikio. Two Sami contributions were heard at the conference: “Sami Radio is for the whole of Samiland” and “The Sami Council has been born again”, which did not convey the same level of crisis consciousness as statements from South American representants, bringing messages of, for example, genocide and robbing indigenous peoples of their lands. The theme of the conference was the situation of the indigenous peoples in relation to the international treaties

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\textsuperscript{11} Kitti, Jouni: Ságastallan sápmelaškultuurrra birra Ohecejogas, Sápmelaš 5/1982.  \\
\textsuperscript{12} Sápmelaš 4/1983, Suoma stáhtas doarjja Álgoálmogid málímmiráddai.  \\
\textsuperscript{13} Saamelaiskuttauritoimikunnan mietintö 1985:66, 197; Saamelaiden kielilaki, Saamelaisvaltuuskunnan ehdotus laiksi saamen kielen käättämisestä viranomaisissa, Komiteanmietintö 1987:60, passim; Saamelaisasiain neuvottelukunnan mietintö 1, 1990:32, Ehdotus saamelaislaiksi ja erinäisten lakien muuttamiseksi.  \\
\textsuperscript{14} Instead of preparatory process, Lehtola focuses on the political process itself and the hearing in the Sami Delegation, as well as the debate that followed the proposal. Lehtola 2005a, 129-138; Tuulentie also focuses on the hearing that followed the proposal. Tuulentie 2001, passim.
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that were meant to protect them and their domiciles. This last-mentioned issue and the information provided on these matters were particularly important.

It has been stated that after the Kiruna conference, contact between the Sami and other indigenous peoples grew stronger. The WCIP Canberra conference of 1981 had concrete results, when indigenous self-determination and self-government over territories and resources were demanded in the resolutions. Earth/land was seen as part of the indigenous culture. A goal of freedom was set, firstly within existing societies and finally between nations. Political and economical imperialism were condemned as destructive to indigenous life-forms, while the need was voiced for the self-definition of indigenous needs and policies. For the “Finnish” movement, the concept of self-determination was a new contribution in the claim box. Many of these issues had already been taken up, or achieved, by the Sami in Finland. Criticism of the self-governing Sami Delegation’s lack of power was an old issue and the old ownership rights to the region had already been demanded. The resource question was also old. Not all the Sami were ready to adopt imperialist rhetoric but some, most audibly Jouni Kitti, did. The discourse on freedom was not voiced. In 1983, a Sami secretary was nominated to the permanent secretariat of the WCIP, which was situated in Lethbridge, Canada.

The Sami conference in Utsjoki, in 1983, attended by President Mauno Koivisto, continued to distance itself from the frames provided by the Nordic nation states and create a separate pan-Saminness. One expression of this was the reference to “our wide Samiland” that Helvi Nuorgam-Poutasuo made in her opening address, as well as the Alta and Tsieskul River issues. The abrogation of the Lapp Codicil and closing of the borders in 1852 were represented as a hindrance to traditional means of living and Nordic co-operation among the Sami. The conference was attended by the WCIP chairman, José Carlos Morales, and the proposal for a treaty on indigenous rights drafted at the time by the WCIP was discussed and introduced by Aslak Nils Sara. This resulted in the application of new categories of international law, collective rights and the self-determination of indigenous peoples at the conference, inspired by the Canberra conference. The global bond was beginning to be

17 Sápmelas 3-4/1981, Áalgoálbmoogid friijavuohta lea dál šaddan bargoplánan.
18 Sápmelaš passim and, for example, Outakoski, Nilla: Suoma sábmelaččaid boaattevuohta, Sápmelaš 3-4/1981; Sápmelaš 3-4/1981, Suoma ráddéhus viiddida luonddusuodjalgguovvuoluid.
effective in the Sami Council and this was evident in the changes of status, claims and representations that were being sought.\textsuperscript{20}

At the time of the WCIP conference in Panama City, in 1984, the positivity of deepening contact was prevalent and contact was becoming regular and stable. In Panama, the Finnish delegation consisted of Kaarina Suomenrinne, Matti Morottaja, Niilo Aikio, Hans Nuorgam and cultural representatives. Pekka Aikio, Morottaja and Irja Seurujärvi-Kari (who was a member of the executive council of the WCIP) became regulars at WCIP meetings. The conference focused on local matters and accepted the proclamation on indigenous rights,\textsuperscript{21} which was to become influential in the work of the Nordic Council.

The Sami conference in Åre, in 1986, accepted the Sami political programme; this was a manifestation, in identity political terms, of the Sami as colonized, as well as having insufficient rights and tools of power. The programme contained three main areas of interest – land and water rights, rights concerning the means of living and language rights – which also reflected the priorities of the Finnish Sami Delegation. Of the global elements, the most visible was the reference to the international conventions (the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights), while the reference to land rights, which have been never awarded to any outside power, echoed the thinking and research prevalent in Finland. Traditional landownership was perceived as stronger than the newly-established state ownership.\textsuperscript{22}

The conference also publicized the Sami environmental programme, in which the Sami appeared as the indigenous people of Sápmi who had tended the vulnerable lands and waters of their domicile with respect and caution. Environmental deprivation was due to colonization by the majority, whose environmental attitude was totally different from that of the Sami. The Sami and their culture were part of the ecosystem. They had found a balance between their culture and nature. The ecological knowledge the Sami possessed was also transmitted in the Sami language. In addition, the Sami were represented in an inter-Nordic, pan-Sami context as being connected, through environmental adaptive measures, to the economical sphere of reindeer pastures, hunting and gathering grounds, fishing waters, fjords and agricultural land. The claims, being the main issue of the programme, were in two parts. Land and natural resources were to be reserved above all for Sami means of living and


\textsuperscript{22} Sápmelaš 2-3/1987, Sámepolitihkalaš prógrámma.
majority access, and industrial land-use forms were to be restricted and regulated.\textsuperscript{23} Compare this with the Sami discourses in the Finnish public sphere, where direct self-representations of sustainability were increasingly contested by the Sami themselves. The same may be said of the direct (and quite static) representations of Sami culture: the latter, in imagery used in Finland, was bound to traditional trades, not to nature. However, the extent to which the culture was linked to the ecosystem was deeper in an international context than in the Finnish public sphere, where such a direct connection was avoided; the trades that created the connection between the Sami and nature in Finland – and through which the threat materialized – sustained more room for Sami agency. In addition, the legal approach, and the national discourses and political procedures – the institutionalization – had a definite effect on Sami representative strategies in the state of Finland. The Sami Council, the body most deeply involved in global political co-operation, was truly applying the global rhetoric of environmental soundness.

This widening chasm and the different political cultures/orientations were evident in a statement by Pekka Aikio on the ongoing work of the “Sami Rights Committee” of Finland (which published a report and recommendation for a Sami Law in 1990) and on the ongoing work on the Sami Law in Finland, in which Aikio was involved. This was “probably” only going to be national. There had been co-operation among the Sami rights committees in the Nordic countries, but “probably” only a shared, inter-Nordic proposal could be made.\textsuperscript{24} The legal discourse before the breakthrough of the collective rights paradigm was not yet empowering – it still appeared as a mechanism that bound the Sami to national discourses and procedures. The “statism” and different legal discourses in the Nordic countries checked even the inter-Nordic construction of political co-operation among the Sami. Judicial history was also nationally bound and a hindering factor in the Nordic Sami co-operation: the Sami in Finland had researched the potential to apply the Lapp Tax institution (Lappskatte institusjonen), which had been known only in Sweden-Finland\textsuperscript{25}.

The Lakselv conference of 1989 issued Statement # 7 on the international rights and duties of the Sami, which made direct, binding references to the principles accepted by the conferences of the WCIP. As an indigenous people, the Sami had the right of self-determination and the protection of their land-use forms, as guaranteed in Article 27 of the

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
International Covenant on Social and Political Rights on cultural protection. The duties involved co-operation among the peoples of the earth and the contribution that WCIP principles were to be respected and implemented by the various nation-states.\textsuperscript{26}

In Finland, Jouni Kitti came up with most explicit globalized ponderings of Sami indigenousness. The Sami belonged to the indigenous community and their culture, like that of other indigenous peoples, was threatened by Western societal development. The Sami also belonged to the margins of the globe, which were the most ecologically vulnerable. This vulnerability posed a threat to the continuity of the Sami culture. A colonization of resources and the corruption of the Sami mind had occurred through Finnicization. Forestry was represented as the most serious threat to the Sami culture. Kitti transformed these threat scenarios into the possibility of ecological development, where the Sami would be connected to the rest of the world and thus, in the name of the survival of the globe, the Sami and other indigenous people would give up their current, technical world-view and begin to follow their own ecological principles.\textsuperscript{27}

As a form of political demonstration, Sámelas became a medium for the WCIP. When the chairman, José Carlos Morales, visited Finland, he gave a lengthy report about the conditions of the indigenous peoples in the war-waging countries of Guatemala and El Salvador.\textsuperscript{28} During his second visit to Finland, to attend the Utsjoki conference, he “gave his blessing” to the Sami policy of moral and material help to the global movement. This help consisted of financing different indigenous projects in America, contacting officials and providing press releases on indigenous issues.\textsuperscript{29}

The collective identity constructed in global indigenous organizations such as the WCIP is built on commonality, which is usually celebrated as a coherent strategy: an indigenous connection to land and territory, aspirations to autonomy and self-determination, the revitalization of languages and cultures, historical experiences of oppression and marginalization, a continuing state of vulnerability, poor health and education levels, and a low income/standard of living all contain inclusive representative possibilities. Usually, however, the choice of stable indigenous or tribal identities relying on continuity in “pre-invasion” and “pre-colonial” societies leads to primordialist strategies that render some of the


\textsuperscript{27} Kitti, Jouni: Saamelainen kulttuuri muutostensa painessa, Kansan Tahto 24.9.1983.

\textsuperscript{28} Sápmelas 3-4/1982, Álgoálmogid ottastusa presidenta Morales Sámis.

markers unusable in a First World context. This applies to poverty, poor access to welfare services and some forms of common property rights. The indigenous imagery subsequently remained essentially the same in the decades that followed, as we shall see.

8.3. The era of the most positive counter-imagery

Matti Morottaja commented in 1984 on the homogenous reindeer-herding imagery entertained by the Finnish majority. The Sami were, on the contrary, a diverse group, distinguished not only by their different languages but also by race, means of living, customs and history. The need to comment on stereotypical reindeer-herding imagery may be taken as proof of its existence in certain forums. In a closer look at the public sphere during the 1980s, the pluralization of Finnish society is reflected in the multiplicity of counter-imagery. For example, the representational strategy with the longest history, the imagery of a dying, vanishing people and of Sami culture facing destructive modernization, was still used on rare occasions. This imagery was patronizingly positive towards the Sami, but it still relied on the assumption of the Sami being weaker.

One part of the land discourse, the alternative territorial unit of the Sami – “Saamenmaa” or “Samiland” – was dealt with by the Finns in an open manner in the Finnish public sphere. It was not uncommon to read positive references to Sami self-governing territories or to “Saamenmaa” by Finnish writers, sometimes as an already-existing territory. The “territory” of Saamenmaa does not overlap with the Sápmi constructed today; it was constructed through the non-existence, vagueness and invisibility of the national borders in northernmost Lapland (in comparison to the border with the Soviet Union, J.N.), as well as through a demonization of the Finns, who had marginalized the peaceful people to the north, violently occupying their land.

30 Kingsbury 1998, 419, 421.
32 LK 24.2.1987, Viimeinen hetki saamelaisperinteen tallentamiseen.
33 Johannes Helander defined Saamenmaa as different from more formal “Saamelaisalue” (Sami region), which is the legally defined Sami domicile. Saamenmaa means “approximately the same”, but it is based on people’s perception of the Sami domicile. Helander1991, 6-7. Thus the idea of Saamenmaa resembles that of Sápmi, as they both come close to the politically constructed nature of an imagined community.
34 See one example, pondering on a similar self-government system for the Sami as those of the Åland Islands and the Faroe Islands, Sabmelaš 3/1977, Ossodakhoavda Kalervo Síkkala: Sameeädnam samiidi!!
Veikko Holmberg, a Sami himself, mentioned that if a Sami were to speak of “Saamenmaa”, he/she would be labelled an activist and an “extremity person”.\(^{36}\) This caution may be a sign of Sami awareness of the stop-go mentality in the Finnish public sphere (and therefore proof of its existence): as the Sami made radical claims, these were annulled and denied. In Sami conferences the idea of Samiland was expressed, and shared policies for the region were already being drafted in Tromsø by Samuli Aikio in 1980\(^{37}\). Tuomas Magga, a lecturer in the Sami language at the University of Oulu, criticized the term “Sami home area” as a name bestowed by the majority that had connotations with the homelands of black people in South Africa and the reservations of the North American Indians. A better name would be Saamenmaa, because most of the Sami still lived there. But even a Sami could not escape the inclusive Finnish national communion: “And everybody is in different contexts, for example abroad, a Finn.”\(^{38}\) On the other hand, Matti Morottaja referred to the nation-boundness of Saminess, the non-existence of both pan-Saminess and Sápmi, as the Sami society still consisted of small units, which, however, might be organized in a cross-border manner, for example along the River Teno.\(^{39}\)

In one crucial respect, the counter-imagery was out-of-date: the Sami were represented as a cultural minority by cultural markers that categorized the Sami by their means of living. As we saw in the previous chapter, this was one of the main Sami political goals, but in a Finnish context and in Finnish hands this meant the continuing dominance of reindeer-herding imagery and avoiding the use of the categories and statuses of international law.\(^{40}\) The difficulty in coping with the Sami operating in the challenging categories of international law is reflected in an interview with Maret Sára, the general secretary of the Sami Council, who declared that in order to make the Council function better, the Nordic states had to recognize the Sami as one people. Sára was quoted in Kaleva: “I am not a Norwegian, I am a Sami.” The newspaper continued by explaining that Sára had said this “although…with a friendly smile in her face”.\(^{41}\) The soft issues, such as cultural rights and blaming the colonization of the distant past were more easily taken up, while more serious manifestations of regional or ethnic belonging and renouncing citizenship had to be mellowed down. It was usual to speak

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36 Pohjolan Sanomat 2.9.1984 Saamen kirjallisuus ei sairasta enää.
37 Aikio S. 1981. Samuli Aikio referred to the area, which had always been called Samiland. Latterly, attempts had been made to hide behind the term North Calotte.
40 See, for example, Nopola, Sinikka: Sadunkertojen jälkeläiset, Helsingin Sanomat 2.9.1984.
41 An article in Kaleva 13.3.1987, headline is lost.
of the “Sami population” or the “Sami community”, which confined the Sami to being a minority within the national whole, rather than representing them as a people.

The 1980s was also an era of the extensive (mis-)use of Sami cultural markers in the tourism industry of Finland, which aroused a considerable amount of Sami protest. The use of these cultural markers was interpreted as hugely disparaging and a source of misinformation, and the Sami right to define their own culture was demanded instead. Sami images produced by the tourism industry in Finland aroused the interest of and protests among the Sami in Norway.\(^{42}\) Tourism experienced a growth during the late 1980s and proved to be a factor that created friction within the Sami community. It was mostly represented as harmful, colonizing and, in particular, a culturally exploitative industry in the Sami home areas over which the Sami had no control. Snowmobile tourism was a real nuisance in reindeer-herding terms. The trouble was that in the case of traditional river-fishing and salmon tourism in Teno, for example, it was difficult to estimate the income from tourism to the Sami involved and the decreasing effect on income from traditional fishing.\(^{43}\)

8.4. Self-imagery

8.4.1. The streamlined and matter-of-fact identity politics of the Sami Delegation during the early 1980s

The expectation of a commonly-shared Sami policy (see Chapter 6.3.3) meant, in practice, that Skolt Sami and Aanaar Sami identities were under-communicated. Skolt Sami or Aanaar Sami policies were seldom formulated explicitly and questions were reduced to “Sami” questions or language questions\(^ {44}\). This has been attributed to the old internal hierarchies and the dominance of the North Sami (language) among the Sami in Finland. There are exceptions, for example in an angry article by Matti Morottaja in the Sami issue of *Kaltio* in


\(^{44}\) Those who worked on the orthography of the dominant North Sami language in the 1970s did not see any problem with this. The unification of the North Sami orthography would improve trans-border communication and boost the feeling of togetherness among the Sami. In addition, simultaneously with North Sami, the orthography of the Lule Sami was established. Nuorgam-Poutasuо 1979.
1982, where an extreme representation was drafted of the Aanaar Sami as victims. As a people they were “too peaceable”, “too faithful to the authorities” and therefore trampled on as a people, not just by the majority but by other Sami as well. According to Morottaja, the Aanaar Sami also lacked the initiative to protect their own language. As a consequence, the Aanaar Sami and their culture were under a real threat of vanishing and dying. Another way of expressing this would be to represent the Aanaar Sami as the most assimilated of the Sami groups in Finland.\(^{45}\) On another occasion, Matti Morottaja told Erika Satta that in spite of the downgrading attitude towards the Aanaar Sami language, the revitalization and improved status of the North Sami also paved the way for the Aanaar Sami language revitalization.\(^{46}\) In the Finnish public sphere, such expressions of Aanaar Sami identity were few and they were always cultivated by Morottaja. The dominant ethnonym used was simply “Sami”, reducing the field of representation and setting an expectancy of solidarity that was hard to attain, given the intra-ethnic demarcations.

In the Sami Delegation, the project of making Sami an official language continued. The consequent rise in its status and equality with the majority language was seen as a guarantee for the further use of the language, “a part of the cultural ecology of the Sami”, as Helvi Nuorgam-Puotasuo put it\(^ {47}\). The language claims made by the numerous linguists among the Sami politicians sustained the imagery of weakness and people on the brink of dying. Sami culture was dependent on the Sami language surviving; this was also stated officially.\(^ {48}\) The imagery in the proposal for the Sami Language Law (1987) was one of a linguistically unique indigenous people dependent on the survival of their language and state protection. Presenting outside pressures and the way in which the Sami way of life had become more technical and differentiated, and thus an eroding factor for the Sami language, caused representations of Sami culture to remain quite static. Isolation and a nomadic way of life still survived as identity markers, while the greatest emphasis was laid on the command of the Sami language.\(^ {49}\)

\(^{46}\) Satta 2005, 14-16, 63.
\(^{47}\) Nuorgam-Puotasuo 1979.
\(^{49}\) The proposal was published as a committee report and was prepared by the Sami Delegation’s working group for the Sami Language Law. Saamelaisten kieliäki, Saamelaisvaltuuskunnan ehdotus laiksi saamen kielen käyttämisestä viranomaisissa, Komiteanmietintö 1987:60, II-III, 5, 12.
By the mid-1980s, the Sami Delegation’s lack of power had become evident. The Sami experience was that neither the Delegation itself nor its demands were taken seriously by the state authorities. A full-time lawyer was needed, as well as a Finnish administrative body responsible for Sami issues. The Prime Minister’s office was the only formal connection, but it had no time to take care of Sami matters. Efforts to lobby the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry were found to be not very successful. The Sami movement suffered from insufficient funding and limited access to administrative bodies. In 1984, Sami issues were handed to Ministry of the Interior. This was done against the wishes of the Sami Delegation, who had lobbied the Ministry of Justice, since Sami issues were judicial, indigenous issues, not issues of regional policy. Contact with the state authorities became, at any rate, more stable, but the new chairperson, Irja Seurujärvi-Kari (1984-1985), still had to concentrate on the functioning potential and poor funding of the Sami Delegation. By the end of the 1980s, the Sami Delegation had streamlined its bureaucracy, which resulted in improved legitimacy in the state administration. The lawyer’s post (Heikki Hyvärinen, appointed in 1987) became influential in the preparation of subsequent Sami laws. The era was marked by a generation shift, as first generation members gave way to younger representatives, but there was also a shrinking budget and diminished activity.50

An increasing dissatisfaction may be detected in the most radical self-imagery of the “natural people” among the Sami elite. They were not totally legitimised at the Sami conferences either: the resolution from the Sami conference in Inari in 1976 and the Sami trade and social policy programme presented at the Arjeplog conference in 1978 both used the rhetoric of the Sami being in danger of losing their judicial position. These resolutions still relied on the self-representation of an indigenous people as agents of sustainability. By the time of the Tromsø conference, in 1980, a change had occurred. Nils Henrik Valkeapää spearheaded the Finnish Sami opposition by referring to his own study of judicial history and demanding a firmer and more factual judicial foundation for the landownership claims. “Political programmes” were not enough: only litigation would be more efficient. The landownership based on immemorial usage rights could only be settled with reference to the genealogy of the Sami. It also seems that the global rights discourse was dominant in the conference’s Sami political programme.51 A slow change in representational strategies

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50 KA, The archive of SfPLC, Kansainvälinen toiminta, Lecture by Heikki J. Hyvärinen “Saamelaisasiain hallinnosta ja hoidosta erityisesti Suomessa”, given at the “Kenen käsissä saamelaiskulttuuri?” seminar in Hanasaari, Espoo, March 1985; Goldschmidt 1994, 90; Lehtola 2005a, 90-93, 95-97, 103-105.
followed. Sections of the Sami elite wanted the Sami to appear as legal claimants, legal subjects, no longer a people living close to nature: indigenousness was being transformed from a cultural emblem to a judicial status.

During the 1980s, Pekka Aikio (see appendix) became a major actor in formulating Sami identity politics. He was chairman of the Delegation in 1980-1981, vice chairman of the judicial sub-committee in 1982-1983 and chairman of the same sub-committee in 1986-1987. Aikio became chairman of the Delegation again from 1988 onwards. There are shifts in the radicality of Aikio’s representations: as late as 1980, in a statement concerning the recreational use of the Sami home area, where restrictions to outside use were being demanded, the imagery and especially the claims closely resemble the most radical global imagery. Aikio suggested the establishment of “a protection area for Sami culture, where the Sami – the rightful holders of the Lapp villages – can practise and develop without hindrance their traditional, hereditary means of living, which are based on nature”. In the main, Aikio was consistent in using the self-representation he had already mobilized at the Copenhagen meeting in 1973, added to the component of Sami culture: the Sami were a people who were obtaining most of their livelihood from the traditional means of living, which were dependent on nature remaining in its natural state. A change in nature had resulted in a forced change to the Sami economy and subsistence. Preserving/conserving nature meant preserving the Sami culture and life-forms.

This self-representation connected the legal and “natural people” agencies. The former was toned down, in the sense that its inclusivity was greater (“...obtaining most of their livelihood from the traditional means of living...”, italics J.N.). Nature no longer overwhelmed the Sami agency, either: they were a developing people, practising a developing culture. The representation of agents of sustainability was only implicit, but the Western industrial land-use forms were represented explicitly and as definitely less sustainable than the Sami traditional land-use forms were and had been. In any case, the traditional Sami means of living were poorly protected under the conditions of legislation at that time, with the unaltered property rights situation of the state-owned lands. These representational strategies remained dominant and the more straightforward strategies that had been practiced

52 Lehtola 2005a, 197-209.
by Sami Council were avoided. What is also evident is that identity politics had become more matter-of-fact, clearer and more systematic by the beginning of the 1980s – this representation was offered on many occasions and was used to legitimate Sami access to planning and resource management.\(^55\)

To underline the matter-of-factness of the policy, the representation employed was backed up by demographic statistics\(^56\) and used to lend legitimation to blame and represent the industrial use of the resources in the Sami home area as harmful to the Sami means of living. Accordingly, conservation of these resources was favourable to the Sami (this strategy hampered the Scandinavian way of presenting nature conservation as an encroachment of Sami rights). The Sami were victims of economic and ecological oppression. Industrial use would also worsen the biggest problem in reindeer herding, the insufficiency of the winter pastures.\(^57\)

The infrequency of direct land rights claims is noticeable: only access to resource management and various restrictions to majority access were demanded. This may be due to numerous research programmes that were ongoing during this period. The research programme on land rights by *Sami Instituhtta* was presented in the Finnish public sphere and attended by Pekka and Samuli Aikio.\(^58\) Kaisa Korpiaakko was working on her thesis. Legal lobbying relied on studies by Heikki Hyvärinen, who had abandoned lobbying that relied on immemorial usage rights. The legal acquisition by the state of Finland of the Lapp village lands was denied, since it had never been granted to any external authority. The transfer of property rights had to be based on this, while the state of Finland only referred to the Forest Law of 1886 and “consolidation” of the land ownership situation.\(^59\)

In conclusion, the national frame of action and institutionalization were guiding Sami official identity politics towards scientific and legal reasoning, as well as matter-of-fact, toned-down imagery. The difference between this and the radical imagery in the international forums may have been marginal, but it was deliberate. There was a clear dislike of making

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\(^{56}\) In 1970, 52.6% of the Sami population obtained their entire subsistence from traditional means of living. Thus, the percentage of the Sami population in the sphere of these means of living was even higher, since family members and those who obtained only part of their livelihood from traditional means of living were not included in this statistic. *The archive of Sami Parliament, Inari, Annual report 1979*, appendix, *Saamelaisvaltuuskunnan lausunto saamelaisalueen kuntien yleiskaavoiosta* 5.3.1979.


\(^{58}\) LK 11.10.1978, *Verotettu saamelainen*.

direct representations of the Sami as agents of sustainability; on the other hand, there was a receptive political space and a lot of direct evidence with which to make representations of the ecological unsoundness of the industrial action by the majority. Both of these representative strategies had their own “Finnish” roots and history.

8.4.2. “Free” expressions of collective Sami identity in an era of plurality (the early 1980s)

During the 1980s, the political space of the Sami in Finland became more fragmented, in tandem with the rest of society. This fragmentation was evident in the organizational field, where a number of new Sami associations were established, ranging in scope from local to pan-Sami: Sámi girječállit Searvi (the Association for Sami Authors, 1979) was a pan-Sami organization with Nils-Aslak Valkeapää and Kirsti Paltto as founding members. Sámiálbmo nuorainen Searvi (the Youth Organization of the Sami People, 1981) was inter-Nordic, with Anni Siiri Länsmog as the first chairperson. Suomen sámeaahaaddjiid Searvi (the Society for Sami Teachers in Finland, 1982) had both national and Nordic contacts, while Sápmelaš Oahppiid Searvi Suohpan (Suopunki [Lasso], the Society for Sami Students, 1981) was aimed at Sami students studying outside the Sami home area in Finland. Anára Sámisearvi (1983) was a local and mostly culturally-oriented association, intended to unite all three Sami groups in Inari. The tasks of the association were, for example, to strengthen the Sami identity, as well as advocating Sami rights. In terms of language politics, Anarashkiela Servi (the Society for the Aanaar Sami Language, 1986) included publishing activity. In 1989, the culturally and politically-oriented association City-Sámit was established for Sami living in Southern Finland.60

In terms of self-imagery in general, it was quite rare to find ponderings in a larger context about why indigenous people were oppressed. If articles were few, they were consistent in blaming the rich Western powers and their neo-colonialism for tapping the resources and not giving indigenous peoples the chance to lead their lives as they wished.61 The Sami were still predominantly represented as a language or cultural minority, not as a distinctive people or indigenous people. The change was underway, but it was slow, and

meant that “Sami problems” were being reduced to cultural problems in the Finnish public sphere. Processes of assimilation underway among the Sami were processes of cultural loss.62

There were exceptions. In Finland, Matti Morottaja practised an up-to-date rights rhetoric by criticizing the fact that group and cultural rights were not recognized or additionally granted to the Finns living in the area, which constituted a “twisted democracy” for Morottaja.63 This kind of criticism was rare. One reason may be that implementing special rights had already led to conflict in the early 1980s. In Utsjoki, the municipality had decided that all the teachers in primary schools must be able to teach in the Sami language. This led to Finnish protests of favouring bilingual teachers and to a process where the Deputy Chancellor of Justice denounced the municipal decision. Terms such as “cultural war” were already being used at this time.64

There was a continuing use of rhetoric relating to smallness and vulnerability, especially by Kirsti Paltto, who was active in the peace movement, among other venues. She cultivated the image of a small, powerless people threatened by the arms race and rearmament of the Northern regions, which had resulted in encroachments on and a diminishing of the Sami domicile as areas became militarized, especially in Norway: of all the Sami activists, Paltto acted most consistently and with the greatest ease in a pan-Sami, cross-state and risk society context.65

Paltto was also consistent in her colonization rhetoric, which dominated her ponderings on the colonization of the Sami mind. According to Paltto, this was evident in the shame they felt about their ethnicity: the culture was in the process of vanishing from a people from whom everything had been taken away, including their identity, their pride and their national spirit. Paltto introduced a new self-representation, one of robbed identity: she referred to people’s experiences in the Finnish school system, which had taken away the Sami identity by planting thoughts of inferiority in the Sami mind. The Sami national identity was not weak, it was non-existent. The identity would have to be built up anew by the “enlightened Sami”. The Sami were a people divided, linguistically and physically, into Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish language groups and identities, and as a people they did not

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62 Teacher Kaaren Kitti is making the representation here. LK 10.12.1984, Kun kielikatoaa, katoaa kansa; the speech by Elina Helander was quoted at length in Kaleva 6.7.1987, Saamelaiset haluavat oman korkeakoulun.
understand each other: it was very difficult to feel any sense of national communion. Paltto also expressed the common fear of that era, that American mass-entertainment was taking away the Sami identity.66 (For example in the radical Vuovjoš, the discourses on robbed identities, the way in which the state of Finland in many ways blocked the Sami from using their language and how deep a handicap this constituted to the Sami identity led to extreme accusations and comparisons with the “times of Hitler”.67 In addition, the introduction of “foreign” languages in the Sami domiciles was represented as a form of Finnish colonialism.68)

Ideas of pan-Saminess were becoming more frequent. Paltto wrote about the prospect of a self-governing area for the Sami, consisting of parts of Northern Sweden and Finnmark, as well as the Sami municipalities of Finnish Lapland.69 This idea was also contested. Matti Morottaja, for example, perceived hindrances to recognizing the idea of the Sami as one people. One was the thinking of the Finnicized Sami, who thought there was no point in advocating the Sami language and culture. These ideas were “paralysed by the nation-state of Finland”, according to which everybody in Finland was Finnish. This “thought-ossification” (ajatusluutuma) would have to be broken down by the Sami generation to which Morottaja belonged.70

The end of the 1980s also marks the inauguration of a series of committees working for the Sami cause. The beginning was unfortunate. A report by the Sami Cultural Committee (1985) was soon labelled as racist by the Sami Delegation. The Sami were represented as acculturating reindeer Sami and as the “farthest natural people of Europe” (“Euroopan takimmaisin luonnonkansa”). The Sami language was said to be a “typical language of the natural people”, not one containing the vocabulary of technology and modern social life. As the Sami Delegation and Kirsti Paltto stated, the report was based on out-of-date information. Paltto took the opportunity to make a self-representation of the “first indigenous people of Europe” (“Euroopan etummaisin alkuperäiskansa”). The Sami Delegation demanded that the Sami should have the power to develop their own culture, with support from the state. Paltto

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criticized the power that the cultural committee had taken upon themselves in funding Sami culture.71

During the 1980s, Matti Morottaja was active in cultivating holistic representations of the Sami. This representative strategy consisted of categorizing the Sami culture anew, by including the whole Sami way of life into the realm of Sami culture. In Sami politics, all aspects – the cultural, economical and political – had to be taken into account and included, since they were combined in the Sami life-form. Thus, economic and political issues had to be taken into account in cultural politics, and vice versa. In order to make this happen, Morottaja demanded the establishment of an independent Sami controlling body72, showing little faith in the goodwill of the Finnish authorities. This thinking had its roots in the process of achieving an acknowledgement of the widened concept of culture in Finnish legislation. This was an efficient self-representation, since encroachment upon any of the components would become a direct encroachment upon the cultural core and the existence of the Sami people. Morottaja’s self-representations lacked nature as the foundation of the Sami way of life, but nature was attached to the scheme by many actors, rendering ecological encroachment a cultural encroachment.

Of all the topical ideologies, the environmentalist discourse was the one that had begun to influence Sami self-imagery. Connecting Saminess to the ecology of nature was one of the main strategies, but the use of up-to-date ecological knowledge and thoughts entertained by specialist ecologists of the period as arguments was still rare: Nils-Aslak Valkeapää presented an ideal of the Sami way of life at a time “when the destruction of the environment advances uncontrollably”. Human adaptation had to be made to fit the ecological

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71 The archive of Sami Parliament, Inari, Statements, proposals, initiatives 1985-1987, Lausunto Saamelaiskulttuuritoimikunnan mietinnöstä (1985:66), 22.12.1987; the chairman of the committee was curator Martti Linkola. Among the Sami members, nominated by the Sami Delegation, were Oula Näkkäläjärvi, student Kristiina Aikio, janitor Simo Jefremoff, teacher Tarmo Jomppanen and artisan Ilmari Tapiola. Numerous Sami were used as experts. Criticism of the report was partly deserved: the representation of the Sami in the report relied on long quotations from “Lapland” (1675) by Johannes Schefferus and used imagery of the Sami as unique “natural people”, deeply connected to nature, which they used in a sustainable manner. Through Sami animism and long presentations of the Sami natural religion, this connection was made even deeper, warmer and more integrated, and nature was cited as the only basis for Sami culture. Even though the report had a tendency to respect Sami rationality and adaptive mechanisms regarding nature, Western hierarchies were reproduced in ponderings about levels of adjusting the mechanisms of nature to the needs of people, represented as higher in agriculture than in reindeer herding. The settlement history as well as the judicial history was up-to-date, and built on imagery of violent colonization. People being pushed to the north and stripped of their rights was the other representation made in the report. The modern Sami were under-communicated and the overuse of resources was attributed to outside intervention. The committee highlighted the significance of the Sami language and suggested the widening of the Sami language domains. In addition, the financing and reorganization of Sami handicrafts, Sami organizations, cultural management and cultural activities had to be secured. Saamelaiskulttuuritoimikunnan mietintö 1985:66, passim; Paltto, Kirsti: 500 000 lausuntoa, Kaleva 17.1.1988.

72 PS 7.10.1982, Saamelaiskulttuuri on koko elämänmuoto.
frame by disturbing the ecological processes as little as possible, restricting population growth, saving raw materials and energy and “by freezing contemporary development”. One notices again how Valkeapää is making a representation of industrial penetration, not of the Sami.

One is tempted to say that the most obvious trait in this fragmented era was the fragmentation of identity politics itself. However, there are some consistent strategies: the Sami were still being colonized in the field of representation, constituting a continuation from the 1970s. As well as this, the Sami built identities that were consistently separate from the Finnish discourses and frames of identification. I should also like to point out one emerging strategy that was taking place in the freer forums: the ecological imagery and also the ecological reasoning were becoming more scientific. This strategy was different from the international strategies of representing the Sami as an integral part of the ecosystem. In Sami imagery in Finland, the ecosystem outside the Sami influence was threatened; this threat was constituted by industrial penetration and the ecological, scientifically measurable effects thereof to the traditional means of living.

### 8.5. Conclusions

The gap between the legalists and the primordialists had deepened. This dividing line existed within the Delegation, but especially between the official and the unofficial ethnopolitical fronts. National orientation and other problems dominated the formation of Sami ethnopolitics and restricted the use of global discourses, which were entertained in “soft” issues and in the freer forums. There, the global bond of indigenousness was inspirational and Sami histories of colonization were both researched and invented. Plus, the alternative territorialities were communicated there, not on the official, state-bound forums. This was bound to increase the gap between official “Realpolitik” and free cross-state visioning. However, developments in the freer forums were marked by an increasing multiplicity of identificational strategies. This was partly due to shifts in the Sami political field, which was beginning to be truly multinational for an increasing number of Sami actors. The front was most unified in relation

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73 The law proposal of 1973 mentioned is the only available hint of a date for this source. KA, Archive of SPILC, box 30, Miscellaneous, Valkeapää, Nils-Aslak: Mietteitä ekologiasta, ihmisestä ja tulavaisuudesta (lyhennelmä).
to the state of Finland, from which the political Sami broke away for good. Even employment demands are missing from the Sami rhetoric of this period.

At a national level, the political space was characterized by uninformed silence and limited gestures of goodwill. The Sami were already communicating with the state officials horizontally, with a premise of equal position, but state officials communicated with the Sami vertically, maintaining the hierarchies. The Finnish public sphere was receptive to radical self-representations, albeit with restrictions. Thus, Sami identity politics were drafted in a political vacuum: they were not yet taken seriously. The state found no need to make the silent discourses audible: the policy of the fewest concessions possible was functioning in a satisfactory manner. On the other hand, this silence provided political room for manoeuvre for the Sami and the possibility of making radical self-identifications, as these were not yet seriously questioned either.

One of the continuities in the identity building of the era was a way of perceiving Saminess in connection with/relation to nature. This strategy underwent a most important shift, from representing the Sami means of living as ecologically sound to representing the Western means of living as harmful to the Sami means of living. In the self-imagery, the deepest Sami connectedness to nature was dismantled and the discourse was made more scientific using loans from the dominant Finnish environmentalist discourse. To this strategy was added a legal component as well: a representation of the Sami conditioned by nature was replaced by a representation of the Sami not having rights to their environment. This development was not total, as is evident in the imagery used in the cultural forums (see Chapter 8.4.2), and especially in the international forums. In spite of the increasing gaps and a certain dissatisfaction with imageries and representative strategies, the status of indigenousness and the principles of self-determination were extremely important contributions to the Sami movement in Finland. Or to put it another way: it was precisely and only the legal components that were now sought from the global bond. There were also shifts in the inclusiveness of the traditional means of living as a cultural marker. The means of living were enclosed within the holistic realm of Sami culture, but their inclusiveness was reduced. Reindeer-herding imagery no longer dominated.

Another shift was in the “legalization” of the official identity politics, which was beginning to assume a consistent form. The hard-core Sami legal elite were definitely beginning to dominate official identity politics, with demands for judicial accounting and a focus on land rights issues. This trait had both global and intra-Sami origins. Developments in international law were followed through the inter-Nordic Sami movement, as well as through
the global indigenous movement. Studies of Finnish settlement history had begun and attempts were being made to incorporate the new paradigm into Sami policies at both a national and an inter-Nordic level. It can already be said here that, with the Sami issue in Norway politicized in the wake of the Alta struggle, the Sami elite in Finland chose to make the issue judicial. This process was undone at the time of the Kessi dispute, which constituted the first test case for global rights discourse in Finland.
9. The Kessi Forest Dispute as a Forum for Sami Identity Politics

9.1. Introduction

The conflict in Kessi was fought over the loggings in Eastern Inari during the late 1980s. The conflict was part of a series of Finnish disputes over forestry and the conservation of the environment, which had begun in the 1970s with the criticism of efficient forestry. The Finnish environmental movement had radicalized and become more spontaneous and fragmented. The direct action, eagerly taken up by the new, young activist generation, provided the movement and the issues with wide media coverage. With ideas of “sustainable development” trying to link concerns for the environment and economic growth, environmental thinking had become part of everyday life. The consumerist discourse was also shared by a large group of people. Disputes were local, but they mobilized national and, in Kessi, for example, supranational and informal actors with various binding principles and cohesion. The dispute was one of the few occasions that the Sami question truly became a national issue in the media. The Kessi dispute also marks the beginning of a still-ongoing series of disputes between Sami reindeer herders and Forest and Park Service.1

Finnish environmental thinking was partly supportive of deep ecological thinking, stressing the intrinsic value of untouched nature.2 Hence, Finnish wilderness thinking was two-fold: one sector stressed the disappearance and value of the untouched forests in their natural state, the other stressed usage potential, recreation, hunting, reindeer herding and forestry. Both of these views differed from the Sami perception of the wilderness, which has been represented as a combination of a cultural/natural landscape and a resource, where the work of the Sami over generations is visible. These contesting views were mobilized in the Kessi dispute over the “last wilderness forests in Finland”.3

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2 One notable aspect of this deep ecological thinking and the Finnish environmentalist discourse is that the nature is elevated from a mere object of management to an almost subject position: nature has the right to remain untouched, since human beings, regardless of their of ethnicity, have a reduced or denied right to interfere with the ecological dynamics of nature.
3 The Wilderness Committee explicitly took its starting-point in the Finnish concept of the wilderness as a resource area for the ancient settlement movement of “Finnish” tribes, which had evolved to “wide, private hunting and fishing grounds, which were not settled, forestry regions with no roads...” Erämaakomitean mietintö 1988:39, 13: Aikio, Maria Sofia 1998, 90; Heikkilä 2004, 138-146; Leino-Kaukiainen 1997, 216; Länsman 2004, 99; Nyyssönen 2000, 155-157, 175-177; Tuulantie 2003b, 291; Tynys, Tapio: Maa järven takana, Vätsäri - erämaa järven takana, Tapio Tynys (ed.), Metsähallitus, Ylä-Lapin luonnonhoitoalue, s.p., s.a., 15-16; the Wilderness Law was meant to protect traditional means of living and other land-use forms, which did not threaten the natural state of the area. Forestry was one of these means of living. Tynys, Tapio: Muuttunut
For Forest and Park Service and the District of Inari, the logging in Kessi was “predetermined” by numerous nature conservation measures in Inari, the most recent of which had been the establishment of the Urho Kekkonen National Park in 1982; this resulted in a cut in the economic use of the forest area, for which the loggings in Kessi were intended to compensate in employment terms. The District of Inari was running low on new logging sites and employment opportunities, while the reputation of Forest and Park Service as a whole had sunk in the “National Park storm” in the Finnish media during the late 1970s, as loggings in areas that were meant to be protected were revealed. The resistance towards the loggings was met with angry astonishment on the part of District of Inari, but they chose to enter the dispute. The reason for the anger that prolonged the dispute was the disappointment felt in the forest sector as a whole at its shrinking legitimacy: in Finland, forestry has its own national institutions, its own university schooling, its own hierarchies, its own, important role and position in the state administration, and it has the prevailing self-image of employer, modernizer and benefactor of the Finnish state and people. Protests and demonstrations, organized by the nationwide Paatsjoki movement, began as the bridge over the Pasvik river was finished in 1987. A spontaneous, informal, suspicious group of actors of another, younger generation had stepped on the toes of the wooden legs of Finland.4

The first signs of a Sami critique towards forestry in Inari emerged during the early 1970s. Before this, the forestry question had been one of marginal interest in the official Sami movement in Finland, although the consequences of forestry for reindeer herding were a matter of concern among the reindeer herding Sami. The growing criticism towards forestry in the late 1980s, after a long break, led to the beginning of a series of forest disputes in the whole Sami area. This change in the situation and constellation was due to many factors. The Kessi forest dispute was preceded by the most intensive and consistent loggings in the history of forestry in Inari, which caused a series of short-term disturbances, if not diminishing pastures. Conservationist and environmentalist thinking had achieved national acceptance and publicity. In Inari, both supportive and opposing attitudes towards nature conservation had radicalized. The Sami movement had begun to concentrate on land rights.5 All these aspects and conflicting interests focused on forest as land, where the problematics were formulated in two ways. Was the Kessi reserve area for forestry or pasture land: a stock of timber, or the basis for Sami culture? Another aspect was legal: who owned the land? The conservationists

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Västäri, Västäri - eräämaa järven takana, Tapio Tynys (ed.), Metsähallitus, Ylä-Lapin luonnonhoitoalue, s.p., s.a., 181.
were more concerned about the ecology of the area than the rights question, and the use or non-use debate dominated the dispute.

There are different notions concerning which phase Sami resistance was in during the dispute. According to Elina Helander, the Sami movement had radicalized before the dispute. According to Helander, the Sami felt spiritually and philosophically attached to the land, which was considered their own through inheritance from their ancestors. As Sami ethnicity was politicized during the 1970s, the landownership question was radicalized and concrete claims were presented, as a part of the global indigenous peoples’ movement. The interpretation by Helander concentrates on the land question and is correct in that respect. The notion of an old, stronger and exclusive usage right was shared in the Sami communities, also according to Anni-Siiri Länsman.

According to the periodization of the separatism and the cultural identity of the Sami, as detailed by Veli-Pekka Lehtola, the Sami renaissance had gone beyond its most radical phase by the time of the dispute. The Sami movement had bypassed the first phase of the Sami renaissance, which had involved clinging on to separateness and stressing their own cultural features. The Sami movement had entered a phase of “objective accommodation”, where multiculturalism in the Sami culture could be accepted, as well as special features in other cultures. This model may be used to explain the lack of unity in the Sami resistance. The emerging grievances of accepting cultural identities other than that of a reindeer-herding Sami were beginning to be heard from the Sami community. Sami culture was represented as an evolving culture. Enduring pressures to change/transform and the ability to adapt to new circumstances were sometimes represented as Sami cultural features.

In this chapter I shall examine the construction of the collective Sami identity during the Kessi dispute, which went on throughout the 1980s but reached its height at the end of that decade. The identity politics of both the Sami Delegation and freer agents will be followed and compared. Which markers, strategies and global impulses were chosen, and by whom? Which factors influenced the identity politics? There will be a special focus on the impact that the environmentalist discourse had on identity politics and on the reception of the Sami issue. By now, this global discourse was truly effective and had penetrated Finnish society. The

7 Länsman 2004, 84, 94.
8 Lehtola 2000a, 194.
9 The statement was given by Tuomas Magga, who also pondered in retrospect the Sami identity building in the 1960s: The Sami became conscious of their identity then and a “poor past” had to be built to support the new identity. The majority had to be stigmatized in the process, stated Magga. PS 13.11.1977, Saamelaiskulttuuri on pystynyt uusiutumaan, ”Vahva kulttuuri ei häviä”.
Finnish political space had changed in many ways. This was bound to have consequences on
the Sami issue. To understand Finnish Sami politics better, a comparison with the Alta dispute
and the identity political discussion among the Sami in Norway will be undertaken. I shall end
up this chapter by looking briefly at the developments in the 1990s.

9.2. Under-communicating the “natural people” imagery – statements made by the Sami
Delegation

There were three different Sami strategies in the Kessi forest dispute. Firstly, the official Sami
front adopted a strategy based on rights claims, where the self-representation was that of a
threatened indigenous people whose rights had been taken away. Secondly, Sami resistance to
the loggings, expressed in unofficial forums, took as its starting point more radical
representations. The third strategy was to support the loggings in order to secure employment
possibilities. In this chapter I shall go through the statements made by the Sami Delegation.

In 1982, the working group for forestry in the Paatsjoki area had recommended 2.4
million cubic metres of loggings. In 1987, the Sami delegation repeated in a memo\(^\text{10}\) to the
Minister of the Environment, Kaj Bärlund, and to the Minister of Agriculture, Toivo T.
Pohjola, that loggings of that magnitude (almost 100 cubic metres per hectare) would equal
clear cuttings. The Sami delegation estimated that the loggings would be carried out using
normal, heavier methods and that there would be no possibility of using lighter means or
technology.

The Sami Delegation referred to pasture ecological research on the effect of loggings
on the amount of lichen, which would be reduced for decades after the cutting cycle had been
completed. If the forest ecosystem was disrupted, access to nutrition for the reindeers would
be aggravated. Changes to the microclimate at the logging sites would hinder winter grazing
when the snow-cover froze. The research quoted by the Sami Delegation also pointed out how
the natural routes of the reindeer from one pasture land to another would be disrupted because
of the loggings, ploughing and roads. Building the roads would also bring fishermen and
hunters to the lands and waters of the Sami in a way that could not be controlled.

\(^{10}\) The archive of Sami Parliament, Inari, Statements, proposals, initiatives 1985-1987, Pro Memoria: Maa- ja
metsätalousministeri Pohjolalle, ympäristöministeri Kaj Bärlundille. 22.9.1987. Inarinjärven itäpuolisten metsien
hakkaaminen.
The Sami Delegation referred to landownership and the right to practise a traditional Sami means of living. The loggings would be carried out in the area of Inari Siida where the ownership of the Sami forefathers had never been abolished or annulled. Furthermore, this landownership had never been impartially investigated or lawfully settled between the Sami and the state of Finland, and thus the ownership of the state lands still belonged to the Sami. Landownership included a right to practise traditional “Lapp means of living” – fishing, hunting and reindeer herding – undisturbed.

Another typical strategy was to refer to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Finland had ratified. The article was used successfully by the Sami Rights Committee in Norway in 1984, leading to the establishment of the Norwegian Sami Diggi under the Sami Act of 1987 and an amendment of the Norwegian Constitution that recognized the dual-ethnic character of the state.\(^\text{11}\) The Sami Delegation pointed out that the interpretation of the article in Swedish and Norwegian legislation prohibited action on behalf of the state that would assimilate the Sami population to the majority, and it obliged the states to offer the Sami special status in legislation. In Finland the article did not have the same impact or validity as in Norway, where the moral impact of international law on national law was weighted to a greater extent than in Finland.

The special treatment mentioned in the covenant meant that the Sami were to have the power to decide on matters concerning intellectual culture, including traditional land use, which constituted the basis for the Sami physical culture and way of life. The loggings were to be given up for the time being, until the landownership question between the Sami and the state was settled and fortified by legislation.\(^\text{12}\) It should be noted that the self-representation, celebrating being bound to the land, was made in order to match the representation in the covenant. This was in accordance with the representational strategy of sticking to the agency of the judicial subject. It is apparent that the Sami Delegation could only use the covenant to demand cultural protection, not self-determination. It has been stated in retrospect that the argumentation relied on a risky strategy of preserving (pre-modern modes of) culture.\(^\text{13}\)

In a statement given in the Wilderness Committee report, the Sami Delegation adopted a clearer starting-point in the unclear landownership question. While the question remained

\(^{11}\) Johansen 2003, 189-191, uses examples from the Angeli process, where Sami reindeer herders from Angeli, Inari sued Forest and Park Service under the auspices of the UN Human Rights Committee. In these cases, the cultural protection provided by the covenant proved to be insufficient; Smith 1995, 66; Thuen 1995, 47-48.


\(^{13}\) See Oskal 2002b, 9-10. The strategy could have ended up with a majority policy of awarding rights only to “authentic” indigenous people; Åhren 2002, 83-85.
unclear, discussion focusing on nature conservation and the loggings would be premature. The argument of cultural protection was repeated. The Sami Delegation presented the wilderness areas as “safe areas” for the traditional livelihoods, which had to be protected from conflicting interests and excessive outside use. The delegation stated that the wilderness areas should be reserved for the means of living practised by the Sami and for the use of other local people. The Sami Delegation reiterated the protection for the indigenous culture provided in the International Convention. A new feature of this statement was a reference to the Annual Report of 1979/1980 from the UN Human Rights Committee, in which the legislation of ratifying countries was required to protect the land areas used by the ethnic minorities and hinder others from claiming them. There had to be restrictions on moving around in the area and the natural resources had to be reserved for the indigenous people. Sami culture was represented as being threatened, so positive limiting action would be necessary. The proposed Wilderness Law would not protect the traditional means of living, which were protected by the aforementioned covenant and by Sami ownership (of land, J.N.). Finally, the Sami Delegation demanded an involvement in the preparation of the Wilderness Law, as well as in the planning of the use of the land in the Sami area. The Delegation was again bound by the cultural protection paradigm. The emphasis on the Sami use of the wilderness relied on the Sami wilderness concept, which emphasized the use of the area for Sami traditional means of living.

The Working Committee of the Sami Delegation considered another proposal for the statement of the Wilderness Law, which was drafted by a Livelihood Sub-Committee. In this proposal, the starting-point and representation of the Sami was as a people who had gained most of their subsistence from “wilderness nature” – reindeer herding, forestry and fishing – as well as other “organic” means of living (luontaiselinkeinot). Because of this dependency, the Livelihood Sub-Committee proposed that the wilderness area should be reserved exclusively for Sami means of living and nature conservation. The choice of terms highlights the difference in thinking: the Sami means of living was an economical question, while the terminology in the Sami Delegation statements was legal (“organic” vs. “Lapp means of living”, the traditional means of living practised by and within the boundaries of Lapp villages). The representation also offered the opportunity to take advantage of the

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15 The Working Committee was the highest committee in the Delegation, with subordinate sub-committees that had a limited and preparatory mandate. At this time, the other sub-committees were the Language and Education Sub-committee, the Social and Health Sub-committee and the Judicial Sub-committee, containing the judicially-educated Sami politicians. Lehtola 2005a, 204.
modernization and working opportunities created by Forest and Park Service. The proposal contained mainly practical, concrete measures for protecting means of living\textsuperscript{16} and these were shortened and quoted in the final statement, which was drafted by the judicial sub-committee (with Nils-Henrik Valkeapää, Esko Aikio, Pekka Aikio and Oula Näkkäläjärvi as members) and approved by the working group. This is the most solid proof that I have found of the friction between different representative strategies and how the Sami elite – or the most influential section of it – avoided binding the Sami collective identity too deeply with nature. The question of land was a question of regulating access to and the ownership of the land through the conventions of international law.

This statement of the Wilderness Law by the Sami Delegation was presented to the Legal and Economic Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Finland at a hearing in Saariselkä on 20 September 1990. What was different from older versions was that the Sami Delegation mentioned “preventing the destruction of nature” and referred to ongoing preparations for legislation on Sami issues. These laws had to be ready and finalized before the Wilderness Law was passed. The loggings did not promote the aim of preserving “wilderness nature”. The Delegation continued:

...the means of living belonging to the Sami form of culture (Kulttuurimuoto) were based in previous times (vanhastaan) on the sustainable utilization of nature. The traditional Sami use has not changed the wilderness character of the areas. Only the judicial system and administration of society at large (valtayhteiskunta) have created opportunities for the commercial utilization of the Sami area, leading to the destruction, spoiling and poisoning of nature. The legislation is needed therefore above all for protecting nature against Finnish society and its economy and structures.\textsuperscript{17}


The Sami Delegation represented the Sami relation to nature and means of living as more sustainable than the modern Finnish means of living. What is noticeable is the cautiousness of the representation. The traditional land use of the Sami had been sustainable and the landscape had not been changed by it. The Sami Delegation did not present statements about contemporary Sami land use, and it was the industrial land-use forms that were the real problem. Bolder comment was heard in an earlier statement concerning the change in the Nature Conservation Law the previous year:

Sami land-use forms do not threaten the realization of conservation aims.¹⁸

The delegation also appealed for the protection of culture and referred to topical studies on judicial history, published in the autumn of 1989 by Kaisa Korpijaakko-Labba, in which Sami landownership was verified by referring to the judicial procedures undertaken by officials. The Sami Delegation threatened to take the matter to the UN Human Rights Committee if the means of living and protection of ownership were not sufficiently secured. According to the Sami Delegation, the Sami region was in the process of being changed into state-owned wilderness areas without any compensation.¹⁹ The choice was clear. The Sami Delegation appealed with systematic reference to international conventions and human rights. The self-representation was one of modern indigenous people lacking rights to their environment. References to their warm relationship with nature, to the identity “given by the wilderness” or to the significance of the wilderness are absent. The strategy was up-to-date concerning the status that was sought: the improved status of indigenous people in international legislation²⁰ and national policy was consistently claimed by the Sami Delegation.

Marja Sinikka Semenoja, a member of the Sami Delegation, featured in a book Kirjeitä Kessistä, practising the same strategy as the Sami Delegation. Identity questions were under-communicated. Semenoja quoted research by Kaisa Korpijaakko-Labba at length. The rest of the writing was an apology for reindeer herding, under threat from loggings. Pasturelands would diminish, trees with arboreal lichen would disappear and the economic profitability would suffer. Semenoja also referred to the most recent results in the field of

reindeer pasture studies. The results, published by Timo Helle and Yrjö Norokorpi, were most favourable to the Sami: the logging waste and the freezing of the snow-cover after the loggings would make winter grazing more difficult. The reindeer’s annual cycle would be disturbed. Furthermore, the loggings would generate additional costs because of the need for winter feeding.\footnote{Semenoja 1988, s. 37-38.} A striking feature of these statements is the selection and type of knowledge referred to. The knowledge was based on scientific studies in law, judicial and settlement history, and on pasture and forest ecology.\footnote{The study by Korpijaakko was not the only scientific foundation for their claims. Research was known and quoted on an \textit{ad hoc} basis. Compare Tuulentie 2002, 352.} Even references to the traditional ecological knowledge possessed by the indigenous people were absent.

In practice, the statements made by the Sami Delegation did not receive much attention. Ninety Finnish parliamentary representatives referred to the Sami Delegation statement in a written question to the government about the loggings in Kessi. The M.P.s referred to the landownership of Forest and Park Service as questionable.\footnote{LK 20.5.1987, 90 kansanedustajaa kysyi Kessin hakkuista.} This was one of the few official statements that cast doubt on state landownership in the dispute. The Wilderness Committee, founded in 1987 with midwife Kaarina Suomenrinne, head of the herding co-operative (poroisäntä) Juhani Magga and Pekka Aikio as Sami members, did not take the landownership of the Lapp villages into consideration at all. The chairman, Professor Martti Markkula, referred to the aim of “commonly acceptable suggestions” in formulating the task of the committee; this was unlikely to be achieved in the matter of landownership. The committee concentrated on finding a balance between conservation and (clearly favoured) use of the established wilderness areas. Great efforts were made to justify sustainable forestry and the greatest emphasis was also laid on this, not on Sami issues. The status attached to the Sami was that of an indigenous people. They were living mostly from traditional means of living, were attached to nature and mostly to reindeer herding. The judicial agency was constructed through the judicial status of the old siida system and a brief reference to their newly-emerged claim to the domicile. A statement by Aikio, justifying the recognition of Sami landownership and repeating most of the legal arguments familiar from the Sami Delegation statements, was included as an appendix. In accordance with the committee, Aikio also had to rely on the dominant imagery of wildernesses in their natural state and without roads as the foundation for Sami culture and reindeer herding. The collective Sami identity was thus constructed through the Finnish definition of the wilderness! Sustaining the viability and productivity of the wildernesses was a guarantee for the survival
of the Sami culture (while the emphasis on “productivity” left potential loopholes for other kinds of use as well).  

Why was the globally-used “natural people” imagery under-communicated? The representational strategy of the Sami Delegation was dominated by the same people who worked on the preparation of the Sami Law, who were already disillusioned about the primordial imagery. These activists had long experience of acting within the institutionalized frame and had encountered the romanticized imagery used by the majority. The low effectiveness and usage value of the strategy was known to them. In addition, Kaisa Korpiaakko was an influential member involved in the preparatory work on the law, first as a premise giver and in the final phase as the secretary of the working committee. In the committee’s report and the proposal for the Sami Law, natural people imagery was entirely lacking. The Sami were and had been a judicial subject, the indigenous people of their domicile. The Lapp village system was a collective claimant, as well as the Sami as landowners. The means of living were matters of rights and access, while the report was completely silent on the ecological side of these matters. The greatest tension lay in the inclusion/exclusion of the Lappish people and the Finnish settlers as shareholders in the Lapp village resource management system to be established.

### 9.3. Constructing colonized and ecological Saminess – sharpened statements in unofficial forums

The greater freedom to make representations was eagerly taken up in the Sami unofficial public sphere and this led to a great diversity and radicalization of imagery. In 1985, Jouni Kitti made a self-representation of the Sami as “real experts of nature” and “real conservators of nature”, who were lost in a city environment. As we shall see, such extremes were soon mellowed down. However, representations such as “who is dependent on nature will preserve it”, by Tuomas Magga, reflect the greater freedom of manoeuvre of unofficial identity politics. Unofficial Sami statements mostly concentrated on the fate of means of living, mostly that of reindeer herding, the imagery of which was dominant and perceived as a

corner-stone in sustaining the Sami language and culture. Threat perceptions were constructed: how southern industrialists, using “hard” technology, were threatening “untouched” nature and Sami rights, and tapping the resources southwards. The Sami were indigenous people under ecological exploitation. The cultural and economic sphere of the forest Sami had been changed into an area reserved for forestry. The interests of the international paper industry and reindeer herding, as well as transnational and ethnic-traditional interests, were dichotomized in the comments. The district of Inari was logging on lands formerly owned by the Sami siidas, the ecological balance of which would be threatened for decades to come; the Kessi dispute was not just an economic or rights issue, it was an environmental issue. Northern nature was being exploited and indigenous people were facing a colonialistic economy and colonial way of thinking, which could only be dismantled by allowing the Sami Delegation to gain access to resource management. Settlement history was ecologized: it was a history of Finnish expansion with ecological oppression, which had shrunk the Sami domicile and diminished the potential for subsistence. The Sami were the underdogs in this process. Parallels were drawn with the Alta action, especially when it came to the conduct of the states, which was labelled as violent. The notion of Lapland as a “colony” of Finland was quite usual in Lapland, and the notion was not held by the Sami alone. Nature conservation was also a part of the colonial constellation. The critique in the freer forums was built using sharpened tools of identification (reindeer herding as a bearer of Sami culture), sharpened judicial reasoning (blaming colonization) and sharpened, yet scientific environmentalist reasoning (blaming the Finns for ecological colonization and questioning the rationale of the Western relationship with nature).
In one respect, the logic in the statements remained firm: forestry was ecologically unsound and had eroded the basis for Sami culture and other means of living that were practised in areas exposed to expanding logging operations from the 1950s onwards. In particular, efficient forestry and reindeer herding could not be practised in the same areas. Forest and Park Service had betrayed its promises to take the pastures into consideration when planning the logging. Instead, region after region had been logged and hill after hill had been cleared of timber. The regeneration had also turned out to be long in the forests of Inari, and the harm long-lasting.40

Sometimes the wilderness forests in their natural state were represented as a premise for the survival of the Sami culture, especially for reindeer herding.41 In most cases, the Sami rhetoric of protecting their means of living focused on the Sami use of the wilderness.42 Only on one occasion were the Kessi forests represented as holy. Even on this occasion, the Sami were not represented as a people practising some ancient religion of nature, but the holiness of the forests was used to make the Finnish oppression of both the Sami people and the forest/nature in Kessi appear greater.43 It was also typical to avoid direct self-representations in the freer forums.

The Sami and the activists resisting the loggings published a book *Pohjoinen erämaa Kessi-Vätsäri* in 1988. Ella Sarre represented the Aanaar Sami way of life as being self-sufficient, based on nature and many natural means of living and, like the other Sami in the dispute, irreversibly changed by Finnish modernization. The Finnish school system was the most significant actor in this process. The changes in reindeer herding had been due to the settlement of Finns and the Skolt Sami in the Kessi region, and the consequent introduction of alien reindeer-herding methods. Alongside a traditionalistic wistfulness in facing the changes brought about by modernization, Sarre wrote about the blessings of modernization, for example in the sphere of communications and the subsistence offered by Forest and Park Service loggings. Even though Sarre did not condemn the loggings in Kessi, her style was consistent in not representing the Sami as a people close to nature – that option had been lost. The most radical feature of Sarre’s writing was the following sentence: “This was the land of

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42 See, for example, Sápmelaš 1-3/1989, Meahcît earä sajín mállmis.
the Aanaar Sami.” This was a radical statement and identification at a local and national level, and in an intra-Sami and intra-Inari context.\footnote{Ilmari Mattus has tried to connect the earliest known settlement, the Komsa culture, as well as the Sami living in Varangerfjord, to Aanaar Sami ethnicity. The archaeologists have been cautious in constructing links with prehistoric populations, but these two statements may be taken as a sign of emerging Aanaar Sami identity building. Mattus, 239-240; Sarre 1988, quote p. 126, 136.}

In the same book as Sarre, Jouni Kittti pointed out the over-capacity of the timber-processing industry in Lapland with respect to the Sheltered Forest Act\footnote{Suojametsälaki, a law restricting forestry in the timberline forests, passed in 1922.}, and the ecological and economic profitability of the loggings. Kittti presented his logging critique in an extensive historical overview of settlement, where the traditional Sami way of life had vanished under the pressure of Finnish settlement. Kittti wrote, almost representing the Sami as a “natural people”:

The utilization of natural resources in the Sami siida area was a self-sufficient economy, where the natural resources within the siida were utilized in a versatile manner. The hunting siida of the Sami is considered to be the most original organized form of adaptation within the region of Northern Lapland.\footnote{Kittti 1988, quotation pp. 114, 118. “Saamelaisten lapin kylien alueella tapahtua luonnonvarojen käyttö oli omavaraistaloutta, missä kylän sisäpuolella olevia luonnonvaroja käyttettiin monipuolisesti hyödyksi. Saamelaista pyyntisiitä pidetäänkin alkuperäisimpiänä järjestäytynneen sopeutumismoottona pohjoisen Lapin alueeseen.”}

Like the Sami Delegation in Saariselkä, Kittti presented the sustainable organization of the Sami economy as something that had prevailed. The potential for self-sufficiency had been lost in the settlement process.

To sum up a bit, the only shared strategy with the official actors was to avoid making direct representations of the Sami. The reasoning in unofficial forums applied sharpened tools. Why was this? Institutionalization had now influenced the identity politics of the Sami Delegation for real, and the split between the two venues had become wider. The same had happened in the case of the Sametinget (Sami Parliament), founded in Norway in 1989, which chose to professionalize and focus on official procedures and formulae, in order to be able to function as a serious and trustworthy actor in relation to other Norwegian officials.\footnote{Bjerkli og Selle 2003a, pp. 26-27; Bjerkli og Selle 2003b, 58-59, 83.}

Institutionalization contained a number of pitfalls for indigenous peoples. It sometimes meant that indigenous claimants were perceived as “inauthentic”, which corroded the goodwill they enjoyed from the public. The symbolic power derived from their indigenous, oppressed
position was also eroded,\textsuperscript{48} and as a minority they risked being assessed using the measures of majority modes of politics. According to theorists, the establishment of Sami diggis stripped the Sami body of its real power and constrained its field of activity\textsuperscript{49}. On a discursive level, the strategy had to be changed because the actors had to be able to relate to the political discourse of the majority in order to be defined as a serious participant in this discourse. If expectations were not met, political propositions would be ignored, or not taken seriously, because they appeared unrealistic, incoherent and untrustworthy.\textsuperscript{50} The pitfalls of institutionalization applied in Finland, at least when it came to the lack of power. One difference to the theories drafted on cases concerning other indigenous groups and the Sami in Sweden was that institutionalization itself was not the reason that the Sami Delegation was not taken seriously as an actor in ethnopolitics. The Sami issue remained marginal, in spite of the institutionalization, and the shortcomings of the institutionalized modes merely assisted this status quo.

\section*{9.4. The Sami elite and the dispersed front}

In the Finnish public sphere, the Sami front was eagerly represented as being far from unified. This was actually true, and should not be surprising. To begin with, the Sami front was dispersed in its choice of ethnic/cultural markers: language was both a competing marker and a competing, organic way of constructing a connection between nature and man through the vocabulary of natural phenomena, while the traditional means of living dominated the representative field.\textsuperscript{51} In what follows, I shall go through various aspects of the discussion on the “splits” from the resisting front. The focus varies between the counter-imagery and the internal Sami discussion. The aim here is to show the techniques with which the Sami front was represented, the Sami strategies for trying to tackle the Finnish discursive minefield, and explain the reasons for choosing different policies in the dispute.

Disputes within the herding society were brought up in the Finnish public sphere. The variation, dealt with here, was partly due to asymmetric newspaper reporting of statements from the herders. The newspaper \textit{Pohjolan Sanomat} cited reindeer herders as being cautious about loggings at a meeting in Ivalo in May 1987. Juhani Magga, a representative from the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{48} Levi and Dean 2002, 2-3.  \\
\textsuperscript{49} Mörkenstam 2002, 129.  \\
\textsuperscript{50} Heikkilä 2003, 119; Mörkenstam 2002, 115-116.  \\
\textsuperscript{51} Aikio-Puoskari, Ulla: Tupen rapinat, Sompio 28.3.1985.
\end{flushright}
Herding Co-operative of Hammastunturi (in south-western Inari), said that it would be best for the herders if “...the whole of Lapland could be conserved...” but, because that was not possible, loggings on a cautious scale – which did not exactly promote herding, but did not obstruct it either – were acceptable. Reindeer host (poroisäntä) Ahti Hänninen, from the Herding Co-operative of Vätsäri situated north of Kessi, stated that the co-operative would benefit from the bridge and the road, whereas Hänninen perceived the impact of the loggings as negative. The newspaper Kaleva cited the other types of statements from the herders. Veikko Tervonen from the Reindeer Herders’ Association said that reindeer herding had already achieved its aims in the planning phase of the loggings. Juhani Magga was quoted as saying that the quarrel was only small, and that the reindeer were already grazing in the fifteen-year-old sapling stands. Choosing these kinds of quotations seems to imply a desire to represent the supporting front as wide and unified: there was no trouble with the Sami in Inari.

Nature conservation has been both a threat to the Sami usage/land rights and a guarantee against further external encroachment. In Finland, expressions perceiving nature conservation as hostile to Sami rights have been fewer than supportive ones. During the post-war period the Sami have had a say in conservation projects, reindeer herding has been protected in conservation areas and the restrictions of use and of moving around in these areas are not as strict as they are in Norway. On the other hand, the discourse of fearing restrictions in utilizing the areas has been an old Lappish discourse, and the notion that the land in Northern Lapland is “sufficiently protected” is shared by both ethnic groups. The southern Finns are perceived as not having expertise and being outsider “others” in this matter. The protection of traditional means of living, from predators as well, has been highlighted and the local Sami have been most alert about whether they have access to firewood. The basis of the culture – the land – has been protected and most of the protests against conservation have been heard from the “colonists”, Forest and Park Service and the local loggers, whose actions and subsistence have been most severely limited. The rhetoric of conservation as external encroachment was rare before the 1980s. In Finnish discussions about nature conservation,

52 PS 23.5.1987, Liikamsuojeluntomärsyttiminarilaiset.
53 Kaleva 23.5.1987, Kessi yhdistii kunnan, koltat, poromiehet ja metsähallituksen.
54 Andreassen 2001, 146.
the intrinsic value of nature weighs more than in Norway, where the culture and use of resources receive more attention.\textsuperscript{55}

The District of Inari invited the vice chairperson of the Reindeer Herders’ Association executive committee and a representative from the Herding Co-operative of Hammastunturi, Juhani Magga, to a “hike”\textsuperscript{56} in Kessi. According to Magga, it was good that the loggings had been spread more evenly in this district – the Herding Co-operative of Vätsäri had been saved from the loggings so far.\textsuperscript{57} This statement is revealing in two senses. Firstly, it reveals the internal fronts within the reindeer herding community, as well as notions of nature conservation: the loggings became a problem as soon as they were carried out in one’s own herding co-operative. Previous loggings had been carried out in the forests of the Hammastunturi and Ivalo Herding Co-operatives\textsuperscript{58}. The choice of a representative from the Hammastunturi Co-operative may be seen as a cunning choice by the foresters – statements from the Vätsäri Co-operative would have been more critical. Another forestry dispute broke out in the Hammastunturi area later in the 1990s. Another thing that Magga’s statement shows, referring to the harm caused by forestry, is the way in which forestry was considered by the reindeer herders to be definitely harmful.

For the Skolt Sami in the village of Nellim, the loggings meant employment. Forest and Park Service had logged in Nellim, near the Skolt settlement area, from 1966 onwards, employing the Skolt Sami. In the Finnish public sphere the Skolt Sami were represented as supporters of the loggings, but there are inconsistencies and varying tendencies in the sources. A Skolt Sami spokesman from Nellim, Sergei K. Fofanoff, was concerned about employment and accused conservationists of interfering with the economic development of Inari. The village meeting in Nellim protested that Fofanoff had no mandate to speak like that. Matti Sverloff, the spokesman for the Skolt Sami in Sevettijärvi, stated: “The Skolt area belongs to us: the conservationists have no business here without our permission.”\textsuperscript{59} There were also


\textsuperscript{56} The Finnish term is “retkeily”: in practice, the events were press conferences that took place in the forests.

\textsuperscript{57} Inarin kunnan ja hoitoalueen sopu siivittää Kessin hakkuita, Kaleva 12.4.1987.


\textsuperscript{59} On the loggings in Nellim, see The archive of District of Inari, Forest and Park Service, Ivalo, The correspondence of the state forester 1967, Aluemetsänhoitaja Yrjö Säätom Mh:n Ppk:lle 16.5.1967, No. 490; on the employment of the Skolt Sami in Nellim, see The archive of District of Inari, Forest and Park Service, Ivalo, The correspondence of the state forester 1983, Aluemetsänhoitaja Arvi Koivisto vastaaville työntekijille 28.1.1983, No. 47; periodic paid labour became the rule for Skolt Sami males from the 1950s onwards, since fishing could not offer a livelihood for the population. Forest and Park Service was already a source of employment by then, as well as road construction work. Pelto 1973, 23-24; Kansan Tahto 12.5.1987, “Periaatteet
inconsistencies in presenting Sverlof’s standpoint. In May 1987 he renounced his support for the loggings, but he appeared to be promoting them in the summer of that year. 60 A few months later, however, on 12 December 1987, a village meeting of the Skolt Sami in Nellim passed a unanimous resolution that Kessi was not to be protected. Pertti Veijola, the regional forester (alueemetsähuolto) in the District of Inari, has referred to the Skolt Sami as saying that the loggings would have a positive effect on subsistence, services and culture in Nellim. 61 This crack in the Sami front was publicized widely. Periodic employment in small-scale forestry also constituted part of the subsistence of the Skolt Sami in Sevettijärvi, at least during the late 1970s 62.

The Sami made more radical and principal claims in the landownership discussion than in the discussion on means of living: with regard to loggings, as well, there was room for a more pragmatic approach. The means of living question related to necessities such as employment, subsistence and other Sami means of living. 63

Going to the other extreme, Jouni Kitti stated that the loggings had destroyed the Sami culture, especially that of reindeer nomadism. Kitti referred, for example, to the large forest-related vocabulary in the Sami language. The timberline was a geographical and cultural borderline. According to Kitti, the loggings in Kessi would be as dramatic in their consequences as the loggings had been for the hydropower projects in Lokka and Porttipahta during the 1950s and 1960s. The old forests, a habitat for the arboreal lichen, would vanish, the lichen pastures would suffer serious damage from ploughing, and in the logging areas the protecting effect of timber would vanish. Since access to winter pastures would be checked, the reindeer’s own pasture circulation system would be disturbed. The references to ploughing in the Kitti’s statement show that either the silvicultural effects of the loggings were magnified by the resisting side or the statements were based on misinformation. 64 The PR issued by the District of Inari concentrated most of time on correcting statements that

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60 LK 30.5.1987, Koltat peräisivät edusmiestensä tekemisiä; Kaleva 17.6.1987, Kansalaispalveluistametsähallituksenmuusimlinjampohjoisessa.
61 LK 30.5.1987, Koltat peräisivät edusmiestensä tekemisiä; Kaleva 17.6.1987, Kansalaispalveluistametsähallituksenmuusimlinjampohjoisessa.
62 Veijola 1988, p. 47.
64 See also Kitti, Jouni: Davviguovvluide luonnduealaluslåhka? Sápmelaš 7-8/1982, where the local Sami demanded similar benefits from the “law of estates for practising organic means of living” (luontaiselninotilalaki), as provided by the Reindeer Estate Law. This in spite of the sometimes demonizing reporting of Sami legislation in Finland, which Kitti practised.
resisted loggings – ploughing would not be practised. Kitti’s statement is noteworthy because it comes closest to representing the Sami as people as having a close relation to nature, by connecting the forest to the Sami culture through the language. The language carried on the old Sami knowledge of the forests, which was threatened by modern industrial needs. Kitti is also a rare example of the use of traditional ecological knowledge possessed by the indigenous peoples in the dispute.

The difference between the most radical and the more pragmatic statements, which supported the loggings, may be explained by the different types of organization and politics in NSMs. The environmental movement, movements for the rights of sexual minorities and the indigenous peoples’ movement have been categorized as such movements. The NSMs are organized on a non-class basis and have experienced newly-organized, non-class-based oppression, for example ecological oppression. A tension between a committed leading elite and the passive “masses”, as well as difficulties in mobilization, are typical of these movements. The leadership of the new movements usually represents the better-off part of the group whose rights they are supposed to defend. The movements usually suffer from a lack of power in institutionalized processes. The moral commitment of the leadership reflects this lack of power, rather than the moral superiority of the leadership. Non-class-based movements act in class-based societies, where potential members perceive their interest as class-related and class-positioned. The lack of power and the consequent failure to promote the rights of the interest group have also been explained by the failure of the new movements to form lasting alliances with the established political organizations of the majority.65

The Skolt Sami support for loggings was a pragmatic special interest politics that should not be studied from the perspective of ethnopolitics with the presupposition of shared objective interests. The danger of attributing a false consciousness to the historical actors is evident here66. In the same way, blaming welfare colonization or cultural stigma for a lack of shared goals would be too straightforward. The Skolt Sami of Nellim made their claims as the Skolt Sami of Nellim, not as Finns, as theory on cultural stigma and a missing sense of ethnic communion would have required67. Obviously neither the goals of ethnopolitics nor the alleged indigenous rejection of the inclusory, yet harmful egalitarian thinking in the welfare state system and services were shared by all the Sami68. Many Sami groups have proven to be

65 Sklair 2000, 342-343.
67 The comparison is made here with a deeper assimilation, defined as the identity change from Sami to Norwegian of the Coastal Sami societies of Norway. Bjørklund and Brantenberg 1981, 109-110, 123-124.
68 Compare Lewis 2002, 39.
hard to mobilize, since the ideologically more “correct” claim that “this is our land” is met with a claim that “we need jobs”\textsuperscript{69}. In Finland, the case of Skolt Sami is one of the most obvious examples.

The Sami elite did little to overcome this gap in the front: there was no room for a social political approach in the strategies concentrating on gaining land rights, using legal tools and demonizing industrial land-use forms. Indeed, such rhetoric was deliberately toned down, as we saw on the handling of the statement to the Wilderness Committee.

9.5. The reception of Sami self-representations

On the surface the constellation of those involved in the dispute seemed to embody the potential for co-operation and resistance, and contact was established between environmentalists and the Sami.\textsuperscript{70} At a closer look, this co-operation turned out to be filled with problems, different premises and, in the end, shifting loyalties. Firstly, the effort to pursue a shared identity politics failed (with one exception, cf. the paragraph on Kessinhammas). Secondly, Sami self-representations were delegitimized by the most radical and visible actors. This chapter follows and tries to explain these developments. Why were the Sami identity politics not very successful? Why did the Sami lose the dispute?

A long-lived notion in counter-imagery, one of the Sami not being capable of owning and selling land, also survived into the 1980s and was mentioned in a committee report on Sami culture published in 1985. This representation was rendered out-of-date by Kaisa Korpijaakko and the huge publicity around her thesis on landownership on the part of Lapp villages during the years preceding the publication of her thesis\textsuperscript{71}. Many primordial elements survived in the majority imagery, though. The imagery of the Sami entertained by the Finns, that of a natural people practising a warm relationship with nature, has remained as a marker that creates differences between the Sami and the Finns.\textsuperscript{72} The closeness to nature implies a static culture, where pre-modern features are taken as the authentic cultural core of the Sami. Accordingly, modernization is seen as hostile to them\textsuperscript{73}. The Sami have had a hard time trying

\textsuperscript{69} Thuen 2002, 292.
\textsuperscript{70} See Lehtinen 1991, passim.
\textsuperscript{71} Lehtola 1997d, 275; LK 8.2.1987, Vanhoinen lapinkylien tutkimus osoittaa: Käsityksemme saamelaisen menneisyydestä on vääristynyt ja romantisoitu.
\textsuperscript{72} Tuulentie 2001, 89-91.
\textsuperscript{73} The Skolt Sami, especially, have been represented in (intra-)Sami folklore and in Finnish presentations as being harmonious and close to nature. This has offered the potential for speaking about the lost Skolt Sami
to make it clear that the Sami culture is an evolving culture too. The prevailing Finnish imagery of the Sami, with its notions of static and reindeer-herding imagery, has meant that the gap between the “reality” and the stereotypes is vast. According to Anna-Riitta Lindgren, this has resulted in difficulties for the Sami in building their own identity. 74

Nature conservationists, representing the old Finnish nature conservation organizations, draw a parallel between the conservation of Kessi as a wilderness and the survival of the Sami culture and the future of traditional means of living.75 In other words, for the nature conservationists, the Sami were a people living in close connection to the land, who could survive only in relation to the land. The imagery used was well-meant and the conservationists were supportive of the Sami cause. By choosing this rather traditional representation, however, they followed only one strand of the Sami strategies in identity politics, practised by a number of Sami in the unofficial field of representation. One reason for this choice of representation is that highlighting the cultural aspect of the forests to the Finnish people was an old strategy within the nature conservation movement, which was often used in a series of forest disputes in Finland during the 1980s and 1990s 76.

The coalition between the Sami and the conservationists was typical of forest disputes in Finland during the 1970s and 1980s in cases where the nationally-organized conservationist movement tried to ally with the local people. Some of the disputes were initiated locally. In Kessi it seems that the presentation of the Sami drafted by the nature conservationists, with its emphasis on Sami culture and its connectedness to traditional, nature-bound means of living, was an out-of-date, romantic picture of the reindeer Sami. There was also a tendency to represent a unified Sami front, involved in traditional means of living and sharing the anti-modernist views held by the conservationists 77. The legal agency was undercommunicated.

The Sami were represented differently in the environmentalist pamphlet *Kessinhammas*. The environmentalists, representing a younger and more radical generation than that of established conservationists, had established contact with the official Sami movement: the articles on Sami questions were written by a member of the Sami Delegation, Esko Aikio. Rather than building on primordial imagery, Aikio referred to the binding international conventions and the unsettled question of landownership. *Kessinhammas* also

identity and the social and mental problems this has led to in the Skolt Sami community. This important aspect of the matter falls outside the scope of this study. Laitinen 1999, 176 et passim; Mathisen 2004, 19, 27; Nickul 1970, 21.

74 On the dominance of the reindeer-herding imagery, see Lehtola J. 2000, 184; Lindgren 1999, 169.

75 Pekurinen 1997, s. 58; Inarinmaa 15.4.1987, Kessin kairan kohtalonkysymys; Inarinmaa 15.4.1987, Siltamaalarit vastuuseen.


77 See, for example, writing credited to Kessi-Lihkadus, Kessi movement, in Sápmelaš 1-3/1989, Kessi historjá.
included the traditional approach to the Sami problem: cultural survival was not possible without a surviving traditional means of living. Thanks to quotations from the Sami Delegation, both of these representational strategies were used in the pamphlet.78

The conservationists presented the condition of the pastures in Vätsäri as weak.79 The arboreal lichen, for example, a supplementary form of nutrition during the winter, was being consumed throughout the year. Just before the dispute, however, the condition of the pasturelands in the area of the Vätsäri Co-operative was reported as being exceptionally good, although weakening, with regard to both lichen and arboreal lichen, whereas pastures were in poorer condition in other parts of the reindeer herding area and Inari.80 A victim representation was built, where the Sami and their culture were represented as poor and ridden with difficulties. The conservationists also under-communicated the significant rise in the number of reindeer in the co-operatives of Vätsäri and Paatsjoki during the 1980s, the high concentration of reindeer ownership, the Finnish reindeer herding in the area, the mechanization of herding and its transformation into meat production, which had also taken place in Eastern Inari81.

The reception of the most essentializing representations of the Sami, cultivated by the conservationists in the dispute, was not a success. Pentti Linkola, an extreme environmentalist and a participant in the civil disobedience actions in Kessi, trashed these representations in the above-mentioned book, *Pohjoinen erämaa Kessi-Vätsäri*. Linkola criticized both the Sami herders and the romanticizing image cultivated of them, where reindeer herding was being deprived by forestry. According to Linkola, the marks left and the stress to nature caused by forestry and reindeer herding did not differ significantly from each other. Reindeer herding, although more sustainable than forestry, was also mechanized, had left marks, fences, boundaries, waste and snowmobile trails in nature, which were unacceptable to Linkola. The

79 There is highly controversial information available about the condition of the pasture lands in Kessi-Vätsäri. The information about the grazing pattern of the reindeer in Kessi is also mixed. The reindeers were grazing in Kessi throughout the year at this time, which, according to some scientists, had weakened the lichen covering. According to other statements given to me personally by wilderness designer Tapio Tynys in 1997, the condition of the pastures in Kessi was relatively good – the best in Inari – and the crisis was not as acute as in the other co-operatives. By comparison, in Norway and the herding in Paatsjoki Valley, next to Kessi-Vätsäri, the reindeers do not graze all year round, so the lichen-covering has been sustained better than in Finland. Kollstrom, Makarova and Tynys 1996, 88.
81 Tynys, Tapio: Eräitä kehityslinjoja ja 1900-luvun tapahtumia, Vätsäri – erämaa järven takana, Tapio Tynys (ed.), Metsähallitus, Ylä-Lapin luonnonhoitoalue, s.p., s.a., 68-72.
lichen pastures were exhausted by over-large stocks. To Linkola, reindeer herding constituted the same despotism over nature as forestry, which is a logical standpoint in Linkola’s uncompromisingly biological worldview and thinking. Linkola’s thinking put the survival of the ecosystem in the spotlight and marginalized the people, despite their ethnicity, to just one passing (yet exceptionally harmful) species in the long history of life. The people had been transformed from “masters” of nature to being “foreign” to nature. Linkola, who also stood in opposition to the people-centred “Christian humanistic socialist” premises of nature conservation, presented a new and extremely environmentalist trait in reindeer-herding criticism and in the discussion of land-use in Lapland. When it comes to identity politics, the break from both the front demanding Sami rights and from nature conservation is evident. The “natural people” imagery was later questioned by other actors too.

In the Finnish public sphere there were, in addition, two scandals concerning reindeer herding just before the dispute. The first was an exogenous problem: the nuclear accident at the plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine raised the radioactive radiation levels in reindeer meat considerably. The other was endogenous: Some herding co-operatives in Inari and Utsjoki defied the ban on slaughtering reindeer over the quota imposed upon them and chose to disobey the orders issued by the provincial government. Some herders were sued and complaints were heard about herders being greedy and rich. In most cases, the herders simply chose to put the blame on outside intervention for problems with otherwise sustainable Sami herding.

The imagery of closeness to nature is an example of self-representation that was partly loaned from dominant Western discourses. The “primitive” features were perceived as far lower than those of nations with a civilized culture. The wilderness, in itself a Western construction within which the domicile of the Sami was categorized, was bound to the majority representation of the Sami identity and it granted legitimacy to the colonization of the “terra nullius”: There was a need to civilize both the people and the land. Romanticism changed this, as the nature and wilderness was seen as a temple of God. The “happy” people living in the wilderness were in close connection with nature and not practising the duality and sharp distinction between nature and man that was typical of Western scientific thinking.

85 LK 25.4.1987, Käsivarren herkkä luonto ja porotalous turvattava.
The problem with such a self-representation, once legitimized, is that the modernizing features in the culture are easily perceived by the majority as “unnatural” and fraudulent: both against nature – for which an expectation of the lightest possible use is set – and against the romanticizing and stereotypical expectations of the majority. The breakthrough of environmental thinking in Finland meant that the wilderness was appreciated and had strong positive connotations, but only in relation to the intrinsic value of nature itself. The “fraud” committed by the modernizing Sami became even bigger, as nearly every form of land use became a misuse. This also has consequences in the correspondence between “reality” and the representation. The trap hidden in the essentializing imagery was sprung in Finland. In addition, the Sami movement had to endure an increasing number of Sami voices questioning the reputation of the Sami as agents of sustainability, and grievances about actually protecting nature, as well as living up to the image produced.

As the information on overgrazing began to dominate the public image of reindeer herding, even in the northernmost herding co-operatives, the representation changed to a more negative one among researchers as well. Environmentalists began to support state-administrated nature conservation. More crucially, the representation gained popularity in Finnish administrative hierarchies. During the dispute, and during the negotiating process of the Sami Law in the early 1990s, the resisting arguments used a stereotypical imagery of the Sami not being capable of taking care of their environment; according to Seija Tuulentie, even racial characteristics were used as arguments.

At the same time as the “natural people” imagery was abandoned by the Sami elite and was losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the majority, the imagery was sustained, if not deepened and institutionalized in the global indigenous movement. The representation of indigenous people as agents for sustainable development was used in the declarations from various summits, such as the “Brundtland Report” in 1987, and later on at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, and the Kari-Oca Declaration of 1992, which guarantees environmental security for indigenous peoples. The representation combined vulnerability with marginality and a consequent destruction on encountering modernization, over which the indigenous

89 The full name of the Brundtland Report is the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, and it was released in 1987. The report is quoted in, for example, Jull 2003, 21-22.
peoples had no control. The representation was used as a legitimation for greater moral right to the use and management of the natural resources of their domicile. In Norway, the work of the Sami Rights Council (Samerettsutvalget) during the 1990s was also based on such a notion of nature offering a foundation for the Sami culture, referring to parallels with other indigenous cultures. The work of the council was supposed to guide the management of the land in Finnmark and protect the Sami from other forms of land use. The Swedish Sami seem not to have been afraid to represent themselves as agents of sustainability, while the Finnish Sami, due to the Finnish backlash, had become more cautious and the usability of the declarations may have diminished. In critical comments, the representation has been labelled a “modern mythical construction” and a tool for political suppression and marginalization, since the Sami were expected to represent themselves through the imagery of the Western world. When these expectations were not met, paternalistic and intolerant elements were revealed in discussions on Sami resource use in Finland and Norway from the 1980s onwards.

9.6. The pan-Sami context: Alta and Kessi

Resistance towards the loggings in Kessi may be compared with the most significant Sami action of that era, the Alta action. The disputes have in common the late occurrence of active resistance and critique towards the Nordic states, by comparison with other indigenous action. The Alta action may already have been a model for JS activity in the contemporaneous action against regulating the River Ounasjoki, one of the first instances of major and successful “pan-Lappish” conservationist action during the early 1980s. To discuss the influences, it is first necessary to establish the contact that the Sami in Finland had

91 Jull 2003, 21-22.
92 Mathisen 2004, 17.
94 Compare Lars Pittsa and Íisko Sara in Sápmelaš 6-7/1989, Sámiid XIV konfereansa, where Sara blames the majority for their colonialism and ecological oppression, but does not make self-representations. Pittsa, for his part, states that the Sami means of living had been adapted (heivhevuvot, fitted) to nature over the course of thousands of years. The destruction of nature had been imported to the north.
95 Lehtola 1999c, 15-16; Mathisen 2004, 24-26, 29.
96 It may be mentioned that Sami Radio in Finland provided inter-Nordic coverage of the Alta case almost second by second. The land rights were acutely threatened and so was the freedom of the media – Sami Radio reporter Johan Fr. Högman was arrested at the demonstration in front of the Stortinget in Oslo. Högman kept his tape recorder on and reported his arrest. The Niillas A. Somby episode, including his escape via Finland to Canada and adoption by an Indian tribe, was also reported in Finland by Sulo Aikio. Lehtola 1997b, 65-68.
97 Minde 1995b, 23.
98 Saamelaiskulttuuritoimikunnan mietintö 1985:66, 163.
with the Alta activism. I shall then illustrate the similarities and differences, with the aim of explaining the different outcomes of the disputes through the different power constellations.

Since the Alta plan had consequences for the water systems and fishing in the River Teno (Deatnu, Tana) and in Utsjoki, the plan was resisted\(^99\) and followed from the early 1970s onwards by, for example, Jouni Kitti, who reported the process to the Sami through Sápmelaš. As the process escalated into demonstrations, there was a surge of pan-Sami consciousness among the Sami in Finland and contacts were being made.\(^100\) The demonstrations in Norway were followed and Sami from the Finnish side of the border participated in them.\(^101\) Sápmelaš and Jouni Kitti, who was chief editor at the time, were positive about the action taken in Alta: in a report from a demonstration against damming in Helsinki, organized by nature conservationists, the stopping of the road construction was credited to the demonstrations and hunger strike: Alta was brought to the attention of rest of the world and the authorities in Oslo were brought to their knees. Kitti also condemned the project as harmful both to nature and to fishing.\(^102\)

The Alta dispute also seems to denote the start of the co-operation between nature conservationists and the Sami in Finland. Nature conservationists organized a meeting about the Alta case, where Norwegian engineer Arne Øynes stated that there was no actual hurry for the river to be dammed: there was enough power. On the same occasion, Oula Näkkäläjärvi spoke about the traditional Sami way of life in the region and on Sami rights, and Jouni Kitti spoke about the effects of the damming on fishing. The indigenous peoples’ movement and the Alta action were also discussed in a radical spirit: activists were present with stories about majority action. Sápmelaš was positive about the meeting, especially about how the conservationists were made familiar with Sami rights and given an un-romanticized picture of the Sami region and life.\(^103\) In 1981, Jouni Kitti reported on the damming plans for the River Tsieskul in Utsjoki, which was condemned due to its harmful impact on nature and the river

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99 See a petition to the Ministry of Justice, signed by Johannes Helander and Kitti, as early as 1973, KA, Archive of SiPLC, box 30 (miscellaneous), Lapin sivistysseura Oikeusministeriölle 11.6.1973.
100 There are testimonies that at a grass-roots level, and indeed in a pan-Sami context, the Alta struggle resulted in “strong personal awakenings” among those involved on the Finnish side of the border. It also reshaped ways in which the Sami and majority identities and relationships were constructed. Seurujärvi-Kari, Irja: The making of Saami collective identity in the context of Saami and indigenous movement, paper given in the seminar Shaping and negotiating the ethnicity, Department of history and ethnology, University of Jyväskylä, Finland, 21.-22.10.2005.
101 Morottaja 1984, 331; Sápmelas on effects on Norwegian Sami policy, increasing international support and reputation of the Sami and on the dispersing measures taken in resistance, Sápmelas 7/1979, Sámijahki lea vuot vassan ja odda barggu jahki alga.
103 Sápmelas 5-6/1981, Čoahkan Álaheaeianu dulvadeami birra Helssegis.
system, as well as on the traditional means of living. Kitti connected this case to the Alta case: the River Tsieskul belonged to the Deatnu water system, conserved in its natural state by the Stortinget of Norway. Regulations in the Deatnu waterway could result in Norway signing off the conservation.104 When the bridge was blown up, Kitti demanded a wiser use of passive resistance for pragmatic reasons: direct action would provoke the state into sending in a larger police force.105

Three traits can be distinguished in the Alta dispute. Firstly, as in Finland, the environmentalist side; this highlighted the destructive effect of the hydropower project on the environment and means of living, and was led by Norwegian activists. Secondly, the Sami activist front concentrated at the beginning of the dispute on the possible effects on reindeer herding and Sami rights to the areas they inhabited. Thirdly, the exclusive concentration on reindeer-herding issues; this meant that the Sami outside this trade had trouble identifying with the movement. Direct action deepened the mistrust of some of the Sami towards the Alta movement.106 When the dispute had passed its most radical phase, and had evolved into a general Sami issue advocated in the political and administrative hierarchies, the movement became more legitimate among the Sami.

Both the formation of the fronts and the choice of argumentation in the Sami criticism of the loggings were similar to that of the Alta dispute. The ecological arguments may have carried greater weight in the Sami argumentation in Finland, and direct action was avoided by the Sami in Finland. Imagery was both more dispersed and less exclusive in Finland than in Norway.

Among the strategies of Norwegian Sami activism that were adapted to Finnish Sami activism was the plea of unfinished legislative processes, similar to that of the NRL with regard to the work of the Sami Rights Council (Samerettsutvalget) in 1981. In addition, protests were lodged about obvious violations of the law, in the same way that the NRL had protested in relation to the start of the construction work in the Stilla region during the middle of the autumn seasonal reindeer move, which was an offence against the Reindeer Herding Law (Oreigningslov). In Finland there was not a complete breach between government officials and the Sami, whilst in Norway the NSR symbolically broke off negotiating contact in the autumn of 1981.107

105 Kitti, Jouni: Álaheadjulå, Sápmelas 7-8/1981.
106 Eidheim 1992, 22; Lehtola 1997a, s. 76-77.
The differences were greatest in the outcome of the dispute. The Sami in Finland were not capable of such a demonstration of power and unity as were the three Sami organizations – the NRL, the NSR and the Nordic Sami Council – in initiating the Sami Rights Council in 1980. In Norway, the Sami could transfer the focus of the struggle from ecological issues to the Sami aboriginal rights issue. Nor did there occur such a re-evaluation of the state-Sami relationship (if, indeed, any occurred) as in Norway, where it led ultimately to the ratification of ILO Convention 169. Seen from the perspective of the Finnish state, the big issues of self-government (the establishment of the Sami Parliament in 1973), as well as the landownership issue (the Forest Law of 1883) were already resolved. According to the geographer Ari Lehtinen, the Sami Delegation soon encountered the limits of the political space it possessed in the dispute, when the state and forestry officials entered the dispute with an unbending attitude. I have not encountered similar expressions of re-legitimization and revitalization of Sami ethnicity in the Finnish public sphere to those in the coastal Sami regions in Norway. There was no “societal catharsis” among the Sami in Finland. Sami identity issues were not a central focus, partly because they were already legitimized issues and partly because of the way that ecological issues dominated the discussion.

Since environmentalism had penetrated the whole of society, the Sami issue was still marginal and of little interest. There was no broad identity discussion in the media and Sami efforts to guilt-trip the Finnish authorities with aboriginality (which were efficient in Norway) were met with a consistent refusal of special treatment. Forest officials were concerned about securing forest-industrial needs at the cost of the other land-use forms. Forest-industrial issues are said to have dominated the official process that led to the establishment of the wilderness areas, exposing areas to lighter forms of logging and not significantly increasing areas of conservation. The majority discourse of equality remained dominant and the founding principles of Sami politics were not changed in Finland.

The transformation in the environmentalist discourse was fatal for the Sami cause. There was a disengagement from thinking that was hostile to modernization and consumerism, and revival of talk of sustainable development (see Chapter 9.1.). This return to partly utilitarian principles led, in the case of Kessi and wilderness management in general, to an emphasis on economic *multiple use* (another catch-phrase in Finnish forestry discourse

108 Minde 2003b, 122; Thuen 1995, 45, 204.
109 Lehtinen 2004, 137.
111 Compare Thuen 2002, 205, 292-293.
112 Lehtinen 2004, 137-143.
during this period) of the areas, which resulted in softer silvicultural means, but where reindeer herding was only one – and in most cases a subordinate – land-use form. The Sami issue was marginalized and reduced to a reindeer-herding issue.\footnote{Heikkilä 2004, 139, 142; Leino-Kaukiainen 1997, 211.}

In Alta, attempts were made to reduce the Sami issue to a pasture issue. The reindeer-herding Sami of Masi faced opposition from the Norwegian state, the hydropower company and Norwegian agrarian landowners, while they were backed by the Norwegian nature conservation movement. In Finland, the constellation was seemingly simpler: it lacked the agrarian element, but this simplicity was again blurred by sliding ethnic barriers - there were Sami who were gaining from forestry on the payroll of the Finnish land regime, as well as ethnic Finns on the resisting side and in the reindeer-herding community. The symbolic power of herding as a Sami marker was weaker. In addition, the environmentalist side was not totally pro-reindeer herding. Even though official goodwill was there, and may have been greater than in Norway (where the majority bodies had long neglected information that was critical of the hydropower project), Finnish goodwill did not materialize in the official process to its full potential. The disputes ended in compromises in both countries. The efficiency of forestry was toned down and the multiple use of forests was highlighted; in Norway, the harm to reindeer herding was disparaged, but the scale of the project was checked. In both cases, the knowledge on which estimates concerning the effect on reindeer herding were based was predominantly “Western”, not traditional.\footnote{Bjorklund and Brantenberg 1981, 16, 37-50; Paine 1982, 42-43, 50-56, 58.}

Analysing the power constellation as a contestation of different ideas over hegemony, one might ask why environmental ideas became so hegemonic and Sami rights so unthinkable. In what follows, the machinery that was set up is perceived as a self-referring communication, which refers not so much to the reality but to the politics as a communicative field. This field has its own dynamics and developments; thus, both the field itself and the world, society, etc. outside this field can and does change. Different ideas have different potential for becoming accepted and they have a varying “impact area”. Some “impact areas” and some institutions are taken as natural, as a given. In many ways, the nation-state has this status. The “impact area” of environmental ideas was and is taken to be global and national (“Ecological threats have no boundaries. They concern us all, even in Finland.”). In Finland, the rights of the Sami had a very marginal impact area in many ways (as a small national minority living in northernmost Finland), and their challenge to the “natural” borders and territoriality of the “natural” frame of reference – the state of Finland – enjoyed only marginal
support. The Sami question was not yet of a cross-border nature, nor of an ecological character. It was an issue of national integrity that, nationally, formed a communication system of its own, with differing principles. As we saw in the case of the Wilderness Committee, taking up issues of landownership that challenged the legal and territorial principles of the state was enough to create a reaction for fear of a conflict. The principle of finding a consensus overruled the (purely moral) legitimacy of the ethnic-based claims. In addition, the Sami strategy of legalism suffered from differing communication systems. The other actors practised mostly ecological and scientific reasoning, and institutional *power of expertise*, with high-ranking hegemonic systems of argumentation, “property rights” to certain sections of reality and their own discursive tools of exclusion. The Sami communicated with a set of tools challenging a legal system with the highest *institutional power*.

There was a double handicap, a double hegemony to be beaten.

There were a series of forestry vs. reindeer herding disputes in Sweden at the time. Unlike Norway and Finland, where the Sami confronted the state, in Sweden the Sami had to confront and defend themselves against private landowners, timber industry companies and the state. This was due to the more complex landownership pattern in Swedish Sami areas, stemming from extensive industrial landownership from the end of the nineteenth century. The Swedish constellation gave more room for discourses criticizing Sami land-use and herding forms in relation to forestry, hunting (the predator question) and nature conservation. For the state of Finland, there was no need to question the sustainability of the Sami land-use forms, due to the more concentrated landownership and environmental management procedure in Finland. Forest and Park Service could use the discourse of legality: as long as state ownership remained, the loggings would continue, although after the Kessi dispute a slight “environmental turn” (Lehtinen) was detected in the procedures of the Forest and Park Service. The sustainability of Sami land-use forms was rejected by other actors who, given the institutional position of the state and restrictions on modes of speech, had another kind of potential to voice suspicions and accusations. As a practical consequence, unlike in Sweden, the Sami in Finland did not have to file court cases against numerous local powers, and the state, as a landowner and “colonizer”, was more effectively challenged and demonized. However, the state remained firm on hardcore issues, such as landownership. In the Kessi

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115 Meyer 1999, 57-60. Siri Meyer uses the model by Niklas Luhmann on communication systems, which takes the systems to be self-sufficient and more or less closed. In a globalized reality, with overlapping institutions, one might want to analyse the institutional/political/administrative processes as more open.
117 Lehtinen 2004, 143.
process, power was distributed only at a local level in resource management, as modes of civic participation were established. The fact that the Sami in Finland could not have made full use of the symbolic power of an oppressed victim is proof of the institutional dominance of the silent discourses of equality, legality and statism in Finland.118

With the great big exception of the Alta dispute, Sami ethnopolitics in Norway has been moderate and not very conflict-seeking with the majority. The Norwegian Sami movement has been more cautious in taking up the potentially more controversial issues of territorial rights and resource control. The Sami Parliament in Norway has concentrated in its first years on political and legal principles. The Sami Delegation in Finland has been more radical in its statements and has built boundaries more aggressively, highlighting the historical and cultural differences between the peoples. Why was this? The more aggressive Sami policy in Finland may be due to the (relatively) low frequency of conflicts around these matters and the moment of positive (though rapidly-changing) publicity that the Sami in Finland enjoyed and the Sami in Norway lacked in the wake of the Alta dispute in the early 1980s. The long tradition of the Norwegianization policy and assimilation/stigmatization has not been so consistent in Finland, and the strong intra- and inter-ethnic sanctions were mostly lacking from the Finnish public sphere.119 In addition, it was easier to make radical statements and demands in a political environment that practised silence than in an environment that practised a different, more democratic form of communication, and which was prone to react.

9.7. Discourses on Sami identity in Norway and Finland in the 1980s and early 1990s

According to Vigdis Stordahl, the de-stigmatization of the Sami culture, which began in the 1960s120, resulted in the start of the Sami struggle for their recognition, which re-organized the Sami-Norwegian dilemma and us/them dichotomy. A cultural revolution and an outburst of cultural activity took place. According to Stordahl, the struggle also denoted a conflict over politicized reality and the social universe within the Sami movement. By the time of the Alta action, the means adopted by the most radical Sami had caused the Sami front to disintegrate, but there was unanimity concerning the threat that the dam constituted to the Sami means of living, mostly reindeer herding. The need to negotiate the unresolved land and water rights

120 The effort to construct an ethnic incorporation by establishing a “group myth” that de-stigmatized mythical Sami knowledge was depicted and further inspired by Eidheim 1971, 77-79.
issues was widely acknowledged. After the Alta conflict, the Sami movement entered a new phase of internal discussion: the land and water-rights issues were “institutionalized” and negotiated at a higher official level. At a grass-roots level, the scope of the discussion multiplied in topics and solutions as well: a focus on identity issues emerged and many possible alternatives were presented as potential Sami identities and ways of being. An emotional, widespread and agonizing (Stordahl) debate followed, which Vidgis Stordahl has named the “how to be a Sami debate”.\(^\text{121}\)

In Sweden there was a similar pluralization of representative field. According to Ulf Mörkenstam, a disengagement of the (government-bestowed) reindeer-herding Sami identity occurred, and a more flexible definition of Samihood was created: it was a sum of the group members’ conceptions, values, symbols and so on. The Sami were a group, not merely a reindeer herding group. This was significant, as communion could be constructed on many different bases and the scope of the claims made of the government could be broadened out from the reindeer-herding legislation to include other issues. Great importance was attached to language as a cultural marker.\(^\text{122}\) In Finland, reindeer-herding imagery was not bestowed from above and it was not, therefore, an inaccessible and “spoiled” marker in the same way as in Sweden. In Finland, reindeer were adopted on many occasions as a unifying cultural marker, which restored the Sami relation to nature, but there has been an internal critique of the dominance of reindeer-herding (self-)imagery. This is partly due to the growing level of education, a source of pride among the Sami in Finland.\(^\text{123}\)

Overall, the internal discussion on Sami identity in Finland did pluralize, but only partially. The new openings were partly hampered by parallel openings in the discussion on Sami identity with themes such as “who has the right to enter the Sami community” or “who gets to be a Sami”. An attempt was made to bar actors from the representative field. This excluding act was partly initiated by external threat and the discussion assumed more exclusive forms in the 1990s, due to the perceived threat from the “Lappish” movement. The recognition of Sami identity by the Sami community was raised as a decisive ethnic marker. This topical issue had direct consequences in matters of power: a law on who was allowed to vote at Sami Diggi elections (1995) was prepared at that time and there were definitions of Saminess that would have allowed access for many people whom the Sami had not recognized as Sami. The ethnic boundaries were build in conditions of increased intra-ethnic

\(^{121}\) Stordahl 1997b, 145-146, 148.
\(^{122}\) Mörkenstam 2002, 129-130.
\(^{123}\) Lehtola 1999c, 26-27; compare Stoor, Maritta: “Saamelainen identiteetti”, a lecture given at the University of Jyväskylä, November 1996.
difference: the Finnish-speaking Sami and the “city Sami” felt discriminated and belittled by the “hyper-Sami”, who lived in Sami home area, had Sami parents and spoke the Sami language. The “Lappish” identity movement changed the climate around the question of the power of definition: if there was a right to ethnic self-definition for the Sami, what kind of right did the Sami have to deny the alleged “Saminess” or “Lappishness” of the disputed group? The kind of status that any group received had consequences for other groups as well. A growth in the exclusiveness of the identity markers had taken place in conditions of increasing hybridity, linguistic and otherwise, and was only one of the currencies within the Sami community.

The Sami had entered the dispute dispersed, and left the dispute even more dispersed. One reason for this was the involvement of the Sami in the planning of the resource use of Kessi. This inclusion occurred, for example, through the mandate of the Reindeer Herders’ Association (Paliskuntain yhdistys), with Juhani Magga as the representative. The Sami were always in a minority position and the compromises concerning other regions were sometimes interpreted in intra-Sami discussion as a loss of assets in, and harm to, other Sami (regions). This was a rare sign of intra-Sami sanctioning of the Sami taking part in this process. The difference is noticeable between this situation and that of Norway and the Alta dispute: in Alta, Sami activists were negatively sanctioned by other Sami for resisting the state of Norway, whereas Magga was blamed for letting the Sami down and taking side of the state of Finland. As a second example, the Sami movement became more diversified after the breakthrough in environmentalist thinking: after the dispute, Juhani Magga was quoted as saying that if the ideas of the wilderness committee were carried through, the practice of reindeer herding would be secured. Reindeer herding could not be taken as the only land-use form in Inari. Esko Aikio, a member of the Sami Delegation who had been active in the Kessi movement, protested, asking how the committee believed they could foster reindeer herding by allowing logging in the wilderness. Aikio also asked how the Sami culture could be fostered by allowing the majority culture to hamper the Sami culture only a little less than

124 Pääkkönen 1999, 39-41; Stoor 1999, 68-71, 74-78; the question of the definition of the Sami and the Sami home area was prioritized by the Sami elite at the time of the establishment of the Sami Delegation. The Sami living outside the Sami home area were not given the right to vote in the trial election of 1972 and the question has remained topical ever since. Sabmelašt 3-4/1972, Jienastit!
before.\textsuperscript{127} Lengthy disputes began over reindeer-herding and landownership rights within the Sami elite.\textsuperscript{128}

9.8. Conclusions

Identity politics in the Kessi dispute were at their most differentiated during the period of inquiry. The Sami Delegation chose to under-communicate the relationship with nature totally, while the disruption of this connectedness was demonized by the freer actors in the Sami-Finnish public sphere. It is evident that the Sami lawyer elite got its way in the formulation of the statements.

Of all the global discourses available, the Sami Delegation chose to use the rights discourse. The argumentation was judicial and scientific, and most consistent when claiming reconsideration of the landownership question. The international conventions used led the Sami Delegation to make out-of-date claims for cultural protection, not claims for self-determination. The Sami agency was thus not very powerful, while the status claimed now became clear: as a matter of fact, the indigenous status was attached to them by the Finns as well. In the statements issued by the institutionalized movement, caution was followed when making representations of Sami culture and life-forms. The same kind of caution was not followed when making representations of the Finnish intrusion into the Sami domicile. The imagery was scientific and ecological: the intrusion was undesired, as it would result in the deterioration of the ecosystem.

The ecologization of the identity politics was taken further in the freer forums, and this was also the case regarding Sami culture. In this field, some activists came close to an explicit use of the global “natural people” imagery: the strategy was blurred by the use of scientific argumentation, as well as by the expansion and diversification of the field of representation. It had become truly aggressive: ethnic barriers were being built high against the ecological oppressor and the colonizer.

The perception of both of these strategies was negative. The legal claims of the Sami Delegation were sometimes simply ignored, and the dispute remained a dispute between ecological values and economic gain. Even if there were no objections to the status of the Sami as indigenous peoples, the judicial implications of this were another matter. The state

\textsuperscript{127} LK 20.3.1989, Hakkaajat tyytyvät, suojelijat nyreissään erämaamietiöön.
\textsuperscript{128} LK 30.1.1989, Saamelaisvaltuuskunta ja poronhoitolakiehdotus.
remained firm over hardcore issues and Forest and Park Service started to log the wilderness areas, though in limited areas and with limited means. The remnants of the “natural people” imagery were questioned by a more powerful discourse of environmentalism – this affected both forums and strategies, as the state hierarchies also became more suspicious of the ecological foundation of the Sami agency. The reputation of the Sami had become worse.

The Sami in Finland were not in a position to claim such a victory as the Sami in Norway; the Sami front became more dispersed, on a par with the fragmentation and pluralization of the ideological field in the rest of society. These trends affected the Sami society and internal demands for solidarity were no longer achieved. On the positive side, the Sami had gained a place in the political hierarchies, although always in a minority position. They received some partial gains, but the most significant gains were still to be achieved.


On a national level, the first serious “backlash” had been just experienced. However, at an international, and indeed at a global level, there had been serious progress: recognition of indigenous peoples was finally attained and many processes were launched, through which indigenous group rights received acknowledgment, though their claims had not yet been met. Several international agreements stated the need to protect indigenous resource management from industrial land-use forms, including forestry. Self-determination was finally included in indigenous claims, in the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 1993. The Sami contributed to the process. At the preliminary meeting in Geneva to draft ILO Convention No. 169, Pekka Aikio managed, with support from the USA, to get through a clause, highlighting the indigenous relationship to the land, in the paragraphs discussing indigenous peoples’ land rights. This victory highlights three things: 1) The Sami had established their position within the indigenous movement. 2.) The Sami began to practiseseek recognition for the status of indigenousness more consistently after the Kessi dispute. 3) The Sami, and especially Pekka Aikio, began anew to use the imagery of the Sami as sustainable land-users, but only after the defeat of the legalist strategy.

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129 This was one of the most obvious aims of the committee. Erämaakomitean mietintö 1988:39, passim.
130 Barsh 1994, 43-48, 52-54, 58.
131 LK 5.11.1988, Tavoitteena ILO:n sopimusluonnos, Yhteisiä saamelaisteemoja mietittiin Lakselvissä.
As mentioned, it may legitimately be said that the decade culminated with the proposal for the Sami Law (1990). The proposal concentrated on landownership and access issues. Matters concerning traditional means of living, which were represented as “part of the Sami way of life” and the main subsistence of the Sami population, dominated the proposal. The means of living were no longer cultural issues, but their legal aspect and status as “Lapp” means of living were studied thoroughly in the discussion concerning access to them. The rights claims were based on ILO Convention No. 169 and on the need to revise the national law in accordance with international law. Due to the caution regarding people of other ethnicities, and existing rights concerning the traditional means of living, the Sami elite were hindered from using the ILO convention to its full capacity. Instead of self-determination, the only demand was for co-management of the resources within the Lapp village system (the future land regime, with regulated access to shareholdership, which was based on acknowledged status as a Sami, acknowledged property rights within the area or the full-time practice of a “Lapp” means of living). The Sami Parliament, for example, would only have received further tasks concerning the cultural autonomy of the Sami, not a more powerful mandate. The proposal was also cautious in its use of the convention in land rights claims, while the main use focused on claims for protection relating to the Sami culture, subsistence and language. Kaisa Korpijaakko’s study of judicial history was used, and the familiar reasoning of landownership rights having an unclear foundation and having never been handed over to the state. Special rights thinking and the critical attitude to the formal equality provided by the state of Finland were now up-to-date. It may be noted that in the most important political manifestation of the Sami movement the horizons of expectation were backward-looking: they were built on traditional means of living (and their management) and the management form was based on the oldest mode of collective Sami legal subjectivity, the Lapp village.\textsuperscript{132} Whether this had any impact on the inclusivity and Sami reception of the proposal is a topic outside the scope of this study. The proposal and its backward-looking strategies aroused, indeed, a counter-reaction that was “Rønnbeckian” in scale.

Lennard Sillanpää has made the positive remark that the Finnish administrative bodies were moving away from a controlling mode to a more open way of handling Sami policies, based on dialogue. The later development, detected by Seija Tuulentie, reveals a grimmer undercurrent: great difficulty in awarding special rights to the Sami, especially where the land rights issue was concerned, and in spite of concerns about the international reputation of

\textsuperscript{132} Saamelaisasiain neuvottelukunnan mietintö 1, 1990:32, Ehdotus saamelaislaiksi ja erinäisten lakien muuttamiseksi, passim.
Finland abroad. These trends emerged in the Sami rights discussion of the 1990s, but they reveal a dominant discourse of long duration, that of citizenship securing formal equality to all individuals/citizens, including the Sami. This contradicts the Sami demands for positive discrimination. To this discourse, the discourse of justice is a competing, if not a subordinate one.\(^{133}\) This hardened attitude was fatal to the Sami Law, which never came into being.

When the Sami Law was discussed in 1990, the municipality of Inari reacted, stating that the Sami Law would prohibit development in Inari. In addition, the rights of fishing and hunting for those other than the Sami would be threatened.\(^{134}\) Stop-go thinking was now being expressed openly and the goodwill towards Sami issues was eroded further in some circles during the years that followed. Sami statements were also questioned and challenged in a new way, which reflected the new climate of opinion in which the Sami had to operate. The mostly silent discourse of formal equality/citizenship became audible and remained dominant.

In practice, too, in the sphere of political contact in regional and local negotiations, the Sami saw their political space become more hostile as they were forced to meet other local actors, who were sometimes practising the same means of living and had a majority position in local government. The Sami political elite have stated that they had an easier time negotiating with state officials than being directly confronted by local actors.\(^{135}\) In addition, the reindeer herders who launched litigation processes against Forest and Park Service during the 1990s saw the representativeness of their traditionalist representation of reindeer-herding Sami being seriously questioned in the Finnish courts. Reindeer herding was not seen as a carrier of Sami social organization and culture, but as an adapted, evolved and profitable means of living, practised by a minority in the Sami community.\(^{136}\)

In Finland, the process of deconstructing national belonging and citizenship began in the 1990s. This provided room for non-nation-bound spatial identities. National identities and citizenship were replaced by “cultural citizenship”, cultural ways of defining nationhood in constructing the identity of the people living in Finland. “Cultural citizenship” was not restricted to national boundaries, offering the possibilities of newly-awakened *irredenta* ideas regarding Karelia and of constructing different identities within national boundaries.\(^{137}\) It seems that this easing-up of the national identity was not a liberating experience for the Sami,

\(^{133}\) Sillanpää 1994, passim; Seija Tuulentie refuses to claim one or other discourse as dominant, but they exist in parallel in Finnish minority and Sami discourses, and receive their legitimacy strictly from the context of the nation-state of Finland. Tuulentie 2001, 228, 248-250, 261, 266.

\(^{134}\) Sápmelaš 11-13/1990, Anárama gielđa: ”Sámeláhka uhkida giel‘da ovdáneami”.

\(^{135}\) Karppi 2002, 272-274.


whose room for manoeuvre in identity-building had become smaller; the way in which “Saminess” was bound to a particular region placed certain expectations on the Sami identity. The region was seen as vital to the Sami social organization and cultural heritage, and thus to the Sami identity. A greater expectation of authenticity was linked to the Sami living in the region than to those who had moved outside the Sami home area. As in other Nordic countries, the Sami identity was connected to the idea of reindeer-herding Sami. These stereotypical expectations, for example of stronger unity among the minorities, have been and remain hard to fulfil. At the same time, however, because of the state of Finland’s status as a “natural” community and frame of identification, Sami identity is connected to both the idea of Sami nationhood – as distinguished from Finnish nationality and identity – and, on the other hand, to Finnishness, as part of the Finnish state. In the national imagery, there is no “either Sami or Finnish”, but “both Sami and Finnish”. Even though the ethnic borders are flexible, they are typically flexible in one direction only: one can be a Sami and Finnish, but a Finn can never be a Sami.

As mentioned above, the “natural people” imagery emerged anew as part of the representational toolbox of the Sami Delegation/Parliament during the 1990s. The return to this imagery was not total, due to developments in indigenous rights. Norway ratified ILO Convention No. 169 in 1990; references to this became routine in statements issued by the Sami Delegation, resulting in the dominance of the global rights discourse. Referring to nature as constitutive to the Sami identity was combined with rights claims: the Sami were represented as a people with insufficient rights in their environment, which was still the basis of the Sami culture and traditional means of living, but no longer exclusively constitutive to the collective Sami identity. Means of living had become a rights issue, not solely a cultural emblem. The agency of legal subject was now constitutive to the Sami collective identity.

In statements issued by the Delegation throughout this period, political compromise between different interest groups was sometimes visible, blurring strategies and confusing status. In a statement in which a claim was made for the ratification of ILO Convention No. 169, the Sami were “indigenous people, with the right to maintain and develop their own language and culture”. And: “[T]he Sami as indigenous people, and their language and culture, are deeply connected to the nature of the Sami area, to the use of natural resources and the Sami traditional means of living. On the other hand, the Sami are a small minority. In

139 Compare Thuen 1995, 82-98.
addition, the Sami language and culture are so threatened that in order to sustain their viability, state management must provide far-reaching special measures”.\textsuperscript{141} The Sami Delegation systematically combined the status of indigenous people with that of a minority. This was due to the use of numerous international conventions referred to in the statements. Through the discourse of smallness, also a feature of the conventions, measures rather than rights were demanded of the state. This was most evident in language claims, which sustained the old “dying people” imagery with connotations of weakness typical of the old evolutionary thinking.

Overall, how successful have the identity politics been? A partial success is discernable. The most positive response that the Sami Delegation received from the Parliament of Finland was when policy began to be based on a recognition of group rights thinking. At best, the Parliament of Finland could offer recommendations that the Sami be treated as an indigenous people in their claims for equality in relation to other groups of citizens.\textsuperscript{142} Cultural autonomy was awarded to the Sami in 1995, acknowledging the Sami as a collective cultural claimant. Cultural autonomy and other legislative initiatives triggered latent fears at a local and national level of the Sami “taking over”.\textsuperscript{143} The greatest victory was the recognition of the Sami status as an indigenous people in the Finnish Constitution, in 1995.

In addition, the Sami challenge was met with a partial “greening” on the part of the land regime, though this was after a counter-reaction: in the Kessi dispute, Forest and Park Service fully mobilized their arsenal in disputes over resource management. Before the 1960s, forest officials saw no need for this and Forest and Park Service participated in the early disputes using silence and disparagement, or simply denying the problems. During the 1980s, as nature conservation measures aroused criticism of Forest and Park Service, the attitude hardened again and the institution chose to appear as an uncompromising and hard-negotiating partner. The Kessi dispute resulted in the partial opening-up of Forest and Park Service strategies, as the foresters chose – exceptionally – to enter the public debate. Regarding the landownership question, Forest and Park Service did not give in where it counted. Here, formal power overran the symbolic power of the Sami. In resource management and planning terms, a partial and very difficult process of easing access

\textsuperscript{143} Ruotsala 2002, 375-378.
occurred. In 1972, Forest and Park Service allowed access to other land users in planning the loggings. It has been widely debated whether reindeer herders get to have a say at hearings. Foresters claim that the views of the herders are taken into consideration, or see the option as “sufficient”. Herders have claimed the opposite: that their silent presence at the hearings has been interpreted as acceptance of the loggings. Researchers claim that Sami inclusion has had almost non-existent consequences in the placing of the loggings. Forest and Park Service demonstrated great difficulty in establishing a transparent participatory process, based on equal say, until the mid-1990s, when perhaps the first true hearing that led to a compromise took place in Peurakaira, in the Lappi herding co-operative in Sodankylä.144

Probably the most outstanding success has been experienced in international law and in the negotiations on ILO Convention No. 169. This has resulted in improvements to the condition of indigenous peoples in some parts of the world, for example in Argentina and Costa Rica, where it was finally acknowledged that there were indigenous peoples living in their territory. The governments of both these lands are among the countries that have ratified the convention. This success has been blurred by the fact that the WCIP was already in the process of disintegration at this time. There were many reasons for this. The revision of ILO Convention No. 169 already proved to be a diversifying experience, since not all the groups received a mandate. Many indigenous organizations chose to enter treaty negotiations on their own. The regional interests won over the “indigenous” interests and the leadership, increasingly regionally-oriented, lost legitimacy. The organization became a one-man movement, lost its representativeness in the eyes of the UN and sank into invisibility. In addition, the lowest possible status and the smallest possible concessions (negotiating only a declaration) has shown the limitations of the movement. The funding of WCIP ceased and its office was closed in 1996.145

Both at a local level, in Northern Lapland, and in administrative hierarchies in Finland, Sami claims were beginning to be refused, for example by referring to the equality provided by citizenship and to “sufficient” and extensive rights, as well as to the special treatment the Sami already possessed. A third attempt to legislate the Sami Law146 during the early 1990s was rejected, with reference to “sufficient” existing legislation. Again, this may be seen as part of a global phenomenon, the backlash, encountered by the indigenous peoples’

146 In vernacular thinking the Sami Law was intended to settle the landownership question in the Sami domicile. Two earlier attempts were made in connection with the Sami committees, which issued reports in 1952 and 1973.
movement. The dominant, and mostly unarticulated, latent “old orthodoxy” has become audible and challenged what critics claim to be “new aboriginal orthodoxy”. Secessionism, special rights and the violation these constitute to the equal treatment of citizens, as well as the loss of assets and involvement in resource management, have fed this reaction, which is evident, for example, in the mean-minded implementation of negotiated principles. In Finland, lost assets due to ethnically-based legislative measures have been the chief cause for complaint.

In addition to the discourse of citizenship/equality and environmentalism, a third discourse may be mentioned briefly here: the discourse of legalism, which stems from the Finnish nation-building project and the bureaucratic outlook this process took. Another root of this is the pressure of Russification during the nineteenth century, when the rational policy, in order to secure the status of the nation, was to stress the untouchability of the law and the need to obey. Rather than creating new laws, this discourse led to the recognition of legislation from the Swedish era with a highly centralized division of power. The legalism reinforced in the independent state of Finland took a rigid form, due to periods of violence in 1918. This discourse has bound both actors in political processes, and in procedures, argumentation and praxis, but in different ways: following institutionalization, the Sami have adopted a professionalized, legal approach to claims and argumentation, but in this context they have encountered the strongest resistance; the Finnish institutions take their starting-point in existing legislation. Justice is built through existing legislation and legal tradition, not through common moral values. Even though Sami claims are now taken more seriously and negotiated, the argumentation and evidence to support changes in legislation has to be waterproof and scientific. In a Finnish context, this demand has backfired: since the ownership by the siida of their land could not be fully proven in the statement by Doctor of law Juhani Wirilander, the basis for the ratification of ILO Convention No. 169 weakened, as the question of the land and water rights still remained unresolved. In addition, the Finnish legislation had first to be in accordance with any international convention waiting to be ratified. This discourse and its rigid practical consequences have constituted a major obstacle for Sami claims in Finland.

11. Conclusions

Sami identity politics in Finland evolved from representations of a threatened Sami culture to scientifically-based claims for the recognition of the status of the indigenous people of Finland. Before this, two representational strategies were given up: firstly, the modernizing Sami imagery practised by the pioneering Sami activist generation, which was scorned by the “dormitory generation” that launched the “natural people” imagery. This imagery, the most obvious loan from the global indigenous peoples’ movement, blossomed during the 1970s and evolved into scientifically-based imagery of the threatened ecology of the Sami domicile. The claims have evolved from cultural protection to rights to natural resources and lands. The demand for self-determination was replaced by the establishment of a self-governing institution and claims for establishing co-management of land. Let us now look more closely at these developments.

The post-war period corresponded with the beginning of the construction of a collective Sami identity by the Sami themselves using public platforms. The intra-state “Other” sustained and created its own discourses. Even though the ethnic barriers were constructed aggressively on some occasions, the break from Finnish domains was not total – indeed, they were relied upon and demands were made for their establishment in northernmost Lapland.

Sami ethnicity was politicized, but conflicting obligations to both the ethnic group and the greater national whole mellowed down the movement, which was also handicapped by internal quarrels. All of this resulted in incoherent identity politics. The first wave of the Sami mobilization was launched in conditions of economic scarcity, with sections of the elite fearing the Finnish settlement and the break in Sami isolation. Identity politics were constructed around the notion of a threatened Sami culture, implying weakness and creating inactive agencies. This representational strategy was used to demand cultural protection or, in more dynamic statements, voluntary isolation from the majority. However, the Sami elite conquered the representational field, which was the most empowering trait in the early history of the Sami movement in Finland. The eager use of the already-existing and/or conquered political space meant that self-identification was not exclusively state-determined, but also codified by the Sami. There was room for manoeuvre in identity politics and political intention, which SL defended as their monopoly.
One structural continuity in Sami history in Finland was evident from the start: the lack of any real, institutional, constitutive or symbolic power. The Sami issue was considered marginal and occasions to advocate the Sami cause were few. The vaguely articulated identity politics was legitimized only among Sami Friends, not in the higher ranks of Finnish political life.

The 1950s was an era of transition in at least two senses. Efforts to produce a more independent imagery resulted in the fragmentation of Sami identity politics. This was amplified by the beginnings of a generation shift in the Sami movement, the coming of age of the generation born in the 1930s. New actors entered the movement and new ideas were adopted from the inter-Nordic movement. Two strategies emerged. One represented the Sami as modernizing, yet holding onto their culture (the “borderline” imagery); this strategy was practised until the late 1960s. The other was a more challenging and primordial strategy, highlighting traditional cultural markers and means of livelihood.

The low crisis consciousness and the ethos of avoiding conflicts were persistent factors during the early period. The ethnic barriers were not built aggressively and the Sami’s own ethnic modernity was constructed in a process that partly relied on national projects. The conciliatory “borderline” imagery was an expression of this and the policy was institutionalized in the various official forums of the time and personified in the work of Erkki Jomppanen. During the late 1950s, Sami rights-thinking attained a firmer footing and exposed flaws in the prevailing belief in modernization. The radicalization of the movement had its origins in the reservoirs in Sodankylä and the displacement of the Sami. The most radical Sami had now already begun to practice the more challenging talk of a citizen, demanding rights and restrictions in state action, rather than merely calling for protection and relying on the state.

During the 1960s the utilization of emerging rights-thinking to construct and make use of the imagery of the Sami having no access to welfare measures became standard. This imagery was in an organic relationship with the “borderline” imagery and was practised by some of the same actors. There was also an identity politics offensive against the re-emerging “dying people” imagery, which was practised by majority, after the minority political discussion in the public sphere of Lapland became more scientific. There was a need for the imagery of an evolving, viable and modernization-friendly people. The identity politics practised during this period were still bound to/reliant upon national projects and discourses. Equality was perceived as equality of access to identical welfare services. The relationship was beginning to emerge as problematical as well, but the most dominant trait in the thinking
on the Sami collective identity at this time was their capability of dwelling in both spheres, “the traditional” and “the modern”, both of which were constitutive to the Sami identity. This may be explained with reference to the conservative ideological outlook of the early 1960s.

In a Finnish context, the smaller scale of the Sami’s socio-cultural stigma resulted in the lack of a “true”, radical, community-forming “resistance identity”. Even though the ideal Sami identities constructed were stable and settled, the option of strong boundary-building against dominant state institutes and against “the modern”, or modernity, was not undertaken programmatically. The Sami identity was positioned in both realms, constructed using both difference and conjuncture; through connectedness, by loaning from and through identification with the “Finnish” discourses.

An important change occurred during this period: nature and the environment now appeared in the Sami discourse. Saminess was increasingly being considered in relation to the fate and sustainability of the use of natural resources. In Sami self-imagery, a greater amount of flexibility remained, as representations were mostly made of the majority land-use forms, not so much those of the Sami. I credit this strategy to Oula Aikio and Jouni Kitti. This representational strategy was to remain dominant and it replaced the conciliatory “borderline” imagery.

The late 1960s were marked by radicalizing imagery, which became increasingly exclusive and bound Saminess closer to nature. Radicalized and more exclusive self-representations were made in relation to the state of Finland, but especially in the intra-ethnic field, as a response to the political modesty of the “first” generation. There was a reaction to incorrect premises and aims (“Modernization improves the living conditions of the Sami”), as well as to non-existent results. It was felt that the first generation had not truly worked for the Sami good. The Sami renaissance was, to a great extent, a process of claiming power from the older Sami generation, undertaken by the younger generation. Saminess and the needs of the Sami were defined anew and clinging on to Sami traditions began to emerge as an option.

The Sami renaissance is typically presented in a positive manner, as a revitalization of the Sami culture, reclaiming political space and power. This is an apt characterization of the dynamics in the empowerment of the “dormitory generation” elite. The young radicals widened the generation gap and adapted new, critical modes of speech, concentrating on societal issues that were foreign to the older generation. In Finland, another ongoing process was the growing gap between primordializing self-imagery and a more conciliatory modernizing Sami imagery. This gap continued to grow during the 1960s and reached its height in the quarrels across the generation gap in the late 1960s. The Sami renaissance was
undertaken by an already-factioned Sami society. Efforts to build an inclusive collective Sami identity were not successful.

Different aspects of the economic and political modernization from which the Sami modernity and renaissance grew increased the gap between and within local Sami communities and the ethnopolitical elite. This gap, resulting from adopting different policies with regard to modernization (obtaining employment/denouncing employment institutions as hostile to the Sami culture), was never really bridged. The gap was also widened by two strategies in the elite identity politics: demonizing modernization and ecologizing the movement, and Saminess. These strategies created stable and backward-looking agencies that could not be used to build positive horizons of expectation. The modern Sami exited the representative field and has since then had a hard time establishing a firm role in identity politics.

Internationalization (which took place from the late 1960s onwards) and global brotherhood offered representational tools at that time that had a high legitimacy among the most progressive audience: indigenous people who used the land collectively, sustaining its ecological balance. This harmonious way of life was disrupted by violent colonization. The problem was that the parallel development of institutionalization bound the main ethnopolitical activity of the Sami movement to the national political frame, which was not receptive to increasingly radical Sami demands. Thus the “globalization”, or rather internationalization, was not such an empowering experience for the Sami in Finland as it was to many other peoples, who made effective use of international law and institutions in litigation, lobbying and claiming rights from national governments. The national frame, its political culture and the distinctive Sami history within this national frame handicapped parts of the global imagery. It was, for example, impossible to make land rights claims using imagery that built on the notion of indigenous people having no concept of landownership.

The early identity politics of the Delegation were deeply inspired by “natural people” imagery. Whether this was a direct loan from the global discourses of the time or the inspiration of just one man – a Sverloff contribution – is a matter for speculation. If there is any coherence or development to be found among the numerous shifts in the radicality of the “natural people” imagery, it might be just the increasing disbelief it inspired. In addition, a yearning for judicial effectiveness and scientifically-based argumentation and imagery was beginning to appear. The re-orientation of Sami identity politics was made in a “friendly vacuum”, in an atmosphere where the majority were not sufficiently bothered to challenge the Sami self-imagery. The public sphere of Lapland was mostly positive and kept alive the
“natural people” image of the Sami. This well-meant cultural pluralism of the era apparently sustained the imagery and prolonged internal Sami negotiations concerning identity politics, since the “modern Sami” did not enjoy high visibility or legitimacy in the public sphere.

One consistency of the identity politics was in avoiding direct economic claims and focusing on judicial rights claims, not economic gain. Economic claims had been made during the 1950s, but these were now under-communicated and elevated to claims for access to resource management, or transformed into accusations of resources being tapped southwards as a part of the colonization process.

Unofficial platforms were another matter. The greatest change in identity politics was the firmer use of colonized “natural people” imagery, as well as the incorporation of the emerging rights discourse into the imagery of the “Sami lacking rights”. The modernization-friendly thinking that had been explicit in the old imagery was abandoned and the Finnish penetration was now perceived as a factor diminishing the Sami domicile and subsistence. The radical Sami borrowed the discourse of indigenous sustainability from global impulses. This impulse left a transitory mark on the Sami movement in Finland, while the marker with its own “Finnish” prehistory – that of Saminess and their domicile being threatened by industrial intrusion – continued to be cultivated on a longer-term basis than the most radical imageries. However, institutionalization was starting to guide the identity politics of the Sami Delegation and “natural people” imagery was beginning to be “ghettoized” into the sphere of unofficial cultural co-operation, where the global bond of indigenousness was inspirational and Sami histories of colonization were reproduced. At the same time, the elite were carrying out extensive research on the same theme. The actors chose different strategies and the hegemonical struggle over representative strategy continued into the 1980s, at the same time cementing the gap between official and unofficial forums. In addition, representational strategies in the freer forums were marked by an increasing multiplicity. This was partly due to the democratization of the Sami political field, which was beginning to be truly multinational for an increasing number of Sami actors. The front was most unified in relation to the state of Finland – even demands for employment are missing from the Sami rhetoric of this period.

The results were poor and this was at the root of increasing dissatisfaction. The silent state, trying to placate the Sami with partial concessions, had to deal with an increasingly hostile and professionalizing minority that was not giving up its land rights claims. This process reached its climax with the proposal of the Sami Law and the disputes that took place during the 1990s.
In the 1980s the public sphere became increasingly prone to attributing blame for the ecological unsoundness of industrial action undertaken by the majority, for which imagery of ecological unsoundness could safely be constructed, and which was highly legitimized at this time. In the self-imagery, the deepest sense of Sami connectedness with nature was dismantled; the means of living were no longer represented as sustainable but as something that sustained the threatened Sami culture, causing encroachment upon any of its components (nature, or livelihoods based on nature) to be perceived as encroachment upon the Sami cultural core and existence. The *culturization* of the traditional means of living as a representational strategy was one of the most persistent strategies, and can be credited to Pekka Aikio. Another representational strategy was to make the discourse more scientific by using loans from the dominant Finnish environmentalist discourse. To this strategy was added a legal component: the representation of the Sami conditioned by nature was replaced by the representation of the Sami not having rights to their environment.

Another shift during the 1980s was the “judicializing” and scientification of official identity politics, which were beginning to adopt consistent forms. The hardcore lawyer Sami elite were definitely beginning to dominate the official identity political space, with demands for judicial accounting and a focus on land rights issues. This trait had both global and intra-Sami origins. The problem was that the imagery in the international conventions continued to use elements that were beginning to be de-legitimized in the Finnish public sphere. In spite of increasing dissatisfaction with the representative strategies used in international forums, the status of indigenousness and principles of self-determination were extremely important contributions to the Sami movement in Finland. Or to put it another way, it was precisely and only the legal components that were now sought from the global bond. The transition in thought – how traditional means of living are transformed from ecological/cultural markers to legal questions of access – may be credited to the legalistically-oriented elite of the second activist generation. Institutionalization and the grievances of the Finnish administrative culture had overrun the effects of internationalization.

Identity politics in the Kessi dispute were the most differentiated in this period of inquiry. The Sami Delegation chose to totally under-communicate the relationship with nature. The argumentation was legalistic and scientific, and extremely consistent with claiming a reconsideration of the landownership question. The international conventions that were used led the Sami Delegation to make out-of-date claims for cultural protection, not claims of self-determination. The claims were toned down regarding the resources, as well: instead of ownership, “only” restrictions of use and co-management within the Lapp village
system were on the agenda. In the statements issued by the institutionalized movement, caution was followed when making representations of the sustainability of the Sami culture and life-form, while the Finnish intrusion into the Sami domicile was represented as detrimental to the ecosystem.

The scientification of identity politics that took place in the freer forums took a different direction. The ecological reasoning borrowed from the alternative discourse of environmentalism and ecologization was taken further. The romanticized “natural people” were also toned down in the field in favour of scientific argumentation, and the expansion and diversification of the field of representation. This part of the Sami political field had become truly aggressive – ethnic barriers were being built high against the ecological oppressor and the colonizer.

The national perception of both these strategies was negative. The legal claims of the Sami Delegation were sometimes ignored outright and the dispute was reduced to an ecological vs. economic dispute. The state stood firm on the issues most important to the Sami agenda and Forest and Park Service started to log the wilderness areas, though in limited areas and with limited means. The whole discourse of indigenousness was questioned by the more powerful discourse of environmentalism, which remained the most powerful Finnish alternative discourse. This affected both forums and strategies, as the state hierarchies also became more suspicious of the ecological foundation of the Sami agency and of claims made by the Sami Delegation. The reputation of the Sami had become worse and the public sphere, moving from rigid political correctness to a new post-modern value relativity, aired anti-Sami sentiments. The Sami were not in a position to claim victory to such an extent as the Sami in Norway were – the Sami front became more dispersed, in tandem with the fragmentation and pluralization of the ideological field in the rest of the society. The internal demands of solidarity were no longer achieved. On the positive side, the Sami had gained a place in the political hierarchies, although always in a minority position which, at least in the short run, diversified the Sami front still further. The Sami received gains as cultural claimants, but the most significant gains are still to be achieved.

The Sami movement had now disengaged from the national frame of identification that had bound the “first” generation. The Sami identity was built separately from the Finnish identities, but the status of indigenous people was also legitimized in a Finnish context. It contained inclusive potential that watered down the exclusive, challenging aspect of the status: the legal potential could be renounced, as we saw in the outcome of the Kessi dispute.
The Sami were now, in status terms, a “full people” struggling within the inclusive frame of Finnish national identification.

The Sami policy in Finland may be characterized as a policy of partial concessions on soft issues, where the rationale, as Seija Tuulentie has pointed out, was in avoiding conflict. One reason for the small scale of the results was that the resources applied, the time used and the overall effort exerted were marginal. The Sami question has never been of major interest and is perceived as a minority issue that has already been solved, and where the small number of people making the claims lowers the legitimacy of the claims. The consensus-seeking political culture and a tendency to avoid political extremes are both important factors in the outlook of Sami identity politics, which was modest most of the time; when radical, the identity politics were delegitimized in the Finnish public sphere.

Although the state of Finland was demonized in some statements, the radical Sami had fewer actual opportunities to attack the state, which at the time was practising a mostly silent discourse of welfare and equality. This discourse effectively hampered the Sami group rights claims. The unofficial Finnish public sphere was receptive to radical self-representations, though on a restricted basis. Thus, Sami identity politics were drafted in a political vacuum: they were not yet taken seriously. There was no perceived need for the state to make its silent discourses audible: the policy of granting the fewest possible concessions functioned in a satisfactory manner. On the other hand, this silence provided political room for manoeuvre for the Sami, and also the possibility of making radical self-identifications, since these were not yet seriously questioned either.

In Finland the ethnogenesis of the Sami may be partly credited to the newly-drawn national borders that enclosed the Sami within the nation-state of Finland in 1852 and to the rise in the status of the ethnic minority in the latter part of the twentieth century. This rise in status is usually credited to globalization. During the twentieth century (though certainly not without exception), the Sami were transformed from being “a weaker brother to the Finns” and eventually attained the status of “indigenous people of Finland”, which they had already possessed informally. If one wishes to be sarcastic, globalization helped the Sami to gain a status they already possessed in the national frame. The “backlash” occurred in tandem with rest of the globalizing world, though. In some circles, for example among environmentalists, the status of the Sami sank and stigmatization began (anew) as a reaction to the feared rise of Sami power during the 1990s. The assets or images of indigenousness were now de-

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1 Kostiainen 1994, 36-37.
legitimized in the Finnish public sphere, making these tools less usable. The local backlash, especially, created the need for more exclusive ethnic boundaries and institutional impediments to entering the Sami ethnic community.

The way that readers in the Finnish public sphere were shielded from the most radical and oppositional imagery implies that the Sami elite were aware of, or cautious of, certain features of the Finnish political culture, such as avoiding conflict and condemning ethnic-based claims for special rights. There is evidence to support this, especially from the early period: sharper imagery was used and higher ethnic boundaries were constructed in articles written in the Sami language, which were incomprehensible to the Finns. In addition, personal attacks on the “Sami Friends” were restricted to private correspondence. There were exceptions, of course, most notably Nilla Outakoski and the later generations, following Oula Aikio’s direct attacks on Forest and Park Service. Whatever its motive, this caution tethered Sami identity politics, especially in the early period. The national ethos of consensus was either shared or at least respected by the Sami of the first generation.

This also constitutes a reason for the different dynamics of ethnic awakening in Finland, compared to that of Norway. The Finnish political space was not as hostile and Sami culture and ethnicity were not stigmatized to the same extent as in Norway. There was not as strong a need to de-stigmatize Sami cultural markers, but there was a need to disengage from and demonize the non-marginalizing state and majority actors. The first generation activists did not demonize the state, but the Sami elite disengaged themselves from the “Sami Friends”, whose well-meant eagerness to guide Sami ethnopolitics became a problem. Oula Aikio, whose political attitude evolved from expecting state benefits and state-run resettlement to condemning the state when the pastures were drowned, is the most prominent example of this; he was also the first activist to break away from the existing pattern. In the imagery of the first generation, the potential to dwell in both realms, “the Finnish” and “the Sami”, was a natural state of being. This may also have been the case for the second generation, but a challenging attitude towards the state came naturally to them and the act of demonizing and stigmatizing the (silent) state was empowering, as well as a necessary act: especially now that the state was not stigmatizing the Sami, colonization had to be invented and the colonizer constructed. However, the dynamics of resistance and constructing

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2 There was a difference in the merely respectful attitude towards national institutions. This kind of attitude was reported in the case of elderly people in the village of Vuotso: “Many institutions in Finnish society are valued more than the manners and values of the traditional Sami culture. It is significant that especially the elderly show devout respect, and partly fear, towards the authorities. This kind of attitude has not been encountered elsewhere.” Saamelaiskomitean mietintö 1973:46, Liite: Tutkimusraportit, 330-331.
boundaries during the Sami renaissance was as much (if not more) an intra-ethnic generational movement as an inter-ethnic secessionist movement. The silence of the state was also revealing with regard to the power constellation: in the pre-globalized era, the stronger part had no need to mobilize its tools of power (with one exception, that of limiting the powers of the Sami Delegation with reference to the state’s philosophy of equality).

Another consistent trait in the Sami mobilization was the selection and use of ecology-based imagery and argumentation. This strategy was rendered scientific (“The Sami way of life is being threatened by industrial land-use forms that are eroding the ecology of their domicile”) and it very consistently replaced the “primordial” strategy (“The Sami do not own the land, which they have used in a sustainable manner and with which they have a warm relationship”) after the bankruptcy of the latter strategy during the late 1970s. The replacement strategies were almost as backward-looking. They hindered constructions of alternative, ideal Sami communities, since ecological imagery could most credibly be used to construct threat scenarios of a (traditional) Sami culture under the threat posed by the industrial West. More crucially, the “modern Sami” imagery was impossible to use, since it was the logical counterpart, “the unthinkable Sami Other”, to the imagery that was used. Both majority and Sami imageries were mostly constructed on the denial of this implicit “Other”.

Sami identity-building and Sami identity politics have only very recently become a site of contestation and democratic negotiation, as in Norway. Sami identity politics were partly paralysed by the self-proclaimed will of organizations claiming the right to make representations on behalf of the whole of the ethnic collective, where there was competition for a monopoly on practising the power of definition. Efforts to include the Sami people under shared markers have not been successful. The most subtle means of inclusion, such as Pekka Aikio’s use of the word most – as in deriving most of their livelihood from traditional means of living – leaves the door open to ethnic fellowship with those Sami not practising traditional means of living, but the inclusion is only implicit. At any rate, it is more inclusive than the previous ones, which were built on ethnic and spiritual purity (SL and Nilla Outakoski) and Sami tradition (JS).

The Sami society in Finland encountered three globalizations, or rather, one true globalization and two movements that have been labelled as global. The first, the true globalization, was the project of building connections with the global market economy, which was advocated by the Sami. The Sami domain became linked to the global market through trade in timber, a project with many manifestations at an everyday level. The two global movements, which were both introduced and gained momentum almost simultaneously,
questioned this connection. The first of these alternatives, the indigenous people’s movement, questioned the national project of employment and welfare as being insufficient for the Sami as indigenous people. This movement enjoyed a partial success, while the second global alternative movement, environmentalism, proved to be a threat to both of the above-mentioned discourses. This swiftly-changing and frontier-mixing discourse blurred both the internal and external Sami frontlines, delegitimized sections of the global indigenous imagery and eroded the brief moment of support on the part of Finnish society for the Sami cause. It was not the feared economic globalization but the environmentalist discourse, the global greening of values that proved to be most problematic for Sami identity politics in Finland.

What about globalization concerning the hybrid (non-)spaces, where ethnic identities challenge rigid national identities to conquer their space? In globalization, national identities typically remain strong in relation to certain phenomena, such as law and civil rights, while the local, regional and ethnic identities grow stronger as well. This aspect of the globalization theories best encompasses the Finnish process. It was precisely the above-mentioned elements – Finnish law and civil rights, which had the firmest institutional power – that Sami identity politics sought to challenge. These elements remained dominant and active, and hindered the evolution of the Sami into a full-blown indigenous claimant of collective rights. In turn, the Sami continued to claim their part in both projects: claiming the rights pertaining to Finnish citizenship and self-identification with pluralized possible Sami identities. Post-modernity and globalization increased the potential for identification by questioning the state monopoly as a frame of identification, but also by “fragmenting” potential Sami identities. If anything certain can be stated concerning “Saminess” and “the Sami ethnicity” by the end of this period of inquiry, it is precisely the pluralization of Sami society and the possibilities for identification. This also decreases the potential for the traditional expectation of ethnic unity in Sami ethnopolitics in Finland being attained.

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3 Hall 1999, 60-61.
List of abbreviations:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>AKN</td>
<td>The Archive of Karl Nickul, at the national Archives of Finland</td>
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<td>IITC</td>
<td>The International Indian Treaty Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWGIA</td>
<td>International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>JS</td>
<td>Johtti Sabmelažžat</td>
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<tr>
<td>KA</td>
<td>Kansallisarkisto, National Archives of Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>LK</td>
<td>Lapin Kansa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRL</td>
<td>Norske Reindriigsamers Landsforening, National Association of Norwegian Reindeer Herding Sami, from 1978 onwards Landsforbund, National Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSR</td>
<td>Norske Samers Riksforbund, the National Alliance of Norwegian Sami</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Pohjolan Sanomat</td>
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<td>SfPLC</td>
<td>Lapin Sivistysseura, Society for promotion of Lappish culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, Finnish Literature Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>Samii Litto</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSRS</td>
<td>Suoma Samii Riihkaseärvi (the organization has no English name, but translates as “The Sami Association of Finland”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCIP</td>
<td>World Council of Indigenous Peoples</td>
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</table>
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Appendix

Biographies of the political activity of Sami activists in Finland

Aikio, Oula: reindeer herder from Sompio, Sodankylä. A member of the first Sami committee, where he was responsible for Sami reindeer issues. Nominated as one of the first representatives from Finland to the Sami Council, with Karl Nickul and Hans Aslak Guttorm, in 1956. Aikio was among the Sami who were displaced and resettled in Vuotso when the Lokka and Porttipaht Reservoirs were filled in Sodankylä. As the scale of the damage to the Sami community and to reindeer herding became evident, Aikio became one of the first truly radical Sami advocates. Aikio provided the movement with both a radicalized attitude towards the state of Finland and a focus on ecological issues. He was a member of the second Sami Committee. (Lehtola 2000b; Lehtola 2005a)

Aikio, Pekka (born 1944 in Sodankylä): M.Sc. in Zoology from the University of Oulu and a reindeer researcher before becoming a full-time Sami politician. A founding member of the Suoma Samii Riihakseärvi and Soadegilli Sami searvi, to which he was elected as first chairman. Secretary of the second Sami Committee in Finland and a member of numerous legislative committees and working parties dealing with reindeer herding, national parks, Sami culture and legal rights. A representative in the Sami Delegation/Parliament from 1976 to the present, he served as a chairman of the Delegation in 1980-1981, as vice chairman of the judicial subsection in 1982-1983 and chairman of the same subsection in 1986-1987. Aikio became the chairman of the Delegation again from 1988 onwards, a post he holds to this day. He was director of the Nordic Sami Institute in 1993-1996. Aikio took part in the inter-Arctic meeting in Copenhagen in November 1973, and since then has been a regular member of government delegations from Finland to international conferences dealing with indigenous questions, e.g. working conferences of the ILO Convention in 1988-89 and the UN Working Group on indigenous populations in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1998 and 2000. (The archive of Professor Henry Minde, CV by Pekka Aikio (2003); Lehtola 2005a)

Aikio, Samuli (born 1937 in Utsjoki): a founder member of the Samii Nuorak, he edited the periodical Sabmelaš with Pekka Sammallahti in 1967-1974. A Sami scholar, lecturer and researcher at the University of Helsinki and researcher at the Nordic Saami Institute and the Research Institute of Languages in Finland. Awarded an honorary doctorate by the University
of Oulu in 1998. Among his publications is the first study on Sami history to be written in Sami (Olbmot ovdal min, Sámiid historjá 1700-logu rádjáí, 1992). (The Saami – A Cultural Encyclopaedia, entry on Saami studies: Finland; Helsingin yliopiston opettaja- ja virkamiesluettelo Turun akatemian perustamisesta 2000-luvun kynnyselle, Saarijärvi 2001)

**Guttorm, Hans-Aslak** (1907-1991, born in Utsjoki): a Sami author, teacher and journalist, and co-editor of Sabmelaš. A member of SL. He was nominated as one of the first representatives from Finland to the Sami Council, with Karl Nickul and Oula Aikio, in 1956. He published a collection of short stories and poems Gohccán spálli (1940), although further publications had to wait until the 1980s. (Lehtola 2002b; The Saami – A Cultural Encyclopaedia, entry on literature)


**Jomppanen, Johan Erkki** (1918-1987, born in Inari): A reindeer herder, head of the Kyrö herding co-operative and Sami politician. Member of the board of the SfPLC in 1948-1955. Jomppanen was a founder member of SL and acted as the chairman of the organization from 1957 onwards. He was a member of the Sami delegation of 1947. He also took part in inter-Nordic Sami conferences from the beginning. Among his numerous posts of responsibility were member of the committee for Sami affairs in 1949-1951 and of the Nordic Sami Committee in 1954-1956, as well as permanent membership of the Sami Consultative Committee. He was a member of the Sami Delegation from its foundation until 1987, holding the post of first vice chairman and acting as chairman of the Social and Health Committee in 1980-1981. In 1984-1985 Jomppanen was chairman of the Social and Health Committee and first chairman of the Delegation in 1987. He was also a member of Inari Municipal Council in 1946-1971 (chairman in 1957-1971) and a founder of the Sami Museum in Inari. (Lehtola 2002b; Lehtola 2005a; The Saami – A Cultural Encyclopaedia, entry on Jomppanen)

**Lukkari, Pekka** (born 1918): he studied at the teachers’ seminary in Kajaani and became a teacher and principal in Inari and a journalist for *Sabmi, Sabmelaš* and *Tunturisanomat*. He was a member of SL and founder member of Saami Nuorat, enjoying a long career in the movement and at the inter-Nordic Sami conferences. He took part in the Canberra conference of the WCIP. He has been a member of the Sami Delegation since 1974, chairman of the Working Committee in 1974-1975 and second vice chairman of the Delegation in 1977-1978. (Lehtola 2000b; Lehtola 2005a)


**Nuorgam, Johan** (born in Utsjoki): one of the few Sami activists who has made a living in the Sami movement when he took on the Sami cause as a full-time engagement. In 1936 Nuorgam established Syysjärven nuorisoseura (the Juvenile Association of Syysjärvi), the first Sami-run association. The association was a subsection of the SiPLC, in which Nuorgam was involved when he worked in Helsinki before the war. Nuorgam became one of the most influential members of SL. Nuorgam was also the initiator of Sami Radio in Oulu and of the Sami museum in Inari. He took over the chairmanship of SL in 1949 and as a moderate he re-established the co-operation between SL and the SfPLC. Nuorgam edited *Tunturisanomat* and was the chief editor of *Sabmelaš* in 1950-1957. During this period he was a paid official of
SL. He took part in the inter-Nordic Sami conferences from the beginning. He also took the initiative in the foundation of the Sami Delegation and was a member of the Sami Delegation in 1973-1974. As a member of SL he was criticized by the rising new Sami activist generation. (Lehtola 2000b; Lehtola 2000d; Lehtola 2003; Lehtola 2005a)

**Nuorgam-Poutasu, Helvi** (born in Utsjoki): a linguist, founder member of the Teanupakti and one of the leading figures in the Mii association, as well as a member of the working group on Sami education (1971). She was elected to the Sami Delegation as one of the first female representatives in 1975. She was first vice chairperson of the Delegation in 1977-1979, a member of the Working Committee in 1978-1981, chairperson of the Education and Cultural Committee in 1982-1983 and chairperson of the working party preparing the Sami Language Law from 1984 onwards. She was also vice chairperson of the Delegation in 1992-1995, vice chairperson of the Working Committee in 1992-1993 and chairperson of the education and teaching material board of the Sami Parliament in 1996-1999. (Lehtola 2005a)

**Näkkäläjärvi, Oula** (born 1937 in Inari): a lawyer and journalist, and a founder member of Samii Nuorak, Soadegilli Sami searvi and Suoma Samii Riihkaseärvi, of which he was elected chairman. He participated in the inter-Nordic Sami conferences from an early stage. He was head of department in the section for means of living, environment and law at the Nordic Sami Institute. He worked in Sami Radio. He was also a member of the Sami Delegation in 1980-1984. Veli-Pekka Lehtola has characterized Näkkäläjärvi as a lawyer with broad personal connections and an enormous amount of information about the Sami culture and tradition. (Suomen lakimiehet/Finlands jurister 1988; Lehtola 1997b; Lehtola 2000b; Lehtola 2005a)

**Outakoski, Aslak**: an archivist in the provincial archive of Oulu. He was already involved in the Sami movement during the 1930s through contact with Karl Nickul, with whom he worked on the anthropological project on the Suonikylä Skolt Sami in 1934. He participated in the inter-Nordic Sami conferences from an early stage and was involved in demographical studies of the Sami people in Finland. He was leader of the SiPLC-initiated genealogical research project on the Sami people, which took place in 1945. (Lehtola 2000b)

**Outakoski, Nilla** (born 1919 in Pudasjärvi): a founder member and first chairman of SL and editor of *Sabmelaš* before 1949, as well as co-founder and co-editor of *Sabmi*. He took part in
the Sami Delegation of 1947. He studied theology, was ordained as a priest in 1951 and served in many congregations in Finland, before he retired as a minister from the congregation of Loviisa. He was an active journalist on Sami issues for numerous media outlets. He gained a Ph.D. in Theology in 1991. (Lehtola 2000b; Ajattelija myrskyn silmässä, Helsingin Sanomat 28.4.1999)

**Paltto, Kirsti:** (born 1947 in Utsjoki): an author, who made her debut in *Sabmelaš* and became the first woman to publish a collection of short stories in Sami (*Soagŋu*, 1971). She was a founder member of the Sámi girječállit Searvi (the Association for Sami Authors, established in 1979). Paltto has an extensive oeuvre, ranging from children’s books to novels dealing with relations between the Finns and the Sami, as well as change in the Sami domicile and way of life during and after the war. Paltto was also a regular columnist in various newspapers during the 1980s. Paltto was a candidate for the Finlandia Prize for Literature and the Nordic Council’s literature prize in 2002. (The Saami – A Cultural Encyclopaedia, entry on literature)

**Sara, Iisko** (born in Utsjoki): a teacher and a member of the second Sami Committee. He participated in the inter-Nordic conferences and was a member of the Ohcijot Sami Searvi (Utsjoki Sami Association). He was chairman of the board of the first Sami “experimental” Delegation in 1973. He was also secretary of the Sami Delegation in 1975-1979, a member of the working group on vocational education in 1976-1978, a member of the Sami Delegation in 1984-1987, vice chairman of Education and Cultural Committee in 1984-1985 and vice chairman of the Cultural Committee in 1986-1987. (Lehtola 2005a)


**Sverloff, Matti** (born 1924 in Suenjel): a member of the Sami Delegation in 1947 and a member and chairman of Sobbar (the village meeting of the Skolt Sami), as well as a person of trust of the Skolt Sami from 1968 onwards. He was a founder member of Suoma Samii Riikhkaseärvi, a member of the second Sami Committee in Finland and a member of the Sami Delegation/Parliament in 1973-1991. He served as vice chairman of the Delegation in 1974 and chairman in 1975 and 1977-1979, as well as chairman of the Working Committee in 1984-1985 and vice chairman of the Language and Education Committee in 1986-1987. (Lehtola 2005a; Sverloff 2003)

**Valkeapää, Nils-Aslak** (1943-2001, born in Enontekiö): a writer, painter, composer, musician and performer who has been credited with, among other things, the revitalization and modernization of the yoik in Finland. He received his education at the Inari Christian Folk High School and the teachers’ seminary in Kemijärvi. He was a founder member of Johti Sabmelažžat, Suoma Samii Riikhkaseärvi and Sámi girječállit Searvi (the Association of Sami Authors, established in 1979), and was active in the international indigenous peoples’ movement; in addition, he took part in the WCIP Port Alberni conference in 1975. Valkeapää was also active in cultural co-operation between circumpolar peoples and was an organizer of the Davvi Suvva Festival. He received the Nordic Prize for Literature for his anthology of poems *Beaivi, áhčážan* in 1991. (Lehtola 2002b, The Saami – A Cultural Encyclopaedia, entries on poetry and Nils-Aslak Valkeapää)