Extracting human security from the Shtokman gas field

Security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012)

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Extracting human security from the Shtokman gas field
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Maria Goes
Summary

My cross-disciplinary analysis contributes to the academic discussion of the role and place of human security in security studies by introducing the novel concept of ‘security assemblage’ which embraces both state and human security. I apply the concept of assemblage as a theoretical framework and examine the security assemblage in the Murmansk region in relation to the Shtokman project (2007-2012). I examine the security practices of different actors and compare them with the state’s perspective. I define what constitutes the conditions for security in the context of oil and gas development in the Murmansk region. The concept of security assemblage captures the dynamic relationship between the state and individuals. The framework enables an examination of various elements such as people, technologies and space, and studies the process as a whole rather than merely highlighting the outcomes.

My analysis of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012) shows that human security appears in the context of a broader security agenda (which includes state, energy, military, environmental, and economic security) and becomes an important issue at the regional level. I conclude that human security can be excluded from the political agenda at the national level but still be embedded in local security practices. This empirical finding allows me to make a theoretical claim relating to the place of human security in security studies. I conclude that conceptual disagreements on human security are equally valuable since they highlight different aspects of the concept and reveal numerous connections. I argue that a human security approach not only challenges the idea of a unitary actor within security studies, but the system of knowledge as well.
### Abbreviations and acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMAP</td>
<td>Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (2014)</td>
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<td>BEAR</td>
<td>Barents Euro-Arctic Region</td>
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<td>BRFA-2020</td>
<td>Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and for a further perspective (2008)</td>
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<td>CHP</td>
<td>Combined heat and power stations</td>
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<td>CLCS</td>
<td>Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Critical Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FL №2446-1</td>
<td>Federal law №2446-1 “On security” (1992)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FL №2395-1</td>
<td>Federal law №2395-1 “On Subsoil Resources” (1992)</td>
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<td>GAPS</td>
<td>The impacts of oil and gas activity on peoples of the Arctic using a multiple securities perspective</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GRP</td>
<td>Gross Regional Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td>Kola Nuclear Power Plant</td>
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<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEFCO</td>
<td>Nordic Environment Finance Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKVD</td>
<td>People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennih Del)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Rossiyskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSEDM-2025</td>
<td>Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the Murmansk region until 2025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEK</td>
<td>Fuel and Energy Complex (Toplivno-Eneregeticheskyi Komplex)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<td>ZATO</td>
<td>Closed Administrative-Territorial Formation (Zakrytoe Administrativno-Territorialnoe Obrazovanie)</td>
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1. Introduction and the research question

Security studies came of age in International Relations (IR) during the Cold War and mainly dealt with state sovereignty and border protection framed within opposition between the USA and USSR. After 1991, new inter-state challenges like global climate change, scarcity of natural resources and illegal immigration brought into question state-centred security and demanded new approaches. The end of the Cold War and post-Cold War scepticism towards so-called traditional security paradigm gave rise to a new interpretation of threats and security issues, as more pressing threats to individuals were unmasked (Owen, 2004; Heininen, 2014; Hossain, 2016). The concept of human security appeared as a response to the incapability of the state to protect its citizens, as “a reorientation to redress this asymmetry of attention” (Newman, 2001: 240). Human security is achieved “when individuals and communities have the freedom to identify risks and threats to their well-being… and the capacity to determine ways to end, mitigate or adapt to those risks and threats…” (Hoogensen Gjørv et al., 2016: 186). Thus, a human security approach claimed that personal experience and the ability to articulate own insecurities are important to understanding security actors and international cooperation. The introduction of the concept of human security in 1994 challenged the traditional understanding of security actors and the security agenda. Nevertheless, proponents of human security struggle to get scientific legitimacy and to prove the validity of the concept. Besides a lack of a clear definition, human security has been criticized for an unformulated research agenda and a lack of analytical operability, an absence of neutrality, and the impossibility of implementation and political utility (Chandler, 2008ab; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007; Hynek, 2012). In this thesis, I will discuss human security in light of a particular case of oil and gas industry in the Murmansk region, contributing to the theoretical discussion related to the role and place of human security in security studies.

The difficulty with the concept of human security becomes visible when we cross the border of security studies developed within the Western European and North American paradigms and see the application of this concept in a non-western context. There is no adequate translation of ‘human security’ into the Russian language. There have been attempts to translate the term ‘human security’ into the Russian language and to extract the main thoughts from existing literature in English (see, for example, Noyanzina, 2010; Borisov, 2011; Kora, 2012). The concept of security in Russia is multi-layered and multilevel just as in other security contexts, but the dynamics of security are unique given the Russian context. Lomagin (2005) argues that
with the end of the Cold War, Russian security thinking went through a process of transformation. Traditionally security in Russia is defined from above, by the state, therefore formation of security from below is new for Russia and this process is not studied well enough (Lomagin, 2005: 262). The term ‘soft security’ is sometimes used in order to indicate non-military security issues like health, environment, education. Lomagin (2005: 262) articulates the significance of new terms in this changing security landscape in Russia, since these terms represent a non-traditional way of security thinking. Lomagin (2005: 267) claims that security thinking in Russia requires redefinition because “the facts cry out” for this: illegal immigration, polluted land, the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, improper storage of radioactive and nuclear waste – all these factors place “the very survival of Russian people at risk.” These new issues challenge traditional state-individual relationships in Russia and allow for discussing the role of human security in changing security landscape. At the same time, Lomagin (2005: 262) argues that these non-military security issues are located in very specific places: big cities, military bases and trans-border regions. For example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became a part of global international security networks, cooperating with NATO and participating in joint military trainings. Significant results were achieved through cooperation within the Arctic Council (Wilson, 2016) and the Barents Euro-Arctic region (BEAR) network (Rafaelsen, 2013). This Barents cross-border cooperation increased “movement of people and goods, as well as information and ideas,” which to certain degree affected the Russian approach to security (Rafaelsen, 2013: 487-488). But it remains unclear to what degree these regional frameworks affect national security thinking and security policy in Russia and how new security constellations look in the regions involved in cross-border cooperation.

From this perspective, the Murmansk region in the years 2007-2012 is an interesting case since it borders Norway and Finland and is viewed by the Russian state as a geo-strategically important area. Because of the ice-free sea, a large nuclear fleet is located in the ports of the Murmansk region, including icebreakers and submarines. Murmansk was and remains a highly militarized zone with several ZATO. At the same time the Murmansk region hosts one of the

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1 Soft security is understood in opposition to hard security mainly articulated in terms of military security (Lomagin, 2005).
2 The BEAR includes the northernmost parts of Sweden, Norway, Finland and North-west Russia. The official date of establishment is considered to be January 11, 1993 when the Kirkenes Declaration was signed. http://www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region/Cooperation Accessed October 20, 2016.
biggest gas deposits – the Shtokman gas and condensate field, which is located on the shelf of the Barents sea, approximately 550 km away from the shore. The extraction of gas and condensate from this field was expected to start in 2013 (Madeo, 2009: slide 11). This petroleum activity in the region preconditions the appearance of new security actors in addition to the state which can articulate new security issues or threats. Therefore, the Murmansk region is a territory where new trends – oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic shelf – meet traditional military-strategic requirements. The analysis of the case of the Murmansk region will help to indicate whether a change in security thinking took place in Russia at the end of Cold War.

Even though I approach human security as “a potentially transformative project that deconstructs traditional national security discourses and practices and seeks to reinvent the theory and practice of security” (Ewan, 2007: 182), the concept of human security alone does not provide the whole answer. The challenge is how to analyse the dynamic of the state-individual relationship in all its complexity, navigating through interconnections between state security and human security. The process of security reconceptualization in general and in the Russian context in particular, includes not only the appearance of new notions or the creation of new ‘lists of threats’, but also embraces the process of rethinking and deepening existing terms and approaches. In my view, a concept of assemblage has the greatest analytical potential in the field of security studies, yet it remains insufficiently explored. I apply Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage to address the dynamics of state-individual relations and to rethink the connections between human and state security. An assemblage is simultaneously an act of establishing connections and the construction of a new meaning. The application of the word ‘assemblage’ shows, first of all, that any phenomena has a constructed nature, existing in various combinations, inclusions and connections. Secondly, ‘assemblage’ draws attention to the fragmentation or eclectic nature of any constellation, and asserts that any detail in this construction can be changed or reshaped. Thirdly, attention is directed to a process rather than a result (Li, 2007: 264) since assemblage is about connections between the elements and their functions. I introduce and develop a concept of security assemblage as a result of my study of the security practices in the Murmansk region.
Research questions

This study addresses the following research questions:

(1) Is human security an important part of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region in the context of oil and gas development?

(2) Can human security be a tool that helps to reveal existing difficulties within security studies?

This is operationalized through the following subsidiary questions:

- who is involved in security assemblage and what kind of actions related to security thinking take place?
- what kind of perceptions of security exists in the Murmansk region?
- what kind of transformations took place in Russian security thinking in the beginning of Millennium?

1.1. Brief history of the concept of security in Russia

Russian perceptions of security need to be understood in relation to the history of the concept of security as well as to the character of the Russian state and its people. Before the Russian Revolution in 1917, the term security did not have any specific interest for Russian philosophical and political thought. In the 18th and 19th centuries, security was understood as the preservation of a traditional system of state governance, traditional values and the general maintenance of order and public safety (Sedunov, 2008: 103). A number of national and international events in the 18th and 19th centuries\(^4\) convinced the rulers of the state to articulate state security as a national culture against ‘other ways of thinking’. This resulted in the triad, “orthodoxy, autocracy, nation” (pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost) (Sedunov, 2008: 109). The number of police forces was increased, various political organizations were forbidden, and repressive methods were implemented (arrests, sentences, exiles and executions of those who were against the regime). The same mechanisms and strategies, though under a different ideological cover, were later used by the USSR (Sedunov, 2008: 127). After the revolution of 1917, the term ‘security’ again was monopolised by the state. The term ‘state security’ first appeared in 1934 with the creation of a special department for state security.

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\(^4\) Such as Pugachev’s rebellion in 1773-1775, the uprising of Semenov regiment in 1820, the Decembrist revolt in December 1825, and French revolution (1789) (Sedunov, 2008: 107-108).
within the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). The term ‘state security’ came into use in Soviet legal literature in 1936 when a new constitution (known as ‘Stalin’s constitution’) replaced the first Soviet constitution from 1924. Though the term ‘security’ was used without any particular clarification (Constitution 1936, chapter 2, section 14, paragraph 1), its origin in the NKVD and ‘Stalin’s constitution’ played a significant role in the term’s further application. Security studies were mostly conducted by special research units belonging to institutions like the Committee for State Security (KGB) and therefore were not accessible to a broad audience, including the scientific community (Vasiljev, 1999). For this reason, the term ‘security’ became equated with ‘state security’. Additionally, due to defence preparedness in light of the Cold War, the term ‘state security’ became almost synonymous with the term ‘military security’ in the Russian context (Sergunin, 2012). This legacy caused some semantic confusion: it is sometimes difficult to separate the meanings of state security and security and to demarcate the line between different security issues (Sedunov, 2008; Sergunin, 2012). Nevertheless, since the term first appeared in ‘Stalin’s constitution’ and was so highly militarized and securitized during the next several decades, it became difficult to talk about security in everyday life. The consequence for the Russian public is that people are not used to talking about it, since the security sphere is “something in which ordinary citizens should not meddle” (Medvedev, 1998: 80 cited in Åtland, 2009: 8). Security studies are thus strongly dominated by the concept of state security and little is known about the connection between the state and the individual within the Russian security paradigm, nor about the ability of people to cope with insecurities.

1.1.1. The first Russian law on security

Social and political changes at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s led to a discussion about the term ‘security’ (Vasiljev, 1999). The work of various scientific groups and centres on security issues resulted in a paradigm shift away from understanding security solely as a state concern. The first Russian Federal law “On security” (1992) was the result of work of various scientific research groups and thus became a symbol of an open society (Lomagin, 2005). Security was understood as “a state of protection of vital interests of individual, society and state from internal and external threats” (FL №2446-1, 1992, Section 1, Article 1). Vital interests were interpreted as “a totality of needs, satisfaction of which

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5 All translations from Russian to English are mine unless otherwise noted.
reliably assures the existence and the possibility of progressive development of the individual, society and the state” (FL №2446-1, 1992, Section I, Article 1).

The Concept of National Security (CNS, 1997) appeared as an additional document to the Federal law “On security” (1992). The Concept introduced the term ‘national security’. National security was understood for Russia as the “security of its multinational people as the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation” (CNS, 1997, Chapter I). National interests were defined as “a sum of balanced interests of the person, society and the state in economic, political, social, international, information, military, border, ecology and other spheres” (CNS, 1997, Chapter I). The Concept (CNS, 1997, Chapter III) had a particular focus on the issue of threats, which are characterized as both internal and external. Difficult economic situation and threats towards national sovereignty were clearly articulated in the Concept. The Concept had one approach for coping with the problems: the strengthening of state control in all spheres (governance, business, economics, regional politics, health care, political party creation etc.). Economics was defined as a key priority for national development. The energy sector was mentioned among targets for economic threats since fuel and raw materials and energy components dominate Russia exports (CNS, 1997, Chapter III). The depletion of natural resources was mentioned in connection to environmental problems (CNS, 1997, Chapter III). Overall, a strong concern about the weakening of the state in different spheres, and its inability to tackle existing challenges, dominated the document (CNS, 1997, Chapter III). The Concept (CNS, 1997, Chapter IV) also mentioned the Arctic region which was considered in need of special help from the state.

1.1.2. The Federal law “On security” from 2010

The new Federal law “On security” (FL №390) from 2010 substituted the law (FL №2446-1) from 1992. This new Federal law mentions four types of security: national security, public security, environmental security, and personal security, but does not define them (FL №390, 2010, Chapter I, Article 1). Further in the Federal law “On security” (2010) reference is made to ‘security’ and ‘national security’, which become synonymous, and absorb the other levels such as ‘public’ and ‘personal security’. Environmental security is the only other specific security issue mentioned in the document.

6 The economic difficulties presented in the Concept (1997) lately resulted into the financial crisis of 1998, the devaluation of ruble and default in Russia.
This new Federal law from 2010 is connected to other documents such as the Strategy of National Security (SNS-2020). The Strategy (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter III, item 23) defines the main priorities of national security in Russia as national defence and national and public security. The Strategy (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter I, item 6) introduces notions of ‘national security’, ‘national interest’, ‘threats to national security’, ‘strategic national priorities’, ‘system of national security’, ‘forces of national security’ and ‘means of national security’. ‘National security’ is defined as “protection of individuals, society and the state from internal and external threats, which allows the provision of constitutional rights, freedoms, decent quality and standard of life of citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable development of the Russian Federation, the defence and security of the state” (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter I, item 6). The document also introduces the term ‘personal security’ without any further clarification (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 3, item 46). The term ‘public security’ is often used in conjunction with the term ‘state security’ (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter II, item 9; Chapter III, item 23; chapter IV, Section 2, item 37, 38, 39, 40). The document also contains the terms ‘military security’ (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 1, item 26; 30), ‘food security’ (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 3, item 49; 50), ‘energy security’ (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 4, item 60), ‘environmental security’ (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 8) and ‘economic security’ (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 2, item 37; Chapter IV, Section 4, item 60; 63). These terms are not clearly defined, but applied in order to spell out threats in various spheres of the national interest.

The Strategy (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter III, item 23) defines the main priorities of national security of Russia, which are “national defence and national and public security.” National security consists of nine priorities: “[N]ational defence; state and public security; enhancing of the quality of life of Russian citizens; economic growth; science, technology and education; health care; culture; ecology of living systems and environmental management; strategic stability and equal strategic partnership” (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter III, item 24). As noted above, security issues (economic, environmental, food, military, energy) help to identify threats in each priority sphere. The energy sector is mentioned in relation to threats to national security in the economic sphere. Three out of the eight threats named in the document belong to energy sector: “[T]he raw materials export-model of the national economy,” “the loss of control over national resources,” and “the deterioration of the resource base of the industry and energy sector” (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 4, item 55). Energy security is claimed to be one of the main long-term concerns of national security in the economic sphere (SNS-2020,
2009, Chapter IV, Section 4, item 60). The efficiency of the fuel and energy complex (TEK) should be enhanced in the interests of national security in a medium-term perspective, (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 4, item 62). The Strategy (SNS-2020 2009, Chapter IV, section 3, item 48) even connects improving the quality of life of people to “expanded reproduction of the mineral resource base,” which is mentioned among social and economic measurements such as “reducing the level of organized crime,” “the availability of modern education and health,” and “high social mobility and support of socially significant employment.” The issue of the depletion of natural resources and the decrease in extraction of strategic minerals is mentioned in relation to environmental security (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, section 8, item 87). Overall, the SNS-2020 (2009) outlines the importance of natural resources and emphasises their relevance for other types of security. The document indicates that future Russian approaches to international politics will be focused on sources of energy, with special attention to “the shelf of the Barents Sea and the other regions of the Arctic” among other regions of interest (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter II, item 11). It demands effective state border protection, especially in the Arctic zone, the Far East and Caspian Sea (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 2, 42) and the “infrastructure, especially in the Arctic zone, Eastern Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation” (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 4, item 62). The Arctic is linked to natural resources in the document, which defines “strategic priorities, objectives and measures in the field of domestic and foreign policy, determining national security and the level of sustainable development of the state in the long term” (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter I, item 3).

An overview of the official documents provides access to how security was thought at the state level. The first Law “On security” from 1992 introduced the concept of security and defined it as a focus for societal and human concern. Related to the law the Concept of national security mostly documented difficult economic situations in the country and identified threats towards national sovereignty. The Strategy of national security from 2009 and the second Law “On security” from 2010 reveal the development of understanding of term security and introduce other types of security besides state and military security (such as economic, environmental, food, energy). Energy security and the Arctic are claimed to be of special focus of Russian security policy. The question is how this legal frame (top-down) affects people and their perception of security. Do these new understandings have significance for Russians in their daily live?
1.2. Lived experience of security transformation in Russia: from geopolitics to human security

Despite of lack of studies related to human security, the security concept has been present in the Russian experience, ranging from the level of individuals and their communities to geopolitical considerations. This can be exemplified by my own personal experience. I was born and grew up on the shore of the White Sea in the town of Severodvinsk\(^7\) (the Arkhangelsk region, Northwest Russia), during last years of the Soviet era. When I was young I was fascinated by the fact that, in order to travel to or from the town, I had to go through a border control: the bus was stopped at the checkpoint and the documents of every passenger were inspected. I learnt from my mother that it was better not to reveal the name of my town of origin: “Say that you are from Arkhangelsk, if somebody asks you.” Mother was reluctant to talk about her work, but as with every other child living in the town, I knew that we had ‘secret enterprises’ and they were very important to the state. The word security was never pronounced, but the words ‘state’, ‘defence’ (in spoken Russian \textit{oboronka}) and ‘secret’ were always there. I also knew that an order (\textit{zakaz})\(^8\) was very important for our town: enterprises needed orders from the state since only the state could use the facilities of these huge enterprises.\(^9\) Mother told me that, because our town was so important to the state, our life there was much better than outside the checkpoint: there was a better supply of food, our people were better educated and they had better salaries than in the neighbouring towns.

Time passed and the country of my birth ceased to exist in 1991. I was 15 by that time. Suddenly our little paradise started to fall apart: there was a lack of consumer goods, big queues in the shops for essential food (items like sugar, pasta, butter) and after a while people started to move out of the town in search of work. The town was not attractive to live in any more: it was located in a transport deadlock, it was hundreds of miles from the centre in a swampy area and it had serious nuclear threats and pollution. I learned, together with the other inhabitants of the town, that the state was not interested in us anymore and that we were on our own now.

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\(^7\) In the Soviet time, Severodvinsk had status of closed town or ZATO. ZATO status restricted uncontrolled movement out of and in the town.

\(^8\) The system of orders was developed in the Soviet time. It was connected to an economics based on the principle of distribution. The state provided money to the plants to build a submarine or to repair a ship. The plants did not participate in any open competition, and just had to wait for the contact from above. This became especially crucial in the ‘90s. For such a town the absence of orders from the state meant, literary, economic death, because the majority of the inhabitants were employed by the state through four major enterprises.

\(^9\) Life in Severodvinsk is built around four major enterprises working for the state defence.
The words ‘secret’ and ‘state’ quickly disappeared from our daily vocabulary. Inhabitants used various strategies of survival to cope with economic difficulties. The huge military enterprise, where mother worked, was in the process of conversion from military-oriented products into building civilian vessels and oil platforms and supplying consumer goods. Since it was hard to find customers for an enterprise which for years had been subsidised by the state, the plant was not able to pay regular salaries to its workers. Cash was a rare thing. Instead of money, my mother (in common with thousands of other workers) brought home either food from the canteen (which they were getting in lieu of their salary) or special coupons, which we could exchange in the shops for essential food such as corn and pasta. I could tell everyone now that I was from the second largest town in the Arkhangelsk region, where the main industry was defence related. What I could not tell them was that the state could not afford us anymore – the number of inhabitants in the town declined from nearly 259,000 in 1991 to 188,000 18 years later. How could that happen? Was the security of ordinary citizens of Severodvinsk so tightly connected to state security that the geopolitical change of the 1990s so heavily affected our daily life? This thesis is an attempt to answer some of these questions.

The story of my home-town is just one of many from Russia of the 1990s. The change in geopolitical situation with the end of the Cold War reshaped the international security configuration. At the same time, this change also brought uncertainty in ways that were not known before in Russia. The first Russian economic crisis (1992-1995) caused by the transition from planned to market economy heavily affected those regions which were related to the military-industrial complex. Changes in political and economic structure changed the configuration of state – individual relations: they were no longer ‘the one whole’. State control through planned economy was connected to security for the people: stable incomes, social guarantees and predictable future. New political and economic structures brought prospects of development as well as displayed the difference in interests between the state and individuals and inability of the state to be a solo provider of security. Thus, challenges are related to ability

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10 The volume of defence orders to the Naval Yard in Severodvinsk from the state fell by 95% in 1990 (Åtland, 2009: 114).


12 Zubarevich (2016) extracts four crises in Russia. The first one took place in 1992-1995. The second one from 1998 is partly related to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and partly to the difficult economic situation in Russia, which resulted in devaluation of the ruble and default. The third crisis took place in 2008-2009 and was related to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The fourth one started in 2013 and is still ongoing. This crisis is related to the decrease in oil prices in 2014.
of the state and individuals to articulate their concerns, to balance their interests and to mitigate insecurities.

Changes regarding a role and place of energy security in relation to national security also took place. Heininen (2016) points out that increasing role of energy security is a global trend. Moreover, energy security becomes increasingly important in oil and gas dependent countries like Norway, USA or Russia, since access to energy resources is related to power and geopolitical influence (Heininen, 2016: 19, 22). Therefore, it is important to examine how this global trend affects the oil and gas regions and perceptions of security in these places. The first economic crisis of the years 1992-1995 in Russia demonstrated the power of economic security. The threat of economic insecurity forced the state to search for new sources of economic sustainability. The oil and gas sector was one of few sectors of Russian economy which was slightly affected during the first crisis and demonstrated fast recovery compared to other Russian industries like machine building or metallurgy (Zubarevich, 2016). The price for oil and gas was relatively stable in the 1990s and the export of petroleum provided a stable income, in particular for regions where the oil and gas was produced. That is why it is not surprising that the oil and gas sector became viewed by the state as a cure for economic insecurity. Kryukov (2009) points out that the decision to develop the Russian Arctic shelf was mainly based on the reason of economic security rather than energy. The Shtokman project was initiated to support the military-industrial complex of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions in a critical economic situation in the 1990s (Kryukov, 2009: 37). Thus, the oil and gas sector represents an important trend in economic development related to new sources of economic stability. But how do these trends affect the regions? What kind of mixture of economic, energy and military security appears there? What do these changes mean for people?

1.3. The Murmansk region and the GAPS project

The GAPS project provided me with an opportunity to use my experience of living in the Arctic. I had the possibility to work with security concepts in the Arctic context and to examine the relationship between the state and the individual. I deliberately selected the Murmansk region as the focus of my research. The selection was invited by the framework of the project, focusing on the territories affected by oil and gas development. By 2007, when I started to

13 The Shtokman gas and condensate field is located on the territory of the Murmansk region.
14 My research project was a part of big international project supported by International Polar Year (IPY) entitled, “The impacts of oil and gas activity on peoples of the Arctic using a multiple securities perspective” (GAPS) with particular focus on three Arctic states: Canada, Norway and Russia.
work on my project, the Shtokman gas field was a hot topic. It was actively discussed in various conferences and in the Russian and foreign media with headlines such as “Shtokman is our future”\(^{15}\), “Shtokman project as an Arctic cooperation model”\(^{16}\), “Murmansk – among the best places to live”\(^{17}\) or “Total is proud of its cooperation with Gazprom in the development of Shtokman”.\(^{18}\) My origin in Severodvinsk and the experience of living there played an important role during my work on the thesis.

The Murmansk region (as with my home in the Arkhangelsk region) is located in the Northwest of Russia, mainly on the Kola Peninsula and borders Norway and Finland. The administrative centre of the Murmansk region is the city of Murmansk. It was established in 1916, and the region was actively developed during the Soviet time. Murmansk is the only ice-free port in the European North of Russia, and connects Russia to Europe and America. That is why Murmansk is often called ‘a gate to the Arctic’. Nevertheless, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region faced various problems, including the severe decline of population and a high rate of unemployment, not unlike what was experienced in my home town. The development of the Shtokman gas field, located in the offshore zone of the Murmansk region, was connected to hopes for future prosperity of the region and the country. The regional administration and Gazprom\(^{19}\) claimed that the expected development of the Shtokman field would attract not only oil companies, but also building and transport companies and various related services, and that it would boost the development of the region.\(^{20}\) All this had to occur on territory subjected to an active military presence and deemed to be of high national importance. But one can hardly find anything about Shtokman in media today (August, 2017). From time to time, some headlines appear, but the tone of those publications is different than before. For example, “Shtokman: long jump to nowhere”\(^{21}\), “Shtokman moves further out of

\(^{19}\) Gazprom is a large Russian company working with extraction, production and sale of natural gas. The Russian Government holds a majority stake in the company.
sign”22 or “Goodbye, Shtokman”23. The intensity of the publications is not comparable with the period from 2007 to 2012. The capacity of the community in the region to adapt itself to these kinds of changes remained unclear as well as whether or not oil and gas development had an impact on the region. What kind of security issues were brought on the agenda with the course of oil and gas development in the region?

1.4. The concept of security assemblage

For the purpose of my work on the security assemblage, I selected two important works of Deleuze and Guattari as the primary source for my theoretical conceptualization – in particular A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia (2014) (henceforth ATP) and What is philosophy? (1994). The former provides access to the theory of assemblage, while the latter elaborates on some of the concepts articulated in it.

My writings were inspired by Hynek’s book, Human security as statecraft: structural conditions, articulations and unintended consequences (2012). Hynek (2012) introduces the concept of human security assemblages, analyses the construction of human security assemblages in Japan and Canada and examines them on the institutional level and level of international politics in order to reveal structural conditions, obstacles and stimuli. In my work, I approach the concept of security assemblage as a combination of state and human security. This concept is connected to the deepening of the security agenda and a broadening of security understanding, since the assemblage takes context into consideration and throws a light on the connections between various elements – for example, statements of state officials and actions of the state and non-state security actors.

Each assemblage is very specific for a particular moment, and can be modified and transformed over time. I look more closely at the formation of the security agenda in the context of oil and gas development in Russia in the period 2007-2012 and discusses the security assemblage in the Murmansk region. The security assemblage was formed at a time of prosperity and growth and was affected by the third Russian economic crisis of 2008-2009, related to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. These changing conditions create a unique situation: the assemblage in question allows me to examine the security practices of various actors in

transition. The selected time framework corresponds to three significant milestones, which allows me to identify particular dates of the assemblage. Firstly, this framework embraces the Presidential term in office of Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012), years characterized by relatively high oil prices and a strong role of the energy sector in the Russian economy (Godzimirski, 2014ab). Secondly, the years from 2007 to 2012 were defined as the most crucial to the first phase of Shtokman field development. Thirdly, in 2012 the Shtokman project was frozen and the rhetoric around it changed. This sudden change was driven by more than one factor. One is related to the complexity of the project and possibility to develop it (I will discuss this in detail in Chapter 3). The other is related to a growing understanding, maturing through the period from 2009 to 2012, that Russia could not endlessly depend on the income from the oil and gas sector (Godzimirski, 2014a: 2). This understanding was shaped by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Though my case ends in 2012, I am also aware of changes that have occurred after 2012, when the global oil price has drastically fallen from mid-2014 onwards. These unfavourable conditions for the oil market call into question the future of the petroleum sector in general and the future of Russia as the world’s ‘energy giant’ (Godzimirski, 2014a: 1). Between 1998 and 2008 the Russian economy enjoyed the benefits of tremendous growth in the world’s oil and gas production (Mitrova, 2014: 58), but the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 negatively affected the Russian oil and gas sectors, which slowly moved towards stagnation and a decline in income through 2009 and 2010. The fear of the ‘resource curse’ and the need for the diversification of economy was articulated at the highest political level (Godzimirski, 2014ab).

Assemblage analytics is slowly becoming popular in security studies, especially in fields such as terrorism and surveillance. Haggerty and Ericson (2000) claim that people’s bodies, surveillance equipment and social institutions form ‘surveillant assemblages’, which are aimed at risk detection and mitigation. In these conditions, it becomes difficult for individuals to keep

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24 Milestones for the first phase were defined as follows: FEED Contract award: November/December 2007; Final Investment Decision: 2009; Start gas export by pipeline: 2013; Start of LNG exports: 2014 (Madeo, 2009: slide 11).

25 The terms ‘resource curse’ or ‘paradox of plenty’ are used to indicate the situation when a country with abundant natural resources “tends to lag behind comparable countries in terms of long-run real GDP growth” (Tompson, 2006: 189). The discussion includes such topics as underdevelopment of other sectors of economy; uneven tax distribution; the impact on governance and political processes (Tompson, 2006: 189).

26 For example, Sassen (2008) applies analytics of assemblage in order to study the issue of globalization. Though she applies the concept of assemblage in a “most descriptive way,” she stresses the influence of Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization on her work (Sassen, 2008: 5). Houen (2008) applies assemblage analytics and conducts cross-disciplinary study in the field of gender studies, literature and history. McLeod (2014) suggests a new way of thinking about medication (antidepressants), depression (illness and human body) and recovery process (interaction between the institutions and human bodies) by an application of the assemblage thinking. O’Malley (2010) examines the transformation of military subjects through the assemblage of liberalism, militarism and medicine. Koster (2015) applies assemblage analytics to analyse the connections between urban governance and citizenship.
anonymity. Romein and Schuilenburg (2008) apply the concept of ‘surveillant assemblages’ suggested by Haggerty and Ericson (2000) and argue for the rise of a society of control, which is based on mobilization of the private sector and individual citizens. The connection between surveillance, security and governmentality is discussed through the analytics of assemblage by Legg (2011). De Goede (2012) examines the construction of risk and threats through the assemblage of terrorism and financial flows. She shows how previously normal financial practices become securitised under the label of the ‘war on terror’. Fussey (2013) examines the topic of social control as a security assemblage of surveillance techniques and actors. Hutchinson (2014) examines the role of intelligence in the construction of early modern government, which created an ‘order’, as an assemblage of various procedures allowing the gathering and adjusting of information about real and potential risks for the state.

1.5. The relevance of my research

The focus of my research is on the transformation of the understanding of security in Russia with particular focus on the Murmansk region in the context of oil and gas development. This region is located in a specific spatial dimension. Geographically, the Murmansk region belongs to the European part of Russia which is limited by the Ural mountains in the East and by boarder with Kazakhstan in the South. Therefore the region is referred to as the European North of Russia. Since 1967 the concept of the Far North is also applied to the Murmansk region. This concept is related to the socio-economic policy of the USSR towards the Northern regions. The Basics of the State Policy in the Arctic (BRFA-2020) appeared in 2008. The Basics provides an official view on the territories belonging to the Arctic zone. Thus, the Murmansk region is also a part of the geopolitical concept of the Russian Arctic. As the result such terms as the (Russian) Arctic, the (Russian) North and the Far North are often used as synonyms in the Russian language. In my analysis I will mainly refer to the Murmansk region as a part of the Arctic, but I will also discuss the role and meaning of the North and the Far North concepts in the security assemblage. While discussing the socio-economic conditions and the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012), I refer to a broader context, like state policy

28 The Arctic zone of the Russian Federation includes the territories of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, Krasnoyarskyi krai, Nenets,Yamal-Nenets and Chukchi autonomous okrug (BRFA-2020, 2008: Chapter 1, Article 2).
towards the Arctic or state policy towards security in Russia and discuss the consequences for the region.

Overall, in comparison with a number of writings on the Russian Arctic in general, the number of publications on Russian security, and Arctic security in particular, is relatively small. National security and official security documents are discussed by Wallander, 2000; Sokov, 2000; Dimitrakopoulou and Liaropoulos, 2010; Sergunin, 2012; Zelenkov, 2013. Nevertheless, it is hard to find an analysis discussing the development of security thinking in contemporary Russia and particularly in the Arctic. Russian Arctic strategy and security are discussed by Zysk, 2010; Heininen, 2011; 2016; Konyshev and Sergunin, 2012. Military aspects of security in the Russian Arctic are discussed by Baev, 2009; Zysk, 2009; Konyshev and Sergunin, 2014. Larsson (2006) studied Russian energy policy in the context of economic and energy security. Åtland (2009) examined the place of European Arctic in Russian security policy and identified the dominance of a Western perspective on Russian security policy as one shortcoming of existing research. In my work, I actively use Russian published sources, as well as materials in English, in order to create a broader picture and introduce materials unknown to both sides.

Since studies about Russia published in English mostly remain unknown to the Russian scientific community and publications in Russian are known only to a small Russian-speaking community abroad, I can safely indicate a lack of cooperation between Russian and foreign security studies. In order to bridge this gap, I analyse Russian official documents on security issued between 1992 and 2010 and follow the changes in the official interpretation of security in the country, as well as examining how these changes affected security construction in the Murmansk region. I look at security assemblage, which appeared in the Murmansk region in 2007-2012, when a claim that large oil and gas deposits had been discovered in the Arctic (see, for example, reports published in 2006 to 2008) made this region attractive for many states from the perspective of energy security and geopolitics.

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29 The issue of Russian society and society in North-West Russia was discussed by Evangelista, 1995; Stuvøy, 2009; Hønneland, 2010; Riabova, 2012. The specific relationships between Moscow and Northern regions were discussed by Turovskii, 2003; Blakkisrud and Hønneland, 2006ab; Kolodina, 2008; Pavlov and Selin, 2012; Riabova, 2012; Joenniemi and Sergunin, 2014; Gel’man and Starodubtsev, 2016. Peculiarities of Northern policy were articulated by Heleniak, 2009; Wilson Rowe, 2009; Selin, 2009; 2012; Hønneland, 2016. Environmental issues are highlighted by Pursiainen, 2002; 2005; Hønneland, 2016. Issues of legislation on the Arctic is addressed by Koivurova, 2008; Zhukov, 2014; Kupryashkin and Sivakov, 2014. The Russian policy toward mineral resources and the issues of energy sector are discussed by Øverland, 2008; Moe and Rowe, 2008; Moe and Wilson Rowe, 2009; Kryukov, 2009; Tatarkin et al., 2012; Goes, 2013ab; Godzimirski, 2014ab; Kryukov and Moe, 2014; Mitrova, 2014.

30 Ocean Futures, 2006; Glomsrød and Aslaksen, 2006; AMAP, 2007.
Heininen (2016: 28) identifies the need for a redefinition of local security actors in the Arctic context due to several existing practices which cannot be addressed within the state-centred security paradigm (Heininen, 2016: 28). In my study I apply a multi-actor based security model, which was developed within the GAPS project\footnote{The GAPS project addressed linkage between human security and oil and gas development in the Arctic and took human/community needs as a referent point of analysis (for more information see Hoogensen Gjørv et al., 2016).} (Hoogensen, 2008; Hoogensen et al., 2009; Stuvøy, 2011; Dale, 2011; Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012).

![Figure 1: An Actor-Based Security Model](Hoogensen et.al. 2009)

Figure 1. visualises competing security perspectives and presupposes that the actors are connected to each other via powerful relationships (Hoogensen et al., 2009: 7). The GAPS project devised a skeleton theory, allowing the studying of security as a practice of different actors (Dale, 2011) or enlarging the perspectives for understanding security and insecurity in particular contexts (Stuvøy, 2011). Overall, the model allowed the articulation of connections and the operationalization of security by different actors in different contexts. In my study I make a further move and theorise how the connections take place, how the context affects the division between actors and what function actors have, through the application of assemblage analytics.

A multi-actor based approach is important for my study, since the issues facing various actors in security construction in the Russian Arctic have not been well discussed.\footnote{There are works dealing with various actors in the region. For example, the issue of the petroleum supply industry is discussed by Mineev, 2010. Indigenous people are discussed by Koivurova, 2008; Hossain et al., 2016. The role of civil society and the problems of NGOs are addressed by Skedsmo, 2005. An issue of Northern identity is discussed by Hønneland, 2010; 2016. Aure (2008) discusses issues of work migration and sketches portraits of migrants from Teriberka.} Security identity
in Russia is discussed by Lomagin (2005). Stuvøy (2009; 2010ab) examines the crisis centres in North-West Russia and their role in security construction. Åtland (2009) brings up the issue of various security actors in the Russian Arctic. In the Russian literature, analysis is mostly confined to the state as a security actor (see for example, Kryukov, 2009; Nikolaev, 2009; Baryshnikov, 2014; Konyshev and Sergunin, 2014). A special place in Russian security studies belongs to the discussion of soft and hard security (see, for example, works of Pursiainen, 2002; Lomagin, 2005; Smirnov and Kokhtyulina, 2012; Sergunin and Konyshev, 2014). These discussions indicate not only the existence of security issues beyond military security in Russia, but also the existence of non-state actors. From my point of view, a discussion on human security could open up a discussion on multiple actors in Russia. Nevertheless, the analytical potential of human security in the Russian context remains unclear. That is why I focus on the issue of human security in the Russian context and claim that an articulation of individual stories and practices (or the inclusion of a bottom-up perspective) is important if we want to examine the dynamic of the relationship between the state and the individual. I explore the assemblage approach in order to see to what degree it says something about competing and connecting narratives of security in a given empirical context – in this case oil and gas development in Russia. I argue that the assemblage framework permits the undertaking of interdisciplinary research and reveal connections which would remain invisible in the absence of the analytics of assemblage.

1.6. Outline of study

My work consists of ten chapters. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the research methodology. I explain my choice of methods for qualitative study and discuss specifics of data collection in Russia. I outline the socio-economic situation in the Murmansk region (2007-2012) in the context of development of oil and gas resources in the Russian Arctic in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is devoted to the discussion of the conceptual framework of my thesis. I elaborate on Deleuze and Guattari’s analytics of assemblage and explain notions applied in my study. In Chapter 5, I discuss a set of rules that govern the composition of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). The choice of strategies and actions available for the state and individuals in the security assemblage is discussed in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, I examine what kind of tools are accessible to actors in Russia to express their security concerns. Chapter 8 provides examination of the security assemblage’s construction. I discuss articulations and meanings of security in the Murmansk region in the context of oil and gas development. In Chapter 9, I analyse functions of the state and individuals in the security assemblage. I also discuss the
nature of the security assemblage and the role of human security in the security assemblage in the context of Russia. I draw conclusions and provide answers to the research questions in Chapter 10.
2. Methodology

In this chapter I will elaborate on the methods applied in this study and techniques of data collection. Since my aim is to examine whether human security is an important part of the security assemblage in Russia, I select qualitative analysis because it is oriented to the context, specific meanings and various social practices. I also outline some of the post-structural peculiarities related to governing research practices. Post-structuralism is sensitive to the issue of subjectivity, the correlation between theory and practice, and ethical concerns. I will discuss these issues further in this chapter.

2.1. Implementing a narrative approach: the issue of subjectivity and causality

Different actors in society bring different attitudes and perspectives to the security agenda. Therefore, I am asking an epistemological question: “How is knowledge acquired?” To be able to answer this question, I select a narrative approach developed within post-structuralism. Following Gubrium and Holstein (2009: xviii, emphasis in the original) I apply a broader definition of the term narrative and use “the terms narrative, story, and account interchangeably to refer to spates of talk that are taken to describe or explain matters of concern to participants.” This approach helps me to study “how story functions in different situations” (Gubrium and Holstein, 2009: xvi). Traditionally the focus of analysis is on the main elements of narrative – drama, plot, explanation and selective criteria (Somers, 1994: 619), where plot operates as a structure for the whole story. Gubrium and Holstein (2009: xvii) claim:

“…in the context of narrative reality, plots, themes, beginnings, middles, and endings may be completely beside the point…the beginnings of a story may be widely dispersed in a variety of sources other than the storyteller's experience or a particular text. Similarly, endings might be multiply consequential, implicating a variety of others and having diverse outcomes. The articulated part of a story might be as apparently short as a single utterance, such as “Yeah, that’s the way it is.” … The sense of story and storyteller under consideration centers on the social organization of narrativity. This expands story’s operating horizons well beyond what narrative analysts – who are generally concerned with the internal organization of texts – commonly bring on board.”

This understanding of narrative helps me to place the storytellers and their personal experience in the centre of my analysis and to focus on the capabilities of individuals for action and knowledge production. Czarniawska (2010: 67) stresses that narratology is not a method or set
of procedures, but rather an assemblage of ideas and techniques, which allows one to work with a text, “[a] source of inspiration, not of prescription.” Overall a narrative is a collection of heterogeneous elements: “Narratives mix together humans with non-humans, causes with reasons, explanations with interpretations” (Czarniawska, 2010: 64).

Post-structuralism claims that individual experience matters and thus brings the issue of subjectivity into the spotlight. In a positivist paradigm, the notion of objectivity dominates over subjectivity, assuming a ‘neutrality’ about the data. Rational subjects, by a number of ‘scientific’ methods, can obtain objective knowledge about independent objects in the outside world. This objectivity (or being value-free) is closely linked to reliability (or /and replicability) and validity (truth). Situated knowledge, subjectivity, and contextuality became secondary fields in the frame of positivism. The problem is that objectivity is a “somewhat elusive term” (Berg, 2004: 258). While the prediction of behaviour and causal explanation might work within the frame of natural science, it is difficult to apply them in the field of social science. Within the perspective of post-structuralism the world is understood to be plural and eclectic. Various actors, in the same society, have different cultural traditions and contrasting experiences with social institutions. Thus, reality is always subjective and all existing concepts, attitudes, and values are situated and produced in a particular time and place. Within post-structuralism, subjectivity became rehabilitated. The narrative approach for me “is a deliberate way of rejecting the neutrality and appearance of objectivity…” (Somers, 1994: 630). The narrative approach determines my selection of sources, with considerable weight being given to interviews as the main source of data collection since they provide access to the narratives, told individually by each interviewee. These narratives open access to a variety of meanings and practices of security.

The analytic of assemblage encourages a reconsideration of the traditional positivist approach based on “…causal determination within a logic of stability and linear causality…” (Venn, 2006: 107). According to this conventional reasoning, the event A generates predictable effect B. Due to the ability of assemblage analytics to establish new connections between heterogeneous elements, causality does not operate in a linear way within its structure (McLeod, 2014: 116). This quality of causation has a significant implication for the work with an assemblage: it privileges issues both of temporality and spatiality (Li, 2007: 265). Thus, the chain of events important for an assemblage should not necessarily be chronologically linked: the events might interact in a very unpredictable way. In another twist, the issue of temporality
passes through the transitory nature of the connections between heterogeneous elements in an assemblage: such connections can be changed or modified over time. This affects how an assemblage can be researched since the shape of the elements in an assemblage depends on the angle of perspective (Li, 2007: 265). The narrative approach allows me to be sensitive to this aspect of assemblage analytics. While telling the stories, individuals forge various events, which could take place at different times, into “one meaningful whole” (Hønneland, 2016: 4). A narrative can also be viewed as a way of organizing the human experience of time (Carr, 1986 cited in Hønneland, 2016: 5). Hønneland (2016: 5) comments on Carr’s understanding of narrative and stresses, that for Carr, “[n]arration is not just a passive reconstruction of events but is informed and influenced by our knowledge of the past and expectations for the future.” Time is an inherent part of the concept of security of expectation33 and a narrative approach helps to analyse the temporal element of state-individual relationships.

I analyse narratives with the help of assemblage analytics and focus on the examination of connections between various elements. Overall, I am narrating a story, created during a particular time involving particular actors. I choose an assemblage vocabulary to tell a story of multiple security perspectives in the oil and gas context in the Murmansk region because my story is built around the Shtokman gas field, with particular focus on the state and the individual. I assume they have a very dramatic relationship, containing many unpredictable turns, twists, connections and disruptions, which I will explore further in my thesis.

2.2. Case study as a research design

This research is designed as a case study. A case study may be defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not clearly be evident” (Yin, 2014: 16). Case study design allows in depth study of phenomena, in relation to the context and within a specific time and place (Yin, 2014). The security assemblage of my interest is a particular constellation in time (2007-2012) and space (the Murmansk region), and the elements of it can form another configuration in another period of time or in another region.

A case study combines a number of data-gathering technologies (Berg, 2004: 251). I employ several techniques of data collection since I need to encompass the individual as well as the

33 I will discuss the concept of security of expectations in Chapter 4. This concept is based on an understanding that an image of the future reveals hopes and expectations related to the present.
state level. I selected official documents and interviews as my primary sources of information. Security as a state policy is codified in official documents. Interviews illuminate individual opinions and allow studying various security perspectives, which might be different from the official one. My secondary sources of information are publications in the mass media (mainly online newspapers) and scientific materials of conferences conducted in the Murmansk region in 2012-2014. Mass media is used by people to express their opinion as well as by state bodies to disseminate official information or to express official opinion on issues of interest. Conferences publications reveal the opinions of multiple actors: researchers, politicians, representatives of business, NGOs, and the military.

The case study is often criticized for focusing on situated knowledge, and therefore not associated with objectivity, reliability and validity (Flyvbjerg, 2007: 391). I am operating in a post-structural framework, which argues in favour of empirical evidence and the context of research. The case study approach allows me to focus on the question of how we do research and acquire information. This question overcomes normativity on the one side and theoretical determinism on the other (Hynek, 2012: 3). Thus, I am trying to understand how it is possible to approach the discussion on security issues in the Russian context. A further question is how this newly obtained knowledge changes existing interpretations and why we need it. In my case, assemblage analytics does not look for causal explanations, since heterogeneous elements come into play in different ways. It is rather focused on an understanding of unexpected connections and shifts within the assemblage. These new connections, disruptions and changes allow me to examine the role of actors in the assemblage and to acquire new knowledge about security in Russia, which, due to prevalent attitudes towards security in Russian society, cannot be received otherwise.

My empirical research is limited to the case of the Shtokman gas field. I do not regard my case as a sample. Following Yin (2014: 40-45), I rather aim at analytic generalization and look upon my work as an opportunity to contribute my empirical findings and analysis to theoretical debates on the concept of security.

2.3. Research criteria: validity, reliability, plausibility and authenticity

The elements of validity and reliability are important markers in scientific work (Yin, 2014: 45). Validity can be interpreted as a synonym for truth and accuracy of work with studied
Jensen (2012: 38) suggests that authenticity and plausibility can be alternative benchmarks to validity and reliability. These benchmarks fit into a post-structural approach because they highlight the issue of subjectivity as an important scientific criterion. With reference to other researchers, Jensen states that authenticity should be understood “as the capacity of a text to describe daily life in the field so as to convince you, the reader that we, the authors, have indeed ‘been there’. This, unlike the expression ‘accuracy’ or ‘validity’, does not contain an implicit truth-claim” (Jensen, 2012: 38-39). The concept of plausibility is another benchmark, which “focuses on what she [Martin, 2001] calls the relationship between the ‘community of readers’ and the world as drawn in the author’s rendition” (Jensen, 2012: 39). I can further relate these benchmarks to the relevant concepts of the ‘extinction of the author’ and the ‘pleasure of the text’ which were introduced by Roland Barthes in his post-structural essays, *The death of the author* (2008) and *The pleasure of the text* (1990). These concepts address the process of post-structural reading, which includes effects such as intertextuality, recognition and, sometimes even the disappearance of the author’s identity, since the reader is not merely a co-reader, but a co-writer as well. This is because the reader attaches extra meanings and adds their own experience to the text. It creates personal connections and the text becomes more familiar to the reader.

I intend to be reflective upon my role as a researcher with the end goal that the process, reflections and results become more understandable to those who read my work. I also hope that, by narrating the story of security assemblage in Murmansk, I can give a feeling of ‘presence’ to those who have not been there. In the parts related to the interview process, I tried to be as detailed as possible in my reflection on the process and in commenting on narratives told by interview participants. Thus, I hope that others can learn something about the entire setting and be able to follow my conclusions, as well as drawing their own. I also hope that, by giving voices to my interviewees and their stories, I can speak to the experience of other people, who might recognize themselves in the story I tell.

**2.4. Research as experiment**

I approach research process as an experiment. This method is grounded in a post-structural approach towards knowledge: knowledge is partial, open to revision, and “truth is dialectical,
rather than analytical and foundational” (Williams, 2010: 51). Traditionally, the process of experiment is based on a procedure of the verification of a hypothesis. The researcher tests the theory/hypothesis and collects proofs, which lead him/her to support or reject it. Deleuze and Guattari consider this way of obtaining knowledge to be inappropriate and call it ‘axiomatic’ because it is based on existing terminology, methods and goals and therefore excludes innovation and unpredictability (ATP: 143-144). Deleuze and Guattari propose experimental knowledge as an alternative to the axiomatic kind and introduce a method of experimentation. To experiment “is to try new actions, methods, techniques and combinations ‘without aim or end’” (Baugh, 2010: 93). Deleuzian experimentation is an open-ended process, focused on new connections and new outcomes of the experiment rather than on the final goal ‘to confirm’ or ‘to reject’. The focus is not merely on the elements (people, documents, events), but also on what these elements can do: “Experimentation does not interpret what something, such as a text, an idea or a desire, ‘means’, but seeks to discover how it works or functions by uncovering an order of causes, namely, the characteristic relations among the parts of an assemblage – their structures, flows and connections – and the resulting tendencies” (Baugh, 2010: 94). Thus, I am producing knowledge about the security assemblage through my research experience and examining how the state and individuals function in the assemblage. It was not possible for me to have any a priori knowledge about the assemblage, because the connections between the state and individuals simply cannot be predicted.

My case study became a test, an experiment based on empirical findings. The method of experimentation became visible on several occasions. First of all, my whole project is an experiment with methods, structure and theory. Even the application of assemblage analytics was an experiment for me, since I did not have any idea where it would take me or what it would demand from me in terms of sources and time. Secondly, the idea of assemblage came to me from the fieldwork. Some of interviewees were talking about a cluster, which was a ‘hot term’ in 2007-2012.34 A cluster was understood as a centre, capable of cross-cutting several spheres. For example, the cluster around the Shtokman gas field was oriented towards extraction on the Arctic shelf. This included machine building, technologies, logistics, education, supply system and scientific discoveries. This cluster idea helped me to look at my research from different angles: gas field, high technology, actors, Murmansk, Moscow,

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34 Even Russian official documents produced in this period refer to the idea of a cluster. See, for example, the CSED-2020, 2008; ES-2030, 2009; SSEDM-2025, 2010.
Teriberka\textsuperscript{35}, development, security – all these are heterogeneous elements, which are working together. Hence, my fieldwork forced me to look at the connection between actors, events and statements. This is how I ended up with the idea of the security assemblage, which allows approaching state and human security interacting with each other. Thirdly, my interview design was an experiment with concepts and even language – I tried to operationalise the concept of human security, which is almost never used in the Russian language. In a way, I took the liberty of attaching my meaning to it, since I had to make it understandable to potential interviewees. This gave the interviewees a freedom to look at their own experience and to search for their own answers and interpretations. This experiment also helped me and my interviewees to go beyond any assigned meaning of security in Russia and empowered us to talk about this concept which is considered a rather ‘taboo’ topic in the country.

2.5. Official documents as a source of data

I selected official documents as one of my primary sources of information. The qualitative approach to the documents allowed me, as well as studying them directly, to contextualize them in particular social circumstances. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, Lomagin (2005) detected the transformation in Russian security thinking in the beginning of the millennium. The work with official documents provides access to how security was thought from a state perspective and what kind of transformation, if any, took place.

Due to connections between the elements of assemblage, I had to use documents related to various fields: security, energy, socio-economic development, regional development, the Russian Arctic. According to Prior (2003), any document can be viewed as an agent. This field of action involves such elements as ‘creators’ (agents, writers, publishers, publicists and so on); ‘users’ (readers or receivers) and ‘settings’ (Prior, 2003: 2). The circumstances of document creation (discussed in Chapter 1), rules of creation, application and unspoken conventions (examined in Chapter 5) are important from the perspective of assemblage analytics.

\textsuperscript{35} The village of Teriberka is located on the coast of the Barents Sea about 100 km northeast of Murmansk. Teriberka consist of two parts: Teriberka 1 (Lodeinoe or new Teriberka), which was a product of Soviet industrialization and old Teriberka, which was an old settlement with traditional Pomor way of living (Riabova, 2001). A third settlement was supposed to be built, since onshore facilities of the planned Shtokman project were planned to be located in Zavalishina Bay, nearby Teriberka.
Though the security assemblage is limited to the years 2007-2012, the pool of official documents has a different time frame. The oldest document I analyze is from 1992 (Federal law “On security” №2446-1) and the newest is from 2013 (Strategy of the Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian federation and National Security until 2020, henceforth SDAZ-2020). SDAZ-2020 was published in 2013 as an additional document to the Basics of the State Policy in the Arctic (BRFA-2020) and therefore is used as a source of extra information. The document FL №2446-1 (1992) was superseded in 2010 when the new Federal law №390 was adopted. The document “Concept of national security” (CNS) was introduced in 1997, changed in 2000 and became obsolete in 2009 with the introduction of the “Strategy of National Security until 2020” (SNS-2020). Thus, during the period 2007-2012 two new documents related to security appeared and replaces earlier versions. This indicates the importance of security issues in Russia in 2007-2012.

Overall, I examine documents published at the federal level (laws, strategies, concepts and basics of state policy) as well as at the regional level (Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the Murmansk region until 2025, henceforth the Murmansk strategy or SSEMD-2025). Through my interviews in 2008-2009 I was told by several interviewees that I should have a closer look at the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025). I received a draft of this document from one of my interviewees in 2009. The final version of the Murmansk strategy was approved in 2010. Therefore, in my work I quote from both versions of the strategy: the SSEDM-2025 as a draft from 2009 (published by the Kola Science Centre) and a final version of the SSEDM-2025 from 2010 (approved by the Government of the Murmansk region and accessible through the region’s official website). It allows me to use various statistics (presented in one version and omitted in the other) as well as to identify important changes within the assemblage by looking at the differences between these two versions.

2.6. Narrative approach to interviews

The post-structural framework approaches the interview as not just as a method of collecting data, which can be codified, categorized and generalized, but also as an instant process of knowledge production (Fontana, 2003). The interview is not a ‘pure’ form of ‘uncontaminated’ data found somewhere in a laboratory. Post-structuralism assumes that it is difficult to maintain neutrality during an interview; that both an interviewer and interviewee are active participants, and that people are capable of shifting their identities during the process (Fontana, 2003). Therefore it is difficult sometimes to decide if the story belongs to individuals or to an external
source – an organization or institution, for example. I approach the stories narrated during the interviews as constructed in the here and now. While working on the interviews, I was constantly asking myself: what narratives am I co-producing with my interviewees? How are my questions affecting the story we are creating? My observations during the interview, and the interviewees’ reflection on their own activity and the roles of other actors, played an important part in the process of understanding; we together narrated the story of security assemblage in the region. The interviews gave me an opportunity to both learn more about the actors, and to identify connections between the elements of security assemblage. The value of the interview cannot be evaluated only in terms of validity and credibility, “rather, the values of interview data lies both in their meanings and in how meanings are constructed” (Gubrium and Holstein, 2003b: 33).

Gubrium and Holstein (2003b) regard the traditional interview asymmetrical since power belongs to the researcher: what language to use, the right to ask questions and oversee the process. That leads to an asymmetry in the positions of the researcher and the researched. Dialogue and inclusion help to overcome this asymmetry. Gubrium and Holstein (2003b: 35) call it “respondent empowerment”. Empowerment means that both sides co-produce the knowledge, that interview subjects are entitled to raise questions and their answers do not represent the truth per se, but rather help to map the problematic field. In my case, my interviewees asked me questions related to my personal experience (about myself, where I was from, what I was doing in Norway) or what I knew about a particular issue. One interviewee confessed, that he/she had never thought about a particular question before and therefore would try and reflect on it on the spot. I got a telephone call the next day because the interviewee wanted to clarify some things we discussed and to explain their own position in more detail.

Empowerment also allows the issue of subjectivity to be considered. Gubrium and Holstein (2003b: 41) state that we construct the subject by interview since an individual has different subjectivities and they all come into play in their own way during the interview: “Treating subjects’ positions and their associated voices seriously, we might find that an ostensibly single interview could actually be, in practice, an interview with several subjects, whose particular identities maybe only partially clear.” This shift in identity might happen because of the topic of interview or because the narrative demands experience from another sphere. Of course, these shifts are not always evident, but some verbal prefaces can indicate a shift is happening in the subject’s position (Gubrium and Holstein, 2003b: 40). I actually faced those shifts. For
example, while talking about environmental issues, one interviewee made a shift from being an ‘authority representative’ into “talking as the one who lives here and has concerns” (Interviewee 12, October 2008). I will discuss the role and meaning of these shifts in the security assemblage in the next chapter.

2.7. Data and scope of interviews

I used the method of interview to gain access to individual opinions and therefore to bring a bottom-up perspective on security in Russia into my studies. I conducted two sessions of face-to-face interviews in Murmansk: in autumn 2008 and autumn 2009. Overall, there were twenty interviewees. I was interested in interviewing those people who were either dealing with oil and gas issues in the region and therefore had practical experience, or people who could face problems related to petroleum activity in the region while working in non-related fields or industries. Eighteen out of twenty interviewees were digitally recorded. Two interviewees preferred handwritten notes to be taken. In one case, an interviewee asked me to stop the recording while discussing some sensitive issue from their perspective. In that situation the interviewee had more comfort with a pen and paper that with a recorder. I made written notes during this part of our conversation.

As I wrote in Chapter 1, I apply the multi-actor based security model, in order to operationalize the concept of the individual. This model defines six main groups of actors participating in the process of security building: arctic communities, industry and NGOs, the media, the military, policy makers and researchers. I made some changes and split the group ‘industry and NGOs’ into two groups: ‘business and industry’ and ‘NGOs and international organizations’. I divided the interviewees into seven groups: business and industry; local community; journalists/media; military; NGOs and international organizations; researchers; and policy makers. I did not manage to access the group ‘military’ since representatives of this group refused to give interviews. My knowledge about this group is based on secondary sources – references by other actors, official documents, conferences’ scientific publications, the media. In total, eight interviewees were female and twelve were male. Two interviewees out of the 20 were indigenous people. In order to provide anonymity to my interviewees, I did not include their names and places of work. Each interviewee was anonymised and got a number code.

36 See Appendix I.
In order to provide some background information about my project and myself, and outline the interview questions, I created a cover letter. I either emailed it beforehand, or left it in advance in the offices, or my respondent read it immediately before the interview. All my attempts to schedule meetings in advance (one or two months before) were not successful. Everyone was unsure of their schedule and asked me to get in touch with them when I was in Murmansk or the week before my trip. Sometimes, it was hard even to get an overview as to what I was doing the next day, since people were calling and saying they were ready to meet right away.

I have to admit it was much easier for me to contact journalists or representatives of NGOs. They were more open and it was easier to communicate with them prior to the interview. The representatives of the group ‘policy makers’ were more suspicious due to the framing of my project as one exploring ‘security’. Representatives of this group expressed their concerns that, due to their positions, they could not express their own opinion on issues related to the state (including security) and would preferably avoid any discussion of the topic of security. To a certain degree, it was difficult to get in touch with representatives of business as well. However, when I did interview them they were open and easy to communicate with. Nevertheless, they also carefully addressed security issues. For example:

“I just want to say, that I’m not going to comment on things that belong to the federal level, that are not in my competence. I will tell you about what I am responsible for and what I understand. What is not in our competency, I am not even going to comment on” (Interviewee 18, December 2009).

This was said at the beginning of our interview. The interviewee limited the interview to their own competence and made clear that any issue linked to the state’s competence would be omitted. These constraints are in accordance with the narrative approach. It means subjectivity plays an important role and knowledge consists of numerous narratives.

2.8. Interview guide

The entire interview process followed a semi-structured methodology: I created a list of questions, which my interviewees did not see. They received a cover letter with a short interview guide. The interview guide outlined three questions: (1) With whom do you cooperate in the course of your work? (2) How is the development of the Murmansk region

37 See Appendix II.
38 See Appendix III.
connected to oil and gas activity? (3) How do you envisage the future of the Murmansk region? Consent was given orally as an agreement to meet. A semi-structured interview design was selected in order to obtain comparable qualitative data. It also gave me the opportunity to be flexible with my questions and to follow new thematic trajectories during the interview process. For example, in some cases the interview took unexpected directions and I simply could not ask all the questions from my list: either they were already answered by the interviewees in their earlier replies, or they simply did not make sense in this new narrative.

One of my biggest concerns was how to address the concept of security. Being Russian myself, I was still strongly aware of the connotations connected to the word. My first round of phone calls to potential interviewees confirmed my concerns: the word ‘security’ was immediately hoisted as a red flag for people. I wondered how to ask about security without frightening people – how was it possible to address security issues in a context where people preferred to avoid talking about security?

I strategically tried to avoid the direct naming of ‘security’ during the interviews. Of course, in the cover letter I mentioned my interest in human security in order to provide correct information about the project, but I decided it would be appropriate to find a proxy concept, which would help me to address the situation in the Murmansk region. The solution came from both security theory and the research field. The nexus between ‘human security - human development - human rights’ is defined by some researchers as a weak point: the concept of human security loses its anchoring and becomes everything and nothing (Chandler, 2008a). In my case, this weak point became a strength. If human security can provide “a more comprehensive emphasis on human development, human rights and the role of non-state actors” (Hudson, 2005: 165), why cannot these other concepts, in turn, provide more information about human security? My decision to use the ‘development - security’ nexus as an entrance to my interviews was also rooted in the narratives of development, articles in newspapers in connection to the Shtokman gas field and official Russian documents related to the Arctic. I decided that the word ‘development’ would be familiar to my interviewees and could be a safe starting point for our conversations. The development narrative helped to create a sort of comfortable atmosphere for interviews, which allowed us to move smoothly to the field of security – initially perceived by the majority of interviewees as dangerous or unwanted. At the same time, I could learn more about the security assemblage, about its constitutive parts (actors, statements, documents and territory) and the connections between them. Thus, for me
the interview planning and the interview process became an experiment, where I could see how ‘security’ interrupts the ‘story of development’ and appears in the narratives.

2.9. Reflection on my role

Since a post-structural approach calls for reflection upon the place and role of the interviewer, I would like to elaborate on my position in the interview process.

The first issue I faced in relation to my role was a shift between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. On the one hand, I was a Russian person from a Norwegian institute. I was called a ‘Norwegian friend’ during one interview. Some interviewees even used the opportunity to ask me for help: for spreading information in Norway about a forthcoming event, or to explain how the educational system works in Norway. On the other hand, some interviewees were either suspicious (asking me why I left Russia and why needed to work for a foreign institute) or disappointed that I was not Norwegian (they were more interested in talking to a foreigner than a fellow citizen, especially on the issue of security).

Initially, I saw the advantage of doing fieldwork in my own country and speaking my native language. Being Russian I could easily understand the important aspects of context such as jokes or popular phrases. It was also easier for my interviewees to discuss some issues with me, since they could appeal to my experience of being from Severodvinsk. However, despite the shared language and experience, the interview process was sometimes difficult because of this shared knowledge. For example, some interviewees did not explain some specific details or meanings, presuming that since I was Russian, I was bound to know these things by default. In some situations, it was helpful to remind interview subjects that I was not from Murmansk, and then an interviewee had to explain some ‘obvious’ things to me. Thus, I learned that while being ‘insider’ (a Russian person) I could also be an ‘outsider’ (since I was from the Arkhangelsk region). The ‘internal foreignness’ (being Russian, but from another region) helped me to be more open and curious about how things are done in the Murmansk region.

At the same time, my identity in the interview process mattered not only for me. My personal story became, in some cases, very important to my interviewees. Being from a formerly closed city, I realized that my personal background helped to facilitate the discussions and people became more open and willing to talk. In one case, after two weeks of telephone calls, one interviewee stated that it was useless for us to meet. Our last telephone call lasted 20 minutes during which the person explained in depth why we could not have an interview. During this
In a phone conversation, I was asked where I was from. I answered that, originally, I was from Severodvinsk, and that I have a Russian citizenship. After that, the situation changed drastically: I got the face-to-face interview. My interviewee told me that, due to my background, I could understand the uneasy situation around the Shtokman project and what it meant for people. I will discuss this case further in Chapter 9.

Since I was Russian interviewing other Russians in Russia, sometimes some messages were conveyed not only through words, but through non-verbal means such as gestures, body expressions and interjections. I will discuss the meanings of verbal and non-verbal expressions in Chapter 7. My whole interview experience involved words and bodily expressions as well as surrounding such as buildings and offices. All these things together formed the peculiar Russian context. These examples are hard to describe verbally and are difficult to capture in a text and in a different language. This also involves different readings and interpretations. Therefore I will include my interpretation of what was happening, as a Russian, as part of this context.

### 2.10. Conclusion

I have outlined the methods used for collecting the data and discussed the methodological difficulties related to qualitative research. I have discussed primary and secondary sources of information and provided consideration related to my fieldwork. I also discussed the issue of subjectivity and my role as a researcher.

In the next chapter I will provide the background information related to my case study and outline specific conditions in the Murmansk region which influenced the appearance of the security assemblage.

This chapter functions as a meeting point between the case study and a theoretical approach, which I will outline in Chapter 4. In this chapter I will provide some background information about the Murmansk region and discuss the situation regarding the fuel and energy sector (including the oil and gas sector). My aim is to provide an understanding of the challenges and conditions for the development of the Shtokman gas field. As I wrote in the previous chapter, my theory is the result of work in the field. The background provided in this chapter is necessary to understand my choice of theory.

I will also demonstrate the relevance of the interviews by providing background data including the expectations and desires related to the development of the Shtokman gas field as expressed in 2007-2012. This will contribute to understanding the specific conditions for the construction of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region in the context of oil and gas development and prepare the ground for further examination of these conditions in Chapter 5. It is important to remember that interviewees revealed their expectations and concerns related to the Shtokman project at the time, when the project was in the planning phase, and not after the decline in 2012.


Murmansk is the biggest city in the world above the Arctic Circle. The region cannot be considered representative of the entire Russian Arctic as the development of the Russian Arctic regions has been uneven. The differences between the Arctic regions in Russia are enormous in terms of climatic zones, density of population, economic conditions and social stability.

The Murmansk region is located on the Kola Peninsula and the largest part of the region lies north of the Arctic Circle (see Figure 2. on the next page). Despite its remote location, it has a unique geographic position, which underscores the city’s significance in terms of geopolitics and transportation. The region borders the Republic of Karelia and the Arkhangelsk region within Russia, and additionally has external borders with Finland and Norway. In addition, the region includes many islands in the Barents and White Seas. While the White Sea freezes in winter, the Barents Sea is ice-free all year around. Due to the accessibility of the sea and ice-free port, the region hosts the Russian Northern fleet. The Northern Fleet uses the Barents Sea to conduct military exercises, locate missile-carrying submarines and control some port
facilities (Åtland, 2009: 104). The Murmansk port is also the main transportation access to the beginning of the Northern Sea Route, as well as to shipping lanes to the Atlantic. Below, I will provide some statistics relevant to the period of the case study (2007-2012).

The population of the Murmansk region was 836,373 in 2010 constituting approximately 0.6% of population of Russia (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 3). Sami people represented the only indigenous population in the region and, according to Census 2010, around 1,771 Sami lived in the region. More than 92.5% of the population lived in urban areas. By 2010 the level of unemployment in the region was 8.9% with average in the county 7.5% (Riabova, 2012: 178). A process of out-migration started in the 1990s and this tendency remained a factor in the 21st century. The region was struggling to attract a young labour force and to keep the specialists already working there (See Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration of the population, thousands of people</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Murmansk region</td>
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Table 1. Dynamic of population migration from the Murmansk region in 2007-2010

42 The data is taken from Pavlov and Selin (2012: 207).
3.1.1. Industry and economics

The socio-economic situation in Murmansk region underwent numerous changes during the same period of time as my research project (2007-2012). Until the year 2008, the region was rather stable and exhibited a number of positive trends including income growth of the population. Despite the fact that the growth rate of local industrial production was lower in comparison with the Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in Russia at large, the leading enterprises of the region still provided strong revenue growth to the regional economy. Industrial production growth in 2000-2007 was 13.4%, including 9.8% in the mining industry and 22.3% in the processing industry (SSEDM-2025, 2009: 15). Implementation of national projects\(^{43}\) and regional and departmental target programmes\(^{44}\) in the region were aimed at improving the quality of life of the population and some positive results were achieved.\(^{45}\) Nevertheless, in 2009 the regional economy was affected by general crisis trends in the Russian economy, related to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Though economic indicators showed some improvement as the year progressed, negative dynamics prevailed in general. By the end of 2009, industrial production in the Murmansk region had dropped by 6.4% compared to 2008 (Barents Monitoring, 2009).

The regional economy mainly comprises four sectors: industrial production, fisheries, transportation, and fuel and energy. Mining enterprises, together with energy and processing enterprises, accounted for more than 40% of the Gross Regional Product (GRP) (Barents Monitoring, 2009). The region has various natural resources. As one of the interviewees noted: “It seems to me, that the Murmansk region contains the entire periodic table” (Interviewee 7, September 2008). More than sixty large deposits of various minerals are located in the region. The most valuable of them are copper, nickel, iron, apatite-nepheline ores and ores of rare metals.\(^{46}\) Ferrous metallurgy products like nickel, copper, aluminum are in demand by both domestic and international markets. The structure of exports and imports remained unchanged.

\(^{43}\) A ‘National priority projects’ programme was initiated in 2005. It was aimed at improving welfare in Russia. The programme consists of extra funding by the state of four priority areas: health, education, housing and agriculture.


through several years of monitoring. Thus, the region mainly exported mineral products (31.15%) and metals (65.7%) and depended on the import of machinery and equipment (almost 70%), chemicals (15.2%) and food products (10.5%) (Barents Monitoring, 2009). The Murmansk region has one of the most developed mining areas in Russia. The mining and metallurgy industry gave birth to a large number of mining and processing enterprises, which in turn became the basis for the formation of cities or settlements. Thus, the Murmansk region still has a large amount of so-called mono-towns. The production of the Kola mining complex contributed more than 60% of the industrial production of the region (Ivanova, 2012: 169).

While mining plays a significant role in the regional economy, Ivanova (2012) stresses that the state of processing of all types of mineral resources in the Murmansk region was in poor condition by 2012. The largest amount of the most highly profitable large-scale and unique deposits of traditional raw materials were practically exhausted after many years of intensive use (Ivanova, 2012: 169).

Two other significant sectors of the regional economy are fisheries and transportation. Despite economic problems in the 1990s and a decrease in production, the Murmansk region nevertheless contributes approximately 15% of the fish catch of the national economy. However, the decline of the fishing industry is considered to be one of the biggest regional losses of the 1990s, and still affects the region – the number of people employed in the fishing industry declined, there is a lack of modernization of fish-processing plants and fishing boats, and the focus is on catching fish popular on foreign markets. Fisheries had an input of 6.6% in GRP in 2008 compared to 12.9% in 1995 (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 8). In the transport sector, rail transportation has the largest cargo volume in comparison with the total volume transported (60%). At the same time, the volume of sea transportation grew significantly through the period 2000-2007 (the growth is 134.3% since 2000) (SSEDM-2025, 2009: 16).

### 3.1.2. Military-industrial complex

The military–industrial complex in the Murmansk region is mostly related to shipbuilding enterprises which repair and modernize warships and submarines of the Northern Fleet (Fadeev et al., 2011: 34). The Northern Fleet is located in the region and has always been an important

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47 Mono-town is a town where a single industry/company dominates the local economy (World Bank, 2010: 21).
49 It is also called Oboronno-Promyshlennyi Kompleks [Defence-Industrial Complex] or OPK. The military-industrial complex is a sector of the economy, which meets the military needs of the state. The sector usually unites a number of industries, companies and organizations, which can also work for the civilian sector.
source of employment (Åtland, 2009: 104). But many of the enterprises became unprofitable and were not fully in use due to out-of-date equipment or lack of customers by 2010 (Fadeev et al., 2011: 34). Financial challenges and serious vessel decrease\(^{50}\) has led to a high number of unemployed specialists. Though the importance of the Kola Peninsula in terms of national security has changed since the Cold War and civil-military relations in the region became “non-confrontational” (Åtland, 2009: 117), the Murmansk region remains a highly militarised area. A number of towns and settlements and the territory around them are either located within a border security zone\(^{51}\) or have ZATO status (or status of a closed town) due to connections to the military-industrial complex. The Kola Peninsula has a special place in the national security construction:

“…the Kola Peninsula and the adjacent area are still considered a region of special strategic importance to Russia’s national security. The direct access to the Arctic and Atlantic oceans, a relatively close proximity to potential US/NATO targets, and a relatively developed military infrastructure make this region well suited for strategic naval operations. The strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula is above all explained by the fact that it hosts two-thirds of the Russian sea-based nuclear forces. As some military analysts emphasize, the nuclear deterrent remains not only a key element of the Russian military strategy, but serves also as a symbol and guarantee of Russia’s great power status. Maintaining strategic nuclear capabilities is, therefore, one of the highest priorities of Russia’s military policies both in the North and globally” (Konyshev and Sergunin, 2014: 324).

If, at the end of 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, a tendency to a demilitarization of the region was apparent (Åtland, 2009), since 2007 tendencies to restore and enlarge military presence in the Arctic and the Murmansk region were prevailing (Baev, 2009; Ivanov, 2013; Åtland, 2014; Konyshev and Sergunin, 2014). Thus, the decision was made to deploy the Kola Peninsula Special motorized infantry brigade for operations in the Arctic in March 2011, and in July 2011, the government decided that two brigades were to be located in the Murmansk region (Ivanov, 2013: 99). In Chapters 6 and 7, I will discuss this turn from ‘demilitarization’

\(^{50}\) According to Åtland (2009: 112), in 1986 the Northern Fleet had 180 nuclear-powered submarines of different classes. By 2006 it had only 42 submarines.

\(^{51}\) In the Murmansk region it is a 15 km territory along the sea coast and the land border with Norway and Finland. Territories with the border security zone in Russia have restricted access for visitors.
to ‘militarization’\textsuperscript{52} of Murmansk region from the assemblage perspective and examine the role of these processes in the security assemblage.

3.1.3. The fuel and energy complex (TEK)\textsuperscript{53}

The fuel and energy complex (TEK) is an assemblage of industries engaged in the exploration, extraction, processing and transportation of hydrocarbon resources as well as in the production, transport and distribution of electricity.

The structure of the energy system in the Murmansk region included 17 hydroelectric power plants, the Kola Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) with a capacity of 1760 MW, as well as the five combined heat and power stations (CHP)\textsuperscript{54} (Gafurov, 2010). Heat-only boiler stations (kotelnye) and CHP are among the primary sources for heating in the region. The majority of heat-only boiler stations use either liquid (heating oil and natural gas) or solid fuel (mainly coal). Some stations use electricity. These stations play an important part in the regional energy sector and supply many cities and settlements with energy (they produce 95\% of the heat energy – substantially higher than in other parts of Russia, where the number is 71.5\%).\textsuperscript{55} The Murmansk region energy system was and remains one of the oldest in Russia and the fixed assets of the energy sector are of an advanced age.\textsuperscript{56} Under-developed facilities limited the ability to connect new users, both inside and outside the region. It means that many settlements in the region lack connection to the main network and depended on local heating stations. The level of gasification of the region is very low and many settlements in the region still do not have access to main pipelines (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 70).

The regional TEK is controversial: on the one hand, the Murmansk region produces 1.6\% of total national electricity\textsuperscript{57} and fully meets the energy needs of the Murmansk region (extra power is exported to the Republic of Karelia, Finland and Norway). On the other hand, the Murmansk region does not have its own fuel deposits. But the region consumes a lot of fuel due to the presence of a large number of energy-intensive industries (mining, metallurgy,

\textsuperscript{52} I understand ‘militarization’ as a process related to maintaining a presence and enlargement of military capacity of the region.

\textsuperscript{53} The abbreviation TEK is from Russian \textit{Toplivno-Energeticheskiy Kompleks} [The Fuel and Energy Complex].

\textsuperscript{54} TEZ [CHP] is a type of thermal power station, which produces electricity as well as thermal energy in centralized heating systems (in the form of steam and hot water). Therefore, it provides hot water and heating of residential and industrial objects.


\textsuperscript{56} The coefficient of depreciation of fixed assets employed in the energy industry of the Murmansk region in 2008 is 48.2\% (Gafurov, 2010).

chemical). Regional dependency on fuel supply from other Russian regions and abroad is almost 100% (Gafurov, 2010). In order to satisfy energy needs, the Murmansk region imports a large quantity of mazut (also known as heating oil). Thus, the Murmansk region could sell extra power to other regions and gain extra income, enabling it to buy, for example, heating oil on which the region is dependent. Nevertheless, due to the inflexibility of the system, and despite the ability to produce extra energy, the region is not capable of taking advantage of TEK either financially or in terms of the gasification and electrification of the whole region.

The controversial nature of the energy complex had serious implications for the region by 2007. The imbalance in fuel costs and income from the sale of thermal energy created pressure on the regional budget. Since the heating system was centralized, the heat was not distributed efficiently, and consumers – inhabitants of the Murmansk region in particular – had to cover the costs of this inefficient system. The cost of heating was around 70% of housing costs in the Murmansk region. Thus, the region needed a diversification of energy resources in order to ensure sustainability of energy supply in the harsh Arctic climate. An alternative to mazut was coal or natural gas. Among the discoveries that have received international attention were the Prirazlomnoe and Shtokman gas fields. The development of these fields had the potential to satisfy the gas needs of the entire North-West of Russia for many years.

3.2. Shtokman begins

In this section, I outline the history of the Shtokman gas field, demonstrate its role in security construction from national and regional perspectives and examine how this field affects the development of the Murmansk region. As I wrote above, the region consumes a lot of energy, but does not have own fuel deposits and has to buy fuel. That is why, as many interviewees emphasized, the energy complex does not occupy a big place in the regional economy. One interviewee joked that the Murmansk region’s main contribution to petroleum development consists of the burning of refined petroleum products (Interviewee 14, October 2008).

The region hosts four offshore oil trans-shipment complexes in the Kola Bay, but since they are located offshore, the regional budget does not receive tax revenue from this activity (Interviewee 6, September 2008). As one interviewee noted, “oil and gas industry in our region was and is not very developed, mostly it was presented in the sphere of exploration”

58 Mazut is a by-product obtained from the remains of heavy, low quality oil. It is used in power generation, shipping and industry.
The Murmansk region has long-standing experience in the study and development of the oil and gas fields in the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas. From the end of the 1970s, a whole range of companies, aimed at finding and extracting hydrocarbons on the shelf, were established. Here how an interviewee describes it:

“The complex was created very carefully, competently, and there were all involved: the research institute, the company that develops and produces some new equipment, it is called “Tehmorgeo”. Then came Sevmorneftegeofizika and Marine Arctic expeditions that produced all sorts of seismic and geological surveys, then we have Arctic engineering geological expeditions which were carried out engineering geology for the installation of drilling platforms. Then we have in the end Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka, which has its own drilling rigs and vessels that carried out the search, parametric and other types of drilling. That is the whole complex, the whole chain has been created here.” (Interviewee 14, October 2008).

The companies established at the end of the 1970s still conduct the main exploration activities in the region. The establishment of this exploration complex in Murmansk was in line with the general interest of the USSR in mapping the scope of natural resources. In the period from the late 1970s to early 1990s, seismic studies and drilling operations in the Barents and Kara Seas were booming. Studies were also conducted in the Laptev Sea. Considerable reserves of oil and gas were found in the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas. According to Pavlov and Selin (2012: 208) the West-Arctic shelf contains up to 80% of the resources of the Arctic shelf of Russia.

The probability of the existence of deposits in the north-western part of the South Barents basin was predicted in 1981. This discovery was the result of complex marine geophysical studies.

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60 The open joint-stock company ‘Sevmorneftegeofizika’ (SMNG) appeared in 1979 when Murmansk Marine Geologic-Geophysical Oil and Gas Expedition was formed to conduct a geological/geophysical exploration of oil and gas across the Arctic Seas. Obtained seismic data and marine exploratory drilling by SMNG in the West-Arctic shelf of Russia (Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas) allowed discovering nineteen oil, gas and gas-condensate fields.

61 Open joint-stock company ‘Arctic Marine Engineering Geological Expeditions’ (AMIGE) was established in 1980. It conducts onshore and offshore geotechnical engineering investigations in the Arctic and other parts of the world. AMIGE have prepared 183 engineering geological estimations of sites for offshore drill rigs, engineering geologic surveys for 32 petroleum-bearing areas at sea and for underwater pipeline routes.

62 Open join-stock company ‘Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka’ (established in 1979) is focused on the exploration and development of oil and gas fields on the Russian Arctic Seas shelf. The company discovered 15 oil, gas, gas-condensate and oil-and-gas deposits. In 1987, the company was the first one to begin commercial oil production on the Island of Kolguev in the Arctic seawaters.

63 Together with companies from Moscow and Saint Petersburg.
carried out by specialists of the company ‘Sevmorneftegeofizika’ on the research vessel *Professor Shtokman*. The vessel was named after professor Shtokman, who was a Russian oceanographer and geophysicist (1909-1968). The name of the vessel was used to identify one of the world-largest discovered gas fields, the Shtokman gas field. In 1985 the company ‘Arktikmorneftegasrazvedka’ started preparing for the drilling of the first exploratory well, and in 1988 a deposit of free gas with gas condensate was discovered. The deposit is located approximately 550 km away from the shore in the Barents Sea and at a sea-depth of 300-330 meters (See Figure 3.). The deposit is located in four major reservoirs that can be developed separately. Proven natural gas reserves are estimated at around 3.8 trillion m³ of gas and 37 million tons of gas condensate.⁶⁴

![Figure 3. Shtokman field](http://www.shtokman.ru/en/project/gasfield/) Accessed January 9, 2017.  

There are several challenges related to the development of the Shtokman field. First, it is a long distance from land and it is subject to the unpredictable climatic conditions of the Arctic waters (high waves, icebergs and drifting ice). The geographical location of the field also brings

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financial and technological challenges. The cost of the development of the offshore field is very high and infrastructure has to be built. It means that one company alone cannot bear all the costs of the project and needs partners. However, all the potential expenses create a high risk climate for investors. The issue of accessibility of the field and a lack of infrastructure, in turn, present problems for the decision-making process and the ease with which the parties involved in the project can agree upon project structure, costs and benefits (Goes, 2013b: 84). The risks were known from the beginning of the project. Nevertheless, in spite of the risks, the project received the go-ahead. The main rationale behind the project was not connected to the problems of energy complex in the Murmansk region (Kryukov, 2009), which needs own petroleum sources. From the beginning it was planned to export gas abroad, mainly to the US market (Moe and Rowe, 2008), which means that the local demands for gas would not be satisfied from the Shtokman gas deposit. Rather it was viewed as a project that could provide revenues for the Russian state, and jobs for people currently unemployed in the military-industrial complex of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions due to the transition from planned to market economy in the 1990s.

In the early 1990s, Gazprom started negotiations with several Western companies about the possibility of the field’s development. In 1992, Rosshelf consortium, a Gazprom subsidiary, took over the leading position in the project. Their main argument was that the consortium consisted of Russian companies and they would provide more employment in Russia (Hurst, 2007). In 1995 Gazprom and Rosshelf signed a letter of intent with Norsk Hydro (Norway), Conoco Inc. (the United States), Neste Oy (Finland), and Total S.A. (France), to evaluate the possible joint development of the Shtokman field. Initially the idea was to produce liquefied natural gas (LNG) that could be sold in overseas markets, particularly on the North American market. In March 2000, Rosshelf started to work on the project of gas transportation through the pipelines that would be linked to the Northern stream pipeline, which runs from Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in Germany through the Baltic Sea (Goes, 2013b: 84). After several attempts at developing technical solutions in cooperation with Russian companies, Gazprom opened up the project to international tender. Many foreign companies took part (among them ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Norsk Hydro, Statoil, Mitsui, Sumitomo Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron Corporation, and Total). In September 2005, five companies (Statoil, Norsk Hydro, Total, Chevron and ConocoPhillips) were selected by Gazprom as finalists but

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66 One can also include risks related to the financial and political climate in the country.
all of them were rejected and in October 2006 it was announced that the field would be developed by Gazprom alone.\(^\text{67}\) In 2007, Gazprom signed framework agreements with Total (France) and StatoilHydro\(^\text{68}\) (Norway). For planning, financing, construction and operation of Phase 1 of the development of the gas field a consortium of three companies, “Shtokman Development AG”\(^\text{69}\) was registered in Switzerland in February 2008.

The project was divided into three phases with a production capacity of 23.7 billion cubic metres of gas per annum (ESIA Shtokman, 2009: 5). The scoping report ESIA Shtokman (2009) provides a general overview of the project’s phase 1 (the length of which was projected to be approximately 25 years). A number of offshore and onshore elements were planned to be built during this phase. Offshore elements included around 20 boreholes, two sea-bed pipelines connected to a land pipeline, a network of sub-sea infrastructure and a floating production unit (FPU), which included platforms equipped with a quick-disconnect system. This system would allow the FPU to move away from icebergs, while the equipment connecting the FPU to the seabed infrastructure would remain under the sea surface and thus would be unaffected by the ice threat. Produced gas would be transported via the offshore pipelines to the land at Opasova Bay and then approximately 7 km onshore to an LNG facility and gas treatment (ESIA Shtokman, 2009: 7). The estimated size of territory for the onshore facility was approximately 660 ha. Onshore installations included the LNG plant in Zavalishina Bay\(^\text{70}\), a port transportation and technological complex, a power plant, a living base, and support vessels and tugs (ESIA Shtokman, 2009).

The report also looked into the deadlines of the project.\(^\text{71}\) Drilling was expected to start in the second quarter of 2012 and was anticipated to last for three years. The offshore installation would be built in parallel with the drilling operations and expected to be completed in 2013. The report points out that the ‘hilly’ topography at the site demanded significant preparation. Site preparation work was expected to start in 2010 (activities required site clearance, blasting, site reclamation and construction of infrastructure). In addition, a road from Murmansk to Teriberka, access roads around the site, bridges, culverts and other infrastructure were expected to be built as well (see Figure 4. on the next page). All works were predicted to be completed

\(^{67}\) For more on the decision-making process concerning the development of the Shtokman gas field see Moe, 2006.

\(^{68}\) StatoilHydro was used as a temporary name after the merger of Statoil and NorskHydro in 2007 and from 2009 the company is known as Statoil.

\(^{69}\) The shares were following: Total 25%, Statoil 24%, Gazprom 51%.

\(^{70}\) Opasova and Zavalishina Bays are a part of the Teribeka district, the Murmansk region.

\(^{71}\) All the deadlines are taken from the ESIA Shtokman Scoping report 2009.
by the end of 2012, while construction and commissioning activities would continue until 2014. The first gas extraction from the installation was expected to start in late 2013, with construction and commissioning of the main process area and export terminal continuing until 2015.

![Figure 4. Regional setting](image_url)

Despite a very detailed plan, developed by the end of 2009, the “Shtokman development AG” consortium postponed the start of the project several times, changing, among other things, the configuration of production and modes of transport. In July 2012, the terms of the shareholder agreement expired, and a month later Gazprom put the project on hold. Statoil sold its shares in September 2013 and it was announced in summer 2015, that Gazprom would buy off Total’s shares. The new date for the start of the project is now estimated to be after 2025. The events of 2014 exacerbated existing difficulties and made the development of project more problematic. Thus, the Shtokman project was frozen due to economic and technical challenges. Besides this, some changes took place on the world energy market. Initially it was planned to export gas from the Shtokman field to the USA. However, the USA, as the world’s largest

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72 ESIA Shtokman (2009: 11).
75 In 2014 international sanctions against Russia were applied during the Ukrainian crisis, after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and during the War in Donbass.
consumer of fossil fuels, gained access to large amounts of shale gas. This seriously affected the prices on the world market and the attractiveness of the development of new sites. The extraction of gas in the Barents Sea, or elsewhere in the world, became less attractive due a fall of prices.

### 3.3. Shtokman narratives: intensity of desire

Despite the technological and economic challenges, Shtokman became a flagship name for Russian oil and gas development in offshore Arctic conditions. This flagship status was related to the desire of the state to find new sources of economic stability and to solve, to a certain degree, economic and social problems in the military-industrial sector of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions. As I will explain later in Chapter 4, desire is not only a description regarding what an actor ‘wants’, but it can also be understood as a positive force that forms intensities and connections within an assemblage. “The rationality, the efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage brings into play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them” (ATP: 399). As I will elaborate further in Chapter 4, desire is an integral part of an assemblage and therefore an important element of analysis. Desire is apparent in the Shtokman case, and therefore in the following section I outline the expectations and desires articulated around the Shtokman gas field at national and regional levels. I will describe the driving forces behind the desires and show the differences between them.

#### 3.3.1. Narrating national perspectives

In this section, I will discuss plans, reports and ideas related to the development of the Shtokman project from the national perspective. It means I am discussing ‘wishful’ thinking and outline desires and expectation related to the project in the period 2007-2012. Nationally the Arctic is seen as a “strategic resource base” which provides the means for the socio-economic development of the country (BRFA-2020, Chapter 2, Article 4a). The development of the Shtokman gas field corresponds to the national interest to use the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a ‘strategic resource base’. On the website of the “Shtokman Development AG” consortium, the Shtokman project is presented as a Russian strategic project, having high importance for the further development of the Arctic shelf.

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76 Shale gas rose from less than 1% of domestic gas production in the United States in 2000 to over 20% by 2010 (Stevens, 2012: 2).

and 1980s were years of active discoveries and complex geotechnical investigations, the 1990s saw a drastic reduction in the number of exploration and field developments and the beginning of the millennium became a period of stagnation for oil and gas exploration. At the beginning of the 21st century, it became clear that Russia had to start investing in the geological search for hydrocarbons and the mapping of new sites, due to a significant depletion of actively exploited resources. Gas reserves of main producing fields in Western Siberia (Medvezhje, Urengoy, Yamburg) were depleted by 65-75 % and production began to decline (ES-2030, 2009: 40). At the same time, the examination of potential new sites has been minimal. According to the Energy Strategy (ES-2030, 2009: 40), exploration of hydrocarbon resources of the continental Russian shelf in most areas did not exceed 10%. For example, in the Barents Sea, the promising area of potential resources is 726.5 thousand sq.km, but only 30 wells have been drilled. Wells have not been drilled in the northern parts of the Barents and Kara Seas and only a few seismic profiles were made. Out of the 15 fields discovered in the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas, only two (Shtokman and Prirazlomnoe) have been prepared for development (Pavlov and Selin, 2012: 208-209).

As a part of Russia’s future resource base, the Shtokman project narrated through the prism of security, since natural resources are viewed as a way of guaranteeing the energy and economic security of the country (ES-2030, 2009: 39). The slogan “Shtokman will contribute to long-term energy security” currently (2017) decorates the web-page dedicated to the issue of the project’s significance. According to the Energy strategy (ES-2030, 2009: 50), gas production would grow in the traditional gas-producing regions (the main region would remain in Western Siberia) as well as in new regions such as the European North of Russia. The Shtokman field was included in the ES-2030 (2009) and considered to be an important part of the national energy complex. It was expected to play a leading role in energy production by the end of the second phase of the strategy (approximately by 2020-2022). The Energy strategy (ES-2030, 2009) expected that the extraction of gas would be increased in Russia over the period 2010-2030. The intention was that this would be achieved through the development of deposits on the Yamal Peninsula, in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, as well as the continental shelf of the

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78 The Energy strategy of Russia until 2030 (ES-2030) was adopted in 2009. As Mitrova (2014: 61) points out, it represents an attempt to address the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and challenges in the energy sector. The document was created with a hope that the crisis situation on the world market would change soon. Meanwhile Russia would manage to modernize and to regain its strength.
Arctic seas, including the Shtokman field (ES-2030, 2009: 39-40). Thus, in the vision of the future outlined in the Energy strategy (ES-2030, 2009), Shtokman was given the status of the centre of a new gas province in the European North of Russia and made it onto the list of the biggest centres of gas extraction in the country by 2030, alongside the fields of Eastern and Western Siberia. Gazprom stated that the project is fundamental to the formation of a new gas producing region in the Russian Arctic shelf.⁸¹

Shtokman was regarded in the ES-2030 (2009) as central to the future of the country. By the end of 2030, it was envisaged that the gas industry would contribute to the country’s prosperity and strength. The development of the Russian gas industry would lead to the expansion of the use of gas in the economy, not just as an energy source, but also as a valuable chemical product. The inclusion of this hi-tech processing of gas and the creation of a product is an important detail, since it creates a picture of a country that has managed to overcome the raw material curse. It means that the country would turn from a raw materials exporter into a country with innovative technologies, exporting high-tech products. The development of the deposits of the Arctic seas in the East would be started. Active usage of new gas fields would contribute to the completion of gasification of all Russian regions. At the same time, work on the shelf demands knowledge and the technological conditions for production and the industrial use of gas hydrates. According to the Energy strategy (ES-2030, 2009), the Russian pipeline infrastructure would become a part of an energy bridge between Europe and Asia. Russia, once it had acquired the necessary knowledge and technologies, would become a key centre for its management (ES-2030, 2009: 54).

According to the Energy strategy (ES-2030, 2009: 39), the Russian energy complex plays an important role in the economic development of the country and oil and gas revenues would contribute to national economic growth and independence. The structure of natural gas reserves in Russia is more favorable than the structure of oil reserves because of accessibility (ES-2030, 2009: 39). Nevertheless, the number of complex and hard to extract resources also has increased just as in the oil sector (ES-2030, 2009: 39). Thus, the expectations and prognosis of the ES-2030 (2009) relies on the high level of gas extraction and high prices on the world market, which would allow the country to expand the export of gas to new markets and continue internal gasification of the country. The Energy strategy (ES-2030, 2009) was formulated in 2008 in a climate of very favourable conditions for oil and gas prices on the world market

However, in 2009, the Russian energy industry was seriously affected by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and suffered a decline in price and demand (Mitrova, 2014: 58). Compared to 2008, gas production was 12% lower in 2009 (Mitrova, 2014: 58). Some recovery in the industry was identified by the year 2011. Oil production was 0.8% higher and gas production increased by 2.9% in 2011 compared to 2010 (Godzimirski, 2014a:1). However, this recovery has occurred while the price of petroleum has started to fall. The Russian energy sector has had to cope with lower profits, a loss of external investors and shrunken demand for Russian gas (Mitrova, 2014: 59).

The linkage of economic and energy security has particular resonance in Russia. Three elements are of special importance for the Russian state: “[P]romoting economic growth, extending Russia’s international influence, and ensuring Russia’s economic independence” (Larsson, 2006: 50). Larsson (2006) stresses that the Russian state has a two-sided attitude about economic security. It is important for domestic policy, since it provides a way of improving living conditions for Russian citizens and the industrial development of the country. But the state also has a wish to increase economic-institutional influence on its neighbours and to enlarge the export of industrial products, particularly arms, since the Russian state sees “a correlation between arms exports and political influence” (Larsson, 2006: 50-51).

The pressure for new resources, and the demand for economic and energy security, creates specific desire around the development of Shtokman as expressed by the state. I can identify three main modes of the state’s desire expressed in the period 2007-2012. Firstly, there is a desire for a challenge, since the development of this exclusive and challenging project stimulates the search for unique technological solutions and thus generates new experience and knowledge, as it was, for example indicated, in the ES-2030 (2009) which I discussed above. Secondly, there is a desire-demand for security since the country is in serious need of new energy sources. The development of the Shtokman field is seen as contributing to the security of energy supply and the stability of incomes. Since energy and economic security are not only linked to each other, but also to national security, the revenues from the Shtokman gas field would bolster the stability of the country. The third mode is a desire-ambition. This desire was displayed by Russia in various ways. The representation of this ‘desire-ambition’ is articulated through statements and actions. For example, the Arctic is framed through two rather contrasted approaches: as a zone of peace and cooperation and as a zone of security, especially military.

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82 In 2008 one barrel cost 94 dollars. In 2000, it was 27 dollars per barrel (ES-2030, 2009: 3).
security (Heininen, 2016; Hønneland, 2016). Hønneland (2016: 57) points out that these two approaches do not contest each other, but rather coexist. Both approaches are normative, since they do not facilitate a discussion on how politics in the Arctic is built or what kind of actors are involved but rather create a picture of “how the world is” (Hønneland, 2016: 57). This symbiosis of two approaches portrays Russia as a ‘peace-loving nation’, which has to cope with the mobilization of other Arctic nations (Hønneland, 2016: 53). On the one hand, Russia has ambitions to promote peace and understanding in the Arctic. On the other, Russia has ambitions to be a superpower in the traditional geo-political game, since the security approach has “a clear message of military defence for both international and domestic audiences” (Heininen, 2016: 25). The problem with this security approach is that the Arctic is pictured as a place of confrontation in order to justify the need for a military presence. For example, the government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta has a special section, “The Arctic: battle for resources”\(^{83}\), where various news items related to the Arctic are accumulated. Large oil and gas deposits discovered in the Arctic make this region attractive for other countries from the perspective of sustainable energy supply, investments and geopolitics. Therefore, according to the Russian state, Russia should be active in this region and firm up its claims for the Arctic shelf. The polar expedition Arktika-2007 received a high international profile due the action performed during the expedition, when the crew of the self-propelled deep submergence vehicle Mir-1 reached the sea-bed at the North Pole and embedded the flag of the Russian Federation on the ocean floor. In light of these ambitions, the Shtokman project acquired a symbolic meaning: it became a token for Russia’s power and success. For example, the final slide of the presentation about “Shtokman Development AG” (Madeo, 2009) proclaimed two statements about the project. The first statement claimed that Shtokman was “one of the top world class projects with exciting challenges balanced by robust assets” (Madeo, 2009: slide 22, emphasis added). The second statement described Shtokman as “[a] Russian project with a world class partnership to increase gas delivery and improve the energy security in the world market” (Madeo, 2009: slide 22, emphasis added). That it would “pave the way for an efficient development of the Arctic Shelf with the highest standards in terms of Safety Health and Environment” (Madeo, 2009: slide 9, emphasis added). The key phrase in both statements is “world class”. The project should become a pioneer in efficient development of the Arctic shelf, which would set up “the highest standards”. Thus, the Shtokman project was presented as an extraordinary example of the Russian capacity to cooperate, to develop innovative

technical solutions and to cope with the harsh Arctic environment. It was thought to demonstrate that, despite climatic, economic and technological challenges, the country could successfully manage a herculean gas-extraction project.

3.3.2. Narrating regional perspectives

In this section I will discuss regional desires and expectations related to the Shtokman project. Again, I am operating in the field of ‘wishful’ thinking as the project never moved forward from the phase of planning. The Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the Murmansk region until 2025 (SSEDM-2025, 2010) defines the Shtokman gas field as one of the challenges of the Murmansk region, along with integrated development of the Murmansk transport hub and construction of a number of new mining, processing and mining-metallurgical complexes. These projects simultaneously present opportunities for development and harbour various risks, which cannot be controlled by the region, because these projects are managed by the federal government. For example, the Murmansk strategy, which was published in 2010, pointed out that delay or failure of the Shtokman project development would instigate potential threats for the region if the regional economy was relying on the project. However the project was delayed and frozen in 2012. This demonstrates an ambivalent attitude to the project in the region. While community members pin their hopes on the project, they cannot count exclusively on Shtokman, since it can be postponed or cancelled due to the reasons which are out of their control. At the same time, interviewees defined economic and social outcomes of the Shtokman project as well as discussed its connection to the sphere of symbolic power and status of the region.

The economic situation in the Murmansk region is negatively affected by the price of petroleum and transportation, since the region consumes a lot of heating oil, but has to export it from other Russian regions and abroad. The hope is that heating oil (or mazut) can be substituted by gas. What follows is an excerpt from an interview. My interviewee and I were discussing fuel and energy complex (TEK) of the region and I asked if TEK plays an important role in regional development:

“[Speaks (Interviewee 2)]: You know, the issue of fuel is a very acute topic for the Murmansk region and very painful. Because we…because of many factors [we] are still interested in the Shtokman development. We hope to use this raw-material [gas] for
housing and communal services, for heating. Because this service is very expensive here. We use mazut, which costs a fortune now, so we have very expensive rent…[Pause]
[Adds about mazut (ML)]: and it is imported to the region…
[Nods in confirm and continues (Interviewee 2)]: yes, yes. It is such a back-breaking burden for the population. A kind of hope is pinned to that it [Shtokman] will help to shift to gas. And to use gas as a basis. To build up those boilers. Such a grandiose project. This direction is interesting for the region because the fuel industry is very painful topic. [Administration] seeks for grants, some benefits to the northern region from the federal government. As such we do not feel the presence of the complex [TEK]” (Interviewee 2, September 2008).

The interviewee outlines major problems with TEK in the region from a resident’s perspective – high rents – as well as touching upon the actions of the regional government aimed at improving the situation – the search for grants and benefits. The interviewee characterizes the energy situation in the region as “painful”. Shtokman appears as a possible answer to these problems, but not the most desirable one or, at least, not the only one, because the interviewee says “because of many factors we are still interested.”

Another impact is related to the possibility of providing gasification to the region. The plan of the Shtokman gas field development included the construction of a gas pipeline from the Barents Sea (Teriberka) to the town of Volhov in the Leningrad region. This line would deliver gas to the remote towns and villages of the Murmansk region, which in the period 2007-2012, did not have gas supply. Part of the cost for the gasification of the Murmansk region would be covered by Gazprom and part would be financed from the regional budget. In addition, Gazprom with its experience and technologies, could help to improve an existing scheme of gas delivery in the region, originally developed in 2000.

As I outlined above, the project involved a lot of offshore and onshore activities. These developments would provide an opportunity for local companies to compete for contracts, but also would make it attractive for outside companies to invest money and establish offices in Murmansk. A large amount of work in relation to the Shtokman project was related to infrastructure building, the supply and delivery of materials and the production of materials. The development of the project included enlargement of service sector, which would be needed.

84 Until now, August 2017, the Murmansk region is not connected to the united gas-system of Russia.
to provide people working there with catering, cleaning, housing, healthcare etc. The majority of my interviewees had concerns over whether the regional government would actually manage to involve local enterprises, and expressed the hope that small and medium business would get a chance to participate in the Shtokman project. Thus, several umbrella organizations appeared in the region with the aim of uniting small and medium regional enterprises, in order to increase their competence and assist them in getting contacts with the operators of the Shtokman project:

“We, as a regional organization, are interested in, as much as possible, that first of all, regional companies participate in the development of those fields, which will be developed in our Murmansk region. As well as in the implementation of other major industrial projects… I sometimes joke, saying that Nokia - connecting people, and we are connecting companies. That our goal is to establish contacts between the project operators and industry, between general contractors and local companies. But the association includes not only local companies, we have also foreign …” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).

Some of the interviewees mentioned that some foreign companies are already active and their enterprises were already up and running in the region. For example, one interviewee noted that it was possible to observe a certain degree of development, and related this to the activities of foreign companies.

“…Norwegians have a lot of activity. They are actively preparing for Shtokman. They organize production here…They [Norwegians] opened a factory where our [Russian] professionals are working. They earn good money. They opened generally to work on Shtokman. Now in our town a factory for the production of concrete has been opened as well. “Ølen betong” is a Norwegian company. [They] also will get something in the Shtokman project, will supply the plant with concrete” (Interviewee 2, September 2008).

Another impact which the Shtokman could have on the region is in the social sphere. Besides cheaper fuel, new work places could be created in the region. In August 2008, the Governor of the Murmansk region, Evdokimov, announced that around 11,000 workers would be attracted to the works on the Shtokman gas field and that many of them will be local.86 The Governor also announced that the average salary in the Murmansk region would rise to around 55,000-60,000 rubles by 2015. These numbers were drastically different from 2008. According to

Murmansk statistics, the average salary in the region was 15,104 rubles in January 2008.\textsuperscript{87} Despite this expected positive prospect, my interviewees expressed some concerns, related to higher incomes and employment of people living in the region. For example, we were discussing the technical aspects of the Shtokman and an interviewee made a particular remark about the high-tech parameters of the project and chance of becoming rich:

“There is no need to build up an illusion. Because all those advanced technologies require a specific qualification, and all the rest. Someone who just yesterday was drinking, lying under a fence, and today [employers] suddenly take him to the Shtokman plant. No. And the plants will be with the minimum number of people. Automation will work. And it cannot be done differently. These people will be very costly. Those who control [the machinery]. And that's fine. This are the global development trends. So here, too, when it comes to klondikes, and all get rich, as in the United Arab Emirates. Not all get rich” (Interviewee 13, October 2008).

Here, the interviewee brought up several issues, which are very serious for the region. One of them is related to the decrease in population in the 1990s, when many skilled professionals left in search of a better economic situation. At the same time, Shtokman demands specific technological solutions. It means that people living in the region simply might not have the necessary qualifications to be employed on the project. Another social problem is alcoholism. There are cases of oil companies employing local people, but after the first salaries, some workers could not start their shifts due to their impaired physical condition, caused by excessive drinking. Therefore the companies might find it more attractive to employ specialists from outside the region. Many of my interviewees mentioned the problem of shift workers. Thus the interviewees understood that, most likely, there would be a workforce from outside the region. But they could not decide if this would be good or bad for the region simply because they had no prior experience. Nevertheless, expressed concern related to shift workers by the interviewees contradicts with the promises given by the Governor, which I discussed above, that many of employed people within the Shtokman project would be local.

As for the demand for particular qualifications, it could become a positive driver for the development of education in the region. As such the programmes of educational institutions could be coordinated with the needs of industry. This question of how to prepare future workers

\textsuperscript{87} \url{http://www.murmannews.ru/allnews/964061/} Accessed April 10, 2014.
for the Shtokman project was discussed by the Governor of the region. Educational institutions in the region noticed that future students were becoming more conscious of the labour market situation. For example, a representative of the admission commission of Murmansk Technical University said that, in the near future, the University would introduce a new qualification in transport and logistics construction because of potential activities in the region around the Murmansk transport hub. The representative also explained that they would like to increase the number of places in already existing programmes about oil specialization. My interviewees also focused on the issue of education and specialist preparation. One interviewee asked me if I had special questions related to the labour force for Shtokman, explaining that 1,500 specialists were needed for the development of the marine part of the Shtokman field alone. At that time, there were only 50 specialists in this field trained annually in the whole of Russia (Interviewee 7, September 2008). The interviewee regarded this mismatch as frustrating and saw the lack of specialists as a very big problem, which had to be addressed by several educational institutions.

The development of Shtokman and implementation of other big projects such as the modernization of the Murmansk transportation hub should enhance the status of the city. The changes were expected to be visible both on national and international level. Thus, within Russia, a city preferably would become a metropolitan area. This kind of futuristic vision dominated the framing of the region. Murmansk is exhibited as “a strategic capital of the Arctic” in the presentational book-album, prepared by the government of the region in 2010.

Another example can be taken from media discussion of the issue of qualified workers for the Shtokman project. The title of an article on this subject is “Shtokman threatens Murmansk with hunger in personnel.” In the piece, Murmansk is consciously compared with Moscow, since both cities are experiencing similar difficulties: “The northern city, which should become a centre of the Russian Arctic oil industry, faces the same problems that have already hit the Moscow – a lack of qualified personnel.” The article was published in March 2008, when

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89 Each university in Russia each year forms a special admission commission, which consists of representatives of the institutes or faculties (depending on the particular university). The commission is responsible for receiving admission documents and all bureaucratic procedures relating to students’ enrolment.
Murmansk could hardly be called “a centre of the Russian Arctic oil industry,” but this significant detail was omitted in the text. The crux of the article was that Murmansk could be compared with Moscow, a comparison which makes Murmansk’s status seem higher. Some of my interviewees also expressed their belief in the city and its ability to attain a new status in the near future. They did this directly and indirectly. For example:

“The Murmansk region, according to evaluation of some experts, in the next fifteen years will become one of the most investment-attractive regions not just in Russia, but also possibly in Europe ... Murmansk transportation hub will be modernized. The project is estimated at 310 billion rubles, which is comparable to investments in the Olympics games in Sochi 2014” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).

In this interview excerpt, the interviewee believes that the greatness of Murmansk will be known, not only in Russia, but in Europe as well. While talking about the Sochi Olympic Games, the person, consciously or unconsciously, provides some allusions to the word ‘capital’, since often, a city hosting the Olympic Games is called as a capital. I discuss this metropolitan approach and the wish to become a capital more in Chapter 8.

Overall, my interviewees expressed differing attitudes towards the Shtokman project. On the one hand, the project was very promising for the region, which could get benefits out of its implementation. On the other hand, people living in the region had some doubts about the feasibility of implementing it. For example:

“We look at our grandiose projects. It is wishful that they would come true as soon as possible. But a lot of money is needed. It is necessary that the companies and the state would be interested in it. Hard to guess to what degree the project will be interesting for Gazprom. They have southern points. It is very unique project, big. Big remoteness” (Interviewee 4, September 2008).

My interviewees described the Shtokman project in different ways. The viewpoints ranged from a sober attitude to an admiration of the project. Sometimes these attitudes were combined in one interview. Very often, I heard the project labelled as ‘grandiose’, ‘gigantic’ or ‘colossal’. For example, one person struggled to define the project due to its huge size: “One of the most significant, better to say global projects or bigger even on the world scale” (Interviewee 12, October 2008). Some called the Shtokman project ‘a locomotive’. According to one interviewee: “Oil and gas industry is in a way a locomotive for many sectors in the territory of
the region. It will provide new impulses for development of machine building, and instrument making, and education” (Interviewee 7, September 2008). Thus, the project is viewed as a catalyst for the development of the region and the word ‘locomotive’ has a positive meaning. However not all interviewees attributed the same meaning to this word. For example:

“It depends on the regional government if these federal projects and projects of big financial groups will become a straw for the regional economy. Would they become a locomotive in a bad sense, when they would stand in front and tow everything, or would they stimulate the development of the region?” (Interviewee 6, September 2008).

In this case, the word locomotive has a negative meaning, since the interviewee is afraid that focus on Shtokman might shift attention from the needs of regional development. This interviewee was very open about the realistic nature of the project and called Shtokman a ‘straw’ and, in the same interview, ‘a crane in the sky’: “To talk about oil- and-gas crane in the sky which would come to us one day is not really productive” (Interviewee 6, September 2008).

So, on the regional level, I can identify another configuration of the desires related to the Shtokman project. The first one is a desire-ambition that the region will get an important place in the structure of the Russian Federation. It is expressed through the vision of the city as a centre or a capital. It embodies a pride of living in the North and of working there for your own city and people. The second kind of desire is a desire-dream, as articulated in the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010). The region is viewed as an attractive centre for living. This ‘desire-dream’ was expressed by one of my interviewees, who said:

“We have of course and a maximum task, task - dream: to develop the Murmansk region as Stavanger was developed, as Aberdeen was developed, as St. John's - exactly in this oil and gas area. Well, it's a long-term task, there are no miracles, but in 10 years, 15 years, in the long run – Murmansk to be [like that]. In Gazprom's strategy it is defined as a centre for the development of the Arctic shelf of the Western part of Russia. And if that is actually to become true, all of us need to work on it. To lay the foundations. And everything will be good. For children, grandchildren, for many years to come” (Interviewee 18, December 2009).

In this narrative of the future of the Murmansk region, the interviewee includes desires articulated by Gazprom, and thus projects an ambition of the state. At the same time, by the reference to children and grandchildren, the interviewee grounds this desire to the Murmansk
region and the people living here. It is a dream which he/she wants their own offspring to live and is ready to work to make that a reality.

The third one is a desire-hope for development and change. People hoped that something would change in the region and city, when big projects related to the petroleum sector or transportation would occur. The vision of this development was not simple. A glorious, strong and important region was visualised and narrated in the interviews. But development for many settlements and towns in the Murmansk region has nothing to do with prosperity and greatness. Development of the Shtokman project was for them a means of survival. Below is an example from an interview with a representative of the group ‘policy makers’:

“[Speaks (ML)]: Everyone talks about Teriberka. That is a place, where further boosts, development...
[Interrupts (Interviewee 5)]: Yes, it is a question of our existence - that we should not disappear from the face of the earth. We have very terrible demographic situation. At a birth rate of 5% a year, up to 70 % die. Do you understand? Two years ago, at a meeting, where the question Vidyayevo93 or Teriberka was discussed, I presented, let’s say, a little analysis of the past five years. I showed that in the next 10 years Teriberka will be gone. It will die” (Interviewee 5, October 2008).

The interviewee stresses the importance of the Shtokman project for Teriberka, which as a settlement, is threatened with disappearance due to ‘terrible demographic situation’. The settlement is about to disappear if nothing is done in the nearest future. Thus, the Shtokman project is viewed as a possibility for Teriberka to survive. Many people are unemployed and consume too much alcohol.94 I discuss Teriberka and its role in the security assemblage in more detail in Chapters 7 and 8.

A lot depends on the money available, so there is a hope that the Murmansk region would get the necessary funds to develop the project and to conduct various related activities. Sometimes interviewees felt that this hope was groundless. Some interviewees pointed to delays in even the smallest and most unchallenging parts of the Shtokman project – like road-building from Murmansk to Teriberka. Still the interviewees did not want to rid themselves of this hope. For

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93 Vidyayevo is a rural settlement with ZATO status, located 40 kilometres from Murmansk. The settlement hosts the Northern Fleet Naval base. According to the Russian Census of 2010 the population of Vidyayevo was 5,771, while the population of Teriberka was 957.

example, during one interview, I was surprised that a person separated the perspective of the policy makers from the perspective of ordinary people living in the region. I tried to summarise it to be sure I understood their statement correctly:

“[Speaks (ML)]: How interesting, there are different perspectives…
[Interrupts (Interviewee 2)]: but still we hope. Hope dies last” (Interviewee 2, September 2008).

This small passage shows that the interviewee is careful to address directly the differences in perspectives that coexist in the region. The differences spark interesting questions related to the issue of identity and belonging. For example, those who represent the group ‘policy makers’, still live in Murmansk or the Murmansk region. How they can separate the future prospects of the region from people’s prosperity and well-being? Why do some people feel there is a difference in perspectives? I will address these questions further in my thesis.

3.4. Conclusion

The situation with energy complex in the Murmansk region makes the wish for oil and gas development in the region more intense and contradictory. On the one hand, the strong impulse behind the Shtokman project is nurtured by thoughts of benefits and prospects on the regional and national level. But there are doubts and concerns about how Shtokman will be implemented. Concerns are better articulated on the regional level than the state one.

The analysis shows the state and private companies articulate several modes of desire: desire-challenge, desire-demand and desire-ambition. Another set of desires (desire-ambition, desire-dream and desire-hope) is voiced in the local media and by interviewees. The desires discussed in this chapter foster a wish for development. Nevertheless, this wish has different articulations and driving forces behind it.

Firstly, analysis shows that desire, as an analytical category, is scaled. The desire might be conflicting and might be uniting – this depends on who is articulating it and in what context. As discussed above, the same desire, for example, ‘desire-ambition’, can have different content on a national and regional level. This desire gives birth to different interpretations and expectations related to how the Shtokman project is to be implemented. This indicates that the security assemblage is riven by tension. It is not united by one idea, but rather exists in a flux of competing meanings. Therefore, the actors, their role and their statements will be closely
studied in Chapters 6 and 7 in order to illuminate different approaches to security in this particular security assemblage.

Secondly, the configurations of desire show that the actors create alliances depending on the way desire is articulated. It appears that the state and individuals living in the Murmansk region have the same desire related to the Shtokman project: a desire for development of oil and gas resources in the Arctic. However, this desire is differently articulated by different actors, having different agendas. The interviewees are aware of the state’s wishes and demands, but is the state aware of regional needs? I will discuss the issue of collective enunciations in Chapter 7 as part of an analysis of whether national and regional articulations of desire meet each other and what it means for the security assemblage. The differences in desire articulation also means that attention should be paid to the functions of the actors in the assemblage, to the connections between them and to the resources they have at their disposal. I discuss this in Chapter 9.

Thirdly, there is a need for a contextualization of this collective desire for development of oil and gas resources in the Murmansk region. The actors are operating in a web of particular rules and meanings, which demand further clarification. They express their expectations and concerns related to something potential, but not yet real. The Shtokman gas field was still a project in 2007-2012. A time distance between the period of my fieldwork (2008-2009) and my analysis (2014-2017) allows me to take the perspective of a ‘guest from the future’. I am aware that, in 2017, the Shtokman project remains in the phase of ‘something yet to come’. However, this potential development has its own logic and a particular way of arranging people, statements and things. Therefore, in the next chapter I will discuss theoretical approach to empirical material and introduce important concepts and elements for my analysis.
4. Conceptual framework: an analytic of assemblage

My aim is to explore the potential of human security in the Russian context, where the state otherwise claims the security field as its own prerogative. The result of such dominance is that people generally avoid security-related topics in conversations and an adequate translation of the term ‘human security’ does not exist. Therefore, I develop a framework which enables me to take into consideration the complexity of the Russian context and a variety of interpretations of security. I ground my theoretical standpoint in post-structuralism, which approaches theory and practice in complexity and permits the studying of society “not as a monolithic structure but as a series of fragments in continuous flux” (Fontana, 2003: 52). Within security studies, post-structuralism suggests the possibility of rethinking security by focusing on a practice, in which security subjects and issues are constructed (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 142). I apply and develop the concept of assemblage, formulated by the French philosophers Deleuze and Guattari. Originally, the concept means the process of “arranging, organizing and fitting together” (Livesey, 2010:18). I defined an assemblage in Chapter 1 as an act of establishing connections and the construction of a new meaning. This allows me to examine heterogeneous connections between the state and the individual and to learn more about the historical, economic and political dimensions of security in relation to the development of oil and gas in the Murmansk region. Within this conceptual framework, new terms will be introduced. These terms are the result of the creative rethinking by Deleuze and Guattari of existing traditions in social and political thought. In this chapter I will explain the origin and specifics of these terms in order to outline the framework of analysis and to explain my choice of terms and approaches.

4.1. Post-structuralism and security studies

Post-structuralism has its roots in intellectual movements in Europe in the mid-20th century and represents a new way of thinking about established knowledge. There is no conventional definition of post-structuralism since it was never systematised as a discipline or a school of thought, and it was often characterized by the concepts introduced by ‘post-structuralist’ authors. But what unites post-structuralist scholars is an acknowledgement that reality has multiple dimensions, that the world can be described in multiple voices and that no theory or doctrine can explain everything or own the ‘truth’. Following Iljin (1998: 27), I define the

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95 Which sometimes is also called postmodernism, see for example, Gubrium and Holstein, 2003a; Campbell, 2013.

96 I have to note that many of the representatives of poststructuralism deny they belong to this school of thought.
specifics of post-structuralism in its eclectics: it does not exist as a set of certain knowledge, but as a problem field, a “dialogically intense polemical space,” where diverse concepts are given meanings through perpetual competition.

According to Buzan and Hansen (2009: 218), a post-structuralist approach in security studies first appeared during the Cold War. Most actively it was developed in the 1980s with the development of peace studies and alongside the addition of linguistic approaches to security in the 1970s and ’80s (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 141-143). Probably, the most considered reflection on the influence of post-structuralist philosophy in security studies was carried out within the framework of the Copenhagen School. Hansen (2011) discusses the impact of Austin, Foucault, Derrida and Butler on Buzan’s and Wæver’s classical writings on security and concludes that a post-structuralist approach to securitization theory has analytical potential. From my perspective, the Copenhagen School and poststructuralism both challenge the established ideas of structure, language, mode of reasoning, and methodology. I will elaborate on some ideas, developed within the Copenhagen School, later in this chapter.

Following Campbell (2013: 243), I understand post-structuralism as “an approach, attitude or ethos that pursues critique in particular ways.” Critique here is “an operation that flushes out the assumptions through which conventional and dominant understanding have come to be” and establishes the way to include marginalized alternative accounts, which were pushed aside by the dominant interpretation (Campbell, 2013: 243). Post-structuralism promotes a new set of questions and concerns, leading to a reconceptualization of “how particular ways of knowing, what counts as knowing, and who can know, has been established over time” (Campbell, 2013: 225). Post-structuralism focuses on practices, knowledge and power, identity, language, and narrative. This focus advances an ethical concern to include new issues and practices, developed by actors, excluded from mainstream IR, and therefore it questions the status of the state as the most significant actor in world politics (Campbell, 2013: 226). The issue of a deepening and widening of the security agenda is related to the rethinking of theory and conventional understanding through a critical approach to culture and history.

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97 Traditionally, Buzan and Wæver are named as co-fathers of Copenhagen school. Their ideas were further developed, criticized and discussed by Hansen, 2000; 2011; Huysmans, 2006; 2011; Williams, 2003; 2011; Stritzel, 2007; 2011; Wilkinson, 2007; McDonald, 2008; Åtland, 2009; Jensen, 2012.
98 Securitization is understood as a claim that an issue or an object is existential threat to survival of a state or society (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-26).
99 Campbell notes that the post-structuralist approach is not anti-state, but it questions traditional assumptions about the nature and role of the state (Campbell, 2013: 226).
Several schools of security studies (the Copenhagen School, Critical Security, Feminism, Human Security) are engaged in this process of rethinking the security agenda.

From a post-structuralist perspective human security can be viewed as an approach which opened up a polemic space in relation to actors, threats and security issues (economic, food, environment, health). The human security agenda was launched in 1994 as part of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with the aim of focusing on people and their lives, not just on states. The UNDP introduced human security as a framework that should be practically oriented and created something akin to guidelines for policy-makers, with the purpose being to shift the referent object\textsuperscript{100} of security “from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security” (HDR, 1994: 24). The Human Development Report (HDR, 1994: 24-25) outlined a necessity for protection from a variety of threats to human safety and welfare including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security issues. It did not provide readers with a clear definition of human security, but stressed that people should be able to exercise their choices freely and safely (HDR, 1994: 23). Some scholars consider this lack of definition to be a strong transformative element of the concept, bypassing the traditional traps laid by the field of security studies (Grayson, 2004: 357). Others insists on the need for definition (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007), while yet another group of thinkers are sceptical of the concept of human security altogether and argue that security, in general, is an “essentially contested concept” and therefore will be always debated – pursuing definition is useless (Buzan, 1991: 7). In a way, these various perspectives and their lack of agreement on what human security is, form the problematic field, which requires specifications and contextualization. For that matter, exploration of human security potential in the context of oil and gas development in the Murmansk region is of great interest since it is located in the context where traditional security (protection of state sovereignty by military means) meets new threats (economic, environmental, personal). The oil and gas sector is considered as a cure to economic insecurity of the state and, consequently, people, but the impact caused by petroleum development on particular region and the ability of people to cope with challenges remains undiscussed. The application of the concept of security assemblage will permit the connections between security

\textsuperscript{100} The referent object is the one whose survival is threatened. It can be “the nation, the state, the individual, the ethnic group, the environment, the planet itself” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 10).
issues around the Shtokman gas field to be revealed as well as helping to illuminate the nature and role of human security in the assemblage.

4.2. (Im)possibility of shifting focus from the state to the individual

The aftermath of the WWII and the beginning of the Cold War raised the debates on the protection of the states from external/internal threats, which resulted in the formation of strategic studies and, later, security studies with the state interest and concerns related to defence and military means in the centre of attention (see, for example, Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 1993). With the changes on the international arena in the 1990s and 2000s, the difference between people’s security and state security became more prominent, because “[t]raditional conceptions of state security are a necessary but not sufficient condition of human welfare. The citizens of states that are “secure” according to the traditional concept of security can be perilously insecure to a degree that demands a reappraisal of the concept” (Newman, 2001: 240). The question “what or whom should be the ‘referent object’ for security?” facilitated debates in post-Cold War security studies (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 11). Even the term ‘referent object’ is problematic in itself. Traditionally, in IR, the ‘state’ as the highest value is viewed as an ‘object’ that is being threatened and needs to be protected. But the term ‘object’ contains such connotations as ‘passive’ and ‘needy’ and enable somebody else to speak on behalf of the state (this issue is actively discussed by Copenhagen School in their theory of securitization which I will discuss later in this chapter). However, can ‘people’ be treated as ‘objects’? The results of different research projects conducted in different parts of the world show that it is very tempting, but wrong to ‘victimize’ or ‘objectify’ people (Hoogensen and Stuvøy, 2006; Watson, 2011; Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014). People are active participants of security construction, though their security practices are less studied compare to state security practices, and therefore their agency remains unexplored. Below, I will discuss some theoretical approaches, dealing with the question “security for whom?” and start with short overview of two often oppositional approaches, the realist tradition and human security, in order to map the difficulty with prioritising either the state or the individual in security studies.

4.2.1. Realism versus human security

Realism as a dominant approach in security studies never existed as one unified and transparent school of thoughts though it is one of the oldest approaches in IR (Der Derian, 1996: 277). Nevertheless, realists agree that the primary security object is the state. The classic narratives
around the state can be summarized as the following. The international system is a conflicting area characterised by anarchy and struggle for power. That means that there is no central authority or government, which is able to regulate relations between the states, therefore the state is taken as the basic unit of the international system (Waltz, 1979). In order to survive states compete with each other for power. The state function is to secure peoples’ lives and to protect their needs. This can be done by preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is difficult in a system of anarchy and therefore demands military means. The realist tradition did not specify ‘people’ as a group which might have other interests than those of the state. People matter in case of the size of the population or in the discussion on specifics of national character and national moral (Morgenthau, 1993). Additionally, human nature was taken as a base of international relation: “Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau, 1993: 4). The perspective of the human beings as aggressive and seeking for power was attributed to the state. The state became described as an actor which, like a human being, used rational calculations to act (Beer and Hariman, 1996: 4). Thus, people become indivisible, hidden behind the state interest and reduced to statistical numbers: “We … see, but do not see, until perhaps there is a human face in front of the numbers” (Booth, 2007: 16). Political realism does not take into consideration the world which is divided by “tribe, nation, class, gender, religion, and race” (Booth, 2007: 215).

The concept of human security appeared as an answer to the issues which remained unresolved by the state-centric approach. Generally speaking, the human security approach claims that human beings are referent objects of security (as opposed to just the state), and therefore issues that threaten individual existence, such as poverty, under-development or lack of health care, should be included on the security agenda. Despite its arrival on the international political scene in the 1990s, the concept of human security is not new, and some scholars note that it is possible to trace the intellectual origin of human security back to the 1940s (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006; Inglehart and Norris, 2012). Indeed, Rothschild (1995) brings us back to the middle of the 17th century and shows the transformation of the concept through various epochs. Rothschild (1995) and Hoogensen (2005) also point out that, in the 17th and 18th centuries, security was viewed as essential for establishing the relationship between the state and the individual, and therefore the two concepts of state and human security were interconnected.
4.2.2. Debates over state-individual relationships

Probably one of the biggest ongoing discussions is around the ability of human security to challenge the role of the state and to shift focus from states to individuals. Post-structuralist critical exploration of knowledge is advanced by Critical Security Studies (CSS) (see, for example, works of McSweeney, 1999; Booth, 2007), which criticized political realism for ignorance, exclusion and rigidness (Booth, 2007: 31-36), and shared human security concern “with people rather than states” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 205). Proponents of CSS claim that individuals are essential units of security: “Politically speaking, individual human beings are primordial in a manner that groupings such as nations and sovereign states are not. I therefore consider individuals logically to be the ‘ultimate’ referent for thinking about security in a way contingent groups cannot be” (Booth, 2007: 225). For Booth the life of an individual human being is an indicator of the health of the society and the starting point for any action at the societal level. Booth (2007: 228) refers to McSweeney (1999: 16), who states that only an individual can be a referent in the theory and practice of security and asserts that “security must make sense at the basic level of the individual human being for it to make sense at the international level.” Booth (2007) regards this sentence as important because it has several implications. First of all, the term ‘security’ appeared as a response to the need to protect human values, which, in turn, gives “legitimacy and power to the mobilization of resources in the name of security” (Booth, 2007: 228). Secondly, Booth (2007: 228) notes that this claim returns the attention to the original meaning of the state, namely that “states exist as the means, not the end of security.” Despite the view of human security that the individual should be seen as a ‘subject and actor’ in politics (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:13), there are sceptical voices from mainstream security studies like realism (Khong, 2001) as well as from critical human security studies (Chandler, 2008ab; Owen, 2008) who dispute that an individual can be a referent object. The arguments of the opponents can be distilled to two main lines.

First of all, they claim that the state will be always the central actor of international relations and that the human security concept did not achieve a paradigmatic shift between the state and individual (Chandler, 2008a). Thus, the role of the state in the promotion of human security is at the centre of the debate (a special issue of Security dialogue was devoted to this discussion in August 2008). The discussion was provoked by Chandler’s article (2008a) based on his
review of two books devoted to human security. The discussion reveals some interesting points regarding human security and the issue of agency. Chandler (2008a) acknowledges that human and state securities are interconnected, but stresses that it was actually the state that absorbed human security and, in fact, human security helped it to reinforce the power relationship based on state domination. Therefore, due to an existing hierarchy of power, state interests will always be above human ones (Chandler, 2008ab). Owen (2008: 445) concedes that Chandler (2008a) reveals an important contradiction within security studies by pointing out that human security has become “the unknowing Trojan Horse of state interventionism”. But Owen (2008: 446) claims that Chandler (2008a) fails to see that human security does not exist as a singular project or discourse, and therefore there is a difference between human security as critical theoretical framework and human security as a policy paradigm. From Owen’s perspective, these two human security discourses should not necessarily be merged and therefore can be viewed separately. But what is most important, is that during the discussion Owen (2008) and Chandler (2008b) agreed that state and human security do not exist in separate paradigms. Owen (2008: 449) refers to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007) and stresses that they “…believe that the state is an important, albeit not exclusive, purveyor of human security. It is the state, they argue, that has not only the primary responsibility to promote human security but also the potential to abuse its related powers, in terms of both how it defines threats and how it responds to them. Human and state security must therefore work symbiotically.” Therefore, Owen (2008) concludes, it is important to look at the actors beyond the state – NGOs, community groups, private corporations and individuals – and thus to work on deepening the concept of security, rather than broadening it. This idea of deepening security and taking a closer look at security actors was already introduced by members of the GAPS project and further developed through application of the multi-actor based security model (see Chapter 1).

Another argument against the individual as a referent object is made through the issue of plurality. The opponents of human security assert that it is difficult enough to cope with 200 states within security studies, so what can be expected from “theorizing about 6 billion people?” (Khong, 2001: 232). Here, the opponents illuminate a serious issue: it is not obvious in human security studies what kind of role the individual plays or can play in security

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construction. It is a truism that human security is about human beings, but the question is how to represent multiple human experiences, how to systematize them and integrate the knowledge obtained into the field of security studies? Hoogensen Gjørv (2012: 838) argues that Gender security studies (including gendered human security perspectives) provides a crucial contribution to human security theory by building links between empirics and theory. These links between empirics and theory allowed the contestation of the universal man approach that has dominated human security studies and the universalist assumptions about human beings (see works of Hoogensen and Vigeland Rottem, 2004; Hudson, 2005; Stern, 2006; Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014). A gender approach showed that it was easy to overlook the existence and roles of some actors, such as women, just because there was no adequate tool or lens through which to articulate these practices. However, Gender security studies also managed to maintain an argument in favour of human security, where the context of individual and community situations can say much about how individuals experience security (Stuvøy, 2010b; Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012).

In discussing whether or not the individual can be a referent object, the Copenhagen School maintains a sort of “middle-of-the-road position” (Åtland, 2009: 31). In early works they claim that it is not possible to conceptualize security in individual terms; it must always be understood at a collective level: “[T]his classical logic can neither be studied nor avoided by measuring how secure individual are” (Wæver, 1993: 24). But later they concede that “systemic and individual referent objects could become politically mobilised,” though the level of “limited collectivities” remains dominant (Hansen, 2000: 290, emphasis in the original). Even though for the Copenhagen School the individual remains beyond conceptualization, their theory of securitization distinguishes between referent objects and securitizing actors (those who can claim a special right to place an issue on security agenda). They thus move beyond the traditional approach, where the state is both actor and object (Åtland, 2009: 25). The process of securitization is strongly bounded to society and involves two important participants: the audience and the securitizing actor. A securitizing actor can be defined as a person or a group, who performs the security speech act (Buzan et al., 1998: 40).

A securitization actor is entitled to speak on behalf of “the state, nation, civilization, or some other larger community, 102

The notion ‘security speech act’ is related to linguistic interpretation of the concept of security suggested by Wæver (1995). Wæver (1995: 55, emphasis in the original) claims that security is a speech act because “the utterance itself is the act.” Thus, the securitization move is done by claiming something as an issue in security terms. This act does not evoke the routine procedures, but “creates a scene in which actors and things are brought into a relation that challenges a given way of doing things” (Huysmans, 2011: 373). I will discuss specifics of a speech act late in this chapter.
principle, or system” (Buzan et al., 1998: 40). At the same time, the notion of an ‘actor’ is more complicated than the notion of a ‘referent object’ because the former contains “the level-of-analysis problem” (Buzan et al., 1998: 40). This problem means that it is hard to differentiate between collective and individual levels (for example, a state, a state department, an individual) and “to disaggregate everything into individuals is not very helpful, because much of social life is understandable only when collectivities are seen as more than the sum of their “members” and are treated as social realities…” (Buzan et al., 1998: 40). The state is a collective actor and has more experience as a securitizing actor. It has the power to speak on behalf of the nation and can count on institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council, the government or presidency, which support and recreate this power. The other actors (NGOs, private corporations, community members) need appropriate conditions (or circumstances, as Delezue and Guattari would have it) in order to be able to articulate their collective enunciation.

Thus state-individual relations are quite dynamic and in order to overcome the difficulties and reconsider the connections between human and state security, I apply Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage.

4.2.3. Security assemblage as a combination of state and human security

Human security neither undermines the dominant concept of security through the state, nor represents a paradigm shift in security studies as some researchers suggest (see, for example, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). Human security lacks the conceptual innovation to achieve a paradigm shift (Wibben, 2008: 455). Human security is not a contradiction in terms, but acknowledges that: “Traditional conceptions of state security are a necessary but not sufficient condition of human welfare” (Newman, 2001: 240). I agree with Hoogensen (2005) and Hudson (2005) who claim that the state plays an important role in human security provision and therefore the state-individual relationship should be explored in order to identify the way “in which state security is transformed from an end to a means of promoting human security” (Hudson, 2005:165). Security assemblage permits an appreciation of both state and human security and enables an examination of the connections between these two concepts through a consideration of the practices of state and non-state security actors.

In my work, I approach security assemblage as a combination of state and human security. Deleuze and Guattari argue that an assemblage has an open structure.
“Assemblage privileges processes of formation and does not make a priori claims about the form of relational configurations or formations. With assemblage the starting point is ‘context’ and the conditions under which provisional unities emerge from the *agencement* of heterogeneous phenomena, not a neutral frame within which a set of ideal forms are somehow articulated. What assemblage promises, then, is a sustained account of the specific ways in which orders emerge and endure across differences and amid transformations” (Anderson et al., 2012: 176, emphasis in the original).

Thus, on the one hand, I can take into consideration the context of Russian security thinking and that of oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic. On the other hand, the open structure of an assemblage enables an examination of an assemblage to start from any vantage point. Wise (2005: 80) states: “We can enter into an assemblage through a process of taking up or taking on the particular relation of speed, slowness, effectivity and language which makes it up…” The concept of security assemblage is connected to a deepening of the security agenda and a broadening of security understanding, since the assemblage illuminates the connections between various approaches to security and meanings attached to them.

### 4.3. Specifics of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy: possibilities and limitations

Deleuze and Guattari’s works provided a ground for discussion in many fields: philosophy, political studies, cultural studies, sociology and security studies. As Lorraine (2010: 147) points out, in ATP, Deleuze and Guattari “develop a vocabulary that emphasises how things connect rather than how they ‘are’, and tendencies that could evolve in creative mutations rather than a ‘reality’ that is an inversion of the past.” Below, I will outline some peculiarities related to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in general, which affect my interpretation of the concept of security assemblage.

Firstly, Deleuze and Guattari question the ‘political’ nature of thought. Patton (2011) states that it is difficult to characterize political philosophy as the primary goal of their writings or a kind of totality. “It is “political” only in the very broad sense that it enables us to conceptualize and describe transformative forces and movements as well as the forms of “capture” or blockage to which these are subject ” (Patton, 2011: 118). Patton (2000) and Houle (2005) prefer to call Deleuze and Guattari’s set of concepts that relate to political thought a ‘political ontology’. Patton (2000) approaches this ontology from an instrumental point of view, while

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103 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see, for example, Patton, 2012.
Houle (2005) offers a holistic approach. Houle thinks that Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology is more appropriate for a reading of the political than the approach offered by liberal theories or radical politics, since it does not operate in terms of preset measurements, outcomes or coordinates. “The political does not begin with, or come to a full stop at the edge of, the human world, but weaves the entire register (social, mental, natural-material) into the political” (Houle, 2005: 91). This ontological status elevates their set of concepts related to the sphere of the political, into another, existential level. This illuminates some processes in political thinking that are not always well articulated or visible in traditional perspectives. It helps me to envisage human and state security as complementary sets of ideas, encompassing policies and practices. In other words, Deleuze and Guattari’s political ontology provides “powerful ways to conceptualize the complexity, dynamism and differences that are inherent to the political world” (Srnicek, 2007: ii). Widder (2012: 21) argues that Deleuze is a political thinker, but sometimes is treated as apolitical due to a misinterpretation of his ontology. This reduces it to “one” or “oneness,” when, in truth, Deleuze’s ontology is an “ontology of difference”. This means that Deleuze and Guattari privilege “the particularity or ‘singularity’ of each individual thing, moment, perception or conception” (Stagoll, 2010c: 75). Thus, each assemblage is unique and has own feature which cannot be reduced to ‘of the same kind’. Particular constellations or assemblages are formed on the Russian territory, depending on geographical location, the presence or absence of oil or gas fields and infrastructure, involving different actors. It also means that it is difficult to group individuals. I already discussed in Chapter 2 that though I experienced similar difficulties with particular groups (like it was more difficult to approach the representatives of the group ‘policy makers’ than ‘journalists/media’), still each representative was unique and thus it was hard to generalize ‘the group features’. It makes issue of identity and subjectivity of importance and I will discuss them further in this chapter.

Secondly, Deleuze and Guattari created their own language (or terminology), which can be called an ‘idiolect’. This idiolect encompasses their vocabulary and with it they discuss society and politics in terms of mathematics, linguistics, psychology, biology, music, literature and physics. Patton (2000: 1) claims that for some scientists this idiolect becomes an obstacle to considering Deleuzian philosophy as political. The combination of the language of humanities with natural sciences leads to new notions in the dictionary of social science. Terms like ‘smooth and striated space’, ‘schizoanalysis’, ‘rhizome’ are just a few examples of their vocabulary, which burden researchers without a background in natural science with more
questions than answers. Patton (2000: 1) warns readers to be careful before labelling these terms metaphors. Deleuze and Guattari (ATP: 69) themselves write that there are no metaphors in use: “There is no “like” here, we are not saying “like an electron,” “like an interaction,” etc.… all that consists is Real.” This interpretation of metaphor is related to Deleuze and Guattari’s advantage of ‘difference’: “Even if things might be conceived as having shared attributes allowing them to be labelled as being of the same kind, Deleuze’s conception of difference seeks to privilege the individual differences between them” (Stagoll, 2010c: 75). Metaphor (literally, ‘transfer’) allows the characterization of phenomena “in terms of their similarity to, and difference from, one another” (White, 1973: 34). Metaphor is built on opposition between literal and figurative meanings, but for Deleuze this opposition is not acceptable, since the literal is unachievable (Marks, 1997: 243).104 Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology demands an extra effort in clarification and specification – forcing the researcher to frequently check their dictionaries: what rhizome actually means in biology or diagram in mathematics. This terminological challenge also compels the reader to bounce between the certainty offered by accuracy of understanding and the freedom of interpretation offered by the text. The application of their particular terminology can be explained by the crisis in natural and social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s, a crisis detected by Deleuze and Guattari. On the one hand, this crisis was related to changes in the social world. The rise of various social movements and protest actions like anti-Vietnam war protests in the USA, strike of French workers and student demonstrations in France in 1968, feminist protests in Europe and the USA – all demonstrated that existing theories in social or political science were unable to account for unpredictable and unexpected changes in the daily lives of people. On the other hand, some findings took place in the field of natural science. Venn (2006: 107) points out that discoveries in the physics of small particles, in cybernetic systems and post-structural mathematics (theory of chaos, complexity, strings) demonstrated that linear developments coexisted with the non-linear and fixity with flexibility etc. Binary divisions (like natural as opposed to social, structure as opposed to chaos) or cause-effect explanations became counterproductive. Since various events in the social world have unpredictable intensities and uncontrollable movements, not all of these tendencies can be explained in a linear manner,

104 Hayles (2001: 157) argues that a denial of metaphor lies at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation of agency and claims that Deleuze and Guattari “overestimate the power of language to create reality.” I agree with Hayles (2001: 144), who points out that metaphor is not opposed to scientific work, but is inherent to it since “metaphor works to connect and contextualize, broadening the space of abstract thought by embedding it in physical, sensory, linguistic and cultural context.”
which views events as taking place in strict sequences with predictable outcomes. In order to grasp “significant features of the contemporary social and political landscape,” Deleuze and Guattari provided a series of concepts with more adequate, though not conventional, meanings (Patton, 2000: 133).

This new set of concepts revealed two basic difficulties with existing terminology in the scientific world: translation and conceptualization. From a linguistic point of view, it is difficult to translate notions from one language to another without changing or losing the meaning. For example, Deleuze and Guattari wrote in French. French word ‘agencement’ is not equal to the English ‘assemblage’, since the English word has a more technical connotation, while the French one has the connotation of ‘arrangement’, ‘fitting’, or ‘fixing’ (Phillips, 2006: 108). It means that the French word ‘assemblage’, signifying a specific way of connections with other elements, becomes elusive with translation and requires extra articulation in other languages. From a conceptual perspective, it is not always easy to translate from Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical language into the more conventional language of political science or what Patton calls “the language of Anglophone political theory” (Patton, 2000: 1). For example, Deleuze and Guattari’s term ‘line of flight’ which means ‘change’ or ‘transformation’ is very hard to locate in English-based political theory.

Another challenge of working with Deleuzian philosophy is related to their understanding of philosophy and the term ‘concept’ in particular. Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 16) argued that a concept never has a complete, self-sustaining definition but it is always “a matter of articulation, of cutting, and cross-cutting.” Any concept is always fragmented and contains possibilities for additional meaning, which can be realised through various connections. Thus, a concept is always a multiplicity of meanings and exists as a combination of several components (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 15-16). Importantly, a concept is a subject of change, because “a philosophical concept never operates in isolation but comes to its sense in connection with other senses in specific yet creative and often unpredictable ways” (Phillips, 2006: 108). A concept should always be related to the circumstances of its appearance, and never reduced to a singular meaning or particular interpretation. Therefore, in order to specify concepts, Deleuze and Guattari use a particular method, which Patton (2012: 209) calls “proliferating distinction,” in order to explain the meaning of one concept, they invoke a number of other concepts, each adding additional meaning to the concept in question.
With introduction of new terminology and discussion on a concept, Deleuze and Guattari (ATP: 367-374) touch upon the problem of knowledge production. The dominant system of thinking created, they assert, a problem with the usage of concepts. Since science is governed by a finite number of terms or concepts, there is a tendency to simplify the essence of phenomena because the existing pool of concepts cannot fully describe them. At the same time, while looking at practice, it is possible to see that the meanings of concepts change at different levels of analysis (like, for example, the global, state, and local) or might be understood differently by different actors. For example, the gravity of the interpretation of the word ‘threat’ by governments comes from a state perspective on national sovereignty and security. But for people living in a particular territory, the problem of traditional food contamination is more serious than an ‘abstract’ threat to the national border.

With regard to the issue of dominating knowledge, Deleuze and Guattari reflect upon nomadic and royal sciences. According to them, ‘nomadic science’ tries to avoid stabilization of knowledge and attempts to ‘problematize’ issues, rather than applying a ‘problem-solving approach’. In contrast, ‘royal science’ tries to ‘stabilize’ terminology and codify the ‘correct way’ of doing things. ‘Master gatekeepers’ (who at large can be called a ‘scientific community’) always support this knowledge. ‘Master gatekeepers’ know ‘the correct’ answers, they claim the right to establish ‘the truth’ and they support dominating theories to buttress state power through constant reproduction and normalization, by means such as bureaucratic rules, laws, and scientific publication. By these actions, ‘right’ knowledge is legitimised and alternative ways of receiving data are excluded from the dominant discourse.

The issue of dominance of mainstream knowledge is also addressed by feminist and Gender security studies (see, for example, Hoogensen and Stuvøy, 2006; Stern, 2006). Hoogensen and Stuvøy (2006: 219) claim that “…the dominant discourses determine what we can and cannot hear and learn…” as well as these dominant discourses set up the norms and practices and define who must follow them, “who is important and who is not; who defines the parameters of the debate and who does not.” The concept of security did not avoid this destiny. Through dominant paradigms of knowledge, security became so tightly connected to the notion of the state that those who amplify the voices of people struggle to attain scientific legitimacy and to prove the validity of the concept of human security. As long as dominant state players (or representatives of the ‘royal science’) like foreign policy and security specialist generate the debates on human security, they will always define “…who ought to receive the focus of
attention and on what basis” (Hoogensen and Stuvøy, 2006: 219). In this case, the concept of security will remain unproblematicized and striped from extra meanings and particular interpretations.

Overall, Deleuze and Guattari’s attitude to knowledge and science is related to their understanding of the role of philosophers, which should be creative and active in establishing connections between things: “By cutting routinely across disciplinary boundaries, Deleuze abides by his proposal that concept-creation be an ‘open ended’ exercise, such that philosophy creates concepts that are as accessible and useful to artists and scientists as to philosophers” (Stagoll, 2010b: 53). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari, being philosophers themselves, evoked new ways of thinking, expressed and created by their own terminology.

4.4. Schizoanalysis, desire and security of expectations

Further in this chapter I will explore the concept of assemblage suggested by Deleuze and Guattari as well as discuss theoretical considerations related to the security assemblage (2007-2012). As I pointed above, from Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, a concept always obtains its meaning through connections with other concepts. Therefore, I would like to elaborate on the method of schizoanalysis and relate it to the concepts of desire and rhizome, which are essential for understanding the concept of assemblage and the examination of state-individual relationship.

4.4.1. Schizoanalysis, capitalism and desire

Deleuze and Guattari apply a method of schizoanalysis, formulated as a criticism of psychoanalysis (in particular, ideas of Freud and Lacan) and capitalism, which they understand in a very specific way. From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, capitalism cannot be located in the sphere of economy or production only: “There is no universal capitalism, there is no capitalism in itself; capitalism is at the crossroads of all kinds of formations” (ATP: 20). Capitalism is viewed as a totality encompassing all spheres of human life in all historical formations. It is “inventive and productive, and to capitalize, it progressively leaves the factory and invades, like a parasite, all spheres of life and the life-world itself” (Vandenberghe, 2008: 878). Thus, capitalism commodifies culture, nature, human body, sex and sexuality producing social exploitation and inequality. From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, the method of psychoanalysis and its authoritative approach to the individual become dominating not only in the field of mental health, but also in social and political context as a support of a capitalistic
The problem with psychoanalysis, however, is that it is ignorant to the context of disease, provides limited interpretations and becomes a cause of illness, not a remedy.

In opposition to psychoanalysis, schizoanalysis is based on a revised theory of Marx and intended to enlarge the scope of historical and social factors explaining social behaviour and cognition (Holland, 2010). This method allows Deleuze and Guattari not only to criticise psychoanalytic constructions related to clinical practices, but also to see the existing system of capitalism in a new light and reveal mechanisms of oppression and domination. Schizoanalysis becomes a sort of protest, offering a new way of understanding social processes. From the clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari borrow the idea of a “continual integration of seemingly incompatible elements” (Widder, 2012: 106). Behind this integration is desire, which they refuse to interpret in Freudian terms as a ‘lack of’ something (Braidotti, 2010: 240). The concept of desire connects ideas of Marx, Freud and Lacan. Holland (2005: 62) concludes that it combines “the notions of free will operating immanently, will to power operating creatively, and species-being operating productively in the real world.” Thus, desire is both production and creation. Schizoanalysis studies approaches desire in this way: “[I]ts central question being not what desire seeks or means (the psychoanalyst’s question), not what function it serves (the ethnologist’s question), but simply how it works” (Widder, 2012: 106). Desire, as a kind of driving force behind intensities and connections, should be approached “in terms of affectivity,” as a spontaneous way of interconnection (Braidotti, 2010: 240). It means that desire manifests itself ceaselessly in unpredictable and various connections. I discussed unpredictability and intensity of desire in Chapter 3. On the state level it was desire-challenge, desire-demand and desire-ambition. On the regional level is was a combination of desire-ambition, desire-dream and desire-hope.

According to Deleuze and Guattari (ATP: 399), assemblages are configured by desire. In my thesis, an analysis of the way desire works helps us to understand the conditions and context in which the security assemblage in the Murmansk region emerged in 2007-2012. Thus, the development of the Shtokman gas field was framed by the Russian state in terms of prosperity and benefits (Strukova, 2012 cited in Avango et al., 2013: 440), and is viewed as a source of economic security. This framing corresponds with the general attitude of the state towards the Russian Arctic: a land of vast resources with a strategic location. Thus, Russian president

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105 For more connections between capitalism and psychoanalysis see, for example, Tomšič, 2016.
106 For more details see, for example, Holland, 1999; Buchanan, 2013.
Medvedev (2008 - 2012) in his address to the Security Council of the Russian Federation (September 17, 2008) emphasized that the Arctic represented a great opportunity for Russia since the Arctic zone contained a vast amount of natural resources. Since about half of Russian federal government revenues derived from the oil and gas sector in 2010 (Strukova, 2012 cited in Avango et al., 2013: 440), the idea of the Arctic as a future source of prosperity sounded very attractive to many actors. As I discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, for the government, it is an answer to economic, energy and social security challenges, for companies it is a field for development and a source of potential benefits, for individuals, it means places to work and possibility to increase welfare in the region. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “[d]esire does not begin from lack..., desire begins from connections” (Colebrook, 2002: 91). Thus, desire in the context of my research it is connected to the ability of actors to accomplish ‘oil and gas development of the Arctic’. In Chapter 3, I already examined the connections between the actors, which appeared the moment the Shtokman gas field got flagship status for the Murmansk region. I will explore these connections further in my thesis.

4.4.2. Desire, subjectivity and agency

Deleuze and Guattari explored the concept of desire in ATP by analysing the forms of production and mechanisms of oppression in existing systems of capitalism, but much of their analysis can be extrapolated to other contexts. “Capitalism not only produces objects, but also subjects and subjectivities. To assure the conditions of its own enlarged reproduction, it has not only to produce goods and services, but also the producers and consumers of those products and services” (Vandenberghe, 2008: 886). Deleuze and Guattari address the connections between forms of production and subjectivity, where the concept of desire “…serves as a revolutionary fulcrum for social critique…” (Holland, 2005: 59). They ask critical questions such as “what sort of subject (what sort of desires and beliefs) does capital, or each of the other modes of production, require? How is this subject produced? What sort of limits or resistances does this production come up against? And, ultimately, what are the conditions for a different production, for new ways of living and desiring?” (Read, 2003). This focus on subjectivity is connected to the idea that desire operates at the level of the individual. The individual is located in the web of connections and therefore is in a constant process of change.


108 For more on the individual as the agent of change see Srnicek, 2007.
groups are significant for Deleuze and Guattari, since they are important agents of politics: “In their view, the sources of political creativity must always be traced back to shifts in the formations of individual and group desire that in turn lead to changes in sensibility, allegiance and belief” (Patton, 2011:117). Individuals are capable of social change, of evoking new meanings and creating new movements. Individuals are themselves the transformative force and the agents of change – their power of transformation can give birth to “a new earth, a new people” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 99). Despite criticism of social institutions, such as the family, schools, workplaces, used in capitalist society to subordinate desire to the social order, Deleuze and Guattari do not place the individual in opposition to the state. Their political ontology is built on “an opposition between the kinds of lines and functions that appear in, and cut across, the individual and the social…” (Houle, 2005: 91). It means that both state and human security are interconnected and play equally important role in the security assemblage in the Murmansk region in 2007-2012.

4.4.3 Desire and security of expectations

I argue that one of these links is the concept of security of expectations, related to the disappointment-prevention principle articulated by Jeremy Bentham in the 18th and 19th centuries. In a similar vein to Deleuze and Guattari, though in a different historical and social setting, Bentham explored the relationship between the individual and the state and he prioritised the individual (Hoogensen, 2005: 181). Bentham claimed that human beings are not constricted by their nature to exist solely in the present – they are able to create an image of the future and this reveals their hopes and expectations, which are dependent on the present state (Hoogensen, 2005: 15). For Bentham this concern results in the disappointment-prevention principle, which can be summarized as, “one cannot ensure security of expectations if one’s immediate security is still threatened” (Hoogensen, 2005:14). According to Bentham, the state can secure conditions for individual security in the present and in the future through legislation (Hoogensen, 2005: 182). For understandable reasons, this legislation cannot take into consideration all possible conditions of insecurity. Therefore the legislator

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109 Though Bentham is the father of utilitarianism, Hoogensen (2005) argues that it is hard to categorise Bentham’s thought since his thinking absorbs realist and liberal traditions. This eclecticism means that Bentham was a philosopher capable of non-conventional thinking by borrowing elements and arguments from various traditions, which makes him interesting from a post-structural perspective. At the same time the analytics of assemblage allows me to forge different elements and concepts together across time periods. That is why I borrow the concept of security of expectation and apply it to my analysis.

110 It was developed, first of all, with regard to property and aimed to create such conditions, so that no insecurity results from reforms (Hoogensen, 2005).
should secure “a pattern of expectations,” which provides each individual with the possibility to secure their own well-being (Hoogensen, 2005: 182).

The concept of security of expectation embraces both the state and the individual since the state should take a responsibility for providing security of the individual. Thus, it is assumed that the state knows people’s needs and expectations. But as I demonstrated in Chapter 3, the security assemblage is riven by tension. Different actors articulate different desires in relation to the Shtokman project and expectations in the region are different from the state ones.

Therefore, I ask: Does the state have a will or capacity to secure expectations? What kind of expectations can be secured and what cannot and why? With these critical questions in mind, the concept of desire opens up a space for analysis of security of expectations as a connection between the state and the individual. The security assemblage is framed around oil and gas development in the Murmansk region in 2007-2012, and, by this time, the Shtokman project was at the first stage of development (involving planning, consortium formation, the search for technological solutions). This was when I spoke to my interviewees, and their vision of the future was shaped by this prospect. Thus, through the concept of security of expectations, I examine relationships between the state and the individual, look at security conditions through the eyes of different actors and reveal connections in the security assemblage.

4.5. Rhizome and tree

As I discussed above, the issue of knowledge production is important for Deleuze and Guattari. In order to capture the dynamics and creativity of thought, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of ‘rhizome’ in contrast to the concept of ‘tree’. A tree is a biological system with roots and trunk, consisting of linear or vertical connections. They call this tree-like model an arborescent structure. This structure is capable of reproduction and imitation only. It can be characterized as a quantitative multiplicity: “Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centers of signification and subjectification, central automata like organized memories. In the corresponding models, an element only receives information from a higher unit, and only receives a subjective affection along pre-established paths” (ATP: 16).

In order to illustrate non-linear ways of thinking Deleuze and Guattari introduce the term ‘rhizome’ which comes from natural science, where bulbs and tubers represent a form of non-linear, sporadic development as when a node spreads roots in different directions. These shoots can grow upwards and even perpendicular to the force of gravity. A rhizome as “a stranger to
any idea of genetic axis or deep structure” (ATP: 12) can be differently connected at any point and go beyond its place of origin. Tree or root systems suppose linear or fixed development: one point is connected to the other. A rhizome consists of lines, which represent dynamism and create connections. The principle of connection understands a rhizome as a process rather than a fixed unit or a closed system (Stagoll, 2010a: 14). A rhizome supposes that there could be qualitative changes, not just quantitative. “A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines” (ATP: 9). A rhizome possesses creative power. It is constantly ‘becoming’ something different – new meanings appear and continue to exist, producing new combinations and ruptures. Thus, a rhizome is a dynamic concept, which “has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills” (ATP: 21).

It is important to note that a rhizome can be arborified and a tree rhizomatised: “There are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots” (ATP: 20). So tree-like and rhizome models are different by their nature, but both are dynamic and not in opposition to each other. This ability of the models to interact with each other is important for understanding the way of establishing connection within an assemblage. These connections can be formed in two ways: arborescent (or tree-like) and rhizomatic. An arborescent model of assemblage is a numerical and extensive multiplicity, which creates hierarchical connections. A rhizomatic model of assemblage is qualitative and intensive multiplicity, which creates connections in unpredictable and different ways. Neither rhizomatic nor arborescent models of assemblage exist in pure form. They cross-breed and mix with each other (ATP: 15). For example, while discussing a human security assemblage in Canada, Hynek (2012: 97) argues for hybridisation of the assemblage there since human security became a very powerful vehicle for national security and these two concepts merged. Hynek (2012: 90) concludes, “rhizomatic and arborescent models of assemblage can – and often do – in practice intertwine and hybridise.” Therefore, in my study of the security assemblage I examine the nature of the assemblage and define rhizomatic and arborescent elements of it.

4.5.1. Bridging rhizome and human security: a discussion on broadening versus narrowing

The concept of a rhizome is very productive and can be applied to the relationship between state and human security. I see discussions on broadening versus narrowing the security agenda as an example of rhizomatic thinking. The conceptual framework of human security articulated
in the HDR (1994) engendered discussions about the possibility of broadening the security agenda, corresponding to the need to address the most contemporary threats and challenges (such as disease, terrorism, trafficking drugs, arms and people, environmental degradation, migration etc.). Thus, a broader definition articulates human dignity or ‘freedom from want’, not just ‘freedom from fear’, as main elements of the human security agenda. According to the proponents of the broader definition (McSweeney, 1999; Thomas, 2004; Maclean, 2008; Dale, 2011), this concept of security can be used as “a bridge between the interconnected challenges confronting the world” (Thomas, 2004: 353). This holistic approach is akin to a rhizome. It takes into the account multiple aspects of security as well as permitting the tackling of various threats simultaneously (Maclean, 2008). Proponents advocate looking at the bigger picture, where security constellations can have different forms, can be affected by different actors and can be differently practiced. This broader definition uses rhizomatic conjunctions, “and…and…and…” (ATP: 25). For example, in his study on immigration, Huysmans (2006) shows how a broader perspective on security can aid understanding of the threats coming from within a state. In the end, by paying attention to multiplicity of actors and connections, security studies can attach new meanings to security or even, according to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007), achieve a paradigmatic or ontological shift from the state as the central element of analysis.

In opposition to those who want to broaden the definitions, there are voices in favour of narrowing it. Some scholars choose to restrict the meaning of human security to ‘freedom from fear’, which means personal safety and the safeguarding of the most basic needs from direct threat. They consider the broader definition as “hot air rather than ‘paradigm shift’” (Paris, 2001) or a ‘shopping list of threats’ (Krause, 2004). The broader definition is more unwieldy to operate and the development of security becomes less predictable: more factors are needed to be addressed, more actors have to be included. A reductionist definition excludes freedom from want or economy-related items. Scholars see in such minimization the possibility for conceptual clarity and analytical operability (Paris, 2001; MacFarlane, 2004; Krause, 2004). Thus, they try to approach the concept of human security as an arborescent structure, built on the verb ‘to be’: fixed meaning, minimum of changes. Ewan (2007: 183) however, argues that the narrow approach “forecloses the alternative political possibilities signalled by human security.” To me this narrow definition overlooks all the potentiality of human security and reduces security to a fixed number of practices and operations.
4.6. Abstract machine as a rule

I discussed the concept of desire as a creative force that connects people, concepts and things, and discussed its importance for the security assemblage earlier in this chapter. Below, I aim to examine a structure of an assemblage as an arrangement of heterogeneous elements, such as actors, things, institutions, statements, practices, territories, intensities and qualities, which outside of assemblage analytics cannot be forged together. I start my examination with a discussion of the rules of arrangement of elements, what Deleuze and Guattari call an “abstract machine”. If desire is a motor, an abstract machine is a set of rules, according to which connections between the actors can be made within a particular assemblage. An abstract machine has no organizing centre, operates “by matter and function” (ATP: 141) and “is nothing more, than the connections and productions it makes” (Colebrook, 2002: 55). Deleuze and Guattari state that an abstract machine “plays a piloting role…abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” (ATP: 142). In other words, an abstract machine creates the outlook of a particular assemblage. Deleuze and Guattari write: “There are rules, rules of “plan(n)ing” ... The abstract machine is not random; the continuities, emissions and combinations, and conjunctions do not occur in just any fashion” (ATP: 70-71). Actors can know these rules but more at the level of habit or governing principle, as in “we do things like that”. They hardly can articulate them. Nevertheless, knowledge of these rules can generate certain expectations among actors, involved in a particular assemblage. Therefore, interview materials and analysis of expectation provide an insight on the rules of connections within the security assemblage and helps to understand its specifics.

An abstract machine does not exist independently of an assemblage. It is formed prior to it, but is implemented in an assemblage. By governing an assemblage, it acquires material and verbal form: “Of course, within the dimensions of the assemblage, the abstract machine, or machines, is effectuated in forms and substances, in varying states of freedom” (ATP: 511). Dates are important for an abstract machine, since they define the peculiarities of the machine and its actions, and are therefore important for an assemblage in general. “Not that they refer to people or to effectuating moments; on the contrary, it is the names and dates that refer to the singularities of the machines, and to what they effectuate” (ATP: 511). The dates of the security assemblage I examine are 2007-2012. Within this period, the Shtokman project was transformed from impossible (not able to occur in 1990s) to improbable (not likely to happen
in 2012). And even though until 2017 the project remains at the stage of planning (improbable), this virtual change formed specific security expectations (oil and gas as a source of economic security) and generated real changes in the Murmansk region (like, for example, building of the road connecting Murmansk with the village of Teriberka, where main Shtokman facilities were planned be located). Though a machine is always located in a particular period, it always has roots and historical traces in the past:

“It must always be remembered though that particular assemblages are the result of historical processes of production. Their potentials, therefore, are also historically constructed and contingent. This historical development is, of course, not a matter of increasing progress, nor is it a matter of linear development in any sense” (Srnicek, 2007:75).

That is why, some specification (political, economic, demographic), from a historical perspective, is needed for outlining the rules of the abstract machine of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). This historical perspective helps to analyse in what conditions expectations related to Russian Arctic oil and gas development were formed.

The abstract machine as a rule helps us to understand how the elements of the security assemblage are connected and to identify the most influential forces affecting the interaction between its various actors at a given time. As Houen (2008: 34) argues, an abstract machine “inheres in things and gives them meaning, but it is not visible.” In Chapter 5, I elaborate on the rule(s) of the abstract machine and discuss how they function in the assemblage.

4.7. Tetravalent structure of assemblage

After discussing desire and the rules of an assemblage in previous sections, I will introduce a tetravalent structure of an assemblage (people, words, territory and changes). As I defined in Chapter 1, an assemblage is an act of establishing connections and the construction of a new meaning at the same time. Deleuze and Guattari stress the dynamic nature of an assemblage through an introduction of its tetravalent structure (See Figure 5. on the next page). An assemblage is made and unmade along two axes: horizontal and vertical.

On the horizontal axis, an assemblage is composed of ‘content’ and ‘expression’. ‘Content’ or material dimension side of the horizontal axis might take different forms – it can appear in the guise of bodies and things and their interaction. Deleuze and Guattari call it a “machinic
assemblage of bodies, actions and passions” (ATP: 88). The other pole of the horizontal axis - ‘expressions’ - includes the spectrum of utterances, speech acts and statements. Deleuze and Guattari name it as a “collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements” (ATP: 88).

The vertical axis has two poles: the territorial side, which stabilise an assemblage, and the “cutting edges,” which deal with the issue of transformation and change (ATP: 88). Below, I will discuss these two axes and four poles of the security assemblage (2007-2012).

4.8. Horizontal axis: ‘machinic assemblage of bodies, actions and passions’

I start my analysis with the discussion of the horizontal axis and the pole of ‘content’ or material dimension which is called the ‘machinic assemblage of bodies, actions and passions’. The word ‘machinic’ for Deleuze and Guattari is related to productivity of individuals and the ability of people to make connections with each other and material elements because desire operates at
the level of the individual and empowers people’s creativity. Transport, industrial and energy infrastructure are the material elements of the machinic assemblage in the Murmansk region. The region exports raw materials, metallurgy production and electro-energy and imports technical supply, equipment and heating oil (mazut) etc. It is especially important for non-ferrous mining and metallurgy (mainly copper and nickel). Because of high industrial activities, Murmansk is highly dependent on nuclear and hydroelectric energy. The Murmansk region is not only highly industrialized, but also a militarized zone, since it has a border with Norway and Finland as well as an ice-free port, which plays an important role in Russian marine transportation as well as state security. Onshore and offshore facilities of the Shtokman gas field are included as well and form the particular technological part of the assemblage. Nevertheless, the biggest challenge is how to approach individuals and related to them agency (or creativity).

I introduced in Chapter 1 the multi-actor based security model and discussed its methodological application in Chapter 2. In my research, I approached seven groups: business and industry; local community; journalists/media; military; NGOs and international organizations; researchers; policy makers. I also claimed that practices and stories of the actors are important for understanding the context of security in Russia. Therefore, further in my thesis I will name this pole of ‘content’ as a ‘machinic assemblage of actors’. Taking into consideration that Deleuze and Guattari develop a ‘philosophy of difference’, which I discussed earlier in this chapter, it is necessary to clarify who is this abstract ‘actor’ and how I intent to avoid reduction to ‘sameness’ and reveal creativity and uniqueness of individuals.

4.8.1. Approaching the individual: narrative identity and ‘becoming’

As I wrote earlier in this chapter, human security tries to overcome invisibility of human experience in security studies and focuses on multiple (in)security experience of individuals. Assemblage analytics invites not only to examine the differences between human experiences, but also the differences within an individual. This brings forward an issue of identity or subjectivity. Thus, analysis of multiple experience of an individual helps to overcome the difficulty with the idea of an individual as a universal unit of analysis, as outlined in debates over state-individual relationships in this chapter. Below, I will discuss two concepts addressing the multiple experience of an individual: identity and ‘becoming’. The former is actively discussed and applied in social and political sciences (see, for example, Somers, 1994; Hønneland, 2010; 2016), while the latter is introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (ATP).
The issue of identity is central for post-structuralism. Identity helps to answer the questions “who am I?” and “what kind of connections do I have to this world?” By taking into consideration the issue of asymmetry of power and dominance, which I discussed earlier in this chapter, post-structuralism questions the production of the conception of selves. Somers (1994: 606) points out that any categorization of actors contains the danger of uniformity and exclusion. Identity is not something singular, stable and unchangeable, rather it is multiple and transformable. Somers (1994: 621) suggests that one should apply a narrative identity approach, which allows one to locate an individual in a network of social, organizational and political institutions and practices, possessing both spatial and temporal dimensions. Narratives are important for identity construction since they “not only give expression to the outside world about who people are, but they also contribute to making people who they are” (Hønneland, 2010: 6). Narratives incorporate the social agency of individuals and their ability to become agents of change. Narrative identity also allows the concept of “the other” to be redefined. Somers (1994: 629, emphasis in the original) writes that “[i]f persons are socially constituted over time, space, and through relationality, then others are constitutive rather than external to identity.”

Somers (1994) suggests four dimensions of narrative: ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narratives. Ontological narrative helps people to make sense of their lives. “Ontological narratives are used to define who we are; this in turn can be a precondition for knowing what to do. This ‘doing’ will in turn produce new narratives and hence, new actions; the relationship between narrative and ontology is processual and mutually constitutive. Both are conditions of the other; neither are a priori. Narrative location endows social actors with identities - however multiple, ambiguous, ephemeral, or conflicting they may be (hence the term narrative identity)” (Somers, 1994: 618, emphasis in the original). On the one hand, ontological narratives are always social and interpersonal, and therefore always connected to public narratives. On the other hand, public narratives frame ontological narratives and their meaning encompasses “cultural and institutional formations larger than the single individual” (Somers, 1994: 619). Public narratives can range from family stories to organizational or workplace stories or those concerning church, government, and nation (Somers, 1994: 619). The third dimension is meta-narrativity or the ‘master narrative’, which places individuals in the flow of history (Somers, 1994: 619). This narrative operates by abstract concepts and explanatory schemes (such as
social systems), and thus has a tendency towards de-narrativization (Somers, 1994: 619). Both public and master narratives are important for the analysis of an abstract machine. An abstract machine as a set of rules is always located in a particular period as well as has historical traces in the past. Thus, the narratives can help to understand how and in what conditions the rules were formed as well as how these rules influenced various actors at a given time. The fourth dimension is the conceptual narrative. These narratives are constructed by social researchers when they provide explanations or operate through the use of particular concepts. “The challenge of conceptual narrativity is to devise a vocabulary that we can use to reconstruct and plot over time and space the ontological narratives and relationships of historical actors, the public and cultural narratives that inform their lives, and the crucial intersection of these narratives with the other relevant social forces” (Somers, 1994: 620). The call for a new vocabulary resembles Deleuze and Guattari’s search for a new language and conceptual framing. They utilized the language of physics and mathematics in their discussion of society and politics in order to reveal various aspects of contemporary world – features which could not be described using the existing language of social science.

In order to stress the difference between each individual and to articulate the dynamism and agency of individuals, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of ‘becoming’ (ATP: 242). ‘Becoming’ as a process has no particular goal and cannot be fixed (ATP: 162). The concept of ‘becoming’ is related to the concept of ‘rhizome’, which I discussed in this chapter. A rhizome is constantly in the process of change, producing new combinations, it is always ‘becoming’. ‘Becoming’ is “neither imitation nor resemblance” (ATP: 10), it is a production of new meanings. In other words, ‘becoming’ is an alliance. Deleuze and Guattari provide an example of a wasp collecting pollen from an orchid (ATP: 10). Together they form a rhizome and an alliance. They are both in the process of ‘becoming’: “[A] becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp” (ATP: 10).

The concept of ‘becoming’ is related to the discussion on the peculiarities of the concepts of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘identity’. The difference between these two concepts is very blurred and the distinction between them is a matter of interpretation. For Deleuze and Guattari the problem with identity was related to the fact that often it is understood in terms of resemblance, sameness, analogy, “the kinds of relations used to determine groupings of things” (Stagoll, 111)

111 The post-structuralist mentality is sceptical towards meta-narratives because of their totality and monopoly of ‘truth’. Post-structuralism rather privileges variety. It means that society is reflected in numerous local narratives, which coexist with each other (Somers, 1994).
Braidotti (2011: 18) claims that Deleuze and Guattari manage to push the issues of identity and power towards issue of subjectivity, which she interprets as “a socially mediated process of entitlements to and negotiations with power relations.” Braidotti (2011: 18) warns against confusion of the concept of subjectivity with the concept of an individual. Therefore, the concepts of identity and subjectivity are different, but still interconnected parts of an individual. The concept of identity addresses internal structures of the individual while subjectivity stresses the transformable nature of the individual and “is ‘external’ to individual self” (Braidotti, 2011: 18). Thus, the concept of ‘becoming’ can be approached as a mediator between identity and subjectivity because it addresses the complex nature of an individual, capable of shifts and transformations. While articulating uniqueness and shifting attention from how individuals can be grouped, the concept of ‘becoming’ includes stable and transformable elements.

To sum up the above, I suggest that the concept of narrative identity helps to address the multiplicity of individual experience through the articulation of three elements: ‘be’, ‘being’ and ‘becoming’.

The element ‘be’ is related to the questions, “Who am I?” and “What am I doing (what is my role)?” It addresses the core of identity, the set of roles the individual has in society, which are revealed through ontological narratives. This element allows one to work with an individual as a representative of a particular group outlined in the multi-actor based security model (business and industry; local community; journalists/media; military; NGOs and international organizations; researchers; policy makers).

The element ‘being’ articulates the connections of the individual with others, places him/her in the set of public narratives and answers the questions, “Who is important in what I do?” and “Why do I do what I do?” Both ‘be’ and ‘being’ elements can evoke public and master narratives, which place the individual in the course of historical events. Master narratives can also supply a person with some explanations for the choices they make in their life. The element ‘being’ allows for analysing what kind of role particular actors have in the security assemblage and what kind of relation they establish with the other actors.

The element ‘becoming’ involves transformation and is related to creative nature of an individual. It has two connections: ‘be’ and ‘the other’. On the one hand, changes happen alongside “who I am” and “who I became”. They articulate particular changes within an
individual. The individual him or herself is a referent point. The individual becomes different compared to itself and nobody else. For example, each individual has more than one role in society. One person can be ‘a woman’, ‘a researcher’ and ‘a political activist,’ but in what context, and why and how are the changes between these roles happening? On the other hand, this transformation brings forward the more conventional concept of ‘the other’: the other as different, as not like ‘me’ or ‘us’. Can an individual due to her/his ability for ‘becoming’ understand ‘the other’? This ability of ‘becoming’ allows for exploring actors as agents of change and answering the questions: “What kind of transformative force do people have?” and “how does this force function in the security assemblage?”

4.8.2. Approaching the state

Above I discussed the concept of the individual and related it to the concepts of narrative identity and ‘becoming’. Machinic assemblage of actors permits a focus on the state-individual relationship and I argue that the state can be approached as a specific actor within the assemblage. I discussed in this chapter that traditionally in IR the state is viewed as a security actor. Existing knowledge about the state embracing the history of the development of the states “from medieval to sovereign state” in their attempt to provide national and international security (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 22). Traditionally, such elements of the state as population, territory, government and sovereignty are extracted and attention is given to such issues as governance, power and authority. The history of the state as the best form of political and social organisation presupposes linear development and is related to the idea of progress or evolution, because “the State can develop only when a society reaches a certain degree of complexity, evidenced primarily by its capacity to create and sustain a more sophisticated division of labour” (Surin, 2010: 268). For example, the Marxist theory suggested several consequent stages of the historical development of the society (Carling, 1993). The state as a form of governance appears at the stage of slave society and gets further development with the development of economic system and private property. At the last stage of social development, the state would disappear along with the disappearance of private property.

Following Deleuze and Guattari, I suggest a different approach to the state. Deleuze and Guattari argue with the Marxist theory of the state and the evolutionist development from a primitive society to a capitalist state (ATP: 223). Deleuze and Guattari claim that the state has always existed as an abstract machine (or inner logics), capable of capturing power relations: “The state…captures flows of population, commodities, or money in order to extract from these
flows a surplus which then becomes a means to maintain and enhance its own power. It is an institution whose primary mode of operation is one of limitation or constraint, a matter of separating active forces from what they can do” (Patton, 2012: 203). By capturing forces, the state is trying to stabilise any assemblage it is involved in. The state role is to “enable stable and predictable forms of action upon the actions of others” (Patton, 2012: 203). Linked to this interpretation of the state, Deleuze and Guattari develop the concept of the state apparatus. The state apparatus is not confined to ministries or various state agencies. It is an appropriation, it is a mechanism of capture and subordination (ATP: 444).

Though the state is a “secondary formation” (Patton, 2012: 2003) compare to people and social movements, it has two very distinct functions in the security assemblage: capturing of forces and fixation of the system. Therefore, I will examine how the Russian state captures forces related to the issue of security and how it affects the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). In my examination, I specially focus on official documents in order to ascertain the role of the state in the security assemblage. Through my analysis, I look out for the ability of the state to appropriate connections, flows and relations within the security assemblage.

4.8.3. State, individuals and multi-actor based security model

The assemblage approach to individuals and the state demands some reconceptualization of the multi-actor based security model, introduced in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.). In my thesis, I discuss the relations between the state and individuals. Thus, I approach both the Russian state and individuals as actors in the security assemblage. Individuals can have different roles and act differently in different situations. At the same time, the category, ‘actor’, as a universal unit of analysis is complicated. I discussed above that narrative identity overcomes the danger of uniformity and exclusion related to the issue of categorization. It means that the category ‘actor’ is very complex and the division between the actors is not clean cut. Technically speaking, the multi-actors model allows me to discuss two big groups of actors: state and non-state. According to the model, two groups – ‘policy makers’ and ‘military’ – can be considered state actors, while the groups ‘business and industry’, ‘local community’, ‘journalists/media’, ‘NGOs and international organizations’, and ‘researchers’ represent non-state actors. The division between state and non-state actors is related to their formal role. However, all actors are everyday people living in the Murmansk region. It means that the human element never vanishes, and actors can foreground it at any time. Thus every actor is a community member
living in the Murmansk region, even though some of them also represent an abstract idea of the state. Therefore further on in my thesis, I will discuss state and non-state actors when the analysis demands this division. Otherwise I will address individuals as ‘community members’ – as actors in the region in opposition to the state.

Another consideration is related to the group ‘policy makers’. There are three levels of public authority in Russia: local, regional and federal. Thus the group ‘policy makers’ is not homogenous. Theoretically, all three levels represent the state but power of decision-making and the issue of subordination varies. The federal authorities have the highest status and subordinate directly to Moscow. The regional authorities have to coordinate their decisions and actions with the Governor of the region and the Governor’s deputies. The issue of oil and gas development in the Murmansk region is a matter for the federal government. The regional or local authorities cannot make any independent decisions related to the Shtokman project, though the gas field is located in the region. They can only consult federal level representatives. Nevertheless, even though the regional authorities do not have the opportunity to influence the decision-making process in the case of the Shtokman project, they still represent the state as they have to execute the state’s decisions in the region. It means that ‘policy makers’ as a state actor do not all have the same interest. I will examine these differences within the group ‘policy makers’ in the following chapters and discuss these differences in the context of security assemblage (2007-2012).

I also suggest making some changes to the multi-actor based security model which I discussed in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.). I divide the group ‘policy makers’ into three sub-groups: federal authorities, regional authorities and local authorities (see Figure 6. on the next page).
Figure 6. The multi-actor based security model: security assemblage (2007-2012)

4.9. Horizontal axis: ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’

In this section, I will continue the discussion of the horizontal axis of the security assemblage and move to the pole of ‘expression’ or the ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’ (ATP: 88). Hynek (2012) specifies that this differentiation between ‘bodies’ and ‘expressions’ is caused by the fact that “one never does what one says [and, equally] one never says what one does” (Deleuze, 2006: 53 cited in Hynek, 2012: 18). Therefore, the collective assemblage of enunciation deals with discourses, statements, expressions and ‘meanings’. Deleuze and Guattari state that, though language plays an important role in the assemblage, it does not have a leading role, and strongly depends on the abstract machine (ATP: 91). Nevertheless, ‘expression’ cannot be reduced to either linguistics or representation. Snicek (2007: 58-59, emphasis in the original) stresses that ‘expression’ is always a matter of function in the assemblage: “…it is itself within the world having real effects on its surroundings; it is not distinct from the world, abstractly representing it, nor is it simply a matter of transmitting information. Expression is a real force within the world and as such, has the same ontological status as material.” That is why for Deleuze and Guattari language is not just a tool of communication, but is itself a particular event. Thus, the ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’
is addressing the power of language to create and change the reality. This ability of language to change the reality is also addressed by the Copenhagen School, which I discussed earlier in this chapter.

Both the Copenhagen School and Deleuze and Guattari address the issue of action and language with a reference to the philosophy of language and, in particular, the work of Austin (1975) who developed the theory of a speech act. While Deleuze and Guattari developed an understanding of a speech act in relation to its role in an assemblage, the Copenhagen School developed the concept of a speech act in order to understand the dynamic of security. Below I integrate the approach of Deleuze and Guattari with the ideas of the Copenhagen school in order to develop an instrument for an analysis of the pole of ‘expression’ of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012).

4.9.1. Deleuze and the Copenhagen School: performative sentences, ‘incorporeal transformations’ and impersonality of language

Deleuze and Guattari argue for the supremacy of collective enunciation over language and words, since the linguistic system cannot offer adequate forms of expression (ATP: 90). They use speech act theory to build up their understanding of collective annunciation and claim that language has neither an informational nor communicational function. The primary purpose of language is to transmit ‘order-words’ (ATP: 77), because “speech acts…are, and can only be, accomplished in the statement” (ATP: 79). Often language is regarded as a descriptive tool, but there are other types of expressions besides statements of facts like, ‘this is a table’. Not every utterance just states the facts; there are other kinds of sentences, which are actions in themselves. There is a certain goal and these utterances are intended to fulfil it. Austin (1975) calls these performative sentences. For example, the sentence, ‘Today the names of Nobel prize nominees are announced’ performs an action. The situation for the person and around this person, whose name is announced, is changed. This person is not simply a scientist, a writer or a politician any more. The status is changed into ‘nominated for the Nobel prize’. That is why, with reference to performative sentences, Deleuze and Guattari argue that “[o]rder-words do not concern commands only, but every act that is linked to statements by a ‘social obligation’. Every statement displays this link, directly or indirectly. Questions and promises are ‘order-words’. The only possible definition of language is the set of all order-words, implicit presuppositions, or speech acts current in a language at a given moment” (ATP: 79). The idea of performative sentences or ‘order-words’ suggested by Austin (1975) was used by
Copenhagen School for understanding security as a speech act. “Traditionally, by saying ‘security,’ a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development” (Buzan et al., 1998: 21). Thus, the word ‘security’ is an ‘order-word’ capable of changing the reality: an issue or a person can be claimed as a ‘threat’ that should be minimized or eliminated. Below, with the use of ideas of Deleuze and Guattari and the findings of the Copenhagen School, I will outline several features of performative sentences which are important for the analysis of the security assemblage (2007-2012).

Performative sentences always demand an articulation of circumstances: “…a performative statement is nothing outside of the circumstances that make it performative. Anybody can shout, ‘I declare a general mobilization’, but in the absence of an effectuated variable giving that person the right to make such a statement it is an act of puerility or insanity, not an act of enunciation” (ATP: 82). Therefore, performative sentences, in order to be effective, should be said by a particular enunciator within certain circumstances or institutions. The issue of circumstance was addressed by the Copenhagen School in relation to the theory of securitization. Securitization as a claim that an issue or an object is an existential threat to survival of a state or society is a speech act in action. The Copenhagen school outlines two conditions of a speech act, which define its success: internal (the grammar of security\(^{112}\)) and external (the social capital of the enunciator and objects of assumed threat) (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). The role of an enunciator belongs to those who have power and access to the resources of power, thus having obtained the privilege to speak on behalf of someone. For example, the introduction of the human security concept by the UN in 1994 can be considered as a speech act (Maclean, 2008). In this case, an international organization became a securitizing actor and the target audience consisted of policy-makers and academics. Some of the recipients accepted this concept (it became state policy or acquired advocates in the scientific community). Others within the established security realm did not accept it. Therefore, Maclean (2008: 486) concludes, the securitization act remains incomplete. That is why, the collective nature of enunciation demands closer attention to the fields of public discussions in order to study how the audience receives speech acts. It admits the possibility that various actors can express their opinion about an issue and operationalize/reconceptualise ‘collective enunciation’ in other terms than the one who initiated the statement. I noted earlier in this chapter that a state as a

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\(^{112}\) The grammar of security includes threat, the point of no return and a possible way out (Buzan et al., 1998: 33).
collective actor has more experience in securitization moves than any other actor. It can also count on different institutions, which support and recreate its power. It means that most likely, the state articulates a ‘collective enunciation’ within the assemblage, nevertheless other actors might also articulate it. It means that the ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’ can consist of several enunciations and my task is to detect and analyse these collective statements.

Another significant feature of performative sentences or ‘order-words’ is connected to the issue of validity. Performative sentences are beyond the conventional truth/false dichotomy, since they do not bear ‘truth conditions’, but the conditions of ‘felicity’ (Stritzel, 2007: 361). Conditions of ‘felicity’ are defined by Austin (1975: 12-24) as a set of rules necessary for a successful (‘happy’) fulfilment of performative statements, such as special conventional procedure, particular circumstances or acceptance by all the participants. In security speech act these conditions are called as ‘facilitating conditions’, which influence the success of a securitizing move and include “the form of the act, position of speaker and historical resonance of particular ‘threats’” (Wæver, 2000: 252-253). Since performative sentences are beyond the conventional way of validation, these sentences have the power to create and re-create ‘reality’, since a speech act can change a situation. Deleuze and Guattari argue that language is created to be obeyed, not to be believed. For example, police or governmental announcements often have “little plausiblility or truthfulness, but say very clearly what should be observed and retained” (ATP: 76). According to Deleuze and Guattari ‘order-words’ show that language does not present information, but fulfils “incorporeal transformations” (ATP: 81). ‘Incorporeal transformations’ do not change anything in the body of a person, but all the changes occur around the body.113 ‘Incorporeal transformations’ are based on ‘order-words’ and demonstrate creative power of language, its ability to be an agent of change. For example, the transformation of a person nominated for a Nobel prize into a Nobel prize winner happens at the moment the committee announces: “The Nobel prize winner is …” Deleuze and Guattari write: “The incorporeal transformation is recognizable by its instantaneousness, its immediacy, by the simultaneity of the statement expressing the transformation and the effect the transformation produces; that is why order-words are precisely dated, to the hour, minute, and second, and take effect the moment they are dated” (ATP: 81). Thus, a speech act always happens at a given

113 Deleuze and Guattari apply the word ‘body in ‘its broadest sense’ (there are mental bodies, souls are bodies, etc.) (ATP: 80).
moment and in a particular situation. My task is to examine the circumstances of the ‘collective enunciation’ and define if any ‘incorporeal transformation’ took place.

The third specific quality of performative sentences is related to their nature. Deleuze and Guattari claim, “[t]here is no individual enunciation. There is not even a subject of enunciation” (ATP: 79). Deleuze and Guattari stress the primacy of ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’ over language and words (ATP: 90), because through the ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’, desire and the abstract machine acquire material manifestation and become visible. That is why when Deleuze and Guattari talk about the ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’, they refer to this as the “impersonality” of language.¹¹⁴ Particular people can announce the order-words, but a speech act still requires a social field (ATP: 80).

### 4.9.2. The collective assemblage of enunciation in the Russian context

As I stated in previous section, I am examining the ‘machinic assemblage of actors’, which includes both individuals and the state. I also pointed above that the state as a security actor is more experienced in the pronouncement of collective statements especially in the field of security. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the state has a privileged position in expressing collective enunciation. Desire as a creative force behind collective enunciations can find different ways to be manifested. My task is to identify collective enunciations in relation to desire and the abstract machine and to examine their function in the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012).

I claimed in the previous section that it is necessary to address the issue of ‘collective enunciations’ in relation to the context. Therefore attention to the history of the country is necessary in order to understand the specific of utterances in Russian context. The issue of language and the question of public discussion was examined by Vakhtin (2015) and Gladarev (2015). Vakhtin (2015) claims that during the USSR a specific Soviet language was produced. The core of this Soviet language was ‘ritualized speech’ (Vakhtin, 2015). In the frame of this ‘ritualized speech’, true or false meaning was not important, but the way of utterance and selection of right words was essential. This ‘ritualized speech’ was based on ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ statements. Paraphrasing Deleuze and Guattari, the Soviet language was created to be obeyed,

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not to be believed. As a result, in contemporary Russia people know what they can say and what they cannot. I claimed in Chapter 1 that people are not used to talk about security in Russia, because for a long time it was marked as a state prerogative. Thus, it was the ‘wrong’ topic to be discussed by the public. This is an example of how ‘ritualized speech’ works in practice.

I stated in the previous section that collective nature of enunciation demands closer attention to the field of public discussions. Gladarev (2015) applies the metaphor ‘public dumbness’ in his socio-linguistic study of Russian society in 2008 to 2012 and claims that Russian society lacks the experience of public debates and is still learning how to conduct them. Gladarev (2015: 282-284) lists seven features of Russian public debates: mistrust of ‘the other’ (since they could be dangerous); domination of monologue over dialogue; refusal to compromise (compromise is regarded as a loss for both sides); maximalism (which presupposes a monopoly on truth and the existence of ‘right’ opinion); ignorance / neglect of formal procedures; under-development of a public register; deficit of regulatory courtesy (respect to the opponent, the ability to express gratitude and to apologize are considered weaknesses). These phenomena of ‘public dumbness’, as specific characteristics of contemporary Russian society, will be examined in relation to the Shtokman project (see Chapter 7). I will also discuss how it affects actors and their agency in the security assemblage (2007-2012).

4.10. Vertical axis: ‘territory’

Above, I discussed the horizontal axis of the assemblage and its two poles: the ‘collective assemblage of actors’ and ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’. Below, I elaborate on the vertical axis, which also deals with two poles, “one of stability and organisation, one of change and transmutation” (Houen, 2008: 24). The pole of ‘stability and organisation’ is called a ‘territory’. The concept of a ‘territory’ has no particular definition, but it has several important characteristics and connections to other concepts, which I will discuss in this section.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the concept of a ‘territory’ is not limited to the geographical idea of land or earth, since “territory can be a system of any kind: conceptual, linguistic, social, or affective” (Patton, 2011: 119). Thus, a ‘territory’ is a place, where the poles of the horizontal axis ‘actors’ and ‘expressions’ meet. A ‘territory’ does not exist prior to an assemblage. As Wise (2005: 78) stresses, “assemblages create territories. Territories are more than just spaces: they have a stake, a claim, they express (my house, their ranch, his bench, her friends).”
Therefore, a ‘territory’ includes such characteristics as intensity, speed and connections. Thus, a ‘territory’ is just a dimension and does not form a binary opposition to other movements (for example, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, which I will discuss further in this chapter). A ‘territory’ makes it possible to stabilise the arrangement.

4.10.1. Peculiarities of the Russian space

The issue of space has appeared in Russian studies before (Medvedev, 1999; Zamyatin, 2003; Blakkisrud and Hønneland, 2006ab; Heleniak, 2009; Hønneland, 2010; Tarakanov, 2010; Zhukov, 2014). The Russian Arctic is a social construct, and its boundaries were changed throughout the history of the country in accordance with state priorities (Heleniak, 2009: 130). Due to the distances between settlements in Russia, Russian space can be regarded as a power in itself, “a grey eminence” of Russian politics (Zamyatin, 2003: 40). The attempt to organize Russia’s vast space and to gain control over the remote territories contributes to the development of an “atopic culture” or in other words a lack of a sense of space in Russia (Medvedev, 1999: 18). Medvedev (1999) writes that the territory of the country is big, divided by long distances between the settlements where natural boundaries are, in some instances, indistinct. “This characteristic reconciles Russians to the centralized government, and they have become accustomed to define their geographical surroundings according to administrative/territorial divisions, rather than by historical/cultural regions, as do the majority of the world’s nations” (Medvedev, 1999: 18). Medvedev (1999: 18) states that this atopic culture’ leads to disintegration between the regions along the administrative lines. From my perspective, this ‘atopic culture’ creates the perfect conditions for assemblage construction, since naturally predetermined connections can take over artificial establishment and lead to the creation of particular territories, which are different from official administrative borders. This peculiar situation with the Russian space adds a new angle to the security assemblage and I will examine it further in Chapters 8 and 9.

4.10.2. The Russian Arctic as ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ space

Deleuze and Guattari addressed the issue of ‘territory’ as a geographic space in relation to their understanding of the concept of the state. According to Deleuze and Guattari the state has two distinct functions: capturing of forces and fixation of the system. In relation to this Deleuze and Guattari introduce two characteristics of space: ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’. According to
Deleuze and Guattari, a ‘smooth’ space has always more potential for transformation of an assemblage than a ‘striated’ space (ATP: 480).

Deleuze and Guattari claim that initially, our planet Earth is a free or ‘smooth’ space: various elements co-exist with each other and are not subject to any measurement (Protevi, 2010: 83-85). The sea is an archetype of a ‘smooth’ space: unlimited and open (ATP: 478). At the same time the sea is striated as a maritime space due to astronomical and geographical achievements: “[B]earings, obtained by a set of calculations based on exact observation of the stars and the sun; and the map, which intertwines meridians and parallels, longitudes and latitudes, plotting regions known and unknown onto a grid” (ATP: 479, emphasis in the original). Thus, a ‘smooth’ space has no boundaries, it does not privilege one thing over another. Rather it contains numerous possibilities and is counterposed to any measurement systems. The division of this planet into independent states is an example of a ‘striated’ space. The Earth is transformed into a ‘land’ by the movements of capture and centralisation. Each state introduced various systems in order to capture the ‘smooth’ space and to subordinate it to own purposes. Heininen (2016), while discussing the architecture of security in the Arctic, illustrates how the nation-states in the region tried to capture physical (or ‘smooth’) space in the name of security. The Arctic territory was approached differently according to how the needs of the respective states evolved in particular political situations. Thus, the Arctic, since the World War II, was transformed from a “nation-territory” into a “military flank”, then into a “military theatre,” subsequently into a place of “cooperation” and most recently into a space of “contradiction between state sovereignty versus globalization” (Heininen, 2016: 17-18). Thus, a ‘land’ or a ‘striated’ space, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is a ‘territory’ which is captured and codified by the state apparatus through, for example, the imposition of state borders, particular notions or by a tax imposed by the state over a particular territory (ATP: 440-443).

The initial move to the Russian Arctic115 was a move of politico-economic capture of the Earth and its resources. The Soviet state made a tremendous attempt in the 20th century to claim the Arctic as a frontier, a space where brave Soviet people met the elements and mastered their rule over nature (McCannon, 1998; Bergman, 1998). However, heroic mythology was just a part of the bigger picture – political and economic pressure were at the root of the systematic assimilation of the Arctic (Josephson, 2014). Nevertheless, the Soviet government could not define the Arctic (or Northern) territories for decades, despite its own system of classification.

115 For historical overview see, for example, McCannon, 1998; Bergman, 1998; Josephson, 2014.
of the territories which involved a mixture of climatic, cultural, historical and administrative criteria. As a result, the southern border of the Northern territories was blurred and the Northern territories had artificial borders (Blakkisrud and Hønneland, 2006a; Zhukov, 2014). The first documents dealing with the Northern territories date back to 1931 and 1932. The first list of region of the Far North and regions equivalent to the Far North was approved in 1967 in connection to the resolution on the privileges for people working in the Far North. Lately, a number of territories were added to that list, and the territories with ‘uncomfortable climatic conditions’, but lying outside the geographical borders of the North, were included. Thus, the North as a spatial term was never specifically defined. Contemporary Russia inherited this unsolved methodological difficulty and made the territorial definition more complicated by trying to differentiate the Arctic territory of Russia from the North. By 2006, despite numerous attempts to get a clear definition, the government still had not managed to agree upon new criteria for the Russian Arctic (Blakkisrud and Hønneland, 2006b: 194). That is why I will explore in Chapter 8 whether the Russian state managed to capture the territory of the Arctic in 2007-2012 and discuss how this affects the security assemblage in the Murmansk region.

By distinguishing between the ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ spaces, Deleuze and Guattari focus on combinations and changes: how new forces appear and develop, which movements take place and which disappear. Deleuze and Guattari point out that both spaces do not exist in solitary but constantly criss-cross each other (ATP: 474), though a ‘smooth’ space contains greater possibilities for changes than a ‘striated’ space (ATP: 480). A ‘territory’ stabilises the arrangement. Nevertheless, a ‘territory” has a ‘mobile and shifting center’ (Message, 2010: 280), which means that it does not have a fixed image or foundation and thus is constantly in the flux of formation and reconstruction. Because of this dual nature, a ‘territory’ of an assemblage participates in creation of new topographies (from local places to the outer space) and becomes a place of change and transformation. This allows examining the dynamic of the security assemblage and analysing how spatial dimension affects the concept of security. This

116 Postanovlenie № 957 Soveta Narodnyh Komissarov RSFSR “O hozjastvennom razvitii raionov Kraинegо Severa.” [The resolution № 957 of the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR “On the economic development of the Far North”], (1931); Postanovlenie Vserossiyskogo zentral’nogo komiteta Soveta Narodnyh Komissarov RSFSR “Ob utverzdenii polozheniya o l’gotah dl’a liz, rabotajuschih na Kraинem Severe” [The resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, The Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR “On Approval of the Provision of the benefits for those working in the far north of the RSFSR”] (1932).

117 Resolutiya Soveta ministrov SSSR №1029 “Perechen’ raionov Kraинego Severa i mestnostei, priravnennyh k raionam Kraинegо Severa.” [The resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR № 1029 “Enumeration of the regions of the Far North and the territories equivalent to the regions of the Far North”](1967). This document is still in power in Russia (by August 2017).

118 For more detailed analysis see, for example, Blakkisrud and Hønneland, 2006ab.
spatial dimension also brings forward the issue of regional differences within the state and relations between centre and periphery. The concept of security is strongly dominated by the central state in Russia. Nevertheless, the territorial dimension helps to analyse how security is understood in the region and thus to evaluate the role of local security practices in the assemblage. Through application of the concepts of ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ space, I will examine whether the Russian state managed to capture the Russian Arctic in terms of definition and subordination. It helps to understand if the Russian state fulfils its functions of capturing and stabilising in the security assemblage.

4.11. ‘Lines of flight’ as a move between ‘territory’ and ‘cutting edges’

The vertical axis consists of two poles: the ‘territory’ (which I already discussed in the previous section) and the ‘cutting edges’ (which I will discuss in the next section). But before moving to the pole ‘cutting edges’, I have to address the dynamic of changes and transformation which is stressed through the concept of a ‘line of flight’. It is connected to the concept of a rhizome, which makes connections through lines. For example, ‘striated’ and ‘smooth’ spaces replace each other through ‘lines of flight’. ‘Lines of flight’ are an essential element of any assemblage since they “define the form of creativity specific to that assemblage, the particular ways in which it can effect transformation in other assemblages or in itself” (Patton, 2000: 106). ‘Lines of flight’ are creative and transformative, but contain potential danger and uncertainty, because it is hard to predict what direction the ‘line of flight’ will take, what elements will be involved and what kind of multiplicity will be created (Patton, 2000: 67). As Houen (2008: 31) shows, ‘lines of flight’ can turn into lines of destruction for the self or others – through, for example, death, alcoholism or madness. Through the analysis of ‘actors’, ‘expressions’ and a ‘territory’ I will identify ‘lines of flight’, specific for the security assemblage (2007-2012), and examine changes generated by ‘lines of flight’ in order to reveal the nature of the security assemblage and its ability to produce new meanings of security. “The assemblage is destined to produce a new reality, by making numerous, often unexpected, connections” (Livesey, 2010: 19). Therefore, I will examine if the security assemblage (2007-2012) is capable to generate something new: new understanding of security, a new territorial/spatial organization, a new behaviour.

The other pole of the vertical axis is a pole of “change and transmutation” (Houen 2008: 24). This pole is called ‘cutting edges’ and is characterized by two processes: deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation.

The process of deterritorialisation is “the operation of a line of flight” and takes place when something or somebody moves from the ‘territory’ (ATP: 508) and this move leads to any personal, social or political change (Patton, 2000: 106). Deterritorialisation can take different forms: it can involve new ways of doing things or new means; new topics or motives might appear in public discussions or in policies; new actors might come into play. Patton (2000: 101) stresses that deterritorialisation has a complex structure since it involves at least two elements: the ‘territory’ and the deterritorializing element.

Another concept related to ‘lines of flight’ and deterritorialisation is that of reterritorialisation. Reterritorialisation does not mean returning to the territory of departure. Rather it is a recombination of deterritorialized elements (Patton, 2012: 208). Deleuze and Guattari state that it is always deterritorialized flow that both starts the process of slowing down of movements and determines the stoppage of flows. A construction becomes fixed, and no new meanings appear. Thus, movements of reterritorialisation tend to make the assemblage stable. Both deterritorialization as a movement that destabilizes established code by making it more open and inclusive (decoding) and reterritorialization as a movement aimed at fixation of established code (overcoding) coexist, and in the research, it is necessary to be aware that both processes can operate in the same assemblage (ATP: 220-221).

These movements of reterritorialisation, deterritorialisation and ‘lines of flight’ constitute the specifics of each assemblage. Since an assemblage is composed of these movements, it is hard to compare assemblages with each other, because they deal with qualities (like speed, intensity, movement, slowness), which are hard to measure (ATP: 307). By focusing on the processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in the security assemblage (2007-2012), I will examine how the meanings of security are produced. I am going to discover what interpretations of security exists in Russia (initial code or system), if this system can be more open and, for example, local security practices help to include new meanings of security (decoding) or if this system is aimed at closing and stabilization of meanings of security through local security practices (over-coding).
4.13. Conclusion

The security assemblage has four dimensions: actors - words, territory-‘cutting edges’. These dimensions, in turn, can form some smaller micro-assemblages. In a way, I can compare this structure with a Russian doll (a matryoshka doll): you open the biggest one and there is a smaller one inside, which in turn exposes a smaller one and so on. To avoid any possible confusion, I will propose that I call these four dimensions as ‘micro-assemblages’ which all together form the security assemblage in the Murmansk region in relations to Shtokman in 2007-2012. The abstract machine, which defines the rules of oil and gas development in the Murmansk region, governs the composition of the security assemblage. It is driven by desire, which underpins the actions and expressions of the actors. Desire creates an outlook of conditions which influenced the emergence of the security assemblage in 2007-2012. I explore micro-assemblages located along horizontal and vertical axes: the machinic assemblage of actors, the collective assemblage of enunciation, the ‘territory’ and ‘cutting edges’. ‘Cutting edges’ are related to ‘lines of flight’, which can penetrate any micro-assemblage and potentially each of them can be deterritorialised and reterritorialised (see Figure 7.). The focus of my analysis is on the functions of the state and the individual in the assemblage.

![Figure 7. Structure of the security assemblage (2007-2012)]
5. Insecurity of expectations as a main rule of the abstract machine of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012)

“We simply say that fish is for everyone and forever, but oil is for a time and for a few”
(Interviewee 20, September 2008)

In this chapter, I will discuss the specifics of the abstract machine within the security assemblage. As I explained in Chapter 4, the abstract machine creates the framework of a particular assemblage and can be approached as a rule that governs the composition of the security assemblage along the assemblage’s vertical and horizontal axis. It means that the abstract machine is relevant for all micro-assemblages: the machinic assemblage of actors, the collective assemblage of enunciation, a ‘territory’ and ‘cutting edges’. Therefore, an examination of the abstract machine is important for understanding how the connections between the actors can be made in the assemblage, what actors can do and what they cannot.

Russian politics are challenging and complex, and it is not possible to encapsulate the unique dynamics of the entire Russian political system. Instead, I will draw from elements of the system that are important to the development and understanding of the security assemblage, which in turn provides us insights into the creation of security in the Russian context. As assemblages are open and do not exist in isolation or closed domains (Srnicek, 2007: 53), I cannot study the security assemblage (2007-2012) in isolation from the wider context of the legal system, regional policy, natural resource management and the system of governance in Russia. As such, the analysis conducted in this chapter will serve to illuminate the context in which the security assemblage emerged.

5.1. Oil and gas sector as state business: implications for the Murmansk region

In chapter 4 I discussed the differences in regional and national expectations related to the Shtokman project and pointed out that it is not clear how these expectations are reconciled with each other. Below, I discuss the general trends related to the oil and gas development in Russia and their implications for the assemblage in the Murmansk region. I mainly refer to the works of Kryukov and Moe as they have extensive experience with the Russian petroleum sector, and methodically follow the main trends in its development.

According to Kryukov (2009: 37), the Russian model of management of oil and gas resources in the Arctic has three main characteristics: centralism, corporatism and paternalism. Centralism implying that management of oil and gas resources is concentrated in the hands of
the state. Corporatism pertains to the extent to which the major state companies, Gazprom and Rosneft, dominate the process of exploration on the Arctic shelf. This system of management does not create competitive conditions for smaller or private companies, which could provide solutions for technical difficulties as well as contributing to more efficient production (Kryukov and Moe, 2014: 50). Paternalism, finally, refers to those processes whereby it is assumed that addressing the socio-economic problems of the Arctic territories is dependent on the priorities of corporations.

The result is that the needs of the northern regions have not been taken into consideration by Moscow (Kryukov and Moe, 2006: 139). In 1992, after the collapse of the USSR, the principle of joint management of natural resources between the federal and the regional authorities was introduced in Russia and the regions started receiving around 68% of the revenue for the use of mineral resources located on their territory (Kryukov and Moe, 2006: 138). However, in 2002 the payment to the regions was reduced and, in 2004, the principle of joint management was abolished. The income from oil and gas resources was centralized and accumulated in the state budget. As a result the Russian state economy became resource-based and dependent on oil and gas revenues. Such centralization and state control over national resources creates a situation where the state hardly considers the interests of the regions. It means that the oil and gas sector, though articulated by the state as a new source of economic security, can hardly be perceived in the same way in the region. At the same time, this total dependence of the state on oil and gas revenues makes its economy more vulnerable as it is not diversified, and it is not clear how such dependency on raw materials can provide security for the country.

At the same time, major state companies have rights over the oil and gas reserves of these territories and are responsible for development of large-scale regional projects, like Shtokman. Head offices are often located in Moscow, and companies have little understanding of regional needs, but they are in charge of development plans for these far off territories. This brings uncertainty in the regions where the deposits are located: neither the state nor corporations take responsibility for regional development.

Though the system of management of oil and gas resources is characterized as centralized due to prioritization of state companies and state control over revenues, there are no clear norms and rules (Tompson, 2006; Moe and Kryukov, 2010). An inadequate regulatory framework in

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combination with weak rule of law and changing political interests of the Russian authorities lead to difficulties for private and small companies with licensing, limits the ability to attract foreign oil companies and results in an unclear parcelling out of responsibility for possible problems – financial, ecological, social etc. (Kryukov, 2009; Moe and Kryukov, 2010; Goes, 2013a; Mitrova, 2014). It affects the predictability of investing and the investment climate in the country, and, consequently puts into question the implementation of such large and technically difficult projects as Shtokman. The situation is characterised by Kryukov (2009: 37) as a “game without rules”. It contributes to the creation of insecurity of expectations in relation to Shtokman among the actors. For example, as the analysis of expectations in Chapter 3 demonstrated, community members are aware of this “game without rules” in the petroleum sector. That is why some interviewees expressed concerns with regard to potential oil and gas development in the region and questioned actual benefits for the region from the Shtokman gas deposit. Moreover, the state, companies and regions are plunged into conflict by constant changes in the sector, unpredictability of the legal system combined with an absence of clear technical regulations and a dearth of national and industry management standards (Kryukov, 2009: 37).

As I noted above, relationships between centre (Moscow) and the region are challenging since the centre does not take into consideration regional needs. Below, I put this state-region nexus into broader context of governance in Russia and discuss how existing governance model affects the Murmansk region and the security assemblage (2007-2012).

5.2. ‘Vertical power structure’ as a governance model: implications for the region

The Russian Federation consists of 85\(^{120}\) constituent entities (subjects).\(^{121}\) The Murmansk region is one of 46 entities of the Russian Federation that has been given the status of region (oblast). The Murmansk region consists of 12 city counties, five municipal districts, 13 urban settlements and 10 rural settlements. This is the level of local authorities. The region has its own government, a regional charter (ustav) and can pass legislation. The governor heads the region. The region also hosts local departments of the federal authorities.\(^{122}\) Since 2000, the

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\(^{120}\) By August 2017 the Russian Federation is divided into 85 territorial-administrative subjects: 46 oblasts, 22 republics, 4 autonomous okrugs, 9 krays; 3 federal cities and 1 autonomous oblast.

\(^{121}\) In Russian the term is subject [subject]. The official Russian translation of the Constitution includes both terms ‘entity’ and ‘subject’.

region has been part of the North-West Federal district, which is governed by a Presidential envoy or plenipotentiary – a part of the Presidential administration. Since December 2009, this special Presidential envoy, who is located in Saint Petersburg, has been represented in the region by the chief federal inspector of the Murmansk region.

The existing system of governance in contemporary Russia conditions the reforms conducted in the country and makes regional politics ineffective, since Russia is neither a federation nor a unitary state (Kolodina, 2008: 31). Kolodina (2008) points out that two parallel processes have been going on simultaneously in Russia: the development of federal relations (a legal separation of powers) and a movement towards a unitary state with controlled regions and municipalities. According to Kolodina (2008: 31), those processes have been through several stages. The first period from 1991 until 1998 was characterised by a weak federal centre and a regional ‘parade of sovereignties’. The federal authorities were too focused on their own problems, which opened the opportunity for the regions to focus on their own. The second period, from 1999 to 2004, involved the formation of a ‘vertical power structure’. This period saw not only a change in the balance of power, but also the establishment of a whole system of relations between the centre and the regions (Kolodina, 2008: 32). Regional legislation became unified in accordance with federal standards, an institute of federal districts was created and regional governors lost their seats in the Federal Council. The creation of the federal districts, the introduction of the envoys and cancellation of direct elections for governors (there was de facto presidential appointment of governors) – all of these developments affected governance processes in the regions. The inability of the governor to act to the benefit of the region is viewed in the region as an obstacle for regional development. In the words of one interviewee:

“[Asks (ML)]: In your opinion, what factors influence the processes of development in the region?
[Answers (Interviewee 9)]: At the moment – politics of the ‘vertical power structure’. I understand so, but again, it is my opinion, that since the governors are not elected anymore and are appointed, very little is being done. Well, actually it is logical that little will be done for the interests of the inhabitants of the region, and a lot will be done for Moscow – in order to be reappointed as a governor again. You are not interested in your own residents” (Interviewee 9, September 2008).

\[123\] *Sovet Federatsii* is the upper house of the Federal Assembly of Russia.
Thus, the interviewee points out that the appointment, not election, of governors brings more harm than good to the region, since the governor prioritises Moscow’s interests over those of the region.

The third stage, from 2005 until 2008, was the period of the creation of the unitary state: a time of centralization and the installation of strong central control over the periphery (Kolodina, 2008: 32). It included changes in the tax system which meant that almost all regional budgets entered into deficit and became dependent upon subsidies from the centre. Economic dependency became one of the most crucial features of the ‘vertical power structure’. By 2012, only 13 regions of the Russian Federation were ‘donors’ to the state budget – 60 received grants for balancing their budgets (Zaitseva and Selin, 2012: 168). The regions of the Arctic zone contribute with more than 30% of all taxes, fees and other mandatory payments to the central state budget, raised by all the entities of the Russian Federation (Barasheva, 2012: 160). Pavlov and Selin (2012: 208) label these economic relations as “discriminatory,” since the regions do not receive enough money from the centre to cover their own costs, but have to become sponsors of various state activities.

The construction of the ‘vertical power structure’ placed the regions in a subordinate position which brought with it increased uncertainty. This condition can easily turn into apathy, when individuals become aware that their own actions have little meaning for progress or change, and they have no power to make decisions and take responsibility for their own lives. As one of the interviewees noted: “To predict the development of the region is possible only from Moscow. What do they want? Non-renewable recourses are limited” (Interviewee 6, September 2008). Another interviewee also expressed their concern about this structure of governance, which they regard as not good either for the centre or the region, since all the risks and problems accumulate in the regions, while the money remains in Moscow, and nobody can or wants to make an adequate response. The interviewee continues:

“All the companies are headquartered in Moscow. Moscow still remains the main source of [pause] well, not a main source, let’s say the main distributor of finance, and resources… The authorities of the region do not have such a power: not in a financial, administrative or political sense. And what happens? Here is the production [points to different directions by hands]. And there is money. What kind of growth, can we adequately speak about in the region?” (Interviewee 13, October 2008).
Thus researchers, professionals and the community agree that the economic potential of the Murmansk region, in practical terms, does not benefit their own regional budget system, since money goes to the federal budget and the region lacks any administrative power. As Barasheva (2012: 161) concludes, Russian fiscal legislation enshrines a low level of income for regional and local budgets.

The state created the ‘vertical power structure’, which penetrates the region through flows of money (or lack of them), legal framing, the physical location of offices, and a subordination to the Presidential representative. As a result of these disproportional relations between the regions and the centre and desire tension related to the petroleum sector, the Murmansk region has become enmeshed in a web of insecurities.

5.3. Insecurity of expectations as a main rule of the abstract machine

I discussed in Chapter 4 the concept of security of expectations. Bentham argued that present conditions needed to be secured if security was to be ensured for the future (Hoogensen, 2005: 13). According to Bentham the state has a responsibility for providing security for the individual. I demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter that the relations between Moscow and the regions are difficult, and noted that the state is not able to perceive the needs of the region either in terms of oil and gas development or in terms of regional governance. In the section that follows I will discuss whether or not the state has a will or capacity to secure its own expectations as well as the expectations of community members in the region. This discussion will help to explain the choice of strategies and actions available for the state and individuals in the security assemblage (2007-2012), which I will discuss in Chapter 6.

5.3.1. State expectations

State ambitions in the Arctic region are related to natural resources, the development of cooperation, conservation of the unique ecological systems of the Arctic, development of transportation and use of the Northern Sea route (BRFA-2020, Chapter 2, Article 4). Nevertheless, the main interest of the state were outlined by President Medvedev in 2008 in his opening speech of the Security Council of the Russian Federation: “Of course, our first and main task – to turn the Arctic into a resource base of Russia in the 21st century, and in order to achieve this a number of special questions should be answered. The main question is how to
ensure a reliable protection of Russia's national interests in the Arctic region.”

Thus, state expectations are related to security issues and national interests.

At the same time, there are voices at the state level that address the question of state expectations and regional development. The Committee on the North and Indigenous people of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation publishes a newsletter twice a year, which is distributed to government officials. The newsletter is a collection of reports and analysis. Kryukov (2009) published the article, *The Arctic shelf – territory of dreams and reality* in this newsletter, where he discusses justifications for state ‘dreams’ and claims the reality of the development of resources in the Arctic basin is very complex. Kryukov (2009) urges the Russian state to become more effective, if the state wants its dreams to become reality. Kryukov (2009: 38-42) suggests several steps, which should be implemented in order to stimulate development and mitigate against the ‘anti-stimuli’ that dog the oil and gas sector in the Arctic (unclear legislation, problems between state and private companies and between foreign and Russian companies, issues of license, taxes etc.). Kryukov (2009: 42) also claims that “the role of the state should be different at different stages of exploration and development of hydrocarbons.” Otherwise, according to Kryukov (2009) the state expectations are at risk due to the state’s rigid system and the inability of the system to adjust to the situation and to tackle immediate risks.

However, the disconnect between the state dreams of a hydrocarbon bonanza and reality is not addressed by the state. This means that state expectations are insecure. The question is what kind of strategy the state would pursue to secure them? I discuss the answer to this question in the next chapter.

5.3.2. Expectations from the region

Expectations in the region are very mixed. In order to illustrate the divergence, I highlight three parts from three different interviews. The third example consists of two parts: one was recorded and one was written down as the interviewee wanted to express their opinion, but voice

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recording was more challenging for them then handwriting. I made my notes during this part of the interview.

Example 1

“… it is known that the oil and gas industry has a significant impact on the socio-economic development of the region. From my point of view the case of Hammerfest is a good example. It is also located in the North. When there was the development of Snøhvit field, the old-timers of the city compared the region's development with the restoration after the World War II. New roads appeared, shops and businesses opened, the demographic situation improved ... It is known that up to 80% of the work in the oil and gas industry is fulfilled by suppliers, so the oil and gas industry offers additional opportunities for companies that want to become suppliers. This [includes] metalworking, supply of equipment, special clothing, food, and other, and other. This is a huge spectrum…” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).

Example 2

“[Asks (ML)]: And what do you think preconditions the activity in the oil and gas sphere? [Answers (Interviewee 9)]: Price [pause] on energy sources. [pause]. In the first place. Why, it seems to me, all these talks were artificially started about the Shtokman field, about the Arctic shelf, about the Prirazlomnoe field. One gets a very unfair situation for residents of the regions, which have these reserves of oil and gas in subsoil. The same is true in Siberia, the same thing, in my opinion, is true for Kaliningrad, Kamchatka, generally wherever there is oil and gas. This oil and gas will be exported. Residents of the region will get serious environmental problems as a result [of this oil and gas activity], and their regions will not be fully gasified. And people in the regions will get nuclear power plants that will give them electricity, and everything. In our state it is considered that nuclear energy is much cheaper than oil and gas. Oil and gas is more profitable to sell abroad. Natural gas is a much cleaner source of energy than the atom [nods in confirmation of own words], and, it turns out to be a very, very unfair picture. Yes, and in fact, nuclear power is cheaper. So we get such a picture, that the higher the price of oil and gas, the higher the extraction will be, the greater will be the environmental problems in the region, and the more nuclear power plants will be built” (Interviewee 9, September 2008).
Example 3

“[concludes the reflections (Interviewee 4)]: The future theoretically is very beautiful, but in practice – [I] do not know yet.

[Interviewee 4 asks to stop recording. ML asks if paper and pen could be used instead. The interviewee allows ML to write down the following part. Continues after the recorder it turned off (Interviewee 4)]: Oil is a fairy tale. Therefore, fields are named after fairy-tale characters in Norway. We will not have this. We have socially unsecured human beings (high rents, the inability to obtain subsidies). Human beings are face to face with a problem. We have the laws, but there are many nuances that prevent a privilege from being applied for. We have double standards: there’s one thing on paper, but the reality is different. You know, the oil was already being extracted in Tsarist Russia. And it never had an influence on the lives of ordinary people” (Interviewee 4, September 2008).

These three examples reflect the spectrum of expectations in the region. Community members hope that Shtokman will bring some changes to the region. In Example 1, the interviewee refers to Norway, which faces the same arctic conditions. The interviewee focuses on the possible involvement of regional business in the petroleum project and gives a positive evaluation of the situation, by comparing the development related to oil and gas activity with the restoration after the WWII.

Example 2 shows that some people are not so sure about the results of the development. The interviewee does not have high expectations of oil and gas activity in the region and calls this situation ‘unfair’. The interviewee claims that ‘talks’ about Arctic resources are artificially generated: “All these talks were artificially started.” The person refers directly to the state only once, but the state is constantly presented in the narrative in opposition to the region. The interest in natural resources of the Arctic is connected to the economic benefit of the state and has little to do with the region possessing those resources. The interviewee does not narrow their argument to the home region and refers to other Russian regions to show that there are no exceptions or positive examples “from Kaliningrad to Kamchatka”. This territorial dimension shows the absoluteness of the situation, since none of the areas from the most western border of the country (Kaliningrad) to the most eastern (Kamchatka) can escape the destiny defined for them by the state.
Example 3 goes beyond the ‘dream vs. reality’ dichotomy and places the current situation in the ‘state vs. individual’ dichotomy. The interviewee likens oil and gas development to a fairy-tale and refers to the names of the fields in Norway.\(^{125}\) By this reference to Norway, and the implication that oil and gas exploration ushered in a fairy-tale period for the country, the interviewee draws a line between two countries and claims that such a fairy-tale is not possible in Russia. In Russia, the human being is alone and cannot count on the system or the state, since the laws are not made with the people in mind. The respondent gives a historical example and argues that people in Russia have never shared in the prosperity of the state. Despite not knowing how the future will pan out, the interviewee’s expectations of petroleum development are not high, since, as before in Russian history, the individual will not be prioritised. Examples 2 and 3 show that people do not simply evaluate the situation in terms of ‘good’ or ‘bad’, they reflect upon their expectations and ask themselves what the region might get in the end. They are not confident of the answer to that, since they have to rely on the state and they are concerned that the state will not take regional interests into account.

These three examples show that there are differences in expectations inside the region, depending on the anticipated outcome of the development. Some interviewees expect the region to flourish, others are less positive. Nevertheless, for all of them the relation between the state and the region are of great importance.

### 5.3.3. Contradictions in expectations

In example 2 in the previous section, interviewee 9 (September, 2008) characterizes the situation in relation to oil and gas development in the Arctic as “all these talks were artificially started about the Shtokman field, about the Arctic shelf, about the Prirazlomnoe field.” But it was exactly these ‘talks’ that created a context for the discussion on natural resources in the Arctic. This context was formed by the expectations and beliefs expressed at the federal level.

Thus in 2008 to 2012, it was popular among state officials to take refuge in numbers, in order to characterise the situation in the Arctic. For example, the Minister of Regional Development, Basargin, in his foreword to the II Arctic Murmansk International Economic Forum in October 2010, states: “The Arctic is home to 2% of the Russian population and at the same time it forms 14% of Russia’s GDP and 25% of its exports. Here are concentrated the main reserves of

\(^{125}\) For example, the name of the natural gas field Snøhvit is given after a main character of the fairy-tale “Snow white”. Another name of the gas field Sliepner is taken from Norse mythology and originally is the name of the eight-legged horse of the god Odin.
natural resources of strategic importance, including hydrocarbons (approximately 80% of Russian gas, 90% of nickel and cobalt, 60% of copper, 96% of platinoid etc.)” (Kupryashkin and Sivakov, 2014: 88). Another example is a publication of the deputy of the Federation Council: “In Russia the North (or partly the North) takes up around two thirds of territory of the country. At the same time around 10.7 million people live there (around 7.4% of the population). Here we have 60% of discovered hydrocarbons and mineral resources…” (Nikolaev, 2009: 131-132). Further Nikolaev (2009: 204) provides more numbers that are detailed: “65% of oil, 85% of natural gas, 63% of coal, 90 of nickel, 67% of forest, 87% of fish, 80% of apatite, more than 95% of diamonds.”

The officials use numbers to ground their arguments. However these official statistics are in conflict with what the researchers say. For example, Tatarkin et al. (2012: 28) argue that the level of knowledge about the natural resources of the arctic territories in Russia is very low. Tatarkin et al. (2012: 28) point out that various evaluations argue in favour of there being large reserves of hydrocarbons and other raw materials in the Arctic. But the source of data is not clear and often classified (Tatarkin et al., 2012: 28). The state believes it creates a realistic picture but, in truth, this picture comes across as “delusional” (Baev, 2009: 26). The contradiction in data or, in the words of Baev (2009: 25) “fantastic estimates of untapped resources”, contributes to mistrust among the non-state actors in the region towards the government. It also shows that the state does not have a realistic picture of the regions. For example, the deputy of the State Duma Nenashev (2010: 9) claims that he “considers groundless the allegations that there is allegedly no industrial, human resource capacity for the development of the Arctic in the country.” In contrast to this statement, this is how a person who lives and works in the Murmansk region describes the situation regarding human resource capacity:

“We have a problem not only with the staff like skilled workers, engineers, but also with human resources in general: from a cleaning woman to a director. People leave Murmansk. The rate of decrease of the population is very high. Since the last census from the ‘90s until now the equivalent of the population of the city of Murmansk has left the Murmansk region. We have 14% of pensioners here… Everyone who could leave - left. We are experiencing a difficult time in the Kola Peninsula” (Interviewee 6, September 2008).
The interviewee highlights two serious problems in the region: a lack of professionals (skilled workers, engineers) and a decline in population in general. In order to illustrate the decline in the population the interviewee paints a simple but powerful picture: the number of people who have left the region is equal to the number of inhabitants of Murmansk city.

The above examples show that the “industrial and human resource capacity for the development of the Arctic” seems to be seriously challenged if one looks at the situation with human resources in the Murmansk region. And, as noted above, an uneasy situation arises, whereby the state’s knowledge contradicts the knowledge generated by the community members (the researchers, journalists and businessmen living in the region).

However, it would be wrong to think that the contradiction takes place solely along the connection between the state and the region. Even in the Murmansk region, the differences in expectations vary from actor to actor. The researchers and journalists working with the oil and gas sector predicted that the Shtokman project would be delayed and the first phase of production would never be started in 2012 as the “Shtokman Development AG” stipulated it. In contrast to this prognosis done by the researchers and journalists, companies working with the project and especially the administration of the Murmansk region, have another opinion:

“…when in summer we had a conference related to the exploration, which took place in the building of Arktikmorneftegaz, and there were scientists, business leaders, there, too, it was said, that the deadlines will not be fulfilled, the regional administration was very angered by this statement, and even made a special statement that deadlines would be met. Of course the regional government really wants to meet the deadlines” (Interviewee 2, September 2008).

The administration of the Murmansk region was keen to fulfil the Shtokman project in time. There are several explanations for this. My interviewee gives one: “We always have dreamers in the regional authorities. The authorities see everything iridescently. We certainly do not have the same vision” (Interviewee 2, September 2008). Continuing our interview I asked:

“[Asks (ML)]: So do you have another perspective on Shtokman?
[Answers (Interviewee 2)]: Yes, yes. Of course, we would like to believe in what our authorities say.
[Asks (ML)]: What is the basis for your position?
[Answers (Interviewee 2)]: You know, their position [authorities] is based on some
kind of calculation, numbers.

[Asks (ML)]: What do you mean? Do they use reports or statistics?

[Answers (Interviewee 2)]: Yes. Our position [journalists] is based on practical experience and some kind of intuition, based on our life experience. In fact, we have a good picture [in Murmansk]. For example, a high salary. However, the number of people who get high salaries [Pause. Makes a gesture by hands showing how small is the amount of people getting high salaries]. But the average temperature in the hospital is good” (Interviewee 2, September 2008).

The interviewee would like to have the same positive view as the officials; the person says: “We would like to believe in what authorities say”. But the interviewee is at pains to point out the difference in the position of the regional authorities and journalists, and though I asked about the grounds for their opinion, the interviewee discussed grounds for the official opinion and their own. The interviewee showed an understanding of how statistics or ‘calculation’ is made through the example of “the average temperature in the hospital,” based on a popular saying in Russia that shows the difference between statistical numbers and the actual situation. Thus, some patients in the hospital have critically high body temperature, some are normal, and others are very low. One can calculate ‘the average’ temperature of the hospital (which sounds of course absurd and the irony in this saying is based on this absurdness) by putting together very low and very high temperature indications. This ‘average’ number will show that all the patients in the hospital have normal temperature, balancing the difference between those who have very low and very high temperature and who actually need special treatment. The interviewee is using this saying about ‘average temperature’ to illustrate how an image of the Murmansk region as a region with high salaries is generated. This picture of the region is produced through reports based on statistical numbers which demonstrate ‘average’ income in the region. However, practical experience of the interviewee shows that this is not true because that statistical number generated as a summary of very low and very high salaries does not represent the real picture.

This opposition between statistics and the actual situation shows the distance between the official numbers and lived experience in Russia. It also shows that contradictions in expectations is related to knowledge. The state is relying on statistical numbers which are too distant from reality and, as a result, the state is not capable of adequately reacting to responses from below. In turn, people in the region are aware of this distortion and therefore are sceptical to promises from above. The contradiction in expectations shows that the state is not capable
to secure expectations of community members. Taking into consideration this conclusion, in the next chapter I will discuss what kind of strategies are available for the state and the actors in the Murmansk region to secure their expectations.

5.4. Insecurity of expectations: power of division and uniting

As I outlined in Chapter 3, different desires narrated around the Shtokman project, create a tension in the security assemblage. These differences are connected to the Russian system of governance, which includes federal, regional and local levels. The Russian government and business companies represent the federal (state level) and articulate a set of desires regarding state prosperity and state security: desire-challenge, desire-demand and desire-ambition. The analysis of local media in the Murmansk region and interviews shows another configuration of desire on the regional level: desire-ambition, desire-dream and desire-hope. Desires are articulated through the expression of certain expectations and concerns related to the Shtokman project. For example in the excerpts from an interview below an interviewee expresses the difference between expectations in Moscow and in the region:

“[Asks (ML)]: Are expectations of regional and federal levels different? [Answers (Interviewee 18)]: I think they are different and very seriously so. At the federal level it is just another project…They have a big ‘shashlik’\textsuperscript{126}, such a skewer of projects. Therefore, this project is one of these pieces of meat. And for Murmansk it is a very big project. And for the region it is the future. This is the future of our children, who live here, our grandchildren…” (Interviewee 18, December 2009)

Prior to my fieldwork in Murmansk in 2008-2009, I examined the official website of the Murmansk region, as well as news agency websites in order to gain some perspectives on the situation in the region. The impression I got was that there was active development in the region and the preparation for the Shtokman project was well underway. However, on my arrival in Murmansk, I learnt that the situation was slightly different to the way I imagined: yes, there was a development, but not necessarily one connected to Shtokman. There was more talk than real action. For example:

\textsuperscript{126} Shashlik is a meat dish, when small pieces of meat roasted on a skewer.
“[Speaks (Interviewee 2)]: We do not have yet any moments associated with the
development of oil, nobody feels it, all mostly live only in expectations, expectations
from Shtokman.

[Comments (ML)]: This is an interesting point, the expectations.

[Answers (Interviewee 2)]: Yes, yes, great expectations, everyone has great hopes: from
the common person to the government of the region…Of course the ecologists are
concerned about some aspects, the fishermen are concerned to some extent … They show
some concern, but they do not make any active steps yet…Everyone has expectations.
Opinions are divided … there are those, of course, who believe that everything will be
[done] within the deadlines, which are claimed today, but the majority, of course,
certainly have a sceptical attitude. They think that the deadline will be significantly
changed, and Shtokman, will it come to us at all? This oil, gas, all the Arctic
hydrocarbons will not come to us soon” (Interviewee 2, September 2008)

This excerpt from the interview reveals several important points. First of all, expectations have
the power to unite people. Thus, the interviewee informs me that everyone has expectations:
the government and ordinary people. It creates a kind of atmosphere, when the whole
community is sharing the same feeling: while they are waiting they are all full of hope. At the
same time, expectations do not just create bonds between people, they also divide them. Thus,
the interviewee names the ecologists and the fishermen, who already “have some concerns”
about petroleum development in the region. It means that these two groups are able to see some
negative moments in relation to oil and gas development in the region. Besides the split
between those who are “concerned” and those who are not, a line of division also lies in timing:
some people are sceptical that the deadlines will be met, and some are not. The interviewee
expresses their own doubt as to whether Shtokman will be implemented at all. In the end, the
interviewee concludes that the extraction of hydrocarbons in the Arctic should not be expected
in the region any time soon.

Insecurity of expectations as the main rule of the abstract machine is deepening the division in
the region which has to cope with disproportional relations with Moscow and difficulties
related to the management of petroleum sector in general. The division is taking place not only
between the region and Moscow (regional and federal levels correspondently), but also
between community members. The most visible division goes between the representatives of a
group ‘policy makers’ and other actors.
5.5. How the abstract machine affects the configuration of the multi-actor based security model

Below, I discuss how insecurity of expectations affects relations between actors in the security assemblage.

While discussing issues related to regional development, the interviewees at times contemplated the roles of other actors in their activity. It is understandable that interaction between different actors is not always smooth and easy. Many interviewees tried to explain why other actors were doing particular things in particular ways. For example, during an interview discussing difficulties in cooperating with other actors, an interviewee representing an NGO said:

“Well, first of all, all organizations have their objectives, which are officially declared, which they must achieve. If we talk, for example, about science, there are no big contradictions. We always treat science, scientific opinion very carefully. And when we create our position on any question we, of course, get advised. We take scientific evidence as a basis. We also cooperate with governmental bodies, but we understand that the state, hmm [pause] that if we work with a more narrow focus on environmental activities, first of all, that the state has a lot of different tasks…and it is understandable that some of our proposals or joint actions, authorities cannot support – well, due to the fact that they need to fulfil other tasks” (Interviewee 11, September 2008).

The interviewee is speaking about cooperation with other actors and refers to these other actors as ‘science’, the ‘state’ and ‘authorities’. The problems in cooperating with the authorities are not openly stated, but the interviewee pauses to consider an explanation and to justify why the authorities cannot always support their initiatives. The interviewee shows understanding, but does not specify what kind of authorities their organization is dealing with: local, regional or federal. Thus, all these three levels appear as one group ‘authorities’.

Not everyone discussed authorities as one group. Sometimes the actors differentiated between the federal, the regional and the local levels, especially when the topic of discussion was related to decision making processes. Here is one reflection on the role of regional authorities given by a representative of an NGO:
“I do not know. I would not say that I do trust our politicians...I think that one ought to trust or not to trust those people who make decisions, and this is not the regional authorities” (Interviewee 9, September 2008).

The interviewee says that since the regional authorities do not have the power of decision-making, it is difficult to discuss them in terms of trust or mistrust. The regional authorities are portrayed as an executive body rather than a legislative body. This limited ability of the regional authorities to influence decision-making process in case of oil and gas development in the region results into the situation when other actors doubt the capacity of the regional authorities to serve the needs of the region.

This is how another interviewee, a representative of the group ‘journalists/media’ describes their attitude to the regional authorities:

“I do not blame them. An official has such a function that it seriously affects the human psyche. They cannot do it differently. A cat cannot offend you because she is a cat. For example, I am talking to the head of the department. I see that he is lying to me. I know why he is lying to me. Well, so what? I do not have other source of information. And how to interpret this information - it is my task” (Interviewee 6, September 2008).

The interviewee claims that the officials cannot do their job differently because they are influenced by the “function,” which affects the “human psyche”. The interviewee does not explain this function, but says that it allows the authorities, for example, to lie to other actors. The interviewee shows an understanding towards why the authorities are doing this and says that “does not blame them” and “they cannot do it differently”. Their task is “to interpret” the words of authorities.

The analysis of the abstract machine, which define how the connections between the actors can be made, helps to illuminate two important concepts: knowledge and power. The interviewees demonstrate an understanding of what authorities can do and say and what they cannot. It means that generally the non-state actors possess particular knowledge allowing them to predict how the group of state actors would likely behave in any particular situation. This knowledge empowers the non-state actors in their actions, as they do not expect to receive the true information. At the same time, community members have an ambiguous attitude towards the regional authorities. Regional authorities are supposed to have real power since they are a state actor. But, as the examples from regional practice show, regional authorities’ power of policy-
making in relation to the development of oil and gas resources in the region is limited. Non-state actors are aware of that and do not consider them as being real representatives of the state.

Thus, the main function of the abstract machine is to unite and divide groups in the security assemblage. This function divides the group ‘policy-makers’, and power of decision-making is a demarcation line. On the one hand, ‘regional authorities’ are a part of the group, ‘policy makers’, and are viewed by other actors as representatives of the state. On the other, they are unable to influence the decision-making process to the degree expected by the other community members. This lack of power places ‘regional authorities’ on the margins: they are a state actor yet at the same time they cannot entirely fulfil a role of a state actor. The question is whether ‘regional authorities’ as a marginalised state actor can play a specific role in the transformation of the security landscape: can they articulate ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on security issues or do they act on state premises only and thus implement a ‘top-down’ approach? I will answer this question in the next chapter.

5.6. Conclusion

The abstract machine governs the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). The general governance principle and specifics of management of oil and gas sector forms the context in which the security assemblage emerged. If the oil and gas management creates a situation which can be called a “game without rules” which contributes to the insecurities in the region, the ‘vertical power structure’ places the region in a subordinate position through a lack of economic and administrative independence. The regional authorities cannot decide on their own what needs to be done and how. Compounding this subordinate role, legal confusions and lack of clear policy further weakens the position of the regional authorities.

The state and the region are driven by the desire for the development of oil and gas resources in the Arctic. But they have different expectations. The state hopes that income from oil and gas will enhance national stability and security. The region hopes that its problems will receive more attention since it has no freedom of decision-making and depends on decisions made in Moscow. The region is in a kind of standby mode: expectations are high, but nobody knows what the future will bring. But neither the state nor the region (and correspondingly community members) have secured expectations.

The insecurity of expectations is the dominating rule of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). This means that both regional and state security are threatened
because “one cannot ensure security of expectations if one’s immediate security is still threatened” (Hoogensen, 2005: 14). It means that both the state and the regional actors should take action to mitigate their immediate insecurity. I will discuss these actions in the next chapter.
6. Actors in action: the machinic assemblage of actors

In Chapter 1 I referred to Lomagin (2005) who claimed that some new trends in the security thinking took place in Russia at the beginning of millennium, opening up the possibility of a bottom-up approach to security in Russia in addition to a traditional top-down approach. I also indicated that I would examine what kind of transformations took place in Russian security thinking and who generated these changes.

I introduced in Chapter 1 the multi-actor security model which helps to operationalize the concept of the individual, and stated there that I would work with theory of assemblage to better contextualize the relations between the state and individual. This in turn would allow me to better analyse security meanings and creation with regard to the oil and gas industry in the Murmansk region. In Chapter 4, I discussed the tetravalent structure of the assemblage and introduced two axes: horizontal and vertical. In this chapter, I examine the micro-assemblage which is called the ‘machinic assemblage of actors’ and located on the horizontal axis. The word ‘machinic’ emphasises, on the one hand, a random combination of elements or people, and on the other, the fundamental assemblage characteristics of productivity and creativity. The objective of this chapter is to examine what actions are done by the actors in response to the framework of the abstract machine. I will discuss the choice of strategies and actions available for the state and individuals in the security assemblage. The findings presented in this chapter will contribute to a discussion on whether or not changes in security thinking are possible in Russia, addressed in Chapter 9.

6.1. State strategy

I discussed in Chapter 5 that insecurity of expectations can be approached as the dominating rule of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). Below I will examine what kind of action the state takes in order to mitigate its immediate insecurity.

I argue that the state engages in two actions in order to ensure its immediate security. The first action involves the reshaping of the security system in Russia. In order to reveal this transformation I examine in this section primary Russian documents related to security, which help to understand how security actors are understood on the state level. Both the FL №2446-1 (1992) and the CNS (1997) were the first ever documents in Russian history defining a state approach to security in the country. Nevertheless, the appearance of new documents, such as the SNS-2020 in 2009 and the FL №390 in 2010 indicated the need for renewal of security
understanding. Analysis of the superseded documents and the newer ones that are currently in place, allows me to trace the transformation of the state’s interpretation of security actors throughout the time of the security assemblage 2007-2012.

The second action is a securitization move. I discussed securitization theory in Chapter 4, developed by the Copenhagen school. Securitization is a claim that something is an issue in security terms. Securitization theory distinguishes between referent objects (an actor or issue that needs to be protected) and securitizing actors (those who can claim a special right to place an issue on security agenda). I will demonstrate how oil and gas resources became securitized in the section 6.1.3.

6.1.1. Transformation of the role of the individual: from 1992 to 2010

Prior to 1992, there was no document explicitly articulating the national understanding of security and security actors consequently. The Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991 and therefore, the first Law “On security” (FL №2446-1, 1992) represented hopes and visions of how the security should be understood in the newly established Russian Federation. The Law “On security” (FL №2446-1, 1992, Section I, Article 2) introduced a triad of ‘individual, society and state’ as security actors – with equal interests and an equal relationship. The document presupposed the active participation of individuals and the state in the construction of an understanding of security nationally. Such principles as the “balance between vital interests of individual, society and state” and “mutual responsibility for providing security” govern the relationship between the individual, society and the state according to the Law “On security” (FL №2446-1, 1992, Section I, Article 5). These principles declare that each of the actors might have different interests and therefore a ‘balance’ of certain ‘duties’ and ‘responsibilities’ is needed. The document described individuals as active actors ‘doing security’, not passive recipients of security. Special emphasis was placed on the issue of respect and the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens in security provision (FL №2446-1, Section I, Article 7). Overall, this document presented the state and individuals as equal partners.

The Concept of National Security (CNS, 1997) was a supplement document to the Law “On security” (FL №2446-1, 1992) and presented views on how security can be ensured. The document appeared at a time of difficult economic and social transition in Russia, which is reflected in the Concept. As I pointed in Chapter 1, the transition from planned to market
economy in post-soviet Russia exposed the difference in interests between the state and individuals. I also stated that the ability of the state and individuals to articulate their insecurity was challenging and it was not clear if they were capable to balance their interests and to mitigate insecurities. The Concept (CNS, 1997) distinguished between the interests of the individual, society and the state. Individual interests could be fulfilled through “the realization of the constitutional rights and freedoms, to ensure personal security, to improve the quality and standard of living, physical, spiritual and intellectual development of human and citizen” (CNS, 1997, Chapter II). The interests of society consisted in the “reinforcement of democracy, creation of a legal and social state, achievement and maintenance of social consensus, and spiritual renewal of Russia” (CNS, 1997, Chapter II). Society, then, was viewed as a place where state and individual interests meet each other. The document stressed that frustrations with the legal system, difficulties with governance, a problematic economic situation and the rise of criminal activity in the country brought more risk and insecurity to the state, than did threats posed by the international community (CNS, 1997, Chapter III). Therefore, the Concept (1997) claimed, the state should intervene more in moral life of individuals. Thus, the state was suddenly not an equal partner, as outlined in the Law “On security” (FL №2446-1, 1992), but as the one who should take a paternalistic approach over its population. The Concept (CNS, 1997, Section IV) promised that the state would form “a system of measures of effective social prevention and upbringing of law-abiding citizens. These measures should be aimed at protecting the rights and freedoms, morality, health and property of every person regardless of race, nationality, language, origin, property and official status, place of residence, religion, beliefs, membership in voluntary associations, as well as other circumstances”. Thus, the Concept (1997) articulated what the state should do in regards to the society and individuals, but omitted what they could do as equal partners as was stated in the Federal law “On security” (FL №2446-1, 1992).

Overall, the Concept (1997) exposes an insecurity expressed by the state in regards to the individual. Social differentiation in society and rising numbers of people living below the poverty level, created a threat to national security from within. The analysis of the Concept (1997) as additional document to the Law “On security” (1992) shows that by 2000 the situation in the country was changing. If in 1992 the state and individuals were viewed as equal partners, by 2000 individuals were perceived as those who need guidelines from the state, because the state needed more control over individuals.
The new documents redefining state security policy appeared in 2009 and 2010. By that time, the Russian economy became drastically improved, mainly due to the increased revenues from oil and gas. In the political sphere, as I discussed in Chapter 5, the ‘vertical power structure’ was more or less formed by 2004 and the period of the creation of the unitary state has began in 2005. Thus, new documents represent new reality of Russia and outline new configuration between the state and individuals.

The new Law “On security” (FL №390) appeared in 2010 and focuses on the division of state powers and their function. National security is viewed in terms of the absolute dominance of the state. Sometimes it can interact with individuals, though the mechanisms of individuals’ involvement are not clear. For example, according to the law, such non-state actors as citizens and public associations are involved in the implementation of state policy in the field of security (FL №390, 2010, Chapter 1, Article 4, Item 4). However, by whom and to what degree – remains unanswered. Thus, if the first Law “On security” (1992) articulated the triad ‘individual, society and state’, the Law “On security” from 2010 focuses on the state institutions related to security and does not include individuals as equal partners. It is possible to detect a transformation from a perspective ‘the individual and the state as equal partners’ to the perspective ‘the state only’. The Law “On security” from 2010 is connected to other documents such as the Strategy of national security (SNS-2020) and other conceptual and doctrinal documents developed by the Security Council of Russia and approved by the President of the Russian Federation (FL №390, 2010, Chapter 1, Article 4, Item 3). Therefore, in order to better understand how relations between the state and individuals are presented in the security construction in Russia, it is also important to examine the Strategy of National security (SNS-2020).

The Strategy (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter I, item 4) also operates in terms of the triad ‘individual, society and state’ as in the first law on security in 1992. The document is defined as “a foundation for constructive cooperation between state authorities, organizations and associations for the protection of Russia’s national interests and security of individuals, society and the state” (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter I, item 4). The document names state actor (state authorities) and non-state actors (organizations and associations). Though, both the people and the state are the object of security, the state is regarded as an active participant, possessing military and law enforcement power (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter I, item 6). The triad concept creates an expectation of equality between individuals, society and the state since it is borrowed
from the Law “On security” from 1992. But the structure of the Strategy (SNS-2020), and the way the interests of the state and individual are apportioned within this structure, gives another picture. A paternalistic approach to people, detected in the Concept (CNS, 1997) is preserved in the Strategy (SNS-2020, 2009). While declaring that peoples’ rights and freedoms are a priority, the Strategy strongly emphasizes the role of the state as a security provider and prioritizes traditional state ‘values’ such as national defence and border protection.

To sum up, it is possible to detect a transformation in security construction – from the triad of equal partners – ‘individual, society and state’ – in 1992 to the ‘state only’ perspective of 2010. This transformation was in accordance with political developments in the country, which I discussed in Chapters 1 and 5. In 1992 Russians were full of optimism regarding the new ‘democratic’ breakthrough, an atmosphere which prioritised individual rights and freedoms. The federal centre was weak and the Russian regions had more autonomy from the centre. Reacting to this situation, the government began to form the ‘vertical power structure’ between 1999 and 2004, which resulted in the creation unitary state in the years between 2005 and 2008. While oil prices were relatively low between 1996 and 2003, in 2004 the oil price scaled “unforeseen heights” (Goes, 2013a: 7). Rising oil and gas revenues allowed the Russian state to strengthen its control in economic, political and public spheres. In accordance with this transformation in the position of the state, the role of the individual was also transformed. If, in 1992, individuals were viewed as security actors with own interests and priorities, by 2010 individuals were no longer perceived as security actors, but rather as beneficiaries of state security policy. This transformation was consistent with changes in the country related to the improvement of the economic situation, the creation of the ‘vertical of power structure’ and state domination as a main principle of Russian federalism.

6.1.2. Transformation of the role of the state: from 1992 to 2010

As I wrote in the previous section, the state was presented an equal partner acting together with society and the individual in the Law “On security” (FL №2446-1, 1992). The law placed restrictions on the representatives of the state and limited their power: “Officials who exceed their authority in the process of security activities bear responsibility in accordance with the law” (FL №2446-1, 1992, Section I, Article 7). It means that citizens were not merely dealing

127 For more detailed discussion on the understanding of democracy in the Russian context see Lvova, 2014.
with an anonymous state apparatus, but with other individuals who bear the responsibility of being official representatives of the state.

In the Concept of National security (CNS, 1997) the interests of the state were connected to “the inviolability of the constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, political, economic and social stability, unconditional law enforcement and the maintenance of law and order, in the development of equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation” (CNS, 1997, Chapter IV). According to the Concept (CNS, 1997, Chapter II) national interests were protected by governmental institutions, which can, in turn, cooperate with non-governmental organizations. The main security players, however, were the President, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Security Council, Federal authorities of the executive branch, and executive authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation (together with the local authorities) (CNS, 1997, Chapter IV). Since the state felt insecure about its own people, it needed to secure its own position. The call for strengthening state control in all spheres – governance, business, economics, regional politics, health care, political party creation etc. – was prominent throughout the Concept (especially in amendments from 2000). The Concept (CNS, 1997, Chapter IV) stated that it was “necessary to strengthen the role of the state,” “strengthening of Russian statehood,” “strengthening the role of the state as the guarantor of security of the individual and society.” Overall, the document embodied the sentiment, “strong state - secure people”. This discussion has always been popular in Russia. Thus, Prime Minister Putin in his speech stressed the importance of three factors: the Russian idea, a strong state and an effective economy. He also stated: “Russia will not soon become, if at all, a second edition of the United States or England, where liberal values have deep historical traditions. For us a state, its institutions and structures have always played a vital role in the life of the country and the people. A strong state, for the Russians, is not an anomaly, not something with which to be fought, but on the contrary, the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and main driving force of any change.”128 This image of the strong state was outlined in the Concept (CNS, 1997). The strong state dealt with all spheres of life and was a reliable provider of security and prosperity. In a few cases, the state needed support from its citizens or society: they should support the state in its fight against

criminality or to help in health care (CNS, 1997, Chapter IV). In return, the state’s actions should be transparent and clear for its citizens (CNS, Chapter IV, 1997).

The Strategy of National Security (SNS-2020, 2009) affirms the priority of peoples’ rights and freedoms and highlights the role of the state as an exclusive security provider. The focus on military forces and military power creates the image of a strong and powerful state. Forces of national security can cooperate with civil society129 – in the field of environmental security, for example (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, Section 4, Item 88). I will explain in Chapter 7 the role of environmental security in the security assemblage (2007-2012).

The Law “On security” (FL №390, 2010) reflects the ‘vertical power structure’ – when all structures are subordinated to the President of the Russian Federation. In contrast to the law from 1992 (FL №2446-1), the main state security actors are outlined in the document and their functions are defined. The actors are the President, the Security Council, the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the RF (the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and State Duma), the Government, Federal bodies of executive branch, authorities of the entities of the Russian Federation and local government bodies. The Russian President approves the national security strategy and has the right to declare emergencies (FL №390, 2010, Chapter 2, Article 8, Item 2 and 5). The President not only leads, but selects members of the Security Council of the RF. The President also takes measures to protect citizens against criminals and other illegal actions and to counter terrorism and extremism (FL №390, 2010, Chapter 2, Article 8, Item 6b). In addition, the President decides how to protect the population in cases of emergency (FL №390, Chapter 2, Article 8, Item 7b). Thus, the President is enshrined as personal protector and sole guarantor of individuals’ security.

The above analysis shows a transformation in the state’s perspective of its own role and the role of individuals. Though Lomagin (2005) suggested that there were changes from top-down to bottom-up perspectives on security in Russia, I identify the reverse transformation. The state always had a dominant role in security construction in Russia. Nevertheless, the law from 1992, promoting the individual as a security actor, seems to be an exception in the history of Russia. Initially, in 1992, it was claimed that the individual and the state should participate in security construction as equal partners. But later on, in 2010, this was replaced by the claim that, in the field of security, the state should be the sole security actor. As the result, as I noted earlier in

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129 The term civil society appears in this document without further clarification.
Chapter 1, terms ‘security’ and ‘national security’ became synonymous, and absorbed the other levels such as ‘public’ and ‘personal security’.

6.1.3. Securitization of oil and gas resources as an attempt to secure expectations

In this section I discuss another action of the state in order to mitigate its immediate insecurity. I argue that this action can be viewed as a securitization process. This securitization process became explicit on two levels. The first one is related to the legislative language, and the second one is related to the process of militarization of the Murmansk region.

The interest in natural resources can be characterized as “pragmatic” since the energy sector is viewed by the Russian state as significant from an economic perspective, but at the same time natural resources are regarded as important for national security (Konyshev and Sergunin, 2014). The Russian state started to securitize oil and gas resources in the Arctic around 2007. Activity included the research expeditions (the polar expedition Arktika-2007) and the adoption of new legislation in 2008. In particular, the Basics of the State Policy in the Arctic (BRFA-2020) were introduced in 2008 alongside a package of new laws amending the Law on subsoil resources № 2395-1 from 1992. These new laws defined precious metals and hydrocarbons as strategic to Russia’s defence and security (Moe and Wilson Rowe, 2009: 109). This means that the involvement of foreign companies in petroleum sector, for example, requires special permission from governmental authorities (Moe and Wilson Rowe, 2009: 109). According to the new laws, all offshore fields are defined as being of federal significance (Moe and Rowe, 2009: 109) and the Arctic is considered “a strategic resource base” (BRFA-2020, 2008). Russian vocabulary was enriched by such terms as “strategic resources” and “resources of federal significance” (Moe and Wilson Rowe, 2009: 109). I will discuss the meaning of this language of securitization in Chapter 7.

Official speeches actively address the issue of the strategic importance of the Arctic and its natural resources and claim that these must be secured. The governmental position is along the lines of “the strongest state would easily prove its rights in the Arctic and to extract natural resources in the region” (Rimashevskyi, 2012: 22). For example, “[h]owever, it is clear that the provision of these directions and dimensions of the national security of Russia, as well as effective international cooperation is only possible while ensuring an adequate level of national military security, achieving or maintaining an appropriate military-strategic parity with the neighboring powers” (Baryshnikov, 2014: 16, emphasis in the original). Thus, governmental
rhetoric of securitization resulted into militarization of the Murmansk region, which is, as Baev (2009: 27) writes, “by far the most militarized and nuclearized area in the Arctic.” I discussed in Chapter 3 the role of the military-industrial complex in the economy and national security of the Murmansk region. I also noted that if, at the end of 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, a tendency to demilitarize the region was prevailing, this was reversed the years 2008 to 2011 when a restored and enlarged military presence was visible (see Baev, 2009; Ivanov, 2013; Konyshev and Sergunin, 2014). Though state companies like Gazprom and Rosneft indicate no need for armed protection, this securitization approach to oil and gas resources urges military preparedness in order to defend possible resources in the Arctic (Baev, 2009: 25-26). Several military related actions took place in the Murmansk region. For example, the renewal of naval and air patrols in the Arctic commenced in 2007 and in 2011 the decision to deploy a special motorized infantry brigade on the Kola Peninsula for operations in the Arctic was made.

The situation regarding the militarization of the Murmansk region is very complex. Konyshev and Sergunin (2014) note that the Russian militarization of the Arctic region is very moderate and mainly aimed at upgrading the armed forces, which are in a poor condition. At the same time, further development of the oil and gas sector in the Murmansk region demands a balance between military and economic tasks. Teriberka as the mainland location of the Shtokman project lost its status of border security zone in 2009. This status restricted uncontrolled movement in and out of the settlement. If this status had remained, foreign investors, as well as Russian citizens outside the region, would not have been able to access the territory freely, as it would have been guarded by FSB structures.

The rhetoric of securitization of natural resources and growing militarization is differently perceived in the region. The data from my fieldwork shows that people in the region have an ambiguous view of this issue of securitization and enlargement of military capacity of the Murmansk region. Some actors believe that this military enlargement makes dealing with some security issues more difficult:

“Here, in regard to the issues of nuclear safety and radiation, there is the biggest problems, in fact, because [mumbles while formulating the thoughts] it is still administered by the federal authorities, often these objects are of confidential status, although they received it recently and there is no secrecy” (Interviewee 9, September 2008).
The interviewee refers to general situation in the Murmansk region, which hosts the Northern Fleet of Russia and shipbuilding enterprises which repair and modernize warships and submarines of the Northern Fleet, a large number of which have nuclear reactors. This military-industrial activity makes the region of special strategic importance to Russia’s national security from military as well as environmental perspective.

On the other hand, the demilitarization of the region, which took place in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to a deepening of economic problems in the region, since the amount of the governmental orders (zakaz) drastically decreased with the reduction of state military spending. Many local enterprises in the Murmansk region produced goods of strategic importance and relied upon on state orders and purchases. This is how one of the interviewees describes the situation:

“When the reduction happened … armed forces were axed. Military government orders decreased almost to zero. The building of big military objects was stopped. These enterprises [belonging to the military-industrial complex of the Murmansk region] started to die. The external market [market outside of Russia] has enough of these strategic products, it is not something unique. [Minerals and metals] are extracted not only by us, but in other countries too. And then when it comes to the military-industrial complex, it is natural that each country gets [minerals and metals] on its own, independently from other countries. This is a political aspect. Now the political situation is changing. The military doctrine of our country is changing, and we hope that these military-industrial enterprises can at least live more worthily, if not revive. This is also like an example. The total activity of the military units in our region is noticeable…I mean housing as well as the other [buildings] for military personnel, it is increasing. Naturally, materials, which I already mentioned, are needed. This is a burst in building activity in the region, it is also an improvement of the economic conditions of citizens and enterprises” (Interviewee 12, October 2008).

The interviewee points out that in the 1990s the situation was difficult due to the absence of military government orders (zakazy). For a region with strong connections to the military-industrial complex, the lack of state interest in military complex in the 1990s caused economic difficulties. The military interest of the state in the region has a positive effect at the beginning of millennium, says the interviewee, because it means military orders and consequently more
money for the regional budget. Therefore, the interviewee has a positive view of enlargement of military capacity in the region, mainly due to economic reasons.

In this section, I discussed two state attempts to tackle its immediate insecurity. The first action involves reshaping of security system in Russia. As the result of reshaping of security system in Russia, the state becomes the only security actors by 2010. The second actions is related to the process of securitization of oil and gas resources which is exposed through the legislative language and militarization of the region. By using the rhetoric of securitization the state urges military preparedness in order to defend resources in the Arctic. This results into enlargement of military capacity of the Murmansk region and upgrading the armed forces, which had been in a rather poor condition due to the process of demilitarization which took place in 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s.

6.2. Action from below

The analysis of the documents above demonstrate how security is theorised: how the government views the role of security actors. However, the transformation I have observed through the documents’ analysis suggest a predominately state perspective on security and does not tell much about bottom-up perspective. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how security is operationalized on a regional level. My fieldwork provides some answers to this question.

Below, I examine the data from my interviews and present a bottom-up perspective on the role of individuals and the state in security assemblage in the Murmansk region. I argue that community members have several ways to ensure their immediate security. In particular, they create a regional strategy, they appeal to their identity and ability of ‘becoming’, and they include a new group of actors playing an important role in the security assemblage (2007-2012).

6.2.1. Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) as an attempt to secure expectations in the region

As I discussed in Chapter 5, Moscow does not often consider the needs of regions, and due to the ‘vertical power structure’, does not give freedom to regional authorities to be more flexible and make decisions based on regional priorities. This is not an issue of ignorance or bad will, but a systemic problem. The state creates various programmes and strategies, but given the nature of the division of power between the centre and the region, many regional problems are
not visible from the federal level. Issues such as regional economic differences, the financial position of enterprises in various industries, the outflow of financial resources, and the investment attractiveness of the region remain outside the scope of the central forecast (Selin, 2009: 29). Therefore, the existing system of relations between the region and the centre does not take account of many vital regional issues and cannot serve as a tool for regional development (Selin, 2009: 29). Kolodina (2008) notes that with the establishment of the Ministry of Regional Development (2004-2014) there was hope that the situation with regard to regional policy would change. The national government allowed for the formation of an expert community on the issue of regional development. An expert community consisting of “regional centres of strategic studies, various analytic groups and independent researchers” was formed in 2005-2007 (Kolodina, 2008: 33). The Murmansk region used this opportunity and created a regional development strategy (SSEDM-2025), the final version of which was published in 2010.

The Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) is the collective work of different experts – scientists, business representatives, administrators and NGOs. Work on this document took place between 2008 and 2010 and it was discussed at various meetings and forums with different actors (state, regional and local) (SSEDM-2025, 2009: 5-6). I approach the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) as a document articulating a collective desire for change in the region. According to the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) six challenges\textsuperscript{130} influence the situation in the region. First, the strategic mega-projects\textsuperscript{131} (like the Shtokman project) are important for the region, but the region needs to identify its own ways and mechanisms to intensify regional development (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 33). Second, the state focus on industry and raw materials places a disproportionate attention on the energy and industrial sectors, while sectors such as tourism, fisheries, and agriculture are also important for the stable economic development of the region (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 33-34). The third challenge is related to socio-humanitarian problems – people are leaving the region since they do not see any reason for remaining (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 34). The fourth is the outdated infrastructure of the Murmansk region, which was built in the 1960s and 1970s, but has become an obstacle for the development of the regional economy and to attracting people to the region (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 34-35). The fifth challenge is the unsustainable exploitation and use of natural resources.

\textsuperscript{130} Challenges understood as ambivalent: they bring possibilities and risks to the region.

\textsuperscript{131} The three big mega-projects are the Shtokman project, the Murmansk transport hub and the construction of a number of new mining and processing and mining-metallurgical complexes.
Environmental degradation in the region is holding back sectors such as tourism and fishing, as well as creating risks for the population (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 35). The sixth is cooperation within the Barents region and possibility to create a joint agenda and to perform joint actions (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 35).

The Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 38) includes four scenarios for the Murmansk region development: “Depository – strategic reserve”; “Terminal and ‘Navy base’”; “World resources” and “Strategic centre for the Arctic exploration”. The scenarios define “a space of the possible” and create a platform for a discussion about approaches to development (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 35). The scenarios address two important questions for the Murmansk region. The first question is related to the issue of human resources. There are two possible ways of development: shift method and complex development. Shift method presupposes the use of shift workers in the region. All mega-projects are based on advanced technology and most likely will be maximally automatized. It means that few people would be involved in their implementation and those people will have very particular qualifications. Most likely, specialists would be invited from other parts of the country or from abroad and they would not need to stay long in the region. In the case of the implementation of the shift method, the region will not become attractive for people to live and the tendency to leave the region will be preserved if not intensified. Mostly the regional economy would be dedicated to extensive exploitation of raw material resources, and mega-projects will be the only projects implemented in the region. In the case of complex development, Murmansk will become attractive for people to live, because of qualitative changes in the region. The region will be modernized into a “society and economy of knowledge” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 36), which requires changes in both the economy and city planning, based on innovation, knowledge and human capital. A complex development means that natural resources can become a resource for regional development.

The second question is related to the future of the region from a national security perspective and can be formulated as following: “Will the region become more ‘open’ or ‘closed’?” I discussed that the state securitized oil and gas resources by military means. The enlargement of military capacity was already detected in 2007-2011. If the military-strategic significance of the region increases, it will become more ‘closed’. It means that the number of territories with limited or forbidden access will rise, which would lead to the “isolation of the region” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 38). At the same time, as I discussed earlier in this chapter,
modernization of the armed forces and of the Northern Fleet means investments, long-term contracts and improvements to infrastructure. Nevertheless, if military-strategic importance of the Murmansk region would not be emphasised and the attention would be given to implementation of the mega-projects like Shtokman, it can result in a rising importance of international cooperation. The Murmansk region would be able to be more ‘opened’ to international cooperation and joint initiatives.

The scenario, “Strategic centre for the Arctic exploration” is defined as the most ambitious for the region, but the “World resources” scenario is considered the most probable (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40). The difference between these two scenarios is related to the ability of the Murmansk region to be proactive and to cope with insecurity of expectations. If the regional government will be passive, the region will not be capable to fulfil own needs. As a result the region risks to become a source of raw materials, a territory where the state is implementing its mega-projects. The scenario “Strategic centre” focuses on the capacities of the region. In this case, existing sectors are developed and modernized and new ones, such as tourism, rise and grow. This scenario is an indicator of innovation and the constructive opportunities that already exist in the region. Under this vision, the region is proactive and creates something new as well: new enterprises, new opportunities for people to work and to stay in the region (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 41).

Many interviewees were familiar with the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025) and some of them were even involved in its creation. As one of interviewees concluded – in the end, “the region would likely get an outcome somewhere in between these scenarios” (Interviewee 2, September 2008). While discussing the prospect of development in the region, one interviewee referred to the SSEDM-2025 (2009)\textsuperscript{132} and its scenarios. They explained the significance of the scenarios:

“To create conditions for the development. [To use] the stimuli from the Shtokman field. To create conditions for people to stay here. This will have a beneficial effect. Plus the development of the transport hub. Then the Murmansk region will be one of the leading regions of Russia. We have potential and prospect here. Actually at the moment we only have prospect and potential. Nothing more…” (Interviewee 6, September 2008).

\textsuperscript{132} I will discuss the difference between the draft of the SSEDM-2025 (2009) and the final version of the SSEDM-2025 (2010) in Chapter 9.
The interviewee links the scenarios to future prospects and possibilities, but it sounds bitter and desperate. The present situation cannot offer anything but dreams of better life, since the region, potentially, could be rich and have a leading position in the country. Nevertheless, the vision of the future outlined in the “Strategic centre for the Arctic exploration” scenario plays a very significant role in understanding the context of the security assemblage (2007-2012).

Hence, the knowledge and understanding of the expert regional community fed into the SSEDM-2025 (2010), which identifies future challenges, difficulties, opportunities and perspectives for the region. Representatives of the business, regional authorities, scientists and journalists all worked on the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) and they were united by one goal: the future prosperity of the region and people living there. They were united by the wish to secure their expectations. To my question if the interviewee is familiar with the strategy, one of the interviewees replied: “The Murmansk strategy until 2025? We are not just familiar with it, we have written a whole section in the new strategy, and I can print out and give you a piece [we wrote]” (Interviewee 18, December 2009). Interviewees were proud to be a part of this project and wanted to talk about it.

Thus joint work on the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) evolved into a strategy aimed at helping community members in the Murmansk region to overcome the insecurity designated by the abstract machine to them. I argue that the document, SSEDM-2025, is a ‘line of flight’ in the security assemblage and discuss it further in Chapters 7 and 8.

6.2.2. ‘Becoming’ as a strategy to tackle insecurity of expectations

Another strategy applied by the actors in order to tackle insecurity of expectations is related to the issue of identity. I observed in Chapter 4 that Deleuzian philosophy is an ‘ontology of difference’. This ontology presupposes that each individual is unique and thus it is hard to generalize ‘group features’. Assemblage analytics invites not only to examine the differences between human experiences, but also the differences within an individual in order to discover its ability to be an agent of change. Taking into consideration the ‘ontology of difference’, I contextualize the multi-actor based security model through application of the concepts of ‘narrative identity’ and ‘becoming’, which I introduced in Chapter 4. The concept of narrative identity helps to address the multiplicity of individual experience through the articulation of three elements: ‘be’, ‘being’ and ‘becoming’. It means that each individual can act differently and shift between roles. Analysis of these role shifts allow an appreciation of the agency of the
individual and contributes to a better understanding of the role of individuals in the security assemblage. As such, the group ‘policy makers’ allows for a very interesting analysis from several points of view. On the one hand, more often than other actors, a group ‘policy makers’ directly interact with legislation and finance and therefore form specific connections with the state. On the other hand, the ‘regional authorities’ are not viewed by community members as the one who is able to act in the interest of the region. Thus regional authorities, as a part of the group, ‘policy makers,’ have a marginalised role as a state actor.

I already discussed in Chapter 2 that the representatives of the group ‘policy makers’ were very cautious about the things they could comment upon. I interviewed five representatives of the ‘policy-makers’ group. All of them used the refrain: “It is not my competence”. For example, I asked a local authority representative “What factors cause oil and gas activity in the Murmansk region?” The interviewee answered “it is not my competence” (Interviewee 5, October 2008). On one occasion, the federal level representative was puzzled by the question of whether regional development was predictable and answered that it was a very complicated question and probably “it is not my competence” (Interviewee 3, September 2008). Officials distance themselves from some issues by distinguishing them as “out of my competence”. Only one representative of the ‘business and industry’ group used this marker whereas no other non-state actors used the phrase. Thus, the policy makers did not feel comfortable discussing some topics and avoided commenting on some questions. At the same time, during the conversation, they occasionally were providing more information than they claimed they would. For example, below is an answer a representative of the regional authorities provided to my question:

“[Asks (ML)]: Can you name any positive and negative aspects related to the development of the region?

[Answers (Interviewee 14)]: I cannot answer about negative moments [grins]. I can only talk about the positive ones [sighs]” (Interviewee 14, October 2008).

In response to my question about “positive and negative aspects related to the regional development,” the representative of regional authorities claims that he/she can talk about positive moments only and cannot discuss problems. The interviewee here is clearly aware of the constraints imposed by the system. Bodily signs like “grin” and “sigh” are signals of possible discomfort with these constraints, which the interviewee has no wish to express verbally. This signals can be approached as the signs of ‘becoming’. It means that the
interviewee can take a distance from the role of ‘representative of authorities’ and to express by means of bodily signs their own attitude to this role.

This example shows that an individual acting as a representative of the group ‘policy making’ is a part of the state apparatus because he/she is following the rules prescribed to this role: they have taboo topics, they can speak only positively about politically sensitive issues, they cannot criticize the others. I discussed in Chapter 5 the opposition between statistics and the actual situation in the region and demonstrated the distance between the official numbers and lived experience in Russia. The exclusion of “negative aspects” does not mean that problems disappear from the region – they only disappear from the picture the state gets back from the region, when the regional authorities report about the situation, or communicate with community members.

The state created the ‘vertical power structure’ in order to put the regions in a subordinate position and to make national state apparatus strong and powerful. Federal authorities are the highest official representatives of the state in the region and they are not subordinate to the regional government. My interviewees were also concerned about how this hierarchical system affects the region. This is how the representative of the regional authority describes their experience of communicating with federal level representatives:

“This difficulty is of a systemic nature, I would say. Well, I’ll tell you so [pause] we live here, our committee is regional, we report directly to the Governor, and mmm [pause] so to speak, we defend the interests of the region. Well, of the entire population of the region. And the structure of the region, everything is [pause] our, local. At the same time, in our activity, we are faced with facts such as when employees of the federal authorities do not always work, so to speak, from the heart and with full dedication. Officials often limit [their working hours] with time settings: it is five o’clock, time has run out, cuckoo, goodbye. Or he has a need or the chance to promote any business, facilitate it, worry about it, or just formally write down: ‘I have thirty days to respond.’ [they will say] ‘So I wait for thirty days. Or fifteen days. I will not do anything before, because the deadline does not expire.’ Why do not you do it earlier? You can solve it within two hours. ‘But I have a legally established order – I will do it this way’. I do not interfere, and do not want to criticize the organization of the work of other services, but nevertheless, there are questions that need immediate or urgent solution, and if it is not an emergency, it is very difficult to address these questions with the federal.
federal official is a resident of our area, he lives here. So I have such a negative experience of communication with these guys. But not everyone is like that. It is necessary to understand that this is an exception rather than a rule. Often we find mutual understanding…” (Interviewee 12, October 2008).

The interviewee, as a representative of the regional authorities, discusses their own experience of communication with the federal authorities. According to a law, the federal authorities have a certain period to respond to the request from the regional authority, indicated by the interviewee as “thirty or fifteen days”. The federal authorities could respond faster and, as the interviewee says, they can “solve it within two hours”. This decision depends on the will of a particular person. The interviewee emphasizes the importance of belonging to the region and that their committee works in the interest of people in the region. The interviewee claims that it is sometimes challenging to work with the representatives of the federal level, even though they are local people themselves and should act with the region in mind. Here, the interviewee is approaching the issue of identity: the representatives of the federal level can show solidarity with the regional authorities and speed up the procedure because they also live in the region and can see that the regional authorities are acting in the interest of the region. They can also take a distance from 'being' local and to follow the formal procedure. This narrative reveals an importance of ‘becoming’ in the process of dealing with the state system. The interviewee does not appeal to the state apparatus and its effective/ineffective mechanisms, but makes a reference to the identity of the federal official. For the interviewee ‘becoming’ a ‘regional official’ from a “resident of the area” does not pose any difficulty, and the local component dominates over the official one. However, some representative of the federal authorities have no wish to articulate their local ‘be’ and show no understanding to the urgency of the regional authorities regardless of the fact that they come from the region and live there. Thus, an ability of a person to understand the needs of another actor becomes important. Personal decisions can make the state system function and effective, or the opposite.

It is possible to conclude that the group ‘policy makers’ cannot be viewed as a homogeneous group. Moreover, the differences within the group cannot be attributed solely to the structure of the state apparatus: federal, regional and local. The difference takes place within each individual and is related to the multiple identities of individuals. I argue that the ability to change, to go through a process of ‘becoming’, empowers individuals and helps community
members to deal with insecurity of expectations. I conclude that the human ability to understand others and create connections with them, plays an important role in the assemblage.

6.2.3. Meet a new actor: ‘foreigners’

In the section below I argue that by introducing a new group of actors, in particular ‘foreigners,’ community members are tackling insecurity of expectations. This group was revealed in the process of narration (or story telling). The image of ‘foreigners’ frequently appeared in the interviews. This helped the interviewees to reflect on their own roles as well as providing a better understanding of the context of oil and gas development in the region. The appearance of ‘foreigners’ as a specific group of actors in the assemblage was preconditioned by the uniqueness of the Shtokman project and the border location of the region. My interviewees mainly mentioned Norwegians as important partners in connection with oil and gas development, though some interviewees provided examples from Finland. For example, one of the interviewees said that, “in order to avoid “experiments” in the Barents Sea, and to balance ecology, biology and extraction, only experienced companies should participate in the project” (Interviewee 7, September 2008). Therefore, those who are involved in the Shtokman project are interested in foreign partners. This is how an interviewee formulated it:

“I am happy that Norwegians joined the project. I consider them to be the most competent in the question of offshore deposits development. They have experience with regard to the development of deposits in Arctic conditions…” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).

Thus, the competence of Norwegians in oil and gas extraction plays an important role in cooperation within the Shtokman project. Below, I discuss several roles, which foreigners play in the assemblage: they are business partners, neighbours and friends, and provide templates for possible development.

In the above example, the Norwegians appear as business partners. One interviewee told me that their company was established because of cooperation between the government of the Murmansk region and Statoil (Interviewee 18, December 2009). Foreign companies were considered to be the main business partners in the Shtokman project because “they are our closest neighbours and we initially started with them, and are interested in developing neighbourly relations with them” (Interviewee 18, December 18). Foreigners are not just business partners – they also challenge local business companies in terms of competence and knowledge. One of the interviewees points this out:
“And certainly it is a serious positive factor, because the presence of foreign companies creates an internal competitive environment. Norwegian companies have good experience in oil and gas projects and have the required certificates…and other related things…When our companies see the competitors, they study intensively, send their employees for training, get certified, upgrade equipment, and so on” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).

Thus, foreign companies bring experience and knowledge to the Shtokman project and they also become an example. Their presence in the region stimulates local companies to improve their standards. This is positive for the market in the Murmansk region since the Russian companies can compete with strong partners and improve their skills.

Overall, the intensity was high regarding the meetings, seminars, mutual visiting of plants and factories, and exchange of specialists which took place between 2007 and 2012. Interviewee 18 (December 2009) pointed out that their company had approximately 20 international seminars and a number of meetings between representatives of different international business companies over a span of four years. An intensity of physical movement (trips over the border to Norway and Finland) resulted in flows of experience and knowledge. As one respondent noted “[we] are talking about the merger of business.” (Interviewee 4, September 2008).

Intensive connections penetrate geographic borders as well as mental ones – in terms of culture and ways of thinking. This, in turn, brings new connections and ideas related to business and life style into the daily life of the Murmansk region. As the result, foreigners are also portrayed as friends and good neighbours.

The respondents have good knowledge about Norway (the geography of the country, cultural dates like the 17th of May133). Knowledge is a significant basis for cooperation. It helps in understanding neighbours, and not fearing them. This is how an interviewee encapsulated relationships with Norway and Finland:

“Even in a nightmare I cannot dream that something negative can happen between Russia and Norway. Russia and Norway have never had a war between them. Russia was the first country in the world that recognized the independence of Norway, the first in 1905. The Russian Empire [acknowledged] Norway, which, for centuries, was under the protectorate of Denmark and Sweden. In the north of Russia and Norway, we are all like

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133 The 17th May is the National Day in Norway.
brothers. And we have the best neighbourly relations. We are saying, in the Barents region, such a joke, it was born last year. We were in the European Union, together with the Finnish delegation. And there was an annual open day for the regions. And there was the delegation from the Murmansk region and from Lapland, and we met with the Commissioners. The meetings were very serious, on different levels. And when we were doing the presentation, we said: we are not Norwegians, not Russians, not Finns - we are northern people. This is a completely different people. So I do not see many negative things that can happen and affect our cooperation” (Interviewee 18, December 2009).

The interviewee stresses the historical connections between Norway and Russia, starting in the time of Tsarist Russia. They also make a distinction between “us,” as the representatives of the Barents Euro-Arctic region, and “them,” as the representatives of Europe. An identification as “northern people” unites Norwegians, Finns and Russians and underscores good relations, understanding and friendship. This collective “northern identity” is based on geographical location and the intensity of connections between the countries.

The interviewees do not merely admire their neighbours. People in Murmansk are learning from them too. They analyse the situation and understand that things are not going that well in neighbouring countries either. For example, while we were discussing Norway, an interviewee affirmed, that in spite of their experience, Norway is still coping with the effects of oil and gas development and gave the example of Hammerfest’s experience (Interviewee 2, September 2008). An LNG plant was constructed on the island of Melkøya near Hammerfest in order to produce and transport the gas from the Snøhvit gas field. The unstable work of the LNG plant resulted in the appearance of a giant torch of unprocessed gas over the plant and the emission of soot over the town of Hammerfest. Another interviewee made reference to the industrial island of Melkøya in Norway and noted that similar challenges might be faced by the future LNG plant in Teriberka, despite the fact that another technology would be used for construction (Interviewee 11, September 2008). The experience of neighbours impresses on people the need for a careful approach to oil and gas development. Even those with extensive experience cannot cope with all the consequences.

The interviewees establish various connections to foreigners through a territory, identity, business relations, knowledge and experience. I can conclude that my interviewees portray their neighbours as business partners and friends. The interviewees eagerly discussed their experience of cooperation with foreign partners. This eagerness indicates the importance of
such cooperation for both state and non-state actors in the Murmansk region. The sense of belonging to the ‘northern territories’ creates a semantic circle around the northern parts of Finland, Norway and Russia. People living in the North have some things in common – roads, business, a remote and sparsely populated territories and a fragile environment – that allow them to feel closer to each other. The inclusion of Norway and Finland in the narratives brings a territorial dimension into the security assemblage. I will discuss the role and meaning of territory in Chapter 8.

6.3. Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed the choice of strategies and actions available for the state and individuals in the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012) where insecurity of expectations is the governing rule.

Both the state and community members in the region develop own strategies in order to secure their expectations in relation to oil and gas development in the region. The state reshapes the security system and makes a securitization move towards oil and gas resources, framed mostly in military terms, and this leads to increased military presence in the Murmansk region. Community members, in order to secure expectations, create the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010). Unlike the state, community members do not connect regional glory and prosperity to the development of oil and gas resources. Scenarios outlined in the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) take into consideration regional challenges and presuppose several versions of the future. By creating the Murmansk strategy, community members stake out their ability to think and act independently – to take into account regional interests while the state secures its own dreams and expectations.

I discussed the group ‘regional authorities’ as the group which functions as a marginalized state actor in the assemblage (2007-2012). I conclude that even though the group ‘policy makers’ does represent an abstract idea of the state, it is necessary to remember that they are also members of the community. As individuals they have multiple identities and are capable of shifting roles or ‘becoming’. This means that any individual representing the state can contribute to the image of the state: individuals have the ability to open the system or make it more rigid. It depends on their identity, which is displayed differently in different situations. Thus, the state depends on the individuals who represent it. The ability of ‘becoming’ is important, because individuals make the system either more effective or more dysfunctional. I
conclude that the ability of ‘becoming’ is empowering to individuals. It makes them flexible in decision-making and sensitive to the needs of community members.

My analysis demonstrated the importance of the group ‘foreigners’ in the context of oil and gas development. Community members are given the opportunity to learn more about the petroleum sector, especially in Norway, and, as a result, to compare their life and experience with their foreign neighbours. I argue that neighbourly relations, openness to mutual understanding and the possibility of joint projects, stimulates changes in the security assemblage. I further elaborate on this manner of transformation in Chapter 8, where I discuss the issue of security and geography, and Chapter 9, which is devoted to a discussion of my findings.

In this chapter, I discussed actions. In the next chapter, I will discuss statements related to these actions in the security assemblage (2007-2012).
7. Words and silence: the collective assemblage of enunciation

In Chapter 4, I discussed the tetravalent structure of the assemblage and introduced two axes: horizontal and vertical. In the previous chapter, I discussed the horizontal axis of the security assemblage and focused on the micro-assemblage of actors. In this chapter, I continue to examine the other pole of the horizontal axis and discuss the micro-assemblage which deals with a spectrum of utterances, speech acts and statements. I examine the collective assemblage of enunciation in order to understand how security can be articulated in the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). In the previous chapters I pointed out that Russians are not used to talking about security issues, which challenges security discussions. Therefore, before I can discuss meanings of security in the Russian context (Chapters 8 and 9), it is necessary to outline the tools accessible to actors in Russia to express their security concerns.

As I pointed out in Chapter 4, desire and the abstract machine acquire material manifestation and become visible through the collective assemblage of enunciation. Analysis of the collective assemblage of enunciation helps to understand how some statements become possible and others not (Wise 2005: 85-86). The security assemblage is driven by a collective desire for the development of oil and gas resources in the Arctic – as discussed in Chapter 3. This desire forms an outlook of collective assemblage of enunciation. Nevertheless, the content of this collective enunciation needs to be examined. My analysis in Chapter 5 showed that people in the Murmansk region and the Russian state coexist in the security tension, brought about by the rule of the abstract machine. Deleuze and Guattari state that a language exists in “immanent continuous variation” and therefore an assemblage of enunciation “unavoidably produces a language within a language” (ATP: 97). The state dominates the region, but due to differences in expectations related to development of oil and gas resources in the Arctic, the state and individuals pursue different strategies in order to secure their expectations. Therefore it is equally important to examine the linguistic practices of the state and individuals in the security assemblage in order to reveal approaches to security in Russia. This examination contributes to the discussion on the nature of the security assemblage and helps to understand whether human security has a place in the security assemblage or not.
7.1. Official statement “the Arctic as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation” as an example of performative sentence and ‘incorporeal transformation’

While discussing actions of the state aimed at ensuring its immediate security in Chapter 6, I concluded that the language of securitization was developed alongside these actions and Russian vocabulary was enlarged by terms such as “strategic resources” and “resources of federal significance”. This means that actions are connected to language and this connection needs some clarification.

As outlined in Chapter 4, both Deleuze and Guattari as well as the Copenhagen school, apply a theory of speech act in order to understand the issue of action and language. The core of the speech act theory is performative sentences, which are not transmitting information, but are actions in themselves. Performative sentences have the power to change a situation. Change is related to the effect of ‘incorporeal transformation’—when an object remains unchanged, but its surroundings are transformed. In the Concept of National Security (CNS, 1997, Section 4) the Russian Arctic was deemed to be a place in need of special help from the state and not the root of economic development: “At no time mechanisms to maintain livelihoods and economic development of particularly crisis regions and districts of the Far North should be developed.” Eleven years later, the Russian Arctic is defined as “a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation providing the solution to the problems of social and economic development of the country” (BRFA-2020, 2008, Chapter 2, Article 4a). Thus, in the documents, within a decade the Russian Arctic is transformed from an aid receiver to the source of the social and economic development of the country. How then did this transformation happen? I argue that this transformation of the Arctic territory is incorporeal. Below, I sketch a brief history of the events related to discoveries of oil and gas in the Arctic in order to demonstrate the emergence of the region as a “strategic resource base”.

In 2000, the U.S. Geological Survey presented an assessment of worldwide undiscovered oil and gas resources (Glomsrød and Aslaksen, 2006). Though the survey had limited data and didn’t include estimates of undiscovered resources from all basin areas north of the Arctic Circle, the results of it strongly affected various communities – scientific, political, business and the general public. The cause was the statement, “25% of undiscovered petroleum resources” are located in the Arctic (Bailey, 2007). By 2002, Arctic Russia was estimated to have 45 - 55% of the total volume of the undiscovered oil and gas resources in the Arctic (Glomsrød and Aslaksen, 2006: 29). An assessment from 2008 showed that more that 70% of
promising or undiscovered deposits of natural gas were located in three provinces: the West Siberian Basin, the East Barents Basin, and Arctic Alaska. It was also estimated that approximately 84% of undiscovered oil and gas was to be found offshore (CARA, 2008). The interest in the Arctic was growing. This was despite Arctic energy resources being characterized as “undiscovered” and “unproven” (Arctic Council SDWG, 2007: 7). This tendency towards describing estimations of Arctic resources as “unproven” has been going on for more than 40 years (see, for example, Conant, 1992: 180). However the issue of access to energy resources has become more acute since the turn of millennium due to the instability of the political situation in many other oil and gas producing regions in the world, such as the Middle East or Africa. Depletion of oil and gas resources in producing regions was another factor. Thus, within a decade the Arctic became a territory of great research and political interest both in terms of oil and gas but also in terms of geopolitical issues.

In 2001, Russia submitted a proposal to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to establish a new border of the continental shelf and claimed that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges were an extension of the Eurasian continent, allowing Russia to extend its Arctic territory. In 2002 The CLCS replied that Russia had to submit additional scientific evidence. Among the tasks of the polar expedition Arktika-2007 was to find justifications for this territorial claim. The expedition proved that the Lomonosov Ridge was linked to Russian territory and claimed that, potentially, the territory contained 10 billion tonnes of gas and oil deposits.134 The expedition received extensive media coverage both in Russia and abroad. Three members of the expedition were awarded a highest honorary title in Russia – ‘Hero of the Russian Federation’. One member was awarded the order, ‘For the merit of the fatherland’ (third class). These awards demonstrated the significance of the expedition and its discoveries for the Russian state. In September 2008, the Basics of the State Policy in the Arctic (BRFA-2020) was published.

The expedition Arktika-2007 can be viewed as a benchmark of the performative sentence, “the Arctic as a resource base”. The expedition itself was of great importance since it represented an assemblage of people, machines, ships, special equipment, findings and statements based on these findings. It allowed the state to reclaim its right over the Arctic territory because of the proof that enormous hydrocarbon resources were located there. In the period 2007 to 2012,

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the country’s interest in new energy sources became fixated by a desire for the development of Arctic resources. The Shtokman project is part of this desire formation: it is located on the Arctic shelf, it demands specific technical solutions, and the proven reserves are very large.

The Shtokman project became possible because of the performative sentence that “the Arctic is a strategic resource base”. ‘Incorporeal transformation’ changed the status of the Shtokman gas field from impossible to improbable: from a difficult project with too many risks into a challenging Russian strategic project. Work on the project was activated on different levels: on the state level, the consortium, “Shtokman Development AG” was formed; on the regional level, offices were established in Moscow, Murmansk and Teriberka and on the local level different companies were established. Some building activities were started – for example a road connecting Murmansk with the site of future LNG plant in Teriberka. Murmansk became enmeshed in a net of promises, hopes and wishes. But ‘incorporeal transformation’ does not mean that the object gets changed. Thus, the Shtokman project remains in the phase of planning and, as I pointed in Chapter 3, the new date for the start of the project is now estimated to be after 2025.

7.2. Collective enunciations: the state versus individuals

As discussed in Chapter 3, different articulations of desire create a tension between the state and individuals. On the national level, the Murmansk region is regarded as a strategic region with sources of raw materials. But on the regional level, as seen in Chapter 6, focus is given to regional needs and the possible directions development can take, in a situation where decision-making by the state is unpredictable. Community members develop the regional strategy as a response to insecure expectations. I argue that by introducing the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025), community members managed to break the conditions of ‘felicity’, necessary to fulfil the performative sentence “the Arctic as a strategic resource base,” and thus the securitization act remains incomplete. As I discussed in Chapter 4, any performative sentence should either go through a conventional procedure or be accepted by all participants in order to be acknowledged as successful (the so-called conditions of ‘felicity’ or ‘facilitating conditions’).

The Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) takes into consideration the performative sentence, “the Arctic as a strategic resources base,” articulated by the state. This sentence is reflected in all four scenarios of possible development of the Murmansk region outlined in the SSEDM-2025 (2010), which I discussed in Chapter 6. Three scenarios, “World resources,”
“Depository’ - strategic reserves” and “Terminal and “Navy base” are not considered desirable, because in these cases the region does not benefit from activities (mostly related to extraction of oil and gas resources) happening in its territory, since the federal centre will be in charge of mega-projects and receive benefits from their implementation. The fourth scenario, “Murmansk - strategic centre for the Arctic exploration” is viewed as the most ambitious and “at the same time fully consistent with the modernization agenda and ambitions of Russia in the Arctic” (SSEDM-2015, 2010: 40). This scenario allows community members to respond to the government’s ideas of using the region as a provider of raw materials and, at the same time, to coordinate the position of such “diverse players” as “state authorities, society, business, and science on the development prospects” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40). Though the SSEDM-2015 (2010) claims that this scenario is fully in accord with the official statement, the driving force behind it is not the sentence “the Arctic as a strategic resource base,” but another collective statement. This statement is made by community members and headlining a chapter in the Murmansk strategy: “The region, how we see it, want it and can create it” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40). First of all this statement means that community members articulate their voice and their own understanding of the socio-economic situation in their home region. Secondly, it reveals the existence of collective “we”. This collective “we” means that not only the state, but “society, business and science” should be equally responsible for possible changes in the region. This inclusion of several actors, responsible for the regional development, empowers community members as agents of change and allows them to take a proactive position in response to the state’s visions and strategies.

Therefore, in response to the performative sentence, “the Arctic as a strategic resource base” which led to the securitization of the Arctic by the state, the collective statement – “the region, how we see it, want it and can create it” – was formed on the regional level. The performative sentence, “the Arctic as a strategic resource base” becomes ruptured, because the conditions of ‘felicity’ or ‘facilitating conditions’ are not fulfilled: community members do not connect the future of the region to the extraction of oil and gas resources only, and name other actors besides the state. As a result, community members in the Murmansk region operate within a framework of collective enunciation, which consists of the performative sentence and the collective statement. These sentence and statement are not contradictory, but they place different emphasis on the issue of development and the role of actors in this process. Thus, community members question the role of the state as the main actor dealing with oil and gas resources.
The region develops a regional strategy as a response to insecure expectations. Community members involved in the writing of the SSEDM-2025 are aware of the limitation on what is possible and what is not to discuss in the frame of the performative sentence articulated by the state. Because the state has already selected the strategy of securitization of natural resources in the Arctic, community members in the region articulate their own collective statement and thus create a space where different actors like “state authorities, society, business, and science” are included as equal partners who can speak about regional development and the use of oil and gas resources. This indicates that community members have an intention of dialogue. The question is what can be discussed and how it can be discussed in the Russian context?

7.3. ‘The silent security dilemma’ or what was not said during the interviews

I discussed in Chapter 4 the concept of a speech act as bridging the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari and the Copenhagen school. If the former developed an understanding of a speech act in relation to its role in an assemblage, the latter developed the concept of a speech act in order to understand the dynamic of security. The state is a traditional security actor and is used to speaking on behalf of several actors. The state utters speech acts through official documents and speeches of state officials (written, filmed and aired on TV, published in reports, social media etc.). I already discussed in the previous chapter that state officials working at different levels (local, regional and federal) represent the state. I also concluded that an individual acting as a representative of the state could be considered the part of the state apparatus because he/she is following the rules prescribed to this position: they avoid some topics and they can speak only positively about the development in the region. However, the question remains how non-state actors talk about topics like ‘security’ or ‘development’ in the situation when the state designates some topics as unwanted in the field of public discussion? What kind of linguistic practices do individuals have? In order to examine how community members operationalize concepts of ‘security’, I will use materials from my interviews, which provide insights on a practical level.

Taking into consideration the specifics of Russian security context, I suggest that excluded or silenced topics may have special function in the assemblage. Deleuze and Guattari as well as the Copenhagen school addressed the issue of silence. The initial security speech act theory, developed by the Copenhagen school, has been criticized for excluding from analysis those actors who lack the power to speak (Hansen, 2000; Wilkinson, 2007; McDonald, 2008). Hansen (2000) called this situation the ‘silent security dilemma’. Hansen (2000: 285) addresses
it as an intrinsic part of speech act theory and argues “…epistemological reliance of speech act theory presupposes the existence of a situation in which speech is indeed possible. Those who, like the Little Mermaid, are constrained in their ability to speak security are therefore prevented from becoming subjects worthy of consideration and protection.” Thus the concept refers to the situation “when the potential subject of (in)security has no, or limited, possibility of speaking about its security problems” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 216). Hence, silence can function as an exclusion of unwanted or unimportant voices. At the same time, silence can have another function. Thus, while discussing specifics of an assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari refer to music, where the silences play as important a role as the audible sounds (ATP: 95). Therefore, silence can be approached as another way of talking about important issues. Thus, ruptures and pauses create the intensity in the assemblage as well as indicate key topics.

The Copenhagen school was criticised for prioritizing language over other means of communication, such as visual or bodily communication (Hansen, 2000; Williams, 2003; McDonald, 2008). Hansen (2000: 300) argues that the context or circumstances restrict explicit articulation of words such as ‘security’ or ‘threat’ and stresses that visual and bodily communications are as equally important parts of security politics as verbal communication. I will analyse silence as an important part of the collective enunciation. I have to note that in my analysis I verbalise non-verbal signs (pauses, volume and speed of speech, gestures, interjections etc.). I addressed the issue of the interpretation of non-verbal expressions in Chapter 2, when I discussed the meaning of the visual and bodily signs in the Russian context. I indicated that I would lay out my interpretation of what was happening during the interview processes. Below, I will describe and analyse these signs in order to reveal what they implied.

Several times during the interviews, the movements or gestures of interviewees carried more information than did verbal expressions. For example, one interview with a state official was conducted in their office. Traditionally, Russians are concerned that anything said at work does not stay there, because “the walls have ears”. Therefore, during the interview I had to closely observe the body language and intonation of the person (from whispering to very loud articulation of some statements), which they relied on heavily. Mostly it happened in response to questions about federal responsibilities, which the interviewee could not openly discuss. Some sentences ended with a question: “You understand, right?” or “You know it yourself, right?” This extra layer of information transmitted through the body and level of voice added
extra meanings to our conversation and helped me to better understand the context in which words were spoken.

An interesting image was depicted in another interview. In order to illustrate their attitude to the situation in the region, the interviewee evoked the image of a picture, which he/she never saw, but heard about from their grandmother:

“[Speaks (Interviewee 2)]: A picture existed in the Soviet Union’s time, my grandmother told me about it. So it is a huge oil pipeline … It could be “Druzhba”\textsuperscript{135}, it could be something else. And on the side, there is a village, and a granny, an old one, bent with a bundle of firewood, walking to her small hut. And a pipeline is passing by.

[Interviewee 2] looks at (ML)].

[Comments (ML)]: Yeah. Perfect image – very vivid and up to date.

[Speaks (Interviewee 2)]: So the pipeline will go, go past, Murmansk will get almost nothing [from Shtokman]” (Interviewee 2, September 2008)

In this case, the image is used to illustrate the words of the interviewee. They worry that if Shtokman is implemented, gas pipelines will intersect the region, but Murmansk will not see the benefits. In the picture, Murmansk is portrayed as a granny walking with a bundle of firewood to her small house. The oil pipeline symbolizes technical development, success in oil extraction and the scale of cooperation between the state and foreign countries. But this development bypasses the village, where the granny lives. The village, the old woman, her small house and her bundle of firewood, symbolise the everyday life of people, which is not modernized and does not benefit from oil development in the country. The image helps the interviewee to express the feelings, fears and concerns that he/she does not dare to verbalise directly.

It is possible to conclude that some important messages related to security issues can be expressed by other means such as pictures, mimics, gestures etc. So if people do not talk directly about an issue, it does not mean that they do not have an opinion about it, or do not ‘speak’ security.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Druzhba} [Friendship] oil pipeline was built in the 1960s, and is the longest pipeline connecting the eastern part of Russia with Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Germany.
7.4. Silenced words and topics – the ‘invisible hand’ of the state?

Below I analyse how individuals are operationalizing the collective assemblage of enunciation and cope with its limitations of what can and cannot be said in a situation where the state has securitised natural resources. The interviews provide extensive insights into what the average person in Russia says about security issues and what they keep quiet about. I select three examples from three interviews to illustrate silence in the conversation.

Example 1

Prior to interview a person noticed that would not comment on security issues. During the interview I asked the person about what kind of role the oil and gas sector has in regional development. The person struggled a bit to answer which resulted in the structure of narrative: the sentences are reversed, short and ill-structured. They answered:

“It has no place. Today, the oil and gas industry has no influence. It might gain influence in the future, with the development of the Shtokman field, where agreements have been concluded in such a way that the company has been registered in the region, and the whole infrastructure related to Shtokman is placed here. Repair companies, service enterprises, they are Murmansk companies. In this case, we will get [influence]. Not today. Overloading is big, heavy congestion. The load, well, let us speak frankly, is a potential [pause] threat. Although Belokamenka\textsuperscript{136} had two difficult moments, which could have resulted in huge problems. An act of terrorism was prevented, with the explosion of the tanker, and [another] was a banal accident. A tanker drove over Belokamenka during loading, which could also have resulted in an oil spill. Thank God this did not happen. So approximately like this. That is the answer to your question. Today [it has] no influence” (Interviewee 12, October 2008).

The structure of this narrative is very interesting since it has two story lines. It opens and closes with the refrain that the oil and gas sector has no influence on regional development. One story is about the potential benefits for the region from the Shtokman project, and another story is about threats and risks to the region posed by oil and gas. The interviewee combines future,

\textsuperscript{136}Belokamenka is a rural settlement in Murmansk region. A floating storage and offloading vessel is named after the settlement, since the vessel is located in the water area of the settlement in the Kola Bay. It is one of the biggest vessel of this class in Russia. Around four million tons of crude oil per year go through the vessel. \texttt{http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/29107} Accessed February 3, 2017.
present and past tenses in the narrative. The future tense is attributed to the development. The present tense is attributed to the threats caused by oil activity in the region. The interviewee provides two extraordinary examples from the past about the storage vessel Belokamenka. The narration of the story line about Belokamenka and related to this oil terminal risks is not smooth. The pace of speech was also slower than in other sentences. This indicates that the interviewee was selecting the information and evaluating what could be said and how. In my opinion, this was caused by the application of the word “threat,” which belongs to the vocabulary of security and emergency. The interviewee notes that the threat is potential, though also regards it as ever present when working with oil. The example shows how the interviewee, while answering one question, brings up another issue even though the interviewee considers this issue to be outside the discussion, since before the interview I was told that we would not discuss security issues.

Example 2

In this example, I asked if the person could detect any change in interest towards environmental issues in the region. The interviewee answered:

“[Speaks (Interviewee 9)]: I cannot say that people in the region have woken up to the idea that the ecological situation in the region is problematic. People are used to that, to not everything being ok with ecology here… Yes, [we] were shaken a little bit when a tragedy of Chernobyl\(^\text{137}\) happened, that is, people panicked: how can it be, we have the same [the Kola nuclear power plant] nearby, and [they] began openly talk about it and talk a lot. But today it has abated again.

[Asks (ML)]: Is it because it is such an everyday reality?

[(Interviewee 9), talking simultaneously with question of (ML)]: It is impossible to live in everyday fear. You begin to take it easy. Let’s say, hmmm [pause], how do we call it? My Gosh [pause]. Fatalistic!” (Interviewee 9, September 2008)

The interviewee points out that the environmental situation in the region is not good, but has become a part of everyday reality. The Chernobyl catastrophe was an exceptional event that stimulated discussion about nuclear danger, because the Murmansk region also hosts a nuclear power plant. However, these discussions dissipated over time. People learnt to co-exist with the threat and even ignore it, because they could not “live in everyday fear”. Thus, fear is a part

\(^{137}\) Meltdown at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power plant happened on 26 April 1986 and this accident is considered to be the worst nuclear power plant accident in world history.
of daily life, but not spoken about, because otherwise life becomes impossible. The interviewee does not mention the word ‘threat’ directly and does not name the Kola nuclear power plant (KNPP). Instead, the interviewee uses the phrase “the same nearby” in the context of the Chernobyl tragedy. This example shows how some sources of threat (the KNPP) and the word ‘threat’ are excluded from the conversation. The example also highlights the issue of co-existence with a threat, when fear becomes a part of everyday life and is routinized by the community.

Example 3

The following example consists of two excerpts from the same interview. I consider this example as important for the analysis as it illustrates how Russians deal with topics related to state and security.

I asked if the interviewee could elaborate on positive and negative aspects related to the regional development. The interviewee claims that the situation is very positive and expresses their attitude towards the state and provides some explanations for the state’s behaviour:

“I can say that I trust the state more [pause]. However [pause]. The last steps [pause]. Personally, the latest events in South Ossetia\textsuperscript{138} created a respect towards our political leaders. Russia is gaining face. It is becoming a country which is necessary to take into consideration. The state has started to pay attention to teachers, maybe not to everyone, not to the whole system of health care, but it is still better than nothing. It is easy to criticize. Therefore, I do hope that these positive tendencies will be maintained in the future. And, of course, the state started tackling the most acute situation. And then it will pay attention to the other sectors, which do not demand immediate help. But the state support is needed” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).

The interviewee indicates that they trusts the state more and stresses the importance of state support. The person is proud of the state’s success in international politics and positively evaluates the state’s domestic policy with hope for further improvements. The interviewee shows understanding that the state has had to address the most acute issues. Then, our interview

\textsuperscript{138} The interviewee refers to the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. Russia acknowledges South Ossetia’s independence, meanwhile Georgia considers South Ossetia to be occupied by Russian military.
continues and, after a while, we return to the same topic, but now the standpoint of the respondent is different:

“[Asks (ML)]: And now the last question. As a Murmansk inhabitant, as a person living in Murmansk, do you feel confident and secure about tomorrow?

[Answers (Interviewee 7)]: I will answer honestly, and maybe it would not be necessary to include it in the description. But as a citizen of this country, after the crises in the 1990s, I cannot say that I feel confidence in tomorrow. But I live with a certain hope, that still we will not go back to a bad time. Already for a long period of time we live more or less stably, relatively. But I do not have full confidence, yet. It is a result of consequences of the 1990s. [Pause].

[Comments (ML)]: We can say that it was not so long ago.

[Continues (Interviewee 7)]: Yeah, not a long time ago. That is why I cannot say that I have calmed down and look with confidence into the future. Unfortunately, the steps of government are not always predictable here [in the region]. For example, I do not know what will happen to the pension system when it is my turn to become a pensioner. Unfortunately, social politics in Russia is far away from being perfect. Far away. And this does not contribute to absolute confidence. The only thing I can say is that now quite good conditions have been established in Russia for people who really want to do something. If you are not lazy, if you are well educated, if you want to work, are focused on something, then, of course it’s not a guarantee, but the chance to get a good job, to grow up, to climb the social ladder, to focus on your career, has become bigger than it was, let’s say, ten years ago” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).

In this second part of the interview, the interviewee expresses personal feelings regarding their own future and security. The word ‘security’ is used by me alone – the interviewee prefers the word ‘confidence’. The interviewee also thinks that, maybe, their answer should be excluded from the interview. My question triggers the mechanism of ‘becoming’, when the interviewee changes identity from being ‘professional’ (representing particular organization) to ‘citizen’ (expressing personal opinion). The interviewee questions the relevance of their personal comment because he/she is expressing a personal opinion as “a citizen of this country,” who considers the steps of the government to be unpredictable. The person explains their feeling of insecurity and uses the meta-narrative of the 1990s. Many people consider this period after the collapse of the USSR as a time of financial crises, shock therapy and social instability. At the
same time, however, the interviewee is keen to stress the possibilities that exist in contemporary society which were not there ten years ago.

This example shows that the interviewee feels comfortable making a positive evaluation of state politics with some critical insights. But the respondent will only ‘silently’ speak of their mistrust of the state. The interviewee, despite being proud of the state, expresses concerns when it comes to security of expectations. The unpredictability of governmental decisions and an imperfect social system contribute to personal insecurity about the future. As a result, the interviewee combines two opposite opinions about the state: pride in the state is combined with personal insecurity, caused by the state. Insecurity is minimized in the narrative by individual strategies of survival, since the interviewee makes some positive comments about contemporary Russia compared to the country in the 1990s and concludes that a lot depends on personal qualities and personal will to achieve something.

The analysis conducted above shows how individuals are operationalizing the collective assemblage of enunciation and cope with its limitations of what can and cannot be said. I analysed three different examples from my interviews. I conclude that themes such as ‘threat’, ‘fear’, ‘security’ and ‘opinion about the state as a citizen’ are avoided by the interviewees, because they are aware that these topics should not be discussed in public. The question is whether this occur only within the frame of security assemblage, in circumstances where the state has securitised oil and gas resources in the Arctic, or whether there is a wider explanation. I mentioned in Chapter 4 that the issue of language became a matter of interest in contemporary Russia. Below, I discuss the consequences of this for the security assemblage.

**7.5. Coping with ‘public dumbness’**

I introduced in Chapter 4 the work of Gladarev (2015), who applies the metaphor ‘public dumbness’ and claims that Russian society lacks the experience of public debates and is still learning how to conduct them. He identifies two main linguistic registers developed in Soviet society, which have been inherited by contemporary Russia. The first one is the personal, emotional and private language of “kitchen talk” and the other register, which marks the “official language,” is impersonal, formal, and full of bureaucratic jargon (Gladarev, 2015: 285-286). Gladarev (2015: 287) argues that there should be a third, a so-called “public

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139 “Kitchen talk” is talk in a private space (mostly at home with family and friends), when the participants openly express their own opinion or discuss ‘forbidden’ topics.
register,” where language is neutral, reasoned, and polite. This public space allows debates on equal terms with the other, since everyone speaks the same language and complies with the same rules of speech (Gladarev, 2015: 287). This “public register” is under formation in contemporary Russian society, which is still heavily imprinted by the Soviet experience of “governed publicity” (Gladarev, 2015: 288). “Governed publicity” singles out any public statement as a political speech, and presupposes some kind of official control over the speech and the person making it. This practice caused a fear of public statements in contemporary Russia (Gladarev, 2015: 288). Thus, dialogue and discussion in the public sphere are very problematic in Russia because vocabulary and rules of conduct are not formed and the “public register” is under-developed.

I claimed earlier in this chapter that community members indicated in the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) an intention to establish a dialogue, where “state authorities, society, business, and science” can act as equal partners who can speak about the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the region. So in this section I examine whether or not dialogue between the state and other actors is possible in the context of oil and gas development in the Murmansk region.

7.5.1. Establishing dialogue on environmental issues

One of the most discussed topics during the interviews was the topic of environment. The appearance of this topic is not coincidental in the context of oil and gas development. Firstly, environmental issues are essential part of the discussions related to the Shtokman project. Secondly, environmental security has a special place in the state security configuration. I mentioned in Chapter 1 that environmental security is the only specific security issue mentioned in the Federal law “On security” (FL №390, 2010). Environmental security is also mentioned in other Russian documents on security (FL №2446-1, 1992; CNS, 1997; SNS-2020, 2009). According to the Strategy of National Security (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter IV, subsection 8, item 88) the forces of national security (a combination of armed forces, military troops, military formations and bodies, and (or) the law enforcement authorities, as well as the federal authorities) can cooperate with civil society in the field of environmental security in order “to counter threats in the field of environmental security… and to meet the needs of the population and [national] economy in water and biological resources.” Thus, on the one hand, environment security is related to national and military security in Russia since the forces of national security deal with environmental issues in the country. On the other hand, environment
is viewed by the state as an issue where cooperation between the forces of national security and civil society is desirable.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the discussions on the topic of environment exposed the issue of dialogue between the state and non-state actors as well as between community members. For example, I had a long discussion with two representatives of the group ‘NGOs and international organizations’ about environmental issues in the Murmansk region. The interviewees pointed out that the oil and gas companies formally follow the law and have ecological expertise, but do not understand the underlying reasons why.

“[Speaks (Interviewee 20)]: …there is a feeling that all this [ecological expertise] is so very formalized, and all this is purely because the President and the Government start to pay more attention and enforce [ecological expertise]. And the people have no other choice, they simply have to [do it].
[Asks (ML)]: what do you mean? A lack of feedback?
[Answers (Interviewee 20)]: [pause]. No, not this. A lack of frequent dialogue. The companies keep dialogue only at the stage when they ought to have it.
[Speaks (ML)]: Aha. Such a utilitarian, practical approach.
[Answers simultaneously (Interviewees 11 and 20)]: Yes, yes!
[Asks (ML)]: So when they have to have [dialogue] - they keep it, and when they do not need it – they are busy with their own problems?
[Answers (Interviewee 20)]: Absolutely!
[Adds (Interviewee 11)]: They maybe do not see any sense, maybe be they are sceptical about NGOs…” (Interviewee 11 and Interviewee 20, September 2008).

This example shows that the issue of dialogue is considered to be important by the representatives of the NGO. They name two other actors: oil and gas companies and the state (the President and the Government). The interviewees point out that the President and the Government pay more attention to environmental issues. According to interviewee 20, the state tries to facilitate dialogue between business and NGOs. The oil and gas companies maintain dialogue with the NGOs, but mostly because they have to comply with legislation. The representatives of NGOs lack frequent contact with business. Interviewee 11 tries to find an explanation for this lack of interest from the business side and suggests that, maybe, “they are sceptical”. This search for an explanation shows that the interviewee is trying to understand business in order to establish a dialogue. However, the interviewee believes that companies
comply with the legislation only because they are forced to, and not because they consider environmental issues essential.

Environmental organizations work with various environmental problems in the region and they sometimes come across environmental risks which have open connections to military-industrial activity. It does not make the work of organizations or individuals any easier, but in the end, as the interviews analyses show, the state and individuals are learning to communicate with each other and achieve mutual understanding. This is how one interviewee answered my question about environmental issues in the region:

“I can say that environmental issues are important in Russia in general at the moment. Such topics as is pollution, the extinction of rare species, or the proximity of settlements to some hazardous industries - all these topics are increasingly becoming more popular and get more attention in the country. And the same is true in the Murmansk region” (Interviewee 11, September 2008).

Further in the conversation, despite admitting the “de-ecologization of our legislation” in order to facilitate economic development, the interviewee pointed out the interest of the government in the environment, which, in the end, assists environmental NGOs to establish a dialogue with business and the regional authorities (Interviewee 11, September 2008).

NGO representatives are not the only actors who discussed environmental issues and dialogue. A representative of the group ‘business and industry’ believed that through cooperation on environmental issues, both business and the regional authorities were improving their communication with the state by using and optimizing existing channels of communication and by providing some comments about existing legislation (Interviewee 18, December 2009). Below is another comment from a representative of the regional authorities:

“I would like to highlight the ecological and legal illiteracy. It is most important. If not for this [illiteracy], other factors would be solved much more easily. At least easier, compared to how they are solved now. People flare up, become oppositional, defend, rather than deal with what is prescribed by the law. They announce this to be a bureaucratic oppression, an incursion by a governmental agency, etc. But, in reality, it is just an implementation of the law” (Interviewee 12, October 2008).
The regional authorities face challenges in cooperating with other community members (the group is not specified, it is referred as “people”) related to ecological and legal spheres. People feel that the authorities press them, though the authorities want them to comply with the legislation, because it is important for the environment. Thus, the interviewee suggests if people knew more about the environment and the legislation, it would be easier for everyone to cooperate. During our conversation, the interviewee suddenly comes up with an idea to organize special courses for business people and entrepreneurs:

“Actually, our interview gave me the idea to organize training courses for businessmen. Because the person when receiving the money somewhere, or borrowing it, or finding it, he tries to invest in something. Some start their own businesses without thinking about the fact that they are also obliged by law to comply with environmental legislation. In order to comply with it, it is necessary to study it, at least read it, and, frankly, the majority of those with whom we have to work, among the representatives of small and medium-sized businesses, are absolute illiterate” (Interviewee 12, October 2008).

In this case, the interviewee names “business” as a group of actors. Regional authorities already organize special courses for children on importance of protection of environment, but the idea of a course for adults comes as an internal answer to the interviewee’s complaint about problems in cooperation with business. Instead of merely blaming the entrepreneurs, the interviewee comes up with a constructive idea to help them understand their responsibilities. Such an attitude signals that the interviewee is eager to establish a dialogue and improve existing cooperation between the regional authorities and business in the region.

The topic of environment discussed by interviewees reveals the connections between the state and non-actors in the security assemblage. They are not always satisfied with each other: representatives of business feel forced, NGOs feel ignored, the state creates the legislation and regional authorities enforce it, but it remains misunderstood, since none-state actors consider government actions to be a “bureaucratic oppression, an incursion of a governmental agency.” Nevertheless, community members are getting invaluable experience of public discussion and learning about each other. I can conclude that the actors are trying to establish a dialogue on environmental issues. I can also note that community members more openly discussed the role of the state and its action in the field of environment. The topic of environment became a kind of window into relations between the state and individuals.
The absence of experience of public debate in Russian society might be an explanation of why the issue of dialogue and public discussions frequently cropped up during the interviews. Due to the development of the Shtokman project, several interviewees participated in public hearings (debates), related to the environmental, social, economic impact of the project on Murmansk region and future LNG plant site - Teriberka. I will discuss it below how this experience affected interviewees’ understanding of other actors.

7.5.2. Public hearings on Shtokman and security of expectations

A number of public hearings related to the Shtokman project were conducted in 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2011. The public hearings gathered local people, representatives of NGOs, representatives of regional and local authorities, federal agencies, representatives of the Kola Science Centre of the Russian Academy of Science, representatives of indigenous organizations and the Union of Fishermen of the North. Thus, different actors had an opportunity to discuss their concerns and suggestions, related to the Shtokman project.

The issue of public hearings appeared in an interview with a journalist. We touched upon environmental issues, the interviewee named some organization they worked with, and then suddenly embarked on the following narrative. The narrative is not linear and contains several story-lines which I explain following the excerpt:

“Now, according to the new federal legislation it is necessary to hold public hearings prior to the construction of any object [the Shtokman LNG plant]. And we, as editors, are taking part in these hearings. In particular, we attended [the hearing] on Shtokman, when it was held in the regional government. We only discussed the draft…It was approved by the participants of the hearing. In respect of building [activity] by other companies, there are also hearings. Ordinary people can express their views. And by the way, summing up the public hearings: after all, people chose the project [Shtokman]. Yes, of course, there may be some environmental impacts, but again they [people] are in favour because of jobs. Since the implementation of the project will allow them to work, to be paid. People anyway [sad laugh] keep this point of view. Some environmental

aspects may be taken into account. Now everything is narrowed to the point to make the production more environmentally friendly” (Interviewee 4, September 2008).

This narrative includes general information about the public hearing on the Shtokman project. Actors such as the media, environmental organisations, the regional government, business and the local community all featured in the example above. Public hearings, which are mandated by the FL №131-FZ, offer the possibility for various actors to express their opinions and to be heard by others. The interviewee points out that environmental concerns related to the Shtokman project were discussed during the hearings and the local community became aware of them. Nevertheless, people in Teriberka, where the LNG plant was supposed to be located, voted in favour of pursuing the infrastructure projects for Shtokman, because the project will bring employment and money to people living in Teriberka. The whole narrative is related to the possibility of the local community making a choice based on the available information related to the Shtokman project. Nevertheless, the structure of the narrative suggests that the main message is related to the issue of security of expectations. This articulation of expectations provides an insight into how state and human security appear in the assemblage (2007-2012).

After telling me that the draft was approved during the hearing, the interviewee continued their reflection. Then the issue of public hearings about the Shtokman is brought up again, when the interviewee says “and by the way, summing up the public hearings”. The interviewee stresses several times that people approved the construction activity related to the Shtokman project. This repetition already creates an internal opposition: the “people’s choice” against somebody else’s. Since the narrative began with the theme of environmental issues and finishes with the same theme, it is possible to suggest that the opposition is, ‘people vs. environmental organisations’. The interviewee says: “People anyway keep this point of view” and emphasises a word “anyway” with an intonation of stress and a sad laugh, and then continues to reflect upon the environmental issues. This sentence demonstrates that despite the information about possible ecological problems, people of Teriberka were still in favour of the Shtokman project because it offers places to work. Another opposition in the narrative can be suggested between ‘business vs. local community’. The state and business ‘desire’ for Shtokman is well known is the region, but the wishes of people living in Teriberka are less well conveyed in the public space. Here, the interviewee explains that the local community supports business and their suggestion to place an LNG plant nearby the settlement. The interviewee stresses that this is
the people’s choice. So it means that there is no opposition between the wish of business and the local community. The local community had an opportunity to meet representatives of environmental NGOs and businesses and to hear different opinions about the project. Despite warnings about possible environmental damage the people of Teriberka nevertheless supported the development nearby Teriberka. However, do people living in Teriberka make this choice because they are able to choose between several options and they freely select the most optimal?

I discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to the concept of security of expectations that human beings are not restricted by their nature to exist solely in the present – they are able to create an image of the future and this reveals their hopes and expectations, which are dependent on their current situation (Hoogensen, 2005: 15). The expectations in relation to the Shtokman project contain two insecurities. First of all it was questionable whether the development of Shtokman would actually meet the local community expectations in terms of employment. Gazprom promised working places for people living in Teriberka, but it is likely that this promise might not be fulfilled because people do not have necessary technical skills. The only hope is that they can be employed in the services sector. In Chapter 3 I noted that some interviewees expressed concerns that Gazprom would need to hire professionals from outside of the region to work for Shtokman. This concern is also presented in the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2015, 2010), where four scenarios of regional development are discussed. The other expectation is related to the promise of conducting an environmentally friendly production of gas. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the local environment would not be changed or polluted due to the technological complexity of the Shtokman project. In order to understand why the local community supports the project, it is necessary to explore the conditions under which people make their decisions.

7.5.3. Teriberka and conditions for their choice

Teriberka is one of the oldest settlements on the Kola Peninsula and was first mentioned in 1523 (Aure, 2008: 61). In the period from 1940-1960 economic activity was built around fishing and ship-repairing facilities. At that time Teriberka had approximately 10,000 inhabitants with schools, shops, clubs, a culture house, hotel and an ambulance station (Aure, 2008: 62). Later, in the 1960s, coastal fishing became less significant due to increased ship

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142 Gazprom promised around 200 jobs for the people of Teriberka (Interviewee 5, September 2008).
tonnage. Small fish processing factories were pushed out of business by the establishment of a big fishing factory in Murmansk. By the end of 1970s, the population of Teriberka dropped to approximately 2,400 (Aure, 2008: 63). In the 1980s, however, the situation was relatively good. Fishing remained the main activity, but the community also had farms, producing milk and meat, and some people worked at the hydroelectric plant while others were employed at the ship-repairing yard (Aure, 2008: 63). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis of 1998 affected Teriberka significantly. Neither the shipyard nor the fishing collective farm (kolkhoz) could pay salaries any longer and, due to their drastically reduced activity, the community lost its main sources of income (Aure, 2008: 64). At the beginning of the 21st century, Teriberka was characterized by a high level of unemployment, ill-maintained houses and closed shipyards, farms and shops: “In Teriberka all are ‘former’: fishermen, fish processing specialists, repairers of ships. Once upon a time ... people came here to live, work, have children ...”143 By 2007, people in Teriberka mainly lived on the income from a subsistence economy, based on fishing and picking mushrooms and berries.

Below is an example from an interview, where a person comments on their experience of the public hearings on Shtokman:

“... I was there, during the hearings, and I was horrified in what conditions people live there [in Teriberka]. This is the Murmansk region, it is a very beautiful place, and I was just shocked. I did not think that in our country people still lived like that. I had a feeling that I was back into the past, simply very and very distant. And I understand that they need at least some production for their [pause] survival” (Interviewee 9, September 2008).

The interviewee is shocked by the situation in Teriberka and could not imagine that people lived in such poor conditions in Russia. The interviewee is a representative of an NGO working on environmental issues. However, the interviewee understands that current conditions limit people’s hopes and expectations – they need at least something and they do not have much choice. They need jobs if they want their old settlement to survive. For this remote settlement, whose whole infrastructure was damaged in the 1990s, petroleum activity means new hopes for the future.

These public hearings allowed different actors to obtain new information, to learn about other perspectives through a process of dialogue and to visit other places in the region, like the future site of the Shtokman LNG plant in Teriberka. The law facilitates the dialogue between various actors and provides an opportunity to the people of Teriberka to grant or deny consent for Gazprom activity. Nevertheless, the actors do not have equal conditions for decision-making with regard to the Shtokman project. The package offered by Gazprom in 2007 to the people of Teriberka included modern kindergartens, schools, a sports complex, a supermarket, new houses, a two-fold increase in revenues to the municipal budget and 200 jobs at a salary of 20,000 rubles. This package did not include luxuries and huge compensations. Already in 2010, in an interview in the newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda, the head of the settlement noted that though Gazprom promised 200 jobs for the people of Teriberka, they actually employed few local people and the rest were working migrants. Given the conditions in which people live in Teriberka, the choice which people made during the hearings was one where “one’s immediate security is still threatened” (Hoogensen, 2005: 14). In this situation of immediate insecurity, they do not have any other choice than to support potential oil and gas activity nearby their settlement. For them, the potential environmental damage from the Shtokman project lies in the far future and it is less dangerous than the poverty and insecurities they live with today.

7.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the collective assemblage of the enunciation. I demonstrated that this collective enunciation consists of the performative sentence and collective statement. I analysed the statement “the Arctic as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation,” formed by Russia in 2007 as a performative sentence and ‘incorporeal transformation’. The analysis showed how the Russian Arctic was transformed from an object of socio-economic policy to a subject of national security. Thus, the securitization move affected the language used, as discussed in Chapter 6. But, at the same time, the language was part of the state’s move towards securitization of natural resources.

Nevertheless, this performative sentence is not fully accepted by community members, which do not connect future of the Murmansk region to the extraction of oil and gas resources only.

The collective statement “the region, how we see it, want it and can create it” was articulated on the regional level. I argued that this collective statement, expressed in the SSEDM-2025 (2010), is an example of a de-securitization move, done on the regional level in order to meet the expectations and needs of people living in the Murmansk region. Thus, community members also use language as a tool which allows them to question the state as the main actor in the region and to take a proactive position in response to the state’s visions and strategies.

Even though both the state and community members use language to cope with insecurities, this does not mean they have the same opportunity to express their security concerns. If the state has a monopoly of the language of ‘security’, community members operate by other means – in particular by gestures, pictures and silence. I discussed the “silent security dilemma” and demonstrated the importance of visual and bodily communication in the Russian context. I analysed examples of silence from my interviews and concluded that themes such as ‘threat’, ‘fear’, ‘security’, and ‘opinion about the state as a citizen’ are excluded from public discussions. I discussed the role of the concept of ‘public dumbness’ and the consequences of ‘public dumbness’ for the security assemblage (2007-2012).

Since the government’s performative sentence, “the Arctic as a strategic resource base” was not accepted in the Murmansk region as the foundation upon which to secure regional expectations, I discussed how community members operationalised this statement. I examined the public hearings, organized in the region in relation to the Shtokman project. Community members felt that there were gaps in the sphere of public communication and sought their own explanations for that. The analysis of public hearings revealed tensions surrounding some issues (such as environmental issues, goals of the regional development and roles of actors). The Shtokman project and related to its implementation environmental issues became a sort of facilitator of discussions between community members. In the end, all variations (performative sentences, collective statements and public hearings) form the collective assemblage of enunciation.
8. Security and physical geography: redefining the space of the Murmansk region

“For Russia, space is like a suitcase without a handle: it’s not too easy to carry, but it would be a shame to throw it away” (Medvedev, 1999: 16).

In this thesis I am developing a theoretical tool to better understand perceptions and creation of security amongst both state and non-state actors. As I discussed in the previous chapters, the Russian state has a monopoly on security-related topics and in this situation, community members are not accustomed to express verbally their opinion related to security issues. In order to prepare the ground to discuss meanings of security in the Russian context, I analysed the horizontal axis of the security assemblage in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, and discussed what the actors can do in the security assemblage and how they can articulate their security concerns. In this chapter, I examine how the security assemblage is constructed or how ‘action’ and ‘words’ work together. It allows me to examine articulations and meanings of security. I continue an analysis of the tetravalent structure of the security assemblage and study the vertical axis of the security assemblage. This axis consists of two micro-assemblages: a ‘territory’ and ‘cutting edges’. A ‘territory’ is a place, where an assemblage is constructed and stabilised. ‘Cutting edges’ is a place where an assemblage is transformed, driven by new meanings, events or even other assemblages.

As I outlined in Chapter 4, the ‘territory’ of the security assemblage is the actual geographic space of the Murmansk region. The region is important from the state security perspective in terms of geopolitics and military security. Nevertheless, this traditional perspective meets new trends in security related to oil and gas development. At the same time, as I pointed out in Chapter 1, Lomagin (2005) thinks that changes in security understanding take place in the border regions of Russia where cooperation with the foreign neighbours plays an important role. The Murmansk region borders Norway and Finland and is involved in the BEAR cooperation since 1993. I already stated in Chapter 6 that foreigners participating in development of the Shtokman project are regarded as important actors in the region. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to examine whether any changes in security thinking take place in relation to the geographic location of the Murmansk region and to trace these changes.

8.1. ‘Russian space’ and state’s ability to capture it

Deleuze and Guattari addressed the issue of ‘territory’ as a geographic space in relation to their understanding of the concept of the state. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the state, according to
Deleuze and Guattari, has two distinct functions: capturing of existing forces (obtaining money surplus) and fixation of the system (creation of clear rules and regulations). In relation to this, Deleuze and Guattari introduce two characteristics of space: ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’. Deleuze and Guattari oppose the ‘Earth’ as a ‘smooth’ space where changes are possible to a ‘land’ as a ‘striated’ or controlled by the state space. The distinguishing between the ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ spaces allows for analysing how spatial dimensions affect the concept of security.

I discussed in Chapter 4 the peculiarities of the Russian space. In Russia space has always being a challenge, especially for the government. On the one hand, Medvedev (1999: 16) argues that Russia is governed by space, which defines everything in the country: from political institutions to the mentality of its population as it is very hard to control such a big territory. On the other hand, Russia cannot gain control because it, ironically, has “relatively vague sense of distance, border and places” (Medvedev, 1999: 18). Therefore, it is not always clear if the territory of Russia is a blessing or a curse. Below I will explore whether or not the Russian state managed to capture the territory of the Russian Arctic and discuss how this affects the security assemblage in the Murmansk region in 2007-2012.

8.1.1. Connection between spatial reforms and security in Russia

I claimed in Chapter 4 that the interest of the Russian state in the Arctic could be considered, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, as an attempt of a politico-economic capture of the Earth and its resources. The Arctic was viewed by the state as a huge and wild place, which needs to become a ‘land’ or a ‘striated’ space, which then means that it “can be owned, held as stock, distributed, rented, made to produce and taxed. Land can be gridded, distributed, classified and categorised without even being physically experienced…” (Protevi, 2010: 84). All these measures should assist the state in getting benefits of possessing the Arctic. I argue that security can be approached as one of the methods of capturing the territory.

In accordance with the politics of strengthening Kremlin control over the regions, a spatial reform was conducted in 2000.\textsuperscript{146} 85 entities of the Russian Federation were divided into seven federal districts (okrugs).\textsuperscript{147} The division into districts was created to ensure “that federal revenues were not delivered into local coffers and to supervise and coordinate federal law


\textsuperscript{147} In 2010 the eight okrugs were established; in 2014 annexed Crimea became the ninth okrug.
enforcement bodies, which had sometimes developed cozy relations with local interests” (Remington, 2006: 77). As a result of this reform, the Russian North was split, not only between different regions, but also between several districts: Far Eastern Federal district, North-Western Federal district, Siberian Federal district and Ural district. Each district is governed by a Presidential envoy, who is a part of the Presidential administration. The Presidential envoys are members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and almost all of them have a connection to either the military or security services (Lomagin, 2005: 269). These territorial units are different in terms of geographical proximity to the centre, climatic zones, history, ethnic composition, and economic structure. As Blakkisrud and Hønneland (2006a: 14) pointed out, “[t]he ‘northernness’ of the Russian North was thus not perceived as a unifying factor. Instead, the area was split between(okrugs [districts], all comprising a mix of northern and southern regions.” In Russia, the cultural or historical bonds between the territories were never considered as a crucial factor for boundaries definition by the state.

The Murmansk region belongs to the North-Western Federal district, which unites eleven federal entities (Murmansk region, Leningrad region, Novgorod region, Pskov region, Arkhangelsk region, Vologda region, Kaliningrad region, Republic of Karelia, Komi republic, Nenets autonomous okrug and Saint Petersburg). The centre of the district, as well as the headquarters of the Presidential plenipotentiary envoy, is located in Saint Petersburg. This district covers around 10% of the entire Russian territory and is home to approximately 9.4% of the Russian population. At the same time, over half of the population of the North-Western Federal district lives in Saint Petersburg or the Leningrad region. This is an example of disproportions within the district structure: the majority of the district’s population live in Saint Petersburg and its suburbs. Overall, the district is an artificial creation, bonding units with different geographic locations, population densities, levels of economic development and historical connections.

This spatial reform is an example of the state’s attempts to capture the territory – to strengthen federal political influence and to create a ‘striated’ space, under the control of the state’s rules and will. There was little chance that the regions, which historically had no connections, would suddenly actively communicate and cooperate with each other. According to Lomagin (2005), this spatial reform was a serious step in changing the security architecture of Russia. In order to deal with soft-security issues, various institutions at the regional and federal levels needed

148 These federal entities are in turn split between three economic regions: Northern, Northwest and Kaliningrad.
to be coordinated. Lomagin (2005: 269) states that this reform was a move of “de-regionalization” of security in Russia. The spatial reform was undertaken in order to reorganize the security construction in the country: the centre secures the existence of the country at the expense of the traditional spatial configuration between the regions. Below, I will discuss spatial reconfiguration and “de-regionalization” of security through the prism of ‘striated’–‘smooth’ space.

8.1.2. ‘Smooth’ space of the Russian Arctic

The Russian Arctic was subject to inconsistent policies in the 1990s which can be characterized as “haphazard” and focused on “emergency measures” aimed at preventing a social crisis (Wilson Rowe, 2009: 2). At the beginning of the millennium the Russian Arctic territory was approached as a place of abundant natural resources and captured in the rhetoric of national security. I discussed the performative sentence “the Arctic as a strategic resource base” in Chapter 7. While analysing the interviews, I noticed that references to the Arctic as a particular territory mostly appeared in relation to natural resources or climatic conditions. For example: “If we talk about the rise of temperature in the Arctic, it means facilitation of gas and oil extraction on the Arctic shelf ” (Interviewee 11, September 2008); “experience in the development of deposits in the Arctic conditions” (Interviewee 7, September 2008); “the development of the Arctic resources” (Interviewee 18, December 2009); “the hydrocarbons of the Arctic will not come to us soon” (Interviewee 2, September 2008). Nevertheless, these examples are few, because the interviewees preferred to operate by such territorial terms as the ‘North’ or the ‘Northern territories’. It means that there are two different approaches to the territory of the Murmansk region: as the ‘North’ and as the ‘Arctic’.

I discussed in Chapter 4 that despite numerous attempts to find a clear definition of the North, the government had not managed to agree upon new criteria by 2006. The problem with the definition became more visible when the country decided to specify the legal contours of the Russian Arctic as a territory, which is different from the North. Since 2008 until now (August 2017), a number of documents attempting to define the legal status of the Arctic zone have been initiated. This active search for a definition demonstrates the intention of the Russian state to capture the Arctic territory. If international treaties define the borders of the external Russian Arctic zone, the domestic or southern border is not yet defined by Russia. The Basics of the State Policy in the Arctic (BRFA-2020, 2008) provides an official view on the territories belonging to the Arctic zone, but still the term ‘Arctic zone of the Russian Federation’ does not
have any legal basis. In the beginning of 2008, several attempts were made to create a federal law on the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, but as of August 2017, none of them had progressed beyond discussion in the government. The most challenging outcome of this situation is that it is not clear what kind of territories can be considered as subjects of Russian Arctic policy (Zhukov, 2014). Zhukov (2014: 6) also stresses that the Arctic does not have clear natural borders. It means that geographical space does not exist objectively, but as “a geographic continuum” which is the result of interpretation by politicians or researchers, for example. Tarakanov (2010) has come to the conclusion that the North can be viewed as a ‘virtual category’, the spatial localization of which depends on the purpose of the study in question, the subject and matters of legal regulation.

The history of the political/administrative division of Russia shows that regional, historical or cultural differences have often been overlooked by the state in its pursuit of power and strength. As Zhukov (2014: 18) points out, “the decision on the composition of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation - is not a result of scientific research. It is a political action that takes into account astronomic, economic, social, demographic, natural criteria and political realities, considerations of continuity and comfortable governance.” The result of the attempt at capturing is that, despite trying to create legislation, the state has not managed to successfully define the Russian Arctic. Some researchers claim that this has happened because the Russian Arctic is not “a static entity” (Blakkisrud and Hønneland, 2006a: 9) since it was never a spatial concept. The ‘North’ in Russia implies “more of a development method/strategy for state assistance than a strictly geographic notion” (Blakkisrud and Hønneland, 2006b: 194). Zamyatin (2003: 38) explains that Russia, in general, has “a deliberative cognitive lack of the concept region, territory or district” and therefore cannot produce a clear definition. This inability of the state to produce a clear-cut definition indicates the existence of a ‘smooth’ space in the North. The ‘smooth’ space of the Russian Arctic is determined by the natural conditions (ocean, land, ice, coldness) and by its remote location. It means that the state should search for other possibilities to control the ‘smooth’ space.

149 Prezidentskii ukaz № 296 “O suhoputnyh territorijah Arkticheskoi zony Rossisskoi Federatsii” [The presidential decree “On the land territory of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation”] (2014) officially codified land areas of the Arctic, but this document does not have the status of a Federal law.
8.1.3. ‘Double periphery’ as an attempt to create a ‘striated’ space

As discussed above in this chapter, the aim of the spatial reform in Russia was to create vertical power connections between Moscow and the regions. Thus, by being a part of the North-Western district, Murmansk had to deal with two centres: Moscow as a national capital and Saint Petersburg as a district centre. Geographically, Murmansk is peripheral to both of them and therefore tainted by the double stigma of being a remote territory, despite its location in the European part of Russia. The tension between the centre and the periphery is integral to Arctic communities, since they are often located, geographically, at the margins of states. The Arctic territories share similar problems such as decreasing population, low life expectancy, poor transport infrastructure and high rates of unemployment (SSEDM-2025, 2010; AHDR-II, 2015). Therefore, the centre-periphery problem in Russia is far from unique, but has certain peculiarities. I argue that since the centre has not managed to produce a clear definition of the Arctic and to fulfill the creation of a ‘striated’ space, it employs some other methods aimed at capturing territory in order to gain control and get extra surplus in terms of security. In particular, the state marked certain territories with what I suggest to call – a ‘double periphery’ status. This status is related to the issue of unequal development of territories in Russia. The RIA-rating conducts evaluation of socio-economic status of the Russian Federation subjects since 2011.\textsuperscript{150} Below is a table (see Table 2.) showing the top-five entities out of 85 entities of the Russian Federation with the highest level of socio-economic development during 2010-2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
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<td>Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Saint Petersburg</td>
<td>Saint Petersburg</td>
<td>Saint Petersburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tyumen region</td>
<td>Tyumen region</td>
<td>Tyumen region</td>
<td>Moscow region</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous okrug</td>
<td>Moscow region</td>
<td>Moscow region</td>
<td>Republic of Tatarstan</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 2. Rating of socio-economic development: top-five entities of the Russian Federation\textsuperscript{151}

Table 2. shows that those regions or cities which either had a status of a capital (Moscow and Saint Petersburg and Moscow region) or allocated industries and activities related to petroleum.

\textsuperscript{150} RIA-rating was a part of the Russian Information Agency (RIA) Novosti until 2014. At the moment belongs to International Information Agency Russia Today. Specializing in assessing the socio-economic status of the regions in Russia, the economic condition of companies, banks, industries, countries.

extraction (Tyumen region, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous okrug, Republic of Tatarstan and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra), had better socio economic development than the others.

The state formally addresses the issue of unequal development of territories in Russia. This issue of asymmetric territorial division is considered by the Concept of the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020 (CSED-2020, 2008), where the need for a reconfiguration of spatial development is conceded. The document calls for the development of new centres, based on human and technological potential, as an answer to the problems of rigid attachment to the existing energy and raw material zones and financial centres (CSED 2020, 2008, Chapter 7, Section 3). But the document suffers from internal contradictions: in the same section, the description of centres of regional development is again based on the territorial division and Saint Petersburg is defined for the North-West as a metropolitan area with “access to the most important sea lanes, the presence of the resource base for the fuel, metallurgical, chemical, forestry and fishing industries” (CSED 2020, 2008, Chapter 7, Section 3). Thus, the prospects and possibilities of the North-Western district, which consists of 11 federal entities, are narrowed to one centre of regional development – Saint Petersburg – a city which already has a majority of the financial and administrative resources as well as a status of a ‘cultural capital’ of Russia. It is possible to indicate that the inability of the state to facilitate the development of alternative centres gives the Murmansk region a ‘double periphery’ status: geographically the region is remote and is not viewed by the state as a possible centre. I consider this to be an example of successful capture, when the state is trying to create a ‘striated’ space. This ‘double periphery’ status is an attempt to put a grid over a territory with the ‘smooth’ space, to assign to it a subordinate role.

8.2. Compression of physical geography: Shtokman and Moscow-Teriberka

I have argued above about the co-existence of the ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ spaces in the Russian Arctic. I contend that the ‘smooth’ space forms the context of assemblage construction in the Murmansk region. Below I will explore how geographical proximity can be affected in the frame of ‘smooth’ space. I argue that the Shtokman gas field is contained within the ‘smooth’ space and therefore it has specific function in the security assemblage. The Shtokman gas field is located more than 550 kilometers offshore in the Barents Sea. The location of the field beyond the Arctic Circle in stormy, harsh conditions brings extra technical challenges. These include a sea depth of 340 metres, waves of up to 27 metres high, an annual temperature range
of between -50 and +33°C and the presence of four million tonne icebergs. In order to address the challenges, as I wrote in Chapter 3, a consortium of three companies, representing Russia, Norway and France, was registered in Switzerland in February 2008. The consortium was abolished in 2012. Nevertheless, it affected the ‘territory’ of the security assemblage and below I will discuss how.

The headquarters of the consortium, “Shtokman Development AG” was in Zug in Switzerland, while company branches have been opened in Moscow and in Teriberka village in the Murmansk region. This combination enlarges the space of the security assemblage: its geography includes two countries – Switzerland and Russia – and three different locations – Zug, Moscow and Murmansk/Teriberka. Zug does not play very important role in the assemblage; rather it indicates global trends in business development. Moscow and Teriberka, however, as Russian settlements, create a unique configuration which is important for the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). Moscow is a capital of Russia and Teriberka is a rural settlement on the coast of the Barents Sea. These two places would hardly ever be mentioned in relation to each other were it not for the Shtokman project. In order to illustrate this contrast, I provide two pictures: Moscow (Picture 1.) and Teriberka (Picture 2.).

![Picture 1. Moscow](http://www.shtokman.ru/project/gasfield/)  
![Picture 2. Teriberka](http://chistoprudov.livejournal.com/176824.html)

Insecurity of expectations as the governing rule of the security assemblage disconnects these places rather than connects them. It creates a distance between the state and the region since they use different strategies to secure their expectations. Moreover, the analysis of the interviews showed that the actors do not consider Moscow to represent the whole country. For example:

“[Asks (ML)]: As an inhabitant of Murmansk, do you have confidence in the near future?  
[Answers (Interviewee 12)]: Yes, indeed. Sure. Today we are on the rise, the whole country, and the Murmansk region probably even rises a little bit more than the whole country. Well, except for Moscow of course, I am not taking it into consideration.  
[Ask (ML)]: The state in the state?  
[Answers (Interviewee 12)]: Yes. The expression says: Moscow is behind, nowhere to retreat. And we can change it now: Russia ends by the second transport ring. Russia ends by MKAD.  
[Continues to talk (Interviewee 12)]: Any citizen of Russia mocks Moscow.  
[Comments (ML)]: Yes, yes, typical, in the kitchen with a cup of tea.  
[Continues to talk (Interviewee 12)]: Yes. And maybe they are good people…They certainly have own challenges there, especially the government” (Interviewee 12, October 2008).

The interviewee talks about the country, but omits Moscow from the picture. I used the popular Russian saying that Moscow is a state in the state and the interviewee refers to another saying that people living in Moscow think it is the whole of Russia while people living outside of Moscow think that “Russia ends by MKAD”. The main message in this conversation is that Moscow does not represent the country, because it has its own life and logic of development. Challenges in Moscow have nothing to do with the challenges the rest of the country is facing. Therefore, ordinary people living outside of the centre make fun of Moscow and its perspective on the country. In the end the interviewee adds, people in Moscow, especially the government, have their own problems and challenges.

In Chapter 7 I discussed that public hearings on Shtokman stimulated the development of dialogue between different actors in the region. The hearings on the Shtokman project created a platform where different actors had the chance to discuss their concerns and suggestions, related to the project. The actors could discuss the present situation in the region and its future. In other words, these discussions were about security of expectation. Shtokman can be viewed as a centre of the ‘territory’, a place where the micro-assemblages ‘collective assemblage of actors’ and ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’ meet each other and are further developed within the ‘smooth’ nature of the assemblage’s ‘territory’. The geographical distance between

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155 The full sentence is: “Russia is big, but nowhere to retreat - Moscow is behind.” This saying is popular in Russia, but the origin is not clear.  
156 Moskovskay Kol’tsevaya Avtomobilnaya Doroga, MKAD [Moscow automobile ring road].
Moscow and Teriberka becomes compressed and, as a result, they get equal status in the security assemblage (2007-2012), but signify different interpretations of security. Below I will discuss this connection and its consequences for the assemblage.

During the interviews, the configuration Moscow-Teriberka had a very special place. As I pointed out in Chapter 6, for people living in Murmansk, Moscow is a very specific place on the map, where political power is concentrated. This is how the city is characterized by one of the interviewees:

“All companies and head offices are located in Moscow. Moscow, poor thing, is already swollen from the money. Tomorrow a social explosion may follow, which will be caused by the particular antagonism between the city and the rest of Russia” (Interviewee 13, October 2008).

Teriberka, by contrast, is one of many places in Russia which coincidentally happen to be part of a big and important project. As one of the interviewees noticed:

“We need changes. They are [here], these changes. [The Shtokman] project is developing. There are all sorts of these [kind of projects like], Teriberka. You told you are going to have another meeting today. They will tell you about the LNG plant and a lot of things like this. A second life for Lodeinoe.157 And so on. But the reality is different” (Interviewee 13, October 2008).

While talking about projects and stressing the fact that some development related to the gas field is already happening in the region, the interviewee does not have any illusion about the role of Teriberka in these plans. The interviewee warns me that I have to be careful while listening to all the prospects for development, “they will tell you about the LNG plant and a lot of things like this. A second life for Lodeinoe,” but “the reality is different”. As I discussed in Chapter 5, another interviewee compared petroleum projects initiated by the state with shashlik. Shashlik is a meat dish, where meat is cut into small pieces which are one by one placed on a skewer. It means that the state has several projects (pieces of meat) and the Shtokman project is just one of many, a small brick in bigger plans.

Moscow and Teriberka are connected through the intensities of emotions expressed by people, and their expectations of these places. If Moscow appears synonymous with the state and

157 As I described in Chapter 1, Lodeinoe is a part of Teriberka.
central power, Teriberka was framed in the interviews as a place of hope and desperation. I discussed in Chapter 7 that Teriberka became a place where expectations of the local community were high, but people had no guarantees whether these expectations would be met or that promises given by Gazprom would be fulfilled. One of the interviewees quoted the words of a governor of Murmansk region about the settlement: “Teriberka is a Pomor village. It should not finish its historical significance, but continue to live. At least its traditional activities should be secure in order to stop the village from dying” (Interviewee 5, October 2008). The situation in the village is described in strong words: it is “dying” and strives to survive. I wrote in Chapter 7 that the lives of inhabitants are connected to fishing and the gathering of berries and mushrooms in summer and autumn. Everyone knows one another. This is how one of the interviewees describes daily life there: “And life itself in the village is quiet, trivial. For example, we do not have so horrible crimes, like everywhere else. Probably because everybody knows each other” (Interviewee 5, October 2008). The lifestyle of the village cannot be compared to the lifestyle in Moscow.

However the region and the centre became bonded together by desire as a driving force of the security assemblage. As a capital city, Moscow symbolizes power and strength in the space of state security. As a remote, semi-destroyed settlement with high rates of unemployment and out-migration, Teriberka is an indicator of the desire for stability and security in the Arctic. ‘Desire’ for security, which might be different from the state perspective on security. Remarkably, Teriberka came to the attention of the Russian media in 2014 after Zvyagintsev’s film Leviathan, which was filmed in Teriberka, winning the Golden Globe award. Teriberka became a destination for tourists, who wanted to learn more about the film, and to witness the situation there first hand.158 Many pictures of the settlement appeared on the internet and Teriberka became a symbol in the media of the desperate life in the Russian periphery (see Picture 3. and Picture 4. on the next page).

The Shtokman project became a catalyst of discussions related to security of expectation and these discussions opened a space where the actors could express their own understanding of security. The location of the Shtokman gas field in the ‘smooth’ space of the Arctic induced the unique territorial configuration of periphery (Teriberka) and centre (Moscow). These two places, despite the distance and differences between them, become equally important parts of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). Even though for Moscow Shtokman means revenues from the petroleum sector, and for Teriberka petroleum activity nearby the settlement is a matter of survival, public hearings on the Shtokman project allowed different actors to convey their concerns and expectations in the public space. Thus the Shtokman gas field is a centre of the ‘territory’ of the security assemblage where meanings of security are revealed. The Shtokman project accelerates talks on security in the situation when community members have limited verbal resources to express their opinion related to security issues. Below I will explore how the geographical space of the Murmansk region helps to articulate interpretations of security.

8.3. Meanings of security: a glance from below

Above I discussed the state’s attempts to create a ‘striated’ space in the Russian Arctic and demonstrated how the Shtokman project epitomises the ‘smooth’ space. This ‘smooth’ space indicates the lack of state control and opens up possibilities for change. The state wants full control over the ‘smooth’ space which in turn would curtail security discussion. But the state cannot define it, and therefore cannot control it or the dialogue. So Shtokman as the ‘smooth’

space made room for something that would not have been possible in a ‘striated’ space. In a situation where Russians are not used to talk about security issues, the Shtokman project triggers the discussion related to security of expectations. Moreover, the interviewees’ reflections on the geographic location of the Murmansk region contain understandings of security.

8.3.1. The ‘territory’ and geographic location of the Murmansk region

I already mentioned the issue of ‘centre-periphery’ while discussing the attempt of the state to create a ‘striated’ space and the role of the Shtokman gas field in the territorial configuration ‘Moscow-Teriberka’. The ‘centre-periphery’ relationship can also be approached from the perspective of the Russian space. Medvedev (1999) names ‘polyperiphery’ (or “a conglomeration of peripheries”) as one of the burdens of Russian territory. Thus, the entire Russian territory can be narrated as a periphery, which exists in a constant struggle to redefine itself and become something different to what it actually is. Despite of the ‘vertical power structure’ created in Russia, the state is not capable to provide a definition of its Arctic territory and to codify it legally. This codification would increase Moscow control over vast territories in terms of laws and taxes. In this situation, when the dominating rule is insecurity of expectations as I discussed in Chapter 5, the geographical distance between centre and periphery becomes a source of power, a source that contains forces that cannot be controlled by the state and therefore embody the potential for transformation and the creation of something new. The territory becomes a power in itself: “Russian space itself symbolizes and signifies the absolute, “total” power discourse in which power relations, relations of domination and subordination are the spatial relationships” (Zamyatin, 2003: 40).

At the same time, any region can only exist in Russia in the ‘here and now’, as a totality (Zamyatin, 2003: 39). Some interviewees commented on this totality of Russian space. While reflecting about the region and its significance, one interviewee came to a rather ambitious conclusion: the convergence of the region and Russia. For example, the interviewee talks about the role of the Shtokman project and stressed that even though they might sound too enthusiastic, it was still their feeling about the situation:

“The development of Shtokman and Prirazlomnoye will help to improve the demographic situation and development of the region in general ... So all this, in the end,
will contribute to make Russia great, and strengthen the economy. It might sound pathetic, but it’s actually true” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).

The same interviewee again comes back to the issue of totality later in the interview and states that the Murmansk region is the region “that really will help Russia to become a flourishing power (derzhava)” (Interviewee 7, September 2008). This idea of totality allows the person to claim that the success of the region would lead to the success of the country. The interviewee cannot fully express the symbiosis of the country and the region, and admits that probably it sounds pathetic.

Russian space contains elements of instability. This instability means that the geographic space of the Murmansk region is a subject of change, depending on the perspective: the territory of the Murmansk region can be approached as a periphery as well as a center. This means that the ‘territory’ of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region might have a different spatial configuration than the geographic territory of the region. In order to explore the ‘territory’ and to reveal the meanings of security attached to it, I will examine images of the region, narrated by the interviewees. I will discuss four images of the region: ‘transit’, ‘capital’, ‘sacrifice zone’ and ‘borderland region’. These images never appear in a clear, pure form. Rather two or three of them coexist in a single interview.

8.3.2. Image of the Murmansk region as a ‘transit’

Below, I will discuss and compare two different interpretations of a ‘transit’ status of the Murmansk region. Being located between two centres (Moscow and Saint Petersburg), on the border with two countries (Norway and Finland), the Murmansk region is considered to be remote. But at the same time, it is located at the crossroads between sea and land, and between Russia and foreign countries. This crossroad location is mentioned in the interviews. For example, a business representative remarked:

“Recently, Murmansk is increasingly gaining the role of major transport hub. In May last year, the State Council held a meeting with the participation of the Russian President Putin, during which it was quite specifically determined that Murmansk is the future transport hub of Russia. It has the unique geographical and geopolitical advantages, ice-free port, deep water area, a relatively low intensity of navigation, with the ability to use different kinds of sea-corridors. This is the Northern Sea Route, convenient logistics
solutions for access to American and European markets” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).

The interviewee evaluates the significance of the region on the national level and stresses that it was discussed at the highest level (by the President and the State Council). This is a positive interpretation of the image ‘city-transit’. A city, located on the crossroad of sea and land routes, is opened for contacts inside and outside the country. I characterise this connection as rhizomatic, which makes the city active, capable of changing and developing new connections.

Nevertheless, there are other interpretations of a ‘city-transit’. Below are two examples from interviews. In both cases, the interviewees are concerned that a ‘city-transit’ has nothing to do with opportunities and positive changes. ‘City-transit’ becomes a synonym of exclusion, of something insignificant and marginalised. For example, an interviewee informs me about a plan to build an oil terminal in Murmansk region.

“[Speaks (Interviewee 2)]: Now they will build a terminal here. What is the large oil terminal? There will be huge amounts of oil transported, I suppose from Yamal. But then again, what is a terminal? This is a transit. Therefore, Murmansk will remain the transit point. It will get no benefits from oil and gas activity.  
[Asks (ML)]: And you would like Murmansk to be more significant?  
[Answers (Interviewee 2)]: Yes, I would like that very much” (Interviewee 2, September 2008).

The interviewee is afraid that Murmansk will remain “the transit point” and oil and gas activity will not bring any changes to the region. A similar opinion was expressed by another interviewee:

“[Shtokman] is a federal deposit, located offshore. The companies that operate it are located in Moscow, taxes are deposited in Moscow…The Murmansk region is just a staging post. The city of Murmansk maybe will be involved in transportation [of gas], and, maybe will take part in the processing (liquefaction in particular). It means that it will remain a staging post. So I do not see any special possibilities for Murmansk at least” (Interviewee 20, September 2008).

The interviewee does not think that the region will benefit from the Shtokman project since taxes and benefits will be absorbed by Moscow. In the best case scenario, Murmansk will be
partly involved in some actives, like transportation or gas liquefaction. The interviewee is concerned that if the city remains a transit, a “staging post,” possibilities for the future are limited.

The positive interpretation of a ‘city-transit’ connects the Murmansk region to other cities, regions, countries and continents, where everything is on the move, where different roads meet and continue to somewhere else. The negative interpretation narrows the region to the territory of Russia. The interviewees are insecure in their expectations and therefore do not see any prospect for development. This negative attitude to the word ‘transit’ can also be interpreted as an opposition to the state’s perspective: what looks beautiful and promising from centre, does not look so attractive when looked at from a regional perspective. The region wants another status, which will help to overcome its insignificance. And this is the status of ‘capital’.

8.3.3. Image of Murmansk as a ‘capital’

I have already alluded to the image of Murmansk as an “oil capital of the European North” or a “capital of the Arctic” articulated in the regional narratives and desires. Below, I will examine three interpretations attached to the image ‘capital’: significance; ability to change; ‘lost paradise’.

In Chapter 3 I discussed regional and national desires and expectations related to the Shtokman project. One of desires expressed in the region is to enhance the status of the city in the future. This desire that Murmansk can become significant and important is expressed in the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010). The city is visualised as becoming the “main scientific, labour, cultural and business centre of the Arctic” by 2025 (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 42). In the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010), the significance of the region is connected to natural resources and perspective of their utilization. For example, “[o]n the shelf of the Barents Sea oil and gas resources have been explored, including the unique Shtokman field, which is of strategic importance not only for the region, but also for the nation” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 3). This approach to the Murmansk region is a result of the incorporation by SSEDM-2025 (2010) of the performative sentence, “the Arctic as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation,” which I discussed in Chapter 7. The region is portrayed in accordance with this performative sentence in order to demonstrate its significance and importance for Russia. Overall, the significance of the region is stressed through connections to state security and state interest.
Another meaning attributed to the status of ‘capital’ can be formulated as ‘freedom and the ability to change’. A NGO representative was telling about their experience in communication with oil and gas companies and the regional authorities. The interviewee noted that business is better developed in Moscow and it is easy for the interviewee to work with companies from Moscow. Below the interviewee explains why:

“…there is a more serious approach to [business] in Moscow. Here in the region, many [people] keep their old approaches from the Soviet time. It is hard for them to change. It is much easier to work with Moscow-based companies” (Interviewee 11, September 2008).

In this interview, Moscow, as the capital, is associated with changes. The interviewee relates that many people in the region maintain the old Soviet approaches while companies in Moscow have changed their style and are easier to work with. Thus, an image of a ‘capital’ bears not only the significance of ‘state security’, but also has the lure of resources and offers the chance for development and change. This connection between a capital status and its ability to change is also narrated in the Murmansk strategy. The Murmansk region needs to change in order to become a future “scientific, cultural and business centre of the Arctic” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 42).

A third meaning, ‘lost paradise’, also appears in the interviews. Some interviewees spoke about the past of the Murmansk region and especially about the fishing industry, which was (and is) an important part of the regional economy. For example, one interviewee asked me, “Do you know that Murmansk until ’91 was a ‘fish capital’ of the Soviet Union?” (Interviewee 7, September 2008). This attribute of the Murmansk region as a “fish capital” reappeared several times in various interviews. In this fashion, a ‘capital’ becomes a token of a ‘lost paradise’: something that community members had in the past and want to have again in the future. They remember the experience of stability and prosperity and are aware that they do not have it in the present. In other words, they talk about security of expectations. Another respondent brought up the example of fisheries in Murmansk and claimed that the situation was not so good: “Right now, everything falls apart. With this fishing I do not understand anything. The future is not clear ...” (Interviewee 13, October 2008). Thus, this ‘metropolitan’ dream connects the security assemblage (2007-2012) to the time of the USSR. The legacy of Soviet

161 The characteristic ‘Soviet’ has a specific meaning in this context: it means an unfriendly, rigid system of communication.
administrative-territorial decision-making probably plays an important role. During the Soviet time, “[t]he whole spectrum of state activities (law enforcement, military draft, ideology, education, health care, housing, day-to-day management of local industry and agriculture, etc.) were carried out entirely at the regional level, and almost never went beyond it. All state functions were concentrated in the regions, which became focal points, vital centres, and, as a matter of fact, principal institutions of the state” (Medvedev, 1999: 22). Thus, a ‘capital’ evokes history, “the golden age,” the time when the regions were important institutions of state governance and had a certain degree of freedom.

These three interpretations of the image of Murmansk as a ‘capital’ evoke the issue of security and security of expectation. It is important for Murmansk to be a part of state security and natural resources located in the region provide this opportunity. Nevertheless, in the past, things were stable and predictable, and people miss this feeling of security. In the present, they feel they do not have power and ability to facilitate changes.

The insecurities in relation to future were expressed through the image of the region as a ‘transit’ or as a ‘capital’. Narrated from the state’s perspective, a ‘city-transit’ looks prosperous and promising. But narrated in the region, a ‘city-transit’ has dual meanings: both positive and negative. The difference between these two images is related to possibilities and ability to change. Some respondents omit transformative possibilities from the ‘transit’ status, but attribute changes and development to the status of ‘capital’. A ‘transit’ becomes a symbol of loss and a ‘capital’ becomes a symbol of prosperity. At the same time, the image ‘city-transit’ can be approached as ability of the Murmansk region to connect to other cities, regions, countries and continents. In this case a ‘city-transit’ becomes as part of a ‘smooth’ space, where everything is on the move, where different roads meet and continue to somewhere else. I conclude that the interviewees are very careful with transformative space since it involves unpredictability. The status of ‘capital’ is desired to be regained in the region, because it is related to power and stability which begets a sense of security. So a ‘striated’ space is more preferable from individual perspective.

8.3.4. Image of the Murmansk region as a “sacrifice zone”

Below I will discuss the image of the Murmansk region in relation to environment. I discussed in Chapter 3 that the territory of the Murmansk region is an intersection of military and industrial zones. As a result of the activity of the military–industrial complex, the region has
“zones of ecological disasters and high risks” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 22). In Chapter 7, I pointed out that discussions on environmental issues in relation to the Shtokman project generated the dialogue between different actors. Some tensions between the actors were revealed because they could not always understand each other. I concluded that for the local community in Teriberka the potential environmental damage from the Shtokman project was perceived as less dangerous than the poverty they live with today.

I asked all the interviewees about the impact of the Shtokman project on the region and the answers were divergent: from global to local, from national glory to local survival. The interviewees mentioned economic growth, changes in the energy sector and the price for oil and gas, because it affects the price of gas from the Shtokman deposit. Some respondents placed environmental risks as a top priority:

“[Asks (ML)]: What kind of spheres will be affected by the development of oil and gas? [Answers (Interviewee 9)]: Ecology, the environment. Well, it is easier with gas. Gas is cleaner to produce than oil. But then again, we are talking about the Arctic shelf. No country in the world has enough experience to develop deposits on the Arctic shelf. Even Norway, which says, ‘we have experience, we are experienced’, they still have problems with this poor Snøvit, though the deposit is ten times smaller than Shtokman. It is impossible to say that they are experts in this. No-one has this experience” (Interviewee 9, September 2008).

The interviewee expresses concern about the environment because no country has enough experience in offshore extraction in their view. Even Norway, which positions itself as an experienced country in offshore extraction, cannot cope with all the consequences related to production on shelf.

Some interviewees, while discussing the outcomes related to the Shtokman project, mentioned the environmental problems that already exist in the region:

“…it is very important to save our vulnerable nature, especially since the Murmansk region is not the ‘happiest’ in this regard. We already have here the utilization of submarines, and a repository for nuclear waste. So some extra risks which can appear [in relation to the Shtokman project] are very important” (Interviewee 7, September 2008).
The interviewee considers the region to be in poor environmental shape. Therefore, the interviewee thinks that new risks related to the Shtokman project need to be considered.

The profile of the Kola Peninsula is described by Pursiainen (2005: 282) as “the home of about 18% of world’s naval nuclear reactors…Solid radioactive waste is stored at 11 separate sites around the peninsula, while liquid waste is stored at five main naval bases on the peninsula.” In 2003, a report by the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) in collaboration with the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), presented a list of Environmental Hot Spots. 42 major polluters causing ecological risks in the Barents region were identified. The Map of the Barents Environmental Hot Spots covered the territory of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions (including Nenets autonomous okrug), the Republic of Karelia and the Republic of Komi (see Figure 8. on the next page). Ten hot spots were located in the Murmansk region, each of them is marked with the ‘M’ letter where ‘M’ corresponds to the first letter in the name of the region. The source of the problems was pollution caused by industry and heat and power plants, waste water treatment, waste management, drinking water quality and scrapped and abandoned ships in the Kola Bay. By 2013 one hot spot in the Murmansk region had been removed from the list (M8 in green colour, Figure 8.). The monitoring of environmental issues and joint projects aimed at elimination of environmental risks in the Murmansk region are conducted in the framework of bilateral cooperation between Russia and neighboring countries (Norway and Finland) as well in the framework of the BEAR and the Arctic Council.162

Environmental concerns in the region span both land and sea. The Kola Bay and coastal areas are experiencing a serious environmental burden caused by an increase in the volume of transport by sea of various cargoes (including petroleum products) (SSEDM-2025, 2009: 22). Besides a large number of flooded marine vehicles, there is another danger for whole region. The Northern Fleet submarines positioned in the region hold approximately 250 active nuclear reactors (Nuryshev, 2012: 52). I myself witnessed the questionable environmental situation in the region when I took a bus from Kirkenes to Murmansk as a part of my fieldwork trip. During the trip, the bus passed through abandoned buildings and settlements as well as industrial and military zones, all of which looked dilapidated. The impression of the landscape was deepened when I saw black and brown polluted soil and forests consisting of dead trees and bushes nearby the town of Nikel in the middle of summer. I was shocked, but my interviewees had another approach to this landscape. Below is an example from an interview:

“Actually people here are accustomed to the fact that not everything is good with the environment. People always drove by Monchegorsk or Nickel, and saw these moon landscapes. People already for 50 years have been living with nuclear ice-breakers,
standing almost in the city centre. So people are used to that, everyone reacts calmly” (Interviewee 9, September 2008).

Thus, the landscape of the Murmansk region is a combination of towns, abandoned and ruined buildings, shipyards, moon landscapes and nuclear ice-breakers. People are used to this hybrid landscape and therefore calmly react to environmental dangers in the region.

Taking into consideration all said above, I name this image of the territory in the Murmansk region – that of a “sacrifice zone”. According to Lerner (2010: 3), “sacrifice zones” are particular areas inhabited by low-income and minority populations (so called ‘fence-line communities’) that are frequently exposed to disproportionately high levels of hazardous chemicals as a result of industrial activities. These zones are sacrificed, as decision makers have to balance between economic benefits and the ecological footprint of industrial activities. I apply this term with some modifications: to the whole territory of the region and not to a particular ‘fence-line community’. To me, this term marks the territory of the Murmansk region as suffering from environmental damage as well as portrays the region as where economic and environmental interest are constantly in need to be balanced. In other words, this image reveals a cross-point of environmental and economic security as well as state and individual concerns.

I discussed in Chapter 7 that environmental security is portrayed in the documents as an important concern for the state. At the same time, environmental security is also important for community members in the Murmansk region. Thus, representatives of NGOs, business and the regional administration all stressed the importance of environmental issues and articulated their experience in the field of cooperation and dialogue with other actors. Community members also cooperate with international organization, which provide resources and possibilities to study and to address environmental problems the region, as for example, the case of cooperation with the NEFCO and AMAP on the map of the Barents Environmental Hot Spots.

The image of Murmansk as a “sacrifice zone” reveals the serious environmental issues in the region. Therefore, new risks related to development of the Shtokman project are actively discussed in the region. The frequency of environmental issues being raised in the assemblage suggests that the environmental security can be approached as a special meeting point, opening a discussion on security issues in Russia. State acknowledgement that individuals and non-state organizations can be security actors in relation to environmental issues creates the possibility
of dialogue between the state and individuals. Nevertheless, securitization of natural resources by the state, which I discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, makes discussing certain environmental issues more difficult, since they become connected to concepts of national defence and military security. State security in Russia has a direct connection to the issue of treason or the secret service. Some court cases in contemporary Russia have shown that, for example, representatives of NGOs have to be careful while working on environmental issues, because the powerful “security grammar” might overwhelm “common sense”.164 Alexandr Nikitin’s case had an impact on Russian society and especially on people living in the Northwest Russia.165 After his case, people became afraid of engaging in ecological research, especially with regard to nuclear issues.166 I did my fieldwork ten years after this case and I was really surprised that one of the interviewees told me that environmental NGOs were still dealing with the impact of the Nikitin case (Interviewee 9, September 2008). The interviewee said that it was not so difficult to work with oil and gas projects, though sometimes they too faced the issue of ‘secrecy’:

“Because in our country it is very easy to bring anything containing any information related to environmental data under either a state secret or commercial one. And it is very difficult to catch or to prove that it is actually your right according to the constitution to know about the status of the environment in the area where you live. And they [representatives of the state] say: no, no. [By asking questions about the environment] you step into a commercial secret or a state secret…That is a difficulty” (Interviewee 9, September 2008).

The interviewee articulated a very important issue related to the field of environmental security. Since the environment is claimed as a national security concern, the state can apply emergency

164 Thus, in September 2013, Greenpeace’s attempt to board the Prirazlomnoe oil rig resulted in the arrest of the ship by the Russian coastguard. 30 members of the Greenpeace team faced the accusation of piracy and a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison. (Walker “Russia to charge Greenpeace activists with piracy over oil rig protest.” The Guardian, September 24, 2013: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/24/russia-greenpeace-piracy-oil-rig-protest Accessed December 05, 2014). Russia’s negative reaction to the action of the Greenpeace crew showed that Russia would not tolerate any activity, even related to environmental concerns, in Russian Arctic waters.

165 Alexandr Nikitin was a former Russian Naval officer and radiation safety inspector who was arrested by the Federal Security Service on February 6, 1996. He was charged with the crime, “treason in the form of espionage” for publishing a chapter called, “Disasters and accidents on nuclear submarines” in the Bellona report, “The Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of Radioactive Contamination”. The court case against him lasted three years and, in April 1999, all the charges against him were dropped.

rhetoric at any time. This makes it difficult for the individual to predict which environmental issue might create difficulties, since the state can unpredictably classify the place, enterprise, topic etc. So, even though, discussions and joint actions related to the environmental issues could become a meeting point for the state and individuals, the unpredictability of state decisions in this sphere, due to its connections to security, makes cooperation between the state and individuals difficult.

8.3.5. Image of the Murmansk region as a ‘borderland region’

This image of the region is related to its position. The Murmansk region borders with Norway and Finland. This borderland position is differently articulated and its articulation is related to different understandings of security in the region.

The borderland position makes the region significant from a national security perspective, because it has a border with “a country - member of EU - Finland” and “a country - member of NATO - Norway” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 4). The region is seen as integrated into national security with a specific function related to its geographic location. Its unique location predetermines the significance of the Murmansk region as “the only one non-freezing deep-water having direct access to ocean routes harbour in the European part of Russia” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 3). The word ‘outpost’ in various combinations (like ‘strategic outpost’ and ‘Arctic outpost’) in mentioned eight times in the SSEDM-2025 (2010). Murmansk is also described in the Murmansk strategy “a base for the Northern Fleet” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 3). Its geographical location makes the region important in the frame of national security.

At the same time, despite of all these allusions to national security, the SSEDM-2025 outlines the BEAR as a framework for possible development in the Murmansk region. Many problems such as ‘peripheral’ location, usage of natural resources, sparsity of population are viewed as common both for the Murmansk region and its ‘arctic’ neighbours (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 35). For example, the Murmansk region has, relatively speaking, a modest standard of living, and cannot offer young people much chance for self-realization, which explains why young people find it unappealing to stay in the region. But the same problem is faced by the ‘rich’ Norwegian towns on the shore of the Barents Sea. Young people are leaving such towns because they do not want to live in a ‘province’ (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 35). Therefore, the Barents region framework allows the Murmansk region to cooperate with other parts of the Arctic facing the same problems and together search for answers.
Within the system of state security a border is an important marker of sovereignty and independence. From a state security perspective the military protection of the border is an essential part of security. From a local security perspective the national border does not play such a significant role. I discussed in Chapter 6 that due to cooperation in the BEAR framework and joint activities related to the Shtokman project, foreigners were viewed in the region as partners and friends. Due to the Barents cooperation in such areas as environment, economics, scientific and technological cooperation, infrastructure, indigenous people, human contacts and culture, and tourism (Kirkenes Declaration, 1993), the ‘territory’ of the security assemblage in Murmansk region becomes redefined: the region expands beyond the Russian Federation border and becomes a part of the Barents Euro-Arctic region. The ‘border’ as an important marker of state security becomes insignificant in the context of local security practices because these practices are connected to international cooperation. Below I will discuss meanings of security in relation to international cooperation.

8.4. International cooperation and local security practices

In Chapter 6, I identified the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) as a document where new meanings appear. I asserted in Chapter 7 that the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) articulates the collective statement “the region, how we see it, want it and can create it.” Below I suggest looking at this document from a security perspective. I noted in Chapter 2, that I worked with two versions of the Murmansk strategy. The SSEDM-2025 as a draft from 2009 and a final version of the SSEDM-2025 from 2010. Below, I will discuss differences between these documents.

The draft version of the SSEDM-2025 (2009) was openly oriented towards Northern Europe. For example, the SSEDM-2025 (2009) claims that the main goal is an improvement of quality of life of the inhabitants up to the level of their Northern neighbors. The selection of Northern Europe is explained by geographical proximity and by political and socio-economic connections due to cooperation in the BEAR for the last 15 years (SSEDM-2025, 2009: 5). It is not Moscow or any other region in Russia that becomes the template for regional development, but the BEAR. The final version from 2010 returns the Murmansk region back to the territory of the Russian Federation. A comparison is made to the Republics of Komi and Karelia and the Arkhangelsk region, which are also located in the European North of Russia, in order to frame the socio-economic situation in the Murmansk region (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 12). This comparison is more logical, because the Murmansk region is an entity of the Russian
Federation and therefore should be compared with other Russian regions. Nevertheless, the appearance of Finland and Norway in the version from 2009 indicated the intensity of connections of the Murmansk region: the neighbouring countries became more important for Murmansk than the Russian regions.

The interviewees revealed various connections to Norway and Finland: connections of territory, identity, business, knowledge and experience. Finland, and especially Norway, were also cited as examples of possible development in the Murmansk region. People from the region travel a lot to the neighbouring countries and gain practical experience there. One interviewee confessed that he/she goes through Finland if he/she needs to go to Saint Petersburg, because the roads are better (Interviewee 12, October 2008). Another interviewee asserted that he/she is impressed by the level of understanding of individual problems in Norway and the ability of the government to work with various problems. The respondent also noted that “maybe they [the Norwegian government] are more pessimistic, but closer to reality than ours [Russian government], which does not know the reality” (Interviewee 4, September 2008). Sometimes, the respondents tried to explain the differences between ‘us’ (Russians) and ‘them’ (Norwegians). For example,

“In Norway the period of initial accumulation of money is over. There is a certain state socialism. The state has a very significant impact on all processes. There is an approval from the society and understanding. Life is good [in Norway]: sufficient and secure. Not everything is smooth, but in general the situation is good. They have such [big] oil and gas reserves for the 4.5 million population. Norway is a unique country. There is an understanding of problems and there are voluntary or voluntary-compulsory associations, groups that address the challenges [in the country]” (Interviewee 13, October 2008).

The person uses a master narrative to explain the differences. State formation is over in Norway and the relations between the state and society are stable. Oil and gas reserves provide for a good, stable, satisfying and secure life in the country. There are problems too, but there are working mechanisms to address them, for example, through the sphere of civil society (in the words of the interviewee “voluntary or voluntary-compulsory associations”).

So the interviewees discussed the standards and way of life in Norway and Finland. Both countries become related to the expectations for the region: the Murmansk region can reach the same standard of living as they have.
In the final version of the SSEDM-2025 (2010) this statement, “northern neighbours as an example for us” became less direct, but better grounded. The SSEDM-2025 (2010) provides some other answers to the question of why the Nordic countries became an example. The SSEDM-2025 (2010) claims that the Murmansk region is deeply involved in international cooperation and “the state of closeness and isolation of the country and the region seems to be gone forever” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 25). The location of the region makes international contacts “unavoidable” and necessary, according to the SSEDM-2025 (2010). The economy of the Murmansk region is based on the exploitation of natural resources in fragile ecosystems, which are beyond national borders (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 26). Therefore, a number of factors contribute to cooperation with foreign neighbours. The Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 26) states, “International cooperation became vital for the region. At the beginning of the 21st century, the Murmansk region faced several challenges, which are also on the agenda in the macro-region [BEAR]: ecology and sustainable exploitation of the resources of the ocean and land, transport policy and security, youth and social policy, energy, cooperation in the field of emergency response, research and education, cooperation in economics (in particular in forestry and customs regulations).” The document places Murmansk in the macro-region (the BEAR) and claims that, within the framework of the BEAR, the region manages to cope with many challenges, which fall under the label ‘soft-security’. The BEAR became a resource for Murmansk to address challenges which were important in the regional context – environmental, economic, business and related to infrastructure. And, as a result, become a source of security in the region.167

Lomagin (2005) stated that the soft-security agenda has been slow to form in Russia and new security thinking (in terms of soft-security, not only military security) has made only a faint appearance in the country. There were some obstacles to the implementation of this thinking. First of all, Russian federal programmes were thought to be the way of dealing with soft-security challenges, but the old structure of these programmes was not equal to the scale of new security challenges. Often an issue – nuclear threat, for example – was wider than the borders of a region to cope with this threat, but no additional funds were allocated to a region, which limited the possibility to tackle the issue (Lomagin, 2005: 270). This asymmetrical

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167 I have to note that security was never openly placed on the agenda of the Barents cooperation or that of the Arctic Council, though the security aspect was “essential” for the Barents initiative (Rafaelsen, 2013: 486). It was claimed that cooperation “will contribute to international peace and security” (Kirkenes Declaration, 1993). Nevertheless, though security was not framed as an obvious goal, the possibilities were created to address it outside of the formal agenda (Stålvant, 2002: 302).
situation – when the region detected issues, but did not receive adequate resources to address them – affects centre-region relations. Lomagin (2005: 271) named five consequences, which I slightly reformulate into three main challenges. First of all, “there is a feeling of failure” at the regional level, because of the lack of funds and support from the state level. Secondly, the regional government’s failure to tackle security challenges adds to the mistrust of the authorities in the region. At the same time, regional authorities are not involved in forming the soft-security agenda at the state level and fully depend on the centre, which redistributes the money, so they are “the objects rather than the masters of this policy” (Lomagin, 2005: 271). Third, soft-security problems are very costly, and politically and economically unrewarding in the short term. So a culture of working with long-term issues is not developed and not supported by the state. Since the regions are excluded from the decision-making process, they have a tendency to develop a “parasitical strategy” towards the issues: “Let them pay” (and it does not matter who is paying: the state or any other country, concerned about the situation in Russia) (Lomagin, 2005). Regions are not motivated to take responsibility and do not develop an awareness of their own capacity to cope with soft-security issues. In the regional context, the concept of state security becomes an ‘empty shell’ which does not provide measures or resources.

In this situation, the BEAR and the Arctic Council frameworks represent an opportunity to tackle soft-security issues in the Murmansk region, in terms of money, knowledge, expertise, and practice. The BEAR and the Arctic Council initiatives prioritise specific regional concerns such as environmental issues, as well as allowing the Murmansk region to gain valuable experience and significance within this framework through various connections established through joint projects in education, business, culture, and environmental protection. The geographic location enables a transformation of understanding of security in the Murmansk region due to the connections within foreign countries.

8.5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to examine the construction of the security assemblage and to explore the meanings of security in its context. The assemblage creates a ‘territory’ and, in the case of my research, the ‘territory’ is related to the geographical space of the Murmansk region. I applied the concepts of a ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ space to the analysis of the ‘territory’. I examined the examples of state attempts to create a ‘striated’ space in the Russian Arctic and concluded that the state fails to produce a clear-cut definition. This indicates the existence of a
‘smooth’ space (not fully controlled by the state) which creates conditions where particular interpretations or different meanings of security can appear.

I argued that the Shtokman gas field played an important role in the assemblage and discussed how the compression of the geographic space took place in the security assemblage. As a result, despite the distance and differences between Moscow and Teriberka, they become equally important parts of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012).

The ‘territory’ of the assemblage goes beyond physical geography: it includes distances, experiences, feelings, memories and expectations. From the state’s perspective, the territory of the Russian space is, indeed, a burden: it is big, contains too many remote territories and is hard to penetrate through vertical connections. If one alters the prism and looks at the distance from the community members’ perspective, the space becomes an advantage. The ‘smooth’ space, where dominance of the state is weak or invisible, created a possibility for the actors in the region to express their understanding of security. At the same time, my analysis of the interviews showed, that while exploiting the advantage of a ‘smooth’ Arctic space, community members have a tendency to long for a ‘striated’, more predictable space.

While discussing images of the region the interviewees expressed their understanding of the present situation, discussed wishful futures and reminisced about past events significant for their hopes and expectations in the present. The past appeared in the interviewees as a ‘golden age’. In the ‘Soviet past’ Murmansk was a ‘fish capital’ and at that time the regions were important institutions of state governance and had a certain degree of freedom and possibility to make their own decisions. In the past, things were stable and predictable, and people miss this feeling of security. This wish for the return of the ‘lost paradise’ is narrated in interviews and is related to the image of Murmansk as a ‘capital of the Arctic’ or ‘oil capital of the European North’. The expectations related to the future are partly related to the oil and gas development in the region, and partly to the ability of the region to have a control over present situation and to facilitate changes. Overall, the present conditions can be characterised as insecure. This insecurity is exposed through image of the Murmansk region as a “sacrifice zone” and as a ‘transit’.

In the situation when the concept of security is strongly dominated by the state in Russia, the ‘territorial’ dimension of the security assemblage helps to analyse how security is understood in the region. I discussed articulations of security through images of the region related to its
geographical locations and meaning related to that. Lomagin (2005) suggested that changes in security understanding could take place in the border regions of Russia where cooperation with the foreign neighbours plays an important role. My analysis shows that the borderland position of the Murmansk region preconditioned its connections with countries such as Finland and Norway. Examples of cooperation on the Shtokman project and environmental issues in the Murmansk region show that the ‘territory’ of the security assemblage extends its border beyond the Russian Federation and becomes a part of the Barents Euro-Arctic region.

I identified transformations related to the changes of the geographic space of the Murmansk region in the security assemblage (2007-2012). The ‘territory’ of assemblage includes cities outside of the region (Moscow) and different countries, such as Norway and Finland. Through cooperation with the neighbouring countries, people in the Murmansk region learn that security could also be about people and their concerns. This means that though human security is not openly articulated in the Russian context, it has a role in local practices. I will develop this idea in Chapter 9, while discussing the function of individuals in the security assemblage.
9. Functions of the state and the individual in the security assemblage: discussion and analysis

In the previous chapters I discussed the issue of desire, the abstract machine of the security assemblage (2007-2012) and analysed the micro-assemblages alongside two axes: horizontal (micro-assemblages of actors and words) and vertical (micro-assemblage of territory). These analyses helped to explain what actors can do, and what and how they can talk about security in the security assemblage. I will summarize the findings from the previous chapters and discuss the case of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). I will discuss the function of the state and individuals in the assemblage. The functions of the state and individuals in the security assemblage are a summary of their actions, utterances and their ability to change and create something new. The analysis of functions is connected to the vertical axis of the assemblage and its pole of ‘cutting edges’.

In Chapter 8 I discussed the vertical axis of the security assemblage which consists of two sides: the micro-assemblage of a ‘territory’ where an assemblage is constructed, and ‘cutting edges’, where the assemblage is transformed, driven by new meanings or other assemblages. This pole of ‘cutting edges’ is dynamic and related to two processes: deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. I discussed in Chapter 4 that deterritorialisation is a process which leads to opening of an assemblage and the appearance of something new (new meanings; new ways of doing things; new topics in public discussions or in policies; new actors might come into play). Reterritorialisation is a process which makes the assemblage stable and closed. It includes fixation of particular meaning or way of doing things. I also pointed out that both processes can operate in the same assemblage.

My analysis of functions in relation to the processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation throws a light on the nature of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region and indicates whether human security is a part of the security landscape in Russia in the context of oil and gas development. I will also discuss if the security assemblage (2007-2012) is productive. An assemblage is productive when something new appears: a means of expression, a new territorial/spatial organization, a new institution, a new behaviour.

9.1. Functions of the state in the security assemblage

As I discussed in Chapter 4, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the state has two main functions: the capturing of forces and the fixation of the system. In Russia, the state dominates
the field of security and is considered to be the main security actor. In the previous chapters, I examined how the Russian state captures forces related to the issue of security and how it manages to stabilise the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). In the following section I summarise findings about the state. I outline the capability of the state to fulfil its functions and discuss the limits to its capabilities. Taking into consideration Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of state functions and the results of my analysis, I identify three main functions of the state in the security assemblage (2007-2012): (1) provision of security, (2) accumulation of powers and forces and (3) stabilisation of the assemblage.

9.1.1. Function ‘Provision of security’

This function is declared by the state in the Federal law “On security” (FL №390, 2010). The law officially delineates the security architecture in the country, based on the principle of the ‘vertical power structure’: the President is on top and the other structures – such as the Security Council of the RF, the Government, Federal authorities, authorities of the entities of the Russian Federation and local government – are subordinated to him. According to the law, citizens and NGOs participate in the implementation of the state security policy, but the way they do this and their rights and responsibilities are unclear.

Analysis of the documents on security in Russia (1992 - 2010) reveals the gradual elimination of ‘non-traditional’ providers of security: society and the individual. The state, searching for security and stability in the country, chooses the traditional security approach: the state as security provider and the military as a security force. This selection is preconditioned by a traditional approach to the concept of security in Russia. In Chapter 1, I outlined the history of security in Russia and demonstrated that the field was strongly dominated by the state. For Russian political and academic thought, security was an alien concept. In 1992 the first Russian law on security (FL №2446-1) represented a unique chance to create new configuration of the state-individual relationship. The state had the chance to develop a novel approach to security based on the triad, ‘individual, society and state’. The state had the opportunity to go through a process of transformation in the post-Soviet space and, together with the people, learn about the new reality. But instead, by 2010, the state chose to become “an exclusive security producer”. This choice was partly prompted by a fear that the regions in Russia would become independent and the country would suffer further disintegration, or that citizens, facing a hard time economically, would disobey the state. In a way, this choice was logical from the perspective of historical continuity. As I discussed in previous chapters, the USSR was
considered by some interviewees to be a strong state, capable of protecting its own people. This is how one of the interviewees reflected upon this experience:

“We cannot any longer feel absolutely safe in terms of psychological and spiritual comfort ... It was a different life then [refers to the USSR]. I experienced that and this. I understand how it was there [Soviet time] and how it is here [present Russia]. The country was rich, in fact. People were not rich, but they were relatively equal. And they were absolutely protected. Absolutely! …There was a clear understanding of the life programme...There were the institutions of social guarantees: from the trade unions to different [organizations] … Today, after the [Soviet] state has collapsed, there is no mass feeling of security. No one feels secure” (Interviewee 13, October 2008).

The interviewee contrasts the time of the USSR and the situation in contemporary Russia within a security perspective and names social security, economic stability and predictability of development, and social institutions. All these elements create an aura of a secure life ‘back then’. But were needs of society and people living in the USSR visible from a top-down perspective? Other features of the USSR were forbidden literature (only published in the 1990s), dissident movements, the banishing of alternative ways of thinking from public discussions, development of ‘ritualized speech’ and ‘public dumbness’, the censorship of films and plays and uneven distribution of consumer goods (as I mentioned in Chapter 1, towns related to military-industrial complex had better supply). Still, many consider the Soviet time as a good one in terms of security. Why is that so is a question which demands further investigation. I would suggest that at a minimum, community members were aware of the ‘rules of the game’. They knew that if they followed the rules they could count on some social dividends from this behaviour: a stable salary, the possibility to predict their lives and enough money to live on.

Thus, the interviewee talks about a security of expectations in the USSR. During the Soviet time, which the interviewee remembers, the limits were known (salaries, access to consumer goods, what could be said in public space), but the present was satisfactory and the future was predictable. The interviewee acknowledges that the situation in the country has changed. But

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168 This refers to the late Soviet time; the second part of the ‘60s, ‘70s and the beginning of the ‘80s. The time of the Great Terror (1937-1939) and the policy of forced labour conducted by the USSR between 1920s until 1960s, which included direct imprisonment, forced resettlement and politics of deportation, are omitted from the narrative.
the state and individuals went through this time of change separately and had different experiences, which are not discussed in the public space.

I discussed in Chapter 5 that insecurity of expectations is governing the security assemblage. I argue, that during the period of the security assemblage (2007-2012), people could not predict what would happen next, because the transitional period became permanent. The government introduces new laws all the time and there are new administrative units and new conditions. My interviewees were very careful in expressing their attitude towards the state. They seldom criticized it directly and if they did so, made sure to be careful. Despite some positive assessments of the state’s work, my analysis showed that the state in the regional context is the one which is difficult to understand, which is unpredictable and spatially located in Moscow. This is how the same interviewee talks about difficulties in their work:

“But how can you be sure if you do not know what the authorities will invent tomorrow? For example, any document, according to which I am not legitimate and my name is ‘no-one’. Or will load me with [such a function], that I cannot fulfil” (Interviewee 13, October 2008).

The interviewee indicates difficulties in their daily work, because the rules are constantly changing and people do not have the capacity to tackle new demands. The interviewee is afraid to become illegitimate or to get some functions which are difficult to fulfil. Inconsistency in policy and no clear explanation of the process creates a distance between the state and individuals.

The state, through the implementation of the ‘vertical power structure’, creates a distance between itself as an abstract machine and the officials who represent it. The officials are representatives of the state, transmitters of the state’s will in the region and agents of the law. However, the state does not trust them or allow them to make independent decisions. In previous chapters I discussed several examples from interviews with officials representing federal, regional and local levels, where the interviewees claimed that since they are a representative of the authorities they cannot express their own opinion, cannot criticize anyone and can say only positive things. These limitations imposed on the representatives of the state lead to malfunctions inside the system: criticism and negative perspectives are airbrushed away. Due to the hierarchical structure (which makes it possible to send orders down but not to get signals back), feedback is almost impossible. This does not work in favour of the state
or its representatives. It leads to a homogenisation of the image of the representatives of the state (federal, regional, local) and mistrust towards them in the community (referred to, in general, as the ‘authorities’). At the same time, since the state as an abstract machine excludes people who work for the state apparatus, the officials also feel that they do not belong to the state and can use the loopholes in the state system for their own benefits. The state becomes destabilized from within: state institutions act against each other and, in the end, against the state (for example, corruption of bureaucrats).

This phenomenon is partly addressed in contemporary Russian philosophy and called “alienation of the state” (Kurennoy, 2016). Kurennoy (2016) uses the Marxist term, “alienation of the state” as emblematic of a particular culture in Russia – when people experience the repressive nature of the state and cannot ally themselves with it. They do not play according to the state’s rules even when they have official positions. They play against existing rules and “parasitically use it for their own purposes” (Kurennoy, 2016). Kurennoy (2016) calls it corruption and claims that it is fundamentally a cultural, not a legal, issue. I look at the problem from another angle and therefore call it the ‘alienation of the state from individuals’. The state, due to its hierarchical constructions, becomes incapable of communicating with individuals. This alienation has a spatial form and was articulated by the respondents: the state as an abstract machine is connected to Moscow, and Moscow is not Russia. Moscow has money, has human resources, has the glory of being a capital, but possesses little understanding of what is happening outside its boundaries. Unpredictable decisions which are carried out in Moscow and unclear ‘rules of the game’, as I discussed in Chapter 5, create a greater distance between Moscow and the regions, than existed during the Soviet time.

As I outlined in Chapter 4, Deleuze and Guattari discuss two ways of knowledge-production: linear (arborescent, based on vertical connections) and non-linear (rhizomatic, based on horizontal connections). An arborescent structure is a hierarchical system, capable of reproduction and consisting of homogenous elements. A rhizomatic structure can form unpredictable connections between heterogeneous elements and is an open system prone to transformations. I can compare the transformation of state approach to security in Russia with a transformation from rhizome system to arborescent. I discussed the Russian legislation related to security in Chapter 6 and showed, how the state eliminated an individual as a security actor from the law. This security structure is based on traditional, state-based approach to security. It eliminates any possible rhizomatic stems out of a fear of losing control – as when,
for example, society and individuals ceased to be one part of the security triad ‘individual, society and state’. I discussed, in Chapters 5 and 6, how the channels of receiving feedback from the regions and from the people working for the state become constricted. In the end, this increases the insecurity of the state and individuals, and state’s efforts to provide security become inefficient from the perspective of individuals. The state becomes a closed vertical arborescent structure, reproducing itself. It fails to become a security producer because its knowledge is too distant from practice and it is not capable of adequate reaction to the responses from below. This leads it to adopt a rigid structure, or as I call it, a condition of ‘state solipsism’ \footnote{I borrow the term ‘solipsism’ from the field of philosophy to articulate the idea that knowledge can be produced by one unit only and only this knowledge is considered reliable and usable by the unit of production.}, it itself generates information about its parts and creates strategies based on this information.

Such a system can hardly produce a reliable, secure framework. It can generate a temporary feeling of security for some parts (some actors, institutions and structures), but not for the whole system.

9.1.2. Function ‘Accumulation of powers and forces’

Deleuze and Guattari (ATP) argue that the state is not a source of power itself, but a machine, which is capable of accumulating surplus from other flows (populations, commodities, money) already existing on its territory. Therefore, this function of accumulation is related to the nature of the state. The most visible “modes of capitalization of power” are rent, profit and taxation (ATP: 444). Below, I discuss examples of accumulation related to the analysis of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). Accumulation takes place through the processes of centralisation, taxation and capitalisation of threats.

Taxation is a traditional way of power accumulation by the state. Appropriation of taxes was a popular topic during the interviews. In Russia it is related to the process of centralization. As I discussed in Chapter 5, a period from 1999 to 2008 was a period of centralization and the installation of strong central control over the periphery (Kolodina, 2008). This also involved the formation of the ‘vertical power structure’. This ‘vertical power structure’ placed the regions in a subordinate position to the centre. Changes took place in the tax system as well and as a result the regions became dependent upon subsidies from the centre. In 2002 the income from oil and gas resources was centralized and accumulated in the state budget.
Economic dependency became one of the most crucial features of the ‘vertical power structure’
established in 1999-2008. For the interviewees, the biggest problem is that the Murmansk
region does not receive any income from the various activities that go on in the region. For
example:

“We have oil trans-shipment. Four offshore oil trans-shipment complexes are located in
the Kola Bay. But their contribution to the economy of the region is not significant.
Trans-shipment complexes are located in the bay, and therefore not on the land that
belongs to the region. They do not pay for the land. All incomes from these complexes,
if there are any, go to the federal budget, not to the regional. They also try to recruit
people from other regions and from neighbouring countries ... Murmansk gets almost
nothing from oil trans-shipment” (Interviewee 6, September 2008).

In this interview excerpt, the interviewee brings the topic of tax and explains, that though oil
shipment takes place in the regional waters (the Kola Bay), the regional budget does not benefit
from this activity as profit goes to the federal budget.

This inability of the region to control financial resources creates some tensions in region. The
Shtokman project was initiated in the 1990s to support the military-industrial complex of the
Murmansk region during the economic crises during the transition of Russia from a planned to
a market economy in 1992-1995. But since the state controls the field, the project is not viewed
in the region as an answer to economic problems. The main impetus for the state to start the
Shtokman project is that gas reservoirs are important for the national economy and national
security. This causes a tension in expectations, because for community members in the
Murmansk region, Shtokman, while a promising project, is not a solution to regional problems.

Security threats can also be a capital for the state. In Chapter 8 I discussed the state’s attempt
to derive a clear-cut definition of the Russian Arctic. By August 2017, despite numerous
attempts to produce a definition, the term ‘Arctic zone of the Russian Federation’ does not have
any legal basis. A state policy towards the Arctic becomes problematic because it is not clear
which Northern territory is considered to be a part of the Arctic. Since the state is not capable
of gaining control over the territory in terms of definition and border limitations, it resorts to
the rhetoric of securitization in order to assert its right to the geographic space. The officials
actively address the issue of the strategic importance of the Arctic and its oil and gas resources
and claim that these resources have to be secured. This leads to a capitalisation of potential
threats to state security. Shulman\textsuperscript{170} points out that the state will always make an attempt to capitalise any security threat: “[The threats] are profitable for any state apparatus because they allow it to enlarge its mandate, and, so to speak, to increase its funding. Nothing is better sold, and not only in mass-media, but also in a process of budgeting, than a kind of threat, by which it is possible to get more money and, correspondingly, some kind of power resources to fight this threat.” As shown in Chapters 5 and 7, at the beginning of millennium the Russian Arctic became securitized by the state due to the amount of natural resources located there. The performative sentence, “the Arctic as a strategic source of base of the Russian Federation,” transformed the Arctic from an object of socio-economic policy into a subject of national security. Likewise it transformed the Murmansk region from one of many Arctic regions into a flagship region of development due to the existence of two fields with proven resources: the Prirazlomnoe oil field and the Shtokman gas field. The claim that the Arctic has large oil and gas deposits connects the Arctic to national security. This generates a discussion around the Arctic in terms of confrontations and geopolitics. The biggest threat from a national security perspective is that other Arctic countries would claim the Arctic territory and thus the resources located there.

The state capitalizes potential threats and justifies securitization of the region in military terms. While the creation of a special military brigade for operations in the Arctic in 2011 was more a matter of speculation (since officials denied such a plan, which, nevertheless, was actively discussed in the media\textsuperscript{171}), the creation of the Arctic brigades and the active building up of military infrastructure in the Arctic was a matter of reports in media in 2015 (see, for example, the special section in the online version of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, which is considered to be the official voice of the government\textsuperscript{172}). The move towards enlargement of military capacity of the Murmansk region can possibly be explained by the interpretation of forces and the means of security in the Strategy of National security (SNS-2020, 2009, Chapter I, item 6), which are defined as armed forces, troops, military formations and bodies, and (or) law enforcement authorities. The focus on military forces and military power creates an image of a strong and powerful state, and militarization of the region becomes a symbol of state power over it. When the Arctic was declared `strategic’, the development there became framed in terms of

\textsuperscript{172} \url{http://www.rg.ru/sujet/3076/} Accessed October 17, 2016.
geopolitics and oil and gas resources (state and energy security), but not in terms of the needs of Arctic people and regions (human security).

The state makes attempts to accumulate powers and forces in order to provide security and stability in the country. The ‘vertical power structure’ is hierarchical and helps the centre to dominate over the region. It is also related to the concept of national and state security which assumes that what is good for the state is good for the regions and Russian people. The state approaches oil and gas sector as a new source of security and stability in the country. This opens a possibility to establish new connections between the centre and the Murmansk region. This connection could be established through, for example, a dialogue on environmental issues related to the Shtokman project, and inclusion of other actors into security provision. Nevertheless, the oil and gas in the Russian Arctic becomes linked to state and military security. This limits the capability of the security system in Russia to absorb any alternative approaches to security.

9.1.3. Function ‘Stabilization of the security assemblage’

As I outlined earlier in this chapter, a transformation of an assemblage takes place in two directions: deterritorialisation (making assemblage open and inclusive) and reterritorialisation (making assemblage rigid and closed). I argue that the state selected reterritorialisation in order to stabilize the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). The analysis of two previous functions shows that the state selects a role in the security assemblage as a solitary provider of security. In an attempt to cope with difficult economic and political situations in the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state introduced the ‘vertical power structure’ in order to ensure stability in the country. The problem with this structure is that the state took into account mostly threats, and not possibilities. The possibilities could be related to development of the triad ‘individual, society and state’ and an inclusion of human security into security agenda.

The state creates a closed system where militarised state security is the only possible approach to security. The assemblage becomes located in the process of reterritorialisation, which means that no other meanings of security are attached to interpretation of security. The state is trying to fix the meaning of security which can be viewed as ‘state - security - oil and gas’. Nevertheless, as the analysis shows, this linkage ‘state - security - oil and gas’ is not fully accepted in the regional context.
9.2. Functions of individuals in the security assemblage

This section is devoted to a discussion of the function of individuals in the assemblage. If the function of the state in the assemblage was identified by the theory of the state suggested by Deleuze and Guattari, my task was to define the function of individuals. The function of individuals depends on the configuration of an assemblage and is always specific in relation to it. Based on the findings in previous chapters, I identify two main functions of individuals in the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012), which are discussed below: (1) articulation of security meanings and (2) stabilization.

9.2.1. Function ‘Articulation of security meanings’

This function of individuals in the assemblage is related to the ability of individuals to be creative and to become agents of change. Though individuals do not talk directly about an issue, it does not mean that they do not have an opinion about it, or do not ‘speak’ security. As I discussed in Chapter 7, community members are not used to talking about themes such as ‘threat’, ‘fear’, ‘security’ or ‘opinion about the state as a citizen’. This exclusion exposes an unwritten rule of speech, which not only defines what an individual can and cannot discuss, but is also embedded in individual survival practices: if you want to survive, you avoid particular topics in public discussions. The history of the security concept, which I briefly outlined in Chapter 1, shows that state security in Russia was for a long time connected to the secret service and national defence. Despite the attempt in the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s to develop the triad ‘individual, society, state’, in the period 2007-2012 the state tries to stabilize the security assemblage by limiting the meaning of security to state and military security, as I discussed in section 9.1. Nevertheless, the security assemblage reveals that there is a combination of state and human security. I claim that silence can be approached as the marker of borderline zones, where state and human securities meet. These zones can only be indicated while talking with individuals, because people navigate through different narratives, which involve their own experiences as well as their own understanding of how the system works. Below I illustrate this argument with an example.

I discussed my personal story in Chapter 1 and made clear that this was a lived experience of security transformation. The change in geopolitical situation with the end of the Cold War reshaped international security configuration. At the same time, this change also brought uncertainty in ways that were not known before in Russia. The market economy brought
prospects of development as well as exposed the difference between interpretations of security. In Chapter 2, I discussed how my personal story and origin from Severodvinsk helped me to get an interview in a situation when the interviewee was convinced we had nothing to talk about. This interviewee is a representative of the group ‘policy makers’. I discussed in Chapter 6 that policy makers distance themselves from some issues by claiming that they were “out of their competence”. During the discussion, interviewee 5 (October 2008) often replied with “it is not my competence” or “I do not know.” At first, I told myself it was a structural problem, since the officials often used such answers due to restrictions on what they were able to say. Nevertheless, in this particular case, I felt uneasiness in the communication and had a feeling that our conversation did not go smoothly because of some other reasons than professional restrictions. I knew that the interviewee wanted to talk to me, but I was not able to get the message. I could only indicate unpredictable ruptures, twists, and misunderstandings. I had the feeling I was driving on a very bumpy road and I did not know how to handle it. Only later, while doing my analysis, did I understand what made our conversation so uneasy: we were navigating through the collective enunciation by speaking the language of silence.

Interviewee 5 had strong connections to Teriberka and decided to talk to me because I myself came from a town which experienced tremendous economic difficulties in the 1990s. Thus, the interviewee gave me the signal that I was the right person to talk to. Due to my experience of my home town I could understand what was happening in Teriberka, which was facing an immediate threat to its existence as a community. Nevertheless, interviewee 5 had only silence as a tool to express insecurities and I had insufficient experience in understanding silence as a part of the narrative rather than as a communication problem. Throughout the whole course of our communication, through our difficult telephone conversations and during the meeting, interviewee 5 was silently shouting about insecurity while outwardly operating through the existing language tool. For example, prior to our face-to-face meeting, during a phone conversation, interviewee 5 noted that Teriberka community is used to relying on themselves, on their own resources. Interviewee 5 said the state should support the municipalities, which are at the edge of collapse, instead of placing the financial burden on companies like Gazprom, because they have their own interests, and people in Teriberka have different ones. However, later, during the face-to-face interview, interviewee 5 was constantly expressing gratitude for the support of the state and Gazprom, stressing how much they were doing and how happy the local community was. At the same time, when I was trying to summarise their statements to be sure I understood the interviewee correctly, the interviewee would reject my interpretations
and provide another explanation. I was genuinely confused and puzzled. Only later, while developing a theoretical approach and going through the notes made during the phones conversations and listening to the interview, did I manage to create the whole picture. Interviewee 5 navigated between two main parts of the collective assemblage of enunciation: as an official the interviewee was articulating the performative sentence “the Arctic as a strategic resource base of Russia” and as a community member – collective statement “The region, how we see it, want it and can create it.” The interviewee was constantly commuting between being ‘local’ and being a representative of the group ‘policy makers’. Simultaneously, the interviewee was trying to articulate the unspeakable, but verbally managed, as a policy maker, to express only happiness and satisfaction. I discussed in Chapter 7 the situation in Teriberka village and concluded that the local community had no other choice as to support potential oil and gas activity nearby their settlement. They made their choice in conditions where their expectations were insecure. For people in Teriberka, the potential environmental damage from the Shtokman project was in the far future and it was less threatening than the poverty they live with today. The interviewee could not verbally express that the existence of the people of Teriberka is threatened, that they live in a constant pressure of insecurity. The local community (a “dying community” as one of the interviewees called it) supports the Shtokman project because they have to choose between either disappearing or dealing in the future with all the possible consequences of development of the Shtokman gas field (shift workers, environmental impact, changes in landscape etc.). The interviewee could not verbally express words such as ‘threat’, ‘fear’ or ‘insecurity’, but used silence and rupture to indicate an insecurity of expectations. During the interview, my interviewee and I were balancing between ‘state’ and ‘human’ security, but we could barely put it into words.

Thus, individuals can indicate nexus points between officially recognized claims and other meanings: ‘desires’ existing in the local context. Moreover, individuals not only indicate these points, but also articulate them. It means that while operating in the narrowed meaning of security prescribed by the state, individuals are capable of generating other approaches and understandings.

9.2.2. Function ‘Stabilization of the security assemblage’

This function is the same as the state function in the security assemblage which was earlier discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless, individuals and the state differently interpret such words as stability and predictability. If for the state stability is related to the process of
reterritorialisation and narrowing the meaning of security to a state centric approach, for community members stability is related to openness and transformations, and thus connected to the process of deterritorialisation, which makes the assemblage open and inclusive. I argue that knowledge is important parts of this transformation process.

The amount of knowledge accumulated within the security assemblage (2007-2012) is enormous due to the number of actors involved, who all bring a variety of experiences and sources of information. Below, I analyse an example from the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010).

The Basics of the State Policy in the Arctic (BRFA-2020, 2008) claims that the Arctic is a resource base of the country. This claim is considered in the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) to be highly risky for the region. Global trends, such as the formation of a global political consensus on climate change and changes in technological solutions (in energy and transportation) can affect the profitability of the Shtokman project on the world market (SSEDM-2025, 2010). As the result, the mega-project like Shtokman can be delayed or postponed (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 36). Therefore, in order to tackle this insecurity the Murmansk strategy refers to the economy of knowledge. Knowledge becomes a unique attribute of the region, which can and should be used for regional development. Knowledge is narrated in the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) in terms of innovation and human capital. An economy of knowledge is viewed as qualitatively different and a very challenging alternative for the region, whose current economy is based on the consumption of raw materials and the ‘transit’ of consumer goods (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 36-37). Accumulation and implementation of knowledge creates a future vision of Murmansk as a region, which will be located in a network of international projects and efficiently use all possibilities, from geographic ones like having an ice-free deep-water port and connections to ocean sea-routes to state connections like military infrastructures and naval bases (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 42). The ability to create new opportunities is very important because, as a result, the region itself controls the risks and possibilities. In contrast to the current situation, Murmansk in 2025 would become a “main centre of the use of ocean bio-resources in the European part of Russia,” “national centre for research, knowledge and excellence in the Arctic,” and “globally important centre of knowledge and excellence on the problems of development, work and life in the Arctic” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 35-43). Knowledge becomes connected to security. The
Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) aims to articulate conditions of stability and predictability in the region, which are related to knowledge.

Thus, the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012) becomes located in two processes: deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of security. Both, the state and individuals, want to operate in the stable structure of assemblage which is initially governed by insecurity of expectations. However, ommunity members and the state approach the function ‘stabilization’ differently. If the state connects stability with process of reterritorialisation, individuals connect stability to the process of deterritorialisation. It means that while the state reduces the understanding of security to state security, individuals open it up for other interpretations.

9.3. Deterritorialisation of security space in the security assemblage (2007-2012)

Above I have discussed functions of the state and individuals in the assemblage. Together they co-produce the assemblage, but have limited interactions with each other, especially in the field of security, which is claimed as a state priority. Traditionally, the architecture of state or national security is limited by the territory of the state in question (the Russian Federation). The borderland position of the Murmansk region plays a significant role in the construction of the security assemblage (2007-2012): it preconditions both deterritorialization (changes) and reterritorialisation (recombination and stabilization of elements) of the traditional space of national security. This borderland position of the Murmansk region became important for the Shtokman project and its role in the security assemblage (2007-2012).

As I outlined in Chapter 7, the public discussions on Shtokman helped to articulate insecurity and reveal differences between state interest and regional concerns in relation to oil and gas sector. In the situation, when community members have limited tools to express their opinion about security and are not used to discuss this topic publically, the Shtokman project became a catalyst of discussions related to security of expectation. The concept of security of expectations helped me to throw a light on security from different angles. The discussions on the role of oil and gas in the region and expectations related to the Shtokman project opened a space where the actors could express their own understanding of security.

Deterritorialisation of state security space occurs in the Murmansk region due to cooperation with neighbouring countries. Cooperation within the framework of the BEAR and the Arctic Council elevate the daily concerns of community members such as the environment, health and
transportation, since these issues affect community members’ quality of life. Thus, the broadening of the security agenda through international cooperation allows the region to expand the range of its choices, which are not available within the state security paradigm in Russia, not least due to money, interest and political will. The region becomes a territory where state security (issues addressed by the Russian state) and human security (issues addressed by the community members with the help of foreign partners) meet. With the establishment of cooperation in the framework of the BEAR and the Arctic Council, new and varied cross-border connections were created (joint projects, money flows, face-to-face meetings, cross-border travelling). Below is an insight of the reasons for this interest in neighbouring countries:

“Cooperation between northern countries and the Murmansk region is more developed. There is cooperation with the southern [regions] too, but they are too far away from us. We have a lot of common interest with the North, like Finnmark. It is climate, roads, kind of everyday moments. It plays a particular role. The relations become deeper, kinder, not so cold as they were before. Of course, in some critical situations the coldness appears again. Like, for example, relations became colder when the war events were going on in South Ossetia” (Interviewee 4, September 2008).

The interviewee defines cooperation in terms of location (North and South). State borders do not matter so much for the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). They become more visible only when something happens in the international sphere, like the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. Then the quality of connections within the assemblage are affected (the relations become colder). In this interview narrative, the North is a place where people have common roads, comparable climate, and similar everyday routines. It makes it easy to look at those who are nearby, even if a border with another state technically separates them. But the actors are not naïve and do not reduce the intensity of connections to geographical location only. For example, in the following excerpt, the interviewee shows an awareness of global flows of capital and connects this process to the assemblage:

“We talk about business merger. The interpenetration is in the process. The borders become blurred. There are joint enterprises. Russians invested money in [bank]’DNB-Nord’. Another example is the Hotel Polarnye Zori. It is a result of joint Russian-Norwegian business. Another example is [a gas-filling stations]‘StatoilNefto’. The leader is Norwegian business, but the managers are Russian” (Interviewee 4, September 2008).
The interviewee points to the significance of the economy in the construction of the assemblage. The region and the processes there do not exist in a vacuum. The security assemblage in Murmansk region (2007-2012) is affected by the world-wide processes such as globalisation or business merger. These processes make nation-state borders less significant. The interviewee characterises borders as “blurred” and does not regard these “blurred borders” as a threat – they see them more in the way of given circumstances they are living in. This is how another interviewee comments on it: “We are trying to make a kind of projection of positive Norwegian experience to contemporary Russian conditions” (Interviewee 7, September 2008). This means that community members include their region into global processes and try to rely on knowledge accumulated by their neighbours.

Because of cooperation, the Murmansk region became a unique territory where a specific assemblage of state and human security could appear. The territory of the security assemblage was transformed both by the state and by individuals. This transformation took place as the result of cross-border cooperation, and increased prospects for stability in the region. In addition, due to cooperation on the Shtokman project, the connections especially between Norway and the Murmansk region became more intensive. This connection expanded the border of the Murmansk region in the security assemblage. In this deterritorialised space of the security assemblage, individuals feel more secure and have more options in coping with their daily challenges, than in the space of the nation-state. The ability to learn, to develop knowledge, to be able to control the situation and govern the processes in the region – things that constitute the core of human security – become an important part of the security landscape in the region.

9.4. Conclusion

The analysis shows that the security assemblage is not just a collection of actors and their statements, but various connections within it also have a significant role. Flows, intensities, and disruption are important characteristics for the assemblage. The assemblage is an effect, a result, but not a static result – it is located simultaneously in the process of stabilisation of the meaning of security and transformation of it.

The analysis of the security assemblage showed that community members put maximum efforts into creating a situation where the development of the region was predictable, where risks and challenges were more or less identified and strategies to mitigate them were conceived. Thus,
human security appears as a result, as a co-function of state and the individuals in the assemblage. This demonstrates the productive nature of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012).
10. Conclusion

The analysis in Chapter 9 showed that despite a general approach in Russia towards security as a state issue, in practice people dealt every day with security issues and human security became an integral part of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012). Below, I summarise my findings and discuss how my study answers the research questions posed in Chapter 1:

(1) Is human security an important part of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region in the context of oil and gas development?

(2) Can human security be a tool that helps to reveal existing difficulties within security studies?

I will start with the revision of the relevance of the concept of human security for studying security in the Russian context. I will go on to discuss how the case study contributes to theoretical generalization related to security studies.

10.1. Relevance of human security for understanding security in the Russian context

As I outlined in Chapter 1, security has, traditionally, been formed from above in Russia. Nevertheless, after the end of the Cold War, Russian security thinking went through a process of transformation. The biggest challenge was how to document possible changes and how to approach the topic of security in a situation where society had no experience of public discussion about it. I applied the analytics of assemblage in order to examine the security constellation around the Shtokman gas field in the Murmansk region from 2007 to 2012. This was a period when the development of oil and gas resources in the Arctic became a hot topic in Russia and the Shtokman project was considered by the state to be of high importance. The project was frozen in 2012 and until now, August 2017, there has been no development related to it. Nevertheless, the case of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2012-2007) allowed me to debate the concept of security in the context of oil and gas development in Russia.

My analysis of the desire for oil and gas development in the Murmansk region showed that the security assemblage contains competing meanings of security. I examined transformations related to security thinking in Russia and applied the multi-actor based security model in order to study the security practices of different actors such as ‘business and industry’; ‘the local community’; ‘journalists/media’; ‘the military’; ‘NGOs and international organizations’; ‘researchers’ and ‘policy makers’. I contextualized the desire for oil and gas development and
I concluded that this is actually not the desire for the development of oil and gas, but for the development towards stability and predictability. In other words, I detect a desire for security or what can be called ‘security of expectations’. This desire cannot be expressed within the existing state dominated model of security in Russia, which was codified in the Federal law “On security” in 2010. In a situation where the state has a monopoly on the language of ‘security’, people operate by other means of expression – in particular they use non-verbal means of expression (silence, body, visual means), and exclude particular words (like ‘security’ and ‘threat’) from their vocabularies.

Both the state and individuals became hostages to a traditional interpretation of security, which can be simplified as the protection of state sovereignty and national borders. The desire for security is captured by the state and transformed into “needs” and “duties” (Holland, 2005: 61), wrapped up in the enunciation, “the Arctic as a strategic resource base” with an expectation that oil and gas revenues will help create stability and provide security for the state and, consequently, for individuals. The state excluded society and individuals as security actors, as potential generators of new meanings and practices. The state limited the space of security by claiming that it was an exclusive security provider in the country. As a result, instead of trying to create conditions which would secure the expectations of different actors (for example, by providing clear and non-contradictory legislation), the state focused on the securitization of natural resources in the Arctic. The state, as a security provider, did not manage to successfully secure either its own expectations or those of other actors. My analysis showed that, in the Murmansk region, community members did not approach oil and gas as a salvation to insecurity of expectations and had looked for other sources of security.

By analysing the micro-assemblages along the horizontal axis (‘actors’ and ‘words’) and the vertical axis (‘territory’ and ‘cutting edges’), I revealed the functions of the state and individuals in the assemblage. Both the state and individuals fulfilled the function of ‘stabilization of the security assemblage’. But while the state connected stability to reducing interpretations of security to state and military security, individuals opened up for other interpretations of security through their experience and knowledge. I discussed in the previous chapters how international cooperation allows community members to tackle insecurity of expectation in the region. This enhances their ability to secure their expectations. I conclude that human security becomes an important part of the security landscape in the Murmansk
region. Thus security practices in the Murmansk region occurs within the framework of international cooperation rather than within the framework of the nation-state.

Due to the historically preconditioned approach to security as a matter for the state alone, both the state and individuals in Russia lack experience of promoting human security concerns. I conclude that the state needs individuals to fulfil its tasks and functions to the same extent that individuals need the state to create the frame for security. The analysis of the role of individuals in the assemblage showed that through various practices (such as the ability of ‘becoming’) they help the state to fulfil its function as a provider of security. The state and individuals co-function and interact, not only within the frame of legislation and institutions, but also through disconnections and disruptions. I showed in Chapter 6, how individuals working, for example, as representatives of authorities (federal, regional and local) have the ability to make the arborescent state system more flexible through cooperation with other actors inside and outside of formal rules. At the same time, as I discussed in Chapter 7, the state, by introducing new laws, facilitates the dialogue between the state and non-state actors such as businesses, authorities, and NGOs, all of whom view this experience as positive and important for them. The state and individuals long for conditions where they can secure expectations, determine risks and mitigate those risks. These conditions are very close to the condition of human security, when “when individuals and communities have the freedom to identify risks and threats to their well-being… and the capacity to determine ways to end, mitigate or adapt to those risks and threats…” (Hoogensen Gjørv et al., 2016: 186). The case study of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012) shows that the state is not capable of providing security of expectation in the framework of traditional state and military security.

The discussion of functions showed the dynamics between the state and individuals and helped to elucidate the perceptions and creation of security amongst both state and non-state actors. The focus on the connections between the elements in the security assemblage (2007-2012) moves my analysis beyond the traditional formula, ‘strong state - secure people,’ which is articulated in the documents on security in Russia. I concluded in Chapter 9 that human security appears as a co-function of the state and individuals in the assemblage. This co-function is an important result of the assemblage. On the one hand, it challenges traditional understanding of the state as a solitary security actor, because multiple actors play an important role in the security assemblage. They have different practices and strategies, but through interaction and joint action, they co-produce new meanings and experiences related to the concept of security.
On the other hand, this co-function opens the assemblage for transformation in the understanding of security. The state and community members select different strategies to secure expectations in a situation of unpredictability and uncertainty. Nevertheless, despite different strategies, both are driven by the same desire – a desire for predictability and stability. This desire generates a specific connection between the state and individuals. They are connected via insecurities. Together, the state and individuals work on security provision. It is difficult to examine these connections outside of assemblage analytics because they are not articulated either in official documents or in the mainstream literature on security in Russia, which is mainly focused on the issue of state security. Thus, my analysis urges a reconsideration of the architecture of security in Russia and an appreciation of existing security practices in the regions.

Security is a complex concept, and the security constellation is a result of different combinations between economic conditions, the political situation, the relationship between various groups within a society etc. The state and individuals articulate security differently, but discussion of their practices helps to illuminate the contours of the security assemblage. The concept of human security in the assemblage was exposed through the connections, disintegration, deterritorialization and reterritorialisation. In the Russian context human security is a very unexplored concept and comes into play through the concept of soft-security, dealing with various non-military issues like health, environment, education etc. Articulation of human security is also connected to the issue of development in the region. Community members in the Murmansk region co-produce the meaning of development: stability, predictability and flexibility. Predictability allows them to secure their present and, therefore, their expectations for the future. The issue of human security in Russia often appears through silence or indirectly, through another concept or topic. All the same, it becomes an important concept, allowing the state and individuals to meet and learn about each other.

My analysis shows that the main function of the security assemblage was to produce human security in the region and, even though human security can be excluded from the political agenda at the national level, it remains embedded in local security practices. I conclude that human security is relevant for understanding security in the Russian context and this case study shows how security landscape is constructed and what kind of elements are the part of it.
10.2. Human security as a rhizome

With reference to the findings of this case study, I contribute to theoretical debates regarding the concept of security and discuss whether human security can be a tool that helps to reveal existing difficulties within security studies.

As I claimed in Chapter 4, the concept of state security is not sufficient on its own, for analysing the dynamic of the state-individual relationship. But human security alone is not up to the job either. I applied the concept of security assemblage in order to find the connections between the state and individuals and to examine various approaches to security and meanings attached to it. In order to understand what kind of security assemblage existed in the Murmansk region in 2007 to 2012, I had to analyse the assembly of actors, statements and utterances, territory and transformations. The findings of this case study challenge the idea of the state as a unitary security actor in Russia. I argued that human security is relevant for understanding security in the Russian context. My study also reveals the connections between different concepts of security. Despite the direct advancing of state and military security in Russia, human security appears at cross-points of security issues: energy and economic, environmental and military, state and economic security, environmental and economic security. For example, energy and economic security are linked to each other and to national security in Russia. This linkage allows the state to regard the revenues from the Shtokman gas field as means of achieving stability in the country. But the exploitation of petroleum resources is approached differently in the regional context. Community members do not see extensive exploitation of raw material resources in the region as a means of providing them with security and stability. Rather, a reconceptualization of state-regional relations would allow community members to articulate their concerns. Another example of the cross-point of security issues exposing human security is related to the rhetoric of securitization, in connection with the state’s wish to secure its expectations. Even though the oil and gas sector represents new trends in economic development with the promise of providing security to the country, the rhetoric of securitization evokes traditional means of security – i.e. a military response. Nevertheless, it is questionable to what degree military response can ensure economic stability. It is possible that the Murmansk region might benefit from the enlargement of the military capacity of the region since the military provides jobs and more state money for the regional budget. However this entails strengthening state control over the region. Potentially more regional territories would be saddled with a restricted access status related to state security. However, the region
undoubtedly benefits from being connected to the outside world. The analysis conducted in the previous chapters demonstrated that, even though work on the Shtokman project was suspended in 2012, the experience of community members in the five years up to that point showed that the involvement of foreign companies had a positive effect on the development of the Murmansk region. Foreign investments and the presence of foreign companies improved the business climate in the region: companies competed with each other, learned from each other and thus improved their competence and knowledge, facets which are seen in the region as essential for future development and well-being. I noted in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 that military-industrial activity makes the Murmansk region of special strategic importance to Russia’s national security, from a military as well as an environmental perspective. The rhetoric of securitization allows the state to claim that a territory or an object is an issue in security terms. This security announcement has the connotation of secrecy which makes it more difficult for community members to deal with serious environmental issues. Consequently, community members have to act within the framework of state security, while working with environmental issues on the regional level. This limits their ability to tackle environmental issues, such as nuclear waste. Thus while discussing how to strike the balance between state security and environmental issues, community members articulate their needs, which, in turn, expose human security concerns in the region. At the same time, environmental issues are also related to economic security. I discussed in Chapter 7 the role of public hearings on Shtokman in the security assemblage. These public hearings generated discussions on environmental issues related to the oil and gas industry. These discussions helped to reveal state and individual concerns, since the region has to balance the economic benefits of industrial activities with their environmental consequences. Thus, security issues are interconnected and security entails the arrangement of practices, feelings and connections. Because security issues do not exist in isolation, but rather as assemblages, the state, on its own, has trouble tackling the security issues by traditional (mainly military) means, which presuppose a linear, problem-solving orientation. Rather, security issues require an understanding of how various elements and actors interact with each other. Therefore, the human security approach not only challenges the idea of a unitary actor within security studies, but the system of knowledge as well.

I explored the problem of knowledge production in Chapter 4 and outlined the difference between royal and nomadic science. According to Deleuze and Guattari, while royal science protects the dominant method of knowledge production by the application of approved terminology or modes of research, nomadic science suggests new terms and attempts to
‘problematize’ the issue in order to find new and sometimes more adequate ways of addressing it. Thus, nomadic science is closer to what Deleuze and Guattari call a rhizome, while royal science is closer to an arborescent structure. The difference between a rhizomatic and arborescent structure lies in connections. The former is linked through lines, ruptures and sporadic connections; the latter has linear, repeated connections between the points. I also claimed in Chapter 4 that the field of security studies can be approached from both a royal and nomadic science perspective. Through the history of development of security studies, the state was seen as a unitary security actor. The introduction of the concept of human security in 1994 challenged the traditional understanding of security actors and the security agenda. Nevertheless, proponents of human security struggle to get scientific legitimacy and to prove the validity of the concept. After a while, the noticeable lack of a clear definition of human security generated discussions on the nature of the concept and its analytical and practical utility. A persistent criticism is that a ‘lack of definitional boundaries’ undermines the concept’s usefulness as an analytical tool and its ability to inform the policy agenda (Ewan, 2007:183).

I argue, however, that human security has analytical potential and suggest that we can ground discussions within the concept of human security through arborescent-rhizomatic coordinates. Conceptual debates around the concept of human security reflect its complexity. At the same time, practices highlighted through the application of a human security approach reveal its creative nature. Wibben (2008: 455) states that, surprisingly, little attention in the debates has been directed at seeing human security “as both a continuation of and a challenge to efforts to rethink security within the field of security studies.” This statement, from my point of view, has an important epistemological premise, since it illustrates the Deleuzian approach to concepts in general: each concept has multiple meanings obtained in various connections. Conceptual disagreements on human security are equally valuable since they highlight different aspects of the concept and reveal numerous connections. None of the proponents or opponents has the ‘right’ or the ‘wrong’ answer, simply because a solitary answer does not exist. There is no agreement on “what is human security” since human security is a concept that “never existed in singular form” (Hynek, 2012: 3). What I see while looking at the history of the concept of human security is a history of a rhizomatic concept within a tree-like structure of security studies. Its roots have spread out in the most unexpected and interesting forms by addressing questions of actors, the security agenda, multiple experiences, language etc. Overall, the discussion about the place of human security within security studies is an illustration of the
argument between nomadic and royal sciences. Royal science helps to structure thoughts and to classify objects of study. The traditional approach in security studies fulfilled this role by explaining and classifying phenomena in international relations. For example, according to Buzan and Hansen (2009: 10-13) four main questions dominate international security studies and facilitate debates on security:

- Is the state an exclusive referent object?
- Can internal as well as external threats be included?
- Can security be expanded beyond the military sector?
- Is it inevitable to link security only with threats, danger and urgency?

Different schools of thoughts within security studies provide different answers to these questions (see, for example, Buzan and Hansen, 2009). At the same time, by playing by the rules of royal science, the researchers simplify existing experience and practices, because “security theory became based on an unacknowledged consensus about what constituted legitimate knowledge about the social world” (Sheehan, 2005: 2). The quest to define human security is symptomatic. Grayson (2004: 357) points out that security studies is “pathologically obsessed with definitional universality,” which leads to non-reflexivity, simplification of concepts, ignorance of detected needs and, as a result, the creation of framework “amenable to the status quo”. Articulation of various meanings of the concept is very problematic within a tree-like structure because “the subordinate elements, once so arranged, are unable to ‘move’ horizontally in such a way as to establish creative and productive interrelationships with other concepts, particulars or models. Rather, their position is final, according to an organising principle implied or determined by the superior concept” (Stagoll, 2005a: 14). The critics of human security are trying to adjust human security to an existing model of thinking within security studies and to make human security fit in to the tree-like pattern. I compare this tendency to the process of tracing or replication, which functions well within a tree-like structure, but creates “…impasses, blockages, incipient taproots, or points of structuration” in case of a rhizomatic structure (ATP: 13). As a result, discussions centre on the inability of human security to fit into the pattern of royal science rather than on what human security elucidates and what kind of horizons it opens. Without human security such topics as human agency, security practices of various actors would not be addressed. What we tend to forget is that the connections generated by rhizomes are not as simple or linear as those within an arborescent structure. These concepts do not exist in isolation, in a vacuum, because the human world is not a sterile laboratory. For example, while looking at human security assemblage in
Canada, Hynek (2012) examined various connections between domestic and international security policy, concluding that, “human security and national security have never been mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, human security has been sustained by national security while, simultaneously, national security – and sometimes even the use of military force – has been legitimised by human security” (Hynek, 2012: 95). My case study also shows that state and human security do not exist as alternatives to each other – even though in Russia, due to historical tradition and political and economic developments from 2007 to 2012, state security is presented as the only possible alternative. On the contrary, my analysis demonstrated that these two concepts coexist and co-function in the security assemblage in the Murmansk region and that community members play an important role in allowing the state to represent itself as a security provider.

Instead of tracing and repetition, Deleuze and Guattari (ATP: 12-15) suggest map creation as a way of studying the connections between concepts and the production of new meanings. I followed this road and, indeed, by analysing the security assemblage in the Murmansk region, I created a map of security thinking in Russia. Maps are not possible without history of concepts, because history helps to illuminate how concepts takes new shapes, transforms, or ceases to have effects: “In any concept there are usually bits or components that come from other concepts, which corresponded to other problems and presupposed other planes” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 18). In the case of Russia, the concept of security existed, for a long time, in relative isolation because only specialised institutions, linked to the national security structure, such as the KGB, were allowed to work with the concept. Nevertheless, I judge this isolation ‘relative’ because in 1992, right after the collapse of the USSR, the first Russian security law, was introduced and the understanding of security in this document is closer to a human security perspective rather than to a state security one. The law articulated the triad of equal partners – ‘individual, society and state’. This indicates that the isolation was artificial and different group of actors (even though not officially approved by the state) were dealing with the concept of security and had other interpretations of the security concept.

As I discussed earlier in my thesis, the human security concept was introduced as part of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and therefore was criticised for lack of value and independency (see, for example, Chandler, 2008a). The issue of its independence became a challenge: can it be discussed as an autonomous concept or should one always refer to the broader context (human rights, human development etc.)? There were different attempts
to investigate complex and, sometimes, confusing links between human security, rights, capability and development (Alkire, 2003; Gasper, 2005). The concept of human security, like the concept of human development or human rights, is multi-dimensional. All these concepts have some similarities, but also significant differences. By approaching the human security concept as a rhizome, the nexus “human security - human development - human rights” acquires an additional meaning: it becomes about the ability of human security to make connections with other concepts rather than about its inability to be an independent and, therefore, reliable term. In my dissertation I focused on the ability of human security to create connections with other concepts in order to enter the security assemblage, in a situation where the topic of security is perceived as undiscussable in Russian society. I discussed in Chapter 2, how the nexus “development - security” allowed me, during the interviews, to explore the topic of security, which was initially perceived as dangerous by the majority of interviewees. This nexus also allowed me to develop my knowledge of the security assemblage and to reveal connections between the actors, their actions and words, which otherwise would be hidden. For example, discussions with the interviewees on oil and gas development in the Murmansk region opened up a space for examining the rule of assembling elements along the assemblage’s axis, which I discussed in Chapter 5, and allowed me to contextualise the multi-actor based security model in this thesis. I learnt about different groups of actors in the context of oil and gas development as well as discovered a group of actors whose existence was not presupposed by the model (I discussed the group ‘foreigners’ in Chapter 6).

The case of the security assemblage in the Murmansk region (2007-2012) shows that community members use the opportunity for change: they create the regional strategy to articulate insecurities and to mitigate risks, use the geographic location to gain new experience and work on environmental issues in the region. As a result, they change their relations with the state and with each other through dialogue. Therefore, the question “how to see and document change in security thinking?” becomes more important than a precise definition of human security. Analysis of these changes discloses information about the role of state and the individual in the security assemblage, allows an examination of their functions and the detection of the various interpretations of security that exist in the assemblage. I argue that the concept of human security with its ability to change, create and adapt, does not need an independent status. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) state, the meaning of a particular concept is always fragmented and never can be fully revealed. We can never predict the appearance of new connections between the concepts and related to these connections changes. It means that
human security cannot be captured by one universal definition. It encompasses numerous practices, articulations and experiences. As Deleuze and Guattari (ATP: 25, emphasis in the original) write, “[a] rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, inter-being, *intermezzo*. The tree is filiation, but rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance”. The same can be said about the concept of human security: it is appears in the middle, between the other security issues and theories. It brings questions, challenges our perspectives and generates new discussions. It disappears to emerge again on the agenda. It is an intermezzo, an open project, a post-structural irony to our ways of knowing.
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Appendix

Appendix I. List of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas company</td>
<td>Deputy director</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal authorities</td>
<td>Head of the department</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research institute</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research institute</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Public relations specialist</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional authorities</td>
<td>Head of the department</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authorities</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>September 2008 October 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>October 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional authorities</td>
<td>Head of the committee</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>October 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>October 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional authorities</td>
<td>Head of the department</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>October 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business company</td>
<td>General director</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>October 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National oil corporation</td>
<td>Vice director</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas company</td>
<td>General director</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II. Cover letter

Информация о научно-исследовательском проекте

«Безопасность человека и влияние нефтегазовой активности на людей, живущих в условиях Крайнего Севера», университет г. Тромсе, Норвегия.

О проекте

Я, Львова Мария, работаю над докторской диссертацией, и моя работа является частью большого международного проекта, занимающегося изучением Арктических регионов России, Канады и Норвегии. Моей задачей является выявить, какие возможности к адаптации существуют у жителей Мурманской области в связи с изменениями, связанными с развитием нефтегазовой отрасли в Арктическом регионе, в частности с освоением таких природных месторождений как «Штокман».

Безопасность человека является достаточно новым подходом к проблеме безопасности в целом. Традиционно эти вопросы решаются на уровне государства, и связаны с такими понятиями как независимость, охрана границ, вооружение. Однако, достаточно ли этих мер простому жителю страны для того, чтобы чувствовать себя в безопасности? В 2003 Комиссия по безопасности человека в ответ на призыв Международного комитета ООН написала доклад, в котором говорится что безопасность человека – это всесторонняя защита человеческой жизни. Что это значит? Кто участвует в этом процессе?

В рамках моего проекта используется гипотеза, согласно которой, безопасность человека зависит не только от деятельности государства и политиков, но создается при участии арктических сообществ (город, поселок, область), средствами массовой информации, общественными организациями (коренные малочисленные народы Севера, экологические организации, женские организации), представителями бизнеса, исследователями. При этом роль участников и их активность обусловлены региональной и/или локальной спецификой.

Интервью

В ходе интервью я хотела бы затронуть три значимые темы для моего исследования:

- С кем Вам приходится сотрудничать в ходе Вашей деятельности?
- Как развитие регионального комплекса связано с нефтегазовой активностью?
- Как Вы представляете себе будущее Мурманской области?

Предполагается, что интервью будет записываться на диктофон при отсутствии возражений с Вашей стороны. Вся информация строго конфиденциальна, и если Вы считаете нужным, то Ваше имя не будет упоминаться при использовании данных.

В результате исследования будет выполнена докторская диссертация, в которой я проанализирую данные полученные в Мурманской области. Диссертация будет закончена примерно в 2010 году.

Контакт:

Львова Мария, Институт политических наук, университет г. Тромсе
Тел.+7 921 2455270
Электронная почта: marial@sv.uit.no
Information about the research project:
“Human security and the impact of oil and gas activity on people living in the Far North”,
University of Tromsø, Norway.

About the project

My name is Maria Lvova and I am working on my doctoral thesis. My work is part of a large international project that studies the Arctic regions of Russia, Canada and Norway. My task is to find out what opportunities for adaptation exist in the Murmansk region in connection with the changes associated with the development of the oil and gas industry in the Arctic – in particular, the development of such natural deposits as Shtokman.

Human security is a relatively new approach to the problem of security in general. Traditionally, security issues are solved at the state level, and security is associated with such concepts as independence, border protection, and armaments. However, are these measures enough to make an ordinary citizen feel safe? In 2003 the Commission on Human Security in respond to the UN call wrote a report to the effect that human security involves the comprehensive protection of human life. What does this mean? Who is involved in such a process?

Within the framework of the project, my hypothesis is that human security depends not only on the activities of the state and politicians, but is created also through the participation of the Arctic communities (a city, a village, and a region), the media, public organizations (indigenous people, environmental organizations, women’s organizations), business, and researchers. At the same time, the role of participants and their activities is determined by regional and / or local specifics.

Interview

During the interview, I would like to discuss three important topics for my research:

• With whom do you cooperate in the course of your work?
• How is the development of the Murmansk region connected to oil and gas activity?
• How do you envisage the future of the Murmansk region?

The interview will be recorded if there is no objection from your side. All information is strictly confidential – unless you think it necessary, your name will not be mentioned when using the data.

As a result of the research, a doctoral thesis will be written, in which I will analyse the data obtained in the Murmansk region. The thesis will be finished approximately in 2010.

Contact details:

Maria Lvova, Department of Political Science, University of Tromsø
Tel. +7 921 2455270
E-mail: marial@sv.uit.no
Appendix III. Interview questions

1. Скажите пожалуйста, чем Вы занимаетесь и что является центральной частью Вашей работы?
2. Расскажите, пожалуйста кратко о Вашем опыте работы до того, как Вы пришли в эту структуру?
3. По роду Вашей деятельности, с какими структурами Вам приходится взаимодействовать?
4. Какие возникают трудности и, если они есть, то почему они возникают, на Ваш взгляд?
5. Знакомы ли Вы со стратегией социально-экономического развития Мурманской области? Считаете ли Вы подобные программы необходимыми и почему?
6. По Вашему мнению, какие факторы оказывают влияние на процессы развития области?
7. Можете ли Вы отметить позитивные и негативные моменты связанные с развитием области?
8. Какое место занимает топливно-энергетический комплекс в развитии региона?
9. На Ваш взгляд, что обуславливает активность в сфере нефти и газа?
10. На чем по вашему мнению сказывается в первую очередь разработка природных месторождений? (каков результат, на чем отражается)
11. Как/каким образом повлияет развитие энергетического комплекса на ситуацию в мурманской области)
12. Как Вы считаете, можно ли назвать развитие региона предсказуемым, и каким Вам видится будущее?
13. Чувствуете ли Вы защищенность и уверенность в завтрашнем дне?
14. Как Вам кажется, у Вас есть возможность выбора?
15. Вызывает ли у Вас доверие работа других структур?
Interview questions (English)

1. What are doing and what is the central part of your work?
2. Tell me briefly about your work experience
3. With whom do you interact in your daily activity?
4. Do you have any difficulties in interaction and, if any exist, why do they appear?
5. Are you familiar with the strategy of economic development of the Murmansk region? Do you consider such programmes to be necessary? Why?
6. In your opinion, what factors influence the development of the region?
7. Can you name any positive and negative aspects related to the development of the region?
8. What kind of role does the oil and gas sector have in regional development?
9. What factors generate oil and gas activity in the Murmansk region?
10. Can you elaborate on what kind of sectors will be affected by the development of oil and gas?
11. How will the development of the energy complex affect the situation in the Murmansk region?
12. In your opinion, is it possible to describe the development of the region as predictable, and how do you see the future?
13. Do you feel secure and confident about the future?
14. Do you think you have a choice?
15. Do you trust the work of other structures?