

# **The Impact of Economic Reforms on the Maasai Pastoralists of Tanzania: The Case of Migrant Youths.**



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**THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORMS ON THE MAASAI PASTORALISTS OF TANZANIA.  
THE CASE OF MIGRANT YOUTHS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Since the mid 1980s, Tanzania has adopted the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that are sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to improve upon its economic performance. In Tanzania, structural adjustment programs have focused on institutional reforms known as privatisation, cutting of government expenditure in various economic and social sectors, and to boost exports.

More than 80 percent of the people live in rural areas, depending on land and other natural resources for their livelihoods. This makes agriculture the most important economic sector in Tanzania, accounting for about half of the GDP and providing the major source of income for about 80 percent of the population. The agricultural system is mostly peasant based or production by householders for self consumption and, at times for sale. Reforms in the agricultural sector and its components, such as livestock herding, crop farming, land and land tenure, has had far reaching effects on livelihoods of these rural households and other Tanzanians. The impact of the new policies is mostly seen on the changes in livelihoods, health, and education and housing sectors.

The Maasai of Tanzania are among the major pastoral societies of Africa. They are expert herdsmen, with their traditional homeland located in northern Tanzania. The economy liberalisation policies have led to profit driven tourism, farming and mining by large companies in the Maasai areas. The pressures on lands otherwise used by pastoralists have resulted in a reduced capacity of rangelands. An outcome of these pressures on Maasai lands and their traditional livelihoods source has been the outward migration of Maasai youths to urban centres for new forms of livelihood.

With a focus on migrant Maasai youths in Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital of Tanzania. This study found out that these migrant youths mostly earn a living in the informal sector. The specific income generating activities were the sale of herbal medicine, doing Maasai hair style plaiting and working as security guards. While these activities provided a form of "life" in Dar es Salaam for these migrant youths, they were also platforms for exhibiting the distinctiveness of Maasai culture in the complexity of urban life.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

BOT	Bank of Tanzania.
CPRs	Common Pool Resources.
DFID	Department for International Development.
ERP	Economic Recovery Plan.
GDP	Gross Domestic Product.
IMF	International Monetary Fund.
IFIs	International Financial Institutions.
NMC	National Milling Corporation.
NAP	National Agricultural Policy.
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations.
NESP	National Economic Survival Plan.
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development.
PPP	Purchase Power Party.
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs.
SRL	Sustainable Rural Livelihoods.
TTC	Tanzania Tourist Company.
UNDP	United Nations Development program.
UNHCS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements.
URT	United Republic of Tanzania.
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund.
WB	World Bank.
WTO	World Trade Organisation.
WHO	World Health Organisation.

## **CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

### PART ONE:

#### **1.1. Introduction**

Since the 1980s Tanzania has adopted the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that are sponsored by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)<sup>1</sup> to improve upon its economic performance. Such structural adjustment programs package often revolves around devaluation of currency, increased foreign trade, liberalization of prices, reduction in budget deficits, raising interest rates to their natural market levels, elimination of government subsidies, and reduction of the State's role in the economy and the encouragement of the private sector (Engberg Pedersen et al 1996). The IMF insists that the private sector play a greater role in the management of such economies; it views the present economic crisis of many third world economies as a function of too much government intervention (*ibid*). Hence third world countries in economic crisis have no option but to embark on structural adjustment programs and its prescriptions if they want to improve their stagnant economies. Indeed, as the world encyclopedia of poverty observes, “Economic liberalization became part of the official development strategy of international economic organizations: the IMF, the WB, the WTO and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)” (World Encyclopedia of poverty 2006:291).

##### **1.1.1. Balance of Payment Problems**

The balance of payment difficulties of the great majority of African countries, including Tanzania are mainly the product of external disturbances aggravated by the two oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979, protectionist measures imposed by industrialized countries, deteriorating terms of trade and the protracted world recession. (Finance and Development, 1984). Tanzania faced severe economic difficulties in the early 1980s. The country had experienced low GDP growth and falling per capita income since the mid 1970s. The causes of the crisis were to a large extent external in nature, but there is in addition no doubt that domestic policy short comings contributed to the difficulties (Campbell et al, 1989).

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<sup>1</sup> The International Monetary Fund, formed out of the Bretton Woods compromise in 1944, had a specific task of assisting states with balance of payments problems. Since the end of the fixed exchange rate system in 1971, the IMF has gradually evolved as the Third World lender –at- last-resort.

It was against this background that Tanzania turned to the IMF for balance of payments assistance in 1979, but the negotiations were not successful; especially over the issue of currency devaluation. Also the governments' socialist orientation since independence called *Ujamaa*,<sup>2</sup> that was based on the popular president Nyerere's ideas of community and self reliance, was in sharp contrast to the neoliberal ideas dominating the economic philosophy of the IMF and WB, making it difficult to reach an agreement. Due to these sharp contrasting ideologies between the two, The IMF and the Word bank's stated goal of economic liberalization was publicity resisted in Tanzania until 1986, when Tanzania government signed an agreement with the IMF (Stein et al, 1992).

In Tanzania, structural reforms have focused on the reforms and privatization, as well as creation of a market oriented regulatory framework (*ibid*). For example reforms in the agricultural sector components such as livestock herding, land and land tenure, has had far reaching effects on Tanzanian society (Campbell. *et al* 1992). This is due to the fact that any changes in this sector are likely to affect especially the well entrenched communal property and the collective work systems, the basis of the *Ujamaa villages*, and the livelihoods of the peasants (*ibid*).

### **1.1.2 Nature of Tanzania`s Sectoral Reforms**

#### **Agriculture**

Agriculture is the most important economic sector in Tanzania, accounting about half of the GDP, providing the major source of income for about 80 percent of the population (Engberg Perdersen *et al*,1996). In the agricultural sector the adjustment programs aimed at liberalizing the agricultural parastatals as well as promoting export crop production (*ibid*, 1996). According to Campbell et al (1992), “reforms covered important aspects of the sector from modes of farming to land tenure, agricultural marketing, pricing, credit and financing” (Campbell et al, 1992: 27). For example on land and land tenure system, the policy suggested that allocation of the land for agricultural development should be on long term basis, the maximum period being 99 years and that land users be provided with ownership title deeds (*ibid*, 1992). The policy went further to direct the government to “maintain an atmosphere of confidence and security in order to attract investment in agriculture” (URT, 1982a: xiv).

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<sup>2</sup> A major policy statement declared in 1967 as the Arusha Declaration that called for egalitarianism, socialism and self reliance, and major investments were put in education, and health sectors. Soon after the declaration major economic activities were nationalized. Out of these policies a state economic sector was created in the form of parastatals, i.e. companies where the state has some share.

On agricultural marketing, the policy demanded among other things “large operations to buy and sell directly from producers and consumers respectively” (URT, 1982a: ix). The reforms envisaged in the policy were concerned with the liberalization of the distribution of food crops that was formerly under the control of the state owned National Milling Corporation (NMC). This was a major turn in the elimination of state monopoly in marketing of agricultural products because previously producers were confined to sell their products through the state trading companies.

### **Mining**

The mining sector in Tanzania involves both the formal and informal mining. With the nationalization in 1967, a number of mining companies withdrew (Engberg Pedersen et al 1996). In the informal mining sector, the main beneficiaries have traditionally been landlords or gemstones dealers collecting rent from miners (*ibid*). The changes in land and land tenure has increased the demand for land because of the increased security of ownership, also during the adjustment period the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) started buying directly from the dealers of informally produced minerals at around 70% of the world price (*ibid*). These factors have brought an increased registration and operation of these “large scale companies” in the informal mining sector (*ibid*). As for the formal mining sector, “the adjustment has also seen the emergence of a renewed interest in the country by some genuinely large scale companies” (Engberg Pedersen et al, 1996: 274).

### **Tourism**

The tourism sector has also been impacted by the reforms. Tanzania possesses one of the highest tourism potentials in Africa; tourism in Tanzania involves both hunting and viewing<sup>3</sup>. With the structural adjustment program, the monopoly that the state owned parastatal, the Tanzania Tourist Company (TTC) used to posses over the tourism sector came to an end. Driven by land and land tenure reforms as well as the enabling environment to encourage investors that adjustment programs calls for, the sector has seen an increase in investors both external and internal. According to wildlife department of the ministry of tourism “the hunting blocks has risen from 47 blocks between 1967 and 1989 to 140 between 1990 and

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<sup>3</sup> The Maasai belt extends into south eastern Kenya. So does the seasonal migratory route for thousands of game. Game hunting is prohibited in Kenya, only viewing is allowed. This is probably one reason for increased requests for hunting blocks licenses in Tanzania during the adjustment period.

1997, nearly tripling in seven years” (URT, 1992). This pinpoints part of the increased demand for land generated by this part of the tourism sector in the adjustment period.

### **1.1.3 Who Shoulders the Impact the SAPs?**

The impact of the economic reforms is greatly shouldered by those who do not participate in shaping them, which is the underprivileged class (Kiondo, 1992). In rural areas, the impact of the new policies is mostly evident in the changes in livelihoods, health, education, and housing sectors. In Tanzania, more than 80 percent of the people live in rural areas, depending on land and other natural resources management for their livelihoods (WB, 2000). Policy changes brought about by the adjustment programs have had a great impact upon the livelihood of a large percentage of the population.

### **1.1.4 Maasai Land and Livelihoods**

The Maasai are among the major pastoral societies of Africa. They are expert herdsmen,<sup>4</sup> their social structure is organised for the optimal utilisation of their cattle. Important forms of land use for rural people living in Maasailand are pastoralism and agro pastoralism<sup>5</sup> (Homewood et al, 2005). Maasai depend on capital assets i.e. natural assets (such as land, water, biodiversity, and other environmental resources etc.) This together with human capital such as traditional skills and knowledge), as well as social capital (kin and social relationship etc) as their livelihood assets.

By the time of European Colonisation in East Africa in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century; the Maasai occupied much of the rift valley in Kenya and Tanzania as well as surrounding highlands and plains. During the Colonial period from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the half of the 20<sup>th</sup>, the Maasai's land was divided between two countries, Kenya under the British and Tanganyika (today Tanzania) under the Germans. During this period large areas of Maasailand were alienated, initially for settlers and later for the creation of protected areas (Waller 1993, Anderson et al 1987, Homewood et al 1991). Since Independence more and more of Maasai land has been taken for private farms and ranches, for government projects or for wildlife parks. In agricultural point of view, the driving factor was that administrators both pre and after independence tended to regard cropping as a more important form of agriculture (Engberg-Pedersen et al 1996), and thus tended to give preference to settlers proposing arable

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<sup>4</sup> Livestock is not only a means of subsistence and transaction, but also a measure of wealth (Talle, 1988)

<sup>5</sup> livestock production supported by small scale farming

farming. This trend of transfer of pastoral lands has continued and increased after independence (*ibid*).

## 1.2 Research Problem

The traditional home of the Maasai in Tanzania is located in northern Tanzania. Pastoralism, the dominant land use in this part of the country has been on decline for many years due to declining per capita livestock numbers, (Homewood et al, 1991) and a lack of viable livelihood alternatives. With the economy liberalisation policies adopted in the mid 80s<sup>6</sup> led to investment ridden tourism and mining booms in these areas hence tremendous pressure on rural land tenure. In northern Tanzania lands used by pastoralists have come under tremendous pressure by outsiders during this period (Homewood et al, 1995). These pressures have resulted in reduced capacity of rangelands as the key resources to support pastoralists. One of the outcomes of these pressures on Maasai land and their traditional livelihoods has been the outward migration of Maasai youths. Another has been the change from a predominant subsistence economy to a market economy for the Maasai people.

The confluence of international conservation pressures, private and state interests in Maasailand is increasing land privatization and decreasing rangelands (Thompson et al, 2002). The Maasai and their livestock herds are granted only a limited access to these range resources or prohibited from them altogether. Because of its ecological potential, land which has traditionally served as seasonal pastures for the Maasai herds has now been demarcated as national parks. The generous distribution of valuable grazing land and wildlife is understandable in the light of the tourist industry, which game viewing and photographic safaris are important components. Tourism is one of Tanzania's main sources of income. Maasailand, with its rich wildlife and some extent its "exotic" people in fact constitutes one of the most important attractions in the whole of Tanzania. In 2004, Tanzania's tourism industry was the second highest exports earner after agriculture, generating more than \$ 275 million (Homewood et al, 2005).

The livelihood base of the Maasai people has come under increased pressure. In reaction to these shocks migration becomes one of the means of livelihood diversification. (Oberai, 1986), observes that migration is an age selective process, and that migrants of age 15 to 34

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<sup>6</sup> This was the change from *Ujamaa* (socialist) system, with its centralised economic system to market economy, as part of the structural adjustment program prescribed by the World Bank.

dominate most of migration streams. As for the Maasai it is predominantly the male youths who migrate to urban areas in search of new livelihood opportunities.

### **1.3 Hypothesis**

That SAPs have undermined traditional Maasai livelihood forms.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

1. Why did the Maasai youths migrate, was it based on their own free will, or forced? How do they cope with life in their “new homes”?
2. What are their means of earning a living in these urban centres?
3. Do they retain elements of their social identity (dressing, hairstyle etc)? Is there an ongoing social identity change among the Maasai youths in the City, and how do they identify themselves?

### **1.5 Relevance of the Research**

The study is relevant for the understanding of social change and persistence. Rural to urban migration among the Maasai youth and their engagement in informal activities in the urban areas has increased significantly during the adjustment period. While the migrant Maasai youths may have resorted to new forms of earning a living in the cities, they are traces of their other traditional cultural practices. They “live” their culture in the urban centers. One will catch a sight of Maasai youths in small groups in the midst of the city, in their traditional attire and body adornments, such as bright coloured hairstyles. Usually dancing their warrior dances, if not resting under the tree shade sheltering themselves from the scorching Dar es Salaam’s mid day tropical sun. It is interesting to study the migration and coping mechanisms of the Maasai youths in the City, and how they manage to preserve much of their cultural distinctiveness in such culturally diverse urban areas. Maasai youths are very proud of who they are, and make no effort to hide it.

### **1.6 Scope and Organisation of the Study**

This work is divided into six chapters. Every chapter focuses on a series of topics. Chapter one consists of two parts; part one gives a general introduction to the thesis. It gives a general presentation of the structural adjustment programs, and then zooms on Tanzania’s sectoral reforms, as well as stating the research problem. Part two is on the methodological

framework. The first section focuses on the country profile, as well as the description of the of the selection criteria for the study area. The second section deals with techniques of data collection and the field challenges. Chapter two looks at the structural adjustment programs, with emphasis on the agriculture, the mining and the tourism sectors and how these sectoral reforms have impacted the livelihoods of the Maasai people. Chapter three is the theoretical framework of the study, Chapter four describes the social economic and cultural background of the Maasai people. Chapter five is about to the presentation of findings and analysis. Finally, chapter six focuses on the conclusion of the whole study with a summary of the principle findings.

## PART TWO: METHODOLOGY

### 2.0. Introduction


This section comprises of two parts. The first part focuses on the country profile, highlighting the geographic, demographic and economic aspects. It also describes the selection criteria for the areas of study. The second part deals with the methodology, pointing out the techniques data collection.

### 2.1 Section I. Country Profile

#### 2.1.1 Geography

The United Republic of Tanzania is located in east Africa along the great lakes region. It has an area of approximately 945,100 sq. km, and a total population of about 34<sup>7</sup> million, and it is a Union between Zanzibar Islands and Tanzania mainland. The commercial Capital is Dar es Salaam, and the Capital City is Dodoma. It attained its independence from the British in 1961. The Country contains many large ecologically significant wildlife parks including the famous Serengeti National park in the north, Mount Kilimanjaro, Africa's highest peak and the world's largest free standing mountain.

**Figure 1: Map of Tanzania showing Study Areas.**



Source: [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ges/tz.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ges/tz.html) 1:

<sup>7</sup> 2002 National population census revealed that the Mainland had a population of 33,461,849 while Zanzibar had a population of 981,754

### **2.1.2 Demographics**

The country is culturally and ethnically diverse. The Black African population consists of 120 ethnic groups. The majority of Tanzanians are of Bantu stock. Groups of Nilotc or related origin include the nomadic Maasai and Luo, both of which are found in greater numbers in neighboring Kenya. The Cushtic group consists of the Iraqw<sup>8</sup>, there is a small group of the Khoisan family called the Sandawe and Hadzabe.<sup>9</sup> The Persian descendant group called the Shirazi are found mainly in Zanzibar Islands.

Each of the 120 ethnic groups has its own language; the national language is Swahili, a Bantu tongue with strong Arabic<sup>10</sup> borrowing. Virtually all Tanzanian's inhabitants speak Bantu languages. With the exception of Maasai and Luo who speak Nilotc languages, the Sandawe and Hadzabe speak a language akin to Khoikhoi and the Iraqw speaking a Cushitic language. The Country is divided into 26 administrative regions.

### **2.1.3 Economy**

Tanzania has a vast amount of natural resources like gold and diamond deposits and beautiful natural parks. Over 75 percent of Tanzania's population resides in rural areas where people rely on agriculture and other natural resource uses for their livelihoods (World Bank, 2000). Rural economies hence are a product of use of land and management of natural resources. Tanzania's economy is overwhelmingly agricultural. According to the European Union website for Tanzania "providing more than 46 percent of the GDP and 80 percent of employment" ([www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)). Most of the population however is engaged in subsistence farming; in addition a large number of livestock are raised. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ranks the country as 164<sup>th</sup> out of 175 in the human development report of 2004, with an estimated GDP per capita (PPP US \$) in the year 2003 of 621, with a Human Development Index <sup>11</sup> of 0.418. The population living below 1 US \$ a day (1990-2003), was 19.9 percent.

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<sup>8</sup>The Iraqw who are historically believed to have migrated from the Ethiopian highlands have been integrated into agricultural communities. The State's efforts to integrate the Sandwe and Hadzabe has not been successful.

<sup>9</sup>These are the remaining hunter-gatherers in Tanzania, and are very few in numbers.

<sup>10</sup>History reveals that Arab traders have been in contact with the East African coast as far back as the 15th century, and hence the development of small swahili states along the coast of east africa

<sup>11</sup>The Human Development Index (HDI) reflects average levels of a Nation's human development by reflecting achievements in long life, knowledge and standard of living.

Tanzania remains a relatively peaceful country in the region faced with a great political instability and conflicts. It is a home to thousands of refugees from many of the troubled great lakes region countries.

In 1967 Tanzania became a socialist<sup>12</sup> country, with a central planned economy. However, in the mid 1980s, it was pressurised to adopt the market economy, under the structural adjustment programs (SAPs), prescribed and spearheaded by the World Bank and International Monetary fund. The SAPs programs targeted among other sectors<sup>13</sup> the establishing a policy of decentralisation<sup>14</sup> and undertaking civil service and local government reforms.

## **2.2 Selecting the Study Area**

The research field was carried out in Dar es Salaam, the commercial Capital of Tanzania. The choice of Dar es Salaam was due to the large presence of Maasai youths, as well as being the economic hub for the Tanzanian economy. I have lived in this City for a number of years; hence I have some background information.

### **2.2.1 Dar es Salaam**

It is located on a natural harbour on the Indian Ocean, and the terminus of the longest railroad in Tanzania, giving it advantage in transportation, industrial location and an industrial labour force. It is the country's most important City for business, industry and government.

Dar es Salaam City is a culturally, ethnically and religious diverse. “Dar es Salaam, meaning the haven of peace in Arabic, was a fishing village and established as a port and trading centre by the Arabs in 1862, until the German Colonial Government moved its Capital to Dar es Salaam in 1891” (Kironde,1994: 82). It is one of the Cities in Sub Saharan Africa experiencing a very high rural to urban migration, and continues to attract the majority of migrants. According to the 2002 National population census, it had a population of 2.5 million. The urbanisation rate is so high that the City authorities can not keep up with the population in terms of providing basic services and infrastructure, “An estimated 70 percent

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<sup>12</sup> The Ujamaa (meaning togetherness) policy, called for egalitarianism, socialism and self reliance, private factories, banks and farms were nationalized, and major investments were made in primary education and health care.

<sup>13</sup> Devaluation of the currency, cutting state spending in health and education sectors, parastatals reform etc.

<sup>14</sup> At national level, this has meant the devolution of power and decision making from the central government in Dar es Salaam to regional, district, ward and village levels.

of Dar es Salaam's population live in unplanned settlements"(Kyessi, 2002). A common nickname for the City is "Bongo" literally meaning brain in english, which refers to the street smartness required to survive there.

### **2.3 Section II. Techniques of Data Collection**

This section, discusses the research methods that were used in collecting data, and why they were chosen, how they were used, as well as the field challenges. Research methods are an important aspect of any rigorous effort at understanding the social world. They are defined by Blakie (2000) as procedures used to collect and analyze information about reality. Hence, various methods of data collection were employed to obtain reliable data. Both secondary and primary data collection techniques were used.

Secondary sources of data involved reviewing relevant books, articles, newspapers, journals from libraries both in Tanzania at the University of Dar es Salaam, and Tanzania National library, as well as from the University of Tromso and the Public Library of Tromso in Norway. The essence was to review literature on youth and migration, sustainable livelihoods, identity and effects of structural adjustment programs in sub Saharan Africa, and particularly on Tanzania. In addition to supplement the information gathered during the field work, the literature also served both as a theoretical and empirical base for analysis of the collected data.

Primary sources of data collection involved focused group discussions; semi structured interviews, direct observation oral histories, informal discussions and structured interviews with municipal officials. I employed these data collection techniques so as to investigate, and find out as much as possible about the coping mechanisms of the Maasai youth migrants in urban Dar es Salaam. It also provided an open discussion, that allows the interviewer and the person being interviewed the flexibility to probe for details and discuss issues. These multiple approaches were particularly important, because using only closed ended questionnaires would have provided a set of fixed questions to the informant, and thereby restricting their views. This would have made it researcher driven, hence many issues don't come up.

Most of my respondents had no formal education, they could not read and write. In this respect, using the open ended semi structured guide proved to be more appropriate.

Quantifiable data resulted from answers to formalised set of about 15 socio demographic questions in semi structured interviews. This made it possible for me to get relevant information such as name, age, marital status, education level, herd composition, geographic area of origin, reason for migration, and coping mechanisms in Dar es Salaam in terms of type and place of work and living conditions. Other supplementary topics followed a more open ended conversation, including inquires into the interactions with non Maasai people, frequency of home visits and contribution to family economy, their choice of wearing the traditional Maasai clothes in urban areas, their future aspirations etc. In brief, both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection were used to gather data.

### **2.3.1 Direct Observation**

I chose direct observation so as to observe the flow and sequence of social activities. It also enabled me to supplement the interview schedules, Most of my informants gather at the *Oloipi* (described under sampling procedure) during the day. This was also the place where customers of a Maasai hairdo come. During my three months in the field, I started direct observation from early in the morning to late in the evening. Because almost all of the Maasai youths also work as watchmen at night, I had to seek permission from their employers so that I could also spend some of the nights watching with my informers to see and understand how it is during the night. All the employers had no objection to this, after I approached and explained to them what I was doing. I did the night watching for a few days at various working places of my informers. But I had to stop because I caught malaria after not so long a time a started this kind of observation. After this experience I continued with observation only during the day time.

During the day, I spent most of the time either at one of the many construction sites that Maasai youths guard, or at the Maasai hair dressing areas. If not at the hair dressing, then somewhere else where my informers were engaged in another income earning activity. During this period of my regular presence I learned a lot and made several Maasai friends. It was during this time that the many secrets and information that they had not wanted to reveal to me in the beginning were revealed. I suppose this is after they come to trust me and thus regarded me not as an outsider, but someone who is interested in their living conditions in the city

### **2.3.2 Interviews**

Both structured and non-structured interviews were employed. Maxwell (2005:110) observes that “Structured and unstructured interviews are methods that can lead to reliable data.” Before I got into the field, I had anticipated that my informers could read and write. But after I arrived in the field, I came to realise that some of them could not read and write. So I used structured interviews and sometimes semi structured interviews for the government ministries and Municipal officials. I employed unstructured interviews in the form of oral history to Maasai youth informants, first and foremost because, most of them could not read nor write. Thus it was easier for them to narrate the reasons for coming to and the coping mechanisms in the City. Blakie (2000:235), pointing out the importance of oral history, writes that “a special use of unstructured interviewing is oral history, one or more individuals are asked to recount aspects of their lives and to discuss their perceptions of the process and the changes they have seen.”

Secondly, I found this method to match well with direct observation because the situation would bring out a question for me, and would get a response right away. In most interviews, a pen and paper usually creates a distance between the interviewer and the interviewee. To avoid this, I directed my questions based on the questionnaires I had made, but not with a pen and paper but by voice recording the response. I found that especially in the rural Maasai area, they had a previous bad experience of foreigners coming in and holding a pen and a notebook.

### **2.3.3 Sampling Procedure; Setting, Approach, and Population**

Sampling is an essential part of research methods (Maxwell, 2005). To sample entails making a selection of a part from a larger whole. In this respect selecting a particular area in the country and a particular number of people from the *Oloip* from which to gather data.

In various sections of Dar es Salaam City and its suburbs, it is easier for even a foreigner to catch the sight of Maasai youths. This is because they tend to gather in fairly large and highly visible groups, called *oloip*.<sup>15</sup> Through my experience living in Dar es Salaam, I know of the

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<sup>15</sup> According to my main informant Luka 25 years. The *Oloip* (singular), (*iloipi*) is a Maa word meaning a shade of a tree, where people meet and socialise. In traditional Maasai system, the warriors and elders move from one homestead to another, meet their age mates and find a particular tree shade whereby they sit, exchange news and play games. It is particularly interesting that this culture as led to a similar practice by the migrant

existence of about 10 of these *iloipi* in the city, but there are probably even many more in this huge city. The *oloip* is significant for the Maasai youths; it enables access to connections and networks.

### **Ilala Oloip; a big “tree shade” in the City**

I first came to know Luka, my main Maasai youth contact way back in 2004.<sup>16</sup> Being a resident of Dar Salaam for a number of years, I had noticed an increasing presence of Maasai youth in the city since the mid 90s. I suppose, like many other residents of Dar es Salaam City, the sight of distinctively dressed Maasai youths in the city was of particular no reason for me to raise eye brows. When a colleague made enquires to me about visiting the Maasai youths, we ended up landing at one of the areas called *Ilala Amana*. This place is popularly known in the city for having a big gathering of Maasai youths, most engaged in hairdressing enterprises. *Ilala Amana* is one of many *iloipi* in Dar es Salaam city; other *iloip* are found in various localities in the city such as at *mwananyamala*, *mwenge*, *sinza*, *mbezi suca* etc. Upon our arrival at *Ilala Amana* oloip, there were at about fifty or more youths. Some were busy socializing, some taking a siesta under the shade, some trying to attract customers or attending to customer’s hair. This was my first experience of the many survival strategies of the migrant Maasai youths. I was deeply moved especially by the context, contrasting the usual city landscape. The Maasai youths appeared to be in rural home context, and many appeared to look too young for such survival strategies. It seemed to me, as if they would rather be in school. Doing a Maasai hairstyle could take up to 4 hours, so whilst waiting for this colleague to finish his hairdo do, I used the time to observe and talk to Maasai youths about their life in the city. This was also the beginning of my growing curiosity to find more about the life of these youths in the City.

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youths in the urban centers far away from home. During my visit to rural Maasai land, I experienced the same practice.

<sup>16</sup>This was after a newly arrived expatriate colleague from Germany at my work place asked me to take him to meet the Maasai in the city. He had read about the Maasai people prior to his trip to Tanzania, and was deeply moved by their cultural distinctiveness, and was now eager to visit a place where Maasai youth gather so as to meet them, record some traditional songs, make a video shooting and have a Maasai hairdo. We were met at the *Oloip* by Luka, a Maasai youth.



Maasai youths gathered at the *Oloip* to discuss a notorious<sup>17</sup> *Maasai youth.. Source field survey, 2006:*

I chose this particular *Oloip* amongst others and Luka as the main contact person for my field work, because I was already acquainted to him and the place during the visit in 2004. Given the limited time framework for the field work and practicalities, I needed someone with whom it would not take a lot of time and resources to break the ice in the initial stages of acquaintance.

After I talked to Luka about my study objectives, he agreed to cooperate. Through him, I managed to be introduced to other informants, from whom I chose fourteen to form the primary data source of the study. In this respect, my informants were obtained through a means of snowball sample. Bernard (1994) observes that “snowball sample is obtained by locating one or more key individuals who can then provide contact with others in the group” (Bernard, 1994: 97). The sample is mostly male because there were very few Maasai female migrants. The few I met were not engaged in any income generating activities,<sup>18</sup> hence did not fit in the project objective of the coping mechanisms of Maasai youth migrants. Indeed, writers such as Stichter (1985) and David (1985) writing on African migration models, have generalized that migrants are more likely to be male than female.

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<sup>17</sup> His deviant behavior of drunkenness and living a waister kind of life in the City was regarded as contrarily to Maasai warrior values. He does not send remittances back home, so fellow Maasai have convened to give him a last warning or else risk being exterminated by the rest or be returned to rural home by force, Maasai youth keep an eye on one another so as to guard Maasai values and norms whilst in the city.

<sup>18</sup> Most Maasai women usually after the age of 40, come to Dar es Salaam and stay for shorter periods of time and engage mostly in handcraft income generating activities. The younger ones usually migrate with their husbands in areas close to their rural homes so as to be close to agro or pastoral activities in the rural home. Whilst in the urban areas they engage in income generating activities, usually beaded work and herbal selling.

The *Ilala Oloipi* has about forty or more Maasai youths. My experience in the field is that most of the Maasai, who frequent a particular *oloip*, were usually from the same geographical area in maasailand. But one of my informants hinted to me that this was not a rule, “as long as a person is a Maasai, he or she can come and socialize thereby maintain networks in the unsympathetic city environment”<sup>19</sup>.

## **2.4 Field Challenges**

### **2.4.1 Un kept Appointments**

Maasai are highly mobile people. This was due to the nature of their coping mechanisms, that necessitates them have occupational combinations. Hence there were times when appointments were very much delayed or not met altogether. So I had an extra task of tracing anyone of my informants and to find what he is doing at that particular time. This sometimes revealed a new coping mechanism or new information for my research. Un kept appointments were also very common when I was to meet officials, you would go only to find that he or she has a meeting or has gone out, all these resulted into delays and given the limited time I had for conducting my research.

### **2.4.2 Confidentiality and Consent**

Most of the younger youths were withholding information in the beginning. But when I won their trust as someone who could keep secrets, I understood better what they had previously told me. This was because the older youths seemed to have an influence and dominance on the younger ones. I came to learn that this was due to the fact that older youth were prior to arrival in the City than the younger ones, and thus most of them had more connections to job opportunities in the City than the younger ones had. The younger youths had to abide to rules and norms of the social network, i.e. respect for elders. This also reveals the existing hierarchy of the network. In such social networks, confidentiality and trust is built over time and that if my stay had been longer, I would have leaned much more from my informants.

Most of my informants did not like the “pen and note book” method. I came to realize that engaging in the recorded conversation focused on my research was a far better method. For it provided the opportunity to talk freely as if engaged in a casual conversation. I came to learn that when land officers came to tell them to leave the land or reduce the number of livestock

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<sup>19</sup> Voice of Simon, 27, on his views on the importance of the Oloip as means to maintain social networks, foster stronger maasai brotherhood prospect in the City far away from home.

due to environmental concerns, they had pens and clipboards. It was through this experience that they have developed less trust to “paper and pen holding” outsiders. In a word, all forms of lived experiences in Maasailand were being reflected in urban Maasai communities.

#### **2.4.3 Time Constraint**

I used the time consuming direct observation and interviews to collect data. Most of my informants were involved in multiple occupations. Thus, direct observation to a very highly mobile individuals such as the Maasai youth who have to participate in several informal activities to make ends meet and sometimes at varying locations, was a challenge especially given to the mostly never on time Dar es Salaam commuter buses.

#### **2.4.4 Education and Language Barrier**

Before I went to the field, I had taken for granted that almost every Tanzanian could read and write. But I came to find out that most of my informants could not read or write and most of them were born in the 80s. This was probably due to structural adjustment programs, which the state adopted in the mid 80. These programs called for the removal of subsidies on social services, such as education and health services. Indeed, as Campbell (1992) points out, “With the reintroduction of the school fees, universal primary education<sup>20</sup> is being implicitly undermined, many parents cannot afford to pay the school fees no matter how small the amount may appear to be” Campbell (1992, 165).

Some of my informants too were not proficient in *Swahili*, the national language. Neither did I understand the *Maa* language spoken by the Maasai. Hence I needed a translator. During translation some valuable pieces of information might get lost or lose its originally intended meaning. The *Maa* language spoken by the Maasai is derived from a Nilotc group of languages. Swahili the national language is derived from a group of Bantu languages, Arabic

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<sup>20</sup> A major program that Tanzania embarked on after gaining independence, sought to expand the education system to provide access for more Africans “The achievement of universal primary education, where all Tanzanian children have access to a basic c education, was a commendable for one of the twenty five poorest countries in the world” (Campbell R: 1992:147)

and Portuguese,<sup>21</sup> so any person speaking any of the Bantu languages it is a bit easier for me to grasp some meanings. There were times, especially when I attended the large Maasai meeting places, which was purely conducted in Maa language, on such occasions I depended solely on my translator.

#### **2.4.5 Challenges in the Definition of a Youth**

The world Health Organization defines people from 10-19 years of age as “adolescents”, and in some circumstances, 15-24 year olds as “youth”. It further observes that “markers of life stages are not necessarily specific to chronological age and may vary between individuals (ibid), across cultures and across individuals” (WHO, 1995). According to UNICEF (1990), young boys and girls between about 16 to 24 years are known as youths, whereas at 25 years they are considered “grown up”, or adults.

On the other hand, The United Nations defines “youths” as those between, 15 to 24 years. Nzioka (1991), points out that in Kenya, for example this category is from 15- 34 years; this definition is not however uniformly acceptable among the various communities within Kenya (ibid). Waage (2006) in his study of youth migrants in Ngaoundere a city in north Cameroon observes that the concept of “youth” or being young does not seem to have an exact equivalence in many local languages used in Ngaoundere as is the case with many African languages (Waage, 2006).

According to Omari (1991:12-13), youth are characterized in the Tanzanian census as those less than 15 years old, but in the same volume, Malekela notes that a “youth” is from 0-17 years of age, and at 18 years a person is legally an adult. (1991:49). From my interaction with people of various cultural backgrounds during the field work, when I asked them how they define a youth age wise, most of them said the ages between 18 to 34 and sometimes 35 years old. But most of them emphasized that it has to with culture and changing social roles in a person’s life.

The confusion that arises when it comes to defining who a youth is obvious. The above arguments reveal that ages vary considerably across cultures. Because in many African

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<sup>21</sup> The Portuguese under Vasco Da Gama first landed on the east African coast around 1490 on their way to Asia, and built a fort to maintain their trade posts on the east African coast. The Arabs also by that time had already been engaged in trade far into the interior of east Africa. This interaction gave birth to swahili language.

societies, childhood and adulthood begins not at specific age, but with such events as circumcision or initiation, marriage or parenthood. In this study I regard a youth to be from 18 to 36 years old.

## CHAPTER TWO: THE MAASAI CULTURE AND SOCIO ECONOMIC ORGANISATION

### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter describes the socio economic and cultural background of the Maasai people. Issues such as the age set, value attached to livestock, proudness of their culture and identity, social structure, and the importance of social networks within the Maasai society are discussed. Also pressure on Maasai lands before and after Independence, as well as development efforts taken by authorities whilst overlooking the local resources management system is pointed out.

### 2.1 Background:

Maasai are a pastoral people<sup>22</sup> who herd cattle and goats, at times moving their homes in search of better grazing lands.<sup>23</sup> They form part of more than 120 other ethnic groups in Tanzania. The Maasai, famous as herders and warriors once dominated the plains of East Africa, now they are confined to a fraction of their former range. By the time of European Colonisation in East Africa in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century; the Maasai occupied much of the rift valley in Kenya and Tanzania as well as surrounding highlands and plains. During the Colonial period from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the Maasai's land was divided between two countries, Kenya under the British and Tanganyika (today Tanzania) under the Germans in what is today the south eastern of the republic of Kenya and north east of United Republic of Tanzania.



*Source: field survey, 2006*

<sup>22</sup> The Maasai are primarily pastoral, but there are a few groups of agriculturalists. Talbot (1964)

<sup>23</sup> A good, brief synthesis of Masai social organization and cultural trends is presented by Gulliver (1969: 234-41), who stresses the point that the Masai are often held to be the classic case of an East African people who are strongly committed to their particular cultural tradition

## **2.2 Social and Economic Structure:**

Maasai are expert herdsmen and their social structure is organised for the optimal utilisation of their cattle. It is organised into male age-groups,<sup>24</sup> whose members together pass through initiations to become warriors, and then elders. They have no chiefs, although each section has a *Laibon*, or spiritual leader, as its head. They are easily recognized by the red plaid "shuka," and layers of beaded jewellery that they wear and their warrior spears. They are fiercely independent, holding on to their traditional tribal customs and way of life long after their neighbouring tribes have adopted several western ways.

Traditionally the Maasai have always been a proud and independent tribe. They did not cultivate the land and depend on a cash economy as many of those around them did; rather they lived off the blood, milk and meat. Due to their distinctive customs, dressing and residence near the many game parks of East Africa, they are among the most well-known African ethnic groups internationally. The Maasai believe in the God Called "Ngai", who lives in Mt Lengai in northern Tanzania and acts in extraordinary events rather than in the daily matters of life.



*Source: field survey, 2006*

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<sup>24</sup> The basic social unit was the kraal, a polygynous family compound. One or more kraals--the average number was 20 to 50 (Huntingford 1953: 107)--constituted a village, also called a kraal, or variously, boma and/or enkang. There was an age-grade system, in which the males were divided into three groups: youths, warriors (moran), and elders.

### **2.2.1 Age set**

Kinyaol Portoboli<sup>25</sup> narrating on the age system observed that Maasai culture is centered on a very sophisticated age set system. This age system distinguishes the different stages of male life. After childhood, the first stage of adulthood starts with initiation, after which a male goes through stages of manhood, the last being *iltasat* (retired elder). He further remarked that when youths became warriors, they moved to a different type of village, called a *manyatta*. In the *manyatta*<sup>26</sup> lived the warriors, their mothers, sisters, and uninitiated girl lovers. The age set of warrior hood is the time that stands out as the most typically Maasai, especially in male Maasai's minds. "If you ask a Maasai elder about the best part of a Maasai life, he will reveal in stories about his time as a warrior, about lion hunts and cattle raids with his age mates, and about the strong sense of unit and sharing amongst each other"(Kinyaol Portoboli).

### **2.2.2 Livestock as Property**

Pastoral societies across the world have a very special connection to their livestock. (Bjorklund, 1990, Talle 1988, Nyssonen 2003). For the Maasai their herds play a very central role in their lives, indeed every cattle has a name. Possession of cattle or its lack could be "a mark of inclusion or exclusion" (Anderson *et al*, 1999:25), hence cattle ownership has important implications for the construction and maintenance of social and ethnic boundaries. Cattle represent food and power; the more cattle a Maasai has, the richer he is and therefore the more power and influence he will have within his tribe. As Talle (1989) observes, "among the Maasai, livestock is not only a means of subsistence and the medium of transaction, but also a measure of wealth" (Talle, 1988:69). In Maasai relations of production, the rights of disposal or alienation of livestock are usually held by a male head of family (*ibid*: 74), while the wives and sons are vested with the rights to use only. The Maasai's love for cattle also determines their attitude towards wild animals (Spear *et al*, 1993). Maasai have great respect for nature in general and do not kill wild animals, unless they form a threat to cattle and if so its meat is not eaten (*ibid*). A Maasai elder acknowledged during a personal interview in rural Maasai, that for the Maasai, cattle are what make the good life, and milk and meat are the best foods. He further pointed out that according to Maasai myths, *Ngai* (The Creator) gave them all the cattle on earth to care for. This belief justified traditional cattle raids by Maasai warriors to non Maasai societies to take what they believed already belong to them. They also

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<sup>25</sup> A Maasai elder, in Ngaramtoni, a rural Maasai settlement a few kilometers outside Arusha city. He reckons his ages to be close to 90 years.

<sup>26</sup> In contrast, the kraal was made up of families of married elders.

keep goats, sheep and donkeys for transport. Milk is every day food, and cattle are killed for meat only on special occasions. Their old ideal was to live by their cattle alone and other foods they could buy, but today they also need to grow other crops. Scholars writing on livelihoods of the Maasai have argued that over the last couple of decades many Maasai have barely survived only on the livestock herds and have been forced to seek income from other sources Talle (1988), Kituyi (1990), Arhem (1995). The Maasai are semi nomadic. They move their herds from one place to another to find fresh water sources, and to give grass a chance to grow again. Traditionally this was made possible by a communal land tenure system in which everyone in locality shares access to water and pasture.

### **2.2.3 Ecological Potential of Maasai Lands**

The lands of the Maasai have a great ecological potential. In addition to being land rich in mineral deposits such as the Tanzanite,<sup>27</sup> and geographical land forms such as the Ngorongoro Crater<sup>28</sup> and various highest mountains in Africa such as the Kilimanjaro.<sup>29</sup> Another important aspect of the ecology of Maasailand is that it contains the largest number of species of plants and animals in the world (Talbot, 1972). The greatest concentrations are in the Maasai Mara, i.e. in northern Tanzania and the adjacent Narok District in Republic of Kenya. Game was apparently much abundant throughout Maasailand at the time of early European settlement than it is today (Parkipuny, 1991). Ever expanding cultivation and dense habitation, as well as extensive game hunting over the years, have contributed to the unfavourable conditions for wildlife. The Maasai themselves have never hunted game for food. They only kill predatory animals that threaten the safety of humans or domestic animals (Parkipuny, 1991)

### **2.2.4 Pressure on Maasai Land during Colonial Rule and after Independence.**

Most pastoral societies, like other nomadic communities such as the hunters and gatherers often live dispersed over vast areas, and this makes their specific way of life vulnerable to encroachments from sedentary people, from governmental or cooperative industrial developments. Likewise governments feel compelled to regulate their resource use

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<sup>27</sup> A precious gem stone, found in the world only in Tanzania and in Maasailand in particular.

<sup>28</sup> Ngorongoro crater is a 19 kilometers wide and 1 kilometer deep depression in the earth's crust; it contains a large biodiversity of animal and plant species, drew 250, 000 visitors in 2004, according to an interview with Arusha City official (Mr Noah). Ngorongoro area is where most Maasai youth migrants originate.

<sup>29</sup> Kilimanjaro is the tallest free-standing mountain in the world, rising 4600 meters (15,000 ft) from the base, and includes the highest peak in Africa at 5,895 meters (19,340 ft) ([www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org))

(Bonfiglioli 1992, Galaty 1999). By 1880<sup>30</sup> Maasai territorial expansion had largely ceased due to creation of reserves in both German and British territories (Waller, 1999). Since the colonial period, most of what used to be Maasai land has been taken over, for private farms and ranches, for government projects or for wildlife parks. (Engberg-Pedersen et al 1996). In the case, of wildlife parks massive evictions of pastoralists living in the periphery of gazetted national parks such as the Serengeti, Ngorongoro, Manyara etc, where carried out to protect the parks from poaching and encroachment (IIED 1994, Homewood et al 1991, Brockington, 2001). In the wake of Independence, such wildlife activities have increased to cover almost 70% of grazing resources of Maasai lands (*ibid*).

Today the Maasai mostly retain only the driest and least fertile areas (Homewood et al, 1991). The stress this causes to their herds has often been aggravated by attempts made by governments to 'develop' the Maasai. These are based on the idea that they keep too much cattle more than land can hold and thus degrade the land, and the environment as whole.

According to the conventional knowledge, overgrazing and thus land degradation is regarded a result of an ecological foot print caused by the pastoral management systems. "The reason of this development is to be found in the combination of individual ownership of animals and common ownership of land that characterizes pastoral economy" (Bjorklund, 1990:75). This argument is the basis of the concept of the tragedy of the commons, put forward by Garrett Hardin in 1968, "Every single herder will try to maximize individual gains by putting more animals in the pasture, and this ultimately leads to overgrazing, diminishing herds and economic loss for all herders" (Hardin 1968 cited in Bjorklund, *ibid*). This ever since has been used as a standard reference for pastoral people and natural resources use. "Garret Hardin who introduced the concept in 1968 saw that private ownership as a necessity to sustain environmental resources (Nyssonen, 2003:251).

The above point of view based on tragedy of the commons, was picked up as a reference by several governments when dealing with pastoral societies (Bjorklund, 1990. Nyssonen, 2003). Several development efforts whether state led or external development agencies initiatives have been carried on Maasai people based on the frame work of tragedy of the

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<sup>30</sup> This was after the Berlin Conference of 1884-1886 that divided the African continent into colonial powers. Thus the basis of establishment of current African country borders, Maasai people found their territories divided into two countries Kenya under the British and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) under Germany administration.

commons. Observing on the development efforts of Maasai areas, Aud Talle observes, "The Maasai economy, basically oriented towards livestock subsistence production, has since the Colonial era, been considered to generate solely unproductive wealth, which is of little profit to the state and harbours a few development potentials" (Talle, 1999:107). Hence the state administrators both during Colonial times and after independence have incessantly tried to "develop" the pastoral Maasai by means of variety undertakings. These 'development' efforts try to change their system of shared access to land. While this has suited outsiders and some entrepreneurial Maasai who have been able to acquire land or sell it off, it has often denuded the soil and brought poverty to the majority of Maasai (Thompson et al, 2002), who are left with too little and only the worst land. However, Maasai people are in fact very efficient livestock producers and active managers of their natural resources. They rarely have more animals than they need or the land can carry. In this way, they have always manipulated their stock and rangelands to sustain an adequate level of productivity in essentially marginal environments (Widegreen 2000, Niamiri 1990, Allan 1990).

There is evidence that the Maasai are not resistant to development<sup>31</sup> in itself (Scheinder, 1974). But it is the way most development initiatives have traditionally been formulated with its top-down approaches which disregards much and valuable lived knowledge that is part and parcel of culture. That Eade, (2002) points out; "when top- down development practices are hostile to the values of the people affected, local culture may resist modernity and development" (Eade, 2002:11). Also as Talle (1999) remarks on the development discourse and Maasai pastoralists "the distinction between the traditional and modern is frequently invoked in the temporal imaginary of a discontinuity between *zamani* (before) and *sasa* (now) (Talle, 1999:106).

Increased pressure on pastoral Maasai land before and after independence has put the pastoral production system under deep crisis. Confined with this massive loss of land. The traditional livelihoods means can no longer be properly sustained. Hence most Maasai have diversified their means of livelihoods. In addition to livestock keeping, many have taken up crop cultivation as their main source of livelihoods, (Mbonile et al, 1997, Timberlake, 1985). The main option has been for pastoralists to migrate to other parts of the country and change occupations, example crop cultivation and wage employment (Mbonile et al, *ibid*). Maasai

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<sup>31</sup> They have for example shown a keen interest in upgrading and improving their livestock as well as the use of veterinary drugs and treatment of their animals (Talle 1981).

have been migrating southwards, there have been indications that some have crossed into northern Zambia (Galaty, 1989). Within Maasai land, other strategies such as livestock accumulation have been adopted (Mwamfupe et al, 2003). The adoption of the type of the strategy however, depends on the access qualification available to that group (*ibid*) The richer homesteads seem to have accumulated and diversified their livestock keeping, while the poor have adopted crop cultivation and or wage labour (*ibid*).

### **2.3 Types of Mutual Assistance systems of the Maasai**

According to Kinyaol Portoboli a Maasai elder, the Maasai have been making use of mutual assistance systems for hundreds of years, and this has enabled them to persist in natural disasters such as draughts and famine. He observed that there are two distinct categories of Maasai mutual assistance systems, the individual based and collective based mutual assistance systems. In the individual assistance system, the loans of food and livestock, and gifts may be made from one person to another. He termed this type as the one constituting the majority of transactions and takes place between herders. The basis of such assistance can be close family ties (patrilineal and affinal), personal friendship between recipient and donor in their friendship as age mates. He stressed that these individual gifts or loans are based on the expectation of future reciprocity.

The second category is collective, clan based mutual assistance, He said that this constitutes the core of mutual assistance practiced by the Maasai in most rural areas operated at community level, and is known as *ewoloto* “through its operation poverty stricken families are enabled to move back and toward self sustaining pastoralism once again.” He further added that this is a distinct and consciously maintained system of mutual assistance within clans. He stressed that the objective of the system is to assist families that cannot help themselves to break out of the vicious cycle of poverty. This forms one of the four other types of *engalata*.

#### **2.3.1 Types of Collective Clan Based Mutual Assistance Systems.**

The first *engalata enkaputee* is the collecting of cattle among clan members for a man to pay his bride wealth in a single transaction and where the livestock demanded exceed his resources. He noted that these marriage transactions usually involve higher bride wealth payments than usual, in this respect; no further claims can be made subsequently upon the husband.

The second type of collective clan based mutual assistance, known as *engalata embolwa*, this involves collecting of cattle from among clan members for a man to pay back bride wealth and other marriage payments received earlier for a daughter, in case of divorce or a broken engagement.

The third type of collective clan based mutual assistance is known as *engalata oloikop*, this type of mutual assistance comes into effect when clan members collect cattle to pay “blood wealth”, a traditional payment made when one Maasai killed another accidentally during protecting their livestock from predators.

*Ewoloto*, is the fourth type and the most important collective, clan based mutual assistance, according to Kinyaol Portoboli, it denoted the collection of cattle from among the clan members to assist a destitute family so that it can be able to stand on its own. As mentioned earlier that in Maasai wealth is measured in terms of the number of cattle and children a man has. In this respect ewoloto, becomes very crucial here to prevent a poverty stricken wife to run back to her clan with the children. Which leads to loss in wealth of clan, as Kinyaol Portoboli remarked, “we collect cattle to feed the hungry children who are dying, who are our children.”

### **2.3.2 Importance of Mutual Assistance within Maasai People.**

It is apparent that mutual assistance systems within the Maasai society constitutes a very crucial part of the culture. It has maintained kin relationships, and helped families to break out from the menace of poverty in terms of the clan joining hands to collect cattle to assist the family in need so that it could again stand on its own as a self sustaining pastoralist family. What is interesting here is that within the assistance systems, the main objective that is noted is the maintenance of brotherhood, each one looking over the welfare of one another. Indeed this forms a very interesting and important philosophy of the mutual assistance systems.

### **2.4 Summary**

The lands that the Maasai people occupy have a major ecological potential in Tanzania and they have been under pressure since the colonial period and after independence the pressure on these lands did not seize. These land squeezes have limited their access to large areas of

grazing and important water resources. Cattle play a central role in the lives of the Maasai, cattle is not only a measure of wealth, but also a means of transaction and a basis of inclusion and exclusion. The Maasai are very proud of their distinctive culture and social networks. The strong adherence to social networks especially the collective clan based mutual assistance systems, play a significant role in the communal nature of pastoral production system. Mutual assistance systems also play a significant role in assisting families in crisis.



## **CHAPTER THREE: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS**

### **3.0 Introduction**

These are economic reforms designed and supervised by the Bretton Woods Institutes, i.e. the World Bank and IMF as a measure to help countries in economic crisis. In the third world economic reforms are mostly concentrated in Africa; especially in sub Saharan Africa (Kiondo, 1992:27). Most of the countries in sub Saharan Africa with ailing economies are currently undergoing these structural adjustment programs. They include a number of reforms aimed at stabilizing developing countries in economic crisis's external and internal imbalances and promoting their growth by devaluation, trade liberalization, producer price increase, privatization and supporting institutional changes. The IMF insists that the private sector play a greater role in the management of third world economies. (Campbell et al, 1992, Pedersen et al 1996). The prescriptions imposed by these International financial institutions (IFIs) have been reported to have major social impact upon the majority populations in the several developing countries. This is due to the reduction in social expenditure by the national states, and hence a deterioration of health care and education systems (Chassudovsky, 1991, Macarov, 2003).

### **3.1 Causes of Tanzania's Economic Crisis**

The result of Tanzania's economic crisis was largely due to both external and internal factors. The break up of the East African Community in 1977, was a big blow to Tanzania, this necessitated substantial investments to provide services that were formerly rendered by the Community. The country fought a costly war with neighboring Uganda in 1978 over a border dispute, oil price hikes of the 1970s and declining world price for primary products had a tremendous impact upon the economy (Cheru, 1987). Since 1980 the recession in the west generated high interest rates, intensifying the country's debt service burden (Malima, 1982 b). The above mentioned shocks together with prolonged periods of draught did cost the Tanzanian economy dearly (South, 1985). It was clear to the government by the end of 1979 that unless Tanzania attains an equilibrium in balance of payment position as quickly as possible, all the productive sectors of the economy would continue to suffer heavy losses due to their inability to import essential inputs (Cheru, 1987). It was under these circumstances that the Tanzania government quickly concluded an agreement with the IMF in 1979 (Cheru 1987, Husser 2000, Kiondo, 1992).

### **3.2 History of Adjustment Programs in Tanzania.**

In 1979 the government failed to reach an agreement with the IMF that would have released a standby by credit. The major cause of the disagreement was over the issue of devaluation; The Government took an equally hard line position (Fantu 1996, Campbell et al, 1992) and refused to compromise with the IMF. In 1981 the World Bank indicated that a quick disbursing aid would be available if certain policy changes were implemented, and an agreement was reached with the IMF (Rakes et al, 1996:220).

Soon after these disagreements, the Tanzania government took various measures aimed at tightening the existing policies. A series of campaigns against corruption and against “loitering” in towns did not reduce corruption, but did further reduce supply of goods (Campbell et al, 1992). By 1984, of course the shortages were becoming severe that the government made an important change of course (*ibid*). It was during this period that the government allowed people with their own foreign exchange to import consumer goods.

#### **3.2.1 National Economic Survival Plan (NESP), 1981 – 82**

This was the first local plan aimed at resolving the economic crisis before a renewed application to the IMF (Raikes et al, 1996). Its focus was to increase export income and to eliminate food shortages through village irrigation schemes and cultivation of drought resistant crops and “to reduce public expenditure through strict control”(Wagao, 1990 cited in Raikes et al, 222). The NESP never offered solution to the achievement of its targets, nor was it able to impress the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to unlock funds to Tanzania (*ibid*).

#### **3.2.2 Structural Adjustment Program (ASP), 1982 -86**

Its approach was to look in some detail the structure of the economy, and see what needed adjusting. This was a more serious attempt to do this (Raikes et al, 1996). The SAP focused on increasing agricultural and especially exports production. Devaluations of 20 to 40 percent were aimed primarily at neighboring countries and cross border smuggling (*ibid*, 222).

Fiscal and monetary controls were to be further tightened to reduce inflation. Later, as it became apparent that the effect of these measures were having no effect, then other policies such as “own foreign exchange,<sup>32</sup>”(*ibid*) were introduced. Even though the State self initiated Structural adjustment program did increase agricultural sales and exports, however it did not impress or move the IFSs to issue funds to the Tanzania government.

### **3.2.3 Economic Recovery Plan (ERP), 1986-89**

This is the first economic adjustment program that Tanzania embarked on after reaching an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank in 1986. It focused around a series of specified targets and means of achievement (Engberg-Pedersen et al, 1996). The Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) was followed by the Enhanced Structural Adjustment program (ESAP,) sometimes referred to as ERP I from 1989 to 1992. From then, onwards institutional reforms commonly defined as privatization, have been the main focus of ESAP conditionality (*ibid*).

## **3.3 Impact of the Adjustment Program upon Agriculture and Its Components**

Policy making to some degree in most fields has been penetrated by the Structural programs, the most being the transition from *Ujamaa*, Tanzania’s version of socialism to economic liberalization (Engberg-Pedersen , et al 1996). In many respects, the stated aims of Tanzania’s economic policy are the diametric opposite of those before 1986. There is no any central policy direction in any field. This includes and is even perhaps more obvious in the agriculture sector (*ibid*, 1996). Most of the current reforms in the agricultural sector can be related to what was said about them in the Tanzania National agricultural policy (NAP)<sup>33</sup> of 1982. (Kiondo, 1992).

### **3.3.1 Agriculture**

Providing the major source of income for 80% of the population and contributing over 60% of exports. Agriculture is the most important economic sector in Tanzania, accounting for about half of the GDP (Engberg-Pedersen et al, 1996). In Tanzania agriculture is overwhelmingly

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<sup>32</sup> Trade liberalization arrangements whereby people with their own foreign currency were allowed to import goods and sell them at market determined prices.

<sup>33</sup> For example on land tenure the policy suggested that allocation for agriculture development should be in a long term basis with a minimum period of tenure being 33 years. It also suggested that land users should be provided with ownership title deeds, the policy also directed the government to “maintain an atmosphere of confidence and security in order to attract investment in agriculture” (URT 1982a:iv).

based on small peasant production. Any policy reforms in this sector have a great impact upon not only the national economy but also the livelihood of a major part of the population.

In agricultural sector liberalization, adjustments started with the aim of reducing both the scope of agricultural Parastatals activities. Prior to adjustment program virtually all agricultural marketing was monopolized by these corporations, they also accounted to varying proportions of production. By the early 1980s these rigid set of controls were not only reducing producer prices and services to producers, but also huge deficits at state owned banks (Pedersen et al 1996: 267).

### **3.3.2. Land and Land Tenure.**

Adjustment programs have also involved reforms in Land and land tenure. In Tanzania, the land formally held by settlers and some other land is held under formal right of occupancy, normally a 99 year lease. The remaining vast amount of land is held under the customary tenure, which comes from colonial transcriptions of “local custom” as recounted by the appointed chiefs, via a system of local courts and their decision (Raikes et al, 1996). Though formally equal, the customary tenure system has always been less secure than a formal right of occupancy, and particularly that of pastoralists have been more vulnerable (*ibid*: 268). The driving factor being that the administrators during and after independence regarded cropping as a more important form of agriculture, and thus tended to give preference to settlers proposing arable farming. Transfers for settlement schemes, state farms and ranches continued, and increased after independence (*ibid*).

Pointing out this alienation of land *Engberg-Pedersen et al* (1996: 268) observes that , “there have also been a number of cases where groups of people (notably pastoralists) have complained about alienations of land for “development” purposes, both public and private.” That *Homewood et al* (2004) studying the diversification and poverty at house level in Maasai areas of north Tanzania, points out that the large-scale privatization of Maasailand for both commercial and conservation purposes has placed a considerable constraint on the capacity of the rangelands to support pastoralism as a viable livelihood option (*Homewood et al*, 2004).

The adjustment program advocates for private land ownership; in the case of Tanzania the World Bank was of the opinion that “private registered property in land should be introduced

as soon as possible (Raikes et al, 1996:269), in the view that having titles would guarantee owners to access credit from Banks. As for the pastoral people whose livelihood is based upon common ownership of wide range lands for pasture and water, and sometimes shifting from place to place within these ranges. This ideology of individual property rights is quite a limitation to the pastoral production system. Experience with adjustment program in this respect have shown elsewhere in Africa that processing for an individual title is not only a bureaucratically long one and expensive, but also many of the people in rural areas cant afford it, “private land ownership does not seem to favor the fortune of villages or individual peasants” (Kiondo, 1992:37). In this regard it further exposes the rural people, notably Maasai pastoralists to their lands being bought off by other people with money. This further increases land dispossession. As *Raikes et al (1996)* points out on the increased pressure on Maasai peoples’ lands: “There are also been a number of cases of large scale alienation of Maasai grazing land, also in northern Tanzania” (Engberg-Pedersen et al, 1996:269). Remarking on the negative impact of the private ownership, that has been advocated by the structural reforms, *Kiondo (1992)* observes, “the reforms involving the land and tenure system have obviously benefited the private bourgeoisie investing in agriculture...Concentration of land in the class of few people” (Kiondo, 1992:37).

### **3.3.3 Livestock Herding**

Livestock herding is a very crucial component of agriculture in many parts of Tanzania. The donor and State policies and programs towards livestock herding, has been even more modernization-dominated than for crop production (Thompson et al 2002, Talle, 1999). With policies and programs mainly focused on costly attempts to set up ranches and dairy farms, of which most collapsed in the 1980s (Raikes et al, 1996).

With the liberalization of the agricultural sector and its components, livestock herding being one of these components, there has been increased opportunities for marketing farm and livestock products which in turn have led to high demand of land. This coupled with increased populations, has led to land shortages. “During the past fifty years under the stimulus of population increase many or most of Tanzania’s rural households have intensified their cultivation enormously” (*ibid*:298). This trend has led to encroachment of previous regarded as infertile lands for cultivation that have historically been occupied by pastoralists. Increased market opportunities for agricultural products, especially cereals that tend to grow

very well in the northern regional areas of Tanzania has been a factor that has increased pressure on Maasai pastoral lands.

In the agricultural sector, the adjustment programs have promoted crops production (Rakes et al, 1996). Even before the adjustment programs, pastoralism has been less favored<sup>34</sup> by the state's development programs compared to cropping activities (Talle, 1999). In this regard adjustment programs in the agricultural sector have further increased the pressure on Maasai lands. Because now investors in agricultural sector are guaranteed much more security to land ownership, as a measure to attract them as stipulated in the 1982 National Land Policy.

### **3. 4. Mining**

Formal mining sector provided a major source of government revenue in the 1950s, its share of the GDP was 10% (Raikes et al, 1996). With Nationalization in 1967, as a result of the Arusha Declaration, “a number of smaller foreign companies withdrew in 1967 to 72, leaving Williamson Diamond Limited since before Independence a joint venture between the State and De Beers”(ibid:274).

The mining sector both formal and informal has also been impacted upon by the structural adjustment programs. The informal mining sector, which dates back to the 1930s, utilizes very low levels of technology, but the industry has a highly organized internal structure (Chachage et al, 1993).The main beneficiaries are usually land lords or gemstone dealers have traditionally been the main beneficiaries owning claims and collect rent from the miners.

With the adjustment programs, in 1989 brought about the officiating of this long established and extremely intensive informal industry (ibid). This phenomenon has brought about two major changes in the Informal Mining Sector, firstly an increase in the registration and operation of new “large scale” companies, and secondly the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) official purchase of informally produced minerals especially gold. At around 70 percent of the World price. (*ibid*), As for the formal Mining Sector, the adjustment program has brought about a renewed interest in the country by large scale international companies to invest in the sector (ibid).

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<sup>34</sup> Based on the concept of the *tragedy of the commons* established by Garret Hardin and pressure from conservationists point of view towards the ecological foot print they believe pastoral activities cause to the environment.

The above factors have increased pressure on lands with mineral deposits all across the country, notably the range areas used by Maasai people in northern Tanzania have come under increasing demand, not only by local mineral entrepreneurs, but also by the external mining companies. The nature of pastoral life of using wide range areas has particularly been increasingly exposed to encroachment in this period. The increased pressure on land by entrepreneurs wishing to buy large chunks of land to become land lords, or dealers in mining in the informal mining sector, has not only increased struggle for land but also hostilities. “as a result the mining areas are probably the only parts of the country where there has been large scale hostility to adjustment programs” (Raikes et al, 1996:277).

### **3.5 Tourism**

Tanzania encompasses varied climates, diverse wildlife populations, and host of natural wonders including the snow capped Mt. Kilimanjaro, Africa’s tallest mountain, and the famed Ngorongoro Crater. Tanzania has one of the highest concentrations of biodiversity on the continent. Serengeti and kilimanjaro national parks, Ngorongoro Conservation are designated as World Heritage Sites by the UNESCO’s Convection for the Protection of World Culture and Heritage. All these are located in northern Tanzania, and particularly in Maasai traditional lands. Today, the majority of wildlife of Kenya and Tanzania is found within Maasai cross border belt, a continuous region comprising the southern part of Kenya and the northern part of Tanzania. The major protected areas in the Maasai cross border include Mt. Kilimanjaro, Mkomazi, Lake Natron, Ngorongoro, and Serengeti in Tanzania, and Tsavo, Amboseli, Lake natron and Maasai Mara protected areas in Kenya (Brockington, 2001). These National Parks also consists some of the world’s endangered animal and plant species (*ibid*). Since the time of British colonial administration, and after independence there has been various wildlife conservation initiatives, commonly known as “fences and fines model”. And Maasai pastoralists have been given partial access to these areas or excluded from them altogether and strict fines set for what is regarded as trespassing and illegal grazing. This has generated several conflicts among conservation interests and Maasai people (Anderson and Grove 1987, Bonner 1993, Brockington, 1999, MacCabe et al 1992, Neumann, 1995, West and Brechin 1991, Shivji et al, 1998 and Western 1997).

Maasai on both sides cross the border between the two countries regularly when grazing their animals; in fact very few Maasai people are aware of where the actual boarder line is located

(Brockington, 1999). Even though traditionally conservationists have been of the opinion that the Maasai way of life is harmful for the biodiversity, the Maasai way of life, and thus traditional conservation practices are have been shown to be indeed compatible with life conservation objectives (*ibid*), they have lived in harmony with nature and wildlife for hundreds of years.

Tourism is one of the major revenue earners for the State. Although government sanctioned hunting activities in Tanzania date back to the nineteenth century, the industry witnessed dramatic growth in the 1990s. This was after the government shifted from state controlled to market driven economic policies. According to the wildlife department of the Ministry of Tourism, for example between 1965 and 1989, there were only estimated 47 blocks set aside for hunting, between 1990 and 1997, the number increased to 140, nearly tripling in seven years. This signifies a sharp increase in hunting licenses. In Tanzania, wildlife tourism involves both viewing and hunting, but hunting is only allowed in some designated areas. In neighboring Kenya, it is only viewing tourism that is allowed, hunting of game is strictly forbidden. This difference has brought about an increased commercial hunting in the Maasai lands of Tanzania.

The National agricultural policy of 1982 (NAP) addresses the question of security of land ownership, “because private farmers in the past could easily lose their property to villages or government (Kiondo, 1992)”. The policy calls for land users to be issued with title deeds and increased length of tenure. But more specifically the article in the policy that requires the state to “...maintain an atmosphere of confidence and security in order to attract investment in agriculture” (URT, 1982a: iv 27). This transforming structures being the policies and laws agricultural sector, and particularly with regards to land and land tenure have has increased the value of land. Thus increased investment in cropping agriculture especially of cereals in the northern region of Tanzania. Also tourism especially in hunting, and other safari activities such as snake and crocodile parks, tourist lodgings etc have become very popular during this time. These activities together with increased populations have further increased the pressure on Maasai lands. As Carney (1998) points out “markets and legal restrictions have profound influence on the extent to which one asset can be converted into another type of asset” (Carney, 1998:9). This is indeed true, because with the adjustments programs, the land has now achieved higher values, that is market forces increasingly converts the natural capital, i.e. land into financial capital, now investors can access large bank loans to start up tourist

investments. But most of these investments run at the expense of the pastoral people's wide ranges and thus their means of livelihood.

### **3.6 Summary**

Indeed the adjustment programs have brought a significant pressure on Maasai lands. The policy changes especially in agriculture and its related components have resulted into increased security over land ownership hence increased value on land. The increased value on land has brought about an increased pressure on Maasai lands. This has in turn resulted into increased restrictions for the majority pastoral Maasai to access the range land resources for pasture and water. These changes threaten the pastoral production system and thus the livelihoods of the pastoral Maasai society.

## CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### 4.0 Introduction


In this chapter I try to situate my study of the changes of livelihoods of the Maasai pastoralists, brought about by economic reforms on the framework of the sustainable rural livelihoods (SRL). SRL identifies assets, capabilities and activities as the key components of any means of earning a living (DFID, 1997). Simply SRL is represented as such: Livelihoods=Assets +Capabilities + Activities. In this respect, gaining or losing assets represent a change in livelihoods. That is why it is important to look at the assets possessed by the migrant youths in the city, in efforts at understanding their coping mechanisms.

The Maasai are pastoral people. Their means of earning a livelihood traditionally depended upon communal ownership of wide range resources for pasture and water. Change of policies in land and land tenure have compromised pastoral property and generally jeopardized the pastoral economy (Ndagala 1992, 1990). These changes have triggered pressure on Maasai lands, or increased land squeezes. Many Maasai have found themselves in the margins of existence in such land squeezes (*ibid*). This has forced the pastoral Maasai to diversify livelihood strategies. Among these strategies, has been the out migration of Maasai youths to urban centers in search of other means of earning a livelihood.

Earning a livelihood in urban centers involves challenges and opportunities. The majority of Maasai youths lack formal education. Despite this handicap, they have skills in some traditional goods or practices that are potential for improving their livelihoods in these urban centers. Since these youths are absorbed into the informal sector, formal education is not a prerequisite for entry. Having arrived in a complete new context, and a new means of earning a livelihood, they capitalize on their traditional social and human capital in maneuvering their existence in the city. In this regard, the Maasai youths are loyal members of the *Oloip*, the Maasai social network in the city. This social network not only plays a significant role against urban insecurities, but it also enhances the maintenance of the Maasai youths identity in the city. Indeed, Portes (1998) defines social networks, interpersonal trusts and norms of reciprocity and mutuality as features of social capital that individuals can draw upon in earning a livelihood.

## 4.1 Overview of the theoretical framework

The SRL framework endeavors to improve the lives of the rural poor or the vulnerable. It views livelihood strategies in the light of available capital assets as well as the transforming structures and processes, and the vulnerability context of those capital assets. The framework shows that there is a close correlation between people's asset status, the resources upon which people can draw in the face of hardship.



Source: DFID guidance sheets.

### 4.1.1 Livelihood Assets and sustainable livelihoods

According to Ellis (2000:31), “assets may be defined as stocks of capital that can be utilized directly, or indirectly to generate the means of survival.” There are five different types of assets upon which individuals draw upon to build their livelihoods. These are natural capital, social capital human capital, physical capital and financial capital Scoones (1998). Natural capital refers to natural resources stocks<sup>35</sup> from which resource flows useful for livelihoods are derived. Social capital refers to social resources<sup>36</sup> upon which people draw in pursuit of their livelihoods (*ibid*). Human capital is the knowledge, ability to labor and good health important to the ability to pursue different livelihood strategies. This capital can be enhanced

<sup>35</sup> eg water, land, wildlife, biodiversity, environmental resources

<sup>36</sup> that is networks, membership of groups, relationships of trust, access to wider institutions of society

by investment in education and training. Physical capital refers to basic infrastructure;<sup>37</sup> it can enhance the capacity of people to access and utilize or enhance other capitals (Ellis, 2000). Financial capital refers to financial resources which are available to people<sup>38</sup> and which provide them with different livelihood options (*ibid*). The framework shows that there is a close correlation between people's asset status, the resources upon which people can draw in the face of hardship (Carney, 1998: 8).

A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living (*ibid*, 1998:4). A livelihood is sustainable "when it can cope with and recover from shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resources base"(*ibid*, 1998:4). This definition provides a far richer concept of livelihoods, one which unites economic development, reduced vulnerability and environmental sustainability, while building on the exiting strengths of poor people. In economic sense, the term livelihoods essentially refer to people's income and employment opportunities (Chambers, 1988). The later interpretation was adopted by the SRL committee (*ibid*).

#### **4.1.2 The Vulnerability contexts**

In the analysis of the livelihoods vulnerability context, the (SRL) framework looks into the trends of the quality and quantity of resources stock, population density, politics, particularly on how ethnic origins play a role in political representation, how economic trends affect livelihoods. It also looks into how the shocks due to climatic disasters and civil or resources conflicts affect livelihoods. Finally it looks whether culture have an effect if any on the livelihood choices that people make. This helps in explaining the vulnerability contexts upon Maasai livelihoods: increased populations of Maasai due to natural population growth have been growing at a rate of 2-3 percent per annum in the last couple of decades (Homewood et al, 1991). Economic trends can be explained by the impact of economic reforms upon Maasai livelihoods. These vulnerability contexts have had a significant impact on the natural resources stock. Political representation can also be viewed in the fact that pastoral production system forms a livelihood of the rural minority; the majority of rural Tanzanians are into sedentary agriculture (WB, 2000). This factor could have a significant impact upon political

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<sup>37</sup> eg transport, shelter, water, energy and communications and the production equipment

<sup>38</sup> whether savings, supplies of credit or regular remittances or pensions

representation. Politics and policies have compromised and generally jeopardized pastoral economy (Ole Kuney 1994, Ndagala 1992, 1999).

#### **4.1.3 Transforming Structures and processes**

The SRL defines *the Structures* as organisations ranging from layers of government through to the private sector in all its forms. It further regards the processes as the laws, policies, incentives and all rules of the game. According to the SRL, structures and processes impact upon livelihoods in two ways. In the sense that they are critical in determining both who gains access to which type of asset and what the effect value of that asset is. In conjunction with people's assets status, they help define which livelihood strategies or activities – natural resource based or otherwise are open and attractive (Carney, 1998).

Furthermore according to the SRL framework, markets and legal restrictions have a profound influence on the extent to which one asset can be converted into another type of asset (e.g. natural capital into financial capital or human capital into physical capital). This explains the increased pressure on Maasai communal lands by private investors. Land as a natural capital is increasingly being converted to financial capital. Title deeds and increased length of land tenure and other associated incentives in land and land tenure, have increased the value of land and thus its market. Title deeds provide a basis of collateral and thus facilitates access to loans from financial institutions.

Private ownership of land according to the structural reforms is highly encouraged (Raikes *et al*, 1996). This threatens the communal range ownership that the pastoral economy relies upon. Livelihoods of the Maasai pastoralists have been impacted upon by these structures and processes. Hence land as a natural resource based livelihood strategy is no longer an “open and attractive means of earning a livelihood” (DFID, 1997) for the majority Maasai. In reaction to these shocks, out migration becomes a livelihood strategy that is open and attractive. Those that are able to migrate out migrate, since migration is age sensitive. Fall (1998) observes that those who move tend to be young, physically fit and often better educated, that is they have higher levels of human capital. For the Maasai youths, it is predominantly the *morani* (warrior group) that out migrate. This age group is not only endowed with efficient warrior skills, but also a strong sense of unit and sharing amongst each other acquired from the traditional warrior initiations (Spear *et al*, 1993). Despite the fact that

most Maasai youths that out migrate have no formal education, they are endowed with traditionally acquired social and human capital.

The strong social and human capital inherent in Maasai culture are valuable capital assets that migrant Maasai youths make use of in their coping mechanisms in the city. In this respect, maintaining Maasai identity of cultural distinctiveness and a reputation of being efficient warriors, and their extensive knowledge in herbs, and their strong adherence to Maasai networks within the City are what they capitalise on and use as the core components of coping mechanisms. The myths held by the “ethnic other” towards the Maasai enhances the Maasai youth’s coping mechanisms in the multicultural city. These myths towards the Maasai are a blessing in disguise. For example, Maasai herbs are regarded as the most potent and medicine man looked upon as being knowledgeable in traditional pharmaceutics. Also most people would rather hire a Maasai youth as a night watchman. These myths not only play a major role in night watch man employment recruiting process, but also in the flourishing Maasai herbal business in most urban areas of Tanzania. Having no formal education and involved in the high risk night watchman job, they further rely more on Maasai social networks in the urban areas as a safety net against urban insecurities. This convertibility of one capital to the other, in this case human and social capital to financial capital is according to the SRL framework, “a positive aspect which should be natured as it increases the options available to people who are striving to improve their livelihoods and withstand shocks and stresses (Carney, 1998:4).

## **4.2 Livelihood Diversification**

Ellis (2000) defines rural livelihood diversification as the process by which rural households construct an increasingly diverse portfolio of activities and assets in order to survive and to improve their standard of living. In rural communities, it includes both on- and off-farm activities undertaken to generate income (i.e. monetary and non-monetary contributions to household consumption) additional to that from the main household agricultural activities. Diversification of livelihoods in rural areas of most developing countries occurs for many reasons: Farm fragmentation, rural population growth, and declining returns from farming compared to other activities (Ellis, 1998). Nowadays farming in many low income countries rarely provide sufficient means for survival. This has made it necessary for the traditional rural production systems, such as crop farming and livestock keeping, to be supplemented by

other activities for income generation. Studies show that between 30 and 50 percent of rural household income in sub Saharan Africa is typically derived from non farm sources. In some regions e.g. southern Africa, this can reach 80 – 90 percent (*ibid*).

The encyclopedia of world poverty s-z (2006) on diversification and migration, mentions three types of vulnerability. These are vulnerability to globalization, disease and environmental change that ultimately forces the affected party finding itself needed to migrate, “to other areas in which traditional ways of life can no longer be sustained clearly” (Encyclopedia of World Poverty s-z, 2006:1140) and thus diversify their livelihoods. It further points out that the poor and wealthy are affected differently, because the more able economically will be able to avoid the health or life threatening problems that affect them than will the poor. Hence around the world the poor and those with low incomes are the most vulnerable to environmental change and will suffer from it (*ibid*).

Ellis (2000) gives a basic division of income sources as natural resource based activities, and non natural based activities or income sources. The former include collection or gathering food cultivation, non food cultivation (e.g. export crops), livestock keeping, pastoralism, and non farm activities, and so on. The later include rural trade (marketing of inputs and outputs), other rural services (e.g. vehicle repair), rural manufacture, remittances (urban and international), and other transfers, such as pensions deriving from past formal sector employment (*ibid*).

Off farm Income typically refers to wage or exchange labor on other farms (i.e. within agriculture). It may also include, although classifications sometimes differ in this respect, income obtained from local environmental resources such as fire wood, charcoal, house building materials, wild animal, wild plants, and so on.

#### **4.3 Migration: a Way of Diversifying Livelihoods**

Stark (1991) points out migration to be one of the most important methods of diversifying rural livelihoods, and that it takes several different forms (Stark, 1991). Migration can be defined as movement of people from one place to another resulting in change of residence for some period. Migration can be classified on the criteria of duration, volume, geographical range and inherent characteristic of the migrant (Afsar, 2000). Ellis (1998) defines migration as a process whereby, “one or more family members leave the resident household for

varying periods of time, and in so doing are able to make new and different contributions to its well being (although such contributions are not guaranteed by mere facts of migration” (Ellis, 1998: 55). Some different types of migration as described briefly by Ellis (1998) are as follows:

#### **4.3.1 Types of Migration**

##### **Seasonal migration**

This refers to temporary migration according to agricultural season. It is typically associated with movement away in the slack season and the return of migrants for the peak periods of labour input in the agricultural calendar (mainly land preparation and harvesting).

##### **Circular migration**

This refers to temporary migration that is not necessarily tied to seasonal factors to agriculture , and that may be for a varying durations (sometimes dictated by cyclical needs for labor in non farm labor markets ). Circular migration implies that migrants routinely return to the resident household and regard that as their principal place of domicile, in other words, they do not set up permanent living arrangements in the places they go for temporary work.

##### **Permanent Migration (Rural –Urban)**

This implies that the family makes a long duration move to a different location, typically on urban area or a capital city, and sets up domicile at destination. In this instance the contribution to the rural resident household takes the form of regular or intermittent remittances back home. Clearly the capability to remit depends on the type and security of the livelihood of the migrant in the urban environment.

##### **International Migration**

The family member moves either temporally or permanently abroad. There are many different variants of international migration corresponding to the distance traveled , the permanence of the movement, the type of work obtained in the destination country, and so on.

#### **4.4 Approaches to Understanding Migration**

Various disciplines ask different questions, look at different levels of analysis and use various approaches to the study of migration (Brettel, 2000:3-7). In general terms anthropologists,

look at context specific kin networks and transnational communities, and engaged in cross cultural comparisons, sociologists and economists concentrate on effects of social and human capital, settlement and incorporation. Historians examine the complex experience seeking understanding of hopes and ambitions of migrants.

#### **4.4.1 Anthropology and Migration**

Anthropology asks questions as; how does migration affect cultural change and ethnicity. Migration was frequently linked to urbanization and development (Brettel 2000:119n2). Economic factors alone cannot predict movements, anthropologists insist on social and cultural contexts (ibid: 6). Anthropologists also look at formations and process of networks and transnational communities. There is an anthropological focus an experience and meaning to migrants, and socio cultural changes that result, as well as social relations in both sending and receiving societies, ethnic identity, its construction and symbolic makers, the importance social relations and networks, and behavior (ibid:5,6)

Anthropologists have used two distinct analytical approaches to study migration, one rooted in the linier development model of modernization theory, with its bipolarization of the sending and receiving areas, The bright lights theory (Du Tort, 1990, Gulliver 1957), This model was accompanied by the notion that success at the urban side would ultimately mean, “elimination of differences between rural agrarian and urban industrial area.” That is, migrants as “agents of change” would help equalize town and country through migrants’ contribution.

#### **4.4.2 Earlier Studies on Migration**

Much of the available literature on migration is based on the concept of push and pull factors. This is a traditional model that has been used to study migration. When conditions in the homeland become intolerable an individual or family may be compelled to leave. This illustrates a push factor. The individual or family “pushed” from their homeland will choose a place to relocate that has some redeeming value and is judged to be superior to the original homeland (Encyclopedia of World Poverty H-R, 2006).This illustrates a pull factor-something positive is expected in the new location. Virtually all migrations involve both push and pull factors. Further, three types of push and pull factors have been identified. They are economic, cultural and environmental (ibid). The economic factors are easy to understand. National and

transnational migrations, moving to a region where there is the prospect of employment and a better way of life has occurred for centuries (McDowell et al, 1997, Chambers, 1988).

Other authors argue that the decomposition of rural society results much more in a push to the City rather than any “bright lights” pull towards towns (Castells, 1977: 46). The literature on migration patterns in Africa, focuses on tribal survival, emphasizing on “circular pattern” which proposed that people move back and forth from urban labour employment, and from time to time returning to their rural areas with gifts and cash remittances (Rain, 1999).

The Environmental push factors are especially evident in sub Saharan Africa because of perennial land degradation resulting from decades of desertification. Millions of people from the Sahel region have relocated to places where opportunities for better life are possible (Word Encyclopedia of poverty H-R, 2006)

Waller (1985) reveals that prior to colonization in east Africa, for instance, groups were fluid and labor was interchanged between and among various social and kin networks. Rural to urban migration has taken place over long periods of time and continues within these populations (McDowell et al, 1997). Most migration occurs within national borders, and in recent decades, rural to urban flows of sahilian migrants have quadruped urban populations (*ibid*). This study considers migration as a livelihood diversification strategy due to the capital assets in the rural areas being exposed to vulnerability because of the previous mentioned reasons.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

### **5.0 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter analyses and presents research findings. The voices of Maasai youths narrations are also presented to verify these findings. It starts by presenting the general characteristics of Maasai migrant youth respondents. I looked into the livelihood strategies of these youths and problems they face. How they draw upon their inherent traditional practices to face challenges and opportunities in their struggles to earn a living in the urban areas.

The chapter is structured as such: While section I looks into social demographic characteristics of the Maasai youths. Section II is on the specifics of the coping mechanisms as well as the challenges and opportunities in earning a livelihood in the city.

### **SECTION 1**

#### **5.1 Social Demographic Characteristics**

This section presents the distribution of Maasai youth respondents by age, marital status, education, reason of migration, intention to return home and by having multiple jobs.

##### **5.1.1 Age Distribution**

The age plays a significant role in the migration processes, certain age intervals give an idea if a youth is within a migration cohort or not. It could also give us an idea on the responsibilities, since it could also determine if the respondent is in the marriage cohort, or not. But for the Maasai people this factor is to be looked at with extra care, due to the fact that life of a Maasai male is centered on a very sophisticated age system. Ranging from initiation, warrior hood to various stages of elder hood.<sup>39</sup> and its associated responsibilities. Due to this most Maasai youth marry at a later age. Indeed Literature on migration models discuss young unmarried men as the most frequent cohort to migrate out (Oberai 1986, Fall, 1998).


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<sup>39</sup> Most Maasai youth migrants are in the warrior group, and many aspire building up a significant herd of their own before they leave the warrior age group roughly after the age of thirty.

**Table 1: Age Distribution of Maasai Youth Respondents**

Age Group	Absolute Figure	Percentage (%)
19-24	7	46.7
25-29	3	20
30-34	3	20
35-39	2	13.3
Total	15	100

Source Field Survey, 2006



The youngest migrant Maasai youth was 19 years and the oldest was 37 years. Migration is an age selective process. As from the sample; the age with the highest frequency is 21-25.

The graph shows that the migrant's tendency to move to the city increased significantly between the ages of 19 and the early 20s, by the mid 30s the tendency to migrate starts declining slowly. Indeed, Oberai (1986), Fall, (1998) observe that the mobility of migrants decline at the age of about 34 years. (Oberai 1986, Fall, 1998). Often above the age of 35 years migrants have established families and some property at rural home and have less desire to move to urban areas.

### **5.1.2 Marital Status**

*"Maasai girls marry at a quite young age. But it is common that males don't marry till after the age of thirty, this is the time when they are initiated into elders. Most of the Maasai youths you see married at younger ages is because their parents marry them off before they come to the city. This is a tactic by the parents to make them leave families back home, so that they don't get lost in the city and never return home".(Eliza, 42 years, Maasai woman herbs and decorated beads seller, June 2006).*

**Table 2: Marital Status of Respondents.**

<i>Marital Status</i>	<i>Absolute Figure</i>	<i>Percentage (%)</i>
married	6	40
Unmarried	9	60
Total	15	100

Source: field data 2006

The sample shows that the number of single migrant youths exceeds that of the married youths. This can be attributed to the fact that those who have already established families and may be some property in rural areas have less desire to migrate. Another reason is that unmarried youth are struggling hard to earn money to establish the herd of their own. In Maasai culture, cattle in addition to being a measure of wealth, it is also a means of transaction. In Maasai society marriage is an obligatory social norm, and before marriage is realised one has to pay a bride price measured in terms of cows. Andersen et al (1999) observes that in Maasai society, "possession of livestock or its lack could be a mark of inclusion or exclusion" (Anderson et al, 1999: 23). An example expressing pride of a self owned herd among the Maasai youth is revealed by Elibariki;

*"I first came to Dar es Salaam city in October 2004; I worked till May 2005 then went home, I stayed home till September 2005. Upon my return home I had enough money to buy more cows and prepare my fields of beans and maize. Today I own ten cows. When I am in the city my mother and father take care of my livestock. I hope that by the time I marry my herd shall have grown considerably."(Voice of Elibariki, age 22 years. 5<sup>th</sup> July 2006)*

### **5.1.3 Education Background**

Formal Education forms an important aspect of human capital. This capital can be enhanced by investment in education and training (Ellis, 2000). Education plays a significant role in equipping an individual with skills like being able to read and write, as well as enhancing the

ability to seek information. One's skills and qualifications attained through formal education, are a basis for admission into white collar jobs of the formal sector. This sector is regulated and has assured pensions and wages.

In the informal sector, formal education is not a basis for entry. The informal sector is usually survival orientated, hence often requires multiple jobs to minimize risks. Also this sector has broad avenues for entry and exit, has low initial capital requirement to set up an enterprise and covers a wide range of small enterprises ranging from petty trading and street merchants to home based enterprises (Mackdonald, 1999). In this respect most Maasai youth migrants are absorbed in the informal sector. Despite the fact that they lack the formal education aspect of human capital, but they are endowed with other aspects of human capital attained through traditional initiations. It is these assets that they utilize to eke out a living in the city. Indeed, as Ellis (2000) observes, despite the fierce labor competition in urban areas, the people from rural areas also have skills in some traditional goods which have potential for improving their livelihoods.

**Table 3: Educational Background of Respondents.**

The following table shows the proportion of migrant youth with formal education, and those without formal education.

<i>Status</i>	<i>Absolute Figure</i>	<i>Percentage (%)</i>
Formal education	5	33.3
No formal education	10	66.7
Total	15	100

Source: field data 2006

The percentage of youths with no formal education exceeds the ones with formal education. This could be a result of several factors, among them the nature of the pastoral economy that necessitates constant migration in search of pasture and water. Nevertheless, the State's education policy before the adjustment program was that every Tanzanian should have access to free education. Tough laws were introduced for those trying not to enroll their children in school. The major reason for the occurrence of large percent of illiterate Maasai youths could be the introduction of user fees on social services such as education during the adjustment

period. This is revealed in the fact that most of the youths with no formal education were born during the structural adjustment period.

As pointed out earlier, the informal sector has broad avenues for entry and exit. Also, formal education is not a prerequisite for entry in the informal sector. In this respect, most Maasai youth migrants are absorbed into the informal sector. Despite the fact that they lack the formal education aspect of human capital, they are equally endowed through initiations. It is these assets that they utilize to eke out a living in the City. Indeed, as Ellis (2000) observes, despite the fierce labour competition in urban areas, people from rural areas also have skills in some traditional goods which have potential for improving their livelihoods.

But in the City, the lack of formal education can also be a serious liability in the labor market. For example, Lucas Thomas (24 years), who works as a night watchman and a Maasai hairstylist observed;

*"I have several esteemed female customers who are employed in government offices coming to me to do their hair. I once did a customer's hair perfectly well; she was so impressed, that she told me that If I could have been able to read and write she would have found me a job as an assistant watchman in a government office". (Voice of Lucas Thomas 25, years, 4th July 2006)*

Many of my informants told me how they wished that they could one day be able to read and write. This indicated that many of these youths regarded the lack of formal education as an obstacle to meeting some of their aspirations. Lucas clearly voices dissatisfaction with his inability to read and write, and how it stands as a limitation for him to get a job in the formal sector. Literally meaning increased job security, because of a written contract, and other social security services mostly associated with employment in formal sector such as retirement benefits, allowances etc. This answers the research question: How do they cope with life in the city. That is they fit in easily within the informal sector, because formal education is not a prerequisite for entry, but this handicap limits their coping mechanisms to some considerable extent.

#### **5.1.4 Reason of Migration**

The structural reforms have brought about a decreased capacity of range lands to sustain the pastoral production system. These changes have had a major impact upon the traditional means of earning a living for the Maasai people. In reaction to shocks upon their means of earning a living, migration has become one of the most important livelihoods diversification strategies (Ellis 2000, Oberai, 1986).

**Table 4: Respondents by Reason of Migration.**

The following table shows the proportion of migrant youths who moved to find employment opportunities and those who moved for any other reason.

<i>Reason of migration</i>	<i>Absolute Figure</i>	<i>Percentage (%)</i>
Economic (search for a job)	13	86.7
Non Economic Reasons	2	13.3
Total	15	100

Source: field data 2006

\*Non Economic Reasons (might be education, peer influence, blight lights)

Economic (own decision, influenced by a friend or close relative)

The higher percentage of economic as a major reason for migration confirms that a large number of rural urban migrants are motivated by higher urban wages. In this respect, they “tend to move to places where they are likely to find employment opportunities (Tacoli, 1992:22). This further confirms to Tacoli’s work on rural urban- linkages and sustainable livelihoods; that with the changes in means of earning a livelihood in the rural areas, migration becomes an important element of diversifying livelihood strategies (*ibid*, 25). The two respondents stated that they had come to the city to visit friends for a short time, and whilst they were in the city, news on employment opportunities came to them through their friends. The news was that a new timber yard was opening and needed Maasai youth night security personnel. These respondents told me that because the jobs were good paying, they decided to stay and take the jobs. Ever since that time, they have been returning home once a year to visit..

An example indicating that the major reason for migration was economic is expressed by Moring (19 years):

*“Youths that had migrated to urban areas in the late 90s, upon their return home to visit they bought more cows, goats, improved their huts and ploughed their fields. Their lives improved tremendously, I needed money to buy cows and goats. This was the main driving force for me to come to this City”. (Voice of Moringe, 19 years, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2006, narrating his reasons of coming to the city)*

A study in Kenya published by the international labor Organization (ILO) suggests that migrants are motivated by higher urban wage formal jobs, but also due to income opportunity in informal sector which the migrant can enter without much barrier Oberai, (1986). Niamir, (1990) in his work on the natural resources management and labour among the pastoral societies of east Africa, in the case of Tanzanian pastoralists, showed that the decrease of labor in the range was a result of the influence of market economy, modern education and influence of wage labour. This confirms the major reasons of migration as voiced by the Maasai youths, but with the exception of the search for modern education, a reason that none of my informants referred to as a push factor.

Economic reasons were the major reason for migration. The search for money to buy cows and prepare *shambas*<sup>40</sup> was the major voiced reason by the majority respondents. There were a few who pointed out drought, and most “had connections to urban based networks” (Tacoli,1992:23).The decision to migrate was reached on a free will after seeing the improvement in the lives of their fellow youths that had migrated into urban centers. This answers the research question; why did they migrate, was it based on their own free will or forced one?

## **5.2 Summary**

This section has presented the major characteristics of the surveyed Maasai youth migrants. It has shown that, with the changes in means of earning livelihoods, migration becomes an important element of diversifying livelihoods. And that migration is an age selective process, with the majority migrant youths of age ranges of early 20s to mid 30s dominating migration streams. After the age of 35, the mobility of migrants decline. The major reason for migration was economic. Most of the migrant Maasai youths lack formal education; hence these youths are absorbed in the informal sector. This is because in this sector, formal

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<sup>40</sup> Swahili word for fields.

education is not a basis for entry. Maasai youths enter jobs in the informal sector that are traces of their traditional practices.

## **Section II: Working and Living in Urban Centers**

### **5.1.5 Occupation**

*“Apart from working as a watchman, I also work as an hairdresser. Sometimes I earn an extra income from guarding cars for people who park for short periods in various places in the city centre. Even though I can’t read nor write nobody can cheat me on money. I make sure all my customers pay me accordingly”. (Voice of Samuel, 25 years, narrating his coping mechanisms in the city, 4<sup>th</sup> July 2007)*

Employment in the informal sector requires one to hold multiple jobs in order to minimize risks, because this sector lacks assured wages and other social security benefits. The sector has fluid avenues for entry and exit, and usually requires little or no capital to set up.

**Table 5: Respondents by Occupational Combination**

The following table shows the proportion of migrant youths who were involved in a single or occupational combination at the time of survey.

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Absolute Figure</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Exclusively Night guarding	4	26.7
Combination of either Herbal business, Maasai hair style, or Other	11	73.3
Total	15	100

Source: field data 2006

The results indicate that 73.3 percent of the Maasai migrant youths were engaged in occupational combination, these jobs were such as selling herbs, decorated beads and doing Maasai hairstyles. The larger percentage of youths involved in occupational combination confirms the fluidity of the informal sector. It also reveals the necessity of occupational combinations to spread risk required in the informal sector.

26.7 percent were having single jobs at the time of survey. These were usually working as security guards for small commercial enterprises, such as timber yards, garages, and construction sites. The nature of work required their presence also during the day, and were usually provided with meals at their work places, also they had some days off during the week. The Maasai youths who worked as night watchmen in residential houses, usually were there only during the night. Hence could combine this job with other survival activities say doing Maasai hairstyles. There was one exceptional case whereby one Maasai youth also employed two non Maasai youths to hawk black coffee and *kashata*<sup>41</sup> along the streets of Dar es Salaam. He took the profit every evening, after paying the coffee boys and buying the recipes for the following day. He also received a profit monthly from the charcoal dealer. This is a share of the amount he invested every month when the charcoal dealer goes to rural areas to buy charcoal. It was amazing because the total monthly earnings of this Maasai youth exceeded by far the minimum wages of a civil servant. Youth migrants who practiced occupational combination had a possibility of maximizing their earnings. So they had a better financial position, and so was the reduced level of risks as voiced by Daudi;

*“Surviving in this city depending just on one source of income is never easy; one has to develop some other coping mechanisms. Apart from working as a night security guard. I also work as a Maasai hair stylist, I get at least two customers a month, occasionally I sell herbs” (Voice of Daudi, 30 years narrating his reasons of having multiple jobs, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2006).*

This answers the research question: What are their means of earning a living in these urban centers? The large number of respondents with multiple jobs provides an indication of the nature of coping mechanisms in the informal sector; that is they need to have multiple jobs to spread risk. The job categories also indicates that Maasai youths enter into jobs that are traces of their traditional cultural practices.

#### **5.1.6 Intention to Return Home**

*“I came to the city to save money so as to have a better life back home. Otherwise I never ever would have come to the city. I become so home sick on several occasions. I will definitely go home for good when I have achieved some of my aspirations.”(Voice of Elibariki 22 years, narrating of his future plans and aspirations)*

The above voice is one but a representative of many other voices of Maasai youths, expressing their intention of returning home. All of my respondents unanimously expressed a

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<sup>41</sup> A snack first introduced by early Arab settlers. It is made from coconut and sugar, commonly taken with strong black coffee with no sugar, a very popular beverage along the coastal areas of east Africa.

deep desire to return to rural home some day. According to Stark (1991), migrants with an intention to return home may have self interest motive to remit. They may send a remittance to invest in farmland, business or livestock. As for these youths every saving they make in urban areas goes into increasing and taking care of the livestock herd back home. The circular nature of Maasai youths migration, also proves the intention of these youths to return home. Ellis (1992) defines circular migration as the one whereby, “migrants routinely return to the resident household and regard it as their principle place of domicile and do not set permanent living arrangements in the places they go for temporary work” (Ellis, 1992:14). The intention to return home is further exemplified by a distaste of urban life expressed by these youths, even though it has several opportunities compared to rural areas.

*“I don’t like life in the city, everything is monetarised. I have never dreamt of staying here permanently. My heart is in Maasailand, that’s where I belong, it is tribulations geared by the lack of money that brought me to the city, I miss my family and livestock...”* (Voice of James Moses, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2006)

## **5.2 Summary**

This section has presented the major characteristics of the surveyed Maasai youth migrants. It has shown that, with the changes in means of earning livelihoods, migration becomes an important element of diversifying livelihoods. And that migration is an age selective process, with the majority migrant youths of the age ranges of early 20s to mid 30s dominating migration streams. After the age of 35 the mobility of migrants decline. The major reason for migration was economical. Most of the migrant Maasai youths lack formal education; hence these youths are absorbed in the informal sector. This is because in this sector, formal education is not a basis for entry. Maasai youths enter jobs in the informal sector that are traces of their traditional cultural practices. Occupational combinations are a necessity in the informal sector to minimize risks. In these occupational combinations, Maasai youths utilize the human capital attained through traditional initiations.

## **Section B: Working and Living in Urban Centers**

### **5.3 Income Generating Activities**

Maasai youths as opposed to other youths with different ethnic backgrounds involved in the informal sector, usually enter into specific culture linked Informal activities. These activities are such as the selling of herbs, which is the sector that the ethnic other view the Maasai

people as having an unquestionable expertise in. Other informal activities are such as braiding Maasai hair styles, that Maasai youth have excellent expertise, also a very sought after expertise by several women in the city. My informant's customer told me that an hair do done by the Maasai is long lasting and hence results into a considerable saving of time and money. For this reason Maasai youths are in great demand when it comes to doing this particular hair style. Maasai youths are also largely engaged in working as security guards, this range from guarding residential houses, buildings under construction to small commercial buildings such as shops, hotels and restaurants.

The informal sector in urban Tanzania covers a wide range of activities. The commonly seen scene is usually characterized by youths from diverse backgrounds working as porters at bus or train stations or market places, construction sites, water vending, a lucrative enterprise in several areas in the city due to unreliable supply of potable water, or hawkers of various merchandise, etc. Hawkers usually conduct their activities at specific locations or roaming all day long in several parts of urban centers in search for customers. Maasai youths as opposed from other youths from other ethnic backgrounds, retain and enter into jobs closely connected to their culture and traditions. For example, the traditional Maasai morani (warrior) and their unquestionable competences when it comes to herbal knowledge. There was however an exception from one of my informers, in addition to working as a security guard, he also employed two coffee vendors and had invested in a charcoal; dealer's business.

### **5.3.1 Selling Herbal Medicine**

The sale of Maasai herbs is one of the most thriving enterprises in the informal sector in many urban areas in Tanzania. The Maasai people are noted for their skills in traditional herbal medicine. Maasai youths draw upon this "myth" or perceived skills to cope with life outside their homelands. These youths operate herbal businesses at specific locations in the city, usually close to market places, open spaces, tec. In such places, several Maasai would be found; each displaying what their herbs can cure. Usually the names of a number of diseases they claim to treat, typed and framed, adorn the frontage of the neatly arranged bottles of herbal medicine. A very enterprising way of marketing one's merchandise to catch the sight of a passer's by. The diseases they claim their herbs to cure range from headaches to as complex as heart related problems. I experienced quite a good number of people frequenting the Maasai herbal "clinics". This popularity could be explained by the introduced user fees on

social services such as health under the adjustment programs, and the increasingly rising costs of modern medicine.

**Table 5: Informants by Income Generating Activities**

Informant	Herbal Medicine	Security Guard	Hair Styling	Other
Thomas		x		x
James		x	x	
Osiek		x		
Jackson		x		
Lucas (N)	x	x		
Lucas (T)	x	x		
Samuel (T)	x	x		
Elibariki	x	x		
Saruni	x	x		
Moringe	x		x	
Simon		x		
Baraka		x	x	
Daudi	x	x	x	
Paul		x	x	
Samuel (M)		x	x	

**Source:** field Survey 2006

### 5.3.2 Hair Plaiting

This is yet another type of enterprise that absorbs a larger number of Maasai youths. From my observation is that one customer is usually attended by 4 or 5 youths, and the duration could last up to 3 hours, and would cost around 15, 000 to 20,000 Tshs<sup>42</sup>. The style involves the braiding of air with strands of synthetic fiber , Maasai youth are particularly well skilled in this field, because during their warrior hood, this spectacular hairdo is part of identifying a *moran* hence many learn how to do it

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<sup>42</sup> 1 US dollar is approximately 1, 000 Tanzania shillings

### **5.3.3 Security Guards/watchmen**

Maasai youths have managed to secure jobs as security guards due to myths held by non Maasai towards the Maasai. Non Maasai perceive the Maasai youths as having excellent fighting skills acquired through traditional warrior initiations. These myths make Maasai youths in high demand as security guards. Some of my informants are paid daily. Some weekly and others are paid monthly. It was only three of my informants who had written documents from their employers showing that they are employed. Others were on what can simply be described as face to face understanding form of contract.

## **5.5 Informal Sector and Urbanisation**

The informal sector in urban Tanzania involves a countless of mostly survival activities. It is flexible in the sense that it usually needs a little or no capital at all to set up. The informal sector is also sometimes referred to as “second economy”, and has grown dramatically during the adjustment<sup>43</sup> period (Maliakono et al 1990, Sarris et al, 1993, Trip, 1997). Vuorela (1992) in an extensive study of the informal sector in Dar es Salaam during 1986 and 1987, indicated that “more than three quarters of informal activities were started between 1980 and 1987 a period of economic crisis and liberalization” (Vuorela, 1992: 114).

The majority of work force in the informal sector in Tanzania’s urban centers is formed by youths, commonly termed as *Machinga*<sup>44</sup>. Despite their visibility in one sense, however these youth migrants from various ethnic backgrounds are “invisibly” employed in the informal sector, receiving almost nothing in a way of benefits, social services, or protection under the law. Advocates for their hasty return to the countryside are vocal among both the citizens and authorities. (Maliakono et al, 1990, Sarris et al, 1993.). Despite the fact that these youths have an immense contribution to the growth of the national economy, however this contribution is hardly accounted for. This is because the Growth Domestic Product (GDP)<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> With Public sector reforms under the adjustment period, much of the civil servants have been laid off, and most of these have turned to the informal sector for earning a livelihood.

<sup>44</sup> Machinga refers to an ethnic group from the south of Tanzania, originally from the Republic of Mozambique that historically migrated to the then colonial capital City of Dar es Salaam and were famous as vendors and hawkers, and during the colonial times they were largely employed as house servants, because of their reputation of being efficient house servants. Today the term has grown to mean all youths migrating to the urban areas and are employed in the informal sector.

<sup>45</sup> The fact that GDP estimates misses out a large proportion of “informal” activities in Tanzania, leading to underestimation of the GDP values has also been pointed out by Tanzanian scholars Maliakono and Bagachwa (1990). Also Sarris and Van den Brink (1993)

values are measured in terms of the formal goods and services produced domestically. This is a paradox in the validity of the GDP values as a true representation of the national economic growth, because the majority of people in the urban areas in Tanzania are self employed.

Cities and Urban areas attract people and have always been engines of economic growth and centers of opportunity (UNCHS, 1996, Short 2006). Viewed in that sense then, the city is more than an abstract space for anonymous economic transactions. It is the place where people make a living. High urbanization is a major challenge to most African cities (UNCHS, 1996). Tanzania's cities like many other Cities in sub-Saharan Africa experiences a high rural to urban migration. In fact Tanzania's rate of urban growth is one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa (Kyessi, 2002). Indeed, several scholars on urbanization have predicted rapid urban growth to continue in Tanzania particularly impacting the informal sector (Becker et al 1994, Ishumi 1984, Lugalla 1995).

Furthermore, scholars writing on migration and urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa have pointed out that the increasingly arrival of large migrants in the City nevertheless make claim on existing and usually already overburdened resources of the city for social services like health, education, housing and land. The difference can also be seen in terms of marginal locations the majority migrants occupy. Having arrived without monetary resources in the city whose infrastructure is already overtaxed, slums are the final destination of many urban migrants. Most living in extremely marginal conditions, (Kyessi 2002, Oberai, 1986). High rural urban migration can also lead to mushrooming of slums, sometimes referred to as squatter settlements and deviant behaviors like theft.

Increased urbanization has a significant impact upon the informal sector. It increases opportunities viewed in terms of expansion of Cities on one hand, and emergence of new niches of self employment on the other. But it is also increases challenges and insecurities for the majority.

#### **5.4 Urban Insecurities**

Youths in Dar es Salaam as it is in other urban centers of Tanzania apply countless coping strategies to survive in the informal sector. This is reflected in the nick name of the Capital

city Dar es Salaam, “*bongo*” literally meaning to survive; one has to use his or her brain properly well. Waage (2006), in his study of the coping mechanisms of urban migrant youths with various ethnic backgrounds in an urban area in northern Cameroon, points out that “the coping strategies may appear to be flexible, creative, traditional, limited by ideals of respectability and characterized by trickery” (Waage, 2006:63).

Remarking on the existence of insecurities in the urban informal sector, Samuel (25 years) had this to say:

*“I was cheated once by a person posing as a job recruiting agent in the first few weeks after I arrived in the City. After I gave him half of monthly salary, and a passport size photo, in the hope of getting a better paying job, he disappeared, and I have never seen him again. Ever since, I am always alert in whatever I do. Even though I can't read nor write, nobody can cheat me on money. I make sure that all my customers pay me accordingly..(Samuel 25 years. 15<sup>th</sup> June 2006)*

Various scholars writing on how youth employ various strategies to find a better life in the urban areas, have remarked that youth in Africa have been characterized in negative and highly generalized terms as a problem: they are marginalized, disempowered, and reduced to the status of an underclass; in fact they are a lost generation (Sarris et al, 1993, Maliamkono et al, 1990, Nzioka, 1991). This argument is witnessed by the frequent report from the media on the confrontations between the city authorities and the informal sector workers commonly referred to as street hawkers and vendors from different cities across Africa and Dar es salaam City is not an exception to this phenomenon. During these confrontations, much of the merchandise of these youths is lost either through confiscations or being destroyed, also they are often arrested and fined. Also taking into consideration the fact that much of the activities in the informal sector are not insured, this also creates a major challenge on its own. Strong voices mostly from the city authorities frequently advocates for their hasty return to their rural homes and sometimes forcibly repatriating them to their rural villages. This point of view is spearheaded by the fact that in most cities in east Africa, youths engaged in survival activities such street hawking and vending are largely regarded by many as jobless people and loiterers.

Stereotyping youth migrants is yet another factor that further exposes them to insecurities, in their coping mechanisms in urban areas. Manger et al, (2006), holds that, general attitudes towards migrants are often largely negative or dismissive, and this hold potential to hurt them (Manger et al, 2006). Some urban Citizens perceive Maasai with fear, due to their epic of

fierceness and also strangers and country bumpkins, “backward” “uncivilized” and out of place in the City (Stephen 1995). Lewinson (2003), in her work on Dar es Salaam and nation culture in cartoons observes, “for many urban Tanzanians one ethnic group, the Maasai embodies cultural conservatism and resistance to modernity” (Lewinson, 2003: 21). This observation indicates that Maasai youths in the City are viewed by many as the “other,” people out of place and strangers in the City.

## **5.6 Managing/Surviving Urban Insecurities**

Maasai youths apply various strategies to manage urban insecurities. These strategies are such as occupational combination, being active members of the Maasai social network, the Oloip, and management of Maasai identity.

### **5.6.1 Occupational Combination**

The informal sector lacks assured wages and pensions. In this respect occupational combination plays a major role in spreading these insecurities. The Encyclopedia of World Poverty, describe people who are vulnerable as those who, while not facing immediate problems, may do so in a very short notice, Examples of vulnerable people “include those reliant upon obtaining daily employment who if, they cannot find work, cannot afford food or housing; or are reliant on single, variable source of income. Such as market vendors of commodities” (Encyclopedia of World Poverty Volume3 s-z 2006:1140). Maasai youths combine occupations to diversify their sources of income and minimize risks associated with employment in the informal sector.

**Table 6: Respondents by Occupational; Combination**

The following table shows the proportion of migrant youths who were involved in a single or occupational combination at the time of survey.

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Absolute figure</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Exclusively Night Guarding	4	26.7
Combination of either Herbal Business, Maasai Hair Style, or Other	11	73.3
Total	15	100

**Source:** field survey, 2006

The results indicate that 73.3 percent of Maasai migrant youths were engaged in occupational combination, these jobs were such as herbs, decorated beads and doing Maasai hairstyles. The larger percentage of youths involved in occupational combination confirms the fluidity of the informal sector. It also reveals the necessity of occupational combinations to spread risk required in the informal sector.

26.7 percent were having single jobs at the time of survey. These were usually working as security guards for small commercial enterprises, such as timber yards, garages and construction sites. The nature of work required their presence also during the day, and were usually provided with meals at their work places, also they has some days off during the week. The Maasai youths who worked as security guards in residential houses, usually worked only during the night. Hence could take on other survival activities say doing Maasai hairstyles doing the day. There was one exceptional case, whereby one Maasai youth also employed two non Maasai youths to hawk coffee and *kashata*<sup>i</sup> along the streets of Dar es Salaam. He took profit every evening after paying the coffee boys and buying recipes for the following day. He also received a profit monthly from the charcoal dealer. This is a share of the amount he invested every month when the charcoal dealer goes to rural areas to buy charcoal. It was amazing because the total monthly earnings of these Maasai youths exceeded by far the minimum wages of civil servant. Youth migrants who practiced occupational combination had a possibility of maximizing their earnings. So they had better financial positions, and reduced level of risks. Observing the reasons for occupational combinations in the informal sector. Daudi,( 30 years) had this to say:

*“Surviving in the City depending just upon the salary is never easy; hence one has to develop some other coping mechanisms. Apart from working as night security guard, I also work as Maasai hair stylist. I get at least two customers a week, occasionally I sell herbs.” (Daudi 30 years, 30th July 2006).*

This answers the research question: “What are their means of earning a living in these urban centers”? The large number of respondents with multiple jobs provides an indication of the nature of coping mechanisms in the informal sector. That is they need to have a couple of jobs simultaneously in order to spread risk. The job categories also indicate that Maasai youths enter into jobs that are traces of their traditional cultural practices. In this respect, they utilize human capital attained through traditional initiations.

### **5.6.2 Social Network: The Oloip and Urban Insecurities**

The World Bank defines social capital as norms and networks than enable collective action (WB, 2000). The role of social networks as a strength that people can draw upon to reduce insecurities in both urban and rural areas of developing countries, has pointed out by various scholars. (Portes, 1998. Ellis, 2000, Carney 1998).

Social capital refers to those features of social organization, such as networks, norms of reciprocity and mutuality and interpersonal trust that act as resources for individuals to facilitate collective action (Portes, 1998). In this respect, one can think of social capital, particularly social networks, as an asset that accumulate, largely by spending time building relationships with and helping others. The *Oloip* is a typical feature of social organization. It is an institution that enhances social networks among the Maasai urban migrants in the City. Membership and attendance is strictly reserved for the Maasai only. Before an outsider, as was my case could attend, permission had to be granted by the Maasai elders. This reveals the norms and hierarchy governing such networks. During my time in the field, I attended a couple of sunday meetings at the *Oloip*. These meetings bring together Maasai from various *iloip* close to the *Ilala Oloip* were my informants were based. There were several agendas during these meetings; introducing newly arrived Maasai, receiving reports of any Maasai who is sick or has been into trouble such as being robbed at the work place, etc. It was during these meetings that some “wastrels” were also discussed, given a chance to defend themselves and warned, if no signs of reforms in their attitudes were observed, then such people risk being exterminated from the *Oloip*. Another important agenda I observed was that each sunday there was a fixed amount of around 1,000 Tshs<sup>46</sup>. This amount was contributed by each member as a fund for the *Oloip*. I was told by my informants that money from this fund is used when a member has lost a close relative, or has been detained due to loss of property at work, and therefore needed to hire a lawyer, etc. After all other agendas for the day were discussed, and then the meetings were usually followed by singing of traditional songs and dancing.

When I asked the Maasai youths how they view life in the city, and especially the social networks enhanced through the Oloip, they had this to say:

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<sup>46</sup> 1 US dollar is equivalent to 1,000 Tanzania shillings.

*“I don’t have any contract at work; this sometimes scares me, what if my employer decides to terminate my employment abruptly. But I am a member of the Oloip, to me this means a lot” (Baraka, 20 years. 30th July 2006).*

*“Surviving in the City depending just upon the salary is never easy, hence one has to develop some other coping mechanisms. “ I contribute money for food monthly with a group of friends, I only eat lunch with them, I eat dinner at my employer’s place The Oloip is the only place that I can go and shade off my anguish resulting from the ups and downs of city life” (Baraka, 20 years. 30th July 2006).*

*“The Oloipi is an important social network for any Maasai being far away from home and in the Swahili<sup>47</sup> land. The Oloip provides news from home; it introduces new Maasai that have come to the city, It is the most valuable asset that I have in the city, and this is the only safety net I can count on in times of tribulations and thus I value it highly” (Thomas Tariya is 30 years, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2006).*

The above voices from Maasai youths strongly points out the value these youth attach to being a member of the Maasai social network, the *oloip* in the city. Also, these networks of trust like contributing money monthly for food that Daudi points out are crucial in saving the meager wages. These memberships also save as a safety net against the risks associated with employment in the informal sector.

## **5.7 Identity as a Safety Net**

*“I hire a Maasai youth as watchman for my timber yard, first of all because the Maasai youths are brave, hardworking honest and most of all they are ferrous fighters, They also don’t associate much with other non maasai, as far as I am concerned this means increased safety for my property, since not many young people come to visit them whilst at work.” (Voice of Salum Haji, 45, timber yard owner and employer of a Maasai night and day watchman, 15<sup>th</sup> July 2006)*

The above voice of a Maasai employer represents similar sentiments that were echoed by several other Maasai youth employers I informally spoke to, to find out what motivated their choice for Maasai youths over many other youths from diverse ethnic backgrounds present in Dar es Salaam city. I also informally asked various sections of the population,<sup>48</sup> as to why

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<sup>47</sup> Is an official language spoken by almost 95% of all Tanzanians, it is a mixture of Bantu languages and Arabic. The Maasai refer to other ethnic groups in the city inclusively as the “Swahili.”. The Maasai are a Nilotc ethnic group.

<sup>48</sup> These were not Maasai employers, rather were people who know Maasai youth for one reason or the other, I thought this would give me a comparative views to that of Maasai youth employers.

most people would rather hire a Maasai youth than a non Maasai youth, and the views reflected very much that of Salum Haji the timber yard owner. That is, discourse constructions of the identity of the Maasai population among the non Maasai holds that Maasai men are in great demand and readily hired as *walinzi*, (swahili for night watchmen or security guards) because they are considered to be brave , honest and ferrous fighters. As *Salum Haji* remarks, he finds this inherent human capital characteristics of the Maasai identity a major strength when it comes to night watchman recruitment processes, for the eligible candidate to get the job at his timber yard. Apart from the other characteristics, he also points out that the maintenance of ethnic boundaries by Maasai youths as an additional merit, since for him a presence of many different unknown youth visitors at work, might also include some untrustworthy street boys who would be a threat to his property.

As pointed out before, Maasai are quite distinctive in the urban context. Maasai are often identifiable by ritual cheek scars and stretched ear lobes, A majority *ilmurran*<sup>49</sup> also adorn themselves with red ochre, inventive hairstyle colorful beaded earrings anklets and bracelets, and other decorations. *Ilmurran* and elders alike wear rubber or tire sandals and carry machete like swords and very long sticks. A few exhibit minor variations such as wrist watches, sunglasses, a or western style shoes and socks, but otherwise look virtually the same as they do in Maasai homelands. During my time in the field, I heard stories about the existence in some parts of Dar es Salaam City, youths from other ethnic backgrounds who try to pose as Maasai so as to get security jobs. My informants however told me that, when employees get security guards through spreading a word among the Maasai youths at the *Oloip*, this problem is avoided.

For the Maasai youths, identity management in addition to being a major qualifying feature for gaining employment as watchmen, and thus an additional merit in night security job competition. It is also part of maintaining the pride of a distinctive culture in a multiethnic urban environment, In this regard; Jackson (30 years) had this to say:

*"I wear my traditional dress, because I love my culture, and one aspect of portraying identity is through dressing, this is one way of expressing my "Maasainess"(emphasis added.) This together with Sunday meetings at the Oloip, helps me maintain my identity as a Maasai in the City.(Jackson 30 years. 15<sup>th</sup> June 2006)*

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<sup>49</sup> Maa term for maasai warriors, the age set(traditionally roughly between 15 years to 34 years in Maasai age system) group forming the majority participants of this research

When I asked Lucas (T) how he identifies himself in the cultural diverse city such as Dar es Salaam, he proudly pointed out:

*"For me being a Maasai is to be able to preserve Maasai traditions and culture. I am so proud to be a Maasai" (Lucas Thomas 25 years, 4<sup>th</sup> July 2006.)*

*Similarly, Simon 26 years noted that*

Similarly, Simon, (26 years) noted that:

*"Being a Maasai for me is putting on my traditional attire, carrying my stick sticking to Maasai values. Of course, attending the Oloip too, that is where I can close my eyes I feel like being at home". (Simon 26 years, 27th July 2006)*

The above observations clearly show these migrant youths retain their identity as Maasai in the City. These answer the research question: Do Maasai youths retain elements of their social identity such as hairstyle, dressing, etc? Is there any ongoing social identity change among the Maasai youths in the City? And how do they identify themselves?

### **5.7 Aspirations**

Diversification plays an important role in achieving objectives or reducing vulnerability and raising incomes (Ellis, 1998). It was difficult to get the information on the exact earnings of the Maasai youths. They were reluctant to tell me (an outsider), the amount they had made at the time of the interview. There were many reasons for refraining from telling me their earnings. Among them was the fact that these youth don't keep their earnings in the banks. In this respect giving information on their earnings seemed to be risky business.

It is obvious that migration as a means of diversifying livelihoods has had positive outcomes to the majority of the Maasai youth migrants. This is manifested in the increased purchasing power. Most Maasai youths told me that they have managed to start or add to their existing herd back home. Also that they have been able to pay for veterinary services for their livestock as well as managed to acquire some other material assets. All youths proudly mentioned the number of cattle they have been able to purchase ever since they migrated to the city. This reveals that cattle possession continues to be a strong cultural and economic value among the Maasai youths. The much older ones in the mid 30s told me that they have managed to improve their houses, from a mud thatched houses to block houses.

Despite the constant remarks of the hostile city environment by the Maasai youths, they told me that they plan to stay a bit longer to continue earning money and meet their other aspirations. The majority of the Maasai youths expressed a strong desire that one day they could be able to read and write. This is perhaps a reflection that they would one day like to enter into the formal labour market, and enjoy the secured pensions and other social benefits in this employment sector.

### **5.7.1 Intention to Return Home**

All of my respondents unanimously expressed a deep desire to return their traditional homeland in the future. According to Stark (1991), migrants with an intention to return home may have self interest motive to remit. They may send remittances to invest in farmland, business or livestock. With the Maasai youths, the savings they make in urban areas go into starting up cattle herding, increasing existing stock and taking care of the livestock herd back home. Also, preparation of fields by those practicing some crop farming.

The circular nature of Maasai youth migrations, also proves the intention of these youths to return home. Ellis (1992) defines circular migration as the one whereby, “migrants routinely return to the resident household and regard it as their principle place of domicile and do not set permanent living arrangements in the places that they go for temporary work” (Ellis, 1992:14). The intention to return home is further exemplified by a distaste of urban life as expressed by these youths, despite the relative economic opportunities. The voices below are a representative of many other voices of Maasai youths, expressing their homesickness and intention of returning home some day:

Expressing a strong desire of retuning to rural home permanently one day, James Moses (36 years) had this to say:

*“I don’t like life in the City, everything is monetarised. I have never dreamt of staying here permanently. My heart is in Maasailand, that’s where I belong,. It is tribulations geared by the lack of money that brought me to this City. I miss my family and livestock...(14<sup>th</sup> June, 2006)*

Elibariki (22 years), narrating his future plans and aspirations had this to say:

*"I came to this City to save money so as to have a better life back home. Otherwise I never ever would have come to this City. I become so home sick on several occasions. I will definitely go home for good when I have achieved some of my aspirations." (5<sup>th</sup> July, 2006)*

## **5.8 Summary**

Cities and Urban areas attract people and have always been engines of economic growth and centers of opportunity. But urban areas also increases challenges and insecurities for the majority. They increase opportunities viewed in terms of expansion of Cities on one hand, and emergence of new niches of self employment on the other. Tanzania's rate of urban growth is one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. High urbanization in Tanzania has been predicted to continue, and particularly impacting the informal sector. In this respect, occupational combinations play a major role in spreading these insecurities.

Maasai youths apply various strategies to manage urban insecurities. These strategies are such as occupational combination, staying active members of the Maasai social network in the City the *Oloip* and management of Maasai identity. Management of Maasai identity serves as an additional merit for accessing jobs in the informal sector, such as selling of herbal medicine and night security guards.

Indeed diversification has played an important role in achieving objectives or reducing vulnerability and raising incomes of the Maasai youths. This is manifested in the increasing purchasing power of these youth migrants. Despite the fact that the informal sector doesn't necessarily require formal education as an entry merit, the majority of these youths aspire to be able to read and write one day. This is probably a reflection that they would one day like to maximize their access into the job market. In this respect be able to enter the formal sector, and thus become eligible to enjoy the pensions and other social benefits associated with employment in this sector.

Indeed, they all expressed a deep intention of returning home for good one day. The intention is evident in the circular pattern of Maasai youth migrations as well as in the regular sending of remittances back home.

## **CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

### **6.0 Introduction.**

#### **6.1 Summary of Principle Findings**

Economic reforms have indeed brought about changes in the livelihoods of the Maasai pastoral people in Tanzania. In reaction to these shocks towards their means of earning a living, resorting to migration as one of livelihoods diversification methods has become a prerequisite: Hence those that are able to out migrate, do so, and it is predominantly the male unmarried Maasai youths of particular age ranges. This is because migration is an age selective process.

The decision to migrate was reached on a free will of an individual; there was no family pressure upon reaching this decision. The major reason for migration was economical; hence it was geared into diversifying the means of earning a livelihood in urban centers. Most of these youths lack formal education aspect of the human capital, but are richly endowed with informal education aspect of human capital and strong social capital inherent in the Maasai culture and in particular in the age group of *irmuran*, the warrior group that these youths belong to. Therefore, the skills and strong social networks are the capital assets that they turn to in their survival strategies in the urban centers.

The informal sector becomes compatible for these youths due to its various niches for self employment, its fluid nature and its broad avenues for entry and exit. However, the Maasai youths enter into jobs that are closely related to their culture and traditions, i.e. selling of decorated beads, doing Maasai hair styles, working as security guards and selling of herbs. In this respect management of identity, is crucial for accessing the job market for security guards, selling herbs and Maasai hair styling.

#### ***The Oloip; Enhancement of Social Capital and Safety Net***

Whilst in the urban centers, these youths maintain the social capital through an institution known as an *oloip*. This institution in addition to enhance the maintenance of the social capital between its members, it also enhances maintenance of the Maasai culture and identity of these youths. The *Oloip* is maintained by attendance as well as weekly contributions from the members. The strong social capital enhanced by the *oloip* becomes a major strength that

these youths can draw upon against the urban insecurities they face in a place far away from home.

### ***Insecurities in the Informal Sector***

Ever increasing urbanization, also results into increasing competition in the informal sector. My informants expressed their concern over the existence of youths from other ethnic backgrounds who pose as Maasai in order to get jobs as security guards etc. Stereotypes towards people of distinct culture in urban centers was an issue that was raised by the informants, perception of Maasai as people resistant to modernity and change were issues that were expressed by my informants, and they however clearly told me that most of them have never faced direct discrimination from non Maasai in the city.

The Lack of education as a stumbling block in survival strategies, was also a concern by many of the informants, this handicap limits them from accessing security jobs in the formal sector, hence the minimizing of insecurities associated with employment in the informal sector. In this category of stumbling blocks was also the resistance on the part of most employers of Maasai security guards to write a binding contract with these youths. The inability by the Maasai youths to access credit facilities is a combination of several factors. Among them the lack of education and hence inability to keep proper records of transactions, lack of collateral and fixed addresses. Perhaps the major factor is the fact that very few micro credit facilities cater for males. A factor overlooked by several micro credit facilities, that Guerin, (2006) observed “in a effort to address gender issues many programs ignore men...(Guerin, 2006: 567). He proposed the need to bring men too into the micro credit schemes to be a priority.

### ***Outcomes of Migration as Livelihoods Diversification***

Despite the fact that most of these youths don't intend to stay in the city for ever, the majority, especially the ones that have stayed in the city for over a year, told me that that from the money they have earned, they have been able to increase their existing stock or start to build a stock of their own as well as being able to buy vertenary medicine for their livestock, some who also do a bit of agriculture have been able to hire tractors to plough their fields. The circular nature of the migration patterns of the Maasai youths enable them to go home at least once a year, and whilst they are away which is usually for a period of three months, they have

someone usually a close relative who takes over their jobs until they return to the urban centers. In this case one can't lose his job and kinship ties are serviced. Migration as a way of diversifying livelihoods has brought an increased purchasing power among these youths, and thereby increasing the living standards of these youths.

### ***Social Change and Persistence***

Even though the Maasai youths have left their homes and migrated to the city, they still retain much of their cultural and traditional traces. This is reflected in the types of jobs that they enter into, the dressing, way of life and social boundaries they create and maintain, because Maasai youths scarcely mix with non Maasai youths. Indeed this is what might be described as "pastoralists with no cattle" in the urban centers. This is quite a unique character, because other youth migrants from other ethnic groups tend to become quickly assimilated into the urban culture; reflected in the way of dressing, as well as making use of the various employment opportunities in the various niches of the informal sector in the city.

Even though the change in the means of earning livelihoods was abrupt; it was manageable by the Maasai youths. This was because they were unmarried and within the age ranges that are flexible to migrate. In this respect they could move, and whilst in urban centers they could jump from one job to the other in their endeavors to survive. For the much older and married Maasai, the change was quite difficult. This signifies that, if public change is meant to save the needs of the people, it should not be dramatic. When it is dramatic, it increases the vulnerability of poor people rather than improve their lives.

### ***6.2 Conclusions for Policy Planning***

There is a need to bring local or indigenous knowledge also into the centre of development tool boxes. Most development initiatives towards pastoral production system have always been framed into the scientific knowledge. The scientific knowledge unfortunately references the pastoral production system into the tragedy of the commons concept. This concept attacks the communal ownership of resources, and largely views the pastoral system as harmful for the environment and harboring few development potentials. It is important to adopt participatory planning; in both development, as well as in land use and management initiatives. This bottom-up approach is crucial for "drawing strengths of diverse intercultural traditions in policy planning and implementation" (Oware, 2005:2). Adopting this approach to

Maasai development initiatives, will take into consideration local or indigenous knowledge's system of the Maasai pastoral production system. The knowledge that has sustained the Maasai for centuries. In this respect the development initiatives will be able to meet the needs of the Maasai people.

### ***1. Engendering Credit Schemes***

Credit facilities play an important role in enabling human capital to be powered with physical capital in order to increase income (Hollis, 2002). The inability by the Maasai youths to access credit facilities is a combination of several factors. Among them the lack of formal education and hence the inability to keep proper records of transactions, lack of collateral and faced addresses. Perhaps the major factor is the fact that very few micro credit facilities cater for male youths. A factor overlooked by several micro credit facilities, that Gurein, (2006)observed, “ in an effort to address gender issues, many programs ignore men...(Gureni, 2006:567). He proposed the need to bring men too into the micro credit schemes to be a priority. As for the married youths, the equal access by both couples together with proper training on how to manage loans and the small enterprises as a whole would bring about an increased improvement in the livelihoods both individually and at household level. Two hands are always better than one in several instances.

There is a need for micro credit institutions especially NGOs to consider giving loans to both males and females. In this respect, micro credit institutions as stakeholders in youth development will be effectively implementing the economical development of youths. The National youth development policy, (1996 article 1.1) instructs stakeholders in youth development: “To promote the lives of youth, female and male by developing them in the areas of economy, culture, politics, responsible parenthood, education and health”

### ***2. Training Programs***

Human capital is knowledge, skills and education for labor. This capital can be enhanced by investment in education (Ellis, 2000). Regarding to education, the poor and minorities, usually have limited accessibility thus “scoring low in education” (Saugestad, 2001: 309). Specifically designed literacy programs for the pastoral societies need to be introduced. Pastoral communities have been lagging behind in education compared to the other societies

in education. There are several reasons for this, constant migration in search for pasture and water for livestock being one, but the other is the introduction of user fee on social services such as education. This has made it increasingly difficult for the majority to access such social services.

Literacy training and formal education effect production and income, in this respect programs relevant to their economic activities need to be introduced. This will result into sharpening their skills needed for entry not only in the formal job sector but also in the informal sector. The ability to read and write will build their trust for and making use of banking institutions. It will also result in an increased access to information and using a secure way of keeping the hard earned savings.

There is a need to promote and strengthen Nongovernmental institutions that promote education in predominantly pastoral communities. Also the government needs to spend more on basic education and non formal education with emphasis on pastoralists.

### **3. *Sharing of Natural Wealth with Local Communities.***

There is a need to make it compulsory that investors in tourism sectors first consider candidates from communities surrounding areas in which their investments are located when it comes to recruiting employees in semi skilled jobs such as security jobs etc. The lands of the Maasai are endowed with several potentials ranging from tourism to mineral sectors. The increased investment in the tourism sector such as hotels, game hunting etc generates quiet a good number of jobs that the Maasai should be a priority in consideration of jobs such as security, game hunting and viewing guides, etc. Also part of the profits that the investors earn, should consider giving back some to the communities, to promote education and health services.

The above mentioned considerations as far as employment within tourism sector is concerned, would lead into Maasai youths diversifying their livelihoods within their homelands. This will not only ensure that the Maasai also benefit from the ecological potential of their traditional lands, but also help in minimizing the breakup of valuable Maasai kinship relationships that have sustained these communities for centuries, now being threatened by excessive out

migration. But if they decide to out migrate, then they have formal education than can increase their chances of accessing jobs in the formal sector too

#### **4. *Tenure and the Commons.***

From the study, it has been observed that the out migration of the Maasai youth is due to economic reforms have brought about changes in land and land tenure. Also that private ownership under adjustment programs seems to be the most favored form of land tenure. Hence the communal ownership of resources has become under increasing attack. The communal pools of resources (CPRs) are of particular importance to pastoral production system for pasture and water for the livestock. But it is very unfortunate that the customary tenure regimes under which CPRs are held is often misunderstood in policy terms (Quon, 1998). Unaware of the customary tenure regimes under which CPRs are held and managed by the rural people, States globally frequently allocate common resources for other uses. Example granting concessions to private users. This results into the attack of the livelihoods of those who depend on CPRs, and in turn generates confusion, insecurity and resources conflict.

It is important that a participatory bottom-up approach in land and other natural resources policy making be adopted during the planning stage. This approach insures that the beneficiaries are consulted. Thus results into taking aboard the local or indigenous knowledge, as well as the understanding of customary tenure regimes of CPRs. In so doing will result in formulation of coherent land polices that meets the needs of both nation economic development and the livelihoods of the population, in this case the livelihood of the pastoral Maasai people.

#### **6.3 Overall remarks**

Migration as a way of diversifying livelihoods has brought an increased purchasing power among the Maasai youths. This has in turn increased the standard of living in the lives of these youths back home. Even though the change in the means of earning livelihoods was abrupt; it was manageable by these youths. This was because they were unmarried and within the age ranges that are flexible to migrate. For the much older and married Maasai, the change was quite difficult. This signifies that, if public change is meant to save the needs of the

people, it should not be dramatic. When it is dramatic, it increases the vulnerability of poor people rather than improve their lives.

Bottom up approach to any development initiatives towards pastoral societies need to be adhered to, because this approach addresses the valuable local or indigenous knowledge. There is also a need to promote and strengthen non governmental institutions that promote education in predominantly pastoral communities. Social networks such as the *Oloip* need to be used as an entry point for any support schemes whether governmental or non governmental initiated, that are intended for the urban migrant Maasai youths.

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The online multilingual encyclopaedia. [www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org)

***Appendix***

**Questionnaire for Maasai Urban Migrant Youths**

Respondent code.....

Name of enumerator .....

Name of Interviewee.....

Date of Interview..... Day of second interview (if necessary).....

Data Checked by	Date	Status	Comments
		Ok      returned	

**Part (i) Migrant bio information**

Please fill the following about respondent

Name	Sex	Age set	Marital Status	Place of Origin	Level of education

Code

Sex: M0 = male and F = female

Marital Status: S = single, M= Married, D = Divorced, W = widow.

Level of education: O= No education, 1= Primary, 2 = Tertiary College, 3= University.

**Part (ii) Migration**

1. When did you migrate?

.....

2. Was your migration direct or stop over?

.....

3. Did you migrate alone or with families/relatives? Y/N

.....

II. If you migrated with you family please indicate the following

Name	Sex	Age	Place of origin	Relation to you	Level of education


4. Why did you migrate?
- i. Seek better living opportunity.
  - ii. Finding employment.
  - iii. Better education.
  - iv. Others (specify) .....

5. How did you migrate?
- i. Planned by family.
  - ii. Own decision.
  - iii. Peer influence.
  - iv. Others (specify).....

6. How did you finance your migration?
- i. Sold livestock.
  - ii. Saving.
  - iii. Borrowing.
  - iv. Donation from somebody.
  - v. Others specify...

7. Did you have any relatives at the place of destination?  
 Yes..... No.....  
 If yes specify relation with you.....

8. Do you intend to return to rural home?

### **Part (iii): Employment**

1. Are you employed? Yes..... No.....
2. Where are you employed?
  - i. Security guard.
  - ii. Others (specify).....
3. How did you get your present job?
  - i. Introduced by a friend.
  - ii. Introduced by relatives.
  - iii. By myself.
  - iv. Others (specify)....
4. How many years have you worked so far with your current job?
  - i. Between 0 to 2 years.
  - ii. Between 2 to 5 years.
  - iii. Over 5 years and above.

5 Have you worked at any other previous place a part form this one?

Yes..... No.....

i. If yes where.....

ii. What was the reason (s) for quitting your previous job?

- a. Sacked.
- b. Contract expired.
- c. Got a better paying job.
- d. Others (specify).

6. What is your net salary or wage per month?

- i. Between 10000 to 30000.
- ii. Between 30000 to 50000.
- iii. Between 50000 to 70000.
- iv. Over 70000 and above.

7. What is your mode of payment?

Cash.... Other.....

8. Do you own a bank account?

a. Yes.....No.....

b. If no, why?

- i. .....
- ii. .....

If no, where do you put you savings?

- i. .....
- ii. .....
- iii. .....

9 How many days do you work in a week?.....

10 How do you identify yourself?

11. What do you do during those days you are off duty?....

- i. Visiting Non Maasai friends.
- ii. Staying at the Oloip with Maasai friends.
- iii. Engaging in some other income earning activity.
- iv. Other.

12. Do you have annual leave? Yes..... No.....

If no why?

.....  
.....

13. Do you make monthly contributions to the *Oloip*?

Yes.....No.....

If no please state reasons.....

14. Do you engage in some other income generating activities?

#### **Part(iv): Entrepreneurial ventures**

1. What type(s) of income earning activities are you engaged in?
  - i. Selling herbs.
  - ii. Selling decorated beads.
  - iii. Maasai hair stylist.
  - iv. Others (specify)....
2. How did you raise capital to start your income earning activity (es)?
  - i. Savings.
  - ii. Borrowing.
  - iii. Donation.
  - iv. Others (specify)....
3. (a)What are the problems and challenges you face in running your enterprise?
  - i. ....
  - ii. ....
  - iii. ....
- b) How do you overcome those challenges?
  - i. ....
  - ii. ....

#### **Part v: Remittances**

- 1) Do you send remittances to the rural home?  
No.....yes.....
- 2) If yes, how often do you send or take remittances? Tick where applicable

monthly	Semi, annually	When need arises
quarterly	annually	Others (specify)

- 3) If no why?
- i. ....
  - ii. ....
  - iii. ....

- 5) Why do you send remittances?
- i. ....
  - ii. ....
  - iii. ....
- 6) What other income generating activities do you do?
- i. ....
  - ii. ....
  - iii. ....
- 7) How do spend your remittances?

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