Rescuing Peacebuilding? Anthropology and Peace Formation

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Abstract

IR and related social science disciplines focusing on peace and conflict studies have enabled a bureaucratic understanding of peacebuilding and a liberal form of peace. This has extended into a neoliberal type of statebuilding. There is now an impressive international architecture for peace, but its engagement with its subjects in everyday contexts has been less impressive. As an earlier group of conflict researchers, grouped around John Burton and later AJR Groom, have long argued that this is partly because IR has concentrated on elite power, problem-solving methodology, and positivist epistemologies. It has failed to understand the dynamics, agency, and hybridity of human society and institutions when it comes to peace, or that inequality is conflict inducing. Rescuing peacebuilding from neoliberal epistemology frameworks requires an anthropological and ethnographic sensitivity.

Keywords: local agency, networks, peace formation, IR theory, methodology

Bio

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Introduction

When mainstream (i.e. realist, liberal, and to some degree now constructivist) IR scholars and policy makers view the world they are endeavouring to govern, pacify, make compliant, or

1 A very early version of this paper was presented at a conference on “The Local in Global Understandings of War and Peacemaking: Anthropological and Inter-Disciplinary Perspectives”, PACSA-PCC Conference, Nicosia, Cyprus, 1-2 September 2011.
liberate, they perceive problems to be solved with sophisticated material, rational-legal and normative policy instruments, including the need to refine that world via state or global governmentality (practices of neoliberal government that coercively insert themselves into social praxes). The twentieth century saw the emergence of an international architecture of peace, one revolving around liberal versions of law, institutions, norms, economy, and practices of intervention. AJR Groom has been a great supporter of its study and improvement, but not of its reality and practices. Long ago, in lectures he gave in Canterbury at which I was present, he was already beginning to outline the weaknesses of post-Cold War liberal peacebuilding (even at the height of Fukuyama-mania) and was convinced that neoliberalism would make it weaker. He was also arguing that in response, hybridity was emerging both in IR theory and in its practices, by necessity. His was not a post-colonial understanding of hybridity, but perhaps it was post-socialist.

He made it clear in his lectures of that early post-Cold War period, some of which I attended in different locations around the world, that the UN and EU were vital to world peace, local social agency could not be ignored, neoliberalism was a red herring, and hubris about the potential of liberalism was dangerous for world order. The culmination of his thinking at this point seemed to be pointing to a sort of ‘entangled hybridity’ emerging from IR theory and practice- a term I noted that he used in one of his lectures of that period.\(^2\) His concern with global justice- perhaps more specifically his support of John Burton’s human needs and ‘cobweb’ theories, plus his work on conflict resolution, directly connected the

social, the local, justice and rights to a putative world order, one that would transcend the liberal international architecture of the UN and EU. He is no idealist but his gritty, empiricist presentation of the evolution of the post-war world order, peace and its methods, has been deeply influential in my own work, especially with my recent and current explorations of peace formation and a ‘new international peace architecture’. He and his generation lived through the greatest post-war reconstruction project- at state and international levels- the world has ever seen: early on he was already concerned about its viability, however.

Mainstream IR has long been concerned with the tragedy of the way the state exercises power from a realist perspective, often causing violence as a consequence. At the same time, from a more liberal perspective, it has investigated how states organise a power balance or build international cooperation to avoid conflict. Mainstream IR theory explains how and why states and international actors may act militarily, diplomatically, and politically, through strategies such as peace-making and mediation, military forms of peacekeeping, or comprehensive peacebuilding, designed to rebuild political communities.\(^3\) Because such approaches are related to either state power structures or international norms, rarely engaging with the positionality of their subjects (i.e. conflict affected populations), the related conceptual frameworks of conflict resolution or transformation, peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development have taken on colonial characteristics. A diverse array of subjects receives externalised governmental methods of order creation and maintenance from a hegemonic centre in an encounter between international and local actors.

IR has monopolised the discussion of peace, and critical various sub-disciplines, such as peace research or peace/ conflict studies, have emerged, following inductive/ qualitative, case study oriented, conceptual, statistical/ quantitative modes of investigation. More

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recently, as the limitations of such approaches have become clear, there has been a post-colonial concern with the subaltern perspective, the production of hybridity (representative of the formation of political frameworks subject to unequal power relations and agonistic encounters between subaltern and powerful actors), and agency, resistance, and a local turn. This, in turn, has led to a discussion of negative and positive forms of hybrid peace, combining the liberal peace system and other forms of political arrangements to provide opportunities for a more legitimate peace, whilst also and more problematically maintaining aspects of stratification in justice.

A key concept emerging in the 1990s in both theory and policy was peacebuilding. Peacebuilding foregrounds the development of a universal human rights framework along with democracy as a response to conflict. In the 2000s, statebuilding has added the priorities of security and marketisation following the neoliberal model of state rather than a welfare model. This project is one of pacification and governance (local, state or global) whereby its subjects’ needs and identities are not engaged with directly. According to the principles of the liberal, they are to be ‘transformed’ into rights-observing and rights-bearing subjects in a neoliberal world of self-help, so that local, state, and systemic conflict may be avoided. Thus,

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they are to become putative liberal subjects, resilient, and capable of self-help in the global economy as if there had never been historical injustice, and there is currently a level playing field where rights may be exercised.

As various forms of peace activity and theory, including the UN system itself, are theorised under this rubric, the very notion that it has the right to act needs to be examined. English School, critical, post-structural, feminist and other approaches in IR, often seen as marginal, have long challenged epistemic power structures and have been quietly influential. A long-standing critical literature in IR draws on social theory, anthropology, ethnography, political philosophy, activism, and postcolonial or subaltern studies. This critical movement has begun to significantly modify mainstream IR, but more needs to be done. Mainstream IR cannot do this from its own perspective – a positionality driven by the interests of power and cosmopolitan norms, contained within geopolitics and a territorial system of state sovereignty. In essence, IR’s view of peace is in crisis, with the subject’s pressure on the state, international system, and global capital, and his/her claims for emancipatory forms of politics. A similar crisis occurred when anthropology began to reflect on its engagements with colonialism. AJR Groom’s reflections on IR theory and on peace presaged these concerns often from a functionalist and pluralist perspective.6

Following these earlier insights, this article examines the developing relationship between mainstream IR and aspects of anthropology in both positive and negative terms and the implications of the tensions between the two disciplines for peacebuilding and peacemaking. Mainstream IR tends to instrumentalise anthropology according to its own

needs and expectations. This creates a tension between governmentality and emancipation, with cultures (a field which lacks precision, but remains necessary;\(^7\) and rationalities of security, governance, peace and liberation in competition. A new – perhaps fourth – generation of peacemaking\(^8\) cannot be achieved without anthropology – its methods, ethics, and perspectives – taking a place in IR and IR making space for anthropology. A mutual rejection will destine mainstream IR to repeat its mistaken and utopian valorisation of power, modernity, the state, territorial sovereignty, and norms, whilst anthropology will attempt to avoid the implied interventionism of the politics of peace at the social level, which is ultimately integral to every society. Instead, what is needed is an understanding of ‘peace formation’ at the local level to modify IR’s oft-perceived arrogant focus on liberal peacebuilding, neoliberal statebuilding, and orientalist understandings of state formation,\(^9\) and to provide anthropology with a more direct critical agency where modern power (particularly in political and economic terms) is concerned. This may also help inform a more critical functionalist and pluralist- rather than ideological or geopolitical- perspective, in relation to organisations such as the UN, EU, the IFIs and international donors.


The collapse of governmental forms of statebuilding and peacebuilding

In their attempts to mitigate the forces of state formation, statebuilding and earlier peacebuilding have constructed a framework of the state and society which are often not suited to post-conflict or development settings. Ultimately, they are more focused on political deals and power-sharing.10 Designed with the assumptions, norms, structures and dynamics of the global north in mind, they are focused on issues of security, institutional frameworks, liberal norms and law, contractual governance, individualism, and neoliberal marketisation. This intellectual and policy project has been carried out according to the rationalities of politics, economic, and management. It is depoliticising and endorses global inequalities, inadvertently at least.11

All governance or administration of this type tends to be metropolitan and biased, based on a long history of scaling up power to maximise industrial scale state agency.12 It is increasingly driven by neoliberal rationalities.13 It is isolated from its subjects – communities,


villages, cities, and societies and their local interests, histories and identities – by distance, language, culture, status, bureaucracy, and conceptions of universal norms and interests. It is focused on short-term projects requiring a problem-solving approach, with academics and local actors implicated via a disciplinary revolving door of problem-solving.\textsuperscript{14}

Some policy makers and scholars have noted and criticised the everyday dynamics, biases, and side-effects of the ‘projectisation’\textsuperscript{15} of peacemaking. Policymakers and mainstream scholars tend to write off their comments as overly critical and impractical, but, in fact, their subtext is a challenge to power and social practices of discrimination in material and identity forms.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, even though elites are resistant, the evolution of peace and development strategies over recent decades shows they are forced to respond (perhaps whilst minimising their loss of face or presenting any progression as a product of their own innovative approach). This has exposed the limitations of ‘trickle-down’ and top-down theories, as well as the tendencies of elites to capture progressive advances in theory and practice in ways which least benefit the marginalised. In a sense, existing historical power structures are maintained through this latter process. More specifically, landowners, merchants, money lenders and bureaucrats capture development processes to enhance their own power and wealth, and predatory elites, local and international, professional and customary, attempt to capture peace formation processes, sometimes succeeding. This has happened in Cambodia, where an ‘authoritarian neo-liberal peace’ has emerged since the


\textsuperscript{15} Chambers, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p.28.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, p.28.
1990s, supported in part by international donors.\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, in Kosovo, the aspiration for statehood is contiguous with existing local and international power structures and models of state.\textsuperscript{18}

International actors and academics often claim (perhaps unaware of the neo-colonial implications of their statements) the large scale political, economic, and social engineering suggested by peacebuilding, statebuilding and development approaches does not have a power or cultural component. This conveniently implies these approaches do not need direct local consent or legitimacy. When viewed by their subjects, such peacebuilding and statebuilding often come across as insensitive, distant, and colonial, not to mention ineffective. They are depoliticising and avoid responsibilities to others; they focus on constructing a peace or state in a half-hearted way and are designed, at a minimum, to produce a negative local and regional peace following hegemonic interests and norms.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, governmental approaches to making peace or the state are themselves in a fragile state, or worse, a state of collapse.


The imbalanced and fraught relationship between IR and anthropology

Mainstream IR is regarded by some in the discipline (including AJR Groom) and many outside it as a hegemonic, even imperial discipline, designed to promote compliance with its dominant understandings of epistemology, its interests, its methods, and its norms. Its theorising of interventions to make peace are often seen as colonial, self-interested, and racist, whilst conflict management, neoliberal statebuilding, or liberal peace are considered its goals. Even where ‘elicitive approaches’ aimed at engaging with local agency (and perhaps resistance) are debated, post-colonial scholars do not see these as sufficiently far-reaching because of their reversion to liberal notions of politics. Power structures remain the same, even where ethnography is introduced into discussions of method or legitimacy.

Much resistance to liberal peace projects has arisen, often in subtle or hidden spaces. Many in anthropology, having already reflected on their own experience of ‘policy-led research’ during the colonial era, are reluctant to engage with IR. Yet because it is so heavily driven by elite policymaking by those at the top of the global power structure (particularly in the US), IR needs such relationships to guide it away from the perils it faces and the ease with which non-reflective research can hijack its disciplinary legitimacy in the interests of realism (describing the awfulness of the world out there, to be feared, combated and pre-

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empted at every opportunity), or norms (liberal and cosmopolitan perspectives to be held by all natives regardless of their positionality by virtue of the former’s superiority over context), or states, institutions, and capitalism (all produce geopolitical or efficiency rationales for governing but do not represent local agency).

Such superficial versions of IR need to be saved from themselves, and this involves making alliances with disciplines better equipped to foreground the everyday realities of life, needs, security, rights, institutions, and society in the really-existing world, not utopian or dystopian views projected by the parochial global north or oligarchical leaders. IR’s version of liberal peace – increasingly a neoliberal peace, even though neoliberalism is in crisis – is disciplinary and non-reflective, and its legitimacy is weak at the local level. IR has moved on, so its theories, methods, and epistemology need to jettison such failed approaches (still propagated in many universities by insensitive voices whom others fear to challenge, and who valorise state, military and economic power as if it were ‘nature’), or it will collapse.²⁴

Signs of the discipline’s fragility are already present: co-optation by, or the disregard of, policy-makers; a general dissatisfaction with its lack of emancipatory goals among students and scholars; a lack of research funding for new agendas or critical work, although problem-solving funding is available; vitriolic forms of gate-keeping to maintain hegemonic yet defunct theories and methods (from the perspectives of more advanced disciplines); and a general disregard for IR as developed outside the global north.²⁵ A return of counter-insurgency oriented approaches, as a partial nod by power towards the social, is another cause

for concern, leading in some mainstream peacebuilding quarters to a renewed debate of ‘native administration’. Although debates about the everyday, local agency and networks have emerged, there is no concurrent discussion of reforms to the international or state system and power structures.

Few anthropologists want much to do with mainstream IR’s quasi-Enlightenment top-down and governmental project, given its disrespect for autonomy and difference or needs, not to mention anthropology’s own past experiences with relatively unaccountable power\textsuperscript{26} including collusion with colonial authorities.\textsuperscript{27} However, many IR scholars (and subjects) look to anthropology for theoretical and methodological.\textsuperscript{28}

Although the IR move – often called a ‘local turn’ – has been criticised as yet another imperial disguise for native administration rather than autonomy, or as compliance with local deviancy, or as ‘romanticising the local’,\textsuperscript{29} without such a move or local cooperation, IR will continue to be unable to accrue local legitimacy for international order, peacebuilding projects; nor will it understand properly the crisis of its liberal peacebuilding, development,

\textsuperscript{26} Asad, T. (ed.) (1973) \textit{Anthropology and the colonial encounter}. New York: Humanity Books.


or neoliberal statebuilding approaches. Power would continue unchecked and IR would effectively reject its decolonisation.30

In a way, mainstream IR and its associated liberal peacebuilding or neoliberal statebuilding approach, along with development and modernisation theory, have an understandable fear of the local. It means letting go of speedy modernisation and the rationality that dreams of a tight, technocratic order. Exposure to the historical complexity of the local displays the ignorance and imprecision of universalist claims and universalising approaches. Universalist claims to be all knowing and capable are weakened, highlighting the structural violence maintained by such power, if inadvertently. The local tends to imbue itself with deep and hidden Geertzian meaning, fluidity and complexity, especially via its cultural milieu. The tension between tradition, custom, community and western modernity defines itself and its agencies in relation to a wide variety of networks and others.31 This unsettles and disaggregates western notions of industrial-scale and public mobilisation, with a unity of purpose refined to a few priorities shared by all. Complexity is eschewed, along with the local, unless it can be framed by a technical understanding of modernity, as liberal or neoliberal peace must be. Other dimensions of peace are to be avoided, especially those connected to difference, inequality, and justice. Yet this is self-defeating, according to most scientific evidence on the sustainability of peace.

Contrary to IR’s focus on political elites, business, and state agency, from anthropology we learn, among other things, that culture is a frequently ignored site of peace agency.32 Such supposedly marginal agency has historically shaped the state,33 and modified

32 For a deep analysis, see Brauchler, B (2015) The Cultural Dimension of Peace, London:
the practices of liberal peacebuilding, especially the latter’s concepts of civil society, its cultural and economic formulations, and its modes of political representation. Technical, liberal, and neoliberal forms of peacebuilding are disruptive to these forms of local capacity. It would, thus, be more appropriate for international actors to engage with them and with the possibilities and problems of needs and welfare in peacebuilding. This would accentuate a commitment to local ownership in contextual terms, as well as local capacity and resilience.

This points to the need to develop a type of peacebuilding with a post-colonial nature and suggests the importance of everyday and hybrid aspects. Rather than peacebuilding being representative of liberal subjects and their institutions and history, it would represent a negotiation between the really-existing ‘local’ and the ‘international’. That this has not been accepted in mainstream IR because of its obvious implications for historical processes and the rights and duties of states and communities to each other, echoes colonial arrogance. It undermines the legitimacy and ethics offered by an anthropological research process, especially when such a process is focused on an action research agenda, not of fulfilling policy but of enabling self-emancipation.

Indeed, the propensity of anthropological and ethnographically uncovered critique to challenge this project is both a message IR tends to evade and one it should engage with, if only to recognise the dangers of trusteeship and native administration being reinvented.\footnote{Palgrave: Brauchler, B (2017) “Social Engineering the Local for Peace”, \textit{Social Anthropology}, 24:4, 437-454.}

\footnote{33 For long-standing anthropological engagement with state formation, see for example, Steinmetz, G. (1999) \textit{State/ culture: state formation after the cultural turn}. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.}

\footnote{34 Vrasti, Op. Cit.: Björkdahl, A., Höglund, K., Millar, G., Van Der Lijn, J. & Verkoren, W.}
Likewise, without engaging with this debate, anthropology will be unable to overcome its concern with action as opposed to reflection and the unintended consequences of mobilising or empowering on a more general level.\(^{35}\) Anthropology may hold IR’s heavy-handed industrial scale desire for agency in check, enabling a more legitimate and everyday form of peace to emerge, and IR could enable anthropology to overcome its concerns with moving beyond the minute and particular.

IR needs to localise its legitimacy, either to naturalise power for the mainstream or (and far more desirable) for critical IR to place power as the servant of its subjects. The latter means understanding ‘peace formation’ rather than denoting all local agency as state-formation forces of predation and criminality or valorising liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal statebuilding.\(^{36}\) This is clear from the last 20 years of liberal peace praxis. It also needs methods to govern the local while simultaneously gaining its consent. It is caught in a paradox of seeing the local as a site of agency and legitimacy while being far more focused on the power wielded by states, structures, and norms, and the institutional agenda of organising an internationally legitimate normative order as far as possible around the liberal peace. It has fallen into bad disciplinary habits. Even so, to gain local legitimacy, an instrumental engagement with the ethical, methodological and theoretic insights of

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anthropology and ethnography is attractive for mainstream IR (which needs an understanding of ‘human terrain’ as it has come to be known by the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan). It is also attractive to avoid issues with space, a loss of local consent, or a Maoist style encirclement of industrial or urban areas, as these are a threat both to capitalism and to the state itself. Given anthropology’s experience of colonialism it is keen to avoid such attention. Expanding IR’s understanding of power and its camouflage of it through normative or technical claims may be ethically problematic. Yet understanding how power works in conflict and how peace can subsequently be built is a worthwhile agenda.

While mainstream IR may want to exploit anthropology for local consent and legitimacy and for more effective governmentality, it is also aware of the risk of exposing its perceived need for instrumental rationality which undermines everyday life and peace. Such tensions reoccur throughout the history of social investigations of other epistemological positions. Mainstream IR normally substitutes power for consent or links consent to power, something which a more social perspective would expose if the international peacebuilding and statebuilding architecture were to be more suited to everyday life from an ethnographic perspective. Clearly, peacebuilding cannot exist without external and local daily practices of authority, representation, rights, and needs being held to account and made transparent and just. None of these can be understood within IR’s mainstream disciplinary framework, which is why it so often reverts to coercion to deal with blind spots it can sense but not engage with.

Neither IR nor anthropology can achieve an understanding of how everyday life and representative government may operate together without each other. IR automatically veers towards power, interests, and instrumentality, which is why peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development so often support elite hegemony in local contexts, while anthropology and ethnography veer towards depictions of the everyday as if it were in someway disassociated.

from the regressive or progressive possibilities of power, institutions, rights, and needs-oriented policymaker. The world in which human subjects and societies are shaped, exercise agency, or resist has, therefore, to be part of any understanding of modern policymaking, whether for peace, order, stability, development, or locally and internationally legitimate states.

Resolving this problem involves ‘putting the last first’: a reversal of learning; a suspension of dominant understandings of status and management authority; joint local and international research and development for peace; externals learning about the local by working contextually rather than assuming it should be like any other metropolitan space; participation rather than hierarchy; planning from below rather than working with blueprints from above; the exercise of caution in employing international staff and their rotation; a public venue for the critical and often private transcripts of both international and local peace workers; and empathy for the rights, needs, institutional and security requirements of local (as well as state and regional) level agencies of peace.38 Proponents of human needs theory, of conflict resolution, of functionalism, of regionalisation and integration, as well as later of human security and conflict transformation have long been pointing in this direction. This does not mean international norms, capacity and assistance do not have an important role. Clearly, peace formation also partly depends on such networking opportunities.

Mainstream IR needs anthropology to prevent its projects from verging into hegemonic illegitimacy. Anthropology has resolved this problem for itself – at least to a greater degree. It is reluctant to potentially be co-opted by power all over again and, thus, often verges on the purely descriptive. Critical versions of IR offer more possibility for a

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productive interdisciplinary conversation on the nature of an emancipatory form of peace, socially engaged but internationally framed and supported, if they themselves can avoid becoming co-opted into mainstream IR. The methodology and epistemological pressures of responding to political, economic, and social crises and the processes of observing and engaging with others in minute contexts over long periods of time appear incompatible.

Yet if peace is to be everyday, emancipatory, and contextual, as well as embedded in political institutions, the state, international organisation, law, and the global economy, such a task is necessary, despite its complexity and internal tensions. Increasingly, however, it has come to be understood in both IR and in peace and conflict studies, that culture and identity are crucial factors. Even policymakers now accept this. Culture is a site where historical issues, identities, hierarchies, and narratives are played out, contested, or celebrated; it is not just a representation, but a space of agency with political impact. The insights of bodies of knowledge about culture tend to be unreconstructed in IR, which frequently remains locked in an understanding of its so-called primeval qualities: hence, the mainstream nationalist characterisation of ethnicity in the Balkans was used to reconstruct the state in the Dayton Agreements of 1995 as a nationalist set of interlocking levels of government. Similarly, in Cyprus, the Annan Plan of 2004 envisioned the state as organised according to ethno-nationalist identities. The Irish Good Friday Agreements of 1998 offered a more anthropological understanding in which sectarian identity and its exclusive qualities were dissuaded from pursuing the logic of ethno-nationalism towards full statehood; assisted by the EU, UK, and international community, the Agreements engineered a set of countervailing local, state, regional, and international frameworks for shared governance. Such an anthropologically framed yet institutionally pluralist approach would assist in the Israel/Palestine conflict, long lodged in the blocked passage of 19th century style nationalism.
Mainstream IR and mainstream peace and conflict studies tend to see culture as an immutable source of both good and evil, in essence, too complicated to be included in the economic, legal, and bureaucratic rationalities of peace. More critical versions of IR and peace and conflict studies have, drawing on anthropology, opened this up significantly, in order to return politics to the debate on peacemaking and to engage more fully with everyday issues, identity, culture, gender, and custom. That said, state-craft and peacebuilding remain based on older views of power over culture and related hierarchies which place the west, liberal institutions, markets, and modern statehood at the pinnacle of international historical development.

More anthropological and ethnographic views see culture, society, identity, and aesthetic expressions as a significant and often political site of human agency, essential for the mediation of difference upon which institutions necessarily rest. This is crucial because it connects to liberal understandings of individuality and to property rights as the basis for the neoliberal economy and, indirectly for political representation (as property gives everyone a stake in institutions and equality before the law in liberal thinking). In other words, pluralism cannot emerge without an ethnographic perspective of difference, which must then be applied to the creation of mediating institutions. In a complicated balance, these are linked to notions of self-expression, memory, self-government and self-determination, and to a very broad engagement with politics, society, history and the economy. This implies a balancing of difference and autonomy via an ethnographic approach, rather than homogeneity, universalism and dependence via either realist or liberal approaches. Post-structural and constructivist approaches move closer to enabling this balance, but the former approach tends not to accept that institutions are necessary for the mediation of difference to occur (as this occurs at an epistemological level), whilst constructivism places the state high up in a system of power relations, necessarily undermining (or exploiting) an ethnographic perspective.
This is also contrary to the problem-solving and institutionalised reductions of most modernist theories IR or conflict management theories associated with the state, peacebuilding, neoliberal economic approaches, and development. As a ‘web of meaning’ from which politics and peace emerge, culture is frequently regarded as a critical site of agency, albeit in hidden or marginal ways. Progressive projects of modernity often ignore it because its agencies may conflict with modernisation or claimed universal or cosmopolitan norms and their leadership systems. Culture highlights social meaning rather than centralised and naturalised scientific law. Such a view contrasts instrumental understandings of culture with interpretative understandings, which are far more able to comprehend the complex politics of peacebuilding. It precludes a ‘view from above/outside’, and any analysis will inevitably be incomplete and slightly ambiguous because of its subtleties. Despite this, such semiotic analysis – and its implications for peace – offers more than merely intuition about peacebuilding. It excavates the complexity of both agency and structure, especially in areas IR has rarely been concerned with: beneath the state and beyond civil society. Indeed, it resists the separation of civil society and the state upon which IR, liberal peacebuilding, and statebuilding rest to maintain hierarchies, and it implies civil society is the state.

Culture has often been associated with positions that resist modernity, or with resistance more generally: hence, ‘hearts and minds’ strategies against insurgencies and repeated attempts to include cultural sites of influence are common opposites in peace

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processes, even as the legitimacy of cultural agency is denied.\textsuperscript{42} Culture has been supplanted in the liberal peacebuilding literature by the concept of civil society, separated from the state, which itself is in some way still a depiction of the polity. This has the effect of negating culture’s connotations for identity, alterity, or resistance, as well as maintaining a division between ‘liberal internationals’ and ‘illiberal’ or ‘non-liberal’ local actors. As a result, important stakeholders are ignored, partly because of the fear of not being able to deal with local knowledge or expectations. Such problems arise also because international actors, like the UN, have relatively little capacity at the local level, even though attention to such issues is increasing though field missions and ‘outreach’ practices. That said, local languages and culture remain widely acknowledged weaknesses of international actors. The UN Peacebuilding Commission was partly established to provide complementary legitimacy to the liberal peace, and, of course, field missions develop local contacts where they can. Yet the local remains elusive for international actors.

Culture implies a diversity of identities, custom, and practices, many of which are ‘modern’, transnational, and transversal in their expression of the ‘local,’ even if not secular, explicitly rational, progressive or universal. Clearly, culture should not be essentialised, homogenised, and instrumentalised. Indeed, as a site of agency, it is unlikely that strategies to instrumentalise it will produce anything but more tension. It can be used to imply relativist and eternal divisions, though this possibility should not be used to censor culture from consideration of liberal peacebuilding’s engagement with the local. Yet because of these

dynamics, local cultures, institutions, actors, and practices are often perceived to be the liberal peace’s other, and an obstacle to the project of liberal, rational governmentalism. Local culture is perceived from this perspective to be in opposition to liberal peace and democratic government or development. From here, the disconnect allowing liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal statebuilding to ignore needs, local agency and institutions begins and the local is made invisible or romanticised. Yet local cultures often engender social and economic systems that are expressions of responsibility to each other, despite their limited resources and lack of market infrastructure, and in contradistinction to the elite, predatory state or class systems attempting to concentrate power in the hands of a particular identity group.

IR discounts culture, and so misses (and is perplexed) by the way its industrial agency for liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding is countermanded, whereas anthropology sees only that agency as if there were no structure with which it could tactically engage. That said, Scott, de Certeau, and others show how agency drawn from the most unlikely sources may achieve exactly that.43

**IR and anthropology’s intimate relationship**

Despite the tensions and complementarities outlined above between IR, ethnography, and anthropology, the relationship between IR and anthropology has long revolved around the problem of government and order. If civil society is the state (or community is the polity) in ideal terms, however, and if IR and anthropology have worked hard to maintain their

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separation to allow progress and related forms of governance over society, the argument above has failed. In this understanding, IR has attempted to co-opt anthropology for problem-solving, while anthropology has veered between acquiescence with trusteeship and vanguardist forms of governance and complete rejection of being at the service of power.

In fact, both approaches are integral to the search for peace, albeit disguised by a mutual misapprehension about their relative positionality. Resolution at the social level is crucial, reform of the state to build long term stability is also necessary, and trusteeship often is required to maintain a balance of power at the elite level through a form of powersharing. IR and anthropology are already in a very intimate relationship centring on the nature of power and its exercise, on knowing the subject, and on understanding the diversity of cultures, needs, and social structures that make up the various polities networking across local and global scales. Peace depends on the relations of communities as well as the design of the state and power-sharing, and to achieve this, IR and anthropology can fruitfully combine forces. Without anthropology, IR is destined to repeat the errors of distant and insensitive trusteeship governance, the valorisation of technocracy, industrial scale material power, state sovereignty and international organisation. Its peace will be negative, resisted and incapable at the everyday level. Power’s biases are replicated in a discipline that often preaches rights and democracy but rarely acts in its own ethical, theoretical or methodological frameworks. In contrast, anthropology has long rejected its flirtation with power and policy driven research and has worked hard to ‘de-nativise’ its perspectives of its subjects. By the same token, IR might begin to engage with the complicated task of building legitimate hybrid orders and forms of peace across local and global scales.

By focusing on the seemingly narcissistic details of other’s lives for their own sake, as
the critical move in anthropology has proposed,\(^4^4\) and the various forces, structures, and dynamics affecting them, while celebrating their different life-worlds, anthropology has tried to avoid its own instrumentalisation. In doing so, anthropology has prevented itself from holding other disciplines to account in their respective colonial moments. To enable disciplines like IR to develop their own post-colonial moment and to have a deeper influence on late modernity, anthropology must communicate its epistemic openness more broadly. It requires the capacity to explore local legitimacy and everyday forms of peace and educate IR without being dominated by it.

Both anthropology and IR have had recent or historical disciplinary relationships with orientalism, colonial administration and positivism, and they have lessons to teach each other. Both have the capacity to engage for the purposes of producing fourth generation peace discourses – critical, hybrid, emancipatory, and empathetic,\(^4^5\) in which peacebuilding, statebuilding, development, and local cultural, socio-historical, and political systems interact to produce hybrid forms that resonate legitimately at both the international and local level. One cannot succeed in this project without the other. IR needs a ‘subaltern moment’ in which it confronts the failings of its own power and collapses the distinction between the state and [civil] society. Post-colonial, critical and post-structural approaches in IR offer possibilities, but anthropology leads the way in foregrounding the subject.


**Without anthropology**

IR and peace and conflict studies, as well as development economics, have difficulties in their positions on dealing with conflict, as these frequently follow both a governmentality logic and a colonial and neoliberal economic rationality. This is well documented.\(^{46}\) If reporting on conflict situations must occur to bring peace, and if it is carried out from the elite level of epistemology (i.e., developed northern donors and institutions), it will inevitably be biased towards this level and its understanding of the necessities of governance.

Transformation, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development have an ideal of the northern, developed, rational-legal subject in mind, along with expectations of liberal and neoliberal governors. We cannot describe these subjects as politicians or civil servants in their involvement with developing and southern conflict actors, because they are not locally representative or legitimate in either a technical or a normative sense, even though the humanitarian resources, social peace, and peace treaties they offer will be attractive to many.

Such insights have been circulating amongst ethnographical scholars of peace and conflict studies for some time.\(^{47}\) Thus, it is pertinent to ask whether IR can avoid colonial


\(^{47}\) See for example a range of scholars that AJR Groom’s work was also associated with:

inscription through its epistemic bases’ contacts with the other in the south or post-conflict environments. The answer is that doing so will require a further epistemic base, one building on the perspective of the everyday. This is where anthropological perspectives and ethnographic methods are crucial, as long as they can avoid co-optation.

Mainstream narratives about the international and IR may seem impervious to change or the requirements of global justice, and the default tendency is to look for ways to instrumentalise policies to create subjects. The first sign of this tendency is the production of an international-local hierarchy, or a state-subject stratification of power. But this needs to be challenged. Past challenges from human rights, welfare, democracy, and aid have been very successful in the grander scale of international history. These successes are often seen as emanating from the benevolence of key western figures and actors, but, in fact, they have had as much, if not more, to do with political pressures for peace, justice, and redistribution from below. This provides some hope that anthropology and ethnography can hold power to account.

So far, however, this has proven difficult. The absence of a modern state in many settings (or in developed states, the remnants of customary, social, or religious systems) is often taken by internationals to mean no institutions are present, and any existing norms, law, or institutions must necessarily be ‘pre-modern’ and backwards. This allows mainstream IR scholars and policymakers to revel in the excess of power, righteousness and agency this gives them over consent, only to find they cannot affect the local situation as much as they expected without consent and an understanding of context. Anthropology and ethnography

would, of course, already have furnished this insight.

Furthermore, there is a tendency to use such perspectives to avoid engaging with the roots of conflict because they judge the local as dysfunctional and international processes as progressive. Outsiders in any conflict or development setting ‘under-perceive’ local agency and networks or miss them altogether (Chambers, 1983, p.2).\(^{49}\) They are trapped in ‘urban cores’ that generate their own reality endorsing modernisation perspectives. They make hurried visits to sites of conflict, see them from other urban centres or via tarmac roads, focus on their own project orientation and those who are supportive for whatever reason, and tend to speak to people already in authority (men, warlords, politicians, etc.) who are visibly active. They arrive when conditions are better, whether due to a lessening of political tensions or seasonal variations, try to be diplomatic and not cause offence to those holding power, and are mainly focussed on their own professional concerns.\(^{50}\) They also tend to assume civil society and the local-local (the actually existing local, not one imagined by outsiders) are uncivil and illiberal without western/ northern assistance and direction. Such direction requires conditionality, surveillance, and control to facilitate.

These biases permeate most institutions, including the UN, World Bank, donors, foreign missions, and many international NGOs. Although local actors and many states (for example, the G77, Non-Aligned or G7+ groupings) see this as a neo-colonial gathering of northern power, IR is supportive of it, valorising technical, rational, problem-solving approaches from the top-down. They are short-cuts for those busy with the task of governing, drawn from northern modernisation and conflict-management experiences. They form a top-down historical-organic view of ‘good politics’, but evidence strongly suggests these perspectives are limited and not easily transferable.

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Such biases are used as a way of ignoring local agency and the ‘local indigenous structures of pre-colonial and pre-contact societies in the global South … practiced in these societies over a considerable period of time’ as in a so-called ‘segmentary society’.\(^{51}\) They also appear in contexts of social mobilisation, as with many Balkan NGOs. They ignore local issues that are conflict inducing and disguise local positionality within broader structures of inequality (note the absence of the word ‘inequality’ in R2P and the MDGs documents).

The only way around this is to make such institutions, donors, and northern states speak with other voices, as it were, so that a more sensitive discourse can emerge about informal institutions and politics, more representative of everyday contexts and more attuned to living with difference. This means constituting them more widely, with interests, norms, values, and groups from beyond their usual catchment areas. Social, anthropological and ethnographic methods and approaches are absolutely necessary, not just in terms of a rhetorical acceptance but in implementable terms, and require significant investment. As anthropology is one of the main ways by which the other has been described to power (frequently through ethnography), it may now become a conduit through which power is democratised by the other. All of this needs to be understood in a context of relationality: of power and agency, societies, cultures, individuals, temporal phases, with the environment and economy: neither the international, the state, nor the ethnographic can be isolated in practice or theory.

This has significant implications for how peace is understood and made. It implies understanding, not co-opting the local and avoids the risk of the local resisting in ways that confound power where such power is illegitimate (even if exercised with the legitimacy of another context). It points to how the local, the state and the international are related, mutually constituted, and transgress conceptual boundaries. Peace needs framed with this in

mind, to be spoken and enacted in local languages, with local issues in mind, in a wide array of contexts even if this challenges the international. It must be accepted that there are aspects of the international which may be conflict-inducing in local contexts. New ways of understanding what is retrogressive and progressive are required, moving beyond the Anglo-American, Eurocentric elite categories, priorities, and hierarchies now used to maintain international order.

The role of resistance
Peacebuilding is driven by external agency but held accountable in somewhat mysterious ways by local agency, including elites as well as civil society. Thus, peacebuilding, statebuilding and development are in a complex relationship with social forces, which partially hold them to account and assist in their development, even where local agency may not be benevolent and emancipatory and where internationals may be determined to operate according to their own blueprints, resisting local practices they consider backwards, patriarchal, corrupt, nepotistic, non-rational, against liberalism, neo-liberalism, or against democracy, human rights, and law.

However, power in direct, structural, and governmental form, emanating from global governance, international actors, and donors also shapes peacebuilding, along with other forms of intervention. IR’s project of transformation is useful here, but it must be held accountable and transformed for and by those local peace agencies. Anthropological and ethnographic bias will be towards the local, everyday, and non-intervention is significant because it allows for localised peace formation processes to develop, seeking international support and encountering international norms and standards, but constructing locally legitimate responses. International and local responses become aware of the different demands reflexivity has on their conservative or transformatory impulses. An awareness of
the structure-agency problem, of the relationships between different types of power and subjects, and how both are reversed, through the circulation of power, norms, law, and institutions, different types of knowing, of interpretation via alternative epistemologies of peace can only be a useful encounter, especially if the rationalities of power, neoliberalism, and liberalism, are exposed and countermanded. Furthermore, something as basic as the mode of communication, and discursive praxis, cannot be engaged with through IR, which speaks of direct, structural and governmental power followed by interests and norms, instead of the social and its positionality.

Yet as resistance grows so does intervention in ever more subtle ways. Statebuilding’s governmentalising character makes it more effective and potentially less humane and emancipatory because its effectiveness is associated with a northern or global set of priorities rather than those arising at the local level. Simply put, IR represents mainstream governmentality, and anthropology represents local agency and resistance – in other words, the co-constitution of the subaltern, the state, and the international. Both IR and anthropology are required to produce a politically, socially, and economically sophisticated form of peace, avoiding domination and trusteeship, connected to the possibilities available through international collaboration but engaged with cultural and social patterns of legitimate authority.

**The peace formation turn**

Departing from the century long tension between anthropology and IR requires a multidimensional methodology and interdisciplinary approach – this, in fact, has been occurring for some time.\(^{52}\) The local and the everyday are contextual, historical, social,

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relational, and political, but cannot be reduced to power and interests, whether military, economic, or institutional. The local is not just ephemeral: it is also social and material. Thus, peace, its processes, and programmes, must be made through locally, with some dimensions addressed through states (statebuilding) and at the international level (peacebuilding and global governance).

Engaging with the local, the social, and the everyday dimensions of peace requires peace formation be added to the equation. Peace formation is not merely a rational site of knowledge (another technology of peace)\(^{53}\) but an ethical site of knowledge and an encounter of different types of identity and power/agency. Local knowledge may be seen as a complex social, political, cultural, economic system design to maintain peace and order in the face of shifting structures of power and resources, not to mention space.\(^{54}\) It should not be seen as a way of developing reliable local subjects.\(^{55}\) This requires an understanding of the ways local or ‘organic’ intellectuals, policymakers, politicians, bureaucrats, professionals, networks (social, professional, cultural, religious, identity, labour, leisure) and associations of ordinary people think of peace in everyday life. Peace formation offers what Appadurai describes as an ethnoscape, in this case of peace, partly aimed at claiming autonomy and moving beyond external or colonial control.\(^{56}\) It is not localised, as in being enclaved by ‘global governance’ but liberated by becoming constitutive of peace in general. Peace formation is not territorial;

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\(^{55}\) Ibid, p.181.

\(^{56}\) Ibid, p.183.
it is deterritorialised, transnational, transversal, or perhaps diasporic, but firmly aimed at emancipatory and empathetic forms of peace. This represents a situated form of community via a struggle for the necessary space, resources, autonomy, identity, and institutions. Peace formation would enable an appreciation of everyday agency, structural conditions related to material, spatial, and temporal dimensions of justice, networks, and institutional frameworks, simultaneously with an appreciation of their interplay as a forever unfinished process. It drives the emergence of peace agreement, the shape of the state, and international positionality from below, or across networks and scales, rather than from above through channels of northern authority.

Peace formation needs to utilise eclectic, adaptive, cross-cultural, and inventive approaches based on contextual experience (rather than external managerial technical planning) to overcome top down and external biases.\(^57\) It must move beyond the common external understanding of ‘local knowledge’ as environmentally oriented, when, in fact, it is also social, political, and cultural: ‘a system of concepts, beliefs, and ways of learning’.\(^58\) In peace formation, it is internationals who need to learn, rather than merely local actors, about the deeper dynamics of peace.\(^59\) But while internationals learn, they make mistakes and incur unintended consequences, presenting an ethical dilemma. Internationals need to be aware of the adaptability of local knowledge as well as its vulnerability.\(^60\) Yet local actors are hard working, ingenious, networked, and resilient, empowered by low-level solidarity, even if they are exposed, isolated, vulnerable and relatively weak.\(^61\) Many face a complex array of cultural,


\(^{59}\) *Ibid.*, p.84.


social, political, professional, and economic sanctions in their own contexts where they are identified by elites, nationalists, warlords, or other actors invested in the conflict, as being part of any peace movement, however loosely.

**Conclusion**

Peace formation means bottom up rather than top down empowerment (as AJR once pointed out)\(^{62}\) for all the latter’s risks. It would be a process of enablement and liberation rather than a process of intervention and governance (or governmentality in Foucaultian terms).\(^{63}\) The international architecture is still required however, as a check and balance against state power, and as an enabler of social justice. This requires an anthropological, ethnographic and social perspective of peace in which IR and anthropology combine to expose the tensions inherent in power and the local, and bridge the gap between the two without recreating a new hegemony.

Yet when anthropology risks being co-opted into power, it tends to withdraw, thus failing to hold power discursively accountable. Such a withdrawal is understandable given the past experiences of the co-optation of anthropology. An anthropology critical of its own colonial moment is useful for IR, stopping it from descending into interventionism and over-privileging the international, but an anthropology wary of politics risks over-privileging the local. The tendency of mainstream IR, given that it naturalises power relations across time

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and space regardless of justice, is to drag anthropology and ethnographic engagement back towards a more colonial set of analytical frameworks in the service of security and governance.\textsuperscript{64} Everyday life is still seen as subject to direct, governmental and structural power, perhaps even by divine right. Even critical IR is not adverse to instrumentalising the local or culture in the name of softer versions of political order. Thus, the dilemma remains: subjectivity challenges power, but power shapes subjectivity. For these reasons we might say the disciplines of IR and anthropology are in something of a crisis both with and without each other. IR lacks an understanding of subjectivity whilst anthropology lacks defences against power. Peace is a ground where they might negotiate these dangers together.