Consociationalism and Segmented Cleavages: The Case of Lebanon
Acknowledgments

This thesis would never have seen “the light of day” without the help from my friends and family. Special thanks to my dear Anna, my father Per Gunnar, friends at the University at Tromsø and most of all to my supervisor Jarle Weigård at the institute of political science who has helped in correcting numerous mistakes and offered guidance.
Consociationalism and Segmented Cleavages: The Case of Lebanon
Abstract

Consociationalism and segmented cleavages. The case of Lebanon is about the political development of Lebanon. It is intended to be an exploration, as objective as possible, to the development of major cleavages of Lebanese society related to Lebanese consociationalism. The “science of experience” has been useful as a basis of this thesis, thus the thesis is based on a theoretical framework, exploring Lebanese society from a consociational and a consensus – integrative, cross-cutting theory.

The turbulence of Lebanese society the last century and a half questions the stabilizing effects of the consociational institutions which Lebanon are based on. Lebanese consociationalism is in this work claimed to be based on wrong assumptions to which cleavages that divide the Lebanese society. The political system has been claimed to be disproportional, and to favour the domination of one community over others and it is accused of not including major social and secular forces into politics.

This thesis is dedicated to find what makes Lebanese consociationalism fail in mirroring and represent all major groups of society; which groups the Lebanese society consists of and which political, cultural or religious cleavages that’s divides them. Finally it explores some alternative institutional solutions, inspired by the consensus model of democracy, which may better represent the segmented society of 21st century Lebanon.
Consociationalism and Segmented Cleavages: The Case of Lebanon
Preface

This Thesis is motivated by my own experience; from the perspective of a UN soldier in 1996 and on fieldwork in February 2007. I experienced the diversity of the Lebanon Mountains, Beirut and South Lebanon, and I experienced Lebanon in periods of reconstruction. Both the civil war of 1975-1990 and the 2006 Lebanese – Israeli war made a serious impact on civil society. The 2006 war was followed by a political crisis – a polarization between the anti-Syrian government and the pro-Syrian opposition. No president was elected, creating a serious power vacuum. Thus, as I write this preface an agreement between the oppositional parties and the government is made, electing Lebanese Armed Forces general Michel Suleiman as president and changing the electoral law, further cementing sectarianism by dividing 40 cabinet positions on basis of religious preference, and giving the Hizbullah-led opposition veto ability in the new unity government. The agreement marks the end to an 18 months conflict between oppositional and government parties which resulted in serious clashes may 2008.
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APPENDIX 93
1 Introduction

1.1 Topic

The topic of this thesis considers social and cultural diversity within a state and how diversity is reflected through the representative institutions. Focus is on a small and heterogeneous Middle East country. The region of the Middle East has seen the coming and going of empires and rulers, shaping the administrative and political institution of the region. Movement of people groups has shaped the regions demography. Richard Hrair Dekmejian describes in his article, Consociational Democracy in Crisis, the region with these words: “While the outside world tends to view the Middle East in terms of its national components, the region remains a mosaic of sub national collectivises” (1978: 251). Lebanon is one of the countries that Dekmejian has in mind, and Lebanon is the case of this thesis. Lebanon is known for its turbulent past, of civil wars and domestic instability. The country has been trapped in the “middle”, both geographically, political and religiously in the power politics of neighbouring and western countries through centuries.¹

What makes Lebanon interesting in light of pluralist state theory, explored here, is its demographics and its institutional differences from other countries, with its complex politico-sectarian milieu and its democratic traditions. In contrast to other Middle East countries, Lebanon has a large proportion of Christian and Shiite Muslims compared to other Middle East countries, which usually has a majority of Sunni Muslims.² The complex politico-sectarian society is made up of many different religious communities struggling for positions and power. This more or less

¹ The Palestinian-Israel conflict is often referred to as the basis of other regional conflicts: the Israel-Egypt, Israel-Jordan, the Lebanese civil war and the latest Israel-Lebanon war. The Cold war alignments have certainly contributed to instability in the Middle East as in most other regions. The more resent US versus Syria and Iran conflict, concerns mid east hegemony; – which “world” or culture are going to have the monopoly of interference in the mid East development the next century – Islamism, or Western liberalism?
² Most Middle East countries have a majority of Sunni Muslims; only Iran has a majority of Shiites, and Shiites are the largest Muslim group in Lebanon (see the demography of the Middle East in CIA Fact book: https://www.cia.gov/library/). Syria and Lebanon has a large amount of Christians and different Christian groups (ibid).
“constructed”3 sectarian milieu has led to reforms favouring confessional based political and representative institutional solutions. In a developing Lebanese society there are some dilemmas that appear when establishing modern democratic institutions and at the same time balancing it to complex power structures between traditional sectarian communities and elites. Through time one group has always been dominating other groups, and reforms which intentions was to distribute power between the communities, has usually been in favour of one or a few groups (see Crighton 1991: 130-133 and Salibi 1965). Institutional reforms seem to have contributed to further cement confessional-community as the bases of power distribution. The institutionalization of sectarianism in Lebanon is in contrast to modernization processes and urbanization Lebanon has experienced the last century and a half (see Iskandar 2006, Farah 2000 and Makdisi 2000). The tradition of distributing parliamentary and government positions based on religious orientation is called confessionalism, a form of consociational democracy.

There have been tendencies towards a reinforcement of some cleavages and an increased polarization between groups in the Lebanese society through time (see Dekmejian 1978). The intensity of cleavages can be linked to the confessional based political system. Though other factors like extern actors and major conflict have an effect on the evolution of major cleavages in society, the focus of this thesis is the duality or mutual influence between the confessional based political system in Lebanon related to the major domestic social, political and religious cleavages.

1.2 The Problem and Research Questions

I am curious about what may be the best political institutional solutions to deeply divided societies like Lebanon, how the Lebanese society is divided and how this diversity is reflected through the political system. I am exploring segmented cleavages and the consociational democracy of Lebanon in order to find out how the consociational system has succeeded or failed in including and representing all major segments of Lebanese society, and eventually evaluate if

3 As explained later, Lebanese sectarianism may be conceptualized as a modern knowledge and a modern construction.
Lebanese consociationalism of modern Lebanon is in need of constitutional and electoral reform. From this interest I have constructed two research questions:

*How does the consociational political system of Lebanon, through its representative institutions, reflect the major diversities of the Modern Lebanese society? And which alternative institutions may contribute to more fair (proportional) representation on behalf of the segments of the Lebanese society?*

To answer the questions above I have made three secondary questions which specifies what I am exploring:

1) How is the Lebanese society divided?
2) Is there to be found a trend towards institutionalization and a cementation of sectarianism in government, and how does this affect representation of Lebanese diversity?
3) Can elements of the alternative consensus model of democracy contribute to political stability?

**1.3 Theories Used**

The main theoretical perspectives used in this thesis is Arend Lijphart characteristics of consociational democracy in *democracy in plural societies* (1977), Lijphart’s consensus model of democracy in *Patterns of Democracy* (1999), and Robert Dahl on *pluralist democracy* (1982), all of which has contributed to the exploration on how to manage more or less serious or deep diversity within a country. All of the models are based mainly on western countries in their examples. As secondary theory and perspectives on political development and stability I use Samuel Huntington (1996, 1968) and perspectives from various Arab writers.

Social and political differences within plural societies are held responsible for instability and breakdown of democracies (Lijphart 1977: 1). Lijphart considers consociational democracy as an institutional solution suited to heterogenic or plural societies. Arendt Lijphart explores lines of

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4 The term *consocio* (Italian) means *partner* or *associate*. Democracy in its pluralist version is polyarchy (see *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* Robert A. Dahl 1971). Democracy will have different meanings based on different perspectives of institutional solutions to diversity: majoritarian versus consensus democracy and integrative versus consociationalist power sharing solutions (see Sisk 1996, Horowitz 1985 and Lijphart 1999).

5 Small European countries like Belgium and the Netherlands.
diversity in heterogeneous, pluralist countries. Social cleavages are moderated if they are crosscutting, but they generate conflict if they are mutually reinforcing. In the case of deeply divided plural societies major cleavages are mutually reinforcing, also called segmented cleavages. Elites may work as possible moderators in the case of deeply divided societies (Lijphart 1968).

I use the consociate democracy model of Arendt Lijphart (1977) to examine the status of the confessional based system of Lebanon, the role of grand coalitions, elites, mutual vetoes, proportionality and the degree of segmental autonomy related to representative institutions. Lijphart (1981) examine the difference between pluralist and segmented society. As supplement to Lijphart on the diverse society, Dahl (1971, 1982) and Huntington (1996) contribute with their perspectives and characteristics of what makes a society deeply divided and what may be institutional and representative solutions to deeply divided societies.

I want to see if newly mobilized groups can be incorporated into politics in a peaceful manner. Here I use Huntington’s (1968) view on the relation between the development of political institutions and the mobilizing of new forces into politics. Samuel P. Huntington writes that: “political order depends in part on the relation between the development of political institutions (consociationalism) and the mobilization of new forces (political movement) into politics” (Huntington 1968 p. vii). If newly mobilized groups has difficulties being incorporated into politics this movement may become more radical or extremist.

Through these theories and the literature mentioned above I want to shed light on Lijphart’s main characteristics of the consociational society; grand coalitions, mutual veto, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and how the status of these ideal characteristics are mirrored in the Lebanese consociational system, giving a clue to how well the political system of Lebanon handle religious and political diversity. Ussama Makdisi (1966) argues that the sectarian diversity of Lebanon may be less “deep” or serious than other cleavages. Though I do, in some extent, agree to this assumption, I want to show how the sectarian diversity has been given a significant role through the confessional based distribution of power and government seats through time.
1.4 Methodological Choices

1.4.1 Structure

The challenge of this thesis is to give a satisfactory description of the complex diversities of Lebanon. What’s found to be the major cleavages, mutually reinforcing cleavages and segments of society is then related to the theoretical conditions and characteristics, concerning power distribution, of the consociational democracy; the multi confessional elite into grand coalitions, mutual veto, segmental autonomy and proportional representation. Election results are used to see how the distribution of government and administrative seats reflect the demography of Lebanon. In this way I find weaknesses in the political system, like disproportional representation of important groups and segments of society. This is the first of my main goals.

The second main goal is to explore how Lebanese diversity can be reflected more satisfactorily through the formulation and eventually implementation of a new electoral law and other institutions which make changes that contribute to proportionality in representation and mirrors what seem to be the major cleavages and segments of modern Lebanon. Lijphart’s (1999) consensus model of democracy is the inspiration.

The consociate model of Lijphart (1977) is illustrating an ideal situation. We may see that other perspectives like the consensus model are more useful to handle diversity in the case of modern Lebanon. When exploring how and why major lines of diversity of Lebanon have changed the last century I use the mobilization of different political parties and demographical changes as the main example. Political parties are given a special role through this thesis, eventually it is given the role as important institutions in the abolishment of sectarianism, opening for mass politics and representation on the basis of political preferences.

1.4.2 Collecting Data and Working with Data

Besides collecting data as statistics on elections and political parties I have made my own impressions through my travels in Lebanon. Through interviews of members of the different
religious communities and political analysts of AUB (American University of Beirut) I have made my own picture of Lebanese diversity. These qualitative impressions are a useful experience which helps in the interpretation of quantitative election data. The main qualitative data analysed in this thesis is demographical and election result data. Some mathematical formulas are used to illustrate group and party fragmentation and the number of main political movements\(^6\). Mathematics is also used to make an index of the degree of cross-cutting between the major cleavages – the sectarian-communal axis and the party-system axis. Other interesting numbers is the degree of volatility and cross organizational memberships of the population. Most of this data will be based on estimates and not on exact numbers because it is not possible to know the precise preferences of individuals\(^7\). People’s religious preferences are not mentioned in Lebanese statistics because it is a sensitive issue. Help in the analysis of the 2005 election is to be found in EU’s and Canada’s final report on their observation mission to Lebanon in 2005.

### 1.4.3 Research Tradition

This thesis has elements of both historical sociological, political development theory and the political institutional research tradition.\(^8\) The study of segmental cleavages is supported by the analysis of statistical data. Other relevant data is found in government and party documents. On the background of the Lebanese state and its diversity a lot of information is to be found in literature.

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\(^6\) Effective number of parties in a party system is explored by Murkuu Laakso and Rein Taagepera in *Effective Number of Parties: a Measure with Application to Western Europe* published in 1979. They have developed a mathematical formula – ENP (effective number of parties) = \(\frac{1}{\sum s_i^2}\). The fractionalization index was first developed by Douglas Rae (1967) and is calculated by the formula: \(F = 1 - \sum s_i^2\).

\(^7\) The volatility expresses the proportions of voters that shift their political preferences between elections. Estimates are substitutes. In the case of Lebanese demography, no census is made after 1932. One of the closest estimates to knowing the proportion of each segment and groups of the country at large, is through the election results – what is the proportion of each group participated in the election? Electoral participation of each group = Estimate \(\approx\) group size in population at large.

\(^8\) Political developmental theory is born in an age of development optimism. The paths towards democracy were through nation building, modernization and the decline of primordial loyalties. Huntington and Lijphart were two theoreticians which opposed to these evolutionary perspectives on development and looked for other paths’ towards stable democracy (see Hagopian 2000: 893-894, Huntington 1968 and Lijphart 1977: 21-24). The study of institutions is central to political development theory (Hagopian 2000: 893).
Some of the most influential researchers in the field of historical sociology and political development are Comparativists, like Arendt Lijphart who compare up to 36 countries at once (see Lijphart 1999). This is done both to find similarities and to find differences. My thesis, on the other hand, is an in dept analyses focusing on the diversity and political system of Lebanon and searches for some trends in its political development. But I am using consociational theory that is inspired by the study and comparison of small western European consociational democracies. I see Lebanese consociational democracy as quite different from that of Belgium and the Netherlands and other western European countries and have chosen not to give this thesis a comparative design. Thus, I use the comparative method in my analysis, in the sense that I relate or compare cleavages to each other.

From the perspectives of Macro oriented political sociology I found literature on evolutionary theory, cultural and political development theory from a cross-cultural perspective. But my thesis is also inspired by micro and western oriented sociology through Stein Rokkan (1989) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) with their focus on main revolutions to understand the development of major cleavages of society.\(^9\) Publications on the divided societies (Lijphart 1977, 1999, Dahl ) is a necessary supplement to understand why a national revolution may never appear and how group specific representative solutions may become an answer to societal heterogeneity.\(^10\) Researchers has become highly specialised in their work on specific regions (see Hagopian 2000). This makes comparison between regions more difficult. Comparison is kept between countries in the same region; Arab countries are compared with other Arab countries and Latin American countries are compared with other Latin American countries and so on. Micro political sociology bases their research on statistics and is western oriented. The literature of sociological macro tradition explores countries outside the western world. The Arab world has had a different development than that of the western world, some researches argue (see Huntington 1999). The Arab world consists of a civilization different in culture, languages and religions from that of the western world\(^11\). Another reason for treating the Arab world as another

\(^9\) The research tradition on cleavages and revolutions, see Stein Rokkan (1987) on development through revolutions and Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) on economic development.

\(^10\) The national revolution described by Rokkan (1987): a period or point in time where the people of a country developing a feeling of common identity.

\(^11\) The people of the world can be divided into civilisations, a broad definition of culture. This is explained by Samuel P. Huntington in *The Clash of Civilizations* (1999).
region and as a different field of research has to do with research methodology. Complete and correct Statistical data from Arab countries is not always available. In the case of Lebanon we are somewhat fortunate. Results from the last parliamentary elections and statistics on voter behaviour and also government documents are available. I will compare election data from the last elections, searching for interesting changes or trends in the material.

1.4.4 Considerations

Measuring diversity; economic, sectarian or other cultural characteristics which separate people, is challenging. In the case of Lebanon I make generalizations based on different kinds of data to find the major lines of diversity and the main segments I believe divide the people of this country. A lot of “trustworthy” qualitative and quantitative data is to be found on Lebanese diversity. But it is easy to make the wrong conclusions from statistics and literature. The goal is to find trends in the development supported by different sources, both from literature and through statistics.

There are considerations using Lijphart’s consociational democracy model and perspectives on segmentation as the ideal types or models to compare the Lebanese society. Lijphart’s consensus democracy is considered as an alternative. Some concepts may be unclear and have more than one meaning. The most important concepts such as consociationalism, democracy, pluralism, segmentation and sectarianism will be defined.

The validity of data and relation between concepts are considered. Through the analyses of chapter 4 and 5 I explain why some concepts and events may be related. The reliability of data is considered in every measurement. To secure that my data is reliable I use “trustworthy” sources.

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12 Karl R. Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002) [1935] explains that the only way of make shore of finding truth is through the empirical science – the science of experience. To make generalizations from data you have to make shore that your statements are in the form of basic statements – statements that can be falsified.

13 The evidence or data used to support a statement is valid if it is sufficient, representative and reported accurately from an authoritative source (see Booth 2003).
like professional statistical bureaus.\textsuperscript{14} When doing own measures reliability is best preserved by making use of known methods and doing the same measures many times.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{1.5 Disposition}

The first chapter has contributed with an introduction to the topic and questions explored in this thesis; \textit{Consociationalism and segmented cleavages: The case of Lebanon}. In chapter two Arend Lijphart’s (1977) model of the pluralist society and the \textit{consociational democracy} and Lijphart’s \textit{consensus democracy} is described. The development of sectarianism, political movements and the confessional based political system is described in chapter three (background). In chapter four the evolution of political mobilizations and the segmentation of society are illustrated. The fifth chapter (analysis) evaluate Lebanon as a consociational state and I give a general perspective on the Lebanese political system. Chapter six analyse some contradiction between modern society and liberal democracy on the one side and pluralist, segmented society and confessionalism on the other. Here I put the theories of Lijphart up against each other. The last chapter connects all of my chapters. Some concluding remarks are made, thus, the major conclusions are made through the analysis.

\textsuperscript{14} Reliability is secured by using the right method and doing the calculations and measurements the correct way.
\textsuperscript{15} Karl R. Popper in his theory of scientific work represented through \textit{The Logic of Scientific Discovery} (2002) [1935] some ideal norms or rules (methodology) are established, to make sure science and its conclusions is made as precise and correct as possible. One important norm is that scientific statements must be possible to test and criticize. This is the norm of inter-subjectively testability (2002:34). The method of empirical research may be interpreted as experience (2002:30). Through experience statements or hypothesis are falsified and replaced by alternative or better hypothesis.
2 Societal Diversity and Consociated Democracy

I will describe some theories and concepts concerning the stability of divided societies. Concepts and terms important in making the research questions meaningful are being explored and defined. The analytical framework of this thesis can be taught of going along three dimensions. One dimension follows the history and development of sectarianism, the constitutional and demographical changes of Lebanon. The thesis is organized round Lijphart’s (1977) four main characteristics of consociational democracy. And a third dimension considers the relations between Lijphart’s consociational democracy model versus alternative institutional solutions represented through the consensus model of democracy. The historic background is presented in the next chapter. In the two first section of this chapter, below, I introduce some general concepts on diversity – segmentation and pluralism. In the next two sections I introduce the consociated democracy model and the consensus model of Arend Lijphart which I in the analysis relate to the major cleavages and diversity of the Lebanese society. Other main concepts and theories necessary to building the framework of this thesis is represented in the last sections.

The main reason for choosing the models and theories of Lijphart, Dahl, and Huntington is their common focus. They have all their focus on political development and diversity or pluralism within states. Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy is used to help describe the political institutional, representative solutions of the divided society of present Lebanon; the consensus model, that seem to apply to a wider range of plural and semi-plural states, help in the interpretation of alternative institutional solution to diversity that is up to date to the developments and trends in the political and social milieu of Lebanon. Huntington explores diversity by introducing the factor of civilizations as a measurement of cultural diversity between people and groups.

2.1 The Segmented Society

A plural society is a society divided by segmental cleavages (Eckstein 1966: 34 and Lijphart 1977: 4). In this thesis I am going to relate the term segments to groups of society bounded by these segmented cleavages.
2.1.1 Plural Societies and Segmented Cleavages

A country is pluralist if there is “a plurality of relatively autonomous subsystems or segments within the domain of the state” (Dahl 1982:5). In all democratic countries, and some quasi democratic countries, organizations or subsystems are relatively independent and make these countries pluralistic. A country can be described as more or less pluralist or divided.

In the case of Lebanon I am going to use the term segmented society to describe a deeply divided society containing segments or different communities. Main cleavages are mutually reinforcing between these communities rather than cross-cutting. In less divided societies difference is usually based on political interests and ideology. Political interests of a person or group can easily be shifting, but in the deeply divided, pluralist society, difference is not only based on political preferences and ideology but on cultural, religious and ethnic characteristics of the people; characteristics of a person or group which are not expected to be shifting, at least not in the short run.

2.1.2 Cleavages and Cross-cutting versus mutual reinforcing lines of diversity

Rae and Taylor in the Analysis of Political Cleavages (1970:1) explain that cleavages are the criteria which divide the members of a community or sub community into groups. The relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places. Cleavages are on different levels of measurement; the ascriptive, attitudinal and behavioural. The ascriptive measures the degree of heterogeneity, attitudinal measures degree of dissensus and the behavioural measures degree of fractionalization in the population. In my analysis the attitude and the ascriptive level is most central, describing group’s difference in ideology and opinion (attitude) and relation to specific religious communities (ascriptive).

The degree of cross-cutting is related to the seriousness or dept of societal diversity. When cleavages are mutually reinforcing we say that there is a positive relation between cleavages. Rae and Taylor define cross-cutting as, “to what extent two cleavages divide a community along different axes” (1970: 4). Fractionalization and cross-cutting are used to measure diversity in this
analysis. The Fractionalization index of Douglas Rae (1967) and the NEP (number of effective parties) of M. Laakso and R. Taagepera (1979) and are used to illustrate diversity or fragmentation of groups along one cleavage. Religion, ethnicity and race, are more significant cleavages as basis for political identity and collective action today, than the class cleavage (see Hagopian 2000: 905 and Huntington 1996).

2.1.3 Sectarianism

Sectarian diversity is of special interest in this thesis. Sects are religious groups and sectarianism refers to a culture of seeing the sect and sectarian-communities in a multi sectarian society as an important factor of group-identification and through the sharing of positions and power (see Akarli 1993). There are different perspectives to how sectarianism came to be an important characteristic of the Lebanese society. In the background chapter (3) I will describe some mayor event through Lebanese history that may share some light on the phenomena and evolution of Lebanese sectarianism.

2.2 Consociationalism

Arend Lijphart’s Consociational democracy theory is presented through challenges to pluralist societies of 1977. Consociationalism may be seen as a product of institutional engineering to secure the representation and inclusion of ethnic, religious or linguistic groups within a heterogenic society\(^\text{16}\). This is done by sharing political power and government positions between the major groups of society. The form of consociationalism in Lebanon can be described as confessionalism, a type of consociationalism based on the distribution of political influence and power between groups on confessional or religious grounds.

Consociationalism is distinct from pluralism in that it is meant to apply to societies in which few memberships cut-across ethnic or religious cleavages while plural societies rely on individuals holding multiple memberships, memberships that do cut across societal cleavages (see Eisenberg

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\(^{16}\) Lijphart’s consociational model was created as a response to political development theory of the present (1960-70s). Lijphart meant that present development theory had exaggerated the degree of homogeneity in western countries (see Lijphart 1977: 21).
Consociationalism and Segmented Cleavages: The Case of Lebanon

Overlapping memberships are a component that is absent from the segmented societies on which Lijphart focuses. The evaluation of cleavages of society being mutually reinforcing or cross-cutting cleavages is of importance in considering a society to be divided in such an extent that it deserves the title segmented or deeply divided.

If a society is completely pluralist, four criteria have to be fulfilled Arend Lijphart (1981) explains. If a society is completely pluralist (segmented) it must be possible to identify the segments in which the society is divided. Second, it must be possible to measure the size of each segment. Third, there is a perfect correspondence between segmental boundaries and the boundaries between the political, social, and economic organizations. Political parties are covered by these last criteria. And Last, in completely plural societies, party and segmental loyalties coincide, which result in little or no change in voting support of the parties, from election to election. These criteria’s are important in evaluating how successful my explanation of Lebanese diversity is (chapter 4).

Lijphart (1977) give four characteristics of a typical consociate state. First we find a grand coalition in government which consist of the major elites of each pillar or segment. They come together to cooperate because they recognise the dangers of non-cooperation. Much responsibility lay on the segmental elites to stabilize the relationship between segments. Secondly, there exists consensus among the groups to confirm the majority rule. There exists a mutual veto between groups. Thirdly, each pillar in society has an equal share or proportionally amount of the positions in government, civil cervices and other national and civil segments in society, based on the pillars proportion of the total population (proportional representation). The last characteristic concern communal-segmental autonomy and cultural specific group right. Autonomy gives room for the different communities to uphold their own local school, mosques, churches, courts, laws and practices. All of these four characteristics are important in keeping this society stable and manage conflict (Eisenberg 2002:8). Thus, Lijphart identifies the grand coalition of segmental elites and segmental autonomy and even segmental isolation as the most important to make consociationalism work (Lijphart 1971:10).
Segmental autonomy or limited forms of self-government provides each minority with the security it needs to ensure that its distinctive interests are protected and minimizes the degree to which it must coordinate, compromise and negotiate with other minorities (Eisenberg 2002:8). Lijphart argue that, “good fences make good neighbours” (1971:11). A grand coalition amongst minority elites facilitates elite cooperation and collaboration. The coalition can take a variety of institutional forms including, a coalition cabinet in parliamentary systems, or a distribution of different offices amongst elites of each minority, or equitable representation on councils and advisory boards that support government. Consociationalism incorporates (group specific representational) proportionality as a principle of political representation. The mutual veto acts as the ultimate weapon of the minority in order to protect its fundamental interests.

Lijphart (1977) also describe seven favourable conditions making the consociational state possible. Firstly, Lijphart believe that at least three or more groups should chair the political power. The tree or more disparate groups do all constitute minorities. There exists a *Multi-axis balance of power*. The secondly favourable condition is the existence of a *multi-party system*. One party cannot dominate the other parties, but it is necessary to build coalitions. A thirdly and important condition concerns the *size* of the country. There is more likely that the consociate democracy function well in a small country. This makes the elite members of society more likely to be familiar with each other. This is related to condition four which states that the disparate groups should have a common *feeling of belonging to the same political environment*. Lijphart states as a fifth condition that the close contact between the segments imposes conflict. Therefore the segments of society should, in some extent, be *isolated* from each other. Sixth, there is a tradition of *elite accommodation*. And last, the *elites are firmly in control* and have the support of followers.

How is the model used? Lijphart’s consociationalism has been used as a description of the Lebanese political system. As mentioned in the first chapter the consociated theory of Lijphart will help us understand the Lebanese political system and how well the institutional and constitutional reforms of Lebanon have responded to the politico-sectarian diversity of Lebanon.
2.3 The Consensus Model of Democracy

Arend Lijphart’s consensus model (1999:31-47) is in contrast to Lijphart’s majoritarian or the Westminster democracy model (ibid: 9-30), on the issue of how many parties (majority rule or grand coalitions) should constitute the government. Thus, in the case of Lebanon I use the consensus models characteristics as alternatives and not directly in contrast to that of the consociational model. The consensus model is a more general model and can correspond to many plural and semi-plural societies of today. Some of its characteristics may, better than the consociational model, apply to Lebanese political environment of today. The consensus model consists of ten characteristics. I have picked out the eight most relevant of these characteristics to the case of Lebanon.

Executive power sharing in broad coalition cabinet: Like the consociational model the consensus model favours broad coalition cabinets to secure representation and the inclusion of all major parties. Executive-legislative balance of power: In contrast to majoritarian models of democracy, both the consociational model and the more general consensus model favour a balance of power between the executive and the legislative institutions in contrast to the disproportional stronger cabinet of majoritarian models (see Lijphart 1999: 36). Multi party system: This is a favourable characteristic in both models. In the consociational model parties represent specific segments of society. In the consensus model there seems not to be a problem if the party system cleavage cross cuts major cultural or religious cleavages, while in the consociational model these cleavages are mutually reinforcing. Proportional representation: This is a favourable characteristic in both models. But the consensus model can apply to politics and an electoral system based on votes and proportion of votes distributed between different political parties, while the electoral system in the consociational model is based on votes to mandates which belong to specific segments or groups of society. Interest group corporatism: Lijphart distinguishes between two types of corporatism – social and liberal corporatism (ibid 37-38). Labour unions are referred to as social organization that predominates in social corporatism. In Liberal corporatism, business associations are the strongest force. Incorporation of cross segmental and secular organizations into politics is in contrast to the consociational model – segmental autonomy and isolation. Federal and decentralized government: This is a favourable characteristic in both models. Through federalism and decentralization local communities are
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given self government rights. **Strong bicameralism:** If a society has linguistic, cultural, religious or ethnic minorities these groups can be represented through the second chamber. Strong bicameralism implies that the model can apply to less pluralist societies than the consociational model. In The consociational model the society is highly pluralist and the legislative is already divided between groups as a whole through group specific representation. Bicameralism in less heterogeneous countries works as a special representative institution in favour of minorities. In the highly pluralist developing countries I assume bicameralism may contribute to a balance of power between traditional, sectarian forces (chamber 1), elected on basis of sectarian lines, and new reformist forces, secular movements (chamber 2), elected on basis of “pure” PR. Strong bicameralism can also be contrasted to the consociational models criteria of segmental autonomy because at least one of the chambers cross-cut memberships (segmental contact and integration) because it is elected in a different manner than the other chamber. **Constitutional rigidity:** It takes some form of majority approval to change the constitution. This characteristic can be related to the characteristic mutual veto of the consociational model; the ability of different groups to veto constitutional change. In the consensus countries 2/3 or ¾ majority are required to change the constitution. Support from all important segments of society is not necessary. So every major group or segment of society does not necessarily have veto power in the consensus model, but in the consociational model this is a criterion.

The characteristics of the consensus models are relevant to that of the consociational model on major issues concerning stability, government and representation in the pluralist country. The main issues: group specific representation (consociationalism) versus “pure” PR (western European style proportional representation); candidates elected on basis of their personal characteristics (religion or ethnicity) or their political views; communities or electoral districts boundaries based on confession or political communities; Segmental autonomy and isolation, mutually reinforcing cleavages versus cross-cutting cleavages and cross-cutting memberships; representative democracy and proportionality versus disproportional representation, majority and domination; elite driven processes and sectarian based grand coalitions versus mass politics and party politics; sectarian movements versus political parties (with an ideology and a party program); consensus democracy versus effective opposition and majority. While the consensus model have consensus or integrative arguments towards diversity the consociational model
emphasize that the groups of society has as little contact as possible, and the only contact is the cooperation between the segmental elites – the elite cartel. The distinctions between the models become useful in the discussion of the Lebanese regime of today to that of tomorrow in chapters five and six.

2.4 Core States and Civilizational Fault Lines

Through time grante nations, empires and the movement of people groups has shaped the demography, social and political environment of the Middle East. In the Clash of Civilizations of 1996, Samuel P. Huntington explains the meaning and importance of civilizational fault lines within and between countries to understand deep diversities. The culture of the different groups of culturally divided countries can be connected to that of major civilizations; the eastern and orthodox, versus the western and Christian versus the Arabic and Islamic civilization. Groups are, besides religious diversity, oriented towards a specific civilization through its linguistics. Western oriented groups may have less considerations using and teaching French and English or other western languages than eastern oriented or Islamic groups.

For some 18th century French thinkers, civilized societies were different from primitive societies because it was urban and literate (Huntington 1996:40). Huntington identifies civilization as the broadest form of cultural entity. The Orthodox civilization separates itself from the western, by its “Byzantine parentage, distinct religion and limited exposure to reformation and enlightenment” (ibid: 45, 46). The Islamic civilization is likewise separated from other civilizations by its specific culture, linguistics and religion. Language is mentioned as second to religion a factor distinguishing one culture from another (Ibid: 70).

On a micro level fault line conflicts occur between groups from different civilizations within a state and between groups which are attempting to create new states within the state (a claim of self-government) (see Huntington 1996:208). Cultural and civilizational cleavages are more serious than that of political interests and ideology. “Secular ideology between Marxist-Leninism
and liberal democracy can be debated if not resolved”, while cultural questions on the other hand usually involves a zero-sum solution\textsuperscript{17}, or a yes or a no answer (Ibid: 130).

Civilizations may be related to a state which match the characteristics of the civilization and have sufficient political and military strength to serve and protect the civilization; this state is a core state of that civilization (see Huntington 1996: 155-164). In modern times Sunni Saudi Arabia has been the closest state to have recognition as a core state of Islam (see ibid: 178). The Greek orthodox and the Armenians have had a close relation to Russia, and Russia still has a role as a core state of an Orthodox civilization (ibid: 162-164). The western civilization is related to Christianity and the developed countries of Europe, North America and other Anglo-Saxon countries.

\textbf{2.5 Other Relevant Theory and Terms on Diversity, and Development}

The three last sections below, introduce some perspectives on modernity and development. The first concept, secularization, is in contrast to sectarianism. The nest term, Modern organization, is in contrast to traditional elite hierarchies.

\textbf{2.5.1 Secularization}

In a Sociological term secularization is differentiation and specialization. Service and organizations that earlier went under church administration is being taken over by state bureaucracies. Religious pluralism has aided the spread of rationalising tendency and it is leading people away from religion Hamilton (1995) explains. In the private sphere, secularisation is related to an abolishment of any commitment to traditional values and practises. The people may becoming more acceptant to change and found their decisions and actions on a “rational” basis. Though it is clamed, that, when you accept modernization, like economic development, it is impossible to avoid, “a radical and destructive remaking of life and society, and, often, a reinterpretation of the meaning of existence itself” (Toynbee 1961: 73) Secularization may be unavoidable for a modernizing people.

\textsuperscript{17} In game theory, the zero sum outcome of a game means that there is a finite zero-sum outcome. In a game of two players; if the one player gains the other loses equivalent to what the other wins.
2.5.2 Traditional to Modern Organization

Eisenstadt’s (1968) theory on modernisation explores the development of modern states and the states of the third world. The early modern society was recognised by traditional values and family-status hierarchies that undermined rationality and legal-rational leadership. In the modern society all is rationalized, even religion in driven in to the individual’s rationality. The total state structure is fragmented into a lot of specialised institutions. As a consequence, the individual are able to shift between loyalties. You will get more social mobility. This makes a modern political party system work. The people can choose between parties and their political programs. Eisenstadt, like Lijphart describes why elites are important in mobilizing members of society into politics. His model of cultural evolution and social mobilization describes how society in earlier colonial states may have changed and are changing from traditional societies towards “modern” societies.

Stein Rokkan emphasizes nation building as a necessary step towards building a national common identity and state stability (see Rokkan 1987). Samuel P. Huntington describes political modernization as national integration. It involves the replacement of traditional, religious, and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national political authority (Huntington 1968:34). Political order depends on the relation between the development of the political institutions and the mobilization of new forces and their inclusion into politics (ibid vii). Hench, nation building is an important task of reformist and leaders of developing states. Thus, Huntington writes in his work *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, that development towards stable democracy in third world counties does not rest on the abolishment of traditional values and primordial loyalties, but it rests on the citizen’s commitment to democracy (see Huntington 1991).

2.6 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Two

Lijphart’s consociational theory is different from that of Dahl and Huntington’s theory of democracy, in his defence of segmental autonomy (collective rights) and segmental isolation, while the other sees integration and liberal democracy (nation building and individual rights) as main solutions to diversity. Lijphart’s consensus model seems to be more general than the
consociational model and is useful to describe a wider range of plural and semi-plural countries. This different perspective comes useful in the evaluation of solutions to diversity in Lebanon in the analysis of this thesis. Huntington’s theory of civilizations is later analysed as an important cultural cleavage to understand Lebanese diversity.
3 The Historical Background to Lebanese Diversity and the Political System

I will give an introduction to the Lebanese history and describe some main events or reforms which I believe represent important changes to the complex sectarian-political environment of Lebanon. The starting point of Lebanese modern history may be located to the 1920s and the establishment of Greater Lebanon under French mandate, giving Lebanon the territorial boarders of today. To get a fuller and more qualified perspective on Lebanese sectarianism and diversity I have to go back a bit further. I place the starting point of this history to Lebanon Mountains under Ottoman influence in the mid nineteen century.

3.1 1840 – 1920 Administrative Reform and Religious Diversity of Ottoman Lebanon

In the 1500s, the Ottoman millet system gave religious group’s autonomy through some form of external protection\textsuperscript{18}, from interference in communal-religious business. But Sunnis were always treated as superior to the others groups. Feudalism was the dominant social structure until the 1830s. But in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century a wave of western inspired administrative reforms reached Lebanon Mountains. The traditional feudal families of the Mountain fought to maintain traditional privileges (Farah 2000:5). The administrative reform \textit{Tanzimat} of 1839 made all subjects equal before the law regardless of their religion (Makdisi 2000: 3).

The western missionaries coming to Lebanon Mountain in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century constructed a discourse of Mount Lebanon’s tribal characteristics, by separating the people into Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Shiite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic or Melkite in their discourse (Makdisi 2000: 16-17). The two main religious groups of the mountain were the Christian Maronite and the Muslim Druze communities. The Druze community appeared in the eleventh century and established themselves in the south of Mount Lebanon (Makdisi 2000: 29). The Maronites settled

\textsuperscript{18} Group rights and the Millet system: Will Kymlicka (1995) explain that in the European dark middle ages, the Ottoman Empire offered protection to Jews and Christians which fled from Europe in fear of persecution because of a their “wrong” interpretation of the word of God. In the Ottoman Empire the different religious groups was offered external protection; religious freedom on a collective but not an individual level.
in Mount Lebanon during the tenth and eleventh century following persecution by the Byzantines (Makdisi 2000: 29). The Melkites (Greek Catholic) and especially the Maronites has a long tradition of cooperation with France and the western world. During the crusades, the Maronites went into a formal union with the Roman Catholic Church and Maronites have always seen themselves as the last outpost of western and Christian civilization in the Muslim dominated Arab region (see Crighton 1991: 129).

While the centuries went by, the two major communities of Lebanon mountain developed peaceful relations with each other. Thus some minor clashes between the two communities were common. In the 1840s tensions between Druze and Maronites increased. The conflicts between 1840 and 1861 started as an economic revolution against the Mountains feudal system. The system collapsed into a communal conflict (Mackey 1989: 40). The conflict became more dangerous when the dimension of religious diversities was included to the already up heated political climate. The civil war of 1860 can also be seen as a reaction to a redefinition of new communal and social boundaries introduced via administrative reforms and a declining feudal system (Makdisi 2000). The cumulative impact of the Egyptian invasion of Syria, the fall of the Shiab’s (ruler family of Lebanon Mountain), the introduction of the Tanzimat, and the intervention of the Europeans contributed to the climate that opened Mount Lebanon to the possibilities of a new political order, based on religious differentiation (Makdisi 2000: 51-66). Europeans together with the Ottomans reinvented Mount Lebanon in sectarian terms in 1842, dividing it administratively along religious lines\(^{19}\) (see ibid: 51-95).

To some European thinkers as Mill, colonialism offered an effective method of ensuring the spread of the western civilization (ibid: 5). Ottoman Lebanon and most of the Middle Eastern region, was going through major social and cultural changes as part of this general movement of western inspired modernization reforms (see Salibi 1965: 120). After the civil war of 1860-61 a special administrative regime, the *mutasarrifiyya*, was established, giving the mountain more

\(^{19}\) In 1842 the French, British, Russian, Austrian, and Prussian ambassadors to Istanbul met with the Ottoman foreign minister to seek an agreeable solution to the problems of the Mountain, and in so doing they set a precedent. In the meeting, the parties involved realized that they agreed only on the irreconcilability of the Druze and Maronite positions. Consequently, they decided to divide the Mountain into two qāimaqāmīyās, or districts, one in the north under a Maronite district governor (qāimaqām) and the other in the south under a Druze district governor (Akarli 1993: 27-28)
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autonomy from rest of the Ottoman Empire (see Akarli 1993: 6). French aid made Maronite domination possible through this regime, which gave the Maronites privileges over the Druze community (Crighton 1991: 130).

The Ottoman Empire had been declining for centuries. Finally it collapsed at the end of the First World War. The French gained control over Syria; which contained the area of Mount Lebanon. Mount Lebanon was soon separated from the rest of Syria by the French. The main argument in favour of this solution was the large Maronite Christian population of Mount Lebanon which needed some “protection”, surrounded by a Muslim region. Syria and Mount Lebanon consisted also of other Christian communities; Greek Catholic or Melkites, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Catholics and Armenian Orthodox. The Lebanese country was later extended to include the coast line and the Beeka valley Districts. This extension to the Greater Lebanon meant that a Sunni Muslim population and Shiite Muslim area were included into the territorial state of Lebanon.

3.2 1920 – 1943 French Mandate, Christian Domination and Demographic Changes

In A house of many mansions, the history of Lebanon reconsidered Kamal Salibi writes that “the Lebanese society enjoyed the reputation for liberalism and tolerance, being traditional rather than zealous or fanatical in its attitude towards religion and political ideology” (Salibi 1988:1).

In 1920 the country was established as a state under French mandate. Through the consociational system developed through the constitution of 1926 and further institutionalized through the national pact of 1943, Lebanon distributes power and positions proportionally through multi member districts. The census of 1932 concluded that there was a demographical 5 to 6 proportion between Muslims and Christians of the population (Mackey 1989: 12-13). The French wanted the presidency to go to a Christian, the premier to a Sunni and speakership to Shiite, and using the 5 to 6 ratio in the distribution to a single house parliament and administrative positions (Mackey 20 See appendix map 1 and 2 or Itamar Rabinovich (1985) The War for Lebanon, 1970 – 1985, Ithaca, N. Y: Cornell University Press, page 23.
But during the nineteen thirties the Muslim population had grown larger than that of the proportion of Christians due to the Shiites higher birth rate and immigration.

The Maronites mobilized into politics earlier than the Muslims and had dominated the political and the economic system with the help of their French allied. A western oriented business class pulled in foreign capital. But the institutional, politico-sectarian structure created gross inequalities in wealth between Lebanese and in economic development between Beirut and the rest (peripheral areas) (Dekmejian 1978: 259-260 and Salibi 1965). “Greater Beirut and the mountainous areas in south and north of the city were like a prosperous city state while the Akkar region in the North, Jabal Amil in the south and Beeka Valley in the east, largely populated by Sunni and Shiite Muslims, were zones of economic stagnation” (Mackey 2006: 13).

3.3 1943 – 1963 Reformist Movements and Pan Arabism

The National pact of 1943 divided political offices between the main religious groupings (Crighton 1991: 131). The president went to the Maronites, the premier to the Sunnis and the speaker of parliament went to the Shiite. Parliamentary seats were distributed between Christians and Muslims according to the 6:5 ratios. Lijphart sees this arrangement as an example of good elite accommodation (ibid). According to Crighton this arrangement worked because it met the needs of Maronites for dominance within the system. The arrangement was an assurance for the Maronites that feared engulfment into the overall Muslim region. Crighton explains that the Muslim were willing to accommodate the Maronites with predominance in order to ousted the French. While the Maronites were willing to give up French protection if they could be assured dominance sufficient to protect their minority status in the region (ibid: 132). The Muslim sectarian elites, who agreed to the arrangement, were in conflict to the policy of newly mobilized Muslims (ibid). Muslim opposition fractions wanted a greater share of power. The delicate balance of power inhibited the development of institutions capable of broad political reform and representation. Dominated by only one or two groups, especially through the executive power, the Lebanese state lacked the autonomy important to political development (ibid).
The French was by many Christians seen as the protector of the Christians of Lebanon from the Arab Islamist region. The British, in favour of Syrian-Lebanese independence, supported the Muslims and Arab nationalists and Christian patricians of the Constitutional Block (Salibi 1988: 186). Salibi explains that Lebanese independence in 1941 was followed by a revival of party politics. Emile Edde mobilized his supporters into the National bloc, in favour of Lebanese independence (Lebanese nationalism) but under the assurance to the French to still maintain some connection with the French in fear of a future absorption into a pan Arab state. The idea of an independent Lebanon was also supported by some Muslims, seeing Lebanon as distinct from the rest of the Arab region (ibid: 187). This Christian – Muslim alliance is still to day known as the National Pact. The Muslims and Christians agreed to keep a thirty to twenty-five or six to five distribution of political and administrative positions before the general election summer 1943 (ibid: 188). The Constitutional Bloc was the winner of the election, and the chamber elected Khuri (Maronite) as president in September. Khuri called upon chief Muslim ally Sulh to form a government consisting of the six major sects; the Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics (Melkites), and Druze. A grand coalition on a confessional basis was born. No sect could alone determine policy. Thus, the Maronite and the Sunnis had the largest proportion of the positions in relation to the population at large. The problem was that the confessional system was probably based on a flawed census of 1932, assuming that the Christians had a majority of the populations and that they in all feature are going to constitute a majority\(^{21}\). In reality, it’s possible that the Muslim proportion of the population was larger than that of the Christian already in the 1930s (see Mackey 1989: 111).

“The political reform of the National Pact gave a new distribution of parliamentary seats. Dominant groups’ insecurity influenced the shape of the state and representative organs by encouraging the institutionalization of political inequality, via quotas of representation (5/6 ratio) or even exclusionary rules. The institutionalization of dominance coexists with political underdevelopment” (Crighton 1991:139)

\(^{21}\) According to CIA Fact Book, the Christians of today’s Lebanon constitute an estimated 39 percent of the population (updated may 2008).
The French was not willing to recognize Lebanese independence (Salibi 1988: 189). According to Salibi, Kataib (Christian Lebanese nationalist), Najjada (Muslim) and other, both Muslim and Christian parties forgot old feuds in a common struggle for the international society and France to recognize Lebanese independence. Lebanon was unified against the French and with the pressure from the US and Britain, France was regularly forced to recognize Lebanese independence in 1943 (ibid: 190). Arab nationalism remained an important issue, but the government, had a relatively mild Arab nationalist regional policy (ibid: 192). The Khuri government was relatively weak because sectarian and family policies predominated. There was also a culture of political clientelism developed under French mandate that corrupted politics.

The failure of Syria and Lebanon to represent the Arab cause in Palestine gave in 1949 heart to the Syrian National Party (later Syrian Social Nationalist Party, SSNP). The movement consists of mainly Orthodox Christians. The government tried to suppress organizations with a paramilitary character like SNP, Christian Kataib (Phalange Party) and Najjada (Muslim militia). This forced Kataib and Najjada over to the opposition. These movements were later reconstituted as political parties (ibid: 193). The election of 1951 increased the representation of the opposition in the chamber. Part of the opposition was the Kataib, SNP, National bloc and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party formed in 1949. This, Chamoun-Janbalat (Christian-Druze) alliance pretended to support a distinct political ideology (communism) and called their alliance the Socialist Front. Though, their only real common interest was their opposition to the sitting government (ibid: 194). Under severe pressure on the government Kurih had to resign and Chamoun was elected president 1952, (ibid). Lebanese politics was dominated by the Christians and the Muslim were poorly represented and mobilized in the following period. Lebanese Muslim leaders looked to Egypt for support (ibid: 198). Abd al Nasser of Egypt had turned to communist powers for support. President Chamoun saw the pro Egyptian agitation as a threat to Lebanese independence and the Lebanese president sought a guarantee from the US and the western world (ibid: 199). Before the general election the Muslims mobilized the opposition with support of the Druze leader Janbalat and Christian Khuri under the banner of the National Front (ibid: 200). But the Syrian nationalists (SNP), the National block and the Kataib party still stood

\[^{22}\text{Some Palestinians are Christian Orthodox, making a connection between the Palestinians cause and the Orthodox SNP. The Palestinian cause may be one reason for Lebanese Orthodox to be considered more eastern oriented than the Catholics, and embracing some form of Arab nationalism (Syrian nationalism).}\]
behind the president and approved of the governments foreign policy. Since the country’s opposition was not divided along strict sectarian lines, Chamoun, besides his support of Christians, could also count on support of a substantial number of Muslim (ibid). The new government was formed by President Shihab and the National Front.

There is a deep rift between the Christians and the Muslims concerning Lebanon as an independent state. While Christians has enthusiastically supported the establishment of Greater Lebanon – the Lebanese republic, the Muslims rejected it (Salibi 1988: 2). Prior to the tensions of 1958, the Christians had identified themselves in terms of Lebanese particularism and the Muslims with pan-Arabism and to other orientations linking Lebanon to the Greater Syria or as a part of the greater Arab region. Another crucial conflicting issue in the pre civil war years (pre 1975) was the refusal or acceptance of the free right of the Palestinian revolution to operate in Lebanon and from Lebanon (ibid). The Lebanese people of today are still divided alongside these conflicting issues mentioned above.

Crighton explains that efforts at political reform by Shihab and other important reformists in the pre civil war years, were much too little and too late to make way for a peaceful incorporation of outsiders: “Traditional elites had chronically ignored their interests alienated outsiders from traditional politics and in so doing heightened the appeal of nationalist and irredentist ideologies and radical demands” (Crighton 1991:138).

3.4 1963 – 1975 Slide into Chaos, Uncover Underlying Diversity

President Shihab was convinced that the political system was not going to change to the better. He had tried to improve social educational and administrative conditions in the poorest and mostly Muslim populated regions of Hermel, the Beqaa, Akkar and in the north, and equal opportunities to Muslims without too many results (Iskandar 2006:35). President Charles Helo (elected 1964) was also unsuccessful in reducing the tensions that were building up. Lebanon was slipping into financial crisis and there was growing frictions between Palestinians and Syrian led

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23 President Shihab was in the 1950’s a stabilizing factor to the Lebanese society. He was a modernist with a social direction (Iskandar 2006: 33). He improved underdeveloped areas and worked to achieve good governance.
fractions. This crisis led to the Cairo agreement. The agreement gave the Palestinian military
to the Cairo agreement) by the Sunni leaders, the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and the
Syrians.

“The General of the Lebanese armed forces Emile Bustani signed with Arafat the Cairo
agreement which contradicted Lebanon’s international obligations and opened the country to
dangerous winds of change. A time bomb was set in the politico-sectarian scene” (Iskandar
2006:34).

In 1975 the Christians made up an estimated 40 percent of the population, the Shiite community
32 percent and rising, the Sunni community 22 percent and the Druze community 6 percent
(Mackey 1989: 12). Tensions between Muslim and Christians can also be related to the electoral
law based on the census of 1932 that gave Christians a majority of the positions in parliament and
administrative positions.

3.5 1975 – 1989: Civil War Years and Muslim Mobilization

In the 1960s Lebanon went into deep financial crisis followed by growing frictions between
Palestinian and Syrian-led Palestinians fractions. The following Cairo agreement undermined the
Lebanese sovereignty. This led to an up heated politico-sectarian milieu that eventually became
so unstable that it developed into a full scale war between domestic groups. The different militias
had support from different extern actors. This economical and weapon technical support to
different sects from foreign countries only worsened the situation (see Iskandar 2006: 35).

The Muslims had success in mobilizing during the 1950s-70s under the banner of Arab
nationalism, Islamism and in some degree socialist ideology. The Sunnis traditionally carried the
banner of Arab nationalism. They represented a significant force supporting Nasserite policies
until 1967, and later they advocated freedom for Palestinian fighters to attack Israel from the
Lebanese borders. By the time Palestinian fighters were evicted from Beirut in September 1982, two Lebanese fractions were considered pro-Palestinian, the Sunnis and the Druze community (Iskandar 2006: 168). During the civil war, the Lebanese Sunnis were sponsored and supported by the Saudi regime, which to the Sunnis has and still represent a political core of their religion (see Iskandar 2006: 171 and Huntington 1996: 178). Hizbullah and Amal movement were the major Muslim movements in the 1980s. Hizbullah was inspired by the Islamist revolution, and Iran supported Shiites engaged to the establishment of an Iranian style Islamic republic (see Mackey 1989: 257). Both Islamist Hizbullah and sectarian Amal flourished by this Iranian support. The Christian community had few strong movements during the 1980s, with an exception of the Kataib or Phalange Party of Lebanese Christian nationalists. The rest of the Christian community was fragmented. The collapse of the constitutional order in the 1970s which had lasted since 1943 was to a large extent an effect of the increase in the Shiite population in relation to the Maronite proportion of the population (Huntington 1996: 259).

The Christian Catholic fractions had a close relation to the western world and Israel. When Christian Bachir Gemayel was elected president in 1982 he promised disengagement from the Israelis (Iskandar 2006: 35, 48). He was supported by Sunni leader Saeb Salam. He was later killed by SNP, who believes in the inevitability of one nation including Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine (the Greater Syria) (ibid: 48). In 1984 the society was divided between East (Christian) and West (Muslim) Beirut (ibid: 53). Damascus (peace) agreement of 1985 signed by most warlords, was broken by the return of the Christian delegation by an insurgency (January 1986) led by Samir Geagea, the military leader of the Christian Lebanese forces of Lebanese nationalist (LF) (ibid).

President Amine Gemayel during his time as president was not able to moderate the different fractions of Lebanon (ibid: 169). The society was too divided. By February 1984 the army was split and government was dispersed. “From this date any major decision had to pass the test of three significant groups (The Maronites, Sunnis and the Shiites) and to secure as well Druze blessing by Walid Jumblatt” (ibid). “The country was not longer a state, and the crowning of divergences came about after Michel Aoun, as the designated prime minister by Gemayel in September 1988, waged his war first against the Syrians, and later the Christian Lebanese Forces,
to cement his control politically and emotionally over what is termed *Christian Lebanon*”\(^{24}\) (ibid: 169-170).

With help from the Saudi regime, Rafik Hariri succeeded in gathering the sufficient majority of parliamentarians to meet in Taef to outline a new constitution (Taef Agreement of 1989). Elias Hraoui was elected president only to find that the president palace was under control of General Michel Aoun, nominated prime minister by the departing president Amine Gemayel in September 1988. Now Lebanon had two governments, one disputed in Baabda and one in West Beirut headed by Salim al-Hoss (ibid: 60). Michel Aoun was eventually driven out of Baabda in October 1990 and Umar Karame was elected prime minister (ibid: 61)

3.6 1989 – 2005, the Taef Accord and Sunni Mobilization

The election summer of 1992, the first election since 1972 was arranged with success. “The Lebanese resumed their usual bickering and fractional alliances” (Iskandar 2006: 62).

“Rafik Hariri was a devoted Sunni Muslim and believed strongly that God is the true benefactor and that each and everybody reap what God wishes. This strong religious belief was fused to a political stand in support of Arab nationalism” (ibid: 45). Hariri established the secular party Feature Movement. This movement was going to become an influential movement and its support among Sunnis has increased through the years. Hariri and FM have refused to constitute them selves as a political party until sectarianism is abolished (see The Daily Star 2006). The Taef agreement November 1989 marked the end of the civil war. The agreement implements some new electoral solutions. The seats of parliament are now divided 50/50 between Muslim and Christians and it further divides administrative positions proportionally between the sects (see 1989 Taef agreement in Le monde diplomatique). The Taef accord has further reduced the power of the Christian president. Summer of 1992 important Christian fractions abstained from

\(^{24}\) The Christian Lebanon or “Fortress Lebanon” is a term made by Lebanese Christian nationalists and refers to the boarders of Lebanon Mountains before the extension to Greater Lebanon. The Mountain range has functioned as a home a refuge and an isolated area to the Maronites, from the grater and predominantly Muslim Arab region (see Salibi 1965, Farah 2000 and Akarli 2000).
participating in the election. They felt that their role was marginalized through the Taef accord, and they were disappointed in the lack of progress in the promised Syrian withdrawal and the lack of progress abolishing religious sectarianism in government administration (Iskandar 2006: 77). Hariri stressed that the Taef accord was made to preserve the rights of all fractions and that no fraction should have the ability to mobilize political power and influence to the detriment of the rights of other Lebanese (ibid: 78).

Iskandar explains that after the civil war, emigration of young and educated Lebanese was on the increase and expectations of progress had dimmed to a large extent. Lebanon had a need for change in its political climate and leadership (ibid: 93). “Hariri declared that Lebanon could not match the pace of development and political change of advanced countries with its antiquated and prejudice political system” (ibid: 94). He called for reform of the electoral law, administrative organisations and in the selection of government employees and a modern standard of service to the Lebanese people (ibid: 95).

By 1989, when the Taef conference was held, Hariri had gained sufficient recognition for the Sunni role, that the parliamentarians voted constitutional change, which transferred many of the previous powers of the Maronite president both to the council of ministers and, to a lesser degree, to the prime minister (ibid: 168). Until Taef, the ranking of the top political positions was considered in the following order: President – president of the chamber of deputies – and last, the prime minister. This tradition was inherited from Lebanon’s constitution, drafted in 1926. Article 95 of this constitution stipulated that most senior political and administrative positions would be equitable apportioned (Iskandar 2006: 169, and Lebanese constitution of 1926). There was no specificity about the religious identity of each position. A Greek Orthodox had been president and a Sunni Muslim had been president of the chamber of deputies. The distribution of responsibilities by religious denominations became the practise first after Lebanese independence in 1943. The Taef agreement transferred political powers and duties from the Maronite president to the council of ministers which was and still is (Fouad Siniora) headed by a Sunni prime minister (Iskandar 2006: 173-174). Hariri was very close to the Saudis, who represent the religious and moral leadership of the Lebanese Sunni Muslims. While many Christians welcomed
Hariri’s nomination, they remained wary and stood on the sidelines watching the political and developmental turmoil (ibid).

Besides claims of marginalization of the Christian community there was also a problem of political forces and organizations being marginalized. Dekmejian writes, “Despite powerful integrative and homogenizing social forces that have swept the region in modern times, traditional, ethnic, religious and tribal groups have persisted” (Dekmejian 1978: 252). Families and sects have still a great influence over politics (Mackey 1989: 116) and political organizations have remained closely tied to religious groups (Crighton 1991: 132 and Krayem). The electoral systems in Lebanon have contributed to this marginalization and weakening of the political parties in favour of traditional sectarian elites and families (see Krayem). This tradition of sectarian elite accommodation has its origin in the Ottoman period and became institutionalized during the French mandate period (Dekmejian 1978: 253).

The electoral law from 2000 was influenced by Syria. The law draws electoral district in a way that increases the possibility of a pro-Syrian government. Syria wanted to secure majority by the increase of mixed districts\(^{25}\). The minority anti-Syrian movements had to cooperate with pro-Syrian parties in most districts to win parliament seats. The consequence of drawing electoral district boarders in this way is called Gerrymandering\(^{26}\). Syria withdrew from Lebanon during 2005. Summer 2005 the anti-Syrian coalition with Hariri’s Future Movement as the leading party, won the election. This government now has the opportunity to get the electoral district redrawn and reducing the amount of mix districts and making Lebanese consociationalism work – distributing positions fair and proportional.

3.7 Beyond 2005 – Segmented Society and Political Polarization

After the withdrawal of Syria in 2005 the pro Syrian camp in Lebanon responded with the arrangement of a public demonstration, consisting of Hizbullah and Amal members and

\(^{25}\) Mix electoral district are populated by different sectarian communities, all constitute a significant size as a proportion of the total population of the district.

\(^{26}\) Gerrymandering: the drawing of electoral district boarders to secure support to a given political party or a candidate. In Lebanon Gerrymandering may have been used to favour candidates from a given community.
supporters, on the 8 of March 2005. On March 14 2005 many Lebanese took to the streets to call for unity, independence and in support of the Hariri family\(^{27}\) and the anti-Syrian stand, later called the 14. March movement. These dates connote the two main political blocs – the 8. March opposition versus the 14 of March government after the 2005 general election.

The election of 2005 proceeded without major security incidents. But as most Lebanese recognized, the Lebanese electoral law is distorted by the administrative classifications (Iskandar 2006: 180): In the South, the Shiites has an overwhelming power to determine the success of Christian nominees. In the North and in Beirut the Sunnis have this power. The importance of the Shiite movements in the Shiite dominated communities made sure that their parties (Amal, Hizbollah) nominees would be elected. Feature Movement with its leader Saad Hariri chose to cooperate with the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and his party Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and The Qornet Shahwan grouping, a Christian group of Christian political party chiefs and partisans of the Lebanese Forces. Hizbollah and Amal swept the elections in the south district and the Beqaa. Hariri and Jumblatt prevailed in the districts of Beirut, Chouf, Baabda and Aley. General Michel Aoun came back from exile in France and assumed the position of decision maker in respect of nominees in Metn, Kesrouan and Byblos. Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) benefited from sectarian voting instincts of the Christian electorate, bringing to parliament 21 candidates. Aoun hoped to be supported in the north administrative district, but this failed. This is because the north is Sunni dominated and the Sunnis responded to Saad Hariri (sectarian voting). The Lebanese have, in elections, a self-corrective tendency that operates to limit the power of any one group. “This can be expected in a political society that endorses elections on sectarian bases, and where political representation is often linked to favouritism” (Iskandar 2006: 180).

\(^{27}\) Future Movement leader and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri were assassinated February 2005. The assassination gave the Hariri family a massive support by both Christian and Muslim groups. The Sunnis and most western oriented groups (anti-Syrian fractions) blamed Syria for the assassination and called for an immediately withdrawal of all Syrian troops from Lebanese ground (invited in 1976 to stop sectarian clashes). The anti-Syrian fractions gathered on the streets to protest. Massive pressure from Lebanese and western countries made Syria withdraw its troops after 20 years (see cedar revolution).
In 2004 President Emile Lahoud’s term was extended three years to 2007. No new president was elected in 2007 due to disagreements between the two main political blocs, on the electoral law (veto power to the opposition) and presidential candidates.

Irrespective of the disproportional distribution between sects in some districts, the 2005 parliamentary election may show some new trends in elections (Iskandar 2006: 181). The parliament of autumn 2005 had 61 new members out of 128. Traditionally few new members are elected, usually not more than 20 percent or between 20 and 30. Youth seems to be more important than before. The seventy-two deputy majority block is led by Saad Hariri only thirty-five years of age, a traditionally low age for any influential politician. A problem is uncontested winners. Seventeen parliament members out of 128 were uncontested in 2005. Most competition was to be found in the Christian electoral districts where General Aoun challenged all other Christian nominees. The Hariri bloc (anti-Syrian) elected Fouad Siniora to prime minister (ibid: 182). The new cabinet had representatives from all major political parties except the Bloc of General Aoun, who claimed that his bloc is the only true representative of the majority of Christians (ibid: 184).

In November 2007 the parliament were going to elect a new (Maronite) president. This was not achieved do to serious disagreements between the opposition and the government parties on the electoral law and the distribution of cabinet seats. Parliament has not met in more than a year and the government is not recognized by many of the nation's citizens (Bluhm 2008). This has led to a power vacuum. But for a country with a dormant legislature and without a president or universally recognized government, Lebanon is remarkably stable. The big players (Syria, Hizbullah and The Lebanese Armed Forces) are playing an important part in keeping it stable (Bluhm 2008). The Muslim Hizbullah, Amal and Christian FPM opposition alliance may also prove a stabilizing force because it cross-cuts the religious – and in some extent the sectarian cleavage.

29 The Maronite community is split between the oppositional party FPM and the government coalition parties Qornet Shehwan Gathering (which include the Phalange Party) and Lebanese Forces. See more on this issue in chapter 4.
3.8 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Three

In this chapter I have described the history of Lebanese homogenity and regime development. The main focus of this history has been the development of the politico-sectarian diversities and the confessional based political system. The main question I am rising concerns the relationship between religious diversities in society and representative institutions. The challenge of representative, state institutions is to correspond to the demands of the divided society. The different groups and movements of the divided and segmented society want a share of political power. In modern Lebanon there is a fragile balance of power between the fragments (political movements, communities and sects) of society. Stability is contributed by representative proportionality between the main interest groups, movements and traditional elites. From another perspective, it is a balance between liberal democratic values on the one hand, and pluralist group specific representative institutions, on the other. These assumptions make up the contradictious relation of a modernizing, and in some extent secularizing Lebanese society that exists in a confessional political system based on traditional power structures. As I will describe later the Lebanese society has gone through major political and social changes in modern times (from the mid nineteenth century). Political activism and political interest has increased. Social mobility has contributed to urbanization. The decline of sectarianism in some areas in society like moral, liberty, consumption and secular modern organization, is in contrast to another trend towards increased confessional based political institution like the proposed “tree way split”\(^{30}\). Political assassinations, institutional instability and civil wars have been linked to the fragile power sharing structure of Lebanese consociationalism. The structure of Lebanese diversity is further explored in the next chapter. This structure is related to the consociational democracy in chapter five in the search of an answer to how Lebanese consociationalism has failed or succeeded in representing the main interests and segments of Lebanese society.

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\(^{30}\) Proposition represented by the Hizbullah-led opposition which intends to secure a veto power in a unity government.
4 The Segmented Cleavages of Lebanon

This chapter will introduce some demographical and election data. This data is organized in a manner illustrating the way Lebanese society is divided along sectarian-communal, political and socioeconomic axis. A fourth major line of diversity – the civilizational fault line – is of special interest; it tells a story about a major historical-cultural diversity between Lebanese groups. The sectarian and party system cleavages will be related to each other in a model illustrating their degree of cross-cutting. The first sections of this chapter are dedicated to the description of the major cleavages explored.

4.1 The Major Cleavages

I will measure the sectarian cleavage and party system cleavage by using the fractionalisation index of Douglas Rae (1967), and in the case of the party system cleavage also the formula of NEP (number of effective parties) of Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The class cleavage and the cultural sub-civilizational line are explored in more of a qualitative manner. This is because there is of special difficulty to give any quantitative and reliable sources to give a quantitative illustration of these cleavages. An issue important to evaluate fragmentation along cleavages is the degree of crystallization – defined as the proportion of a given community having a definite position on a given cleavage (Rae and Taylor 1970: 90). In the case of the sectarian cleavage almost all Lebanese has a religious preference. In the case of the party system cleavage only half (64) of the members of parliament relates themselves to one of the eight largest parties.

4.1.1 Demography and the Sectarian Cleavage

There are 17 confessional groups in Lebanon. 98 percent of the Lebanese citizens belong to one of these groups. This makes the degree of crystallization on this cleavage near one or maximal. I am only going to explore the fractionalization on this cleavage related to the seven largest groups. The smallest of these groups, the Armenian Orthodox, constitutes approximately three percent of

CIA Fact Book: 97,7 percent of the population are related to one of 17 recognised sectarian communities. A recent study calculated that the resident Lebanese population in 2001 was 3 935 000, 36 % of which lives in the Greater Beirut Region (Beirut and its suburbs) (Choghig Kasparian, *La population libanaise et ses caractéristiques*, Presses de l’Université Saint Joseph).
the population while the largest, the Shiite community, constitutes 40 percent. The size of this and the other five groups are estimates\textsuperscript{32}. This is because no census or measure of group size has been made after 1932. In a sectarian system, group size is a basis of the distribution of power; therefore the question of group size is a highly sensitive question. Demography estimates are based on interviews or question schemes and voter registration, and this has shown a general increase of the Shiite population and a stagnation of the Christian part of the population.

Cultural-historical differences between the groups may shed some light on the degree of intensity of the diversity between the groups. The largest Christian community, the Maronites, is an old sect with traditions back to 500 AD. They have been influenced by the Roman Catholic Church. In the 18 century catholic missionaries tried to separate the Greek Orthodox from their eastern roots. This was partially successful. A segment of Greek orthodox changed to Greek Catholics now called Melkites (Mackey 1989: 36). A similar divide is to be found among the Armenians – into one catholic and one orthodox interpretation of Christendom. These divides bring us back to the separation between the Western and the Eastern Church. The Eastern Church represented by the Byzantine Empire and later Russia, and the Western church, represented by the Holy Roman Empire and later a large proportion of the western world.

The major Muslim communities are the Shiites, Sunnis and the Druze. The Sunnis constitute 90 percent of the Muslims of the world and represent the Orthodox or mainstream version of Islam. The Shiite community was created from a split among the Muslim on the question to whom to succeed the seventh imam, Ali. Shiites are seen as heretics in the Sunni community. The Druze community sprung out of the Shiite community. The religious practises of the Druze separate them from the Sunni and Shiites community and they are seen as heretics or even worse, non believers or atheist, among other Muslims. Almost all Lebanese can be related to one religious community and no Lebanese may hold multiple religious memberships.

The perspective of centre- periphery perspective of political development theory states that a movement of people from the periphery to the centre (urban areas and the city) would mean that

\textsuperscript{32} Estimation is the calculated approximation of a result which may be used even if input data may be incomplete and uncertain.
the population is getting more homogeneous. In the case of Lebanon this is not the case because of an entrenched communal and confessional based diversity and confessional thinking. Even though great numbers of people of all confessional-communities have moved to or work in the cities and central area (Beirut), they still belong to, and have near connections to a given local community (see Salibi 1965). Christian sects are concentrated in Northern and Central areas and Muslim sects are concentrated in the South, East and peripheral areas of the country\textsuperscript{33}. Although there are mixed districts, many districts constitute a majority of one of the major sects.

Sectarian group fragmentation ($F_{\text{sectarian}}$) is based on the relative size of each sectarian community measured from estimates on group size. I am using the fragmentation index by the seven major groups and their estimated share of the population $s_i$ in percentage 2005\textsuperscript{34}: Druze: 5.6; Sunni, 26; Shiite 26; Maronite, 22; Melkite (Greek Catholic), 8; Greek Orthodox, 6; and Armenian Orthodox, 3.

*The fragmentation formula: $F = 1 - \Sigma (s_i)^2$*

The degree of fragmentation of the sectarian (trait cleavage and nominal) cleavage describes the degree of homogeneity produced by this cleavage. 0 connotes total homogeneity. A result close to the maximal result 1 connotes heterogeneity. The Fragmentation of the sectarian cleavage is connoted by $F_{\text{sectarian}}$ by the seven larges sects’ $s_i$. $F_{\text{sectarian}}$ (Estimate) = 1 - Sum $s_i$ (Estimate) $^2$. $s_i$ (Estimate) is defined as; registered to the parliamentary election (2005) of each religious community $i$ as the proportion of the population at large:

$F = 1 - \Sigma (s_i)^2$

$s_{\text{Druze}} = 0.056; s_{\text{Maronite}} = 0.22; s_{\text{Shiite}} = 0.26; s_{\text{Sunni}} = 0.26; s_{\text{Melkite}} = 0.08; s_{\text{Arm.Orth.}} = 0.03; s_{\text{Greek Orth.}} = 0.06$

$\Sigma (s_i)^2 = 0.003136 + 0.0484 + 0.0676 + 0.0676 + 0.0064 + 0.0009 + 0.0036 = 0.197636$

\textsuperscript{33} See map appendix 2: demography and sectarian communities in Lebanon
\textsuperscript{34} The proportions of each sect of the population are calculated using an estimate of group size found in the final report to the European Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005, or the Lebanese Ministry of Interior 2005 (See appendix table 3).
As expected there is a high degree of fragmentation, using the fragmentation index, which we can read as heterogeneity along the sectarian cleavage.

“If democracy is destiny, population movements are the motor of history.”

Samuel P. Huntington (1996:198)

4.1.2 The Party System Cleavage

It is difficult to place the movements on a political left-right axis because of the dominating sectarian identity of the movements, sectarian interests and that politics are dominated by high status sectarian elites. But on many issues Amal, Hizbullah, LF, Phalange Party and SSNP are all conservative. Hizbullah’s ideology can be described as Islamic nationalist with a special connection to the religious revolution of Iran, while the Shiite Amal Movement has a closer relation to Syria. The Phalange Party and SSNP have been inspired by European fascist movements, and can be placed far right on the axis. But while the Maronite Phalange Party has represented Lebanese nationalism or Christian nationalism the SSNP has represented the idea of Greater Syria. Thus, in later years the SSNP have had internal struggles between right wingers and socialist oriented members, willing to cooperate with communist parties. I will also describe the FPM as conservative. They represent a large part of the Christian population, both Orthodox and Catholic. One segment of FPM members and supporters has a Lebanese nationalist and isolationalist ideology while other accepts the Lebanese boarders of today and their Arab heritage.

In the middle of the left-right axis, the FM describes itself as a secular party and they have much more of a liberal policy, in an economic sense and on family values and religious freedom. But the movement consists of basically Sunni confessionals. This makes it strange to call it fully secular from a western perspective. The predominantly Druze PSP, is constituted as a socialist party. In reality it is not so much of a socialist party. Like all the other movements they cooperate
with other movements despite seemingly ideological differences. The party is highly sectarian
with predominantly Druze members and supporters.

From 2005 the political system is highly polarized into two major political blocs in parliament. Orthodox, Catholics of the FPM (Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement) and Shiites of Amal and Hizbullah have formed the pro-Syrian opposition (the 8. March movement). The Pro-Syrian FPM gained a lot of sympathy in the pro-Syrian Shiite population, though it is a Christian confessional based party. The FPM took the initiative for a protest against the anti-Syrian government and is the leading oppositional party. The government consists of western oriented anti-Syrian, mostly urban, middle to higher middle class Sunnis of the FM, Druze of the PSP and Uniate, Maronite Christians of the LF and Phalange Party, together constituting the 14th March movement.

Fighting fiercely against PLO under the civil war, Amal have no tolerance towards Palestinian aggression. While Hizbullah traditionally have supported the Palestinian cause and searched for a diplomatic solution to the Fatha al Islam (Palestinian, and Palestinian supporting militia) and Lebanese Army clashes in 2007, Amal wanted the Lebanese Armed Forces to use every means necessary in fighting the insurgents, as the Amal militia did fighting PLO during the civil war. There still exists a difference between Shiite movements Hizbullah and Amal in the Palestinian question. Most Christian parties except some orthodox do not support the Palestinian cause. A bound exists between the segment of Orthodox Palestinians and Lebanese Armenian and Greek Orthodox. Both Sunni elites and Druze PSP supported the Palestinian cause in the 60’s (Chapter 3).

I will conclude that there are differences and some major differences between the political parties but I will not try to produce any quantitative measure of the intensity of diversity. Instead I am going to illustrate the degree of homogeneity produced by the party-system cleavage using the fragmentation index. Party system fragmentation \( F_{\text{partysystem}} \) is based on the relative size of each party measured from the voter turnout. I am using the fragmentation index by the eight major political organizations and their share of the mandates after the 2005 election. \( s_i = \text{Proportion of the total number of mandates to party organization} \); Druze PSP (16), Sunni FM (36), Shiite
Amal (14) and Hizbullah (14), Maronite LF (6) and Qornet Shehwan Gathering (Phalange Party) (6), and Catholic, Orthodox FPM (14) and SSNP (2)\textsuperscript{35}:

\[ S_{PSP} = 0.125; \ S_{FM} = 0.28125; \ S_{Amal} = 0.109375; \ S_{Hizbullah} = 0.109375; \ S_{LF} = 0.046875; \ S_{Qornet\ Shehwan\ Gathering\ (Phalange\ Party)} = 0.046875; \ S_{FPM} = 0.109375; \ S_{SSNP} = 0.015625 \]

\[ \sum (s_i)^2 = 0.0156 + 0.0791 + 0.0120 + 0.0120 + 0.0022 + 0.0022 + 0.0120 + 0.0002 = 0.1353 \]

\[ F_{\text{partysystem}} = 1 - \sum (s_i)^2 = 1 - 0.1353 \approx 0.86 \]

\[ ENP\ (\text{Effective\ Number\ of\ Parties}) = \frac{1}{\sum (s_i)^2} \approx 7 \]

Using the measurement of Laakso and Taagepera, ENP the effective number of parties are 7. Both measurement of fragmentation illustrates a highly fragmented party system.

### 4.1.3 Core States, Civilizational Fault Lines and Segmented Nationalism

Major cultural lines of diversity and segments in society are based on what I will call sub-civilizational lines of diversity. Civilizational lines are based on main cultural historic differences between groups of people, sectarian lines, as I claim, are not. I will argue that these cultural differences are related to different concepts of nationality and nationalism. This dimension does not follow the same segments as the sectarian line of diversity. As we shall see later in my analysis there is greater diversity between more or less religious orthodoxy and eastern or western orientation than between Muslim and Christian, in political cooperation and sectarian relations. The Traditional/Orthodox groups are the Shiite groups and Orthodox Christians, while the Uniate/Western oriented groups is the Uniate Christians, the Druze community and Urban Sunni Muslim.

\textsuperscript{35} The data is gathered from the result of the 2005 parliamentary election (lebanvote.com/ Wikipedia.com: Lebanon election 2005)
All Christian groups are minorities in Lebanon and in the Arab region, and they have needed some forms of (extern) protection. And they have found their protectors in other countries, mostly western countries and the western civilization where Christianity is outspread. The Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox have a cultural orientation to the east and their Arab heritage, in sharp contrast to Maronite movements who refuse to accept to have any connection to an Arab cultural and ethnic background. Instead, the Maronites search back in time for their “real” ancestors, the Canaanites, Assyrians and the Phoenicians. In this way, they distinguish themselves from the Arabs and find a closer link between the Western culture and their own (Akarli 2000, Makdisi 2000). In the aftermaths of the crusades the Maronite Catholics’ of Syria went into a union with the Roman Catholic Church. The Orthodox remained allied with the Orthodox Byzantine Empire, and later, orthodox Russia. Until this day, the Orthodox have remained more oriented towards the Eastern Church, an eastern world and Arab tradition. The main member base of the Social National Syrian Party has been Orthodox. While the Maronites have followed the western world, the Greek orthodox have an orientation towards Greater Syria. Because of a closer relation to the Muslim population, Greek Orthodox have adopted Arab ideologies like pan Arabism while the Maronites have rejected it (Mackey 1989: 38). Mackey explains that Lebanese Christians are split in their perception of themselves in relation to the West – how they define their own Arabness. The Maronite Catholics reject any connection to an Arab cultural heritage. The Orthodox accepts a status as part of an Arab world and the Melkites (Greek Catholic) vacillate between the two attitudes. There is a natural scepticism towards Arab nationalism in Christian groups. They assume that Muslims understand the concept of nation in terms of umma – the Islamic community. This image would be in sharp contrast to the western notion of the nation state that most Lebanese Christians embrace (Mackey 1989: 30).

Ussama Makdesi writes that: “Religion became the site of the colonial encounter in the Ottoman Empire in that European officials defined the parameters of reform through a modernization discourse couched in term of a religious civilizational clash” (Makdisi 2000: 6).

The pre Second World War years until the civil war mark a period of conflicting nationalist ideologies, all with its unique view of Lebanese identity and what Lebanon is suppose to be. The lack of a successful national revolution and its multi ethnic mosaic makes Lebanon a multi
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national country\textsuperscript{36}. It’s a pluralist pot of different nationalities – Armenians, Kurds, Syrians, Palestinians and Lebanese split between malignant religious and communal divisions (Mackey 1989: 11). Most Lebanese consider themselves Lebanese. But their identity lies elsewhere than with the territorial boundaries of modern or “Greater Lebanon” and to a Lebanon containing one united people. The family, local community and religious community are more important as a basis of identity. Their nationalism is connected to this communal identity and confessional group identity, and not to the Lebanese state as a whole. Pan Arabism, Syrian nationalism, Christian nationalism and Islamist all contribute with different concepts of nationalism.

Pan Arabism is based on the assumption that all Arabs have a cultural and ethnic common heritage and that there is, or should be, a natural unity between Arabs. Sunnis had the closest relation to pan-Arabism of the Lebanese communities (during the 60s). Islam is sometimes connected to pan Arabism, but especially Shiite Muslims have actually been sceptical to the concept of pan Arabism. Shiites being a minority Muslim community in the Sunni dominated Arab region, has made Lebanese Shiites afraid of being overrun by a Sunni dominated Arabian region. The Shiite community in Lebanon has their loyalty and trust in the Shiite Islamist nationalism and revolution. The Islamist revolution in Shiite dominated Iran gave a boost for the Lebanese Shiite Islamic nationalism in the 80s. On the issue of nationality, Islamists in various Muslim communities reject the nation state in favour of the unity of Islam (see Huntington 1996: 175). There is a tendency towards an Islamic revival the last decades. The Islamic resurgence can be seen as both a product and an effort to come to grips with trends of modernization (see Huntington 1996: 116). The Maronites are also sceptical to the idea of Arab unity and pan Arabism. They have there own idea of a Christian Lebanese nation. This idea has been represented by the Christian movements of the Phalanges Party and Lebanese Forces.

\textsuperscript{36} Nation building and the AGIL scheme of Stein Rokkan’s classical work Stat, nasjon og klasse (1987:298-300): The national revolution; between a central nation building culture against ethnical, religious and linguistic distinct underprivileged people groups in the provinces and peripheral areas, and the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing and mobilizing nation-state and historical corporative privileges of the church. Richard Hrair Dekmejian writes in his article Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon, that the successful nation building in Europe, ("a phase of intense monolithic nationalism, even the larger Western European states have now entered the post-industrial "end of ideology" era"), are followed by an awakening of ethnic and religious nationalist ideologies and a resulting tendency toward decentralization and segmented pluralism (Dekmejian 1978: 263).
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The Greek Orthodox dominated PPS later SSNP (established in 1932) advanced the concept of what is called Syrian Nationalism. The idea is not based on the religious solidarity of Islam but on the idea of Greater Syria (Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, present day Syria, Cyprus and a part of Turkey) as a distinct historical, cultural and geographical entity. This idea is different from Arab nationalism or pan Arabism because it does not embrace all Arabs, only those within the boarders of the Greater Syrian state (Mackey 1989: 38). Today, only a minority of Orthodox are associated with Syrian nationalism. The Orthodox like the other Christian groups is separated between Lebanese nationalism (isolationalism) and the idea of belonging to a greater Arab civilization. But the Orthodox is and has always been the Christians with the strongest eastern and Arab orientation and has the closest relationship with Muslim groups.

Both the Christian and the Sunni communities are, and have traditionally dominated the national political and economic affairs. These communities seek together in political and economic matters. Also the Druze community have a scent for politics, economics and business, though it is a more isolated community. In the Shiite community there has been found a rather different attitude towards political participation and competition and their community lies outside the political and economic prosperous centre of Beirut and Lebanon Mountain.

The breakdown of the Ottoman Empire left Islam without a core state (Huntington 1996: 177). The two main Muslim groups found each their allied and core state or political centre of their religion. As mentioned earlier Iran can be referred to as the core state of what I call the sub-civilizational segment of Shiite Islam, while the core state of the sub-civilizational segment of Sunni Islam is Saudi Arabia. This is, in my view, one of the most important contributors to diversity, because it is closely linked to more or less western orientation. The Sunni Muslims have cooperated tightly to the west and Sunni Arab countries, also with a close connection with the west. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have a close economic connection to the west. Sunni Pan Arabism and especially Nasserism has indirectly contributed to a closer connection between Lebanese Sunnis and the Western world. The breakdown of Pan Arabism, Nasserism and Communism forced the Sunni community to find other allies. Since the collapse of communism,

37 Nasser’s Egypt and his socialist agenda created a common identity among Sunni Muslims. The regime managed to gain autonomy from international actors and it created domestic elite who enabled economic development and the redistribution policies (Hamilton 1982). Nasser’s state- and nation building became an ideal also among Lebanese Muslims (Mostly Sunni and Druze).
pan Arab socialist states were no longer supported financially and ideologically by the Soviet Union (see Huntington 1996: Chapter 6). The Shiite community is another story. Supported financially and ideologically by Islamist Iran the Shiite went towards an Islamist traditional and Islamist nationalist orientation.

This split between groups is related to Huntington’s definition of civilizations (see Huntington 1996), though the main political blocs can be said to cross-cut the religious dimension Islam-Christendom and also the sectarian cleavage to some degree. Huntington does also use linguistic diversity in his operationalization of diversities between civilizations (ibid: 70). In Lebanon there is a greater use of French and English by government supporters and western oriented movements and groups while the eastern oriented groups use Arabic. I have found four sub-civilizations which are connected to sects, a nationalist idea and a political core state of the group’s culture and religion.

*Shiite: Islamic nationalism: the core state of Iran*

*Eastern oriented Orthodox and Catholics: Syrian nationalism: the core state of Syria*

*Western oriented Maronite and Catholics: Lebanese nationalism: the core state of France (and perhaps Italy, US and Canada)*

*Sunni and Druze: Arab nationalism: the core states of Saudi Arabia and Egypt*

### 4.2 Cross-Cutting Cleavages

The major cleavages studied in this thesis are the party system, sectarian and the class cleavage. The quantitative measurements of political cleavages made in this chapter will shed light on Lebanese diversity. The degree of fragmentation of the people on the three cleavages and the relation between the cleavages are measured. These measurements would not be possible without the techniques developed by Douglas W. Rae, Michael Taylor introduced in their work *The Analysis of Political Cleavages* (1970).
4.2.1 The Party System – Sectarian Dimension

The political movements of Lebanon are divided along the sectarian cleavage as follows: The Amal Movement represents a fraction of the Shiite community; Another Shiite fraction supports Hizbullah; Uniate Maronite Christians support the Lebanese Forces and the Phalange Party and in some extent the Free Patriotic Movement; Christian Orthodox and Catholics are also represented by the FPM and a fraction of Christians supports the Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Sunnis support the Feature Movement; and at last, the Druze community are represented by the Progressive Socialist Party. This kind of generalization is possible because we are aware of the Lebanese religious-communal influenced voting and group support.

I have used the party preference and religious orientation to half of the 128 mandates elected to the parliament of 2005. The product is the distribution of table 4.1 below. The remaining 64 mandates are independent candidates or represent a small party or list not among the 8 main parties. Candidates can be elected by their community without belonging to a specific party because they are elected on the basis of their confessional-community relation and not a party program.

Table 4.1 Party preference by religious preference of MPs 2005 - 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shiite</th>
<th>Maronite</th>
<th>Melkite</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>7 (0,11)</td>
<td>1 (0,0156)</td>
<td>8 (0,1256)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>15 (0,234)</td>
<td>2 (0,0313)</td>
<td>11 (0,1719)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizbullah</td>
<td>11 (0,1719)</td>
<td>11 (0,1719)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>5 (0,0781)</td>
<td>5 (0,0781)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPM</td>
<td>8 (0,125)</td>
<td>1 (0,0156)</td>
<td>9 (0,1406)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qornet</td>
<td>2 (0,0313)</td>
<td>1 (0,0156)</td>
<td>2 (0,0313)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>6 (0,0938)</td>
<td>1 (0,0156)</td>
<td>5 (0,0782)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNP</td>
<td>7 (0,11)</td>
<td>16 (0,2496)</td>
<td>18 (0,2803)</td>
<td>16 (0,2501)</td>
<td>3 (0,0468)</td>
<td>4 (0,0625)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 is based on the religious and party preferences of 64 of the elected members to the 2005 – 2009 parliaments. The result 0.1202 illustrate a low degree of cross-cutting. Data on religious preferences and voter behaviour of the population in general is not available. And 64 is too small a sample to establish a qualified or significant result. But the preferences of the MPs may be used as an estimate. And the result illustrates the way I assume how a large proportion of the Lebanese people are distributed on the two cleavages. We have to take into account that many votes are related to independent candidates or small parties also representing specific communal-sectarian interests. If I had taken all of these segments into account I would find an even greater fragmentation on the cleavages and still a small XC. Because there seems to be a strong tendency to sectarian voting, explained by Dekmejian (1978) and Krayem (n. y), the result of the cross-cutting (low degree) of these two cleavages is expected. This low degree of cross cutting is related to the high degree of fragmentation on the two cleavages that I found earlier. 1- \( \sum \) of the probability of a person belong to a given nominal group and it connotes the

As an example; Armenian nationalist interests are represented by the Tashnaq Party, not among the eight largest parties. Most of the small parties and their candidates seem to represent sectarian interest and are strengthening the relation between sectarian community and a specific party or a candidate. One exception may be some of the communist party’s which seems to be based on a party ideology and segmental cross-cutting membership. But these parties have never had much support or been represented in parliament.
fragmentation of the two cleavages. When $\Sigma p^2_i$ and $\Sigma p^2_j$, is large, then $2 \Sigma p^2_{ij}$ is large and XC becomes small.

Thus, in reality, the mutually reinforcing of this cleavages do not seem to stand in the way of inter (sectarian) party cooperation. There may not be any good alternatives to cooperation or other cultural or political cleavages may work as moderators. Two major political blocs are observed (polarization). One block consists of pro Syrian forces and the other of anti Syrian forces. Related to the sectarian cleavage there is a tendency that more orthodox and traditional oriented religious group’s supports the pro Syrian movement while the anti Syrian movement is supported by more “secular” groups or religious moderates. Orthodox, conservative Christians are mobilized through FPM and SSNP and allied with Shiite Islamist Amal and Hizbullah. The other block consists of liberal Sunni Muslims in FM and Druze PSP allied with the western oriented Maronite community through LF and Phalange Party.

4.2.2 The socioeconomic – Sectarian Dimension

Lijphart (1999), Lipset (1960) and Sisk (1996) argue that cross-cutting cleavages can be a stabilising factor in divided societies. The class cleavage is mentioned as the cleavage with the greatest potential to achieve segmental cross-cutting. Unfortunately, in the case of Lebanon, it seems that the class cleavage is mutually reinforcing to the important sectarian-community segments. This is illustrated by Dekmejian (1978: 259):

Illustration 4.1 the relation between class and religious preference (Pre 1975-89 civil war)

Richard Hrair Dekmejian 1978 page 259
The Maronites have the biggest middle class while the Shiites and the Palestinians have the smallest. In general Christians have a larger degree of the high and middle class while the largest proportion of the lower class is Muslims. All thought the model is based on statistics from the 1970’s; there are no reasons to believe that this picture has changes dramatically the last decades. The regions with most Muslims in the North, Beeka and South are still the poorest regions as shown by resent social-demographic statistics:

Table 4.2 Class status of inhabitants by Qadas (districts), of 21. Century Lebanon

| Lower class: Hermel, Akkar, Minyeh, Jezzine, Hasbayya, Bint Jbeil, Tyre, Marjeyoun, Baalbeck, Saida-Zahrani, Nabatieh, Zahleh, West Bekaa, Tripoli |
| Upper class: Keserwan, Metn, Beirut |


The four peripheral districts (Qadas) of Bent Jbail, Hermel, Akkar, and Marjayoun had a deprivation incidence of more than 60% of the population. A total of 14 Quadas are recognised poor districts. Less than 20% of the central districts (Qadas) – Keserwan, Metn and Beirut are recognized as rich.

Measurements done by the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affaires shows that the southern and eastern region with the larges proportion of Shiites has the lowest economic productivity. The Lebanon Mountain which is inhabited by mostly Maronite Christians has a high economic activity. The Sunni Muslim citizens are separated between the low income Sunnis of North Lebanon and the Sunnis of western Beirut and Urban areas which have a high economic activity. This places the Sunni sect as a whole in a place on the middle of the class cleavage. The Druze and the catholic community with its long tradition of western cooperation, which they have benefitted from, are also placed in the middle on the scale. The Orthodox Christians are also placed in the middle because they are located in both prosperous and poor regions of the country.

39 On economic activity by region see appendix, table 7.
In pre civil war years, as illustrated by Dekmejian, the consequence of the relation between the class- and sect cleavage gave a “turbulent environment” (Illustration 4.2). Many researchers see the class cleavage as a possible moderating factor on divided societies if it cross-cuts other major social lines of diversity (see Lijphart 1977, Lipset 1960). The Netherlands and Belgium may be referred to as less pluralist or segmented than Lebanon due to the cross-cutting between religious and class lines (see Lijphart 1977: 79)

Dekmejian’s illustration of the class-sectarian crosscutting is representative of 21.century Lebanon. Thus, social mobilization and urbanization suggests that Lebanon's population is shifting rapidly into the category of socially mobilized, from rural to urban residence, and the income-growth and per capita income-growth indicators leave no doubt that social mobilization is occurring (Hudson 1969: 253-254). Greater Beirut (which now includes the major surrounding towns of Mount Lebanon province) has generated and absorbed the prosperity of the independence era, while outlying regions in the southern and Northern provinces show little material change. “These regional imbalances are a formidable obstacle to developing a positive national consensus, particularly since the outlying regions are predominantly Muslim”(Hudson 1969: 256).

4.3 Segmented Cleavages Illustrated

Firstly, I divide the segments between major political blocks, sub- civilization and religious relation. Secondly, I relate the rest of the cleavages (party relation, socioeconomic status and region) to each of the major religious groups in society into four routes.
Illustration 4.2, Societal Segments of 21. Century Lebanon (June 2005 and beyond)

Variables:
- **Sect**: High/Low: Western oriented Christian/middle/Eastern oriented Muslim
- **Party**: High: Isolationalist, status quo; Low: Arab Nationalism, reformist
- **Class**: High/Low: living conditions, wealth and income
- **Demographical-Central-Periphery**: High: North, central; Low: South, Periphery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western oriented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political blocks and Sub-civilizational relations</td>
<td>Maronite, (catholic)</td>
<td>Druze and Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phalange, LF</td>
<td>PSP, FM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North, Central</td>
<td>West, Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab oriented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8th Movement</td>
<td>Orthodox, catholic</td>
<td>Shiite, (Palestinian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FPM, SSNP</td>
<td>Amal, Hizbullah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North, Central</td>
<td>South, East Periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The generalised table of Lebanese segmentation or mutual reinforcing cleavages and civilizational fault lines above is complex. I believe the model is suitable as an illustration of the segmented cleavages of today’s Lebanon.

4.4 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Four

I have explained how the Lebanese society is divided along major cleavages – party system, the sectarian and the class cleavage. Besides these cleavages I have explained the role of major cultures, civilizations or sub-civilizations and demography in the role of societal heterogeneity in Lebanon. The sub-civilizations and nationalist ideologies in Lebanon seem to cross cut religion and sects and may of this reason prove that Lebanese consociationalism (confessionalism) is out of touch with Lebanese political and cultural environment, if these sub-civilizational segments
illustrate a major diversity of the Lebanese society. Other political institutions and administrative solutions may prove better than the current political system. Here, the consensus model may give some solutions, which I will discuss in chapter six. Firstly we need to describe the structure of the Lebanese political system and its relation to the divided society it is supposed to represent.
Consociationalism and Segmented Cleavages: The Case of Lebanon
5 Lebanese Consociationalism and the Cleavage Structure

The illustrations of the major cleavage structure of Lebanon have shown that Lebanon is a highly pluralist segmented society. Given this cleavage structure how does the political system perform? I will use some of the important characteristics of the consociational model of Arend Lijphart (1977) to illustrate how the political system has performed related to Lebanese diversity (Section 5.3 -5.5). In the first section I explore the development of Lebanese sectarianism and diversity related to Lebanese political development. In the second section I explore the consequences of the cultural sub-civilizational line and segmented nationalism.

5.1 The Institutionalization of Sectarianism

Karl Marx referred to the Lebanese civil war of the early 1860’s as an “atrocious outrages of wild tribes” (quoted by Makdisi 2000: 3). Alternatively it can be seen as a consequence of the institutionalizing of Sunni Turk and Maronite dominance in the region, cultural differentiation and modernist reforms. Sectarianism became a culture in the aftermath of Maronite and Druze elites, European and Ottomans struggled to define an equitable relationship between the Druze and Maronite communities to a modernizing Ottoman state (Makdisi 2000: 4).

Sectarianism is a modernist knowledge in the sense that it is produced in the context of European hegemony and Ottoman reforms and because its articulators at a colonial (European), imperial (Ottoman) and local (Lebanon Mountain) level regarded themselves as moderns who used the historic past to justify present claims and future development (Makdisi 2000: 4-5)

Before this process of western inspired “modernization”, Lebanon Mountain was dominated by an elite hierarchy in which secular rank rather than religious affiliation defined politics (Makdisi 2000: 4). In the nineteen century, Europeans and the Ottoman Empire supported different groups in Lebanon. Because of these interferences and interventions on different groups “behalf” there have always existed a disproportional share of power between religious communities. The Ottoman millet system favoured the Sunni Muslim communities (see Makdisi 2000: 7). In the
1800’s the French intervened on behalf of the “underprivileged” Christians. In the French colonial the Christian community was given privileges and influence at the expense of the Muslims. Sectarianism in Lebanon became a practise by the political sharing of power and through the divide of Mount Lebanon into administrative districts based on sectarian boundaries in 1842 by a joint European-Ottoman decision (Akarli 2000: 27-28 and Makdisi 2000: 67). The 1839 Tanzimat introduced the first of these “modernist” reforms (Makdisi 2000: 2). “Aware of the Ottoman Empire’s image as the “sick man of Europe,” the Sultan and his ministers had decreed in 1839 that all subjects were equal before the law regardless of their religion” (Makdisi 2000: 3). This move and the other reforms in the administration were calculated to satisfy European demands for the protection of the Christian communities and to inculcate a notion of a national and secular subjecthood. Following the civil war of 1860 the area of Lebanon Mountain gained more autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. The implementation of the mutasarrifiyya in 1861 renewed a pattern of modernized elitist sectarian politics (Makdisi 2000: 167). The traditionally most political influential groups under Ottoman rule or French mandate have gained a considerable amount of power. And they do not want to redistribute this power and positions. Therefore, political reforms toward more representative equality between groups are a struggle. This is a struggle that have been going on in political arenas and some times in the street. An even further cementation of the sectarian cleavage followed the reforms of 1926, the 1943 National Pact, and the Taef agreement of 1989.

I have claimed that sectarianism is a construction, developed by institutions and a fragile power sharing structure. The institutions and political system have helped shaping sectarian identification. Sectarian voting is taking place. In elections, the Lebanese have a self-corrective tendency that operates to limit the powers of any other group (Iskandar 2006: 180). In other words each sectarian-community votes on the candidates with the same confessional-community relation. The fragile balance of power makes sects important, because power is distributed on the basis of sects. Belonging to one sect becomes a question of power and influence. Going away from a distribution based on confession means a redistribution of power. Thus, any reformist needs to take into account this fragile sectarian-communal balance of power in an eventually new electoral law and power distribution; no reformist is willing to take the chance of redistributing power. This could lead to violence, civil war and eventually the collapse of the Lebanese state.
Traditional groups and their elites are afraid of losing influence through the implementation of a new system, so instead of supporting political reform in the direction of a form of modern PR system, the result of political and constitutional agreements between the groups and the elites of the grand coalition, do only result in an increased cementation of the existing confessional based political system\textsuperscript{40}.

\textbf{5.2 Implications of the Sub-Civilizational Line and Segmented Nationalism}

The sub-civilizational line and segmented nationalism may be seen as competing cleavages to the sectarian line as factors contributing to culturally-segmented pluralism in Lebanon. I have not tried to operationalize these cleavages or make any quantitative illustration of these cleavages. They are too diffuse and general. The reason for presenting these perspectives of diversity is my doubt that the institutionalization of the sectarian line necessarily mirrors the most important segments of Lebanon. Major clashes and civil wars between groups can easily be linked to different perceptions of nationalism and cultural orientations. Conflicts in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century 1958 and 1975 to 1989 can all be linked to the sub-civilizational line. Conflicts are linked to different perceptions (Pan Arabism, Lebanese nationalism and Islamist) to what Lebanon is, an independent nation or just a part of the greater Arab region. The Palestinian cause has divided people between western and eastern oriented groups. And different extern actors were involved in the conflicts supporting “their” own group. The Uniate Christian militias were supported by the west. The more eastern oriented Orthodox were supported by the Russians. The Sunnis were oriented towards Saudi Arabia the political core of their sub-civilization and the Shiites had support from the Islamist Iranian regime which represents the core state of the Shiite Islamist. The 2005 parliament is polarized between the pro-Syrian opposition, 8. March movement, consisting of groups with an eastern orientation and the anti-Syrian government coalition, 14 March movement, consisting of groups with a traditionally closer contact with the west and have a cultural orientation towards the western world. The polarization cross-cuts the religious

\textsuperscript{40} This statement is strengthened by the recent (May 2008) Doha agreement between the oppositional forces and the government, changing the electoral law to secure the opposition veto power in a new 40 member multi confessional cabinet.
Muslim-Christian line and to some extent the sectarian line in the case of the Christian Maronites and Catholics\textsuperscript{41}. Therefore, a question of stability concerns the relation between western and eastern oriented forces. Thus, stability is linked to the distribution of power between these sub-civilizations and their perceptions of nationalism and the establishment of peaceful ways for them to express their differences.

“Sectarianism as an idea does only draw a meaning within a nationalism paradigm, from the perspective of being a modern construction and that it appeared in a period of Lebanese identity crisis” (Makdisi 2000: 8). In other words, Sectarianism can be seen as a metaphor of failed nationalism (ibid: 2).

5.3 The Performance of Lebanese Consociationalism

Michael W. Suleiman (1967: 135) describes the Lebanese political system as a preset proportional representation system on a communal or religious basis. Lijphart’s characteristics of a well functional consociational regime consist of a grand coalitions, minority veto ability, and proportionality in group representation, and autonomy to the different segments. How has Lebanese consociationalism performed related to these main characteristics? In the last section I am going to explore how the Lebanese multiparty system relates to Lebanese diversity and consociationalism.

5.3.1 Grand Coalitions and Elite Accommodation

By being in the government together, parties that do not quite trust each other have an important guarantee of political security (Lijphart 1977: 31). These grand coalitions are represented by the major groups, parties and their leaders.

\textsuperscript{41} Muslims and Christians are found in both movements. Especially the Maronite and the Catholics are split by this political polarization (see chapter 4). Aoun’s FPM which has contested Christian candidates in most Christian districts has contributed to this split. A paradox is that one of FPM’s important policies is the disarmament of Hizbullah, a party they now are a close allied to in the opposition (See the common agreement between FPM and Hizbullah). This Christian-Muslim relationship by oppositional parties may have contributed to stability in the politico-sectarian environment.
An elite cartel structure is reflected through the role of local elites like Shamoun (Sunni), Eddeh (Shiite), Gemmawayel (Christian Phalange Party), and Jumblatt (Druze leader, PSP), representing the most influential Lebanese sects. Lebanon's multi-confessional elite has its origin in the Ottoman period. Under the French Mandate the cartel became institutionalized, and under Maronite Christian Bishara Khuri and Sunni Muslim Riyad Sulh the first great coalition was put together in the cabinet and the Chamber representing five of the largest communities, in accord with the National Pact of 1943 (Dekmejian 1978: 253). In August 1960, the cabinet was expanded to eighteen; it co-opted not only most of the main sects and interests, but also gave representation to a seventh subgroup, namely the Armenian Orthodox (Dekmejian 1978: 253). In June 1973, a cabinet of twenty-two ministers-Lebanon took office under Premier Taqi al-Din Sulh. However, these measures were insufficient to prevent the inter-confessional war which broke out in 1975 (Dekmejian 1978: 254). Comparing Lebanese reality with the consociational model, it appears that the elite cartel operated with some effectiveness promoting co-optation and circulation without changing the basic formula established by Articles 24 and 95 of the 1926 Constitution and by the National Pact of 1943 (ibid)42.

But the first failure of Lebanese consociationalism may have occurred in the elite cartel. The people in power have often used their position to change the rules of the political game to secure their own positions and avoiding replacement. This attitude towards power sharing has to do with tradition and the electoral system. In the confessional system combined with a tribal society a lot of power lies with a few peoples. Members of the communities are used to be represented by elites from specific, dominant families. “This included the resistance of the Maronite-dominated elite to effect incremental representational changes, particularly in the Chamber where the Christians were numerically dominant”(Dekmejian 1978: 278). Crighton (1991:127) writes that newly politicized groups may place great strain on institution that is not designed to handle rapid change in society. Consociationalism, that emphasizes the merits of elite consensus could raise the suspicions of citizens and provoke a backlash against elite-driven processes (Eisenberg 2002: 25). In Lebanon the elite cartel and confessional leaders seem not to have had the stabilizing effect necessary to make a consociational system work. The resent crisis in government is related to the lack of compromise and cooperation between the segmental elites.

42 On Article 24 and 95 of the Lebanese constitution see Lebanese Constitution of 1926 (La Constitution Libanaise).
5.3.2 Proportionality

One of Lijphart’s criteria of a well functional consociational system implies proportionality in the distribution of mandates on basis of group size. Chapter three and four imply that there are reasons to question the how proportionality is reflected through the Lebanese political system.

The sharing of position along the sectarian cleavage seems not to have produced proportionality. Through time different religious communities have dominated politics and hold a disproportional large part of position related to their group size. The 1932 census was from the start claimed to be flawed, not reflecting demographical realities. Basing the distribution of position on group size may be legitimate if it is based on the assumption that demography is not changing, and an assumption that if demography changes – so will the distribution of influence corrected to these changes. This is naïve assumptions. And in reality, the Lebanese solution to demographical changes seems to have been to ignoring it or deny citizenship to new state members, like the increasing number of Shiites (do to higher child birth in the Shiite community) and Palestinians (refugees from Palestine and Israel).

Some of the reason for the disproportional distribution of influence is related to the involvement of extern actors and a disproportional degree of mobilization and organization of different groups through time. Under Ottoman influence Sunnis were given the privileges. Under French influence, the French secured for the Christians a majority of state positions and the Christians were more mobilized and organized (Phalange and LF) than the Muslims under French mandate. Before the civil war the Muslims became mobilized under socialism, pan Arabism and pro Palestinian militias, and the Christians were demobilized in the same period. After the civil war the Christian community has been fragmented while the Shiite Muslims have been highly mobilized under Hizbullah and Amal. And the last decade the Sunni Muslims have succeeded to mobilize under influential leaders (The Hariri family and Future Movement). Today the Christian Maronites are separated between three or four Leaders and their movements (FPM, Phalange and LF). The other Christian groups seem also to be more fragmented supporting many different groups (SSNP, Phalange, LF and other). The conclusion is that even if proportionality in the
distribution of positions is achieved there will always be a disproportional share of influence, because of the difference in the degree of how the communities have managed to mobilize and organize its political forces. And organized is, of cause, better than unorganized in the struggle for influence. Elections of 2000 and 2005 were carried out using the Syrian influenced electoral law which has been accused of giving a skewed or disproportional election result (see Iskandar 2006). The failure of electing a new president in September 2007 is linked to a dispute on power sharing between communities. In general every new constitutional reform has further strengthened the relation between political representation, power sharing and sectarian-community.

To illustrate the development of proportionality in the distribution of position, see table 1 and 2 of the appendix illustrating the development of parliament seat distribution. Is the Taef accord an improvement to previous constitutional reforms? Using our estimates of group size and relate them to the distribution of seats to the 2005 parliament, lets see how proportional the distribution is:

Table 5.1: Proportionality of Lebanese Group Representation 2005-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community proportion estimate</th>
<th>Parliament distribution 2005 %</th>
<th>% dist. - estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian-catholic: 20 217</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian-orthodox: 90 675</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze: 169 293</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek-catholic: 156 521</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek-orthodox: 236 402</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite: 667 556</td>
<td>22.19</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite: 783 903</td>
<td>26.06</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni: 795 233</td>
<td>26.44</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 is based on the European Union Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005. Final Report to the Parliamentary election

If the estimates are representative to actual community proportion, there seems be a systematic disproportional seat distribution in favour of Christian groups. While the largest Muslim communities, Sunnis and Shiites, has a lower proportion of positions related to their proportion of the population, all of the Christian communities has a higher proportion of seats related to their proportion of the population.
The Mideast expert Hassan Krayem (1997) describes the relation between Lebanese sectarianism and representation. He recognises a low participation at parliamentary elections since independence\textsuperscript{43}. Participation is stronger in the rural areas illustrating the strength of sectarian-communal identities. Since 1922 there have been many changes to the amount and the size of electoral districts. Some changes in the divisions have been in inconsistence with sectarian-communal realities (mixed districts)\textsuperscript{44}. Arend Lijphart’s (1977) consociated democracy model emphasizes proportionality in culturally divided societies. Thus, few governments and parliaments through Lebanon’s history can be said to have been proportional, representing all of Lebanon’s major communities. Elites and movements have instead used their influence, and through making up the rules of the game, dominated other groups. This was made possible by the 1932 census which has been claimed to be flawed in relation to demographical facts. Since sectarian-communities is the basis of representation and power distribution, questions of sectarian demography is highly sensitive, and few groups or elites want to take the initiative of a new census. Especially the Maronite community which has dominated politics after independence and had privileges under French hegemony is interested in keeping its positions and influence, though their community is reduced as a proportion of the total population the last 70 years\textsuperscript{45}. Christians and especially the Maronite community wanted privileges due to their claim of ethnical and cultural heritage.

Another problem of the distribution on a sectarian basis is, as explained earlier, that major groups may be divided along other cleavages than the sectarian. Secular movements and social interest groups may represent values and interest that is better reflected through a political ideology and the class cleavage. Proportionality in distribution does only become meaningful when relating distribution along a main cleavage that mirrors the interest of the important minority groups. If it is difficult to operationalize the major cleavage in a divided society, which may be the case of Lebanon, other institutional solutions may be more suitable than group representative rights on a

\textsuperscript{43} See appendix, table 6.
\textsuperscript{44} Mixing electoral districts or through the drawing of electoral district boarders, makes it possible to manipulate election result. Minority sectarian-community candidates may be forced to compete for the voters from other confessional-communities to be elected. In this way, the interest a given majority group are secured.
\textsuperscript{45} Estimates show that the maronite community has a proportion of ca. 22 percent, using the number of confessionals registered to the 2005 elections (see the European Union Election Mission to Lebanon 2005: Final Report)
confessional basis. From another perspective, if diversity is deep along many cleavages, distribution of positions may become extremely complicated (mirror representation). In chapter six I suggest solutions which imply a decline of the institutionalization of any proportional group representation between deep religious or cultural cleavages, and rather a strengthening of “normal PR in a multi party system and segmental integrative solutions.

5.3.3 Mutual Veto

An important criterion to a well-functional consociational system is veto ability to the major segment of society. In Lebanon minority communities has not always been able to veto the majority coalition decisions. The recent (2007-2008) government disputes are related to the veto question. The Hizbullah-led opposition (8. March Movement) wants a larger share of the cabinet positions which would give them a blocking veto. Berri (Amal, speaker of parliament) is among the proponents of the 10+10+10 distribution of Cabinet posts that gives the Sunni-led majority, the Shiite-led opposition and the Christian president equal shares in a new Cabinet (Bathish 2008). This split would mean a further cementation of the sectarian line, and gives the opposition veto ability in cabinet.

A quite different attitude towards veto ability is expressed by Future Movement MP Hadi Hobeish: “a three-way split has but one meaning: the end of the democratic parliamentary system in Lebanon and a shift to a confederation” (Bathish 2008). Feature Movement has the recent years pushed for abolishing of confessionalism, a greater role for modern political parties and a western style and competitive PR system. The three way split would mark a decrease of effectiveness of government and an even further cementation of sectarian power sharing. In general veto ability is an important security to the minorities. Therefore veto power to major groups may be a stabilizing solution. But from a consensus and integrative perspective it does strengthen the sectarian based system rather than weakens it, in the case of Lebanon.

46 See Will Kymlicka on minority representation in Multicultural Citizenship pp. 138 – 148.
47 See Future Movement commitments at http://www.almustaqbal.se/.

Multi party system and proportional representation in Europe: parliament seats are distributed based on the proportion of the total number of votes in supports the different political parties.
5.3.4 Segmental Autonomy
Segmental autonomy is to some extent secured in Lebanon through the free establishment of communal churches, schools and through decentralization and municipality administration. But the degree of segmental isolation is decreasing caused by a growth in urbanization which increases the contact between segments on all levels in society. Segmental autonomy is an important characteristic of a consociated democracy, and may be stabilizing factor in a heterogenic society. However, in Lebanon segmental autonomy seems not to be enough to avoid conflict.

While inter-sectarian familiarity may promote coexistence in favourable circumstances, it can also breed mutual contempt and increase the possibility of communal conflict. While certain sects predominate numerically in various regions, much of the Lebanese population are mixed both in urban and rural areas. A growth in modernization and urbanization further reduced the separateness of confessional groups, both spatially and culturally. The most favourable condition of segmental autonomy, federalism, in Lijphart’s model, where segmental cleavages coincide with territorial boarders is not achieved in Lebanon. Sectarian isolation may be impossible because of long traditions of mixed districts and cross-cutting memberships caused by economic growth and urbanization.

5.3.5 The Lebanese Version of a Multiparty System
The first real attempts to mobilize social forces into politics can be located to the 1920’s. From the 1920’s Lebanon has had a multiparty system. But it was not until the late 1930’s that political parties began gaining importance and playing some political role in mobilizing the population and have an influence on the political process in Lebanon (Krayem).

Kataeb (Phalanges Libanaises), established during the late 1930’s and the only significant non-clandestine party in operation today, is a vehicle for maintaining Maronite interests in an independent Lebanon (Crighton 1991: 132). The Gemayel family and the phalange had an

48 This article has no year of publication. See references.
idealised picture of a Christian Lebanon with geographical boundaries corresponding to Ottoman-Lebanon Mountain\textsuperscript{49}. Yet even the Kataeb, in its most successful year (1960), placed only six men in a parliament of ninety-nine members; and in 1964 it placed only four (Hudson 1969: 257). Kamal Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist party is distinctly unsuccessful as a party, as Jumblatt himself has admitted, but it is effective as a regional-sectarian (interest) grouping. The PSP is an ideological cover for Jumblatt's personal following as the dominant leader of the Chouf district (Hudson 1969: 257). Chamoun became the ruler of a country polarized by the pro-Western, Christian fraction, which controlled the disintegrating coercive instruments of the state, and the pro-Nasser insurgents, consisting of many of the leading notables (Hudson 1969: 259). The Shiites were almost demobilized in this period in the pre civil war years (Crighton: 133) The Shiite political role and representation has passed through stages of silent masses to ascending forces to dominant forces represented by Amal and Hizbullah, especially since the mid-1980s (Krayem) Amal and Hizbullah have had their disputes on the Palestinian question\textsuperscript{50}, but are today united in the opposition together with Auons FPM. Political organizations in Lebanon have been, and are still today, tied to sectarian-communities as illustrated in chapter four. The Kataeb party gets is support from Maronites (Crighton: 132). And the Druze support the Druze dominated PSP and so on. Traditionally, elites from the upper class have dominated party organizations, and this may have ignored broader social concerns (ibid). This has led to resentment among the lower classes.

People’s relation to a specific communal-religious group is reinforced through the party system cleavage\textsuperscript{51}. The movements are based on the support of well known individuals in a community. It is elite driven parties and not parties supported by masses. They are formed by the families who are resourceful and are well known in their local society. Many political positions are held by just a few families, and by the same families, from one election to another. The people are not voting on parties, and party programs, but on communal elites. We recognise that the party system in this respect mirrors a traditional and tribal society. A society based on a few families’ dominance over their community and where much power is concentrated to a few families. Most of the political parties are movements rather than parties in their lack of a political programme

\textsuperscript{49} See chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{50} While Amal fought against PLO and Palestinian militias during the 1975-1989 civil war Hizbullah supported them (see Mackey 2006).
\textsuperscript{51} See chapter 4.
and a clear ideology. Some movements have been mobilized by intellectuals with a certain ideological (communist parties) base, but these parties have never really gained a lot of support and influence in this sectarian based party system\textsuperscript{52}.

In Lebanon, the sectarian element remains the strongest determining factor of party politics. Most parties and political movements, either in ideology or in practice, are associated with a single sect or an ethnic group. The secular parties have not been able yet to play a national role and the trend in recent years, especially in the post-Civil War period (1990-to present), have been to marginalize these parties, as is the case with leftist parties. The trend has also been for parties to become vehicles for rising militia forces and leaders. The electoral systems in Lebanon have contributed to the marginalization and weakening of the political parties in many different ways. Hassan Krayem\textsuperscript{53} explains that the relatively weak political role of the political parties in Lebanon is related to the structure of these parties, which has remained highly confessionalist and depended heavily on individual traditional communal leaders. They represent first their sect and community and thirdly a political party and a party program. In other words, it seems that traditional and neo-traditional forces and local elites have been emphasized, rather than political parties.

Hassan Krayem describes the changes of the relative strength of the different movements of the Lebanese party system through time. Political party representation in the parliament has changed in terms of sectarian affiliation. In the pre-Civil War period, the Christian political parties were strongly represented, relative to the unorganized and under-represented Islamic political forces. The Islamic community was influenced by Pan-Arabism, and this was reflected in the general mass movements and dominant political currents, especially Nasserism. In the post-Civil-War period, the Islamic parties became well represented and well organized, in contrast to the unorganized and under-represented political movements and currents in the Christian areas, especially the phenomenon of Aounism, a movement of supporters of General Michael Aoun, the previous army leader and head of the transitional military government. A split between Christian communities is also evident under the 2005 election. Aoun’s FPM contributed to this split by competing against the other Christian elites and movements in Christian areas. The Christians are

\textsuperscript{52} Communist parties are examples of ideological based parties’ which never have been influential (see appendix table 4 and 5).

\textsuperscript{53} This article has no year of publication. See references.
split by different concepts of nationalism – Lebanese nationalism, Syrian and Arabic nationalism\textsuperscript{54}.

Because sectarian identity has been more generally more important than political ideology, leftist movements fighting for social and economic development have not been successful in getting through with their programme. Socialist movements were gaining support in the 1950s and 60s but the movements were disrupted by an increased unstable situation in the country caused by the Cairo agreement and international conflict – the Palestinian-Israel war. Members of the idealist and socialist movement ran off to support their specific communities and sectarian militias when political-sectarian tensions were increasing in the pre civil war years. Dubar and Nasr write that, “social identity patterns were developing along horizontal class lines, but this development was aborted by the outbreak of the civil war and quick reaffirmation of rigid sectarian divisions and identity patterns” (Dubar 1982: 106).

Still to day there are major challenges facing political movements in their process of mobilizing social groups and gaining influence in Lebanese politics. Political parties traditionally have a low influence on Lebanese politics. The confessional based political system is to blame for undermining mobilizing forces and political movement, especially those who have a secular base.

5.4 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Five

It seems that, on the one hand, that traditional loyalties and an institutionalization of segmented society exists alongside, on the other hand, liberal democracy, modernism and an increasing secular civil society and political organizations. This seems like a contradiction, but this dualism has to do with a carefully balanced power distribution.

The question asked is to what extent the confessional system is suitable mirroring the diversity of today’s Lebanon. The constitution of 1926, the census from 1932, the independence from France

\textsuperscript{54} See chapter 3 and 4. This cleavage of different nationalist ideas which in some extent is reinforcing to cultural cleavages may be defined as segmented nationalism.
in 1943, the reforms of Shihab of the 1950s, the civil war, the Taif accord from 1989 and the independence from Syria in 2005 are all important benchmarks. These events have had an impact on the formulation of the electoral law making the basis for power distribution and the stability of the fragile power balance structure between sectarian groups in Lebanon. There are reasons to believe that a development towards a modern party system would mark the end of the confessional system or tradition of distributing mandates and influence based on religious diversities. The Lebanese system does fit to a consociational model. But a critical factor to instability has been the disproportionately share of political influence between groups.

Movements and new political and secular forces of Lebanon are giving us an impression through speech and documents that they are fed up with the sectarian based institutions of Lebanon (like the Future Movement). Confessionalism in Lebanon has not mirrored the social and political environment. But are the Lebanese movements doing what’s necessary in order to achieve the goal of an abolishment of the sectarian system? A pure PR system depends on a modern party system. Many movements’ policies are in favour of a reform, but are the pure PR system the right solution? I will explore how the consociational system can function satisfactorily by balancing liberal and integrative democratic institution with pluralist, consociated democracy.
6 Between Lebanese Consociationalism and Consensus Democracy: Institutional Solutions to Diversity

Pluralist theory like consociationalism, group-differentiated citizenship theory and consensus theory address similar problems but present different solutions. Both Samuel P. Huntington (1968) and Arend Lijphart (1977) examine how to ensure democratic governance in culturally-segmented societies. Dahl’s theory applies to pluralistic but not deeply divided – culturally-segmented societies. Cross-cutting theory may illustrate the degree of pluralism in Lebanon. This helps us towards more qualified perspectives on what the Lebanese institutions may be able to achieve in representing the major segments of society and moderating tensions between groups and tensions between opposition and government. In present Lebanon, pluralism and democracy exist without a prior legitimacy or an integrated culture (Hudson 1969: 146).

Pluralist arguments like the ones found in the consociational Theory apply to societies more segmented than that of the consensus model. Two different perspectives on stable democracy emerge from the two theories. Consociationalism favour segmental autonomy and the institutionalization of major cleavages in society. The consensus model is also expected to apply to pluralist societies but solves diversity and stability questions by emphasize an environment of mutual understanding to reach some form of consensus among the different groups on major issues. This chapter explores some alternative institutional solutions to the segmented pluralism of Lebanon – inspired by cross-cutting theory and integrative arguments represented by the consensus model of democracy. I will first reintroduce some of the major pluralist arguments which the present system is founded on.

6.1 Consociationalism and Social Pluralist Arguments to the Institutionalization of Diversity

In many pluralist societies there are a close relationship between party preference and religion. In a plural society like Lebanon segmental cleavages are politically salient and coincide with

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55 In Arendt Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, a Comparative Exploration (1977), the Benelux countries are described as pluralist countries where there is a close relationship between religious and party preference. In the
party system cleavages. Therefore there is no guarantee that today’s minority is tomorrow’s majority. One of the legitimizing arguments of the majority model of democracy is that the (two) major movements of society are shifting in their role as opposition and government. Legitimacy of the consociational democracy on the other hand, is sustained by letting all major segments of societies to be represented in the cabinet at all times, through the forming of grand coalitions. For deeply plural societies, the government versus opposition norm prescribed by normative democratic theory may in practice be a principle of exclusion\(^\text{56}\) (Lijphart 1977: 31). Sisk (1996: 5) explains that:

“Consociational power sharing can be conceived of as an overarching framework in which groups are the analytical construct between which a set of political power interconnections reverberate. Groups are represented as groups (usually through ethnically exclusive political parties), in essence as building blocks of a common society.

High degree of Cross-cutting is less likely to occur in a deeply segmented society like Lebanon. Lijphart argue that applying clear boundaries between the segments have the potential to reduce hostility between groups. Major cleavages not institutionalized may contribute to conflict because people may find other channels than the political to resolve differences (Lijphart 1977: 86). A high degree of fragmentation on the cleavages may also contribute to conflicts. The tension produced by fragmentation or heterogeneity is solved through segmental isolation which reduces the contact between segments\(^\text{57}\). The notion of overlapping memberships argues that mutual contact fosters mutual understanding. Lijphart argues that this may be the case of relatively homogeneous societies but not in the case of deeply pluralist societies like Lebanon (ibid: 88).

But what if consociationalism is based on the wrong assumptions on which cleavages of society constitute the major diversity; the electoral system is flawed and has a low degree of legitimacy; and the segments of society are not possible to isolate from each other?

\(^\text{56}\) Majoritarian rule are unable to meet the demands of the fractionalized society. Majoritarian rule do not guarantee minorities, representative rights (see Lijphart 1977).

\(^\text{57}\) Segmental autonomy is achieved in Lebanon by granting the major religious-communities their own churches, schools and local laws (Lijphart 1977: 147-150). Segmental autonomy along a strict territorial line is called federalism (see Lijphart 1977: 88-89).
6.2 Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Consensus (integrative) Arguments

Sisk (1996) explains that integrative power sharing perspectives pursue the goal of eliciting some degree of "cross-cutting" of cleavages that allow members of groups to generate and sustain affinities that move over and beyond ethnic group politics, thereby in effect promoting political stability. Integrative or pluralist approach seeks to make political organizations that mirror ethnic group differences (Sisk 1996: 7).

There are four main reasons to believe that the consociational democracy of Lebanon do not mirror the segments of society. The first reason is related to the lack of segmental isolation; the second reason has to do with the failure of the grand coalition to be representative balanced; Thirdly, there seems to be a trend of one group dominating other groups through time making Lebanese consociationalism disproportional; and fourthly, as illustrated in chapter four, Lebanon may be divided along other deep cleavages (class, cultural sub-civilizations, east or western orientation and different nationalist views) than the sectarian which consociationalism of Lebanon is based on.

I assume by this last reason that sectarianism in Lebanon is a modern construction. And the constitution and electoral law fail to stabilize the fragile politico-sectarian environment because it is flawed (by the 1932 census) and based on these wrong assumptions of Lebanese diversity. The different cultural orientation or sub civilizations – does not follow a strict sectarian line.

From a consociationalist perspective the solution would be to institutionalize all major cleavages of society. From a cross-cutting and an integrative theoretical perspective it would have a stabilizing effect on society if main cleavages of society were cancelling each other out through cross-cutting. But as illustrated in chapter four the important party system cleavage and the sectarian cleavage are reinforcing rather than cross-cutting in Lebanon. Major conflicts through time are linked to different perspectives of nationalism – segmented nationalism. And the political blocs in Lebanese politics today seem to be reinforcing to some form of sub-
civilizational cleavage. These major cultural and political cleavages, I assume, do not have the potential to be moderating. And since segmental autonomy and isolation is such important characteristics of the consociated democracy, it seems necessary that the eventually abolishment of segmental isolation must be “replaced” by other stabilizing factors and institutions to this power balance issue. I have explored some integrating solutions.

6.2.1 Moderation of Diversity through Cross-Cutting of Cleavages

From a cross-cutting theoretical perspective cleavages may cancel each other out when they are cross-cutting. Some democracy theoreticians argue that democracy is impossible if segments of society are not cross-cutting the party system cleavage. A stable democracy requires that all major parties include supporters from all segments of society (see Dahl 1982: 40, Lipset 1960: 31).

In the case of Lebanon the religious cleavage has been institutionalized through the confessional system. There is a certain extent of federalism and segmental autonomy. But the segments are not isolated from each other by territory because many districts are mixed. Instead there exist invisible borders between religious communities. Through the years the contact between the segments has increased on all levels of society through urbanization, the decline of the feudal system and traditional elite hierarchies, and an some degree of cross-cutting of memberships through party organization and interest groups

58. Present Lebanon, following social and demographic trends, segmental isolation has become impossible. Segmental isolation, in the sense that Lijphart believes contribute to stability in segmented societies, may not apply to modern Lebanon. There is a power struggle between traditional ruler families and new forces in politics. These new forces represented through interest organisations and secular political organizations need to be included into political processes. The institutional solutions must be able to balance the power between all of the major politico-sectarian forces and segments.

58 Sunni dominated FM has some Shiite members and is constituted as a secular party. Labour unions and firms are organizations with cross-segmental memberships. Many people have moved from the rural to the central and urban areas through the last half a century (see Mackey 2006).
6.2.2 Social Corporatism and Institutionalization of the Class Cleavage

Interest group corporatism is one of the characteristics of the consensus democracy model (see Lijphart 1999: 37-38). Hudson is concerned with factors that contribute to Lebanese political stability, and mentions that economic wealth is associated to stable democracy (Hudson 1969:146). In European countries economic development and allocation policies have made the class cleavage cut a cross cultural and religious cleavages, and may have moderated tensions between different ethnic and religious groups. Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) argues that the class cleavage has a moderating effect on segmentation if the class cleavage cross-cuts the segmented cleavages.

Labour unions and companies are examples of entities where membership may criss-cross each other on cultural and religious cleavages. When labour unions are influential in politics, religious cleavages may be moderated because the labour unions may consist of people from all confessional communities. The class cleavage has the potential to become cross-cutting to the major segments of society because one persons wealth and thereby class identity, is easier to change than a persons religious and cultural preferences.

In Lebanon the class cleavage has been reinforcing to the sectarian cleavage. Following the First World War, Lebanon had an economic growth and the politico-sectarian environment was peaceful. Firstly, during the economic decline in the 1950’s sectarian and nationalist ideological conflicts increased. This does not mean that there is a direct connection between economic wealth and stable political and sectarian environment, but high degree of stability, during times of economic wealth, both in Lebanon and in many other countries, makes the relation likely59. Besides economic wealth and allocation of economic recourses the class cleavage can be a stabilising force if it is institutionalized. By mobilizing social movements through a form of social corporatism the class cleavage may function as a moderating factor to the politico-sectarian milieu. Workers unions represent such a cross-cutting of memberships. A workers union with a multi sectarian member base have the potential to get the credibility and support to make the

59 Based on a study of 135 countries from over a 40 year period – 1950 to 1990, Przewosovsky and Limongi (1997) found that no country with a per capita income of under $ 6,066 (1975: 165-166), no democracy failed or declined significantly.
class cleavage moderate the sectarian cleavage, by representing all workers and move society towards economic equality.

An increase of economic equality in the case of Lebanon may be done by strengthening the living conditions of the communities in the poor regions of North, South and East Lebanon. Times of democratic and politico-sectarian stability have been connected to periods of economic development and wealth (1920-1960). Though, the distribution of wealth has always been skewed. The Lebanese society is based on a liberal marked economy (see Iskandar 2006). Little recourse is allocated through the Lebanese state and Lebanon uses a marginal portion of GDP on social services (see social action plan). The Lebanese federation of labor unions (GFLU) has been claimed not to represent workers interests, because the labor unions in some extent follow sectarian lines and are dominated by the politico-sectarian fractions of Amal, Hizbullah and SSNP (see yaLibnan 2008). Leftist parties have also failed in representing worker interests because of their sectarian structure. The Progressive Socialist Party and other socialist parties of the 50s and 60s did not have the credibility and sufficient support. PSP was representing the interest of the Druze elite Jumblatt. PSP and most other parties were highly sectarian, and sectarian communal identity was a stronger characteristic of the party than its socialist ideology. Both Pan Arabism and Communism were international or regional ideologies that to some degree moderated sectarian tensions by cross-cutting the sectarian cleavage. But the people were also separated by these nationalist and political ideological issues. Eventually, both communism and Pan Arabism were reduced as major sources of identity after the collapse of communism and the increase of domestic and international conflicts like the Palestinian – Israel conflicts.

Social forces had problems mobilizing during the 50 and 60s due to the lack of institutionalization of the class cleavage. Labor unions lacked influence and few major political movements represented the lower class and workers because of their sectarian fundament and their priorities to represent sectarian-community interest and often the interest of elites. Since the political channel was closed to them, social movements were more likely to choose other channels of influence, like protest and violence.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{60} The mobilization of social forces is related to the major conflict of 1958.
Times of peace in Lebanon are related to times of economic wealth and prosperity. But there is a strong relation between wealth and development like Lipset (1960) argues then there is reason to doubt if it is consociationalism that has stabilized the complex politico-sectarian milieu of Lebanon, but rather economical factors. From another perspective, times of economic growth have usually been concentrated to the central area of Beirut, and the periphery of the country has not benefitted from this growth. This means that social tensions may have been increasing also during times of general economic development.

6.3 Institutional Solutions to Lebanese Diversity: Institutional Engineering

“The central question of political engineering is: what kinds of institutions and practices create an incentive structure for ethnic groups to mediate their differences through the legitimate institutions of a common democratic state?” (Sisk 1996: 33).

I will propose some institutional solutions that may apply to the segmented society of 21st century Lebanon, given its cleavage structure and fragile balance of power. The solutions are inspired by the consensus model by Lijphart which weights national parties, strong bicameralism, corporatism and segmental integrative solutions.

6.3.1 Electoral Law Adjustments and Representation

Are there measures that can be done to strengthen the representative institutions and legitimacy of Lebanese consociationalism? Sectarianism in Lebanon is cemented through 150 years of “modernist” reforms (see chapter 3 and Makdisi 2000). Therefore it is naïve to believe that sectarianism can be removed or replaced easily. Electoral reforms have to take into consideration the fragile sectarian balance of power before making any drastic change to the way power is distributed. The European Union Observation Mission to Lebanon (2005) has suggested some solutions to how the Lebanese system may become more fair and more “modern” (downplay sectarianism and primordial identities). The problem of the system today is that parliamentary seats are assigned before the voters have been able to express their preferences; Seats seem to be
assigned to candidates before Election day and there is a problem of non contested candidates in some districts; the current electoral system does not respect the principle of equality of votes; and the delimitation of electoral constituencies does not respect this principle (The European Union Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005: 6). The observation mission’s conclusion is to redraw the electoral map (increase the number of electoral districts), improve representation, accountability, and voter turnout (ibid).

The conclusions by the observation mission seem reasonable. Lebanon is today divided into five electoral regions. Reducing the geographical size of regions (and increasing the number) would improve voter awareness. This change would increase the voter’s interest and boost election turnout as more communal interests or issues rise to the national level. It would also increase politicians’ accountability to their constituents (ibid: 7). The number of constituencies should allow for a sufficient number of seats in each constituency in order to have representatives from each of them reflecting all major political views in the respective region. A certain number of seats could be distributed nationwide to achieve an even more proportional representation. Because Lebanon is such a diverse society it is crucial to have as many different views as possible represented in Parliament. Delimiting electoral district boundaries should be done, serving the principles of equal vote, and adequate (proportional) political representation (ibid: 8).

The Siniora Cabinet (2007-) has decided to draft a new law for elections. They want the election result to better reflect individual choices and they want the free establishment of political parties (see FM’s commitments). The electoral law is in the core of the 2007-2008 political crises (no new president after Lahoud is elected). The lack of a president and an ineffective parliament creates a political power vacuum that puts to the test the stability of the politico-sectarian environment. One proposition regarding the electoral law is called the "three-way split". A "three-way split" between the Sunni, Shiite and Christian sects in a new Cabinet was at the core of the disagreement between the assassinated former Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel and Hizbullah's resigned ministers in the present Cabinet (Bathish 2008). Hizbullah are pushing for more positions and veto ability.\(^{61}\)

\(^{61}\) It seems that the Hizbullah-led opposition are going to achieve this through the Doha agreement. (See Hussein Abdallah: The Daily Star, Lebanon May 21\(^{st}\) 2008). Of the 40 positions in the new unity cabinet the oppositions will have a sufficiently large proportion of the seats to have a blocking veto if necessary.
6.3.2 Strong Bicameralism

Strong bicameralism is a separation of parliament into two chambers elected on different basis. Lebanon has only one chamber in Parliament. Strong bicameralism applied to a relative heterogeneous state work as a special representational institution in favour of minorities in society. The implementation of bicameralism to a consociational state works in a different manner. Applied to the case of Lebanon one chamber may be elected on the basis of traditional sectarian line including dominating families and sectarian communities. And one chamber elected on the basis of party politics and a pure PR system. This will include the secular political parties. In the case of Lebanon bicameralism would have the opposite effect on representation as bicameralism originally is tended to. It may reduce group identities in favour of party politics and national parties, because one chamber is not elected on the basis of group diversity. This holds if the second chamber is elected on the basis of “pure” PR without the group specific distribution based on sectarian communities, but rather on the basis of “communities of common ideology and interests”. At the same time it does not abolish the confessional communities, but it reduces the influence of sectarian elites to the advantage of non traditional party leaders and party members. The solution takes into account the fragile balance of power between sectarian communities and their elites, simultaneously as it marks a modernizing reform giving room for a new form of party and ideology based politics and representation.

6.3.3 National Parties

The careful adaption of modern and secular parties is necessary to include newly mobilized forces into politics which base their party policies on political interest and ideology and has a cross-segmental member basis. Alternative to proportional representation based on the distribution of mandates along the sectarian line, mandates can be elected on the basis of party preference and political interest. This would mark a decline of the sectarian cleavage. The political parties of Lebanon today are highly sectarian but they do also represent specific nationalist, social and other ideologies.

Political parties are responsible of recruiting, nominate, and campaign to elect public officials, drawing upon similar ideological, economical or social outlooks to identify issues and mobilize
support. The creation of national based political parties would encourage the identification and promotion of national issues, which would in turn encourage individuals to vote beyond sectarian loyalties (Final Report by the Canadian Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005).

Are there trends in direction of political development: the creation of modern- western inspired PR multiparty system? From statistics in appendix table 4, notice that there has been an overall increase in party member representation in parliament. There may be changes taking place, from traditional elite’s representation to modern representation where political parties are given a greater role. Younger non traditional party leaders like Saad Hariri (32 years of age), and parties with a secular program (FM, FPM and PSP) seem to have a great deal of influence. Most parties are in favour of the abolishment of the sectarian based political and representative institutions, from the judgement of some of their party programs (see the party programmes of Hizbullah, FPM and PSP). From the FPM charter: “Free Patriotic Movement aims at renewing the political life in Lebanon on the bases of knowledge, ethics, progressiveness and the emancipation of the Lebanese individual; …“Promote institutional functions on the basis of competence and the implementation of the principal of liability and accountability” (FPM charter).

To secure that the party-system are influential in the future there is a need for strengthening political parties legal status – there rights of establishment (see Union Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005: 9). If the party member basis is becoming less sectarian grounded and we find a significant volatility\(^{62}\) between future elections, this will strengthen our belief that a development to a modern party system is taking place and the legitimacy of the confessional based political system will decrease. Then some form of modernization and secularization has taken place, since this development mentioned will involve structural differentiation and a further separation between religion and the political system.

I believe that the inclusion and participation of modern (secular) political parties and through a distribution of mandates that reflect major political and social differences of society (and to a less

\(^{62}\) Voter volatility explains in which extent voters tend to shift their loyalty between parties from election to election. The degree of volatility in Lebanon may be used as a measurement of decrease of sectarian voting and the increase of cross-cutting memberships. Unfortunately are the statistics necessary to measure volatility unavailable. The data necessarily to make these measurements are the voter’s religious preference and party preferences from to elections or more.
extent on sectarian diversities) would challenge the traditional confessional based system and eventually secure a more fair power distribution (of parliamentary, cabinet seats and administrative positions) and involve the Lebanese into politics in a peaceful manner.

6.4 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Six

This chapter has evaluated some possible solutions to deep diversity. The consensus model of democracy is the main source. I have also argued from a cross-cutting cleavage theoretical perspective. The main statement is, giving the political trends and cleavages of Lebanon, that segmental integration is better than segmental autonomy. Relevant solutions derived from the consensus model are solutions that through time could remove or at least radically reduce confessionalism. My interpretation of the bicameral system and the cross-cutting memberships of corporatism and secular parties may have this effect.

Consociationalism of Lebanon has been organized on wrong conclusions concerning Lebanese diversity. Still this regime may have contributed to preserving peace, democratic organization and stability better than alternative political regimes. Times of conflict follow times of consociational state failure, disproportionally, group domination, corruption, and ineffective mobilization of important groups. There are strong indications that the relationship between the individual and the state has become more important than before. A peaceful Lebanon lies in horizontal integration between communities and a more dynamic state-society relation.

Some democracy theoreticians argue that the consociational state is not a democracy, but more of a confederation. Through grand coalitions, the groups of society are never in opposition and they are never in a majority. The argument states that the lack of competition is a lack of democracy. I am not going to argue in which extent Lebanon is a democracy; I would rather argue that the political system of Lebanon may be the best one considering its alternative. As long as group specific representation based on sectarian lines of diversity makes Lebanon a stable, peaceful and that fundamental civil and political rights are secured, then consociationalism is the right system in the case of Lebanon. Democracy is a means to secure political and civil liberties. Some times
democracy does not secure fundamental rights and sometimes dictatorship does. Some institutional solutions represented through the consensus model may be used to modify Lebanese consociationalism to better “fit” to the politico-sectarian trends and environment of modern Lebanon. These institutions are supposed to encourage policies strengthening social identities other than religious and encourage cross-cutting memberships. The distribution of resources based on need (class cleavage) would make the important class-cleavage cross-cut the cultural-religious segments of Lebanon.

Summing up, consociational power-sharing in Lijphart’s model and the way consociationalism functions in Lebanon seek to reduce religious tensions by minimizing the need for interaction between ethnic groups, except at the elite level. The consensus or integrative power-sharing institutions seek to minimize conflict by creating cross-cutting cleavages. I have argued in favour of the integrative power-sharing solutions.
7 Conclusion

So how is the Lebanese society divided? I have described society as divided into four main segments: Eastern and Western oriented Muslims or Christians. Muslims with a western orientation is the Druze and the Sunni community. The Christians are split in their view of western versus eastern cultural orientation. The Christians with a western orientation is to be found in Christian catholic communities. Eastern orientated Christians are to be found in the orthodox but also Christian Catholic population. The Eastern oriented Muslim is found in southern and eastern Lebanon and supports the sectarian Amal party and the Islamism nationalist Hizbullah and they are mostly Shiite Muslims. I argue that the sub-civilizational cleavage is a major cultural cleavage that may be more descriptive of Lebanese diversity than the sectarian line. The argument is supported by the recent political polarization. Segmentation implies that cleavages are reinforcing to each other. This is, unfortunately, the case of major cleavages of Lebanon: the class cleavage seems to be reinforcing to the sectarian cleavage, which again is mutually reinforced by the party system cleavage.

If you are a Shiite you vote for Shiite movements if you are a Christian you probably vote for the Phalange party or one of the other Christian sectarian parties. The Sunnis vote for the Sunni dominated Feature movement. In other words, the country is sectarian and segmented through both representative institutions and through voting behaviour. Thus I have stated that sectarianism is a construction. Still confessionalism has been more and more cemented from one political reform to the next. This has to do with the fragile balance of power and less to do with a deep sectarian diversity. The fragile power balance makes elites and reformist less likely to propose a new distribution of positions, not based on traditional sectarian structures.

How does the consociational political system of Lebanon, through its representative institutions, reflect the major diversities of the Modern Lebanese society? When “constructing” the sectarian line of diversity in the mid nineteen century, the Ottomans and Europeans indirectly reduced the influence of groups separated along other cleavages, like the class cleavage and by political ideologies. This is why the 1861 civil war is told as a story of sectarian conflict and tribal disruption, and not as a revolt against feudalism. The conflict was manifested through a sectarian
clash because the sectarian cleavage was the only cleavage institutionalized. Corporate and party channels did not exist to handle political and social difference.

The breakdown of the Lebanese state in later years can be linked to the lack of including newly mobilized forces into politics. Class differences and other political differences were manifested through sectarian violence because the class cleavage had not been sufficiently institutionalized and social forces had not gained influence through the political channel. Corporatist and the party organization channel would have been able to express class interest in a peaceful manner if they had been influential. Different nationalistic and ideological views would also be reflected via the party system. The sectarian system represents first of all sectarian community- and elite interests and this overshadows other political interests. The conclusion is that stability is connected to the institutionalization of the class cleavage and not the institutionalization of cultural and religious cleavages or increased segmental isolation. The class cleavage would, if institutionalized, have a stabilizing effect on ethnic, religious and deep cultural cleavages, because the memberships of social corporatist and socialist parties may cross-cut the religious and cultural cleavages.

Lebanese diversity favour some form of power sharing solutions, Lebanon’s confessionalism may not prove to be the best way of representing the major lines of diversity or segments of society. I believe Lebanese sectarianism, in some extent, has been constructed. I believe an increase of mass politics and party ideology is part of the solution. A basis for party ideology may be found in nationalist and social reformist agendas. Besides representing sectarian interests Druze PSP has a socialist agenda, and the Sunni dominated Future Movement are constituted as a secular movement and has a liberal ideology. Also the oppositional party FPM expresses a liberal ideology through their programme. But until now political movements have had a weak position due to the strength of sectarian elites of the executive power, and a sectarian based representative system.

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63Crighton (2006: 161) explains that the western press reported the outbreaks of fighting (in the 1970’s – 80’s) as a civil war between Muslims and Christians. But no of the fighting camps was really constituted on a communal-religious basis. The civil war may have had more of the characteristics of a sectarian clash later on, but the sectarian cleavage was not the reason to the outbreak.
The confessional system is described both as a stabilising and destabilising factor on the Lebanese society. Injustice in the confessional system explains some of the tension between the confessional groups. In this thesis I mention the distribution of power between the different groups after the implementation of the Taif Accord of 1989. This distribution has more legitimacy than earlier laws. Now, parliamentary seats are shared more evenly between Christians and Muslims than after 1943. The confessional system in Lebanon is an extremely fragile distribution of power between confessional groups. Strong arguments exist both in favour of, and against, an electoral reform. Much could be done to make the system fairer, in relation to proportionality and by increasing the influence of social and secular forces, but not without destabilizing the fragile balance of power between the sectarian communities and their elites.

Which alternative institutions may contribute to a more fair (proportional) representation on behalf of the segments of Lebanese society? Lijphart’s model states that increased segmental contact and the decrease of segmental autonomy can lead to conflict. Integrative perspectives emphasize the segmental integration and the cross-cutting of cleavages. I have given some integrative propositions. This is because I believe the institutionalization of major cultural or religious cleavages, which consociationalism implies, complicates the state structure and is not necessarily in favour of proportionality and stability. First of all the system is not up to date with demographical realities and second, people are segmented along other cleavages than the sectarian. Besides strengthening organizations with a cross-cutting membership, representative solutions mentioned are a special version of bicameralism, the inclusion of national and secular parties and a new electoral reform which downplays the role of sectarian identity.

An interesting theme in the extension of this thesis would be to explore how to implement integrative, modernist reform to the Lebanese sectarian based system without provoking too many traditional privileged groups. As explained in chapter five, the trend is that the Lebanese sectarian system has been cemented from reform to reform. This trend has to change if the integrative institutional solution can be successfully implemented.
Consociationalism and Segmented Cleavages: The Case of Lebanon
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*News Papers*


## Appendix

### Table 1: Assembly of Representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Before Taif</th>
<th>After Taif</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Christians</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Muslims</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
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</table>


### Table 2: Election result 2005

Summary of the 29 May-20 June 2005 Lebanese National Assembly election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliances</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 14 Alliance</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Future Movement (Tayyar Al Mustaqbal)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party (Hizb al-Taqadummi al-Ishitraki)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanese Forces (al-Quwāt al-Lubnāniyya)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qornet Shehwan Gathering</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kataeb Party (Hizb al-Kataeb)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Independents (Tripoli Bloc)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Renewal (Tripoli Bloc)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Left (Tripoli Bloc)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance and Development Bloc</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Amal Movement (Harakat Amal)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party of God (Hezbollah)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party (al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-souri al ijtima'i)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Consociationalism and Segmented Cleavages: The Case of Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Representation in 1992 Parliament</th>
<th>Confessional Base and Region</th>
<th>Ideological Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
<td>4 Deputies</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon (Chouf and Alley) Druze</td>
<td>Socialist Member of International Socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social National Syrian Party</td>
<td>6 Deputies</td>
<td>Secular with heavy representation in the Greek Orthodox Community (Mount Lebanon Koura in the north, and Beirut)</td>
<td>National &quot;Syrian Nationalism&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baath Party (pro-Syrian)</td>
<td>2 Deputies</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>National &quot;Arab Nationalism&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal Movement</td>
<td>4 Deputies</td>
<td>South Lebanon &quot;Shia'a&quot;</td>
<td>Sectarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizbollah</td>
<td>8 Deputies</td>
<td>South Lebanon &amp; Biqa'a Shia'a</td>
<td>Islamic fundamentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Communist Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secular, National</td>
<td>Marxist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kataeb Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mainly Maronites Mount Lebanon &quot;Kisinvan, Mattn, and Beirut&quot;</td>
<td>Conservative rightwing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberal Party</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>Mainly Maronite &quot;Chouf &amp; Beirut&quot;</td>
<td>Conservative rightwing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Block</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>Mainly Maronite &quot;Jbeil &amp; Beirut&quot;</td>
<td>Liberal; Lebanese Nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tashnaq Party</td>
<td>3 Deputies</td>
<td>Armenians &quot;Mount Lebanon &amp; Beirut&quot;</td>
<td>Armenian Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Jama'a</td>
<td>3 Deputies</td>
<td>Sunni &quot;Beirut &amp; Sidon&quot;</td>
<td>Islamic fundamentalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Registered voters from the different communities, 2005 election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Registered</th>
<th>voters %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>23 696</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian-catholic</td>
<td>20 217</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian-orthodox</td>
<td>90 675</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>169 293</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek-catholic</td>
<td>156 521</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek-orthodox</td>
<td>236 402</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>667 556</td>
<td>22.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>47 018</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>17 409</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>783 903</td>
<td>26.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>795 233</td>
<td>26.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 007 927</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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Islamic Philanthropic Projects Association (Ahbash) 1 Deputy Sunni "Beirut" Liberal Islamist
Wa'ad Party 2 Deputies Mainly Maronite "Beirut, Zahleh, Metn" Liberal Ex-Militia
Hanishaq Party 1 Deputy Armenian "Beirut" Armenian Nationalist
Popular Nasserite Organization 1 Deputy Sunni "Sidon" Arab Nationalist
Lebanese Forces ---------- Mainly Maronite "Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North" Militia "Dissolved by the state"
Democratic Socialist Party ---------- South Lebanon Traditional, sectarian, feudal heritage
Small local parties 4 Deputies Very narrowly based Limited local representation
Total: 39. percentage 39/128 = 30.5%
Source: Hassan Krayem: Political Parties and Electoral Systems in Lebanon and Israel: Interactive Reinforcement

Table 5: Political Parties Represented in the Lebanese Parliament 1951-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tashnak Party</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
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<td>2-4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kataeb Party (Phalange)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Block</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberal Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social National Syrian Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baath (pro Iraq)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nasserite Organization</td>
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<td>Najada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialist party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8-10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27-28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
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</table>


Table 6: Electoral Participation 1943-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>52.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>61.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>56.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>53.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>49.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>49.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>48.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>50.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>54.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>30.34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Economic activity rates by governorate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatieh</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Source: Central Administration for Statistics, www.cas.gov.lb

Map 1: Greater and Smaller Lebanon

Map 2: Geography and Communities