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Humanitarian aid to Russian citizens during and after the First World War

The role of the Norwegian society and public figures

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Presentation of the topic

This thesis will explore the humanitarian activity of Norwegian society and public figures, most notably scientist and philanthropist Olaf Broch, towards Russian citizens in need of aid during and after the First World War. The thesis will look at organizations and institutions that were involved in humanitarian aid, and focus on Broch's cooperation and interaction on humanitarian issues with the Norwegian government, society, public figures, Norwegian and Russian actors. There are no fundamental historical works discussing the assistance of Norwegian public figures to different categories of Russian citizens in need of humanitarian aid during 1914-1923. The one exception is the works on Fridtjof Nansen and his efforts to provide aid from 1920 to 1923, through his position as League of Nations High Commissioner for refugees (Vogt 2007; Vogt 2011). However, the scope of this thesis is broader, both chronologically and in terms of historical actors, encompassing figures who worked partly together with Nansen, partly independently of him. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to analyze and assess the role of the Norwegian society and public figures, especially Olaf Broch, in the preparation and implementation of humanitarian assistance to Russian citizens during and after World War I.

The first international humanitarian organizations appeared in the middle of the 19th century but their first real major challenge came with the beginning of the First World War. During and after the war they were focused on the following issues: conditions of detention of prisoners of war (POWs), assistance to refugees, negotiating the repatriation and so on.

Russia entered the First World War in August 1914 on the side of the Entente with France and Great Britain. The country undertook several successful military operations at the beginning of the war (the battle in Galicia in 1914, the operation in Erzurum in 1915-1916, Brusilov Offensive in 1916). However, in the 1917 the country ended up in a very difficult situation. The First World War, two Russian revolutions (in February and in October), the tragic Civil War had led to a humanitarian crisis, which was aggravated by the terrible famine of the 1920s. Under these circumstances, the need for international

help became vitally important. Post-revolutionary Russia needed money, food, medicines and other types of assistance. Conditions were so desperate that in 1921 the author, intellectual and public figure Maksim Gorkiy, at the Soviet government's request, sent out a worldwide appeal for food aid to avert the starvation of millions of people. Although the famine was acknowledged by the Soviet authorities, the country's leaders did not hasten to accept Western aid, fearing to lose credibility, and, in the worst case, power. Western countries doubted the usefulness of assisting the Soviet regime, supposing that the aid would not reach ordinary people. The famous polar explorer and public figure Fridtjof Nansen mediated between the Soviet and Western governments in seeking solution. Due to his efforts, several countries, including Norway, and some international humanitarian organizations answered the call and led a massive relief campaign in Soviet Russia during the famine of 1921-1923.

Norway in World War I supported the Entente but had preferred to stay "formally neutral" in this military conflict. Neutral countries were also in a hard economic situation during WWI suffering from the food shortage and high cost of living, which increased in Norway, for example, by 140 per cent (Fure 1983: 17).

The internal politics of Norway at this time was characterized by the increasing influence of the Norwegian Labor Party (NLP). The Norwegian labor movement responded to the October events in Russia with sympathy and enthusiasm (Danielsen 1964: 49; Holtmark (red.) 2015: 29-31; 139-142). Some of the Norwegian workers organized workers' and soldiers' councils¹ following the example of the Soviet model. Supporters of the socialist revolution received in 1918 a majority in the party, and in 1919 joined the Comintern. As part of the Comintern, the NLP turned out (relative to its "working class") the largest faction after the Russian Communist Party-Bolsheviks (RCP-B) (Holtmark (red.) 2015: 142-147).

In 1923, the Norwegian Labor Party left the Communist International because of the debate over the so-called Moscow Theses (conditions for membership in the Comintern, written by Lenin). At the same time the party experienced a split, when a significant minority of its members left the party to form the Norwegian Communist Party.

¹ In Rus. СОВЕТЫ

Despite political tensions between the states of Western Europe and socialist Russia and fear of the Bolshevik authorities with the Norwegian established society, many public figures sympathized with the Russian people in post-revolutionary Russia and tried to take some concrete actions to provide assistance. One of such persons was Olaf Broch (1867-1961), Professor of Slavic languages at the University in Christiania. Beside scientific activity, he was actively engaged in public and humanitarian actions. His authority in the Norwegian society when it came to Russian society and culture, and his connections in the government and the academic world helped him to mobilize humanitarian assistance and food aid to Russian citizens during and after WWI.

1.2 Historical background: the situation in Russia

The beginning of the 20th century is characterized by the aggravation of relations between European countries, as well as the increased competition for spheres of influence. By that time, there were two opposing power blocs in the European continent: The Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) and the Entente (France, Great Britain, Russia). The main reasons that led to the war were the contest for domination between Great Britain and Germany, the struggle for the territories of Alsace-Lorraine and Ruhr between France and Germany, and rivalry between Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. The formal reason of the war was the murder in Sarajevo of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by Bosnian Serb nationalist.

WWI began in Russia on August 1, 1914, on which day Germany declared war on the Russian Empire. The Entente Allies were supported by a number of countries including the USA, Japan, Serbia, Italy and others. On the opposing side were the Central Powers – Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. The total number of all mobilized people by the armies was 73.5 million people, among them 15 million from the Russian Empire (Iminov 2006: 8,10).

On the eve of the war Russia was ranked among top-five leading world economies after the USA, Great Britain, Germany and Austria-Hungary, but the country still lagged behind the industrial countries in terms of material and technical equipment (Falkus 1972: 12-18).

Russian society met the beginning of the war with patriotic rallying. A lot of newspapers reported about the ending of strikes and successful mobilization (Frolkin, Marutskii,

Shishkin 2014: 151). All political parties, except for the Bolsheviks, supported the entry into the war (Ibid: 152). However, the enthusiasm of Russian citizens was short-lived. In the beginning of 1917, supply shortages, political instability and anti-war calls within the country seriously affected the war-fighting capabilities of the Russian army, which failed to achieve any significant military gains. Two and a half years of war negatively affected the Russian economy. More than 30 per cent of Russian railways were destroyed. This had a severe impact on civil society and, especially, cities, which relied on railway shipments of food and coal (Llewellyn et al 2014). Around half of Russia's working age men were serving in the army (Rossiia v mirovoi voine 1914-1918 1925: 4). Therefore, the farms could not produce the usual amount of food. Food prices kept going up, the inflation exceeded 400 per cent (Llewellyn et al 2014). The discontent within the country was steadily increasing, for example, in 1915 500 thousand workers went on strike, already in 1916, the number of strikers raised to 1 million (Ibid.). By the end of 1916 all political parties were in opposition to the monarchy, especially after the tsar had taken the command of the army. The leaders of the left parties openly called for revolution (Pipes 2005: 67). The First World War contributed greatly in the outcome of the two revolutions in Russia.

In early 1917, bread riots broke out in Petrograd and led to the February revolution that brought down the monarchy and Romanovs. The subsequent Provisional Government took over economic and military commitments from the old regime and continued to keep Russia in the war, despite the public dissatisfaction. Enormous casualties on the battlefields, difficulties and hardships on the home front made people tired and disgruntled. The morale of the Russian troops was extremely low, soldiers were deserting or refusing to fight even though the penalty was death (Oskin 2014: 46,47).

The radical parties took advantage of the situation and in October 1917, several months later the February revolution, the Bolsheviks swept to power, using Vladimir Lenin's populist slogans, such as: "Peace, Bread, and Land", "All Power to the Soviets" and "Peace treaty without annexations and contributions".

The Bolsheviks fulfilled their promise to take Russia out of the war by signing a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. The Great War was over for Russia. In spite of the fact that Russia was a member of the Entente Allies,

which, after all, won WWI, the country was not a winner, moreover, it suffered a devastating loss. The total number of fatalities among military and civilian population varied from 2.2 to 3.5 million people (Iminov 2006: 9). Four years of the war had ruined the Russian economy and infrastructure, caused declines in agricultural sector, enormous currency inflation, food and fuel shortages in the cities. The issue of Russian POWs stationed in the territory of adversaries and Russian refugees who had to displace many times inside and outside the country escaping the war conflict, was not solved. In addition to such difficult conditions, the new Soviet state took strong measures aimed to hold on to power, because the country had been split into two irreconcilable parties – supporters of the new regime “the Reds” and their opponents “the Whites”. *The Civil War* was the only way for the Bolsheviks to suppress the resistance and to retain power. Lenin wanted a brutal civil war so that he could sweep away the main opposition in one bloodletting (Wilde 2018). The participants of the White movement were fighting for recovering their lost power and reinstatement of their socio-economic status (Danilin, Evseeva, Karpenko 2000: 1). The fighting began right after the October revolution, but it was fragmented and spontaneous. The Civil War is often said to have started in 1918, when the formation of the Armed forces was initiated by opposing sides (Wilde 2018). The Red Army (in full The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army) under the leadership of Lev Trotsky² consisted of workers, urban poor, soldiers and sailors of the former Tsar’s Army, who had defected to the Bolsheviks. The White movement was represented by officers, Cossacks, intellectuals, government officials and clergy. The White Army was supported by the Western powers. There were several reasons for the intervention: 1) the Entente Allies planned to restart the eastern front in order to draw German forces away from the west; 2) Western countries had their own economic and political interests in Russia; 3) the concern that “the Red threat” could spread further convinced the Western countries to assist the Whites in order to liquidate the Bolshevik power (Danilin, Evseeva, Karpenko 2000: 2).

² Lev Davidovich Trotsky (1879-1940) – real name Leiba Davidovich Bronshtein, Russian revolutionary, one of the leaders of the October revolution and the Communist Party, ideologist of Trotskyism – one of the types of Marxism. In the Soviet government he served first as People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs (1917-1918) and later as People’s Commissar of Military and Navy Affairs (1918-1925). He was the founder and commander of the Red Army and became the main figure in the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War.

The position of Russian peasantry, who made up about 80 per cent of the population, was varying during the Civil War from passive waiting to active participation in fighting against the Reds or the Whites. Such hesitation had serious impact on the war course and, finally, prejudiced the outcome of the war (Danilin, Evseeva, Karpenko 2000: 1).

The Bolsheviks controlled the industrial center of Russia from the start, while the White Armies were scattered throughout the periphery of Russia and cut off from one another. Aleksandr V. Kolchak was the Commander of the White Army in the *East*, he was also leading the anti-Bolshevik government in Omsk; Evgenii K. Miller was the Commander of the White forces in the *North*, until the Reds defeated his army in February 1920; the *South* of Russia was controlled by the White generals Anton I. Denikin and Pyotr N. Wrangel, who were defeated by the Reds in November 1920; the last troops of the White Army in the *Northwest* led by Nikolai N. Iudenich were defeated in January 1920. Most of the military actions were over in 1920 with the total defeat of the White forces, but officially the Civil War was ended in 1922, when Japanese left one of the last anti-Bolshevik footholds Vladivostok and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed.

In spite of the Western support and the advantage in equipment, The White movement was disorganized ideologically and politically. Different political groups were at enmity with each other and could not find compromise. On the contrary, the Red Army had very strict discipline and was governed by communist ideology. Besides, the Bolsheviks' slogans, such as, "*Factories to the workers*" and "*Land to the peasants*" were closer and clearer to ordinary people than the idea of the monarchy restoration.

What happened with the participants of the White movement after the end of the Civil War? They could not return to their homes and daily routine because of the Bolshevik terror. The only solution was to escape from Russia. This was a tragic consequence of the Civil War, when more than a million of Russian citizens had to leave their country and seek shelter and assistance from foreign societies, thus becoming refugees. The League of Nations and Fridtjof Nansen tried to return them back and pressed on the Bolshevik authorities to declare an amnesty (Simonova 2009). But refugees did not hasten to return back to the Soviet state, they were afraid to be arrested and killed. For example, in October

1922, 72 persons were shot after they had returned from abroad under the amnesty (Rul' №615, 06.12.1922).

The wave of repressions covered not only white officers and participants of the White movement, but also intellectuals, who were considered ideological enemies, because they had an impact on society due to their authority (Rul' №617, 08.12.1922). The Soviet government decided to resettle such unstable elements on the periphery of the country and to deport the most “dangerous” ones abroad (Ibid.).

Endless wars, devastation in industry and agriculture, ruined infrastructure, and Bolshevik internal politics resulted in a huge famine. *The Russian famine of 1921-23* was one of the worst human disasters of the 20th century. The estimated number of famine victims, either through starvation or associated diseases, varies from 5 to 10 million people. Researchers identify economic and natural causes of the famine (Pomogalova 2011: 72). The economic policy of the Bolsheviks was the major cause of the starvation in the Volga region³ and Ukraine. The policy of military communism, which existed during the Civil War, was characterized by the following measures: nationalization of all industry, state control of foreign trade, prohibition of strikes, obligatory labour duty, rationing of food and some others. The new government was also confiscating grain and other agricultural produce from the peasants at a nominal fixed price according to specified quotas⁴. The acute phase of the famine started after a drought in 1921. The situation became so desperate that in 1921 the new regime accepted famine relief from foreign charities.

At the beginning of 1920s, Russia and Russian citizens turned out to be in dire straits. WWI, the overthrowing of the monarchy, economic destruction, forcible seizure of power by Bolsheviks, and the Civil War resulted in deep social, political, ideological, and national split in the Russian society.

1.3 Major terms

Humanitarian aid is material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes typically in response to humanitarian crises. Humanitarian assistance also can be defined as “not military aid”. The main objective of humanitarian aid is to save lives.

³ In Rus. Поволжье

⁴ In Rus. Разверстка

Humanitarian organizations also provides people with food, water, warm clothes, medicine, fuel and so on (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Humanitarian aid).

A *refugee* is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). The problem of refugees became an acute concern only in the early twentieth century. This can be explained by two events: The First World War and The October Revolution in Russia. Questions about massive refugee flows have been regulated sufficiently by the Versailles-Washington system of treaties. Only Russian refugees caused a lot of problems for the world communities (Bocharova 2001). It happened because the new political regime in post-revolutionary Russia forced people to leave their homeland. In the Russian historiography, refugees of the early 1920s are commonly referred to as *emigrants* or *White Russian emigrants*, emphasizing that many of them were participants in the White movement or supported it. Some of emigrants were members of the parties in opposition to the Bolsheviks (Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries) but did not directly support the White movement; some were apolitical, but for various reasons, had to leave the homeland. Many refugees were of noble birth and had a high level of education. So, the refugees/emigrants will be understood in the thesis as educated Russian citizens, who fled from the totalitarian regime or were forcibly deported by the Soviet authorities, and also as military officers, who were fighting against the Red Army and were not granted amnesty by the Soviet State. This category includes intellectuals of various professions, businessmen, landowners, government officials, politicians, high-ranking officers, priesthood and some others.

The first-wave émigrés/ the first-wave of Russian emigration – a period of the exodus of Russian citizens to Europe and America in 1917-1925 caused by the new political situation in the country. Historians identify four waves of Russian emigration: the first in 1920s, the second in 1940s, the third in 1970s and the fourth in 1990s (Gurevich 2003).

Russian intellectuals (intelligentsia) is another important term, which will be often used in the thesis. Intelligentsia is a social group of people with higher education qualifications who are professionally engaged in mental (brain) work, development and dissemination of culture. The term “intelligentsia” became widespread in the Russian language and culture in 1860s by using the concept in Russian press (Encyclopedia Krugosvet).

1.4 Research questions

According to the title of the topic the main research question will be to analyze and assess the role of the Norwegian society and public figures in the preparation and implementation of humanitarian assistance in Russia during and after World War I.

The work will include some other topic-related questions, i.e.:

- What means and methods were planned to solve the humanitarian issues of POWs, refugees, and starving people?
- What difficulties were encountered in the preparation of assistance projects, and why?
- How effective was humanitarian work?
- What was the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards accepting humanitarian assistance?

I think it is important to emphasize the role of Norway and Norwegian society in supporting common people and attracting world attention to this issue. Out of all the European countries, only Norway in 1921 was ready to give credit to post-revolutionary Russia in spite of controversy. Other European countries were afraid to give money to the new regime, being uncertain whether the money would reach starving people.

Timeframe for the topic covers the period from 1914 to 1923. These 10 years became a terrible time for Russia and changed it forever. The country experienced two wars (WWI and the Civil War), two revolutions (in February and October) and The Great Famine in 1921-23. All these events brought the country to the edge of humanitarian catastrophe.

1.5 Previous studies

There are no fundamental historical works discussing the assistance to different categories of Russian citizens in need of humanitarian aid during 1914-1923 in Norway or by way of Norwegian public figures, except the works on Fridtjof Nansen mentioned above. Due to the lack of previous comprehensive studies for the period 1914-1923, it reasonable to divide the historiography of the issue in three blocks devoted to the humanitarian aid to:

- Russian POWs
- Refugees/Emigrants
- Starving people

In this regard two periods can be distinguished in Russian historiography: Soviet and modern. The Soviet period (1920-1990) is characterized by domination of the ideological approach of the Bolshevik Party to all historical events. Modern period (from 1990s) marked by revision of methodology and class-based approach, turning to the new topics and issues, and convergence of views with Western historians. I will focus on modern Russian and Norwegian historiography, paying attention to some relevant Soviet researches.

The Soviet historian Aleksandr. A. Malkov was one of the first who tried to estimate the total number of *Russian POWs* on the territory of the Central powers. He also made the conclusion that the Russian government did not conduct any serious or significant measures to assist Russian POWs. The main role in the relief work was played by private charitable organizations and the Red Cross. Malkov used memories and letters from Russian POWs to demonstrate a diffusion of the Bolshevik ideas into German and Austrian-Hungarian camps (Malkov 1971).

Among the modern historians the works of Tatiana. M. Simonova, Oksana S. Nagornaia and Elik E. Abdrashitov should be mentioned. Simonova analyses the general situation of Russian POWs in German and Austria-Hungary camps, emphasizing that 1914-1915 years were the most difficult, because warring countries were not prepared to maintain a huge number of POWs. Her articles also deal with humanitarian issues and repatriation challenges. According to Simonova, the brunt of providing for Russian POWs had fallen upon the public organizations (Simonova 2006; Simonova 2009).

In 2011, Nagornaia defended her Doctor's dissertation (PhD-thesis) with focus on the situation of Russian POWs in German camps, the formation of the camp community and camp language (Nagornaia 2011). In the article devoted to the repatriation, she views the return of POW's in the context of establishment of the Bolshevik migration policy (Nagornaia 2008).

Elik E. Abdrashitov focuses on the activity of some public and international organizations, which provided aid to Russian POWs. According to the author, Danish and, especially, Dutch organizations played an important role in assisting Russian POWs (Abdarashitov 2013).

The internment of Russian POWs to Norway was a subject of study in the article of Vladimir A. Karelin. The article is based on a rich archival material and deals with issues of internment organization and maintenance of Russian POWs in Norway. The author emphasizes that the Russian envoy in Norway Konstantin N. Gulkevich played a significant role in the negotiations between the Norwegian and Russian governments about total number of POWs and living conditions (Karelin 2010).

The study of the *Russian emigration* has continued to be a very relevant and requested research direction since the 1990s. The interest into this topic is related to the fact that for many decades the study of the Russian emigration was forbidden by Soviet authorities.

A wide range of works has concentrated on the situation of refugees and the humanitarian activities provided to them in the “centers” of the “Russian abroad”, such as France, Germany, and the USA⁵. The number of refugees who fled to the Nordic countries and remained there as permanent settlers is not large, that is why the issue of Russian emigration in Northern Europe is not studied comprehensively.

Tatiana P. Teterevleva is one of the few historians whose research interests involve Russian emigration and Russian diaspora in Northern European countries. In the article *Russiske emigranter i Norge*, Teterevleva provides insight into the living conditions and activities of the Russian emigrants settled in Norway in 1920-1930. Most of the emigrants were from the Northern regions of Russia and were engaged in trade and industry. The biggest group of the Russian refugees came to Norway in February 1920, after the defeat of the White Army in the North. The author points out that the Norwegian government considered the human attitude towards refugees as a priority and allocated considerable sums on their accommodation and maintenance (Holtmark (red.) 2015: 198-203). In another article, Teterevleva discusses the emigrant perception of the Northern countries,

⁵ For ex.: Сперкач А.И. 1998, Кадетская эмиграция в Германии 1920-1931; Баландина О.И. 2011, Российская эмиграция в Северной Америке в 20 веке; Сотников С.А 2006, Российская военная эмиграция во Франции

such as Finland, Norway and Sweden. The positive perception of Norway and Sweden was very similar among emigrants. This can be explained by a small number of Russian refugees in the both countries, similar living conditions and social composition of emigrants, and loyal attitude towards refugees of the Norwegian and Swedish governments. Finland was regarded by Russian refugees as a part of the Russian Empire, such an attitude had caused the dissatisfaction of the Finish authorities. In spite of the cold shoulder, Russian people considered Finland as a peaceful and safe shelter.

In the article *Refugees with Nansen passports*, Zoia S. Bocharova refers to the International assistance to Russian refugees and demonstrates how the refugee issue was solved by the League of Nations. She emphasizes that the discussions on refugee status and rights were of secondary importance in the League of Nations, and that the issue of the refugees legal status had not been fully solved (Bocharova 2001). She develops her studies into a monography devoted to the issue of social and legal adaptation of the Russian emigrants in 1920-1930 (Bocharova 2005).

The various aspects related to the providing humanitarian aid to *Russian starving people* are thoroughly covered by the Norwegian historians, especially, regarding the humanitarian activities of Fridtjof Nansen.

Carl Emil Vogt in his monography *Nansens kamp mot hungersnøden i Russland 1921-23* demonstrates active engagement and efforts of Nansen in the fighting against hunger in Russia. Vogt also provides insight into the work of American Relief Administration led by Herbert Hoover. Sometimes he compares these “two main men”, pointing out that the contribution of Nansen was exaggerated by the Soviet historians, while the humanitarian activity of Herbert Hoover was discredited in Soviet Russia (Vogt 2007: 300). In the article *Fridtjof Nansen og hjelpe-arbeidet i Russland – Konstruksjonen av en myte om suksess*, Vogt refers to the creating of some myths about Nansen’s humanitarian work in the Norwegian society. According to the author, Norwegian press and internet resources overstate his achievements in fighting against the famine. Moreover, some historians write about Nansen without realizing the size of the American aid or attribute to Nansen the contributions of Hoover (Vogt 2011: 258,259).

In Russian historiography the topic of humanitarian work during the Great Famine is also associated with the name of Nansen. A historian, Tatiana U. Bondarenko analyses the

humanitarian efforts of Nansen in the Volga-region in general and his assistance to the education institutes in Saratov (Bondarenko 2001; Bondarenko 2011). In the article *the Scale and causes of the famine of 1921 in Western historiography*, Oksana I. Pomogalova addresses to the views of Western researchers on the extent and causes of the famine. She also analyses the factors which had led the Soviet government to apply for humanitarian aid.

Naboer i frykt og forventning is a fundamental historical work in this connection which covers the period from 1917 to 2014. The book is devoted to the cultural, political, military and commercial relations between Norway and Russia. The book also raises issues related to the Russian emigration after the October events and the famine of the 1920s. In this respect the authors emphasize the importance of Fridtjof Nansen and his humanitarian assistance aimed to support POWs, refugees and famine victims in the 1920s (Holtsmark (red.) 2015: 198-210).

1.6 Sources and methods

This thesis includes 2 main groups of sources: personal sources (private correspondence) and periodical press. Private sources reflect personal impressions of contemporaries, witnesses and participants of significant social and military events. The periodical press can represent both a view of a private person and sentiments of society. Most of sources I have used in the thesis are in Russian. The translation of citations was made by the author of the thesis. The original text in Russian is placed in footnotes.

1.6.1 The archive of Olaf Broch

The archive of Olaf Broch⁶ (1867-1961), the first Norwegian Professor of Slavic languages, is kept in the National library in Oslo in the Special Collections Reading Room. The archive contains the collection of Broch's correspondence, which is preserved in thirteen big folders. The surnames of the correspondents are sorted in alphabetical order, among them are famous scientists, academics, writers, future Nobel Prize winners, politicians, and diplomats.

Olaf Broch, his professional and public activity, his written heritage was the subject of studies by Russian and Norwegian historians. In the article *Forskeprofil Olaf Broch* Erik

⁶ Brevsamling nr.337, Nasjonalbiblioteket i Oslo.

Egeberg refers to Broch's "professional biography", description of his academic activities, and achievements in the field of linguistics (Egeberg 2003). Kari Aga Myklebost, in the article *Olaf Broch – ambassador for the Slavic world in Norway*, provides insight into the academic biography of Broch, discusses some of Broch's contributions to the relations between the Slavic world and Norway, his political and humanitarian work (Myklebost 2018). The article *Professor Olaf Broch – an "Agent" of Russian Influence in Norway?* by Vladimir A. Karelin deals with some unknown facts of the socio-political and cultural relations between Russia and Norway in the early 20th century related to Broch's activity. The author notes that Olaf Broch had a close cooperation with the Russian liberal movement and provided assistance to Russian citizens during and after WWI (Karelin 2013). Tamara Lönnngren in the article "*Drug i pomoshchnik chelovechestva*": *perepiska norvezhskogo slavista Olafa Brocha* made a detailed overview of Broch's archive, which contains letters from 458 correspondents from all over Europe, 134 of them using only Russian (Lönnngren 2015: 84).

Unregistered letters and postcards are preserved in four folders, which are most valuable and relevant for my thesis. In such letters, Russian POWs, refugees and ordinary people were seeking assistance and describing their situation in different settings. The unregistered collection contains Broch's letters and some drafts in Russian, letters and documents of the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives, reports from German camps about receiving aid, letters and postcards from Russian POWs stationed in Germany and interned in Norway.

An ample material of Broch's collection was not fully studied and published. Due to the efforts of Norwegian and Russian historians – Jens Petter Nielsen, Kari Aga Myklebost and Vladimir A. Karelin – the correspondence to Broch from his friend, a Russian diplomat and public figure, Konstantin N. Gulkevich (1865-1935) was published⁷. The library staff has also started the digitalization of Broch's fund, but the work is far from being completed.

The value of Broch's archive for the present thesis is in that it contains a lot of relevant material regarding humanitarian aid to Russian citizens during the research period. Broch,

⁷ К.Н. Гулькевич. Письма к Олафу Броку, 1916-1923., 2017, (сост.) В. Карелин, Й. Нильсен, К. Мюклебуст, Новое литературное обозрение, Москва

together with Norwegian and Russian organizations and public figures, provided relief to Russian POWs during WWI; after the October revolution, which was taking place in a wartime setting, a lot of POWs decided to stay abroad thereby becoming refugees, they were joined by a flood of other Russian refugees escaping the Civil War and the Red Terror, whom Broch was also assisting; the destruction after the wars and a rigorous policy of the Bolsheviks resulted in the Great Famine and the emergence of million starving people who needed food and clothes. Thus, in 1918-1923 Soviet Russia was in a humanitarian crisis caused by WWI, the October revolution, and the Civil War, resulting in the appearance of different categories of people struggling to survive. Broch was aware of the scale of the crisis due to his close connections with Russian intellectuals. He provided assistance himself and tried to involve Norwegian society and government in solving the humanitarian problems.

1.6.2 Private correspondence

Epistolary materials, with all their subjective assessment and opinions, are among the most reliable historical sources. The same authors in private correspondence express their opinions much more frankly than, for example, in public political speeches or in the articles addressed to the common reader. Memoirs are also inferior to private correspondence in objectivity because memoirs are usually written after the historical events, in a new political and social context. The author's view on the historical event could also be changed with time together with his religious, political and social status.

The analysis of private correspondence has the same stages as the analysis of any other written source but with some specific features. Private sources demand utmost care, as the researcher is responsible for checking copyright status and obtaining permission for further use and publication of private correspondence. Also, it is important to define a number of letters relevant to the theme of the thesis. Broch's archive contains a rich collection of letters devoted to different topics – his professional philological activity, private life, political situation in Russia and in Europe, his engagement in the Union of Consumer Cooperation. A part of the correspondence in Russian deals with issues relating to the requests of assistance and organization of humanitarian aid to Russian citizens. Thank-you letters allow evaluating the quantity and quality of the relief.

After the selection of material, external and internal criticism of the source is conducted (Kjeldstadli 1999: 170). The external criticism includes identification of the text and the source origin. At this stage, the author reads the text, finds out the actual meaning of expressions and words, explains abbreviations, makes the translation of foreign words. In Broch's archive there are some letters, which contain some expressions in French, German, Latin. Thus, Konstantin N. Gulkevich very often used words and expressions in French, Professor at the Kiev university Mikhail S. Grushevsky – in Latin, for example, “opus misericordiae”⁸.

The identification of the sender of a letter, place and date of writing is another step within the external criticism, which helps to determine the authenticity. The place of writing can show how far from each other were the correspondents or whether the letters were main or auxiliary means of their communication.

It is also important to understand what kind of relationship (friendly, official, working) was between the sender and the receiver of the letter to analyze the “quality” of information and the degree of confidence. It is worth noting, that, if the correspondence was carried out for many months or years, it is necessary to analyze not a certain letter but rather a complex of letters. Broch's archive also includes long-term correspondence. Even though only two letters out of ten may be devoted to humanitarian assistance, it is important to analyze all of them – to understand the circumstances of writing, relations between correspondents, historical context, etc.

The internal criticism has the aim to interpret and analyze the content of the letter. At this stage it is important to determine the areas of communication, what kind of themes were touched upon by the authors, how full, reliable and credible was information provided in the letters (Kjeldstadli 1999: 170).

The final conclusion about the reliability of the information reported in the letters can be done by conducting a comparative analysis with other sources, for example, periodical press. Emigrant newspapers often confirmed or interpreted information from Broch's correspondence. Thus, the newspaper *Rul'* reported on Broch's appeal to Anatolii V. Lunacharsky, terrible situation and persecution of Russian scientists in the 1920s, an

⁸ Opus – work, labour; misericordiae – mercy, charity.

extremely difficult food situation in 1921, humanitarian assistance from the world society – all these topics were important part in Broch's correspondence too.

The authorship determination was the main problem during the work with Broch's unregistered correspondence because a lot of letters contain only unreadable signatures or first letters of names/surnames. Other difficulties were related to handwriting and abbreviations used in the letters. Some of the correspondents had specific way of writing letters or words, a lot of them used abbreviations. Besides, the correspondence had to be systematized in chronological order.

1.6.3 The specificity of wartime correspondence. Postcards and letters: historical value and information content

The First World War turned the military correspondence from a local phenomenon to an independent and well-organized form of communication between military personnel, prisoners of war (POWs) and their relatives, friends, officials, State and public institutions. Private historical sources, together with archival materials, play an important role in the study of World War I and especially its "black spots", such as military captivity and refugee problem.

Private war correspondence both from German and Russian POWs is represented in Olaf Broch's archive. In this line of research, I will focus on Russian POWs stationed in Germany and POWs interned in Norway. In this respect two types of letters can be distinguished: regular letters with envelopes and open letters/postcards (implied by the POWs correspondence).

Private correspondence of wartime has some specific features, one of which, being multistage military censorship, which was introduced not only in warring parties but also in neutral countries. "The Temporary Regulations on Military Censorship"⁹ came into force in Russia on 2nd August 1914. The Regulations legitimized censorship of all postal mails, except for letters and telegrams of royal family, army generals, diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries. The censorship was divided into two types: partial and full, where the latter could be implemented only at the theatre of military operations. The partial censorship implied mainly the examination of international postal items while

⁹ In Rus. "Временное положение о военной цензуре"

the full one meant total control of internal and external correspondence (Rossiia. Zakoni i postanovleniia 1914: 1-4). The responsibilities were assigned to the local postal and telegraph officials, who had to combine different functions. Many of them did not have enough competence in foreign languages, although the correspondence was permissible in French, German and Russian languages (see attachment 1). In some cases, this resulted in the accumulation of large quantities of letters.

Each country had its own postcard forms, which varied from place to place. On the front page of most postcards there was a stamp of censor in national language, such as “CHECKED”/ “REVIEWED”/ “OPENED” (see attachment 2). Due to the lack of pens, POWs had to use pencils for writing. This, together with their illegible handwriting, complicates the analysis of the sources because some words are either erased or unreadable.

The censorship of WWI was not so strict and thorough as during WWII when ideology was of great importance and full attention was being paid to the leak of classified information, however it still had a certain level of influence on the contents of the letters and time of delivery. Thus, in one of her letters to Olaf Broch his friend wrote that she had not got the letter from her husband but could blame only “*the heavy censorship in Petrograd*¹⁰ which delayed each letter for a long time”¹¹ (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Karasikova to Broch, 01.10.1917). As for the content of the letters, the main attention of censors was given to the claims regarding food, living conditions and description of penalties. Such letters did not pass the censorship and were classified as “transmission of prohibited information”.

In addition, Russian authorities questioned the authenticity of letters requesting the material assistance. The Tsarist government did not provide enough food to Russian POWs, believing that all foodstuffs and money would be used by the enemy countries. (Malkov 1971: 29).

The internal censorship of the author should also be considered in the critique of the source. A person who knows that his letter will be read, will have to be careful with

¹⁰ After Russia entered the WWI in 1914, the German name of the capital - St. Petersburg was changed into Russian variant- Petrograd.

¹¹ In Rus. “К сожалению письма мужа моего [...] не получила, но винить в этом могу и только-строгую цензуру в Петрограде, задерживающую по долгу каждое письмо”

private and important information, or try to codify the text of the letter using abbreviations, metaphors and hints.

The substantive content of the letters and postcards from POWs can be conditionally divided into 4 parts:

- 1) *Introductory part* includes place and date of writing (can also stand at the end), the address to the recipient (Dear, Greatly respected, Honorable Sir, and so on) and reports about previously received/undelivered letters.
- 2) *Biographical part* consists of personal and/or family history, information about former and current status, occupation, the level of education and so on.
- 3) *The part concerning complaints and requests* is the part where the author addressed specific persons and/or organizations with different requests, from the provision of material assistance to the availability of books and periodical press. There are also requests about resending letters and receiving information about families.
- 4) *Concluding part* consists of gratitude, saying hello to relatives and friends, good wishes and hopes, holiday congratulations, signature and/or surname of the author.

Often POWs' letters contained only requests and expressions of hope that it would be granted.

Thus, private wartime correspondence is a very important and informative source for the study of issues connected with POW and humanitarian problems of WWI. The letters of POWs were written in extreme conditions. Therefore, they contain less details and can appear spontaneous and dramatic. The main advantage of military correspondence as a historical source is that it was written simultaneously with historical events.

1.6.4 Periodical press

Periodical press is a type of historical sources represented by long-term periodical publications over the period from few years to decades. Periodicals can be classified by their form – newspapers, magazines, editions of scientific societies, bulletins etc. One of the specific features of periodical press is multiplicity of information, which can vary in genres, origin and content.

The main functions of the periodical press are to shape public opinion, to exert ideological influence and to establish feedback in governance (Istochnikovedenie 1998: 451). The value of press as a historical source is in reflecting not only events and facts of what happened in any given time and place but also what people thought was happening and what they expected to happen (Knudsen 1993).

Periodical press was defined as an independent written historical source by Soviet researches already in 1950-1960th (Rynkov 2010). Modern researches revise the approach to press as a holistic historical source, moreover, they suggest that press should be considered as a complex of different sources: legislative acts, analytical information, news reports, private sources, literature etc. (Ibid.)

There are several ways of using and working with newspapers as a source of historical data. First of all, it is important to identify the causes, conditions, and special circumstances of appearance of a newspaper. The number of copies of the newspaper may indicate the popularity of publication and the scale of influence on public opinion.

It is also necessary to consider whether the periodical is private or official, and to know more about the sources of its funding. The political and social background of the editor and owner / owners must be also taken into consideration. Newspapers often reflect political and economic interests of their owners and sponsors.

While working with any periodical it is necessary to take into account whether this text was created specifically for this publication or the editors have published the author's article.

The intention of the author and reasons why he / she presented information in a such way and supported certain ideas and initiatives are just as important as the direct message of the article.

I have chosen to use Russian emigrants' newspapers issued abroad because they contain a lot of first-hand information about humanitarian assistance to Russian citizens and the situation in Soviet Russia as a whole. Russian refugees, citizens of Soviet Russia, foreigners who had just got back from the Soviet State were sharing their thoughts, opinions and impressions in the newspapers by publishing their reports and letters.

Though the emigrants' press was pursuing its own interests in exposing and criticizing the Bolsheviks, it contains less propaganda and populist slogans than Soviet newspapers, which were under the government control and presented one and the only "right" point of view. The press of "The Russian abroad" had more freedom and less censorship than the Soviet press because democratic countries had granted more rights and freedoms to their citizens and foreigners than totalitarian countries.

Emigrant newspapers performed not only informational, but also consolidating function for Russian community. It is worth noting that Russian emigrant press had a strong influence on shaping public opinion of not only Russian emigrants but the international society as a whole.

The emigrant press can be divided into three main groups depending on the political position of editors and correspondents: conservative press – supported the idea of rebuilding monarchy and the revival of pre-revolutionary Russia, moderate press – represented the views of liberal democracy, who promoted reforms and legal methods of political struggle, and radical press – reflected the ideas of socialist – revolutionaries, who called to take up arms and to overthrow the Bolsheviks.

The moderate daily emigrant newspaper *Rul'* (*Пуль*) published in Berlin in 1920 -1931 is the main periodical source in this thesis. The choice of this newspaper is determined by several reasons. First of all, Berlin was the capital of Russian emigration and Russian literature and press up to the middle of 1920s (see attachment 3). According to the Soviet information, in 1922 – 1923 70 per cent of all emigrant publishers were located in Berlin (Zhirkov 2001).

The second reason is that *Rul'* was one of the most authoritative newspaper among Russian refugees with a circulation of over 20 000 copies. The international impact of this newspaper is demonstrated by the fact that *Rul'*, together with *Poslednie Novosti* (*Последние новости*), *Golos Rossii* (*Голос России*) and some others were subscribed by the Bolshevik leadership and defined as the most "dangerous" counterrevolutionary periodicals (Mikhalev 2009).

The newspaper *Rul'*, together with some other emigrant press and official documents, is available in the digital library of the State Public Historical Library of Russia¹² - <http://elib.shpl.ru/ru/nodes/9347-elektronnaya-biblioteka-gpib>

The digital library does not contain all issues of the newspaper because part of them is missing. For example, the year 1921 collection includes the issues for nine months, from February to October, 3 months are completely missing. The information has been selected in accordance with its relevance to the theme of the thesis. The articles, reports, letters, telegrams devoted to the humanitarian situation in Soviet Russia, discussions about humanitarian assistance to Soviet Russia, accounts of participants or witnesses of the events have been taken into consideration.

The founders of the newspaper *Rul'* were the leaders of Constitutional – Democratic Party (Cadet Party) – Iosif V. Gessen, Vladimir D. Nabokov, Avgust I. Kaminka. The Cardet Party was also called “the Party of Professors” emphasizing the high educational and cultural level of its members, who supported the constitutional reforms and liberal values (Stepanov 2006: 75). The newspaper was funded by the book-publishing company “Ullstein”. But according to the Russian publishers, *Rul'* was purely emigrant newspaper, where a German company was a partner (Sperkach, Internet resource).

The material of the newspaper can be divided into several groups: official information (government regulations, materials from conferences, speeches of officials), informative materials (chronicles of events, telegrams from abroad, reviews, information materials of other periodicals, including Soviet press), analytical materials – the authors’ reflections on events (articles, essays), and letters of readers, which were used to illustrate the situation as seen by general public and to demonstrate people’s opinions.

¹² In Rus. Электронная библиотека Государственной Публичной Исторической Библиотеки России

Beside *Rul'* other periodicals are used in the thesis as sources, such as *Golos Rossii*¹³, *Poslednie Novosti*¹⁴, *Russkij soldat – grazhdanin vo Frantsii*¹⁵, and *Russkie vedomosti*¹⁶, but in this group of sources *Rul'* is most significant for the thesis.

1.7 Methodological bases for the study

Most sources of the master's thesis have an ideological or subjective (personal) attitude to the research issue, thus, *qualitative analysis* of sources will be an important method of historical research. This includes: external and internal criticism of the source, correct reading and interpretation of the text, consideration of when and where the source was created, identifying the exact meaning of the words used by the author, establishing author's attitude to the issues, his or her education and cultural level, profession and occupation, membership in sociocultural communities.

Comparison is another important research method used in the thesis. The use of comparative method allows identifying similarities and differences in various groups of sources relating to the same issue. In this thesis comparative method was used to evaluate similarities and differences both within one group of sources (private correspondence) and between two groups of sources (private correspondence and Émigré press).

There is a distinction between using historical source as a remain (in Nor. levning) or as a narrative (in Nor. beretning). When sources are used as the remains, the researcher views them as a part of reality where they were created and tries to reconstruct the situation. Written sources can also be used as narratives, when the author focuses on the source's content. (Kjeldstadli 1999: 170-173). Narratives can significantly vary from the reality, that is why they require the source criticism. The usage of the source material in the thesis will contain both the elements of remain and narrative.

¹³ Golos Rossii (Голос России) – a Russian émigré newspaper, was published in Berlin in 1919-1922. The newspaper defined itself as a body of Russian democratic thought.

¹⁴ Poslednie Novosti (Последние Новости) – a Russian émigré newspaper, was published in Paris in 1920-1940, was one of the most popular and influential newspapers among Russian emigrants. The editor was a leader of Cadet party and Pavel N. Milukov.

¹⁵ Russkij soldat - grazhdanin vo Frantsii (Русский солдат-гражданин во Франции) – a Russian newspaper, was published in Paris in 1917-1920. The newspaper was a central body of the Committee of Russian troops in France. The newspaper was supposed to be non-partisan and strictly democratic.

¹⁶ Russkie vedomosti (Русские ведомости)- a socio-political newspaper, published in Moscow from 1863 to 1917, represented the liberal views of Moscow professorship and members of local self-government (Zemstvo).

Problematic-chronological method has been applied to determine the structure of the thesis, to analyze the previous studies, and to systematize the correspondence in chronological order.

1.8 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is comprised of five chapters. The first chapter includes the presentation of the topic, the historical background of the situation in Russia in the studied period, the research questions, the previous studies, the representation of the sources, and methodological issues. The second chapter refers to the situation of Russian POWs stationed in Germany and interned in Norway, the area and ways of assisting, and the problem of the repatriation. The third chapter is devoted to the first wave of Russian emigration to Europe, the main difficulties of immigration to Norway, and the assistance provided to Russian refugees by Fridtjof Nansen and Olaf Broch. The fourth chapter focuses on the Great Famine in Russia in the early 1920s, initiatives and proposals of Norwegian public figures in addressing the issue, changes in the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards Western and American relief. The fifth chapter is a conclusion.

Chapter 2. Russian prisoners of war: the discussion on the situation and ways of humanitarian assistance

The beginning of the 20th century has been marked by fundamental changes, both in Russia and abroad. Norway gained full independence from Sweden in 1905 and nine years later World War I broke out. 38 independent countries were engulfed in the war, including Russia, which at the same time was experiencing two revolutions, the Civil War and the famine. These tragic events caused a humanitarian crisis in Russia. In this regard, the problems connected with POWs, refugees and starving civilians came to the forefront. The Russian authorities, in the context of war and internal instability, were not able to overcome the difficulties without the help from the international society.

2.1 Work of Russian and foreign organizations in providing support to POWs

WWI differed from any other military conflict mainly because of its global scope. Many countries were not prepared to such high inflow of refugees and POWs; as a consequence, the problem of the POWs maintenance became the key moment in the international relations and in the activities of charitable organizations.

According to the statistical material, 3 343 900 Russian POWs were kept in camps in the territory of Austria-Hungary (56,9%), Germany (42,14%), Bulgaria (0,59%) and Turkey (0,37%). Russian POW losses amounted to 74,9% of all military casualties, or 21,2% of the total number of all manpower mobilized for the war. (Rossiia v mirovoi voine 1914-1918 1925: 4,5,39). Such high numbers were a result of unsuccessful military operations at the beginning of the war connected with poor communications and blunders of the military leadership. Moreover, in 1915 the Tsar's command admitted that many soldiers had voluntarily surrendered to the captivity. (Malkov 1971: 20).

The situation was compounded by the fact that Germany and Austria-Hungary were facing economic blockade from the Entente Allies, and the condition of POWs directly depended on the outside assistance. In addition, Germany, according to a foreign report, announced that *“for so long as the British and their allies keep us all isolated and make lives of our wives and children miserable, it will be forbidden for POWs to receive food and other goods for a fee from neutral and hostile countries. The prohibition concerned the purchases made by third-party mediation”*. (Russkie vedomosti, №2, 03.01.1917)

All government, public and charitable organizations were engaged in providing assistance to war victims, both existing from before and those establishing in connection with the war. One of the most important roles was played by the Red Cross mission.

In the first months of the war many Russian soldiers and officers were captured. Due to the economic crisis, Germany and Austria-Hungary were not able to provide POWs with foodstuff, clothes and shoes. The Red Cross organization assumed responsibility for POW's wellbeing and needs. The General Directorate of the Russian Red Cross Society decided to establish the Central Informational Office and the Special Committee for Assistance to Prisoners of War, which received 50 000 rubles for its needs from the General Directorate. Emperor Nicholas II also donated 100 000 rubles from his private means to the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to assist Russian POWs (Sokolova 2014: 209).

Furthermore, in 1915 the Committee on Relief to Russian POWs in the Enemy Countries was established under the protection of Empress Alexandra Feodorovna¹⁷, which was not a part of the Red Cross, but actively cooperated with it. Member of the State Council, senator, and prince¹⁸ Nikolai D. Golitsyn was appointed as the Chairman of the Committee. Members of the Committee included present and former political and military leaders and persons represented the Nobles. Alexandra Feodorovna showed great interest in charitable activities and sometimes sought assistance from the Russian government. Initially the Committee of Empress planned to receive monthly donations of up to 10 000 000 rubles (RGIA f.1276, op.12, d.1310, p.38), but the Council of Ministers appropriated 4 000 000 rubles “on the POWs” (Sokolova 2014: 209).

After the report of the Russian Sisters of Mercy about poor food rations in German and Austrian camps, the Committee of Empress developed the following plan: 1) to provide Russian POWs with food 2) to purchase the missing food supplies from America and other friendly or neutral countries 3) to transport goods under the neutral flag to Denmark, which was friendly towards Russia 4) to make sure that the Department of the Committee should not only sorts and sends food to POWs but also observe the activities and

¹⁷ In Rus. Комитет по оказанию помощи русским военнопленным, находящимся во вражеских странах, под покровительством императрицы Александры Федоровны

¹⁸ In Rus. князь

cooperate with other foreign committees (RGIA f.1276, op.12, d.1310, p.41). However, the activity of the Committee of Empress was inefficient and often criticized both by the society and by POWs themselves (Abdrashitov 2013: 126). A POW from a German camp in Hameln, Iulii I. Kirsh wrote that Russian POWs received “*long-awaited gifts*” from the Empress only in autumn 1916. The parcel included dark dried bread, Gospels, and prayer books. Every POW obtained four pieces of dried rye bread, which were impossible to eat without soaking in water for two days. POWs were disappointed with food aid and called it ironically “*Hardtacks from Alexandra Feodorovna*”¹⁹ (Kirsh 1925: 69).

Among new and influential organizations in Russia were “All-Russian Union of Zemstvo for Assisting Sick and Wounded Soldiers”²⁰ and “All-Russian Cities Alliance for Assisting Sick and Wounded Soldiers”²¹, both established on the initiative of local authorities (Zemstvo) and united in one organization in 1916.

One of the first who proposed assistance to the victims of war was the Moscow City Duma. Other cities supported and joined this idea; by December 1915 464 cities acceded to the Alliance. (Ocherk deiatel’nosti Vserossiiskogo soiuza gorodov 1914-1915, 1916: 3-5,30). The POW department of “All-Russian Cities Alliance” was responsible for receiving donations, collecting funds and supplies for Russian POWs, sending parcels and provision, and granting legal assistance to the POWs’ families (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., the Vice-Chairman of POW’s department of The Cities Alliance to Broch, 26.08.1918). These measures concerned POWs confined in Germany and Austria-Hungary as well as POWs interned in neutral countries. The Committee developed networks with charitable organizations in Europe, including Norway (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Krigsfanger og flyktningshjelp). Besides, the Committee was aware of the situation concerning German and Austria-Hungarian POWs located in the Russian territory. This was due to the unspoken rule between humanitarian organizations from both sides, namely “the principle of reciprocity”. It meant that different aid organizations submitted information about location and numbers of the POWs in a particular region and facilitated connections with relatives. The Cities Alliance was later included to the Red

¹⁹ In Rus. “Сухари Александры Федоровны”

²⁰ In Rus. “Всероссийский земский союз помощи больным и раненым воинам”

²¹ In Rus. “Всероссийский союз городов помощи больным и раненым воинам”

Cross organization and received the government subsidy of 3 000 000 rubles (Ocherk deiatel'nosti, 1916: 8).

The Club of Russian Women under the Petrograd Committee of the Cities Alliance contributed to the establishment of the conception of “adoptive mothers to POWs”. There were a lot of POWs who had no relatives in Russia or could not get in contact with their families. The club provided lists of such POWs to everybody who wanted to help. Every woman or man could choose “an adoptive son” from the list and send him support letters and parcels with clothes, dried bread, soap, towels, postcards and pencils. The value of the finished parcels varied from 3,5 to 10 rubles. In a short time, the number of adoptive parents rose to 3000 (Iakushev 1916: 8,9).

It is worth noting that Russian citizens, especially those from remote regions of the country, did not always take the initiative to collect funds for Russian POWs, instead, they rather remained passive and indifferent. This was due to the local administration policies, which often impeded the realization of assistance. In Omsk, for example, two local newspapers were fined because of an advertisement about the collection of charitable donations and presents for army and POWs. In neighboring towns, the collection of funds was forbidden by the local governors, who argued that there were already some organizations in the town dealing with the same issues (Russkie vedomosti, №26, 01.02.1917)

A number of countries which had decided to retain complete or partial neutrality in military conflict, could not stand aside when there was so much human distress and suffering. All over the world different unions, committees, societies and clubs were established. In addition to government subsidies, the sources of funds in such associations were voluntary contributions from different organizations and private persons, membership fees, property income of charitable societies, income from concerts and lotteries, and some others.

The Russian POWs Assistance Committee²² came into existence in Sweden at the initiative of the Russian Ambassador to Stockholm Anatoly V. Nekliudov. At the beginning, the activity of the Committee was limited to coordinating correspondence

²² In Rus. Русский комитет в Стокгольме для оказания помощи военнопленным и пострадавшим от военных действий

between POWs and their relatives and resending parcels. Soon the Committee opened its own warehouse and started to send parcels and provision directly to the POW camps. This initiative was stopped in 1916 by the Swedish government, which imposed a ban on export of many goods, including different food and clothes. (Russkii Komitet v Stokgol'me 1917: 5). Denmark did not have so strict export bans, so the Committee moved its "Food Division" to Copenhagen. After the agreement between Nekliudov and British mission, the Committee got the permission to purchase an unlimited amount of food supplies from America. In April 1917, the Committee spent 100 000 DKK for the procurement of goods. (Ibid.: 6).

Similar committees were established in other countries, such as Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, French, Belgium, Great Britain, Norway and others. In general, the activity of such collectives was focused on sending parcels and provision. But there were exceptions. Some organizations were not only engaged in collecting funds for POWs but also focused their attention on education and intellectual needs of soldiers and officers. One of these organizations was the Norwegian University's Committee for Prisoners of War Students, led by Professor at the University of Christiania (Oslo), "*well-trying friend of Russians*"²³ Olaf Broch.

2.2 Humanitarian activity of Olaf Broch and the Norwegian University's Committee for Prisoners of War Students

2.2.1 Olaf Broch - scientist and philanthropist

In 2017 there was a commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the birth of the first Norwegian Professor of Slavic languages at the University of Christiania Olaf Broch (1867-1961). This event coincided with the reprinting of his socio-political travel reports about Russia - *Proletariatets diktatur*²⁴.

Broch is famous not only as a brilliant linguist, but also as a talented interpreter, writer and publicist. It was him who first translated *The Brothers Karamazov* by *Fyodor Dostoevsky* and *Anna Karenina* by *Lev Tolstoy* from Russian to Norwegian. The area of

²³ In Rus "испытанный друг русских" from the letter of Russian society in Norway to Olaf Broch, 10.12.1918, NB, Brevs.337

²⁴ Олав Брок, Диктатура пролетариата, 2018, издательство им. Сабашниковых, Москва (500 экз.)

his interests was not limited to philology and linguistic studies, he was also interested in history, political issues and public activities.

His active citizenship played an important role in strengthening cultural and public links between Russia and Norway. He cooperated and held correspondence with outstanding Russian intellectuals, philologists and academics, such as Alexei A. Shakhmatov, Filipp F. Fortunatov, slavist Konstantin Y. Grot, historian Mikhail I. Rostovtsev, the Nobel laureate, physiologist Ivan P. Pavlov, writer Ivan A. Bunin, diplomats and politicians Konstantin N. Gul'kevich, Petr B. Struve, Alexandra M. Kollontai, and many others. The correspondents, according to the Russian tradition, respectfully addressed Broch by his first name and patronymic, Olaf Ivanovich. In the persons of A.A. Shakhmatov and K.N. Gul'kevich he found not only colleges and adherents, but loyal life-long friends.

Broch's scientific activity was acknowledged by the St. Petersburg Academy of Science and in 1916 he was elected a corresponding member of the Academy.

After the October revolution many liberal intellectuals in Russia suffered from persecution. Broch, due to his extensive links, assisted many people in emigrating from Russia, helped to get visas, to find employment, to rent a flat and so on. He also donated money to Russian emigrants, refugees and POWs.

During WWI Broch initiated humanitarian aid to Russian POWs in German captivity. In cooperation with different charitable organizations he sent thousands of books to Russian and German POWs. Often, he helped people even without knowing them personally. Hundreds of thank-you letters from people all over Europe have been preserved in his archives. His care and concern touched people's hearts, many of them could not believe that somebody in such "ill-fated time" was capable of mercy. In this regard, a letter from Russian agronomist, whom Broch helped to obtain visa and gain knowledge about Norwegian farming, is very illustrative: "*It is hard to express my appreciation of your assistance...every time when I meet such responsiveness and warmth, I want to be better myself; I want to be kind and useful for everybody*"²⁵ (NB, Brevs. 337, Chernov to Broch, 13.07.1923). Broch was fond of Russia, the "high and mighty" Russian language,

²⁵ In Rus. "Мне трудно выразить мою признательность Вам за помощь...всякий раз мне приходится сталкиваться с подобной отзывчивостью и сердечностью, мне хочется самому сделаться и быть лучшим; хочется самому быть добрым и полезным всем и всякому."

Russian people, traditions and culture. “*One can only be deeply touched by your unfailing love for Russia*”²⁶, wrote K. N. Gulkevich about Broch in 1919 (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch, 29.08.1919). Together with Russian liberal intellectuals he was concerned about Russia’s fate after the October events, which condemned the country to terror, famine and totalitarian rule.

Broch could not stay away from the POW problem also. In his concern for the future of young educated people he established the Norwegian University’s Committee for Prisoners of War Students (The Committee). According to Broch’s archive, he headed the Committee from 1918 and worked closely with geologist Victor Moritz Goldschmidt.

2.2.2 Request letters from Russian POWs confined in German captivity: area and ways of assisting

In November 1915 in Stockholm a conference was held, devoted to the POW issue. Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary charged each other with bad living conditions of POWs, lack of food, and spread of epidemics. According to the convention of the conference, it was agreed to address the obstacles in the correspondence system, which had to become regular and fast. For one month a POW could now send two enveloped letters and two postcards. POWs got the right to money transfers from their homeland, they were also allowed to read books published before 1913. (Abdrashitov 2012).

Approximately at the same time Broch and the Committee started intense activity in assisting Russian POWs. The shipment of different books became the principal occupation of the Committee, in addition to forwarding letters, searching for the location of POWs, sending food and money.

The Committee worked closely with other charitable organizations, such as *The German Society for Assisting POWs the Union of Christian Young People*²⁷, *The German Christian Student Society*, *The Russian Club in Norway for Assisting POWs*²⁸ and many other charitable societies belonging to the Red Cross organization. Olaf Broch’s knowledge and experience in providing assistance to POWs were “greatly appreciated” by the All-Russian Cities Alliance (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Vice-Chairman of the

²⁶ In Rus. “Остается только умиляться Вашей неизменной любви к России”

²⁷ In rus. Германское общество помощи военнопленным союз христианских молодых людей

²⁸ In rus. Русский кружок в Норвегии для оказания помощи военнопленным

Department to Broch, 26.08.1918). Several times Broch made donations to the Book-Library Commission of The Cities Alliance. The Book-Library Commission, for its part, sent parcels with Russian books to Christiania, where Broch forwarded them to their destination. Some of the books, upon request from Broch, were sent by the Commission directly to certain POWs or camps. Thus, the POW student of Moscow University, Ivan Ermansson, detained in German camp Blankenburg, received Russian law books (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Ermansson to Broch, 18.03.1917; the Book-Library Commission of The Cities Alliance to Broch, 29.09.1917). Unfortunately, joint activities of the All-Russian Cities Alliance and the Committee were discontinued because of the prohibition on sending parcels to POWs from any place. Broch was notified of this decision by the letter of 13th of February 1919 (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., the All-Russian Cities Alliance (the POW's Department) to Broch, 13.02.1919).

In Olaf Broch's archive there are POWs' letters from different German cities and camps, such as Königsberg, Fürstenberg, Grafenwoehr, Cüstrin, Göttingen and many others. Most of them are dated from 1916 to 1918.

From the letters we can learn about the situation of POWs, which differed from camp to camp. Thus, the POWs from the Glatz camp in Königsberg lieutenants E. Filippov and Bobylev had an opportunity to pay for the books they needed (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Bobylev to the Norwegian Committee for POWs Students 15.12.1916; Filippov to Broch 10.12.1916), while others strived to make ends meet. The situation was especially hard for POWs who could not make contacts with their families. Lieutenant Karp Kiprianets from Cüstrin camp was in captivity for more than a year and could not make any connection with his wife and parents. He was in a very difficult situation and several times in his letter he asked about an opportunity to send him food. Four times he repeated the request about establishing communication with his relatives. It is clear from the letter that he contacted many organizations and did not receive any response, but he had high expectations for the Broch's Committee. In addition, knowing about the educational activities of the Committee, he asked to send him agricultural, sociological and philosophical books (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Kiprianets to the Norwegian Committee for POWs Students, 19.09.1918). However, it is not clear how he learned about the Committee; he only mentioned that "*he had heard about the existence of the Committee only recently*". Information about how the Russians POWs became aware of the

Committee and its activities may be found in the letter from the POW detained in the camp Holzminden T. Shvartsman. He writes that in a local newspaper there was an article with information that the Committee was ready to provide Russian POWs students with teaching materials. In the letter he also informed that there were more than 200 Russian students in the camp and that the camp's library had more than 3000 books in different languages. There was a lack of history books, books in physics and techniques, which they would like to receive in Russian (preferably), French or German languages in order "to satisfy spiritual needs" (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Shvartsman to the Norwegian Committee for POWs Students, 11.12.1916).

The situation was aggravated after the February events in Russia in 1917, which created confusion among the POWs. One of the POWs from the camp in Furstenberg, for example, pledging to return 250 German marks (150 NOK) to the Broch's Committee, emphasized that because of the coup d'état in Russia, he could not promise to pay the debt by a certain date after the peaceful agreement (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Baron Engelgardt to the Norwegian Committee for POWs Students, 10.04.1917).

The approximate number of books sent to German and Austrian camp libraries was more than 10 000, and this does not include the books sent privately to certain persons (see attachment 4). The difficulties in determining the total number of the books sent is also connected with calculating not separate books but boxes or simple statement of the fact that "all books received" by a camp library. There was also a problem to send some specific books published 20-30 years before 1916. For example, a friend of Broch from Moscow could not find a book for him which was published in 1886, because in Russia "old books are sold by weight and pages from them are used in grocery stores for packing herring"²⁹ (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Sofiia Sh. (most likely Shakhmatova) to Broch, 09.06.1915).

The most sought-after books among POWs were: the Gospel, The Pilgrim's Progress from This World to That Which is to Come³⁰, Russian ABC book, textbooks on different subjects, Russian and foreign classical literature, such as books of I.S. Turgenev, L.N.

²⁹ In Rus. "...у нас старые книги продаются на вес, а потом листы из них служат в лавочке на завертывание селедки!"

³⁰ The Pilgrim's Progress from This World to That Which is to Come – a Christian allegory written by John Bunyan in 1678, one of the most significant works of religious English Literature.

Tolstoy, F.M. Dostoevsky, I.A. Bunin, M.U.I. Lermontov, M. Twain, O. Wilde, Ch. Dickens, H. Ibsen, and others. Besides books for adults, the Committee sent children books for boys-prisoners to the Hammerstein camp's school (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., 20.11.1916).

Some books were sent on a non-reimbursable basis, others POWs promised to return after the war, and only few were able to pay for the books, although the Committee did not require this.

The POWs themselves emphasized the necessity of such committees, because "*man cannot live by bread alone*". Russian POWs were not only concerned of physical but also spiritual hunger. They asked to send them books for teaching and for entertainment in order not to lose their sanity in such difficult living conditions. (Iakushev 1916: 18)

Parcels with books were of great importance to POWs. The students could continue their education, gain new knowledge, broaden their mind, but above all, they preserved cultural and language connections with their homeland.

2.2.3 The internment in Norway. Request letters from Russian POWs interned in Norway: area and ways of assisting

During the First World War all the belligerent parties were faced with difficulties. On the one hand, they had to organize assistance to their own soldiers and officers in captivity, on the other hand, all the warring countries were responsible for the maintenance of the enemy POWs. This had been stipulated in Chapter 2 Article 7 of the Hague Conference's provisions in 1907. Namely, "The POWs maintenance is the responsibility of the government under whose power they are. If there is no special agreement between warring parties, then POWs use the same food, facilities and clothes as the government troops" (Al'bat 1917: 24). The state, according to the same conference, could involve healthy POWs in work. This somehow helped to compensate the costs of maintaining. The disabled, wounded and sick POWs were a financial burden for the government.

One of the solutions was to intern sick Russian POWs in neutral countries until the war would be over. According to the historian V.A. Karelin, discussions around this issue took place both within the country between the War Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and outside the country between warring and neutral countries. Russia agreed to

transfer Russian and enemy POWs to Switzerland and Norway. Switzerland was not able to accept a large number of POWs, because in its territory there were already 13 000 of French, English, Belgium and German POWs. Norway was the other alternative. The country was ideally suited to this role because the Norwegian society was perturbed over the actions of German submarines and implicitly supported the Entente. It is worth noting that the key role in the negotiating process was played by the Russian Envoy in Norway and close friend of Broch – Konstantin. N. Gul'kevich. He actually convinced the Norwegian government to accept Russian POWs, although not in such numbers as he had expected. However, the Norwegian government also refused to accept POWs with tuberculosis, syphilis, or those mentally ill and alcoholics. First Russian POWs entered Norway in April 1917. They came from Sweden to Kongsvinger by sanitary train. The total number of all interned Russian POWs was 302; 229 of them were soldiers, 69-officers, 3- doctors, 1- priest. (Karelin 2010: 95-104). Many of them were disabled and had serious health problems.

A special committee was established in Norway to ensure the well-being of POWs. Russian soldiers were met with flowers, cigarettes and other goods. The Norwegian Red Cross sent doctors and nurses to POWs' stations (Aftenposten 09.09.2015).

Broch's archive contains a list of 70 Russian POWs interned in Norway between April and May 1917 (see attachment 5). He was in correspondence with many of them, and he visited some of them at the stations.

The living conditions of the interned POWs differed from those in German captivity. In Norway the POWs were stationed not in barracks and dugouts, but in the boarding houses, health resorts and hotels, such as Hunder in Gudbrandsdalen, Konnerudkollen in Drammen, Baneminde in Espen, Tromsa hotel in Myre, Holmen in Tretten, Losnaus hotel in Tretten (see attachment 6). The numbers of POWs also varied. The major part of the interned Russian POWs was placed in Baneminde and Konnerudkollen – around 70-80³¹ people in each, while in Myre one Russian second lieutenant lived at the station almost alone (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Katzin to Broch, 08.05.1917; Zavadsky to Broch

³¹ According to the Norwegian daily newspaper Fremtiden, 150-200 POWs were stationed in Konneruddkollen <https://www.dagsavisen.no/fremtiden/lokalt/russerne-pa-bangelokka-1.300807> (last accessed 14.03.19).

27.05.1917). The POWs had the right to free post and were no longer afraid of strict censorship. They had broad freedom of actions but restricted freedom of movement. They were permitted to walk a few kilometers out of the station and had to be back in the evening. Such rules did not stop POWs from getting contacts with local girls and minimum three of them became engaged with Norwegian women during the summer (Aftenposten 09.09.2015).

Broch was extensively engaged in POWs' lives. He suggested not only supplying them with books to continue their studies, but also "*contacting him on any matter*" (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., 30.05.1917). The POWs, for their part, offered to assist in Broch's "*cultural work*"³² (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Katzin and Brandman to Broch 03.05.1917).

After all "secretarial work" had been finished and the soldiers had some rest from German captivity, they started to revert back to normal life, using all kinds of opportunities. In Baneminde and Konnerudkollen POWs, with the help of Broch, established schools for uneducated soldiers. 29 soldiers from Baneminde and 25 from Konnerudkollen had got an opportunity to study the Russian language and arithmetic. In addition to school, in Baneminde, a library (27 books), a reading hall and a choir were established (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Katzin to Broch, 12.05.1917). For all these needs Broch provided them with blackboards, notebooks, chalks, pencils, maps, textbooks and task books. He also sent music paper, music of simple Russian songs and accordion for the needs of the choir. The POWs sometimes took advantage of Broch's kindness and could afford to complain about old-fashioned school books and special types of notebooks (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Katzin to Broch 08.05.1917).

In Konnerudkollen a music ensemble was established. The POWs received a balalaika, a violin and a cello from Broch for public use. A piano and one more violin they had from before (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Weiss to Broch 19.05.1917).

Besides the Russian language, many soldiers and officers were interested in studying Norwegian language. Broch received many letters from POWs asking to send them Norwegian alphabet, grammar, phrase books and dictionaries. All these requests were met. In Baneminde there was a group of 20 POWs who studied Norwegian with the help

³² In Rus "Предлагаем Вам, как и раньше, нашу помощь для Вашей культурной деятельности"

of Sister Helga Due (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Katzin to Broch, 23.05.1917). I would like to note friendly and warm attitude of POWs to the Red Cross Nurses, who were not only providing daily care and medical assistance but brought them back to normal life and helped to adapt to the new conditions.

The POWs also requested to send them books about gardening, farming, beekeeping, guidebooks, fiction, poetry and many others. There were also some special requests. The POWs from Konnerudkollen would like to learn more about National issue in Russia, considering it “a burning question” (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Katzin to Broch, 30.04.1917). A student from Hunder asked to send him Russian newspapers and magazines. He had been away from his homeland for more than three and a half years and wanted to reconstruct the life of Russian society (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Blok to Broch 23.01.1918). Students of different universities and institutes needed books in their studying area such as botany, chemistry, pedagogy, psychology, technic, electricity and others.

Many POWs interned in Norway had an opportunity to buy books and musical instruments with their own money (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Katzin to Broch 18.05.17; Maslennikov to Broch, 11.05.1917). On a few occasions, POWs from different stations asked Broch to send them catalogue of books from Christiania.

Some of the POWs were outraged by the behavior of their countrymen, who used Norwegian hospitality irrationally. The chairman of Russian POWs in Baneminde asked Broch to bring the following to the attention of the Norwegian Red Cross Committee: *“Some soldiers following the kind permission... to ask for the necessary things, allow themselves to make requests for sending them non-essential items for personal use, such as watches, accordions and so on. We consider this as unacceptable excess and exonerate ourselves from the moral responsibility for such behavior of certain persons”*³³ (NB, Brevs., 337, Ureg., Kozin to Broch, 04.07.1917).

Educated officers wanted to be useful and tried to find professional occupation. The student from Hunder, Iulii Blok wanted to live by his own labour and planned to work as

³³ In Rus. Некоторые из здешних солдат, основываясь на любезном разрешении... обращаться за необходимыми вещами, позволяют себе просить о присылке в личное пользование предметов не первой необходимости, как-то часов, гармоний и.т.д. Считая это недопустимым излишеством, общее собрание слагает с себя нравственную ответственность за подобные поступки отдельных лиц.

a teacher, tutor, translator or librarian (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Blok to Broch 23.01.1918). A second lieutenant from Konnerudkollen Vasily M. Falin asked Broch to send him some Swedish stories and articles, which he could translate into Russian. He was a Finn and had a good command of Swedish. In the future, after returning to his homeland, he was planning to translate books from Swedish to Russian, because in Russia there were not so many specialists in literary Swedish (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Falin to Broch, 15.05.1917). At this time Russian POWs were optimistic and looked forward to returning to Russia. The situation changed after the October coup. Many of them, without knowing anything of their future were lost and confused. Some of them did not want to return to Russia. The POW from Hunder station, for example, botanist Iona Kuznetsov at the beginning expected the situation in Russia would be improved, but in 1918 he *“lost all his hopes and with pleasure would stay in Norway, if he could find work”*³⁴ (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Kuznetsov to Broch, 22.05.1918). Subsequently he managed to stay in Norway and changed his status to refugee.

Thus, Russian POWs interned in Norway had decent and comfortable living conditions. Their requests were mainly concerned with education and entertainment. Broch never left POWs' requests without attention, even the minor ones. The POWs themselves were surprised of his kindness and working capacity. In one of his letters Russian general of Norwegian descent Ivan A. Holmsen wrote: *“I just don't understand how You, Dear Professor, find time to provide services and courtesies to all this mass of Russians, who appeal to You with all their sorrows”*³⁵ (NB, Brevs., 337, Ureg., Holmsen to Broch, 12.07.1918). Thanks to Broch's efforts, Russian illiterate soldiers learned to read, write, and count; students got the opportunity to continue their education. Many of them wanted to find some work or occupation, but it was not so easy in the existing circumstances.

2.3 The problem of the return of Russian POWs to the new Soviet state

After the revolutionary events in October 1917 the Provisional Government lost power to the Bolsheviks. The slogan of WWI *“Fight to the finish”* was replaced by *“Conclusion of a just peace without annexations or indemnities”*. Next day after the assumption of

³⁴ In Rus “У меня была вера, что в России положение будет улучшаться, но теперь я потерял всякие надежды и охотно бы остался в Норвегии, если бы удалось получить ту или иную работу”.

³⁵ In Rus. “Просто не понимаю, как Вы, дорогой Профессор, находите время оказывать услуги и любезности всей той массе русских, которые к Вам обращаются со всею массой своих горестей”.

power the Bolsheviks passed “*the Decree on Peace*” and suggested that all warring countries should participate in peace talks. Germany and its allies responded to the call. Many politicians and public figures were against the separate treaty. Austrian socialists stationed in Russian captivity wrote an open letter to Lev D. Trotsky requesting not to conclude the separate treaty with Germany because such agreement would bring a huge population of Slovenians to capitalistic and militaristic power (Russkii soldat-grazhdanin vo Frantsii 1918 №141). The peace talks began on December 1917 and resulted in signing the separate German-dictated Peace Treaty between Soviet republic and the Central powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) in March 1918. Contrary to the Bolsheviks’ promises, the terms of the Peace Treaty were extremely difficult for Russia. The country lost Western Ukraine and Belorussia, Poland, Finland and the Baltics, the total of approximately 780 000 km² with the population of 56 million people.

Articles 8 and 12 of the Peace Treaty were related to POWs: “*POWs from both sides would be released. An exchange of POWs and civilian detainees would be the subject of separate agreements*”. Soviet Russia pledged to pay Germany a huge contribution of 6 billion German marks for the maintenance of Russian POWs. Another issue was where to return Russian POWs. Military personnel of the old army had been recruited from different regions of the Russian Empire, many of which became new independent States. Therefore, another serious problem arose, namely, the issue of Russian refugees.

2.3.1 Competing of interests and delaying the repatriation of Russian POWs

After the end of hostilities, Russian soldiers turned out to be an instrument of pressure used by the opposing parties for the achievement of their particular interests. POWs remained to be a great military, labour, and political force. Soldiers could become either a potential supporter of the new Soviet state or a counterrevolutionary force. Former POWs had an experience of long-term residence in Western countries and could compare it with the Soviet reality. Germany did not hasten to return POWs even after peaceful agreement with Soviet Russia. The country was still waging the war on the Western front and needed labour force. The Entente Allies did not accept the separate peaceful treaty between Russia and the Central powers and after the total defeat of Germany³⁶ and Austria-Hungary established control of the remaining camps. POWs were not allowed to

³⁶ WWI ended officially with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 28 of June 1919

leave German camps in order to protect former allied warriors from hunger and anarchy spread in Soviet Russia (Chernoperov 2006: 190). This was also done in order to prevent reinforcements in the Red Army.

The Civil War in Russia, the change in the State borders, poor transport communication and struggle of interests procrastinated repatriation of Russian POWs till 1922.

Generally, several phases of repatriation can be distinguished. Before the peaceful agreement in March 1918, Russian POWs were exchanged for German and Austrian POWs with the assistance of the Red Cross organization. The total number of POWs who had returned during this period was 775 thousand people (Zhdanova 2011). Most of them were disabled and infected with tuberculosis. 181 375 POWs returned to Soviet Russia within the planned evacuation during the existence of the separate peaceful treaty, in March - November 1918 (Malkov 1971: 192). The joint Russian-German and Russian-Austrian commissions tried to establish assistance to POWs at that time. The fall of the German and Austria-Hungary empires released more than one million POWs in winter 1918-1919 (Zhdanova 2011). Some of the POWs were returned home in an orderly way, others reached the country on their own. The rest of the POWs returned in 1920-1922. According to various sources, there were between 2 and 6 hundred thousand POWs in German camps at that time (Chernoperov 2006: 194). In April 1920 the Entente stopped its assistance to the Russian POWs stationed in Germany and resumed releasing the POWs on the territory controlled by the Bolsheviks. This was due to the lack of funds. Another reason was that Great Britain changed its attitude towards the White movement³⁷, which aim was to restore “the unified and indivisible Russia”.

The figures on the total number of Russian POWs and death toll in captivity vary considerably in historical sources. Historians estimate the total number of POWs in the range between 1.5 to 4.1 million people (Belova 2014: 75). The figures on the deceased POWs show much greater variance - from 27.7³⁸ thousand according to some German and Austrian sources to unfounded number of 1.5 million. Modern historians often indicate the number of POWs deaths at 190 thousand (Zhdanova 2011, Abdarashitov

³⁷ The White movement – political and military forces, which opposed the Bolsheviks after the October revolution and fought against the Red Army during the Russian Civil War in 1918-1921. The main leaders of the White Army were Alexander V. Kolchak, Nikolai N. Yudenich, Anton I. Denikin.

³⁸ Golovin N.N 1939, *Voennye usiliia Rossii v Mirovoi voine*, Paris

2013). Around 95 thousand POWs decided to stay in Europe after the October events in Russia; 215 thousand people returned to Poland and Baltic countries after the establishment of borders (Zhdanova 2011).

Many of POWs died either on their way to Russia or during the first days of arrival because various infections were spreading rapidly in the overcrowded camps and trains. The authorities could not cope with the organization of accommodation, supply, registration, and medical services.

2.3.2 Soviet reality: political quarantine and propaganda

The repatriation of POWs to the Soviet State was spontaneous and mismanaged. The new State was facing the challenge of evacuating millions of people without having any experience. The authorities were not prepared to such massive flow of POWs, that is why the government measures were “improvised” and inconsistent.

POWs did not have high hopes for better life in Soviet Russia, having experienced bad conditions of maintenance, transportation, and hosting. It is worth noting, that neither the Tsarist government nor the Soviet authorities assisted significantly Russian soldiers in captivity. Many historians assert that British and French POWs had much better aid from their governments, while Russian POWs were on a bottom of “classification” in German camps and sometimes served to French and British POWs for food and necessary things (Nagornaia 2008, Zhdanova 2011). Humanitarian assistance to Russian POWs was provided mostly by international relief organizations.

In April 1918 The Central Department for POWs and Refugees³⁹ (from February 1920 The Central Evacuation Department⁴⁰) was established in Moscow. The activities of the Department included the reception and dispatch of POWs, provision of food, loyalty checks, and agitation among Russian POWs. All organizations aiding POWs, including the Russian Red Cross society, were pledged to assist the Department (Zhdanova 2011). The activities of the Cultural-Educational Division of the Department were focused on the political instructing of the returnees. Local authorities promoted political propaganda among the POWs; they received agitational literature, participated in conversations and meetings. Such newspapers as “Izvestiia of the Central Department for POWs and

³⁹In Rus. Центральная коллегия по делам пленных и беженцев (Центропленбеж).

⁴⁰In Rus. Центральное управление по эвакуации населения (Центрэвак)

Refugees” and “POW Newspaper”⁴¹ encouraged former Russian POWs to join the Red Army or labour collectives (Belova 2014: 73).

The Russian POWs interned in Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Norway and some other European countries had better living and working conditions. They had an opportunity to recover and gain strength. Evacuation of the interned POWs from Norway to Russia began in the fall 1917 and finished in summer 1918 when the peace negotiations between Russia and Germany had been already completed. A Norwegian captain and Norwegian nurse were accompanying the POWs to the Russian border (NB, Brevs. 337, Popov to Broch, 13.06.1918).

The POWs stationed in neutral countries looked better than the exhausted POWs from Germany. The Soviet authorities viewed such POWs with suspicion. Many of them were accused of spying, hence arrested or killed (Nagornaia 2008: 58).

In May 1919 “the political quarantine system for all contingents entering through Russian and Ukrainian borders” was introduced by the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (the Cheka). Political filtration was organized by special local commissions in the camps, along the lines of repatriates’ movement, and in the Gubernias and districts. The task of such “reception centers” was to isolate the POWs until full clarifying of their biographies, role in military actions, and attitude to the new regime. The political agitation among POWs was held in the form of discussions, meetings and film screenings.

In November 1921 the Soviet authorities granted amnesty to some former soldiers with the rank no higher than non-commissioned officer, who participated in the White movement. Other POWs and refugees who 1) stayed in Europe continuously over five years, 2) left the country without official permission 3) voluntarily joined anti-Soviet armies 4) had not applied for the citizenship before 1st of June 1922 lost Soviet citizenship and were considered in the same status as foreigners. (The Decree on the deprivation of citizenship rights for some groups of people⁴² 28.10.1921)

⁴¹ In Rus. Газета военнопленного

⁴² In Rus. Декрет от 28.10.1921 О лишении прав гражданства некоторых категорий лиц, находящихся за границей.

2.3.3 International community assistance

Assistance in the repatriation of POWs was the main task not only for certain States but also for humanitarian and public organizations.

The outside world did not want to cooperate with Soviet Russia; connections with the European countries were severed or had an accidental nature. In this context, the International Red Cross Organization and the representative of the League of Nations Fridtjof Nansen mediated between Western countries and Soviet Russia.

The Red Cross Organization was the largest and most authoritative international nongovernmental organization. Its offices in Denmark, Holland, Norway and Sweden played an important role in assisting and returning POWs. In summer 1918 representatives of the International, Russian, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian Red Cross Societies met in Moscow. The main outcome of the meeting was the report sent to the Russian government about the Red Cross willingness to take responsibility for assisting POWs (Aseev 2009: 22).

The situation was aggravated after the October revolution, when the Russian Red Cross Society refused to support the Bolsheviks and lost all of its property. The Soviet authorities tried to replace the organization by the Soviet Red Cross, which was not recognized by the International Red Cross Committee. So, the Red Cross Office and the Soviet State had no connections for more than a year. The situation changed after the Soviet commissars passed a decree on the recognition of all International conventions about the Red Cross, which happened in June 1918.

The first Soviet Red Cross offices were established in Denmark and Holland in 1918 (Ibid). In the International Red Cross Committee the Soviet Red Cross was formally recognized in October 1921.

The Red Cross played a significant role in the exchange of disabled POWs. 17 664 handicapped soldiers were returned from captivity through the Red Cross activities (Vestnik Krasnogo Kresta 1916 №8). In addition, the Red Cross assisted in evacuating and facilitating transit of Russian POWs through the new independent States.

In 1920 repatriation of POWs and refugees became the main task of the League of Nations. The famous Norwegian polar explorer and public figure Fridtjof Nansen was

leading the Commission for Refugees and POWs in 1920-1921. Moreover, from 1921 Nansen was combining two positions, acting – as the High Commissioner for struggle against hunger in Russia and The High Commissioner for Refugees.

Nansen opened negotiations with Soviet representatives on the terms of repatriation. In his opinion, the returning of refugees and POWs could not be against their will, the Soviet government had to declare the amnesty before the repatriation, and Soviet representatives had to be involved in the selection of those, who wanted to return (Simonova 2009: 28,29). The Soviet side accepted these proposals and signed an agreement about conditions for repatriation with Eduard Frik who represented Nansen and was also the representative of the International Red Cross Committee. Nansen took the responsibility for the organization of the repatriation and the related expenses. The Russian Red Cross granted entry visas to Russia. Repatriates signed their consent to voluntary departure. Nansen, for his part, promised to take measures to prevent entry of “agents provocateurs”. The League of Nations established reevacuation commissions in Constantinople and Bulgaria. The Soviet representatives with the Red Cross mandates were also included in the commissions.

The Soviet authorities assumed that the flow of repatriates would stop by 1923. This did not happen. The number of repatriates decreased but the issue was not solved. Researchers noted that even in 1923 in Poland several POWs daily applied for returning to Soviet Russia (Ibid.). There was also an opposite situation when the repatriated Russian POWs, after facing the Soviet reality, chose to return back to Germany (Nagornaia 2008: 61).

Lack of government preparation, unawareness and inactivity of local authorities extended the return of Russian POWs over several years. The government measures were mainly propagandistic. Moral and material conditions of Russian POWs were extremely difficult. Movement of soldiers within the country took features of humanitarian catastrophe. Besides, former POWs found themselves in the center of the Civil War, at the end of which many of them decided to emigrate from Soviet Russia. A large part of former German POWs, participants of the White movement and all civilians opposed to the new totalitarian regime became “forced migrants.”

Chapter 3. Stateless persons: first wave of Russian emigration

*“There are no intellectuals in Russia at present. Former intellectuals have been totally dissipated in a vortex of the Bolshevik revolution, except for those few who were lucky to find a shelter abroad [...] There are views, that Russian people did not overthrow Soviet power because they like it... However, one should not forget that not only there are no citizens in the present Russia, but there are no people either. There are only eaters. The Soviet rule is keeping a strict hand over the multimillion Russian population - not only through the Terror but also by its food policy”.*⁴³ (Poslednie Novosti №41, 13.06.1920)

3.1 Expelled or escaped from the country

The first wave of Russian emigration in 1917-1925 was the result of the October revolution and the Civil War in Russia. A huge number of the White movement officers, government officials, Russian elite, and intellectuals flooded into Europe from all parts of the country. According to the Council of the League of Nations, around two million people left the country at that time (Simonova 2009: 29). France, Germany, Bulgaria, Serbia and Czechoslovakia were the main destinations of Russian emigrants. These countries needed labour force to rebuild infrastructure after WWI. Besides, emigrants considered that the Balkan countries were looking for “intellectual force” (NB, Brevs. 337, Y. Arsenev to Broch, 02.04.1920).

What was the reason for emigration? It was a complex of economic, political and social causes connected with the emergence of the Soviet State. First of all, Russian citizens fled from the Red terror directed against any dissent. Beside the terror of “Cheka”, the whole of Russia was desolated by famine. All categories of the population, except for the Bolshevik leaderships, were suffering and dying. Even well-educated people had to work for a piece of bread. In addition, the Bolsheviks followed a strict policy with regard to the

⁴³ In Rus. В России сейчас интеллигенции – нет. Прежний интеллигентский слой совершенно распылен вихрем большевистской революции, за исключением, по крайней мере, тех немногих счастливых, которые успели укрыться от него за границей [...]. Приходилось слышать от некоторых соображения, о том, что раз русский народ не сверг до сих пор советской власти, то, значит она ему по душе... При этом забывают, однако, одно: в России не только нет сейчас граждан, но и обывателей. Есть только едоки. Господствующая власть держит прочно в своих руках миллионное население России, благодаря террору, даже не ЧК, а продовольственному.

intellectuals by way of, staff reduction, closing courses and educational institutions, deteriorating their housing conditions⁴⁴ (NB, Brevs. 337, Chuprov to Broch, 07.12.1921).

When calling refugees or emigrants “political”, it should be noted that most of them were not directly involved in politics but rather had their own opinions and principles, which were different from the official rhetoric.

People had to leave the country incognito, without warning their relatives and friends, leaving all their property. It is worth noting, that most of the emigrants considered their departure as a temporary measure. Nobody believed that the Bolsheviks could cling to power, even after the White movement was defeated in 1921. A refugee woman from Petrograd wrote that everybody “lives with the expectation of changes, hoping that new educated people will come to power”. Professors, scientists, artists used to meet secretly at somebody’s flat, where they were discussing and dreaming how they would live after the fall of the Bolsheviks’ power (Rul’ №82, 27.02.1921).

Many refugees had very similar experience: participation in WWI, captivity (for some), returning to the destroyed country, involvement in the White movement, and escaping from the Bolsheviks’ terror. Example of brothers Arsenevs, the sons of the former Russian Envoy in Norway Sergei V. Arsenev, can be illustrative. Yurii, the youngest of Arsenevs, volunteered to WWI as a warrant officer. In 1915 he was captured by Germans and spent 2 years in camps. After his repatriation to Russia he had to run from the Bolsheviks to Riga. In December 1918, Yurii Sergeevich joined the White forces within the North-West Army of Yudenich and participated in the offensive on Petrograd. In August 1919 he was seriously wounded in his left arm. Afterwards, he lost all his hopes of the White army victory and ended up in Estonia. Because of the “*terrible attitude of Estonians to Russians*” he had to move to Germany, first to Berlin, then to Königsberg where he found a shelter and a job in the insurance company “Baltic”. Immigration to Norway had never been an option for him, unlike his elder brother, Professor at the Moscow university, Nikolai S. Arsenev (NB, Brevs. 337, Y. Arsenev to Broch, 02.04.1920).

⁴⁴ The policy of densification (in Rus. уплотнение). If a person lived in apartment or room bigger than 16 arshin² (around 8,1 m²) he had to share living space with other, often unknown people.

Nikolai Sergeevich also participated in WWI as the Red Cross Commissioner⁴⁵. After the October revolution he moved to the Don region for supporting the White movement. In 1918-1920 he worked at the university in Saratov, where he was arrested twice and had to escape from the third “final” arrest. In 1920 he fled the country “*with a great danger to life*” across the Polish border, where he had to go part of the way on foot. Nikolai Sergeevich found a temporary shelter in Wilno (modern Vilnius), but he would like to immigrate to Norway. He wrote to Broch to ask about possibility to work at the University of Christiania. History of religions was his main specialization, but he also could teach medieval and Italian literature in German. He was ready for any work if he could spend some time for science. But it was difficult task for many reasons, that is why Nikolai Sergeevich moved to Königsberg to get closer to his brother (NB, Brevs. 337, N. Arsenev to Broch, 06.05.1920, undated). Later he became Professor of Russian culture at the Königsberg Albertus-University and could continue his scientific activity. Most of scientists and university lecturers had to change their professional occupation and social status; only few, who had well-known names and high international repute were invited by foreign higher education institutions. Among them were the historian of antiquity Mikhail I. Rostovtsev, Professor at the Yale university in the USA; Russian linguist and publicist Nikolai S. Trubetskoi, Head of Department of Slavic Philology at the University of Vienna; aircraft designer Igor I. Sikorsky; one of the television creators Vladimir K. Zworykin; astrophysicist Otto L. Struve, and many other scientists, engineers and inventors continued their work in foreign countries.

Cultural intellectuals were also persecuted by the Bolsheviks. The fabricated case of Tagantsev’s conspiracy⁴⁶, during which 103 persons were shot, is one of many examples of “the Bolsheviks’ purge”. Alexander V. Amfiteatrov⁴⁷ wrote to Broch that he had narrowly escaped the fourth arrest connected with this case and fled from Petrograd. After a long wandering journey, he settled with his family in Italy (NB, Brevs. 337, Amfiteatrov to Broch, 26.01.1924). Among the most famous Russian creative artists who made the

⁴⁵In Rus. Уполномоченный Красного Креста

⁴⁶ The case of the Petrograd Military Organization led by Vladimir N. Tagantsev – one of the first case in Soviet Russia against intelligentsia of Petrograd. They were blamed in counterrevolutionary conspiracy against Soviet power. All together were shot 103 persons, among them was one of the outstanding Silver Age poets- Nikolai Gumilev. In 1992 all accused had been rehabilitated.

⁴⁷ Alexander Valentinovich Amfiteatrov (1862-1938) – Russia writer, publicist, literary and theatre critic, author of satirical poems (pseudonyms Old Gentlemen, Moscow’s Faust).

decision to leave the country were: the writer and future Nobel prize winner Ivan A. Bunin, composer and pianist Sergei V. Rakhmaninov, painter and founder of abstractionism Vasiliy V. Kandinsky, and others.

Therefore, the majority of immigrants were forced to leave Russia. The Bolsheviks created unbearable living and working conditions for everybody who was not loyal to them. All those who continued their political, scientific or cultural activity in spite of the Bolsheviks' pressure were expelled from the country in autumn 1922. About 200 philosophers, professors, politicians, scientists, doctors, lawyers, and religious officials were sent by two German passenger ships "Oberbürgermeister Haken" and "Preusen" to Stettin, Germany. Despite the tragic situation, this act of the Soviet authorities can be called "human" because many outstanding people survived, continued their work and made significant contribution to the development of the world science and culture.

3.2 Russian refugees in Norway: main difficulties and ways of solution

Russian citizens from the Northern regions (Arkhangelsk and Murmansk) fled, mostly, to Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark) and Finland. They had the same reasons for escape as other Russians: total stagnation in the economy, redundancy, hunger, political persecution, and shootings. Refugees met new difficulties and challenges in exile. Most of them started their lives from a scratch, adapting to new circumstances and fighting for better living conditions.

3.2.1 Cold shoulder?

First Russian refugees began to come on the territory of Norway right after the October events. But the hospitality extended to them in Norway was far from what they had expected. At that time the Bolshevik ideas were very popular among Norwegian society and labour movement. Bolsheviks spread the communist propaganda through their agents, who from time to time were caught by the police. Thus, a courier of the Soviet delegation in Revel (modern Tallinn) who was going to Christiania (modern Oslo) was arrested on the Swedish – Norwegian border with 65 kilos of Bolshevik's literature in Norwegian, the orders of the Central Committee of the III International, 20 000 rubles in gold and 30 000 NOK (Rul' №176, 18.06.1921).

According to the newspaper *Le soldat-citoyen russe en France*⁴⁸, the Bolsheviks were conducting active and successful propaganda in Norway, calling for a world revolution. People sympathized with the October revolution in Russia, some of them wanted to repeat them in Norway. Norwegian labour movement, following the Russian example, established Unions of workers. In political terms, the Bolshevik agitation in Norway was directed against moderate socialists who were accused of “poor revolutionary spirit” (Russkii soldat-grazhdanin vo Frantsii 16.01.1918 №138). Therefore, at the beginning Norwegian society treated Russian refugees with distrust, doubting their difficult situation. In addition, there was no objective information on the events in Russia.

The ruling circles were suspicious of Russian refugees, fearing the spread of revolutionary sentiments. At the same time, they were afraid of possible penetration of German and Soviet spies in view of the continuing war. In that regard, the Norwegian government banned the entry of all foreigners, except for those, who worked on supplying the country with food and goods (Russkii soldat-grazhdanin vo Frantsii № 141 19.01.1918). Russian refugees were forced to leave the country. They had two alternatives: return back to Soviet Russia or move to another country. Refugees emphasized to the Norwegian government, that they had not committed any criminal or illegal acts, they even were not in opposition to Soviet power, their only guilt was belonging to “thinking people” and expressing antipathy to the Bolsheviks (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., from unknown refugee to Broch, 11.01.1918). Liberal intellectuals, including Broch, came to the defense of the refugees, who were “de facto” political immigrants. In case of return or expulsion, they could expect imprisonment and trial by the Revolutionary Tribunal⁴⁹. Moreover, the Chairman of the Russian Red Cross in Norway, Baron Lev Rozen emphasized that sending refugees back meant death (NB, Brevs. 337, Rozen to Broch, 20.08.1920).

Broch wrote the article in *Aftenposten* (10.01.1918), where he spoke up for refugees’ interests and argued against sending them back to Russia (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., from unknown refugee to Broch, 11.01.1918). Next day an unknown immigrant, “admirer of the beautiful Norwegian nature”⁵⁰, sent to Broch a thankful letter where he wrote about

⁴⁸ In Rus. Русский-солдат гражданин во Франции. The newspaper was established by the Committee of Russian troops in France and was issued in 1917-1920.

⁴⁹ Revolutionary Tribunal – court of special jurisdictions engaged in repressive policies of the State in 1918-1923.

⁵⁰ In Rus. Поклонник природных красот Норвегии

desperate situation of the refugees, inability to move to other European countries and about his disappointment at Norwegian hospitality (Ibid.).

In September 1918, a representative of the Russian mission in Christiania requested Broch's assistance in solving the issue of allocation of the Russian refugees between Scandinavian countries which was raised by Finland. In case of refusal, the Finnish government would have to send them back to Soviet Russia. The representative emphasized that the Norwegian government had a negative attitude towards the hosting of refugees and Broch's assistance would be "*particularly valuable*" because sending them home would be "*unheard of horror*"⁵¹ (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., 24.09.1918). Broch due to his authority and connections in the government, succeeded in hosting 200 Russian refugees in Norway (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch 27/14.11.1918).

3.2.2 Subsequent exodus in 1920. Changes in attitude towards Russian refugees

The situation changed in 1920, when the White movement suffered a defeat, and the Bolsheviks confirmed their power both in center and periphery. At that time the whole world was aware of atrocities and horrors of the Bolshevik regime.

According to some reports, Bolsheviks conducted searches, 8-10 hours interrogations and arrests after seizing the power in Arkhangelsk in February 1920. Some property and goods were expropriated, letters and telegrams were checked and destroyed (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Centrosojus, Martynov to unaddressed, 20.06.1920). Around one hundred officers were shot officially, but there were those who were executed unofficially (NB, Brevs 337, Rozen to Broch, 20.08.1920).

It is difficult to estimate how much Russian refugees arrived or decided to stay in Norway because they moved from country to country in search of better living conditions, employment and protection from danger.

According to Broch's correspondence, in 1919, 200 Russian refugees from Finland came to Norway. Part of them was stationed in Værnes, Trondheim (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Borisov to Rozen, 27.03.1921).

⁵¹ In Rus. Неслыxанный ужас

The biggest group of Russian refugees, around 1000 people, entered Norway in February 1920 on the icebreaker “Kuzma Minin” coming from Archangelsk (Holtmark (red.) 2015: 198,199). Broch’s archive contains an article from a French émigré newspaper, in which Russian writer Alexander I. Kuprin cited the letter from Madame Annenkova, one of the passengers from the icebreaker. She described the reception given to the refugees in Bromsö (she meant Tromsø). The refugees did not expect any welcome meeting in Tromsø, because they had heard that the Northern Norway supported the Soviet regime and around “90 per cent of population were Bolsheviks”. Their fears turned out to be unfounded when after the terrible 7-days journey they received all possible assistance. Wounded officers and sick refugees were sent to the hospital. A local charitable organization consisting of women took the initiative in assisting three hundred Russian women and children, which were stationed in several hostels. The refugees received all the necessary guidance and support, including 4-time meals and new clothes. Children got fruits, candies, chocolate. Besides, Norwegian women were providing psychological assistance, comforting and listening to the refugees’ stories. The most surprising for the emigrants was that the local Workers party, consisting, mostly, of the Bolsheviks supporters, adopted the resolution about participation in the reception of the Russian refugees. Therefore, the emigrants were under the impression that “*if there were Bolsheviks in Norway, then they had nothing in common with the Russian ones*” (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., newspaper article). Most of the refugees continued their journey to other countries; around 100 decided to stay in Norway (Holtmark (red.) 2015: 199). As for the location, Norwegian capital with its surrounding area and Northern Norway were the favoured destinations for Russian refugees (Teterevleva 2006); this was related to seeking employment.

3.2.3 Employment opportunities in Norway

Norway was an important transit country for refugees. Some of them, especially wealthy, could afford to stay here for 2-3 month in order to have a rest before onward journey (NB, Brevs. 337, Goriunov to Broch, 18.03.1921). Others stopped in Norway for obtaining visa to other countries. In Norway it was easier to apply for American visa than in Finland, where special documents about “political reliability” were required (NB, Brevs. 337, E. Mitkevich to Broch, 25.04.1924).

Some of the emigrants considered the possibility to settle in Norway, but only few decided to stay. What was the reason for doubts? First of all, language constraints. Educated refugees could speak French or German, but not Norwegian, and without language proficiency they could not count on scientific or high-paying job. The refugees who had been engaged in an intellectual work in Russia, could be employed, in the best case, for manual labour jobs in Norway. Under the circumstances, it was a great fortune to find any work. Refugees took any chance to earn a living. For example, a Russian captain, who was commanding two ships during WWI, was ready to be an ordinary sailor in the Norwegian merchant fleet (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch, 26.05/08.06.1918).

A refugee from Værnes, a former member of the District Court, Vladimir Borisov worked as a helper on a farm in Vestre Gansdal. He was engaged in moving stones and building roads. It was extremely hard for a person who had never “*worked with his hands*”. After summer season was over, he had an opportunity, due to the Russian Red Cross in Norway, to have 3-weeks rest in Eidsvoll’s boarding house to gain strength for his next challenge (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Borisov to Rozen, 27.03.1921). In winter, refugees moved to the industrial cities for searching work in factories. A refugee woman could earn 260 NOK per month in a factory; it was barely enough to keep her fed and sheltered (Ibid.). Those who did not find any work, faced an extreme need. Thus, a Russian refugee Borisov came to Lillehammer in September, when work crews had already been recruited. For one month he tried to find any work without result. He emphasized, that good connections and recommendations played an important role in getting job. He was in critical situation and asked the Russian Red Cross in Norway to assist in finding any work (Ibid.). The problem was that not only refugees, but a lot of Norwegians were unemployed. So, unemployment was the other reason why Russians feared to immigrate to Norway.

In addition, refugees noted the high cost of living in Norway due to the strong Norwegian krone. Germany, in contrast, attracted refugees by its cheapness.

It is worth noting, that the Norwegian society, government and employers were quite loyal to Russian refugees; emigrants, for their part, were thankful for shelter and opportunity to live in safety. One of the educated Russian refugees, who worked in a farm in Eidsvoll, wrote to Broch that in spite of all difficulties he would not die of hunger in Norway, in contrast with Russia where it was common phenomenon. The most important

for him was to have “*good hands and a head, [...] and only a lack of language skills and unemployment hindered in using them in the right way*”⁵² (NB, Brevs. 337, Preobrazhensky to Broch, 02.12.1921).

3.3 Humanitarian assistance to Russian refugees

The Norwegian society and public figures provided assistance through international and charitable organizations both to the refugees stationed in Norway and to the emigrants who had settled in Europe and America. The aid was ranging from small requests related to resending letters and finding private information to cases when people’s lives were at stake.

An important role in assisting Russian refugees in Norway played the Norwegian government. The authorities took responsibility for temporary accommodation and maintenance of the refugees, provided them medical and social assistance. If a refugee decided to leave the county, he or she received travel allowance (NB, Brevs. 337, Rozen to Broch, 16.08.1920). But in the conditions of post-war economic crisis, closure of factories and job losses, the government support was not enough, and refugees took any opportunity and sought any assistance to settle in the new environment and to find a way of earning a living.

3.3.1 Olaf Broch and persecuted Russian intellectuals: advisory, financial and organizational assistance

Broch was one of those who assisted Russians without ceasing and without dividing people into acquaintances and strangers, unknown and famous, liberals and monarchists.

Among emigrants there were a lot of his colleagues and friends; due to them he received first-hand news about situation in Russia and brought the information to the attention of the Norwegian society and authorities.

In providing aid to refugees Broch cooperated with many organizations and public figures, including the Red Cross organization, Norwegian Missions in other countries, politicians and envoys.

⁵²In Rus. У меня слава Богу, еще здоровые руки и голова [...] лишь незнание языка и безработица мешают в данное время применить их должным образом.

Broch received a big number of appeals and complaints from refugees. Moreover, the Russian Red Cross in Christiania could not cope with the flow of requests and forwarded some of them to Broch. The Chairman of the Russian Red Cross attributed this to the lack of funds and impossibility to find job for all refugees (NB, Brevs. 337, Rozen to Broch, 16.08.1920). He wrote to Broch: *“I’m totally desperate because I don’t know how to help to the Russian refugees asking for work. There is no job now and from different places we are receiving only refusals”*⁵³ (NB, Brevs. 337, Rozen to Broch, 30.03.1921).

Therefore, the main requests of refugees were work-related. Emigrants emphasized that only an extremely difficult and hopeless situation forced them to seek help and to bother Broch even without knowing him personally (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Lew to Broch, 04.10.1921). The situation was complicated by the fact that some of them had to support not only themselves, but also their families and children. Most of them understood that they could not earn by intellectual labour and were grateful to get any work in farms or factories. Some of the emigrants tried their luck to ask Broch about vacancies at the University in Christiania, in Norwegian newspapers, or in trade enterprises (NB, Brevs. 337, Khandamirov, Cyon, Lew to Broch). In one letter, a former refugee, whom Broch helped to move from Norway to his homeland in Lithuania in 1918, after two years of living there, asked about a possibility to return him to Norway to the same workplace. He was disappointed by living and working conditions in post-war Lithuania and confessed that moving to Lithuania had been a big mistake (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Pledzinky to Broch, 05.01.1921).

Another important request was connected with obtaining visas to Norway or to other countries from Norway. A transit visa was of great importance too. Thus, one Russian family had to receive French, English, Norwegian and Swedish transit visas to get to Italy. The task was to receive the first visa and only after that the family could apply for the next one. For example, they could not receive English visa before having a French one and Swedish before Norwegian (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Stakhovich to Broch, 04.01.?).

Broch was contacted not only directly by refugees, but also by a huge number of his friends and acquaintances requesting visas for somebody else. Sometimes it was a long

⁵³In Rus. Я в полном отчаянии, не зная, как помочь русским беженцам обращающимся ко мне с просьбой найти работу. Нигде в данное время работы нет и отовсюду получают отказы.

chain of connections which brought a request to Broch. Everybody hoped for Broch's willingness to assist and his "*all-powerful protection*" (NB, Brevs. 337, Goriunov to Broch, 18.03.1921). Some people were in such desperate situation that they were ready to commit suicide (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch, 22/9.06.1918, 20.01.1921). Through the timely assistance rendered by Broch, a lot of refugees were receiving visas or work.

Financial support was also a matter of great importance for refugees. In many letters, refugees mentioned *the Relief Fund for Russians in Need*⁵⁴ established by Broch. From this Fund refugees received money in order to settle in a new place and hold out until finding a job. It should be mentioned that it was not a one-time benefit, some of the Russian refugees received support from the Fund several times (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Luzhansky to Broch, 02.12.1924). The amount of the benefits ranged from 100-250 NOK to several thousand NOK (NB, Brevs. 337, Diterikh, Luzhansky, Y. Arsenev to Broch). Financial assistance was provided to the refugees stationed in Norway, the refugees who planned to move from Norway and the refugees stationed in other European countries. Some of them signed receipts for the money, pledging to return it as far as possible (NB, Brevs. 337, Diterikh to Broch, 22.12.1919). Besides, Broch was paying for three-month education of six Russian students at the University of Graz, Austria. At first, monthly tuition for one foreign student stood at 650 000 Austrian crowns; further it was tripled and amounted to 1 669 400 Austrian crowns (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Matsilev to Broch, 24.05.1923). Later, one of the students was granted an opportunity to move to Prague, where due to Broch's assistance, he was able to settle in and take the exams (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Lakhno to Broch, 26.10.1923).

Sometimes Broch sent money to emigrants without any requests for financial support. One of the examples is the letter of an educated Russian refugee, who worked in a farm in Eidsvoll. He wanted to sell three old Russian coins to the University museum in Christiania and asked Broch if it was possible. This was all his wealth and rainy-day fund. In respond Broch sent him money not for the coins but to cover his living costs. The refugee was confused and refused to accept money in such a way for moral reasons. He "*knew how hard it was to get money*" and did not want "*to be a burden for somebody*".

⁵⁴ In Rus. Фонд помощи нуждающимся русским

The compromise for him was to send to Broch his hand-made products worth that amount (arts and crafts things) (NB, Brevs. 337, Preobrazhensky to Broch, 02.10.1921, 02.12.1921).

Some cases were both tragic and comic. Thus, the Chairman of the Russian Red Cross asked Broch to assist one Russian refugee who “*instead of looking for work*”, fell in love with a Russian girl and spent all his money on the presents to her. In spite of running out of money he planned to marry and to move from Christiania to Revel (modern Tallinn). Broch donated 250 NOK to him, in addition to his travel allowance (NB, Brevs. 337, Rozen to Broch, 16.08.1920, 20.08.1920).

Russian emigrants very often contacted Broch asking to provide assistance in selling jewelry – the only valuable items they could take from Soviet Russia. For somebody it was the only source of income or chance to cross into other countries. Among jewelry for sale there were family heirloom and works of Cartier (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch 12.06.1919). When Broch could not find a buyer in Norway he contacted his friends in other countries. Broch found a buyer in America for one Russian senior military officer Vladimir Bezobrazov⁵⁵ who tried to sell pearl brooch worth about 40 000 NOK. The former Russian military planned to invest the money in property in Stockholm, where he lived with his family (NB, Brevs 337, Bezobrazov to Broch, 08.05.1918, 18.08.1918).

Another important source of assistance for refugees who left their families and friends in Russia was sending letters and parcels to their homeland through Broch and his friends. The refugees were afraid to send letters to relatives in order not to hurt them, because after they had left the country they became “enemies of revolution” and all their connections were thoroughly controlled by the Bolsheviks. The Soviet authorities arrested a lot of people in Moscow and Petersburg who were accused of their connections with Russian emigrant society and plans to overthrow the Soviet government (Rul’ №188, 02.07.1921). People from Soviet Russia also warned their relatives that “*all contacts with foreign countries were so dangerous that it was better to endure hardships than to receive assistance from them*” (NB, Brevs. 337, Chuprov to Broch, 04.06.1924). Broch, due to

⁵⁵ Vladimir Mikhailovich Bezobrazov (1857-1932) – a Russian military commander of a noble family, General of Cavalry, the Adjutant – General.

his important links with influential people, helped refugees to find out information about their relatives in Soviet Russia and to establish communication between them.

Besides direct support, Broch provided advisory assistance to refugees, guiding in what places and organizations they could ask for work, what documents they needed to apply for a visa or citizenship, what recommendations, letters or other papers were required for the university entry in Christiania, and so on.

3.3.2 Nansen for refugees. Refugees against Nansen

Russian refugees posed difficulties not only to certain countries but to the international society on the whole. The definition “refugee” first appeared at the Geneva Conference in 1922 in the context of the discussion of Russian refugees (Bocharova 2001). The situation was complicated by the Bolsheviks’ policy towards refugees. In the middle of 1920th the doors of the country were closed to all doubters. All who had missed the registration deadline lost their citizenship and were treated by the Soviet authorities as foreigners (the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of 13.11.1925). Thus, the Russian refugees who refused to accept the Soviet regime turned out to be stateless persons in need of the international protection.

The International Committee of the Red Cross initiated the engagement of the League of Nations in finding solution to the refugee problem. The representatives of the Red Cross reported about disastrous situation of Russian refugees and emphasized the need to appoint the Commissioner for Russian people abroad (Bocharova 2001). The main problems were related to defining the legal status of refugees, resettlement, and employment. Gulkevich emphasized that regulation of personal refugee status and restoration of the right for free movement in Europe were his priority concerns (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch, 04.11.1921).

On the 20th of October 1921, Nansen was elected as the High Commissioner for Refugees. His candidature had been disputed from the beginning. Nansen was already holding the post of the High Commissioner for struggle against hunger and according to emigrants consolidated too much power in his hands which could lead to a conflict of interests⁵⁶

⁵⁶ A conflict of interest is a situation in which a person’s private interest may influence the decision-making process and therefore cause the detriment to public interest.

(NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg.). In spite of his “pro-Soviet reputation”, the League of Nations could not find the candidate better than Nansen.

One of the most important initiatives of Nansen’s Commissariat, besides repatriation, was the introduction of identity certificates for refugees, known as “Nansen’s passport”. Some Russian emigrant lawyers were also engaged in the development of the document. Unfortunately, initial draft of the document, which included equal rights to freedom of movement and employment for refugees and other citizens, was changed at the insistence of France. The rights of the Russian refugees were restricted, the provisions about the country’s obligation towards refugees were removed (Bocharova 2001). European countries recognized the certificate on the condition that a refugee would fulfill all recipient country requirements, would pay for the certificate and its annual renewal, and would prove his/her identity. The passport did not guarantee the return of a refugee to the recipient country in case of crossing the borders. Twelve European countries endorsed the system of Nansen’s passport by November 1922; by the end of 1920th 51 countries were using this document (Ibid).

Though Nansen’s passports did not eliminate all difficulties in free movement and employment, it was a major step forward in developing the international refugee law. Many Russians recognized that Nansen did a great job even though he was limited in actions and had modest financial resources (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Grushevsky to Broch, 31.03.1923).

Unfortunately, not all contemporaries commended Nansen’s efforts. Nansen got a lot of criticism both from the conservative emigrants who argued for isolation and blockade of the Soviet State, and from the liberal intellectuals who understood importance for some cooperation and assistance to Soviet Russia (NB, Brevs. 337, Chuprov to Broch 14.09.1921).

Why had Nansen no credibility among Russian refugees? Why would Russian refugees have preferred another representative of their interests?

According to emigrants, Nansen was too loyal to the Bolshevik regime and had no idea what was really going on in Soviet Russia.

His visit to Moscow and publications of articles and interviews about idealistic situation in Russia aroused fury of Russian emigrants. In their letters to Broch some Russian emigrants used the following phrases: “*Nansen makes mistake after mistake*”, “*he caused big harm to Russia*”, “*unskillful diplomacy of Nansen*”, “*Nansen does not know Russian relations and Russian reality*” and others (NB, Brevs. 337, Chuprov, Gulkevich, Grushevsky to Broch). Gulkevich criticized Nansen for his excessive trust in Bolsheviks but hoped that his positive articles about the Soviet regime were an intentional step to persuade the Soviet authorities on concessions (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch, 17.11.1921). Especially Russian intellectuals were disappointed about his article about the situation of the Russian higher institutions (NB, Brevs. 337, Chuprov to Broch, 07.07.1923). Some of them expressed their expectations on Broch’s opportunities to influence and enlighten Nansen, particularly after Broch’s two-month trip to Soviet Russia (Ibid.).

At the end of 1921 Russian organizations in Paris began to collect signatures to the League of Nations, demanding the resignation of Nansen. They took the view that Nansen had not done anything for Russian refugees during the last four months, and that the two posts in the League of Nations mutually paralyzed each other (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch, 31.12.1921). Due to Gulkevich, the final version of the Memorandum contained only the requirement of separating the two posts held by Nansen, but not his resignation (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch, 07.01.1922). Everybody hoped that Nansen would refuse from the post of the High Commissioner for Refugees, because “*it was impossible for a sober person to continue to take care of people who curse him and want to get rid of him*”⁵⁷(Ibid.). But this did not happen, and in 1922 Nansen was awarded Nobel Prize for his humanitarian work.

Though many people considered Nansen as an amateur, he had been able to organize successful humanitarian assistance to Russian people due to his worldwide authority, public activity and personal connections. Unfortunately, political and public activities of Nansen have been neglected for a long time by Russian society and historians. Only in

⁵⁷ In Rus. Нельзя же трезвому человеку насильно опекать людей, которые проклинают его и просят избавить их от него.

the beginning of 2000s an interest to this subject has been increasing among historians, but for most people he still remains to be only famous polar explorer and adventurer.

Chapter 4. The Great Famine of the 1920s: ways of assisting and contradictory attitude of the Soviet government towards Western humanitarian aid

The first part of the 20-th century was a hard and painful period for Russia, time when people were threatened, starved, terrorized and expelled from their own country. The Great Famine in 1921-1923 was, without doubt, one of the darkest chapters in Russian history. Lenin at the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets⁵⁸ called 1921 “*the year of unspeakable suffering*” (Lenin vol. 44 1970: 304). For a long time, this terrible event has been neglected by Russian historiography. Several generations of Soviet people perceived this catastrophe as an insignificant and local episode. However, a huge territory was in the grip of starvation: the Volga region, Southern Ural, Bashkiria, Southern Ukraine, Crimea, Kirgizia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Around 30-40 million people lived on a territory affected by the famine, over 1 million people (according to some estimates 5 million) died from starvation (Anshakova 2017: 76).

It could be a lot more victims without the assistance of international organizations and public figures. Among them was Nansen, who made a great contribution to provide food and medical supplies to Russian people. Moreover, he managed to overcome reluctance of the international society to assist the country under the Bolshevik regime and to receive support from humanitarian organizations and representatives of European governments.

The chapter examines work, proposals and attempts of Norwegian public figures for famine relief in Russia. Attention is also given to the Soviet authorities’ approach to addressing the humanitarian crisis and their interaction with non-governmental organizations within the country and abroad. The chapter addresses the evolution of official Soviet attitude to the Western assistance, its targets, scale, significance, and to the results of foreign activities on the territory of Soviet Russia.

4.1 Acceptance of the problem

For a long time the Soviet authorities did not admit the existence of humanitarian problems, on the contrary, they propagandized success and achievements of the

⁵⁸ In Rus. IX Всероссийский съезд Советов

Communist regime. Though first food shortages began to appear in 1918, the Bolsheviks, through their agents and radical press, were misleading European society and Labour movement about situation in Russia. Thus, in Norway the branch of Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA)⁵⁹ carried out intense agitational activity and published their articles in daily newspaper *Social – Demokraten* (NB, Brevs. 337, Genglez to Broch, 11.11.1918). Russian emigrants were outraged that newspaper presented a distorted picture of Russian reality to Norwegian people. “ROSTA” claimed that the food issue was under control and the country was thriving in “*the Bolshevik paradise*” (Ibid.). People who had recently escaped from this “paradise” offered the editor of *Social - Demokraten* to take one-month trip to Petrograd and to live on a salary of a worker in typography. They would like to hold an experiment how many kilos he would lose during his stay (Ibid.). The Russian Society in Norway⁶⁰ was grateful to Broch for his article in *Aftenposten* of 07.12.1918, where he demanded the closure of “ROSTA” (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., the Chaiman of the Russian society in Norway to Broch, 10.12.1918).

Russian emigrants, who left Petrograd in October 1918, emphasized that food price had already gone up by that time. Bread was given 1-2 times a month even with ration cards. Such items as meat, eggs, butter or milk were not available in Petrograd. People could get such products only with great difficulty in the surrounding villages (NB, Brevs. 337, Genglez to Broch, 11.11.1918). Speculators were taking advantage of that, they were buying food from peasants and selling it three times as much in the capital (*Russkii soldat grazhdanin vo Frantsii №138*, 16.01.1918). Urban population, if they had an opportunity, moved to a countryside, where they could get food from subsistence farming (NB, Brevs. 337, Arsenev, Chuprov).

Though the food shortages were existing during the long period of time, the Bolsheviks did not take any substantial actions to solve the problem. Food insecurity was increasing, especially under the impact of harsh Soviet policy aimed to destroy private sector and commodity-money relations. The famine began in autumn-winter 1920 but officially it was declared in summer 1921. The peak was attained in autumn 1921 – spring 1922. The

⁵⁹ ROSTA – Central Information Telegraph Agency of Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union in 1918-1925. Main activities were distribution of information, publication of newspapers and magazines, and conducting “illustrative agitation” through the dissemination of satirical posters, so-called “Windows of ROSTA”.

⁶⁰ Société Russe en Norvege

situation started to stabilize after the harvest of 1923, but in some regions the famine continued until 1925.

4.1.1 The official request for food aid in 1921

In 1921 it became abundantly clear that without outside assistance it would not be possible to cope with the situation.

The first public announcement about the impending crop failure was made by Lenin in June 16, 1921 during the work of the Third All-Russia Food Congress session⁶¹ (Lenin vol. 43 1970: 350-352), while the first signs of the catastrophe appeared already in 1920. The blame was laid on the old regime and capitalist enemies (see the speech of Kalinin, the Chairman of the Government, at the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets).

Remarkably, the appeal for assistance to the world community was not made by the high-ranking officials, but by the writer Maksim Gorky and Patriarch Tikhon. In his address in July 1921 *“to all honest people”*, Gorky asked *“all intelligent people of Europe and America”* for bread and medicine. At the same time, Patriarch Tikhon, the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, publicized the Proclamation calling to help all starving people⁶². In the first part of his message he appealed to all orthodox people living in Russia. The second part was addressed to the international society *“Help! Help to the country that was always helping others! Help to the country that was feeding a lot of people and now is dying of hunger. Let my voice carry the painful moan, not only to your hearing, but also to the depths of your heart”*⁶³ (comp. Gubonin 1994:178).

He sent similar letters to the Bishop of New-York and the Archbishop of Canterbury. In these letters, he asked not only for bread and medicine but also pointed out one of the causes of the famine, e.g. the terrible drought. As a consequence of famine, he pointed the spread of different epidemics. Patriarch Tikhon emphasized that people had been compelled to leave their lands and houses and *“run away to the east, screaming – bread!”* (Sledstvennoe delo Patriarkha Tikhona 2000: 113). The authorities did not evacuate people and also opposed any moving from the famine-stricken areas. This was related to

⁶¹ In Rus. III Всероссийское продовольственное совещание

⁶² In Rus. Воззвание Патриарха Московского и Всея Руси Тихона о помощи голодающим

⁶³ In Rus. Помогите! Помогите стране, помогавшей всегда другим! Помогите стране, кормившей многих и ныне умирающей от голода. Не до слуха вашего только, но до глубины сердца вашего пусть донесёт голос Мой болезненный стон.

the sanitation situation in the country – sewage and water supply systems were destroyed, cities were full of mud, even during the drought (Izvestiia №144 05.07.1921). The People's Commissar of Health Nikolai A. Semashko admitted that mass movement of starving people was spreading contagions and death (Ibid.).

Soviet press did not publish the full text of Patriarch Tikhon's proclamation because Politburo had censored the text and forbidden the editors of the two main soviet newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestiia" to print any official documents of the Head of the Russian Church (Petrov 2002: 42). His role in efforts to save starving people was either unspoken or falsified.

The Soviet authorities had a completely different attitude to Maksim Gorky⁶⁴. He was not only a famous author at this time but also a respectable and important figure with broad connections abroad. He was an independent mediator between "the new socialistic Soviet State" and "old capitalistic Europe". Lenin had repeatedly requested Gorky to seek assistance from his foreign colleges. In a letter dated December 6, 1921 Lenin asked him to write to Bernard Shaw⁶⁵ and Herbert Wells⁶⁶ and to focus them on fund-raising (Lenin vol. 54 1975: 65). The message of Gorky was published in foreign newspapers, disseminated through the diplomatic channels and was sent to some public persons. One of the recipients was the League's High Commissioner for repatriation of Prisoners of War - Fridtjof Nansen. He immediately proceeded to taking action and assisted in creating links between Gorky and Herbert Hoover – the head of the American Relief Administration (ARA).

4.1.2 Creating the impression of assignment – the activity of the non-governmental organization

Assistance from Western countries, especially the USA, was a necessary and important measure for supporting Russians in need. The socialist state was not able to feed millions of country's inhabitants. At the same time, the Soviet state could not appeal directly to the "capitalist countries" who had been threatened earlier with the world revolution.

⁶⁴ Maksim Gorky (1868-1936) real name was Aleksei Maksimovich Peshkov, a Russian and Soviet writer, a founder of the socialist realism literary method, political activist.

⁶⁵ Bernard Shaw (1856-1950)- an Irish playwright, literary critic, polemicist, political activist and winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1925.

⁶⁶ Herbert Wells (1866-1946)- an English novelist, journalist, sociologist, and historian best known for his science fiction novels.

British Prime Minister Lloyd George noted that in Russia «*there was a change in a course of conduct. The famine opened their eyes and showed that Russia still depends on its neighbors*» (Golos Rossii №936, 07.04.1922). The situation was so critical that the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgiy V. Chicherin suggested Lenin making "small" changes in the Constitution, namely, representation of "parasitic elements"⁶⁷ in the government. The aim of this proposal was to please America and Western countries and to get "*the substantial compensation*". Lenin replied negatively and advised Chicherin to improve his health at one of the Russian resorts. (Lenin vol. 54 1975: 136).

In Europe and America, there was a strong opposition to providing assistance to the Soviet government. According to immigrant historians Geller and Nekrich, Soviet leaders were afraid to receive a firm refusal. (Geller, Nekrich 2000: 122).

In July, an initiative group proposed Soviet authorities to use "social force" (public figures, members of parties opposite to Bolsheviks, liberal intellectuals), that was politically active before the October events 1917, in fight against hunger. The Kremlin accepted the proposal in the expectation of fast aid from the West.

On July 21, 1921 the All-Union Central Executive Committee approved the establishment of the All-Russia Committee for famine relief. It was non-governmental "bourgeois" public organization, which brought together scientists, writers, editors, "prerevolutionary" public figures and politicians. The former Food Minister Sergei N. Prokopovich, his wife, publicist and politician Ekaterina D. Kuskova, and the representative of Constitutional – Democratic Party (more commonly known as Cadet Party) Nikolai M. Kishkin were taking an active part in the work of the Committee. Gorky also was a member of this philanthropic organization and took on the role of mediator between the Soviet authorities and opposition intellectuals. The Chairman of the Moscow City Council and Lenin's close associate Lev B. Kamenev headed the organization.

The authorities hoped that the Committee would bring the Soviet state closer to foreign governments. The Soviet authorities gave the organization wide-ranging powers: right to form its field offices and offices abroad, to purchase food and medicine in Russia and abroad, to distribute the assistance to people in need. The Committee also could provide

⁶⁷ Meant former Russian liberal politicians and representatives of the opposition.

guarantees to Europe and the USA that the aid would reach Russian people. As a result of negotiations with foreign committees for famine relief it was agreed about the trip of Russian delegation to Stockholm. These facts inevitably bothered Soviet authorities, who began to hinder the activity of the non-government organization (Makarov, Khristoforov 2006: 199).

On August 21, 1921 the Soviet authorities concluded an assistance agreement with ARA. Fridtjof Nansen also continued his work regarding the organization of assistance to Russia. On August 15, 1921 a Conference was held in Geneva, which brought together representatives of the European Red Cross organizations, voluntary and charitable organizations. As a result of the Conference, Nansen headed to Moscow and on August 27th signed an agreement with the Soviet authorities. Thus, the existence of the Committee was no longer required. The official reason for the abolition of the Committee was “reluctance to work”, whereas the immediate reason was information about the anti-government speech of Prokopovich at one of the meetings (Lenin vol. 53 1970: 141,142). The Committee was dissolved on the 27th of August, its members (except Kamenev) were arrested on the charge of anti-Soviet agitation. This was the end of a short and unfortunate experience of cooperation between the Soviet authorities and “bourgeois opposition”. Modern researches consider the liquidation of the Committee as the beginning of the Bolsheviks’ fight against “dissenting intellectuals” (Makarov, Khristoforov 2006: 200).

4.2 Discussion about the situation in Soviet Russia: initiatives and proposals of Norwegian public figures to address the problem

After the declaration of famine in Russia, International society and Russian emigrants started a discussion on possible ways to assist Russian citizens. The main question was whether any international aid should be provided to the Soviet State at all. Another important issue was the position of Russian intellectuals, who were suffering and dying of hunger. The terrible situation of common people, corroborated by visual sources, was doubted neither by the Soviet authorities nor by the international organizations, while the living conditions of intellectuals were considered as acceptable. As for the humanitarian assistance, I shall not dwell on the contribution made by Nansen, because a lot of articles

and books have covered this issue⁶⁸. I will focus on some less known initiatives of Norwegian public figures.

4.2.1 Discussion on humanitarian assistance to the Soviet regime among Russian emigrants

Since summer 1921, the issue of foreign aid perspectives was the subject of extensive discussions in Russian emigrant press. Vasiliy A. Maklakov⁶⁹ in his correspondence with Boris A. Bakhmetev⁷⁰ highlighted two main points of view on the matter. Those who thought that the Famine would overthrow bolshevism offered not to provide aid and follow the hands-off policy. The majority, however, could not stay away from the tragedy. Russian emigrants could not allow millions of people, among whom were their relatives and friends, to die of hunger. They considered that it was important to help, but to help on special conditions which would destroy bolshevism. The latter view soon became all-Russian. (Maklakov, *Sovershenno lichno i doveritelno* vol.1 2001: 438,439). On 29 July 1921, the emigrant daily newspaper *Rul'* printed five conditions that America had put forward to the Soviet government for receiving assistance: 1) Soviet authorities must declare the need for American assistance; 2) American delegates must be granted full freedom of movement; 3) the Soviet government should not interfere with American regulations; 4) food transportation must have some privileges and should not be taxed; 5) children and sick people would have extra rations⁷¹. The American government pledged to distribute food irrespective of nationality, religion and social role (*Rul'* №211, 29.07.1921). There was also the view that the equitable distribution of food would help people to unite against Bolsheviks, because the Soviet government terrorized people with the threat of starvation and waiver of ration, in this way killing in the bud any attempt to resistance. (Bakhmetev, *Sovershenno lichno i doveritelno* vol.1 2001: 157).

Russian emigrant press emphasized that Bolsheviks were ready to pass any tests *“to come to the negotiation table together with people who had armies, fleets, banks, money and*

⁶⁸ For ex.: Per Egil Hegge 2002, *Fridtjof Nansen bare en vilje*; Carl Emil Vogt 2007, *Nansens kamp mot hundesnøden i Russland 1921-1923*

⁶⁹ Vasiliy Alekseevich Maklakov (1869-1957) -Russian lawyer, politician, supporter of the «white movement», immigrated to French in 1917.

⁷⁰ Boris Aleksandrovich Bakhmetev (1880-1951)- Russian and American scientist in the field of hydrodynamic, politician, public figure. In 1917 he was appointed by the Provisional Government as ambassador to the United States. After the October Revolution Bakhmetev decided to stay in USA.

⁷¹ In Rus. Паёк – нормированная выдача продуктов на одного человека.

factories” (Golos Rossii №936, 07.04.1922). The newspaper Rul’, referring to Steklov’s⁷² article, wrote that Bolsheviks lacked credibility among the citizens and that they admitted being powerless in the face of widespread problems of poverty and famine (Rul’ №211, 29.07.1921). Some of the correspondents could not help gloating and called the situation in Russia “incredible” meaning the general dissatisfaction among the peasants and workers (Ibid.). Many European periodicals supported the idea of assistance to Russian people and printed appeals for assistance from different public organizations and public figures, such as Amsterdam International (Golos Rossii №928, 29.03.1922), German writer Gerhart Hauptmann, Russian Bishop Evlogij, Austrian socialist and revolutionist Friedrich Adler (Rul’ №212, 30.07.1921).

Another important topic of discussions in emigrant press was the comparison of the soviet official announcements and western Bolshevik press (Rul’ № 209, 210, 211). While the official Soviet press recognized the disastrous situation in the country and the need of European assistance, Western communists tried to downplay the dimensions of the tragedy considering that nothing special was happening in Russia. They claimed that only 2-3 million people were starving and even the most affected territories were able to feed 2/3 of their population (Rul’ №211, 29.07.1921). Providing “secure” conditions of Western aid was a priority theme among western Bolsheviks. They even suggested sending all European and American assistance, including private charitable donations, not to the starving territories but to Moscow and St. Petersburg (Ibid.).

Western communists tried to disguise the tragedy of the Soviet authorities, were strongly criticized by emigrant press, which called them “hangers-on” living in luxury mansions on the money of starving people, citing the example of Aleksandr A. Blok⁷³ - famous Russian poet who was suffering from scurvy in St. Petersburg (Rul’ №209, 27.07.1921).

4.2.2 Russian intellectuals were not starving?

The point of view that Russian scientists and cultural intellectuals were one of the wealthiest categories of population during the Civil War and the famine continues to prevail in Russian historiography. This happened due to the existence in 1919-1923 of

⁷² Yuriy Mikhailovich Steklov (1873-1941) – a Russian revolutionist and publicist, editor of official soviet’s newspaper №2 after Pravda, Izvestiia

⁷³ Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Blok (1880-1921) – a Russian poet, writer, publicist, translator, classic of Russian literature in the 20th century, representative of Russian symbolism.

the so-called “academic ration” – the norm of food that was granted monthly to scientists and remarkable cultural figures – writers, artists, musicians. Besides academic ration there were teacher’s ration, Red Army’s ration, ration for the government officials and so on, but the academic ration was the most substantial. Even senior staff and “indispensable workers” of the Central Commissariats received less food than intellectuals.

Item	Academic ration (in pounds ⁷⁴)	Ration for the workers of the Central Commissariats ⁷⁵ (in pounds)
Flour	35	20
Cereals (different types)	12	7
Butter (different types)	4	3.5
Meat	15	10
Fish	5	10
Peas	6	-
Sugar	2.5	1
Salt	2	1.5
Coffee	0.5	-
Tea	-	0.25
Soap	1	1
Tobacco	0.75	-
Matches	5 matchboxes	3 matchboxes

The introduction of the academic ration was a necessary measure because the situation of Russian intellectuals was critical. Information about hand-to-mouth existence of intellectual workers was spread abroad through emigrants and could undermine the Bolsheviks’ myths about socialist paradise for everybody. Another reason to support intellectuals with food packs was to win them to the Bolsheviks’ side. Most of intellectuals treated the new Soviet regime with distrust. They did not join the communist party, did not go to any meetings and demonstrations; moreover, they, either overtly or

⁷⁴ 1 pound = 409,5 gm.

⁷⁵ In Rus. Паёк для особо ответственных и незаменимых работников центральных учреждений (Совнаркомовский паёк). Положение Совета народных комиссаров от 14.06.1920

covertly, criticized the Soviet authorities, and among other things, the policy regarding the educational system. A lot of them made a decision to immigrate to other countries. The Soviet government could not allow the country to be left completely without scientific and cultural capacity that is why the authorities made some concessions.

In practice, however, the Bolsheviks failed to meet their obligations. Intellectuals were receiving their rations with a delay of several months, many of the items were excluded from the list, a lot of scientists and artists who had the right to the ration were not granted it because of limited numbers of allowances. Thus, in Kharkov⁷⁶, the capital of Soviet Ukraine, only 25 per cent of scientists and 4 per cent of artists were receiving academic rations. The quota for the academic rations was 170 for Kharkov and 120 for Kiev (Koliastruk 2015).

The archive of Broch contains a number of letters from Russian and Ukrainian intellectuals, who were describing the real situation concerning food supply. The food ration packages were continually reduced. The main dishes on the table in the best case were potato and porridge. Many of teachers were surviving on bread and water. Broch received the information that scientists in Petrograd had been getting only “one rotten herring per day during three weeks”⁷⁷ (NB, Brevs., 337, Ureg., Centrosojus, Broch to E.F.Gofman, 07.06.1921). This information was confirmed by newspaper’s articles about bread shortages and replacement of bread by herring in the rations (Rul’ №166 07.06.1921, №167 08.06.1921). Cheese, butter, eggs, cacao, coffee, sugar were an unaffordable luxury. Some cultural intellectuals found solace in alcohol and drugs. Morphine, opium and cocaine replaced food for them and helped to escape from reality (Rul’ №181, 24.06.1921).

Some university and school teachers had to give private lessons for food. A teacher of geography, who had worked 40 years at school was giving private lessons for two pounds of bread (NB, Brevs. 337, Chuprov to Broch, 02.06.1921). This bread helped her and her two elder sisters to survive.

⁷⁶ Kharkov- the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic from 1919 to 1934.

⁷⁷ In Rus. ...более 3 недель не получают решительно ничего кроме одной (испорченной) сельди в день.

The head of one of the Moscow museums and a “*talented teacher*” had to give a lot of extra lectures and courses for adults to feed his old parents and young wife. In addition, he was planning to do shoe-shining in the street to earn a piece of bread. According to the author of the letter, this man made a mistake to marry not long ago, forgetting the position of a present-day-person, who “*was not prepared to share his piece of bread and water-soup with anybody else*”⁷⁸ (NB, Brevs. 337, Chuprov to Broch, 14.09.1921). Teachers and scientists were living in appalling conditions. Therefore, one teacher from Moscow wondered: “*How could a teacher avoid starving to death, when he had to keep working, but did not get any salary?*”⁷⁹ (NB, Brevs. 337, Chuprov to Broch, 07.12.1921). Some of professors were starving so hard that they had no living force to pursue science and to give lectures. Students at the Kiev University found out that the Professor Mikhail S. Grushevsky⁸⁰, who during the whole winter had been wearing summer cloths and nearly no footwear, had not eat anything for three days. Together the students decided to buy him some food (Rul’ №175, 17.06.1921). Moreover, the staff purging process was started at the universities and a lot of people were fired.

It is worth noting, that the problem was not related only to the lack of food, but mostly to the lack of financial means. In Moscow, for example, there were a lot of food stores with the choice of all kinds of products. There were also people, who could afford to buy meat and fish for ridiculously high price, while others were starving. Thus, one of Broch’s friends cited his sister living in Moscow: “*The whole Moscow is covered with grocery stores; sellers in such shops receive salaries in millions... Yesterday a well-dressed woman, accompanied by a servant, bought an 11 pounds pike on a market for 15 000 rubles per pound, whereas a pound of bread costs around 5 000 rubles*” (NB, Brevs. 337, Chuprov to Broch, 07.12.1921). Who were these wealthy people? Most likely, high-level officials and officials dealing with transportation, distribution or storage of foodstuff. A German sailor described Petrograd in a totally different way. The city, according to him,

⁷⁸ In Rus. Он имел неосторожность жениться на своей бывшей ученице, забыв позицию современного Онегина: “Но я свою четверку хлеба, и свой советский суп-бурду ни за какие блага неба ни с кем делить уж не могу”.

⁷⁹ In Rus. Вся Москва покрылась магазинами съестных припасов; продавщики в них имеют миллионные оклады. Вчера на рынке наблюдала как, как нарядная дама с сопровождавшей её прислугой выбрала щуку в одиннадцать фунтов по пятнадцать тысяч за фунт [...] черный хлеб уже на рынке пять тысяч фунт.

⁸⁰ Mikhail Sergeevich Grushevsky (1866-1934) – a Ukrainian and Soviet historian, Professor, academic of Soviet Academy of Science, public and political activist.

looked awful, houses were half destroyed, wooden pavement had been taken apart, shops were closed, only few small stores were opened (Rul' №213, 31.07.1921). Such different descriptions of the situation in the Russian biggest cities can be explained by the blockade of Petrograd in 1919 by the White Army and British fleet.

The position of Ukrainian intellectuals was even worse. A Professor at the Kiev University, Mikhail S. Grushevsky secretly wrote to Broch about “*the extinction of Ukrainian intellectuals*”⁸¹ (NB, Brevs. 337, Grushevsky to Broch, undated). Such famous and productive representatives of science and education as historians and academics Orest I. Levitsky (1848-1922), Nikolay I. Petrov (1840-1921), an ethnographer and academic Nikolay F. Sumtsov (1854-1922), lawyer and academic Bogdan A. Kistiakovsky (1868-1920) died one by one. In spite of the fact that most academics were in old age, the author of the letter thought that they could have lived and worked longer, if it were not for terrible living conditions (Ibid). Some of the Ukrainian intellectuals died directly of hunger, as for example, a famous political and public figure, writer and publicist Petr Y. Stebnitsky (1862-1923); more than 10 professors and university teachers died of typhus in winter 1921 – spring 1922 (Koliastruk 2015).

As for the academic ration, both university professors and academics received almost nothing. The salary was received so late, that money had by that time lost its value. A professor or an academic earned about 100 million rubles per month, but they had to pay 102 million rubles for a two-room apartment, electricity, and water (Ibid.). The academic ration, which consisted of a few kilos of groats or rye flour, was the only source of food for them. Intellectuals had to sell their own things to survive. They did not receive any substantial assistance from international organizations either, because the Bolsheviks never accepted the fact that intellectuals were starving.

Broch was aware of the harsh living conditions of Russian intellectuals and together with his Norwegian, Swedish and Danish colleagues, among whom were Nansen, Waldemar

⁸¹ In Rus. Вымирание украинской интеллигенции

Brøgger⁸², Svante Arrhenius⁸³, Hugo Hildebrandsson⁸⁴, Vilhelm Thomsen⁸⁵, appealed to the People's Commissar for Education Anatoly V. Lunacharsky. Broch put forward a proposal to Lunacharsky to allow Russian doctors, scientists, artists, musicians and writers who wished to learn about developments in science and art for the last three years to travel abroad (Rul' №209, 27.07.1921). The group of Scandinavian scientists was ready to undertake all the costs related to their transportation (Ibid.). Lunacharsky assured Broch that in spite of "*endless need*"⁸⁶, the Soviet authorities were widely supporting Russian scientists who were getting the biggest ration in the country – the academic ration. Therefore, around three thousand scientists had been fully secured by the State. He affirmed that Russian intellectuals could freely leave the country (NB, Brevs. 337, Lunacharsky to Broch, 21.05.1921). Unfortunately, his information was far from the truth. The Soviet authorities refused in exit visas to many Russian scientists and artists. An outstanding Russian writer, Aleksandr Blok, for example, was even unable to go to Finland to improve his health (Shepelev, Luibimov 1995).

Thus, the promised government assistance to the intellectuals was not fully implemented. Only distinguished scientists and well-known artists could count on some aid. Many Russian scientists, teachers, doctors, students, artists and cultural workers were on the brink of death. The Soviet authorities were recognizing the distress of ordinary people but refused to acknowledge the terrible living conditions of Russian intellectuals.

4.2.3 Humanitarian activities of Norwegian public figures

Fridtjof Nansen was one of the few who genuinely took action to relief Russian people in need. Beside the position in the League of Nations as the High Commissioner for struggle against hunger in Russia, he led the newly established organization – International Committee for Famine Relief. It is through this organization that Nansen represented the Western governments and negotiated with the Communist authorities because the Soviet government did not recognize the League of Nations. He made few trips in the most

⁸² Waldemar Christofer Brøgger (1851-1940) – a Norwegian geologist and mineralogist. The mineral broggerite was named in his honour.

⁸³ Svante August Arrhenius (1859-1927) – a Swedish scientist, was one of the founders of the science of physical chemistry. He received the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1903.

⁸⁴ Hugo Hildebrand Hildebrandsson (1838-1925) – a Swedish meteorologist and Professor at the Uppsala University.

⁸⁵ Vilhelm Ludwig Peter Thomsen (1842-1927) – a Danish linguist and turkologist.

⁸⁶ In Rus. Бесконечная нужда

affected regions of Soviet Russia and brought back a number of photos showing deaths of starvation to convince the world community in the need of assistance – not to the Communists but to ordinary people (Vogt 2011: 255, 256). The International Committee for Famine Relief brought under its authority around 32 charitable organizations among which was the International Red Cross and its branches, Save the Children, and Society of Friends (Quakers). These organizations helped to feed all together around 1.5 million children and adults (Bondarenko, Nikolaeva 2011: 101).

Nansen closely cooperated with another famous Norwegian public figure – Olaf Broch. He was also concerned about the destiny of Russian people and already had a wide experience in assisting Russian students and intellectuals. It was he who played the main role in the negotiations with the Norwegian government about food aid to Russian people (NB, Brevs., 337, Ureg., Centrosojus). Due to his efforts Norwegian Stortinget loaned 700 000 NOK to buy fish and fish oil for starving Russian population (Rul' №209, 27.07.1921).

Nansen and Broch initiated assistance to starving Russian intellectuals and, according to the letter of 20.05.1921, provided wagon of fish to the House of Scientists⁸⁷ in Petrograd (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Centrosojus, E. Lenskaya to Broch, 20.05.1921).

Besides, Broch was sending a lot of parcels with food and was transferring money to his colleagues and friends in Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine privately. It was done through ARA and through the Committee of a Finnish Professor Jooseppi J. Mikkola⁸⁸, which was “*well organized and could provide full guarantees*” (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Broch to E.F. Gofman, 11.06.1921). Some parcels were taken by the receivers in Finnish consulate in Moscow. The food parcels consisted of flour, cheese, butter, sugar, mackerels and other goods were important source of food, not only for the receivers but also for their colleagues and friends with whom they shared these “*delicacies*” (NB, Brevs., 337, Chuprov to Broch, 14.09.1921). A large amount of provision was also sent through the Finnish Committee. Thus, Broch wrote about sending the second big parcel to Russia

⁸⁷ The House of Scientists was established in Petrograd in 1920. It is a scientific and cultural institution of Russian Academy of Science, where intellectuals conduct lectures and debates, present scientific articles, organize concerts, and so on.

⁸⁸ Jooseppi Julius Mikkola (1866-1946) – a Finnish linguist of Slavic languages

with flour, sugar, potato, pasta and two wagons of Norwegian fish (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg., Broch to Gofman, 07.06.1921).

Some European and American organizations, commercial establishments and high schools also provided aid to Russian intellectuals. American, French, Finnish and Czech assistance committees for the Russian scientists and artists were sending food, clothes and shoes by ships (Rul' №82,175,190,191). At the same time European communists opposed to any assistance to Russian intellectuals because they claimed that "*the Soviet State took good care of them*" (Rul' №192, 07.07.1921).

Some European companies were ready to help Soviet Russia and could sell food at low prices or provide loans, but Soviet delegations were more interested in buying equipment and machinery (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg, Centrosojus, Martynov to unaddressed, 20.06.1920). There was also a point of view that the main problem was related not to the lack of food, which was enough in the Soviet warehouses, but the lack of transportation because the roads were destroyed after WWI and the Civil War (Poslednie Novosti №41, 13.06.1920).

A lot of initiatives remained unimplemented for various reasons. Nansen and Broch planned to send a large shipment of salt fish by sea through Finland. Nansen sent a telegram to Georgy V. Chicherin⁸⁹ about his willingness to assist Petrograd. Broch started preparations for forwarding the fish. They found a Norwegian captain, Konrad Sundlo, who was ready to deliver the shipment to Petrograd. The captain went to Helsinki through Stockholm to wait for further instructions. The waiting period was far too long. At first, the situation was aggravated by the absence of a respond from the Soviet side, then by the issue who should cover the transportation costs. In the long run, the parties could not agree, and the fish stayed in Finland (Ibid.).

An interesting initiative to assist Russian starving people was made by a Norwegian Labour Movement activist, Ellisif Wessel⁹⁰. She was a revolutionary and wrote a lot of articles and poems in support of the working class. In 1914 and 1915 she ran her own periodical *Klasse mot Klasse*. Wessel translated articles into Norwegian about Russian

⁸⁹ Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin (1872-1936) – a Russian revolutionary and Soviet politician. He served as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet government from 1918 to 1930.

⁹⁰ Ellisif Ranveig Wessel (1866-1949) – a Norwegian radical politician, pioneer of the Labour movement, writer, journalist, photographer.

revolution, electrification in Russia, reports of Russian politicians, namely Lenin, Zinoviev, Martov, Trotsky and some other. Since 1905 she actively helped Russian emigrants and political prisoners. The local historian Steinar Wikan calls her house – “hostel for Russian being on the run” (Wikan 2008: 187)

Wessel, on behalf of the communists from Narvik, Vardø, Kirkines, in February 1922 proposed the Central Committee of the Norwegian Labour Party to conduct All – Norwegian lottery (RGASPI f.495 o.178 d.13 p.1). The collected money was going to be sent to Russia. She considered that if the workers supported the initiative, it would be possible to overcome any difficulties and to conduct the global lottery in future. She also emphasized that it was not possible to cope with the famine in one year, because the extent of hunger was large (Ibid.). Some expressed fears that hunger could spread over Europe and escalate into the international crisis (RGASPI f.495 o.178 d.13 p.14).

The Central Committee of Labour Party discussed the idea of the lottery with the representatives of Nansen’s Committee and the Labour Assistance Committee, but no organization was capable to hold a national lottery.

One of the supporters of the global lottery from Vardø even developed a plan, which included engagement of all international charitable organizations and establishing the Lottery Commission. The author of the plan expected that European countries would distribute one million lottery tickets; 150 000 tickets - France, England and Italy, 100 000 - Germany and the USA, all other European countries including Norway - 50 000 tickets (RGASPI f.495 o.178 d.13 p.17). He emphasized that the lottery was very popular in Norway and 160 000 tickets of the regular Norwegian cash lottery were going fast (Ibid). If the full ticket price is 10 NOK and 1 million NOK would be shared between the winners than the rest of the sum could cover the costs on organization and tax deductions. According to the calculations net profit could be 7 million NOK.

Nansen sympathized with the idea, but thought that its implementation required involving a big company or organization, which could take the responsibility for costs and arranging (RGASPI f.495 o.178 d.13 p.2,3). It was also impossible to hold a worldwide lottery because of differences in countries’ legislations (RGASPI f.495 o.178 d.13 p.6).

Though Wessel managed to draw the attention of the Norwegian Youth Union, tried to arrange the demonstration in support of the lottery and involved the press, the idea was not realized.

4.3 The Soviet's official rhetoric to the Western humanitarian assistance

The transformation of the Soviet attitude to the Western humanitarian assistance can be traced in the official and universal source of information in Soviet Russia – “Great Soviet Encyclopedia” (GSE) and “Small Soviet Encyclopedia” (SSE). The attitude has changed over the time from neutral-positive to highly negative. The title of the book published in 1985 speaks for itself – “Diversion under the flag of relief”.⁹¹

Soviet official rhetoric showed different attitude towards some public figures and organizations. ARA, for example, was strongly criticized even at the beginning of its work, while Nansen was presented as a friend and “true humanist”. However, Nansen himself admitted that his results were lower, compared to the scope of assistance by ARA. Even according to a Soviet official, by Mai 1922 ARA supported over 6 million people, while Nansen's Committee itself, without other organizations, only 138 thousand citizens (Geller, Nekrich 2000: 124,125). But the issue of American humanitarian assistance was removed from the Soviet and, later, from the Russian historiography, while the contribution of Nansen was exaggerated by the Soviet authorities.

The first edition of the GSE (1926) gives the following definition of ARA, - American philanthropic organization, which provided significant food and medical assistance during the famine in Russia. At the peak of its activity, the organization fed around 10 million people. The Small Soviet Encyclopedia (1930) radically alters the tone, emphasizing that the organization “*under the guise of charity*” had the opportunity to alleviate the economic crisis in the marketing of goods in the USA. In the second edition of the GSE (1950) the humanitarian relief aid of ARA was not even mentioned and, it was alleged that the American administration had used the famine in Soviet Russia as a pretext for the organization of espionage and counterrevolutionary activities. The third edition of the GSE (1970) agreed that ARA had provided “some” humanitarian assistance but had been more interested to use the relief as a weapon against revolutionary

⁹¹ In Rus. Диверсия под флагом помощи (Поляков А.А. 1985)

movement in Russia and strengthening the position of American imperialism in European countries.

The Soviet press and agitation magazines have been criticizing international charitable organizations since the beginning of their work. This was due to a number of political and ideological reasons. The Soviet leaders had a difficult task - to give "the correct explanation" to Soviet citizens about the reasons of the famine, who was responsible for these events, and why capitalist countries provided their assistance. The Soviet authorities were seriously concerned about interfering in the internal affairs of the country. The official media minimized the importance of the Western organizations' work and at the same time drew attention to the Soviet achievements. It was important to plant the idea that the leading role in fighting against hunger was played by the Soviet regime. The idea of the foreign humanitarian help was very popular in the agitation materials, but it was far less than the help to the White movement and support to the anti-Soviet activities. Another myth, about "predatory nature" of the western economics and the overproduction crisis in the USA, was used to convince the Soviet people that European countries and the USA could easily save Russia from sufferings but provided only limited assistance. The opinion that the bourgeois organizations were more interested in exploration of the country's natural resources was widely expressed. In response to the desire of capitalist countries to help Russia, Lenin declared, "capitalism is preparing new plans against the Soviet republic aimed at military intervention and counterrevolutionary conspiracy" (Rul' №224, 13.08.1921).

The western organizations found support and understanding among people and had certain influence on their minds; the situation scared the Soviet authorities strongly. In spite of the fact that the food conditions in the country remained critical in 1923, the Bolsheviks adopted the course of rejecting any Western assistance.

Thus, the Soviet government did not deny the fact of Western relief aid but claimed that Western countries benefited from the assistance, which was non-onerous and relatively small.

5. Conclusion

In one of his letters to Olaf Broch, Konstantin N. Gulkevich wrote that Russian people will never forget his enormous contribution in providing diverse assistance, as well as, his numerous attempts to improve the situation of Russians in need (NB, Brevs. 337, Gulkevich to Broch 30.11.1919). Unfortunately, Gulkevich was mistaken. The humanitarian activity of Broch is relatively unknown theme in Russian and Norwegian research literature. Broch's relief assistance deserves special attention not only because he provided it for many years, but also because he used different means and methods to achieve high results, such as: establishing a special committee and fund; attraction of public attention through the press; cooperation with public figures, politicians, and diplomats; drawing up and implementing humanitarian projects. All his measures were aimed to provide as much assistance and protection to Russian people in need as possible.

5.1 Humanitarian aid to Russian POWs

For the first time military captivity became a mass phenomenon during WWI. More than 3 million Russian soldiers and officers spent from a few months to several years in camps in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The distinctive features of the captivity experience were the lack of support from the Russian government, unbearable living conditions, and forced labour in the camps. The warring parties were not prepared to provide maintenance for a such large number of POWs. And the economic blockade of Germany and Austria-Hungary had complicated the food situation in these countries in general. As a consequence, the position of Russian POWs depended directly on the international assistance. The International Red Cross and affiliated organizations played the main role in assisting.

The Norwegian charitable organizations and public figures had been also involved in such humanitarian aid. Olaf Broch was one of those who was concerned about the fate of young educated people placed in camps. As Professor at the University of Christiania, he established the Norwegian University's Committee for Prisoners of War Students. It is worth mentioning that the Committee aided both Russian and German POWs, but the main focus was concentrated on the Russian POWs. The Committee worked closely with Russian humanitarian organizations and charitable societies belonging to the Red Cross organization.

The shipment of scientific books, religious literature, fiction and teaching material became the main occupation of the Committee, in addition to forwarding letters, searching for the location of POWs, sending food parcels and money. The approximate number of books sent to more than 30 camp libraries was more than 10 000. Humanitarian aid in the form of books was of great importance to Russian POWs. They could continue their education, gain new knowledge, read for enjoyment, but above all, they preserved cultural and language connections with their homeland.

Another important area of humanitarian activity was acceptance and hosting of more than 300 Russian POWs on the territory of Norway. Norwegian citizens established a special committee to ensure the well-being of POWs. The Norwegian Red Cross sent doctors and nurses to POWs' stations, because many of them were wounded or disabled and needed medical treatment. Broch was also engaged in POW's life and provided them with necessary things, as well as, books and newspapers, musical instruments and notes, materials for establishing schools and libraries, such as blackboards, notebooks, chalks, pencils, maps, and textbooks.

The Norwegian society granted Russian POWs interned in Norway decent and comfortable living conditions, qualified medical and moral care. Some of the POWs considered the possibility of staying in Norway, especially after the October revolution in Russia, and tried to find occupation or work.

5.2 Humanitarian aid to Russian emigrants

One of the most tragic consequences of the October revolution and the Civil War in Russia was the mass exodus of Russian citizens to Europe and America in the 1920s. Not only the military personnel of the White Army had to flee from the Soviet state, but also political and ideological opponents of Bolsheviks and ordinary citizens, among whom there were outstanding scientists, philosophers, writers and artists.

Most of the Russian civil refugees were forced to leave their homeland because the Soviet authorities created unbearable living and working conditions for everybody who did not belong to proletarian classes or was absolute loyal to them.

Russian citizens from Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and St-Petersburg fled, mostly, to Finland and Scandinavian countries, before continuing to continental Europe. At first, the

Norwegian government were skeptical to receive Russian refugees, fearing the penetration of radicals and spies. In that regard, in 1918 the Norwegian authorities closed the borders to all foreigners. Liberal intellectuals, including Broch, came to the defense of the refugees, who could expect imprisonment and execution in the Red Russia. Broch due to his publicist work in the Norwegian press and connections in the government, had succeeded in hosting 200 Russian refugees in Norway. The biggest group of Russian refugees, around 1000 people, entered Norway in February 1920. The Norwegian authorities took responsibility for temporary accommodation and maintenance of the refugees and provided them with medical and social assistance.

Broch, in addition to his public efforts to protect the rights and interests of Russian refugees, was also providing advisory, financial and organizational assistance privately. He assisted in seeking work, admitting to universities, obtaining visas, forwarding letters, and initiated financial support to Russian emigrants.

The Norwegian society was quite positive to Russian emigrants because the issue of refugees was not so acute in Norway as in Germany and France.

The League of Nations assumed responsibility for refugees at the international level and appointed Nansen as the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees. Nansen had a difficult task in establishing legal status of Russian emigrants and organizing resettlement and employment. He believed that under certain conditions Russian refugees could return to Soviet Russia. This position got a lot of criticism from Russian emigrant community. According to emigrants, Nansen was too naïve regarding to the Bolshevik regime and trusted to the Soviet leaders too much. In spite of criticism, Nansen did not leave his post and tried to alleviate the situation of Russian refugees, introducing special identity certificates for emigrants, known as “Nansen’s passport”.

5.3 Assistance to Russian citizens during the Great Famine

The Soviet authorities did not admit the existence of food and fuel shortages for a long time. Only in the summer of 1921, when thousands of people had already died of starvation and infections, the Soviet government appealed for help to Europe and America.

Fridtjof Nansen took action to aid Russian starving people immediately. He began fundraising for the fight against the famine in parallel with the work for the repatriation of Russian POWs and refugees.

The Soviet government did not recognize the League of Nations but accepted to negotiate with Nansen personally. European countries were afraid to provide aid to the Soviet state, without guaranties that the food would reach the people in need. But nobody could give such guaranties. Even so Nansen was managed to convince the European and American governments to provide food and medical assistance to the Soviet state.

Another important issue was the situation of Russian intellectuals, who were suffering and dying of hunger, but the Bolsheviks never accepted this fact, insisting that the living conditions of intellectuals were the best in the country.

Broch was aware of harsh living conditions of Russian intellectuals and together with his colleagues appealed to the People's Commissar for Education, Anatoly V. Lunacharsky, with a proposal to allow Russian scientists who wished to learn about developments in science and art to travel abroad.

Broch also communicated with Nansen and suggested to cooperate in providing food assistance to Russian scientists in Petrograd. Due to their efforts, the Norwegian government provided credit to buy fish and fish oil for the starving Russian population. Besides, Broch sent a lot of parcels with food and transferred money to his colleagues and friends in Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine on his own behalf.

Unfortunately, some initiatives remained unimplemented because of various reasons. Thus, Broch together with Nansen had developed a plan for sending a large shipment of salt fish by sea through Finland to Petrograd. Everything was ready, but disagreement with the Soviet authorities over the cost covering, and differences with Russian emigrant leaders over aiding at all, prevented the implementation of the project.

A representative of the Norwegian labour movement, Ellisif Wessel, on behalf of the communists from Narvik, Vardø and Kirkenes, offered to conduct the Lottery in Norway, and then all around the world. The collected money she suggested to send to Russia. The idea did not become a reality because of various difficulties in organization and holding the lottery.

Another discussion issue of this topic is the attitude of the Soviet government towards Western humanitarian aid, which had changed over the time from neutral-positive to highly negative. Moreover, Soviet assessments of the humanitarian work of different organizations varied considerably. The contribution of Nansen in fighting with hunger was exaggerated by the Soviet authorities, while the aid from American Relief Administration was neglected, despite that the main assistance was received from America. According to the Soviet official rhetoric, Western countries provided limited assistance to the Russian citizens and even benefited from the situation, while the main work in the fight against the hunger, had been done by the Soviet government.

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Руль №166, 07.06.1921 – Сельди вместо хлеба

Руль №167, 08.06.1921 – Положение в Петербурге

Руль №171, 12.06.1921 – Раскрытие большевистского заговора в Швеции; Положение в Петрограде

Руль №172, 14.06.1921 – На помощь Лиге Наций; Фабрика Красных профессоров

Руль №173, 15.06.1921 – Французский комитет помощи русским ученым

Руль №175, 17.06.1921 – Русская эмиграция в Бразилию; Финские ученые в Петербурге; К расселению русских; В Советской России. Красная Украина

Руль №176, 18.06.1921 – Арест Советского агента; У американцев; Организация помощи русским беженцам

Руль №179, 22.06.1921 – Письма из Петербурга; Большевистский заговор в Швеции; Русские и Лига Наций

Руль №180, 23.06.1921 – Меры против русских во Франции; Иностранные грузы в Петербурге; Новый кабинет в Норвегии; Коммунистический заговор в Швеции

Руль №181, 24.06.1921 – В Советской России. Письма из Москвы

Руль №185, 29.06.1921 – В советской России. Из Петербургских писем

Руль №188, 02.07.1921 – Аресты в Москве и Петербурге; Письмо из Москвы

Руль №189, 03.07.1921 – Манифестация в честь русской интеллигенции; Организация посылки продовольствия в Советскую Россию; Холера в Советской России

Руль №190, 05.07.1921 – Помощь русским ученым

Руль №191, 06.07.1921 – Помощь русским ученым; Письмо из Москвы

Руль №192, 07.07.1921 – Протест против помощи русским ученым

Руль №204, 21.07.1921 – Французский Красный Крест и холера в России; Советское радио о голоде; Англичанин о положении в России; Письма из России

Руль №206, 23.07.1921 – Вести из Советской России; Как борются с Холерой

Руль №209, 27.07.1921 – Помощь Норвегии; Обращение скандинавских ученых к Луначарскому

Руль №211, 29.07.1921 – Беспомощность; Борьба с голодом

Руль №212, 30.07.1921 – Голод в России; Прекращение питания беженцев

Руль №213, 31.07.1921 – Большевистские признания; Германский моряк о Петербурге; Голод в России

Руль №223, 12.08.1921 – Предательство; Голод; Письмо из Москвы

Руль №224, 13.08.1921 – Мировая помощь; Голод; Участь детей в голодающих губерниях; Помощь голодающим

Руль №225, 14.08.1921 – Голод и внешняя торговля Советской России; Голод; Папа и помощь России; Помощь Америки; В Советской России. Письмо из Москвы

Руль №226, 16.08.1921 – Голодная политика; Соглашение между американцами и большевиками об условиях помощи голодающим; Верховный совет и помощь России

Руль №227, 17.08.1921 – Условия помощи; К русскому обществу

Руль №228, 18.08.1921 – Чума в Париже; Холера в Польше; Вооруженная сила для сбора продналога; Русские студенты в Праге; Конференция Красного Креста по борьбе с голодом

Руль №232, 23.08.1921 – Голод; Помощь ученым; Нансен об организации борьбы с голодом; Похороны А.А.Блока; Помощь квакеров

Руль №233, 24.08.1921 – Шаляпину отказано в английской визе; Бегство советских властей из голодающих местностей; Голод и хаос

Руль №253, 16.09.1921 – Обращение Нансена к английскому народу; Америка и Лига Наций; Конференция по делам русских беженцев; Петербургские казни (дело Таганцева)

Руль №255, 18.09.1921 – Прибытие продовольствия Нансена; А.В. Амфитеатров о смерти А.А. Блока

Руль №258, 22.09.1921 – Что написал бы я в Россию? (из дневника эмигранта)

Руль № 263, 28.09.1921 – Вокруг беженского вопроса; Норвежские банки и торгово-промышленные фирмы против соглашения с Советской Россией

Руль №264, 29.09.1921 – Обращение Нансена к Американскому Красному Кресту; Врачебно-питательные пункты АРА; Вопрос о помощи голодающим в России в комиссии Лиги Наций; Русский ученый о помощи голодающим

Руль №275, 12.10.1921 – Открытие съезда русских ученых; Кладбище поэтов

Руль №611, 01.12.1922 – Лига Наций о голоде в России (отчет)

Руль №613, 03.12.1922 – Русские студенты в Чехии; Письма о старой и новой России

Руль №614, 05.12.1922 – Русские завещания; Наступление на фронт просвещения

Руль №615, 06.12.1922 – Вымирание; Расстрел после амнистии

Руль №617, 08.12.1922 – Новые репрессии против интеллигенции; Последствия голода; Рассказы беженцев; Нужда в одежде (из бюллетеней Американской Администрации помощи)

Руль №618, 09.12.1922 – Студенчество в Советской России; Рыночные цены в Москве; Рыночные цены в Петербурге

Руль №619, 10.12.1922 – Плата за учение в Советской России; Развал народного просвещения; Что сделали большевики из Петрограда?

Руль №620, 12.12.1922 – Паспорта Лиги Наций; Расширение Раппальского договора

Руль №621, 13.12.1922 – Русские беженцы в Австрии; Русская душа; Судьба соблазненных

Руль №624 16.12.1922 – Голод в России (беседа с квакером Вильямом Альбрейтом)

Руль №625 17.12.1922 – Итоги борьбы со взяточничеством; Ликвидация вопроса о закрытие Большого театра

Руль №629, 22.12.1922 – Дела эмигрантские

Руль №631, 24.12.1922 – Помощь Московским ученым; Разъезд русской колонии

Руль №632, 28.12.1922 – Студенчество в Советской России

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Голос России №936, 07.04.1922

Голос России №968, 18.05.1922

Голос России №1020, 01.08.1922

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Последние новости №248, 10.02.1921 – Среди эмигрантов. Русские беженцы в Марселе

Последние новости №253, 16.02.1921 – Прием русских беженцев в Бразилии

Последние новости №260, 24.02.1921 – Большевистская пропаганда в Англии; Помощь беженцам

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Русский солдат – гражданин во Франции №141, 19.01.1918

Русский солдат – гражданин во Франции №143, 22.01.1918

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
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Attachments

Attachment 1

The postcard's back side



“Written communications are allowed only in Russian, French and German languages”
(NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg.)

Attachment 2

The examples of the postcards with censorship's stamps.



“Checked. Kommandatura Cüstrin” (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg.)

Фамилия Name: *Joseph Schmitz*
 Имя: *Wilhelm*
 Чинъ Charge: *902.*
 Ранг Rank: *102.*
 Отправитель Absender: *Troitzkossawsk, Transbaikalien, Beresowka*
 Район: *Троицкосавскъ, Забайк. обл.*

КОРРЕСПОНДЕНЦІЯ ВОЕННОПЛѢННЫХЪ.
 Kriegsgefangenen-Postkarte.
 Levelezőlap hadifoglyok részére
 CORRESPONDENCE DES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE.




Кому An: *Norwegen Christiania*
 Адрес: *Def Norske Komite for Krigsfangne Studenter*
 Куда Куда: *Christiania*
 Wohin Wohin: *Christiania*
 Новá Nová: *Christiania*

Просмотрѣно ИРКУТСКИ ВОЕННЫМЪ КОНТРОЛЕМЪ № 26
 Справочное отделение по деламъ военнопленныхъ Троицкосавскаго гарн. Auskunftsabteilung für Kriegsgefangene Troitzkossawsk. Tudakozó iroda hadifoglyok számára

“Reviewed by Irkutsk military control № 26” (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg.)

Absender und Lager (genaue und vollständige adresse).
Lieutenant Zwardyni
Promsa hald, illyre st

Корреспонденція Военно-плѣнныхъ. Безплатно
 KRIEGSGEFANGENENSSENDUNG — TAXFREI

Mr. Professor
Olaf Broch
Christiania
Dybwadst 8

Krigsfangpost Norge

“Checked” (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg.)

Attachment 3

Audience of Russian emigrant's press in 1922 (Zhirkov 2001)

Country	Total amount (thousand people)
German	250
Poland	175
France	70
Yugoslavia	34
Bulgaria	31
Turkey	35
Far East	145
Total:	863

Attachment 4

NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg.

№	Confirmation of receipt (date)	The name of the camp/city/commune	The number of the books
1.	17.08.1916	Cottbus -Merz	106
2.	15.09.1916	Halferbach	31
3.	22.09.1916	Münster	2888 (5 boxes)
4.	22.09.1916	?	3
5.	23.09.1916	Bad Stuer i M.	75
6.	26.09.1916	Stralkowo	1 box
7.	28.09.1916	Rosenberg b. Kronach	?
8.	05.10.1916	Langensalza	201
9.	06-19.10.1916	Würzburg, Weissenburg	?
10.	12.10.1916	Halbe	93
11.	13.10.1916	Elbe-Parey	60
12.	14.10.1916	Göttingen	480 (1 box)
13.	17.10.1916	Münster	546
14.	30.10.1916	Frankfurt (Oder)	92 (1 box)
15.	30.10.1916	Cassel	325
16.	2-15.11.1916	Ingolstadt	51
17.	2-15.11.1916	Friedberg	120
18.	06.11.1916	Holzminden	715 (1 box)
19.	07.11.1916	Halbe	260

20.	11.11.1916	Hirschberg	11
21.	13.11.1916	Ingostadt	96
22.	16.11.1916	Hammerstein	500
23.	17.11.1916	Puchheim	481
24.	20.11.1916	Hammerstein	218
25.	23.11.1916	Shteinmel (between Puderbach and Niederwambach)	?
26.	25.11.1916	Hameln	119 (in two or more copies)
27.	27.11.1916	Wiederborstel.	91
28.	29.11.1916	Parchim, Mecklenburg	89
29.	29.11.1916	Crefeld	2 boxes
30.	29.11.1916	?	43
31.	30.11.1916	Ingolstadt	185
32.	22.12.1916	Dachau	244
33.	?	Halle	94

Attachment 5

The list of the Russian officers interned in Norway (NB, Brevs. 337, Ureg.).

(the names of those who were in correspondence with O.Broch are highlighted)

№	Name, patronymic, surname	Rank
1.	Степан Петрович Михайлов Stepan Petrovich Mikhailov	Полковник Colonel
2.	Казимир Александрович Матусевич Kazimir Aleksandrovich Matusevich	Полковник Colonel
3.	Роберт Фердинандович Вейсс Robert Ferdinandovich Weiss	Полковник Colonel
4.	Хасим Нуриович Ахмеров Khasim Nuriovich Akhmerov	Подполковник Lieutenant Colonel
5.	Александр Александрович Проценко Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Protsenko	Подполковник Lieutenant Colonel
6.	Игнатий Платонович Гончаренко Ignatii Platonovich Goncharenko	Подполковник Lieutenant Colonel
7.	Лев Филиппович Бабичев Lev Filippovich Babichev	Подполковник Lieutenant Colonel
8.	Николай Михайлович Ушаков Nikolai Mikhailovich Ushakov	Капитан Captain
9.	Василий Гаврилович Лисань? Vasilii Gavrilovich Lisan?	Капитан Captain
10.	Петр Николаевич Максимович	Капитан

	Petr Nikolaevich Maksimovich	Captain
11.	Казимир Эдмундович Подвысоцкий Kazimir Edmundovich Podvisotsky	Капитан Captain
12.	Фёдор Иванович Семягин Fedor Ivanovich Semiagin	Капитан Captain
13.	Фёдор Георгиевич Кривошей Fedor Georgievich Krivoshei	Капитан Captain
14.	Иван Андреевич Бояр Ivan Andreevich Boiar	Капитан Captain
15.	Дмитрий Григорьевич Злачевский Dmitrii Grigorevich Zlachevsky	Капитан Captain
16.	Константин Пятницкий Konstantin Piatnitsky	Капитан Captain
17.	Николай Иванович Четвериков Nikolai Ivanovich Chetverikov	Капитан Captain
18.	Игорь Владимирович Юркевич Igor Vladimirovich Iurkevich	Капитан Captain
19.	Николай Евграфович Обозненко Nikolai Evgrafovich Oboznenko	Капитан Captain
20.	Павел Григорьевич Григорьев Pavel Grigorevich Grigorev	Капитан Captain
21.	Вацлав Аполинорович Правдзик Vatslav Apolinorovich Pravdzik	Капитан Captain

22.	Демьян Федорович Пардюмович Demian Fedorovich Parduimovich	Мф. Капитан Captain
23.	Александр Прокофьевич Следковский Aleksandr Prokofevich Sledkovsky	Ротмистр Captain of cavalry
24.	Андрей Стефанович Мельников Andrei Stefanovich Melnikov	Есаул Ротмистр Cossack Captain of cavalry
25.	Андрей Васильевич Жуков Andrei Vasilevich Zhukov	Поручик Lieutenant
26.	Клементий Семёнович Кравцов Klementii Semenovich Kravtsov	Поручик Lieutenant
27.	Василий Васильевич Ососов Vasilii Vasilevich Ososov	Поручик Lieutenant
28.	Михаил Титович Козловский Mikhail Titovich Kozlovsky	Поручик Lieutenant
29.	Александр Иванович Мерзляков Aleksandr Ivanovich Merzliakov	Поручик Lieutenant
30.	Николай Антонович Завадский Nikolai Antonovich Zavadsky	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
31.	Владимир Павлович Таньков Vladimir Pavlovich Tankov	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
32.	Митько Mitko (only surname)	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant

33.	Павел Иванович Гаврилов Павел Иванович Гаврилов	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
34.	Василий Михайлович Фалин Vasili Mikhailovich Falin	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
35.	Василий Иванович Чемакин Vasili Ivanovich Chemakin	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
36.	Феодосий Павлович Инфимовский Feodosii Pavlovich Infimovsky	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
37.	Николай Афанасьевич Еремеев Nikolai Afanasevich Eremeev	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
38.	Борис Михайлович Калинин Boris Mikhailovich Kalinini	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
39.	Николай Иванович Бернацкий Nikolai Ivanovich Bernatsky	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
40.	Василий Михайлович Еременко Vasili Mikhailovich Eremenko	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
41.	Николай Филиппович Иванов Nikolai Filippovich Ivanov	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
42.	Михаил Александрович Миролубов Mikhail Aleksandrovich Mirolubov	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
43.	Корнелий Иванович Юдин Kornelii Ivanovich Iudin	Подпоручик Second Lieutenant
44.	Александр Кузьмич Барабаль	Прапорщик

	Aleksandr Kuzmich Barabal	Warrant Officer
45.	Иван Иванович Фомин Ivan Ivanovich Fomin	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
46.	Андрей Корнилович Фриз Andrei Kornilovich Friz	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
47.	Андриан Михайлович Морозов Adrian Mikhailovich Morozov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
48.	Борис Алексеевич Климов Boris Alekseevich Klimov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
49.	Василий Иванович Степанов Vasilii Ivanovich Stepanov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
50.	Владимир Михайлович Григорьев Vladimir Mikhailovich Grigorev	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
51.	Виктор Алексеевич Васильев Viktor Alekseevich Vasilev	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
52.	Василий Иванович Кирьяков Vasilii Ivanovich Kiriakov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
53.	Борис Александрович Рыбников Boris Aleksandrovich Rybnikov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
54.	Павел Павлович Корниенко Pavel Pavlovich Kornienko	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
55.	Константин Владимирович Андреевский Konstantin Vladimirovich Andreevsky	Прапорщик Warrant Officer

56.	Дмитрий Иванович Хвостов Dmitrii Ivanovich Khvostov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
57.	Василий Ефимович Аленин Vasilii Efimovich Alenin	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
58.	Василий Андрианович Жуков Vasilii Andrianovich Zhukov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
59.	Николай Николаевич Россыпной Nikolai Nikolaevich Rassypnoi	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
60.	Константин Иванович Масленников Konstantin Ivanovich Maslennikov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
61.	Яков Александрович Козлов Iakov Aleksandrovich Kozlov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
62.	Николай Исаевич Фёдоров-Лукиянов Nikolai Isaevich Fedorov-Lukianov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
63.	Александр Васильевич Шурунов Aleksandr Vasilevich Shurunov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
64.	Иван Александрович Кацымов Ivan Aleksandrovich Katsymov	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
65.	Эварист Казимирович Стобницкий Evarist Kazimirovich Stobnitsky	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
66.	Константин Алексеевич Шубин Konstantin Alekseevich Shubin	Прапорщик Warrant Officer
67.	Никита Андреевич Смирнов	Прапорщик

	Nikita Andreevich Smirnov	Warrant Officer
68.	Наум Савельевич Рахлин Naum Savelevich Rakhlin	Доктор Doctor
69.	Виктор Антонович Бахалов Viktor Antonovich Bakhalov	Младший врач Second Doctor
70.	Самсон Томасидзе Samson Tomasidze	Priest

Attachment 6



Russian POWs Baneminde, Espa; Photo: Unknown / Digitaltmuseum- Anno Domkirkeodden

<https://digitaltmuseum.no/011012780658/baneminde-stor-gruppe-russiske-rekonvallesenter-espa-under-1-verdenskrig> (last accessed 05.03.2019)



Russian POWs in the dining room, Baneminde, Espaa; Photo: Løberg, Oscar / Digitaltmuseum- Anno Domkirkeodden

<https://digitaltmuseum.no/011012787288/interior-baneminde-pensjonat-spisesalen-russiske-krigsfanger-espa-under> (last accessed 05.03.2019)



Leonid Lvovich Brandman / Леонид Львович Брандман; Russian POW student, was in correspondence with O. Broch; Baneminde, Espa; Photo: Unknown / Digitaltmuseum-Anno Domkirkeodden

<https://digitaltmuseum.no/011012788761/ukjente-russisk-krigsfange-baneminde-espakort-sendt-til-peder-johansen> (last accessed 14.05.2019)



Konnerudkollen sanatorium, 1910; Photo: Kjellerød, Georg / Østfold fylkes billedarkiv

<https://digitaltmuseum.no/011015155587/konnerudkollen-sanatorium> (last accessed 05.03.2019)