Mo birget soađis (How to cope with war) – strategies of Sámi resilience during the German influence

Adaptation and resistance in Sámi relations to Germans in wartime Sápmi, Norway and Finland 1940-1944

Abstract
The article studies the Sámi experiences during the “German era” in Norway and Finland, 1940-44, before the Lapland War. The Germans ruled as occupiers in Norway, but had no jurisdiction over the civilians in Finland, their brothers-in-arms. In general, however, encounters between the local people and the Germans appear to have been cordial in both countries. Concerning the role of racial ideology, it seems that the Norwegian Nazis had more negative opinions of the Sámi than the occupiers, while in Finland the racial issues were not discussed. The German forces demonstrated respect for the reindeer herders as communicators of important knowledge concerning survival in the arctic. The herders also possessed valuable meat reserves. Contrary to this, other Sámi groups, such as the Sea Sámi in Norway, were ignored by the Germans resulting in a forceful exploitation of sea fishing. Through the North Sámi concept birget (coping with) we analyse how the Sámi both resisted and adapted to the situation. The cross-border area of Norway and Sweden is described in the article as an exceptional arena for transnational reindeer herding, but also for the resistance movement between an occupied and a neutral state.

Keyword: Sámi, WWII, Norway and Finland, reindeer husbandry, local meetings, Birget

Sámi in different wartime contexts
In 1940 the German forces occupied Norway. Next year, as brothers-in-arms, they got northern Finland under their military command in order to attack Soviet Union. During the period 1940-1944 the Sámi society both in Norway and Finland experienced the German presence in different ways. This situation leading up to autumn 1944 will be the primary perspective in this article. We will focus on the Sámi communities in general, and the reindeer herding Sámi in particular, but other Sámi groups will also be included in the discussion.¹

The Sámi population was, and still is today, an ethnic minority spread across four countries – Norway, Sweden, Finland and the former Soviet Union/Russia. We will take a brief look at
the whole area. The period of 1940–1944 in Sápmi was experienced differently depending on the country in which one lived. Norway put up a fight against the German invasion in 1940, but was occupied by the Wehrmacht for five years. The Swedes remained neutral for the actual period of the war, but permitted the Germans to use their country as a transit area, a transit policy that would eventually change during the war years.

Although never formally allying itself with Germany, Finland allowed the German army into the country as brothers-in-arms. By June 1941, Finland collaborated with the Germans as co-belligerents to attack the Soviet Union in a war that the Finns call the Continuation War (1941-44). The German attack on the entire Eastern European front first halted in the North, in the Petsamo District, after an intensive advance on Murmansk proved unfruitful. Until September 1944 when Finland signed an armistice with the Soviet Union, the northern half of Finland remained under German military command, but the civilians were administered by the Finnish authorities.²

For four years, the Sámi in Norway and Finland were facing the German forces with a Nazi ideology. One could draw hasty conclusions about the relations between these two: one obviously had the upper-hand especially in Norway, while the Lapps or the Sámi had already for a long time been defined as a static, fragile, naïve, backward culture, repressed or fated to disappear. Our article, however, tries to question this initial setting with several perspectives. We ask if the situation of the Sámi was different in two countries due to the distinct roles or status of the Germans.

Germans attitudes were more nuanced than mere Nazi ideology. The Germans were not ignorant of the fact that several ethnic groups lived in the countries they invaded in the north: Sámi, Kvens, Finns and Norwegians. There are many documents reflecting the “tourist-like approach” the German soldiers and officers took towards the Sámi. The Sámi, wearing their
traditional costumes, were considered exotic and a “people of nature”, who could be enlisted and exploited to ensure survival.

The Sámi were also active subjects in their own history, and not only passive objects. It has been remarked that always considering the Sámi as victims of historical events, means ignoring their own agency. When the Sámi are studied as people who are trying to make up their own minds, they have their own strategies, which have made them able to survive critical periods in their history.

Resilience, or survival strategy of this kind, has been described as “tenacious adaptation”, “evasive strategy” or “wisdom of procrastination”. This notion has been criticised as a romanticising myth or a pacifying concept, i.e. it disregards the Sámi’s own agency and assumes that the Sámi have been incapable of resisting the pursuits of majority populations. We argue, however, that the North Sámi concept of birget, which has recently recurred in Sámi research, depicts the essential survival strategy of the Sámi which can also be observed in their actions in wartime.

The verb birget (noun ´birgen´) means ´getting along´ or ´coping with´, but instead of “victimry”, it emphasises active survivance, as it is designated by an indigenous scholar George Vizenor. It is described as a value of being independent, capable of actively and creatively coping with changes; taking responsibility for one’s actions, without complaining about difficulties. The Sámi method of “birget” is often compared to silent resistance and thus difficult to perceive. The survivance strategies are not typical for the Sámi only, but they are quite universal operation models especially among supressed groups and peoples. In certain situations, even the authorities can use them (reference: During the Second World War the Swedish authorities, for instance, often termed the "politics of acquiescence", avoiding
German invasion by i.e. letting German soldiers on leave to pass through their country.), but this article focuses the indigenous or Sámi strategies.

In those situations where the Sámi felt they could not act as they wanted, because the others defined the rules for the game, the Sámi used the tactics of withdrawal instead of fighting or resisting. When coping with changes which were caused by the foreign occupiers, they used indirect forms of ‘peaceful obstinacy’. Deliberate evasiveness was used for gaining time to think things over or to make one’s mind up; or to postpone and delay actions and minimize the consequences of an encounter or a conflict of interest.⁸

Our aim is to study the strategy of birget as a form of cultural resilience by the Sámi in an exceptional situation, during wartime in Finland and Norway. In this way, we try to present Sámi-German relations from a different and new perspective that has so far been missing in public discussions and research literature. The history of the war in Northern Norway and Finland 1939–1944 has attracted much interest. However, there are some discrepancies when it comes to accounts in national-level publications.

One criticism alleges that there is an asymmetry between the rich local literature describing wartime in the northern areas and the apparent lack of interest in the Northern War on the part of national historians and the public.⁹ In regional histories of the war in Lapland and Northern Norway, authors have shown interest, understandably, in the fate of the entire population, with no particular focus on the Sámi alone.¹⁰ We must remember that Sámi history overlaps with the general history of the northern Nordic areas.

The works of national scope in Norway especially include and highlight the battles in and around Narvik in 1940, including Sámi participation in the 6. Division, in the well known Alta Battalion and the other two battalions, IR15 and IR16. In the work Norge i krig (Norway at War), there is a brief discussion of the Sámi’s situation, such as a paragraph about the
Germans’ relationship with the Sámi from a racial perspective. In national-level Finnish war histories, Lapland is mentioned mostly by war historians and with a specific focus on military operations.

Thus, the national-level publications have to a limited extent focused on the Sámi’s wartime experiences. Other sources shed more light on the topic, and accounts of personal experiences told by the Sámi people themselves can be found in annals and private publications. In Norway, the Sámi’s war history is also studied in research that has analysed reindeer herding activity during the war years in specific local areas. In our article, we will use both prior research and other first-hand sources. The latter have been created particularly in conjunction with studies of reindeer herding during wartime, where the Lapp bailiff’s archives in Norway were key resources. However, many of the documents in the archive were lost in the scorched earth burnings by the Germans in 1944–1945, such as the Lapp bailiff’s archives for Finnmark, although some fragments have been recovered. In Finland, a large variety of war time archives have been prospected, and many interviews were conducted, especially in 1990s to preserve testimonies of the Sámi. These narratives provide further knowledge about the years 1940 to 1944.

Sámi as soldiers
The Sámi (or Lapps, as they were called by the outsiders) have often been considered to be a homogeneous group of reindeer herders. In reality, already in wartime, the Reindeer Sámi constituted only one part of the whole Sámi population, although they were the most visible representatives of Sámi culture. Both in Norway and Finland, they represented approximately ten per cent of all Sámi groups. In Finland, reindeer husbandry historically has also been the livelihood of ethnic Finns, while in Norway, it is the privileged livelihood of the Sámi. In 1885 in Sweden a new administration of the industry limited reindeer husbandry to only Sámi living in the sameby (Sámi village). In Russia, on the Kola Peninsula, Sámi reindeer
herders often worked with the Komi, a people that had migrated to the Lovozero region already at the end of 19th century.

The Sea Sámi was a large group of Norwegian Sami who did not make their living as reindeer herders in the 1940s. In a region stretching from Northern Finnmark and down the coastline to Trøndelag, the Sea Sámi made their living as fishermen and small-scale farmers. Their use of Sami language and dress varied, but as a rule, these were used less the further south on the coast. One of several exceptions was Tysfjord municipality in Nordland county, where the Sámi language and culture remained vibrant. In Finland, too, there was variation between the Reindeer Sámi and the Deatnu Sámi (both speaking North Sámi), and between the Aanaar Sámi and the Skolt Sámi. A majority of the remaining Sámi had fishing and farming (among other seasonal sources) as their main way of life. Already before the Germans, there were negative attitudes towards the Sámi in typical Sámi areas. Long-standing and bitter conflicts over agricultural and reindeer grazing territories have exacerbated the friction.

Concerning the war, the Sámi are unique because throughout their recorded history, they have been exempt from military service in national armies. It was a privilege extended to members of Sámi siidas (Lapp villages) in return for submitting to taxation. It was ratified in 1751 in the Strömstad border treaty supplement or Lapp Codicil with the rationale that the Sámi should never be caught in a situation in which power politics would force them to wage war.¹⁹ In 1897, Norway extended conscription to include the inhabitants of Northern Norway, where most Sami lived.²⁰ Russia began drafting Sámi people into the army in 1915 and Skolt Sámi had to serve on distant fronts during the First World War.²¹ The Sámi in Finland were drafted into the army in 1919 after Finland became independent. Their duties of war started in the Winter War, 1939-1940.²² In Sweden, the Sámi were not drafted for military service until the 1950s.²³
Thus, World War II was the first known historical event in which the Sámi in Finland and Norway took up arms. In Northern Norway, the battles raged around Narvik during spring 1940 while all of Southern Norway was already occupied. Much credit is generally given to the 6. Division in this respect since they managed, with the help of other units, to hand the Germans their very first defeat in April/May 1940. In the winter conditions of the mountains, most of the combatants came from the north and were well experienced with the cold climate. It is difficult to say with certainty which soldiers were Sámi. However, a 1998 report states that the Sámi’s experience in the winter environment was without a doubt an advantage. The victory was short-lived. The Allies were unable to intervene to prolong the resistance and pulled out; but that is another story.24

In Finland, all the Sámi youth were drafted to the army. In both the Winter War (1939-1940) and the Continuation War (1941-44), Sámi soldiers were mainly able to stay at the northern front. In summer 1941, the Finnish troops' most important job was to provide a rear guard to protect the German attack against Murmansk and Kandalaksha. Sámi from Utsjoki and Inari Counties were for the most part stationed in the Petsamo region in the Pennanen Special Detachment. Some Sámi soldiers also served on the Salla-Kuusamo front and on the isthmus of Karelia, the main front where the bloodiest battles took place. Their history is also chronicled on tombstones in the Sámi areas.25

Generally, the Sámi were loyal to the Finnish state and no conscientious objections from the military service were seen, at least apparently. In the army, however, the traditional tactics of evasion could be used in order to avoid the most dangerous places and to serve, for instance, as boatmen, horsemen, or reindeer troops. The birgen mentality was also reflected in later storytelling, in which the men remembered their abilities to cope with officials, for instance, because of their hunting or fishing skills. The Sámi were also telling “the good soldier Švejk” stories as Sámi versions, referring to e.g. a man who tried to escape the gunfire under the
snow cover, but when crawling into a wrong direction and rising up just in front of the enemy
line, became a hero for his bravery.26

With Sámi soldiers, the Finnish army acquired a group of specialists in their ranks: people
who were accustomed to moving about in the “wilderness”. For the commanding officer of
the Finnish troops in Petsamo, Captain Antti Pennanen, a central concern was supply
logistics, and the Sámi were seasoned experts in two fields, maintaining boats and reindeer.
Reindeer-herding troops became a fixture of the Pennanen Detachment up until the end of the
Continuation War, so much so that an entire unit of reindeer handlers continued to fight in the
Lapland War from 1944 and onward. Their example likely led the Germans, as well, to start
developing reindeer supply chains, although these remained peripheral.27

Reindeer troop units were also established on the other side of the front. The Second World
War became a trying ordeal for the Eastern Sámi population of 2,000 on the Kola Peninsula in
the Soviet Union. Together with the Komis, they established three and later even seven
reindeer brigades in all. In addition to ensuring supplies of provisions, the reindeer brigades
are known to have transported some 10,000 wounded soldiers away from the front.28

Some of the soldiers in the Finnish army speculated later about whom they had actually
confronted during the war. Hans Niiles Pieski concluded that in a fight against any Russian
group, some enemy soldiers would have been Sámi, based on their war shouts and their skill
in handling reindeer. It is similarly possible, however, that these soldiers could have been
Komis from the Kola peninsula who also served in the reindeer brigade with the Sámi.29

Although Sámi soldiers comprised a comparatively small group among the list of fallen
soldiers in the Finnish and Soviet armies, the losses were nevertheless painfully great in the
small Sámi communities. In Finland, 48 Sámi fell in the Continuation War. As Karl Nickul
confirmed, the proportionate losses among the Sámi population were the same – two per cent
– as in the rest of Finland’s population. The death toll was especially heavy among the Eastern Sámi and Komi. Of the 800 residents of the Lujávri district who went to war, 111 Sámi or Komi were killed. In occupied Norway, where there was little continually ongoing military action, conditions were more peaceful after the end of the Narvik campaign in June 1940.

**Naïve admiration and racial ideology**

In the racial ideology of the Nazi occupants, the Sámi’s origins were normally linked with the concept of a separate “Lappish” race. The Sámi were not considered to belong to a European race, but a subgroup of the Asiatic or Mongoloid race and thus ranked lower on an evolutionary scale of development than the European races. Scientists studying race at the time published many negative observations concerning their physical and mental state, all the while expressing a certain naïve admiration for what they considered an exotic minority.

A more complex picture emerges when one examines more closely the views of the occupying power and its supporters. The Germans’ attitude and treatment of the Sámi was not uniform and was neither preponderantly negative nor positive. It also seems that the Norwegian Nazis had more negative opinions of the Sámi than the occupiers. Contrary to the quasi-romantic and more relaxed attitudes of German soldiers towards Sámi and reindeer herding, the Quisling regime had a brutal Norwegian Minister of Police, Jonas Lie, who looked upon Sámi as worthless human beings. He stated publicly that Sámi and Jews should be treated in the same manner. SS Reichsführer and head of the Gestapo, Heinrich Himmler, did not share this view. In his opinion, the Sámi represented no danger to the pure Aryan race and could be useful as a source of knowledge about adaptation to Arctic conditions. Lie was undoubtedly influenced by Himmler’s racial theories concerning the Sámi people, but was far more aggressive than the representative of the Third Reich. In a biography on Lie, it is claimed, “Himmler restrained the Norwegian Nazis’ contempt for Sámi people”. 34
Recent research on Finland by historian Lars Westerlund confirms that earlier research exaggerated the negative attitudes of the German forces themselves towards the Sámi. They had a more positive view of the Sámi than they had of other ethnic minorities in Europe, and this prevailed despite the theories advanced by Nazi racial specialists, generated and supported by emerging physical anthropological research.\textsuperscript{35} Many Germans openly stated that they admired the Sámi’s ability to live in the Arctic climate and saw this a result of genetic selection of traits such as strength and endurance to survive. German officers frequently took photos with Sámi, and apparently in a seemingly jovial atmosphere. Not least, the performance of the northern battalions in the first year of the war had proved that people from the far north possessed knowledge and abilities to live in the Arctic climate and topography.\textsuperscript{36}

Although Germans had the military command in Northern Finland, they had no jurisdiction over the civilians; the latter were administered by Finnish authorities. This may be one reason why racial issues do not seem to have arisen in Finland during the war. In addition, Finns themselves had a debatable position in racial hierarchies, where they were considered as belonging to the same Eastern Mongol race as the Sámi – thus, it would have been daring for either party to broach the subject of racial assessment. In other ways too, the Germans looked carefully after their soldiers so that the good relations between the brothers-in-arms would be retained on the local level. Violators were harshly punished.\textsuperscript{37}

**Germans and locals**

Relations between Germans and locals were different in Norway and Finland, partly due to the settlement patterns in both countries. In Norway, armed combat, such as in the Narvik area, the bombing of cities, such as Namsos, Bodø and Vardø, and sabotage actions such as the blowing up of the railway in Namsos, were all dramatic events both for those who experienced them first-hand and those who learned of them from a distance. This applied equally to the Sámi and to the non-Sámi. In areas spared from direct armed conflict, the
visible signs of war came in the form of rationing, inspections of households and directives to supply quantities of reindeer meat. In Finland, the Skolt Sámi lived in the same area as the battlefield of Petsamo, but also other Sámi settlements near the border zone were targets for e.g. Soviet partisan strikes.

One of the most important German projects was to finish building the roads and railways from south to north in both Norway and Finland. In Norway, activity was high in the northernmost counties, Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. In Finland, the roads from Kaamanen to Karigasniemi and from Karesuvanto to Kilpisjärvi went straight through two important Sámi settlements, which until then had been roadless, far from outside influences. In the postwar period, these roads were means for the Finnish government to gain firmer control of the Sámi. The Germans also built the first airfields in the Sámi region in Finland, although the large bombers flew their sorties from Banak Airfield in Lakselv to attack Murmansk.

The Germans planned to work and live on site at the military installations. They provided most of their own food, but living quarters were more difficult to procure. They requisitioned entire buildings, or they moved into the lofts, bedrooms or living rooms of private families, both Sámi and non-Sámi. The occupying forces were present to the greatest extent possible, but most of the occupied citizens who experienced this intrusion recall that the enemy behaved calmly and politely. Using birget as a strategy, this was the way of adapting to a situation where the locals met with representatives from the powerful German army. Protesting or active reactions would lead to a stressful everyday life.

Lack of compassion and respect for fellow human beings was common in German prison camps. These were established wherever there was a need for labour to build or operate installations of various sizes. In many Sámi stories from the time of the war, there are horrific reminiscences of encounters with these signs of the new "civilized Order’s" way of treating
people. It was a gruesome oppression of disfavoured groups, the Jews especially in Norway, and the prisoners of war held in separate work camps.

In the midst of the misery, the German presence strengthened the cash economy in Sápmi. In Finland, the Sámi joined the economic boom in Lapland, created by the Germans, with a strong need for workforce, offering employment and moneymaking possibilities for the locals. The boom was reflected in the term “Lapland mark”, referring to the higher salaries in the north. As geographer Ilmari Hustich stated, Sámi “took part in the German enterprise” by selling reindeer products and other foods and by sewing fur boots, shoes and slippers. According to him, there were probably only a few houses along the roadside between Sodankylä and Inari in which Steinhäger gin was not drunk during those years.

Up until that time, especially in the more remote regions, wealth had been elusive. Mikal Urheim in Tysfjord tells how the women’s contribution in sewing komaga and skaller (Sámi shoes), and the income derived from selling them, increased the value of duodji, Sámi handicrafts. Older Sámi in Karasjok recall that both permanent residents and Sámi nomads sewed and sold a large amount of moccasins to the Germans. They preferred moccasins with laces, not with shoe bands. To supply their army, the Germans bought reindeer from herders in Finland and Norway. Arvid Petterson, from Finnmark, confirms that reindeer-herding Sámi were respected. “The occupying forces acquired knowledge about how they coped with the cold winters in the far north. There was a great demand for local handicraft products such as sheepskin jackets, moccasins and slippers and other warm garments.” Again using birgen as a strategy they traded with the occupiers, and thus improving their economic situation. Protesting would have led to a stressful everyday life.

Dual German attitude
It seems obvious that German interest in Sámi culture was grounded in a duality similar to that of many national Sámi policies in the Nordic countries. In Sweden, for instance, so-called
«Lapps shall be Lapps» ideology was based on preserving the reindeer Sámi communities as a «genuine» form of Sámi culture and even preserving them by means of a special school system (nomadskola). Conversely and at the same time, other “non-genuine” Sámi groups were encouraged to assimilate with the majority, without any special rights as Sámi minorities. The same treatment was practised in Finland with the Skolt Sámi in the Pechenga area. The Finnish government protected the Suenjel sij´dd community with special measures because of their traditional way of life and under the rationale of «ethnological interest», while the other Skolt Sámi groups defined as “degenerates”, predestined to disappear and thus not deserving of special measures.

The fishermen, both Sámi and non-Sámi, were greatly affected by the war in Norway. For strategic reasons related to the war, the heretofore-vital weather forecasts on the radio were suspended already on 9 April 1940; the lights of lighthouses extinguished during autumn 1941, and the Germans requisitioned a large number of vessels such as rescue boats for military use. Without weather forecasts and functioning lighthouses, the fishermen were far more exposed to the risk of accidents and potential disaster at a time when the fishermen’s contributions in terms of food was extremely important. The greatest challenge, however, were the extensive mines laid along the coast.

Mine laying was implemented for strategic reasons by the military, not to stop all fishing; a vital part of the coastal diet came from the local fisheries. It went on and no hunger appeared. Norwegian fishing resources also had an important place in German plans for the future. It was anticipated that Norway would become the major supplier of protein-rich seafood products. In this conjunction, the Germans carried out a grand-scale modernization of the fishing industry introducing freezer technology innovations such as factory ships with freezer capacity and freezer storage plants on land like the freezer plant in Bodø. The occupying authorities tried to take charge of organizing the fisheries, but somewhat unsuccessfully.
Recent research has shown that the number of fishermen declined during the war, and the number of boats and rigs were significantly reduced, but the gross revenues earned by individual fishermen increased because of higher prices for fish. This helped to eradicate much of the poverty of coastal Norway. Most fisherfarming households came to the realisation that cash was significantly more abundant than prior to the war. Moreover, it was easier to find paid work on shore rather than continuing in the fishing industry. German construction projects entailed a great need for labour. Soldiers and prisoners of war worked on the projects, and there was also forced conscription of Norwegian labourers, also Sea-Sámi, to do the work that the Germans needed done. A tactic of withdrawal, and not an open protest took place, the latter might have led to prisoning. To avoid forced conscription and working for the Germans many escaped to Sweden.46

As for voluntary work, a change took place. In the beginning, most Norwegians were reluctant to do any voluntary labour for the Germans. Many considered such work as aid and comfort to the enemy, or at worst, treason towards themselves and Norway. Gradually, working for the Germans was accepted; people needed the work to make a living. In the local communities that had German installations, many local citizens took jobs and earned good money, Sámi and non-Sámi. People adapted to the situation, they were capable of actively coping with changes and taking responsibility for one’s action, a birgen mentality.47

“Bloodletting the Reindeer”
One recurrent idea in Sámi wartime memories both in Finland and Norway is that, despite many kinds of concerns, there was no famine, especially among the Reindeer Sámi during the war. This may reflect the economic growth during the German occupied era, but the Sámi usually attribute well-being to their relationship with nature. “Game was abundant in the forests and reindeer were plentiful”, a Sámi from Finland stated, and the harbours on the Arctic Ocean were nearby as well. In Norway, Jonar Jåma from Snåsa recalled that one had
few encounters with the war in daily life as a reindeer herder. Since herders could wander freely in the mountains, the father of the family strolled unchallenged across the border into Sweden to shop for sugar, coffee and flour.\textsuperscript{48}

Apart from the Skolt Sámi in the Pechenga area, no other Sámi were in the war zone before the Lapland war in 1944. The effects of the war on the home front were felt more indirectly. The gravest problems were caused by the absence of young men. There was an obvious feeling of insecurity, as well as a constant anxiety about the men’s situation on the front. Although in Finnish Lapland, for instance, the German Luftwaffe countered the Soviet threat in the first years of the war, the mere awareness of an enemy presence weighed heavily.

Life without men present was especially hard among the Reindeer Sámi in both Finland and Russia. Since the communities did not have the youngest skilled workers present, the gathering of reindeer by older men, women and boys proved to progress slower and not as efficiently as usual, and the same was true for handling them at the round-up and during separation.\textsuperscript{49} The situation can be also interpreted in other ways. Kiseljov notes that while women, teenagers and older men managed to keep the industry going, Sámi women took the responsibility of reindeer herding and learned special skills that previously were the domain of men. Kiseljov states: “The war broke a century-long tradition – that men should have the task of herding reindeer.”\textsuperscript{50} After the war, however, women returned to their former roles, as was the case in many industries in Europe.

Some people took advantage of the unstable situation in reindeer herding. In Finland, outside buyers saw to it that the prices fell as low as possible. Some purchased whole herds, which drunken men would gladly trade for liquor, and alcohol became an instrument of policy. An even more serious problem was that clever reindeer thieves were able to reduce reindeer herds more effectively because of the lack of “watchful eyes” and lack of surveillance. In addition,
the war caused other challenges in the northern areas that were not directly involved in military conflict; flocks of wolves and contagion victimized several herds. The Same, Ponoj and Sosnovka districts lost many animals. During the war, the number of reindeer in the Murmansk area declined by almost 40% from 1940 to 1945. The number of reindeer quickly rose again, however.  

In both warring countries, Finland and Russia, living animals and carcasses were requisitioned in abundance for the army's use. In Norway this was less common. In Finland, heavy compulsory slaughtering was in force throughout the war years, and the quotas filled by nearly one hundred percent. Handing over reindeer was a painful process for many herding cooperatives. Old reindeer men and women remembered decades later that many families had to hand over more than half their herds. At least one third of the counted reindeer were requisitioned. According to Oula Näkkäläjärvi, this entailed disproportionately large numbers bought at nominal prices. The fields surrounding Sámi villages were covered with blood as more reindeer than ever before were slaughtered, bloodletting the reindeer.

Although these deliveries were parallel to what Finnish farmers had to part with in terms of cattle, some Finnish experts regretted the burden that animal husbandry had to bear. "No other livelihood was so heavily taxed to benefit another sector as was reindeer herding", T. T. Kaila, historian of the Lapland War, stated shortly after the war ended. The Lapland Provincial Government also considered this contribution excessive, especially in the first winter of the war. Statistics show that the numbers of reindeer plunged during the war years. Reindeer herding in Finland also suffered a great loss, since nearly all the Skolt Sámi's large herd of reindeer, some 3,500 head, were lost to the Russians.  

Despite the orders to slaughter, reindeer herders did not complain, because they wanted to show their loyalty and be supportive of the Finnish government. The same was true in Russia,
where the role of the home front in supplying the military front was important. Both reindeer herding and fishing in kolkhozes were important for food production. In the course of the war years, for example, the reindeer cooperative Tundra in Lovozero increased its revenues up until 1942. As of 1943, profits were even higher.\

It is difficult to visualize in detail the losses of Sámi reindeer in Finland during the war, because the reindeer herding area extends far from the Sámi area, and many Finns were reindeer herders. Thus, exact figures for animals owned by Sámi and animals lost do not exist. This is why the general picture must be inferred from figures and numbers for the whole Province of Lapland. In these counties, there were also generally more reindeer per inhabitant and per reindeer owner, because for the Finns, reindeer herding was usually a sideline livelihood. The number of Sámi reindeer in comparison to others may be estimated from the observation that since almost exactly half the animals in the entire herding area belonged to the Lapp Reindeer Herding Cooperatives, more than half of the reindeer in Lapland belonged to the Sámi, some 176,599 animals in 1943.\

Reindeer herding in occupied Norway

In Norway, the occupying forces aimed to maintain the reindeer herds in order to ensure supplies of meat and means of animal transport. Therefore, they placed few obstacles in the way of reindeer herding, unless of course the activity came into conflict with major road or railway projects. The main pattern in seasonal migrations of herds continued in accordance with the pre-war pattern, which was embedded in old tradition but also through border treaties, border closure, legislation and recent reindeer herding conventions, the most important and relevant of which was the Reindeer Herding Convention of 1919.\

The largest herds were located farthest north, in Finnmark. There, as well as in the northern part of Troms County, the winter grazing was inland and the summer pastures were along the coast and on the islands. Further south, the movement patterns varied; in Southern Nordland,
winter grazing took place on the islands along the Helgeland coast and summer grazing was in
the inland mountains. In addition, there were local variants; for example, herds migrated from
Nordland to Troms during summer while spending their winters in Nordland.

Moreover, there was cross-border reindeer herding; some Swedish Sámi would follow the
reindeer to summer pasture in Norwegian border areas, with winter grazing on the Swedish
side. Even though these Swedish Sámi lived in a neutral country, many of them were, through
the border-crossing industry, affected by the war. In general, during the occupation, the border
to neutral Sweden was closed. Already in the summer of 1940 the occupying forces came to
an agreement with the Swedish authorities to continue reindeer herding without making the
border areas inaccessible to Swedish herds. Above all, reindeer herding was not to be
stopped.57

It was the Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture, through the Office of Reindeer Management,
that issued the German permits to cross the border. Swedish Sámi were reluctant to cross the
border into occupied Norway, but as the reindeer could not be restrained from crossing,
Swedish Sámi herders followed them. The reindeer-herding Sámi in this part of the industry
were given exclusion-area permits so that they could freely cross the border with their herds at
specified times.

Although the principal workers in the industry had no severe restrictions placed on them, the
reindeer business, with its intensive land requirements and the high demand for meat, must
have been affected by the occupation. In Troms as in Nordland Counties, military installa-
tions and erected fences hindered the Swedish Sámi from taking their herds down to the coast to
their traditional summer pasture grounds; they had to remain in the mountains on the
Norwegian side of the border throughout the summer as well as winter.
Despite the German commanders’ concern that the reindeer herds must not fall below a critical minimum and that the future of reindeer herding had to be ensured, reindeer were periodically harvested to a greater extent than previously because of the need for food. On occasion, detachments of the German army yielded to temptation and helped themselves to fresh meat. Along the state road across Saltfjellet in Nordland County, where there were large camps of soldiers and prisoners of war used as forced labour in construction projects, some 200 reindeer were poached in 1943 alone. Norwegian civilians reportedly poached reindeer as well, but in fewer numbers. Similar incidents were reported in other areas, too.

Other sources tell of entire herds of reindeer shot dead by German soldiers. Karen, a reindeerherder’s daughter recalls that German soldiers who were in pursuit of her father surrounded the entire herd and mowed the animals down with machine-guns. Nearly the whole herd was decimated. The Germans loaded the carcases into their vehicles and left, while the father and his entire family fled to Sweden.

On the Norwegian side of the border the Sámi had to hand over animals to the Germans for transport and fresh meat. The amount of animals to hand over was hard to set since no one could tell how many animals were to be found in the mountains. The herders answered questions on the matter in a rather vague way, avoiding giving information and thus coping with a threat to their flocks.

Because of the lack of accurate information on reindeer herding in wartime, the authorities reported diffuse information after the war. In 1948, when the Lapp bailiff in Finnmark as well as in Troms looked back on the war years, they concluded that theft of reindeer had increased largely. In certain cases, the thefts were unravelled and the Sámi owners compensated.

Reindeer thefts across the border between Finland and Norway appeared, reflecting a long-standing conflict involving the border zone between Sámi villages. Peder Hagen, Lapp bailiff
in Nordland County, summed up the war years in Nordland: «Some reindeer owners suffered losses; others experienced more difficult conditions for their operation, but all in all, there were no dramatic changes to report.» The cheerfulness of Hagen’s perception was somewhat exaggerated. Nordland was a county comprising many reindeer districts, and in which the war had many different consequences. In Tysfjord and Saltfjellet, reindeer herding came to a standstill as a result of poaching during the last year of the occupation. This was no doubt perceived as a dramatic event.\(^{61}\) Research from the Swedish side has shown paternalistic attitudes from theses authorities towards the Sámi.\(^{62}\) This might be valid in the exemplifying statements of the Bailiff in Nordland. More research is needed on the topic.

From Nord-Trøndelag, Lapp bailiff Ornæs wrote that reindeer herding generally emerged from the war without excessive losses or disruptions. In the far south, Lapp bailiff Arne Galaaen wrote in 1945 that reindeer husbandry had come into “complete disarray” during the occupation. This differs greatly from the depictions of the areas further north. The herds had grown enormously, and the Sámi herders were unable to keep them together. The reindeer were spread throughout the entire mountain range and some were now in areas where grazing had not been allowed. The reindeer had become shy and difficult to catch. «They are not working the way they should work with reindeer, and the way they used to work in the old days. »\(^{63}\)

**Assistance and resistance**
The Sámi were not, of course, one united people among whom there was a common consensus. People differed from each other, in both the north and the south of Sápmi. Within families, Sámi and non-Sámi alike, there were dividing lines. One example is that of a Sámi family in Suohpanjárga, Tana. The father of the household, Jacob, joined the Nasjonal Samling (NS, the Nazi party) party and became mayor in the municipality. He stayed in this position until autumn 1944. Two of his sons, Jakob Jr. and Ole, did not share their father’s
political conviction and fled to Sweden, where they served in the Norwegian police troops. While their father was tried and convicted after the war for membership in the NS and political service to the party, his sons joined the forces that came to clean up after the German occupation of their homeland. All of them were Sámi. The father, however, was given a light sentence in the court proceedings after the war.  

There was no resistance movement against the Germans in Finland, while in Norway the Sámi were actively involved in the Resistance. Throughout the entire period of the war, as mentioned above, reindeer Sámi were obliged to deliver a specified amount of reindeer meat, far from all obeyed. It was considered a tacit form of resistance to avoid delivering the mandatory quantity of meat. In 1942, the Lapp bailiff wrote that despite high demand, an insignificant number of reindeer were sold and sent to slaughter.

In an effort to stimulate delivery of animals to slaughter and reindeer meat, the Lapp bailiff was eventually given the authority to allocate extra tobacco rations to the Sámi. This worked, but not to the extent that the NS regime wanted. A letter from Røyrvik supply board in April 1944 reveals that the Sámi were obliged to deliver 2,655 kg of meat. Only a little more than half that amount was delivered, they argued that the animals were not to be found. “Some of them are a little slow on the draw”, was the Lapp bailiff’s comment. In fact, the Sámi would not be bribed into delivering more meat than they deemed necessary, not even in exchange for tobacco. This is an example of double agency, on the one hand the ostensible compliance toward official demands, and on the other following their own plan of resisting.

Sámi fishing boats in the fjords were well suited for spying and determining an enemy ship's position and characteristics. Perhaps the largest operation they participated in was the plan to sink the camouflaged battleship Tirpitz in the Álaheadju Fjord. The plan, however, was not implemented; Tirpitz was only destroyed by British bombers in 1944 in the Alta Fjord.
Another act of resistance was sabotage of communication routes to prevent German transports through Norway. Towards the end of the war, two South-Sámi brothers, Jonar and Bengt Jåma, served as guides for an American sabotage unit targeting a railway line in the Snåsa area. On 12 January 1945, the Jørstad railway bridge on Snåsa Lake was blown up. Sámi and non-Sámi saboteurs participated. Seventy-eight Germans and three Norwegians perished.  

One important activity for Norwegian and Swedish Sámi in the Resistance was smuggling people to neutral Sweden using the Reindeer Sámi’s migration routes. The Sámi were familiar with the mountains and prevented the escapees from getting lost in the “wilderness”. Not only the Sámi, the permanent residents, Sea Sámi, Kvens and Norwegians put their lives on the line many times by helping people seek refuge in Sweden.

The Germans were well aware of potential escape routes and maintained close surveillance in the border areas. At times, there was a great risk of being caught by German border guards, but the local residents memorized the guard post routines and crossed the border when there was the least possible risk. Such a route ran from Sulitjelma across to the Sámi settlement in Mavasluokta, and another from Tysfjord over to Vaisaluokta. On the Tysfjord route, the Sámi population on the Norwegian side of the border were heavily involved in transporting refugees inside the fjords, providing them with food, clothing, and guiding them along the final stretch across the border. The Germans prohibited any kind of assistance provided to refugees, but the locals were willing to take the risk. As far as Tysfjord is concerned, the help provided to the refugees had a lengthy sequel, which we will not discuss further here but that is discussed in a separate publication, *Grenselos igrenseland* (Borderless on the Borderland).
The most famous of these refugees was Jan Baalsrud, known for his “nine lives” and an epic escape that has been the subject of two films that show how cross-border reindeer herding Sámi helped Baalsrud over to Sweden via Finland.

On the Swedish side of the border, Sámi locals received refugees, such as in Gröndalen, a couple kilometres from the border in Nord-Trøndelag. They also trekked over to the Norwegian side and worked with the Norwegian Resistance. The Swedish authorities frowned on these initiatives and summoned them for interrogation; they threatened the Sámi with punishment if they did not reveal the names of their contacts in Norway. This did not happen; none of the Sámi revealed any information.\(^{69}\)

In Finland, the refugee routes to Sweden were not as organized as at the Swedish-Norwegian border. There has been storytelling in Finnish Lapland about the Reindeer Sámi smuggling the refugees from prison camps, but the issue has not been studied. The truth was that in the extremely thinly populated northern Finland, the local workers could not fulfill the Germans’ need for workforce in their widespread building and maintenance projects. The Germans extensively utilized their war prisoners and multinational forced and slave labourers in these projects, as they did in Norway. According to Oula Seitsonen, besides about 9000 Soviet prisoners, the Germans imported some 20 000 war prisoners and labourers from the occupied areas, at least from Estonia, France, Ingria, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and the Ukraine.\(^{70}\) Some of these were shot when captured, some escaped. They could easily lose their way in the vast “wilderness”, but the Sámi advised or led them to the Swedish border rather than exposing them to the Germans. The fugitives were not afraid, despite of two murders in Kilpisjärvi in 1942, executed by war prisoners.\(^{71}\)
Although the Sámi in Finland participated in military activities on the German/Finnish side, and Norwegian Sámi were part of the occupied Norwegian society, there do not appear to have been any extraordinary consequences deriving from German attitudes or treatment of Sámi, nor from a German conception of “racial superiority”, as far as we have seen. In the small, local communities in which soldiers lived in close contact with the local population, encounters between the two appear to have been cordial, not the least due to the *birgen* mentality of the Sámi, prioritizing mutual interests.

Generally speaking, the Germans demonstrated respect for the reindeer herding Sámi and the knowledge they possessed. On the other hand, they did not pay attention to other Sámi groups, such as the Sea Sámi in Norway, whose benefits or competence in fishing was subjugated to German fish industry. This division followed the idea of “genuine” and “other” Sámi in Scandinavian Sámi policies, but from the economic point of view, for the German troops, the reindeer was also a precious meat reserve, which they were not accustomed to take care of themselves.

Despite the partly admiring German attitude, the reindeer herding suffered during the war in both countries. Large military installations along with major road and railway projects created hindrances for reindeer husbandry, and in both countries, illegal reindeer poaching was a problem, although the scope is unknown. In Finland, young men, including reindeer herders, were conscripted as soldiers and were not able to take care of the herds. Thus, women and elders stepped in. Finnish authorities in Finland demanded large quantities of reindeer meat. This happened to a lesser extent in Norway, where the herders also could continue their traditional border crossing practices concerning their grazing rights in Sweden.

This article has restricted to analyse German-Sámi relations before the Lapland War, starting in September-October and bringing new changes and challenges. They are not discussed in
this article. During the Lapland War, however, there occurred an event which illuminates concretely the survivance strategy of the Sámi. It is the most famous Sámi "hero story" during the whole wartime.

It happened in Norway during the evacuation from Finnmark and Northern-Troms. The Germans ordered the reindeer herding Sámi to lead all their flocks to Helligskogen or Basevuovdi in Troms. Thus the access to fresh meat would be sustained from Troms. The Sámi agreed to do so, but when the Germans had turned their backs on them, they directed their herds to Finland, and not Troms, to another place called Basevuovdi or Helligskogen. By this heroic action, they saved the flocks and prohibited the Germans, now fulfilling the scorched earth in Finnmark and Northern Troms, to get hold of the meat supply.73

This event showed the double agency or even silent resistance that the Sámi were practicing the whole wartime, usually in a less obvious scale. The most common form of it was the ostensible cooperation with the occupiers especially in Norway. Instead of considering the Sámi as helpless victims of the Germans and the war, we have aimed at, with the idea of birget, to analyse how the Sámi tried to cope with the changes and, in unusual conditions, to normalize their lives as best they could. We have studied their possible strategies of shuttling between the expectations of the Germans, e.g. by representing experts of traditional skills, and the evasive tactics of being “out of the way” as much as possible.

The birgen mentality was reflected between the ostensible compliance and consent of the Sámi towards official demands, on the one hand, and the carrying out their own will as planned, when the eyes of the opposing party were turned away. The aim was not to challenge the establishment directly, because it would be risky, even after the hasty and hurried efforts
to make quick changes. The double agency included means of double communication, multi-layered discourse where the person expresses one thing but means something else that only the insiders of the community can understand. Resistance to the Germans was active in Norway, and the Sámi took part in several types of resistance tactics, from the silent non-compliance with orders for meat delivery, to physical sabotage and aid provided to help escaping refugees through the mountains and across the border into Sweden.
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1. In autumn 1944, the situation dramatically changed with burning the land and evacuation, a focus in another article.
8. About the silence resistance among the Sámi, see Lehtola, Evasive strategies.
10. In Finland, see e.g. Müller-Wille, Lappen und Finnen; Lähteenmäki, *Jänkäjääkäreitä*; In Norway, see e.g. Dancke, *Opp av ruinene*; Finne, *Krigen som aldri*; Berg Utviklingen av; Hage, *Gjenreisningsbyene*; Petterson, *Fortiet fortid*.
11. Eriksen and Halvorsen, *Frigjøring*, 64.
13. In Finland, see Lehtola Saamelainen evakko; Aikio, Olmmošhan birge; Nyyssönen *Everybody recognized*, 74-122.
14. For example, Johnskareng *Mu uhca*; Buljo, Eira, Hellekjær *Sámiid historja*; Samer i Sør, annals 2004.
15. Berg, Mot en korporativ.
One exception to the latter are the individual tame reindeer farms in the mountain regions further south in Norway.


One exception to the latter are the individual tame reindeer farms in the mountain regions further south in Norway.


See Lehtola, *The Saami siida*.


Before 1919, all the men of Lapin kihlakunta, whether Sámi or non-Sámi, were exempted from the military service because of the Lapp taxation scheme. Even after 1919, the absence of a suitable service precluded conscription for ten years, until the Pechenga border guards started training at the beginning of the 1930s. See Itkonen, *Inarin kirkkojen*, 221; Lehtola, *Saamelaiset suomalaiset*, 163.

Niklas Labba’s oral remark.

NOU: 1998:12 Alta battalion, chapter 7.3.


Kotimäki, *Saamelainen*.


Interview of Hans Niiles Pieski, see Lehtola, *Saamelainen evakko*, 52-53. Similar observations are reflected in some sources concerning the Sámi in Soviet forces during the Lapland War in 1944. Jakov Oktavov, one of the participants in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation in 1944, made the following statement: “Our village received the order to send more people with reindeer … Imagine that – a Sámi for the first time in a foreign country … Our skirmishes on the Norwegian side were not major … Besides, I met Norwegian reindeer herders … I was so surprised. Just think, Lapps like me living in Norway. I would never have believed it.” Gorter et al., *Frigjøringen av* 21ff. In Murmansk, a monument was later erected in gratitude to the ski and reindeer battalion’s contributions during the war. NRK Sápmi, August 2011.

Lehtola, *Saamelainen evakko*, 54.


Kyllingstad, Norwegian Physical.

Evjen, *Fra koppereventyr*.


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Eriksen and Halvorsen, *Frigjøring*, 65.


Hirsti, *Tuhotu*, 120-121.


About the Swedish Sámi policies, see Lantto and Mörkenstam, *Sami Rights*, 29-30.


Johansen, *Brent land*, 28 ff. One example is the land mine in Russelv in Kvalsvund that detonated and took the life of a Sámi nomad boy. When the war ended, German troops were assigned to clear the Germans’ own mines. In the course of eleven days in May 1945, some 61,000 mines were unearthed in Northern Norway alone. Nearly 30 soldiers died in the mine-clearing effort, and an equal number were injured.

Finstad, *Spiskammer*, 357ff. Recommendations came from people in Norway that the London government should issue a prohibition against participating in the fisheries because the industry was so important for the occupying powers. The recommendation was not heeded, but it serves as an indication of the importance of the fishing industry during the occupation. The fisheries had to be maintained at any rate to ensure uninterrupted food supplies, even though these supplies included meeting the occupying forces’ needs.

Andresen and Evjen (to be published 2020) chapter 7, Occupied (1940-1945).

Ibid.

Stenfjell, *Krigen forendret*, 121.


Kiseljov, *Sovietske*, 89.

Ibid, 91.

Kaila, *Lapin sota*, 146.
Annual reports of Lapland province governor 1939–1946. OMA; Interviews of Oula Näkkäläjärvi and Inger-Saara Magga. In fact, the Winter War of Finland caused compulsory slaughtering on the Norwegian side of the border as well. In 1939/40, as the Winter War raged, Sámi were advised by public authorities to slaughter as few of their livestock as possible so as to have a minor reserve in the event the war expanded northward. The Sámi nomads accommodated. Report on reindeer herding in Finnmark county for 1946–1947–1948, p.45.

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Lehtola, Saamelainen evakko, 61.

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See e.g. Gaski, When the thieves, 35-45.