



UiT Norges arktiske universitet

FAKULTET FOR HUMANIORA, SAMFUNNSVITENSKAP OG LÆRERUTDANNING

## **Norway`s pivot to Europe**

An analysis of Norwegian security policy direction

Jørgen Gammelgård

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Thankfully it appears as the worst is behind us.

Jørgen Gammelgård

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## **Abstract**

There is limited research done on whether Norway is in the process of shifting its security focus away from a transatlantic focus to a European focus. Such a shift would be completely unthinkable until recently, on grounds of Norwegian dependency of the US as its main security provider. Is this still the case? It is interesting to see what kind of effect the changes in international relations has on Norwegian policy. There are doubts in Europe on future American commitment to the region, Germany has gradually accepted more responsibility on security matters, and the EU have long been in the process of becoming a major security policy actor. The US diverted a lot of focus away from Europe with its pivot to the Pacific, and the current administration seem to be at odds with Europe on many issues, both trade and global governance. This thesis will analyze these developments and a Norwegian and German perspective, in order to see if Norway indeed is shifting its security policy focus closer to Europe.



# Table of contents

- 1 Introduction ..... 1
  - 1.1 Structure of the study ..... 3
- 2 Method ..... 5
  - 2.1 Choice of Method..... 5
  - 2.2 Research design..... 6
  - 2.3 Literature review ..... 7
    - 2.3.1 Empirical foundation..... 7
    - 2.3.2 Theoretical Foundation ..... 8
    - 2.3.3 Studies on the subject..... 8
  - 2.4 Positioning..... 9
  - 2.5 Validity..... 9
    - 2.5.1 Internal validity ..... 9
    - 2.5.2 Conceptional validity ..... 10
    - 2.5.3 External validity ..... 10
    - 2.5.4 Reliability ..... 10
  - 2.6 Weakness of the method ..... 11
  - 2.7 Research question..... 11
- 3 Theory ..... 13
  - 3.1 Introduction theory ..... 13
  - 3.2 Realism..... 13
  - 3.3 Neorealism ..... 14
    - 3.3.1 Defensive structural realism..... 16
    - 3.3.2 Offensive structural realism ..... 16
  - 3.4 Summary realisms ..... 17
  - 3.5 Liberalism..... 17
    - 3.5.1 Classic liberalism ..... 18

3.6	Neoliberal institutionalism .....	18
3.7	Summary liberalisms .....	19
3.8	Constructivism .....	20
3.9	Summary constructivism.....	20
3.10	Summary of theories .....	21
4	Norwegian security policy .....	23
4.1	Introduction .....	23
4.1.1	Hypotheses .....	24
4.2	Norwegian security policy development.....	25
4.2.1	Analysis of Norwegian security policy development .....	29
4.2.2	Summary Norwegian security policy development .....	31
5	NATO's Return to Europe .....	33
5.1	NATO's Return to Europe and conflicting interests in Norway-US relations.....	33
5.2	Analysis NATO's Return to Europe and conflicting interests in Norway-US relations .....	35
5.3	Summary analysis NATO's Return to Europe and conflicting interests in Norway-US relations .....	36
6	Security challenges and development in NATO and the EU .....	37
6.1	Analysis Security challenges and development in NATO and the EU .....	38
6.2	Summary analysis Security challenges and development in NATO and the EU.....	38
7	Burden sharing and Norwegian contribution .....	41
7.1	Analysis Burden sharing and Norwegian contribution .....	43
7.2	Summary analysis Burden sharing and Norwegian contribution.....	44
8	Norway and EU relations .....	45
8.1	Norwegian EU relations and developments in EU approach to security and defense policy	45
8.2	Analysis Norwegian EU relations and developments in EU approach to security and defense policy.....	50



8.3	Summary analysis Norwegian EU relations and developments in EU approach to security and defense policy .....	52
9	Norway, Europe, USA and the community of liberal values.....	53
9.1	Norway, Europe, USA and the community of liberal values.....	53
9.2	Analysis Norway, Europe, USA and the community of liberal values.....	56
9.3	Summary analysis Norway, Europe, USA and the community of liberal values ....	56
10	US-NATO relations.....	57
10.1	US-NATO relational development.....	57
10.2	Analysis US-NATO relational development.....	59
10.3	Summary analysis US-NATO relational development .....	60
11	Norwegian-German relations .....	61
11.1	Development in Norwegian-German relations .....	61
11.2	Analysis Development in Norwegian-German relations .....	63
11.3	Summary analysis Development in Norwegian-German relations .....	64
12	German security perspective .....	65
12.1	German security perspective development .....	65
12.2	Analysis German security perspective development .....	67
12.3	Summary analysis German security perspective development .....	68
13	Norwegian-German submarine development agreement.....	69
13.1	Joint Norwegian-German submarine collaboration .....	69
13.2	Analysis Joint Norwegian-German submarine collaboration .....	71
13.3	Summary analysis Joint Norwegian-German submarine collaboration.....	71
14	Results .....	73



# 1 Introduction

Why interest in the subject?

There is limited research done on whether Norway is in the process of shifting its security focus away from a transatlantic focus to a European focus. Such a shift would be completely unthinkable until recently, on grounds of Norwegian dependency of the United States (US) as its main security provider. Is this still the case? I attended a workshop arranged by CPS (Center for Peace Studies at the University of Tromsø) on: Interconnected Security? Military Activities, Postures and Risk Reduction in the Barents, Baltic and Black Sea, in cooperation with ISPK (Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University) in Tromsø last year. Scientists from various foundations and Universities, and nationalities participated. The perspectives presented by the Ukrainian delegation, painted a picture of a desperation and of a feeling of standing alone. That western Europe had not done enough to aid them in their conflict with Russia. The response from representatives from western Europe, was that they somewhat agreed. They sympathized and wished their countries could have done more, but risking war with Russia, over a state that neither was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), nor (European Union (EU) member was never going to happen.

In the discussion of what can be done to avoid, or minimize risks of similar conflicts in the future, the participants from; University of Kiel, ISPK, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg, Odessa Mechnikov National University, National Academy of Educational Sciences, Kyiv, The Royal Danish Army Academy, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, all agreed on the need of more cooperation and integration. EU and NATO was the only two actors that could serve as credible balance against foreign threats. This workshop greatly influenced the direction of this thesis. The main sentiment I left with from the workshop was, who your allies are matter.

It is interesting to see what kind of effect the changes in international relations has on Norwegian policy. Norway is a founding member of NATO and ever since the end of WWII has sought great power protection from the US (Tamnes, 2019). Ever since I read about the Norwegian-German submarine development agreement, and its depth and scope, I wondered if it could be a sign of a more continental European security policy focus from Norway. The same fears of decreasing American commitment to Europe are valid for Norway. Without a

solid commitment and support from the US to NATO, Norway have little in means of deterrence capabilities towards a more aggressive Russia. This thesis will analyze developments in Norwegian security policy. It will analyze developments in Norwegian relations with its most essential partners. It will analyze the relations between US-NATO, and EU developments on security policy. It will analyze the German perspective on security policy. Then it will complement the other parts of the analysis, by analyzing the Norwegian-German submarine development agreement to see if Norway is turning its security policy away from a transatlantic focus, towards the EU, and especially Germany

For as long as I can remember (early 1990's), the US has been the hegemon in international relations, and it has been regarded as Norway's most important ally. In recent years the international stage has changed, some states have become more authoritarian, some more liberal. There has been challenges to the balance of power, some have gained power, some have declined in power. What of the liberal values community, are the bonds still as strong as they previously have been regarded as. During the George W Bush era (2001-2009), a major stumbling block, in form of the invasion in Iraq (2003), and the “*with us, or against us*” policy (Bush, 2001) took place and criticism escalated between Europe and the US and Great Britain, and tensions grew (Kaufman, 2017). During the presidency of Barack Obama (2009-2017) efforts were made, and America declared itself ready to lead again. Simultaneously the US had its “*pivot to the Pacific*” that caused doubts on the credibility on US commitment to Europe (Kaufman, 2017). Under the current administration the US has not carried out policies that attempt to bridge tensions and relive uncertainty. Rather it is promoting a more isolationist policy “*America first*”, the President also has made it a habit of praising leaders of totalitarian regimes, such as Russia (B. Williams & Cilizza, 2019), Europe's arch enemy. The US President has also sowed further doubts on American commitment to Europe by threatening to not prioritize supporting Europe if article 5 was triggered, unless Europe payed more for American security guarantees (Zapfe, Thränert, & Zapfe, 2017). Very recently the US has withdrawn from important reassurance arrangements between NATO and Russia (Kruse, 2020), and has pulled its support of World Health Organization (WHO) (McNeil Jr & Jacobs, 2020).

After a period with “*perestroika and glasnost*” Russia has risen as a more aggressive neighbor. The intervention in Georgia in 2008 and especially the annexation of Crimea in 2014 heralded a heightened focus on European security (Holm, 2017).

Inside the EU there has developed an increasing will to become a major security policy actor, capable of taking more responsibility of its own security (Oma, 2019), As evidence of that ambition, the EU has developed agencies and institutions facilitating cooperation and integration in order to reach “*strategic autonomy*” (EEAS, 2016).

Germany has been supported and called for to take more responsibility on security politics in the EU, at the same time it has gradually developed an understanding in Germany that it must and wants to be a partner to lean on, and to accept more responsibility of European security (R. M. Allers, Masala, & Tamnes, 2014). Germany also stands out as leading promoter of liberal values, of global governance, and of opening up the EU for collaboration with third party countries (Bendiek, Kempin, & von Ondarza, 2018; Koenig & Walter-Franke, 2017).

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## **1.1 Structure of the study**

This thesis begins with by presenting the chosen theories from international relations, and key concepts and theoretical arguments for what affects a state chosen path of security, and defense policy. Central driving forces derived from the empirical data will contribute to an understanding of state behavior in situations with conflicting, and coinciding interests.

Next, after presenting the theoretical foundation, the methodology is presented. This thesis is a document analysis, with a hermeneutical basis, intensive design, analyzed with an abductive approach. Trademarks of the chosen method, and its weakness will be presented.

Next, a comprehensive description of Norwegian security policy development, Norwegian relations with Germany, US, EU, will be presented, US-NATO relations, developments in the liberal values community will be presented. German, and EU perspectives on security will also be presented. Next a description of the Norwegian-German submarine agreement will be presented. The empirical data will be analyzed partially under each segment, and conclusively they will be summarized in a conclusion.



## 2 Method

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze empirical data to answer the following research question: “*Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus*”? Data from various sources, with different perspectives will give a more in-depth understanding of developments in not only Norwegian security policy development, but also developments internationally. In order to answer the research question in a scientific way, the thesis has to gather empirical data, and subsequently analyze it. The method chapter will show the considerations, and basis for the choices made regarding which method was thought to be the best suited to construct the structure of the thesis.

### 2.1 Choice of Method

Scientific method is a necessary condition which is the foundation needed in order to carry out a serious scientific assignment (Holme & Solvang, 1996). The concept of Scientific method is according to Riley (1963) a comprehensive approach that encapsulate both organization of, and interpretation of data which helps us achieve a greater understanding of society. Scientific method can in turn be defined as a tool or a comprehensive approach to solve problems, and create new understanding (Holme & Solvang, 1996). The literature generally divide between qualitative and quantitative method. For this master thesis qualitative method was considered to be best suited to answer the questions posed by this study. Qualitative method focuses on processes and meaning which can not be measured in quantity and frequency (Thagaard, 2018). This thesis objective is to analyze empirical material on Norwegian, EU, German and US security policy development and relation development between the actors. Connections of this kind is assumed to be based on complex interaction between political, structural, economical, and social factors. For that an hermeneutical approach is chosen, as the purpose is to understand a phenomenon, and not measure it. The need for interpretation and understanding supports the choice of qualitative method (Jacobsen, 2005). This study also intends to account for theories on international relations (IR) which appears to be well suited to explain the basic mechanisms behind bi- and multilateral cooperation.

## 2.2 Research design

The research design is a description of how the entire analytical process is laid out to answer the questions posted by the study, in an efficient and reliable way, given the goals of the researcher and the practical and ethical restraints (Toshkov, 2018). Choosing the research design, case study is a design, where in order to answer the research question, it requires depth and comprehensive description of a complex phenomenon (Yin, 2003). The main scientific methodological approach for this study is document analysis, as the relevant information for answering the research question is to be found there.

Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents (Bowen, 2009). As with other qualitative methods, document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge (Bowen, 2009). Yin (2003) describes the applicability of document analysis as “*a qualitative method document analysis is particularly applicable to intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, program or event*”. The literature separates between primary sources and secondary sources (Thagaard, 2018). The sources of empirical data, is mainly Norwegian and German peer-reviewed secondary sources, that has studied Norwegian security policy, German security policy, and developments in relations in NATO, the US and the EU. The secondary sources will provide an substance and depth, albeit interpreted description of the different perspectives. Primary sources are in this study, government strategical documents, and white papers. The primary sources are intended to support, or debunk perceptions from the secondary sources. There is a need for choosing between extensive or intensive design. Complex research questions with many variables, demand an intensive design (Busch, 2013). A hermeneutical base further drives towards choosing intensive design (Busch, 2013). For the researcher it is important to be aware of the possible effect it could have on interpreting, analyzing the data, and on the selection process behind the gathering of empirical data (Thagaard, 2018). A qualitative approach opens for several methods of gathering data, this study initially intended to use individual interviews as a complementary method, it applied to Norwegian Center for Research Data, the thesis was regarded as in compliance with official guidelines, and was approved. So the study could have proceeded with carrying out interviews with relevant researchers, government officials, and individuals from the Ministry of Defense. Unfortunately, the covid-19 pandemic made it impossible to travel and meet the subjects in person. It also meant that both possible interview subjects, and myself had to home-school children and work from home. This meant people



had little opportunity to find the time to participate in interviews. It is important to underline that no interviews were conducted, and therefore no more attention is given to interview as a method.

Summarized it is a study based on a qualitative hermeneutical theoretical method. The study is a document study, with an intensive design, that will be solved by an abductive approach.

## **2.3 Literature review**

### **2.3.1 Empirical foundation**

There has been extensive research on Norwegian security policy. Much of the research has been on Norwegian dependency on the US as its main security guarantor, and on Norwegian balancing between NATO integration and non-escalation with the Soviet Union. The research has contributed to increase knowledge on different aspects of Norwegian security policy, either it is on the role of NATO as the main source of deterrence capabilities, and Norwegian dependency, on burden sharing developments in the alliance, or on international structural change. Norwegian institute for foreign affairs is a source of a substantial amount of research on Norwegian security policy development (Græger, 2002, 2005, 2016, 2018, 2019; Haugevik & Græger, 2018; Leira & Græger, 2018). Græger, Haugevik, Holm and Leira have analyzed and discussed Norwegian relations with its closest partners, security policy direction, and developments affecting Norwegian priorities. Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS) has also been a major source of research material. IFS studies on Norwegian security policy, has provided an insight to driving forces behind Norwegian security and defense policy, and theoretical approaches on Norwegian decision-making in IR (R. Allers, 2018; R. M. Allers et al., 2014; Børresen, Gjeseth, & Tamnes, 2004; Hilde, 2019; Tamnes, 2019), as well as insight to German security perspectives and to NATO relations. The German Institute for International and Security Affairs has been a source of empirical material concerning German policy development and relations with NATO (Zapfe & Glatz, 2017). The literature is also supported by other various sources, from newspaper articles, and articles from different magazines and institutes.

### **2.3.2 Theoretical Foundation**

Regarding security policy and theoretical approaches, the most dominating theoretical approaches are neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. With a neorealist perspective Norway security policy would be a result of the changing power configuration, that will affect patterns of alignment and conflict in world politics (Waltz, 2010). A defensive structural realist perspective would assume Norway to pursue a policy of “just right” amount of power, since steps taken to increase defensive capabilities often are ambiguous and could be misinterpreted as aggressive measures, and could lead to an arms race or war (Fiammenghi, 2011).

With a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, Norwegian security policy would be expected to be driven by cooperation, and by that states have incentives such as limited resources, common good, collective interests, and shadow of the future. The perspective explains driving forces behind cooperation after the Cold War, and revived cooperation after Russian aggression. The neoliberal institutional approach also explains continued existence of support to international institutions since institutions are created by state actors to facilitate the achievement of their joint interests (Axelrod, 2006; Keohane, 1986, 1989, 2005; Navari, 2013).

In a constructivist perspective, institutions are an expression of shared identity, where allies share common norms and values. The constructivist perspective would assume Norwegian security policy to be seeking cooperation with the partners most likeminded and who at the time has shared understanding, norms, and values. Because the international system is changeable, identities and interests are not static, these may be altered through social interaction (McDonald, 2013)

### **2.3.3 Studies on the subject**

There has been recent master studies from IFS on Norwegian-German cooperation, that revealed relevant aspects behind cooperation, on the submarine development agreement. They are the following; Leif Ivar Wahlund studied the Norwegian-German submarine agreement as a case in international armaments cooperation, as his master thesis. His study underlines driving forces as US pivot the Pacific, and the resulting fear of marginalization as the main reason behind Norway seeking multiple sources of security (Wahlund, 2019). Malte

Ermerling studied the driving forces behind Norwegian-German cooperation. His study analyzed driving forces behind increase in security cooperation in Europe, with Norwegian-German cooperation as a case. Ermerling argues that cooperation in Europe, is being forced upon them, by the security situation, limited resources. He also argues that constructivist drivers determine who works together with who (Ermerling, 2018).

Research on Norwegian security policy development, EU security policy development armaments cooperation, and on shared values in the security community, has contributed to many important findings and knowledge that this thesis will make use of as empirical data to be analyzed.

## **2.4 Positioning**

There is limited research done on whether Norway is in the process of shifting its security focus away from a transatlantic focus to a European focus. Such a shift would be completely unthinkable until recently, on grounds of Norwegian dependency of the US as its main security provider. Is this still the case? This thesis aims to complement knowledge on this area. This thesis analyzes security policy developments in Europe, from a Norwegian and German perspective and relations between Norway and its most relevant partners, NATO, the EU, USA, and Germany. The analysis of the different perspectives and relationships will provide theoretical explanation of the main driving forces behind Norwegian security development and will conclusively give an answer to whether Norway is shifting its security policy away from a transatlantic focus, to a European focus.

## **2.5 Validity**

Whichever theoretical approach chosen, quantitative or qualitative method, validity is important (Thagaard, 2018). To check and control for validity Yin (2003) prescribes four tests. They are internal validity, construction validity, external validity and reliability.

### **2.5.1 Internal validity**

Internal validity is whether the study examines what its meant to examine. Are the results considered as correct, when put up against the purpose of the study (Jacobsen, 2005). The purpose of the study is to see if it could find empirical evidence from analyzing developments

in Norwegian security policy, to support an answer to the research question which is: : “*Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus*”? The internal validity is considered secured, by utilizing a theoretical framework of IR theories, and analyzing empirical data concerning not only Norwegian security policy developments, but also developments in its closest allies. This framework constructed, with appropriate theories is considered compatible to answer with the study`s research question.

### **2.5.2 Conceptual validity**

Conceptual validity is to which degree the study examines the concepts meant to be examined. It was important to secure that international relation concepts, and their connection to Norwegian security policy was examined. The conceptual validity was considered as satisfactory, by performing these actions. First, by gathering data from different research environments, different countries to secure different perspectives. Primary Norwegian government sources could either support, debunk or contradict the secondary sources, as to clear up any misperceptions. Finally, there is an openness surrounding the study, where what is done is described in the study.

### **2.5.3 External validity**

External validity, is to what degree the results of the study can be transferred to other situations, or relevant contexts. That means, to what degree, the findings of the study can be generalized (Jacobsen, 2005). This study does not seek generalization, when the empirical data gathered, was intended to examine Norwegian security policy development, and its closest partners. This study is nevertheless concerned on securing the external validity, this is attempted by selecting empirical material from different research environments and nationalities.

### **2.5.4 Reliability**

The term reliability is well incorporated in quantitative methods, and refers to whether the study could be reproduced and would produce the same outcome, while conducted by a

different researcher. In qualitative method it has a different meaning. This study has highlighted what is considered to be primary sources, as these sources are not interpreted by the researcher or have been interpreted by other researchers, to increase the openness. To secure reliability, this study by describing the process, its empirical data, and what it is intended to examine, allows it to be transparent. Description of what the study is meant to examine, the chosen method of executing the study, and transparency are considered to secure the reliability.

## **2.6 Weakness of the method**

By not being able to triangulate the data, there is the possibility of missing out on relevant information. Interviews could have been a way of gathering information not available in official documents or peer reviewed articles. Anonymity of sources opens up for the possibility of obtaining information, not public. Multiple methods of gathering data could have strengthened the empirical foundation the analysis is based on.

## **2.7 Research question**

This thesis will perform an in-depth analysis of the direction of Norwegian security policy. It will focus on external factors affecting the development of Norwegian, but also European and American security policy. It will give an in-depth account of factors affecting Norwegian and its partners security policy in the past, and how they affected the security policy direction in Norway, NATO, EU, US and Germany. This will provide a greater explanatory foundation, because of the possibility of comparison of different factors effecting security policy direction. Compared to other research, this thesis will combine a Norwegian, and German/EU perspective on security, on order to carry out an analysis on a solid foundation of empirical data. It will highlight developments, major incidents, and implement them in the analysis. Analyzing perspectives from outside sources, and Norwegian partners, the development in their relations, will add depth and quality to the analysis, and will therefore add value to the findings. Applying international relations theory to explain the driving forces and the mechanisms at play, will also add quality and validity to the findings of the thesis. The research question of the thesis is as following:

*“Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus”?*

To answer this question, an analysis of the following empirical data will be conducted. A historical perspective on Norwegian security policy, Norwegian relations with the US, NATO, the EU, and with Germany. A German perspective on security policy, and German relation with Norway. US-NATO relation development, and developments in the community of liberal values, as this community has been regarded as the same as the security community (NATO). An analysis of these perspectives and development in the relations of these security policy actors, will give insight to which driving forces determine security policy, and is in this context essential to answer whether Norway in fact is *in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus?*

## 3 Theory

### 3.1 Introduction theory

The goal of this chapter is to review major theoretical approaches and highlight theoretical mechanisms that can might explain the nature of why Norway has a goal of expanding security cooperation and alliance building. And further describe and possibly explain whether the Norwegian/German submarine development can be seen as a step towards a more Eurocentric basis for security, or if it is a step towards differentiation of Norwegian security. The theoretical framework allows this thesis to analyze the empirical data, and give an account of the theoretical mechanisms behind security policy development. The major theories in IR are neorealism/structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. The relevancy and the main tenets of these theories will be described in sufficient detail in this chapter.

These theoretical mechanisms and explanatory factors, will constitute a foundation for analysis, and will be tested against what the empirical data shows. It will further give an indication towards which, if any of the theoretical approaches seems to be best suited to explain the Norwegian-German submarine program and if the close cooperation can be seen as part of a greater shift in Norwegian security policy, towards a closer security community with Norway`s European allies. But as (Keohane, 1986, pp. 4-5)described international relations theory *“If international relations theory were as generally valid as Newtonian physics is for ordinary events, practitioners could learn only its theorems, or maxims, without exploring carefully the question of on what assumptions, and under what conditions, they will continue to be applicable. But since it is neither so generally valid nor so unchangingly applicable, we must be on our guard”*.

### 3.2 Realism

Realism is considered a relevant theoretical approach, as it explains how states in an anarchic international structure strive for security through power, and claim that abstract moral discourse does not take into account political realities, and therefore should focus on hard power and on securing national interests. From the 1940s and the follow decades, realism was the predominant IR theory. Twentieth-century classical realism generally traced back to Edward Hallet Carr`s *The Twenty Years` Crisis* published in 1939 (P. D. Williams, 2012).

Realism can trace its basic ideas back to Thucydides' writings on the Peloponnesian War in the early 400's B.C., where Thucydides writes that all men are motivated by honor, greed, and, above all, fear (Thucydides, Finley, & Crawley, 1951). Thomas Hobbes wrote in his book *Leviathan* first published in 1651, about the natural state. That anarchy is the rule; order, justice and morality are the exceptions. Hobbes natural state could only be dealt with, by individuals give up some of their liberties in order to form a government, a form of common security, what Hobbes called a social contract (Hobbes, 1996).

What Gilpin (1984) wrote about the nature of political realism, is that all realist theories share three core assumptions regarding political life. The first assumption is regarding the inherent conflictual nature of international affairs, the rule of anarchy. The second assumption, is about that the essence of social reality is the group. A possible way of interpreting the second assumption is that in a world of scarce resources and conflict over the distribution of those resources, human beings confront each other, not, as individuals but as members of a group. In the modern society, we call these tribes, nation-states. The third assumption is that power and security is at the core of all political life. These are assumptions on the core of political realism, but they do not mean that the realist needs to forego quest for higher virtues, such as justice and morality, but in the end all moral schemes will come to an end if the basic reality about power is forgotten.

Hans Morgenthau was one of the key classic realist thinkers and writers. As he writes in his classic work *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. That the reason behind the conflictual nature of politics among nations, and the lust for power, comes from the nature of human beings. Another of Morgenthau's core concepts of political realism is the concept of balance of power. The world order is not moral, not just, and equilibrium or stability, can only come to pass, when there is a balance of power between nation states (Morgenthau, 1948).

### **3.3 Neorealism**

Neorealism is considered as a relevant theory to analyze development in Norwegian security policy, as it describes how the international structure affect the actors possible choices of action. Neorealism, or structural realism developed in the 70's from the belief that human nature as the foundation for explaining the behavior of states was incorrect and did not



provide a satisfactory explanation. Kenneth N. Waltz's 1979 book *Theory of International Politics* is recognized as the seminal work on structural realism (Jensen, Elman, & McDonald, 2013). Waltz recognizes that IR is ordered by the principle of anarchy, what Waltz means is that the anarchic structure places more severe restraints on state behavior than classical realism and neoliberalism (Baldwin, 1993; Waltz, 2010). Structures, according to Waltz are what defines the ordering of the parts in the international system. (2010). International relations is populated by units (states) that perform similar functions, and what differs between the units is the distribution of power, or the relative capabilities of the units (Waltz, 2010). The question of whether relative gains concerns, impede cooperation between states has been extensively debated subsequently by among others Grieco, Powell, and Snidal (Baldwin, 1993). The international political outcomes that Waltz predict include that multipolar systems will be less stable than bipolar systems; that interdependence will be lower in bipolarity than multipolarity (Waltz, 2010). In Waltzian neorealism, the changing power configuration will affect patterns of alignment and conflict in world politics, so balances of power must emerge (Waltz, 2014). Neorealism and neoliberalism agree on the key premise about anarchy, but anarchy does not have the same core elements.

Neorealism goes further with what anarchy means, it does not only encompass the neoliberal interpretation that states fear being cheated in the absence of an international government, realist theory states in addition to the fear of being cheated, states fear domination, or even destruction by others (Grieco, 1992). For the small states of the world, they could easily find themselves in another dilemma. As they lack deterrence capabilities, they may be forced to join alliances with more powerful states in order to have a reliable capacity to deter perceived threats. A consequence of joining an alliance for a small state, is that the state becomes too dependent of its partners, and in fear of abandonment may be drawn into their conflicts (Snyder, 1984).

Under the neorealist umbrella, there are two distinct variations of structural realism that are prominent in political realism today. That is defensive structural realism and offensive structural realism.

### **3.3.1 Defensive structural realism**

Norwegian defense and security policy has a certain degree of duality in its approach to deterrence and accumulation of power, that a defensive structural realist approach could explain. What separates defensive structural realism from neorealism, is, in the case defensive structural realism, that, rational choice is the sole source of explanation of state behavior. Second, defensive structural realism adds the offence-defense balance as a variable. This theory argues that technology and geography often are in favor of defense. Third, combining rationality and an offence-defense balance that favors defense, defensive structural realist predict that states should support status quo (Jensen et al., 2013). Balancing according to defensive structural realism, is the rational response to traditional security threats. Defensive structural realism relies on security dilemma to explain war. Since steps taken to increase defensive capabilities often are ambiguous and could be misinterpreted as aggressive measures, and could lead to an arms race or war. The state should accumulate enough power to deter opponents, but not so much that they feel compelled to take action against it. Increasing capabilities beyond a certain point, can thus be self-defeating (Fiammenghi, 2011) This is why international politics is tragic, not evil, conflict happens because states are placed in difficult situations and misinterpret perceived threats. The idea that by seeking to increase its own security, a state may be perceived as an aggressor by another state, defensive structural realism suggests that states should seek an appropriate amount of power, not maximizing it (Jensen et al., 2013).

### **3.3.2 Offensive structural realism**

The balancing between deterrence and reassurance towards Russia in Norwegian security policy, could be explained by defensive structural realism. Yet, Norway at the same time seek cooperation, and development of capabilities with as many allies and partners as possible. This could be seen as a way of power maximizing, therefore offensive structural realism could have some explanatory power.

Offensive structural realism differs from defensive structural realism on the premise of that states should seek an appropriate amount of power. States face an uncertain international political environment, and could be under threat from other states. Under such circumstances relative capabilities is of the utmost importance, and the best security strategy requires acquiring as much power compared to other states as possible in order to secure the survival

of the state (Jensen et al., 2013). States will take any increment of power they can get away with, and that states are relative power maximizers that try to figure out when they can push, and when not to push.

### **3.4 Summary realisms**

The realist theories presuppose an anarchic international system, and regard states as the main actors in the system. The structure of the system is also characterized as self-help. The concept of security claims that accumulation of power is the basic motive for state behavior, since some measure of power is needed to ensure the survival of the state. The power structure reflects distribution of power, and the will of dominant powers prevails in decision-making in institutions. In an offensive realism perspective, we have an armed and watchful peace anchored in mutual deterrence. In a defensive perspective we have status quo states, who has managed to signal their peaceful intentions. The basic theoretical mechanisms this paper derive from realism, is, in an anarchic international structure, states seek to increase their power, traditionally “hard power” (military capabilities), or other capabilities, such as monetary, natural resources, etc. Increment in power to increase security, can be achieved by either development of the state capabilities, or as many states, especially in the case of Europe and North-America join an alliance, in order to balance against a perceived threat by way of deterrence thru military capabilities.

### **3.5 Liberalism**

Liberalism has its origins in the writings of enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). According to Kant, the only legitimate form of government was the republic government, a constitutional rule, where even the monarchs were subject to law (Navari, 2013). Kant argued that republican states were more inclined to peaceful behavior than other states. Peaceful behavior he attributed to the legal foundations of the republican state and consultative habits, a people consulted before going to war, he argued were less like to condone war easily and that a state built on law, would be less likely to endorse lawless behavior in international relations (Navari, 2013). One of Kant’s key arguments was his critique of the concept of balance of power. The idea of conscious balancing, that it served as a peacekeeper was fallacious, since it was the desire of every state to, or of its ruler to arrive

at a state of perpetual peace by conquering the entire world (Navari, 2013). A view shared by offensive realists. Kant established the idea of perpetual peace as a consequence of republican governments, the foundation for democratic peace theory, that states that democratic states are more peaceful, and will not go to war with each other. Other liberal thinkers claim that trade has a peacekeeping effect between states, an approach called *deuce commerce*. (Kalnes, Austvik, & Røhr, 2010). The foundation of *deuce commerce* is, that trade is considered a less costly way of accumulating wealth than war (Moravcsik, 2001). When one adds economic interdependence, the costs of engaging in war, becomes even more costly and complicated.

### **3.5.1 Classic liberalism**

Simultaneously as Norway has sought great power protection, Norway has had a firm stance on the importance of liberal values, and belief in Norway could make a difference. Liberalism is considered to have explanatory power on this aspect of Norwegian security policy.

Classical liberalism, or idealism shares the concept of the anarchic structure in the international system. It does not share the what can be described as the cynical view on human nature, and claims that anarchy can be moderated thru a common norm system and cooperation. During the 1970`s Liberalism made a comeback as a major IR theory, after a long post WWII realism dominated period. *Détente*, international trade, the European integration into the EU were influential as to why liberalism had more explanatory power, than the past previous decades (Navari, 2013).

### **3.6 Neoliberal institutionalism**

Norway has, and is a strong supporter of an international order governed by international law, and the international institutions that regulate and implement international law. Neoliberal institutionalism is considered as having explanatory power, as it describes the role of institutions in shaping the international system.

Neoliberal institutionalism was especially influential in the liberal theory`s rise in this period. The foundation for neoliberal institutionalism is the role of international institutions in mitigating conflict (Navari, 2013). Keohane (1989) and Axelrod (2006) played a central part in pointing to the ability of institutions such as the United Nations (UN) to redefine state roles and act as a mediator in state disputes. Institutions, cannot transform anarchy, but they can change and influence the character of the international system. The interaction between states in institutions, with the right framework, can be developed to cooperation on important topics

such peace and prosperity. The practice of tit-for-tat was identified by Axelrod (2006) as a key factor in explaining under which circumstances cooperation will emerge in a world of egoist without central authority. When states returned good for good, it would initiate a spiral of cooperative behavior. This practice would lead to an increase in trust between states. Through modelling this practice as a prisoner dilemma, it was implied that if states repeatedly found themselves in a situation where they feared being taken advantage of, they would seek to create reinsurance devices, reinsurance creates institutions (Navari, 2013). In neoliberal institutionalism state actors create institutions in order to reach joint interests (Keohane, 1989). Tit-for-tat was not the only factor introduced by Axelrod, “shadow of the future”, was his term for the possibility to attain gains in the future, and it provides a strong incentive to cooperate, for fear of what lay ahead (Axelrod, 2006). Another central point to neoliberal institutionalism is transaction costs. It is argued that institutions are desirable, even though they limit actions possible to states, because they reduce transaction cost associated with law-making, enforcing, implementing and conflict resolution (Navari, 2013).

Institutions can evolve over time, and become regimes. Regimes often continue to exist after the reason for its creation has disappeared, “because they are difficult to create or reconstruct” (Keohane, 2005). This is the core of neoliberal institutionalism, international actors should promote institutionalization as a means to promote the collective interest in international stability. This is also considered the reason behind the durability of NATO, it did not only persist, it has also expanded after the end of the Cold War. NATO was not merely an alliance, it became a security institution (Navari, 2013). Complex interdependence was introduced by Keohane and Nye (1977) as a term to describe how traditional power politics no longer stands alone a top of the hierarchy as the most important agenda in international politics. It describes how power, in a multilateralist world no longer primarily comes from the threat of military forces. Power comes in these circumstances from asymmetries in interdependence (Barkin, 2006).

### **3.7 Summary liberalisms**

The structure of the international system is social, and dynamic, it is characterized by governance without government. The system is anarchic but by cooperation in international institutions, integration, democratization, conflict resolution, and by the rule of law, states can achieve security. Gains are in absolute terms, and therefore win-win situations are possible,

which increases possibility for mutual interest in cooperation and conflict resolutions. The functional scope of security, is across multiple areas, not only the military realm. The power structure is symmetrical, it has a high degree of interdependence, and decision-making is democratically legitimized.

### **3.8 Constructivism**

Constructivism has become an increasingly prominent IR theoretical approach since its emergence in the 1990's, drawing insight from sociology (McDonald, 2013). The central assumption of constructivism is that the world is constituted socially through inter-subjective interaction, and that ideational factor such as norms and identity is central to the constitution and dynamics of international politics, and that security is a social construct. Constructivist focuses on how perspectives and practices emerge, and how social and historical context through social interaction affects actors to bring values and norms in to international politics. In the constructivist approach, the international system is changeable, identities and interests are not static, these may be altered through social interaction (McDonald, 2013). The possibilities for structural change was highlighted in Wendt's article *Anarchy is what states make of it*. The argument Wendt poses is that there is nothing inevitable about anarchy in the international system (Wendt, 1992). States can influence structure through the way they act, and through their practices, they can either maintain the structure or disrupt it. Constructivists believe that shared understanding about what is legitimate behavior, and expectations to adhere to what is seen as the correct behavior, can become so powerful that it limits possible political actions, by fear of not being seen as a state that does not follow shared norms and values. Constructivism is an adaptable approach, it is not cemented in theoretical assumptions, in the way realism and liberalism is (McDonald, 2013).

### **3.9 Summary constructivism**

The community of liberal values has been regarded as the same as the security community, but there are indicators that point to growing tensions and a divide between the members of that community, on grounds of changing identities and changing norms. Constructivism describes how identities and norms can affect relations between actors, and how the

international system can be affected. Therefore constructivism is considered as havin some explanatory power towards Norwegian choice of allies.

Constructivism argues that actors identities, interests and the system they operate in not is predetermined and static, but is a interpreted and constructed by the actors through social interaction, and changes as a result of interaction between the actors. This entails that cooperation between states is socially constructed, and based on norms, identities. Shared norms and values, leads to stabile social relations between states on all levels, and to an agreement on many fundamental issues in international politics.

### **3.10 Summary of theories**

In this chapter it is given a detailed description of what structural realism, institutional liberalism and constructivism claims about motivation behind state behavior. What strategy lies behind Norwegian security policy, which mechanisms from the major IR theories has the greatest explanatory power for the purpose of this paper. For that purpose, central mechanisms from each of three theories have been highlighted, and will be used when analysing and discussing the results of the analysis. The security political environment is changing and becoming more integrated in the EU, USA has had the Pivot to the Pacific, uncertainties about the future affects Norwegian security strategy and will be discussed in the analysis chapter.





## 4 Norwegian security policy

### 4.1 Introduction

It is interesting to see what kind of effect the changes in international relations has on Norwegian policy. Norway is a founding member of NATO and ever since the end of WWII has sought great power protection from the US (Tamnes, 2019). Ever since reading about the Norwegian-German submarine development agreement, and its depth and scope, I wondered if it could be a sign of a more continental European security policy focus from Norway. The same fears of decreasing American commitment to Europe are valid for Norway. Without a solid commitment and support from the US to NATO, Norway have little in means of deterrence capabilities towards a more aggressive Russia. This thesis will analyze developments in Norwegian security policy. It will analyze developments in Norwegian relations with its most essential partners. It will analyze the relations between US-NATO, and EU developments on security policy. It will analyze the German perspective on security policy. Then it will complement the other parts of the analysis, by analyzing the Norwegian-German submarine development agreement to see if Norway is turning its security policy away from a transatlantic focus, towards the EU, and especially Germany

The main research question this paper aims to answer is; *Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus?* The empirical material will review a historical description of trends, events, in international relations, between Norway and German, between the US and Europe, between the EU and the rest of Europe and within the EU, that sheds light on factors that can provide an empirical foundation that answers the main research question. The secondary research question is *“Is the Norwegian-German submarine project an indicator of this change in security policy”?*

The paper will present the empirical data of Norwegian defense and security policy after WWII. The purpose of the empirical data in this paper is to present a comprehensive description of how Norway has chosen to align itself in consideration of its allies and partners, and its perceived threats. The empirical data aims to show the reader what was the main drivers behind Norwegian security policy focus, what are the main drivers behind contemporary Norwegian security policy focus, and how international actors, and external

factors affect Norwegian choice of action. In order to determine whether there is a changing focus in Norwegian security policy focus.

In order to identify the main drivers and mechanism behind Norwegian security policy, insight from central theories on international relation and security studies will be taken into account. The empirical material will be analyzed with the perspective of; structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism to derive the central driving forces and mechanisms behind Norwegian security policy development.

### **4.1.1 Hypotheses**

*Norway is moving closer to its geographically close allies in mainland Europe, predominately closer to Germany, but not away from the transatlantic cooperation.* The scope of the Norwegian-German submarine development collaboration is a sign of a wish to form closer ties with Germany. This development is as a result of increased German will to take more responsibility for European security, as a result of fear of being abandoned, and marginalized, if the EU on account of decreased American commitment to Europe, were to take a more prominent role as security provider. As a result the combined need of Europe to increase its defensive capabilities after Russian aggression challenged European security.

Is the bilateral agreement between Norway and Germany sign of a larger security focus change by the Norwegian government, to form closer ties with its geographically close allies and partners? Was there something special about Germany, or about Norwegian German relations, that formed the basis that made choosing Germany a natural choice? Norwegian security and defense policy is not made in a vacuum, it is effected by external factors, as structural change, and the needs of more powerful states, that Norway has to adapt to. Yet Norwegian security is characterized by two mainstays, territorial security (great power protection ) and support of the liberal world order. Which developments can we see in Norwegian security policy over the years. Are developments for the most part caused by a matter of external factors outside of Norwegian control?

The chapters on context aims to give an in-depth presentation of Norwegian security policy, and developments in security and defense policy direction. The context chapter will also include a German perspective on security and cooperation, an American perspective, and will include a EU perspective. As these actors and their perspective, developing strategies and

views on security are postulated here to a great effect on Norwegian security and defense strategy.

This chapter will by presenting these different perspective on defense and security lay the foundation for using theoretical mechanisms from Realism, Liberalism and constructivism to find theoretical basis and explanation behind Norwegian security policy development. Conclusively the paper will take a closer look on the Norwegian-German submarine development agreement. To see if the agreement is a representative of a more European security policy approach.

## **4.2 Norwegian security policy development**

First a description of a historical perspective on Norwegian security and defense policy is presented, including turning points, and constant elements still visible today. This perspective is relevant, in order to create an introduction to the main priorities of Norwegian security policy, and to which drivers and mechanisms that has effected its direction. The derived drivers and mechanisms will be included in the analysis, where they will form part of the basis of answering the research question and determine whether *Norway is in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus?* Further they will be examined in a theoretical perspective, to find out which of the chosen IR theories have the most explanatory power of Norwegian security policy.

The year 1949 is marked as an important turning point in Norwegian security policy. Norway joined NATO, as part of the founding member states. It was an unequivocal statement, and Norway had chosen sides with the west for the Cold War (Tamnes, 2019). As turning points can be identified, it is also possible to identify red threads of continuity in Norwegian security policy that has lasted for centuries. The most important red threads are great power protection, first from Great Britain, then the US, and the belief in a liberal world order based on liberal values, international law and global governance (Tamnes, 2019).

As an unalterable structural fact, Norway has realized that as a small state, with limited resources and without the necessary capabilities to defend its territory from larger more

powerful states, therefore Norway is dependent on cooperation with the great powers, in order to safeguard national security interests (Tunsjø, 2011). Great power protection, but also the ability to keep them at a distance, is another red thread in Norwegian security policy. As the former Minister of Defense Jens Christian Hauge described the Norwegian approach to security cooperation from 1949 “*Forsvar vår dyd, men kom oss ikke for nær*” (Eriksen & Pharo, 1997, p. 85). Defend our virtue, but do not come too close, (my translation), This statement was a signal of the enduring dualism in the Norwegian security policy. Norway before WWI sought protection from Great Britain, the most powerful naval power, but also wanted to remain neutral (Tamnes, 2019). The balance between military support, and guarantee from the west, and a low tension relationship with the Soviet Republic became increasingly important after WWII.

Foundational belief in International Law, order and global governance as security-increasing mechanisms are also core beliefs of Norwegian security and defense policy. Norway upheld its position on the importance of international law, and in after WWII Norway's position on international law was reformulated to support a more just and fair international order, where rights have surpassed power, this adjustment is rooted in self-interest and in the idea that Norway can make a difference globally.

The formation of NATO, was innovative and unlike other defensive alliances of the time (Tamnes, 2019). NATO had significant political functions. It became an important arena for interaction on several levels of public officials. It also served as an arena where the member states sought unified solutions on security issues. An important effect of NATO, was that it underlined solidarity and a common will to suppress the threat of a totalitarian communist Soviet Republic.

A result of the formation of NATO, was also that it shifted some of the impression of European dependency of the US and restored some of the symmetry of Euro-US relationship. A united Europe could take more responsibility than any single state could. For Norway, after realizing that Great Britain no longer had the resources to act the main security guarantor, Norway feared little military support in case of a Soviet invasion. NATO created the framework for collective security, but it would lack the necessary deterrent capabilities without participation of the US, the only state with enough power projection to deter any possible threat from attacks against Europe and reassure allied member states of their security. Which lead to concessions from Norway and the rest of the member states, as it was of

paramount importance to keep the Americans in. It was regarded as a small price to pay. Norway and other states, carried out what Lundestad (1990) called an invitation policy towards USA, with the goal to further integrate itself in the western alliance, Lundestad described the role of USA as an *empire by invitation* (Lundestad, 1990).

It has been claimed that Norway had a closer affiliation to USA than other European NATO states. The Americans also had a great military strategic interest in Norway and the high north (Tamnes, 2019). The idea of a Scandinavian defensive federation, never got far, because Norway had its focus on the west. Norway has been considered from an American perspective as one of the least troublesome NATO members, and its strategic important location meant it was of great geopolitical importance to the US.

There existed a fear that the Soviet focus on rebuilding its norther fleet, and cause greater asymmetry between NATO and the Soviets in the north, that they would turn the Norwegian Sea into a “Mare Sovieticum” (Tamnes, 2019). To counter this growing Soviet threat, Norway responded with more openness to allied initiatives and efforts in the north (Tamnes, 2019). The high degree of integration and complicity in the defensive efforts from the western alliance, makes a fascinating side of Norwegian security policy, since Norway simultaneously has self-imposed restrictions and caveats towards certain military activities on Norwegian soil during peace time. These caveats and self-imposed restrictions was seen as a politically important symbol for the Norwegian government due to the wish to reassure the Soviets, and to keep the high north an area of low tension (Tamnes, 2019).

This duality has been one of the red threads in Norwegian security policy. Norway has had an active approach to balance deterrence and reassurance towards the east. There exists clear patterns in the timing of the Norwegian self-imposed restrictions, the first one was that no foreign military should have permanent bases in Norway. The policy on permanent bases and permanent presence of allied soldiers restriction came shortly after the decision to join NATO. The decision to not allow nuclear weapons in Norwegian territory, came as a result of growing nuclear capacity and nuclearization of NATO in the 1950's and Norway did not want to allow nuclear capabilities in Norwegian territories, well aware of the threat that would pose to the Soviet Union, who had the vast majority of its nuclear capabilities on submarines in the Barents sea region in close proximity of Norway.

Finally the decision to place the American marine corps storage facilities to Trøndelag instead of Northern Norway, came as a result of domestic opposition toward increased allied presence and the increasing amount of stored military equipment in Norwegian territories (Tamnes, 2019). Norway has been balancing towards both the east and the west. Towards the Soviet Union in the east, it was a balancing act between deterrence and reassurance. Towards NATO and the West, between integration and self-imposed restrictions and caveats (Hilde, 2019).

The breakdown of the Soviet Republic and the end of the Cold war had a major impact on security policy, there was “*perestroika and glasnost*” (restructuring and openness) taking place in the late stages of the Soviet union, under the Gorbachev era, and in the early stages of new Russia. The breakdown of the Soviet Union had a major impact on the structure of the international order, not only for Norway, but the entire globe. It impacted command structures in NATO, and signaled major consequences for the balance of power between NATO and the Russia, which in turn has great effect on Norwegian security policy (R. M. Allers et al., 2014).

There was no longer the same focus on the high north and Norwegian traditional goals was challenged by the changes in what was supposed to be NATO’s new tasks and direction (Hilde, 2019). A war broke out in the Balkans, terrorism spread both in the Balkans and in the Middle East, and a transition of power towards Asia, specifically towards China as a potential great power and major actor internationally. Changes was taking place within NATO, the reasons for its formation was gone, but new threats emerged, and the rule based international order came under pressure. Of which the US had been the foremost proponent of, they now gradually abdicated from that role (Tamnes, 2019). The restructuring of NATO entailed a new main focus, on military operation outside NATO territories. It was to be a “out-of-area or out of business restructuring (Tuohy, 1993). Simultaneously, collective security arrangements, such as joint defensive plans, a robust command structure and most of the reinforcement arrangements were all but fully decommissioned (Tamnes, 2019). The restructuring gained greater momentum after the terrorist attacks on the US 9.11.2001 (Hilde, 2019).

With the Russian military intervention in Georgia I 2008, NATO’s traditional main focus area of in-area operations and collective security was suddenly back on the agenda, and another restructuring of NATO was afoot. Norway requested NATO to revise the balance between where NATO focuses its attention, out-of-area- versus in-area. The Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 placed Russia back on top of NATO’s agenda. Support of

international law and order, as means to secure national interests was the Norwegian choice of action following the new Russian direction, and is consistent with Norwegian traditional approach to security. Norwegian support of and belief in international law and liberal values are demonstrated in *Veivalg i norsk utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk* (2017) published by the ministry of Foreign Affairs, that Norwegian security-architecture is based on the UN pact (UD, 2017).

Within the alliance, Norway's main focus was to recreate the collective security principle based on article 5. Something which before 2014, seemed a nearly impossible task, with the expansion of NATO and many new conflicting interests, at the same time as the US no longer had the same active leadership in the Alliance (Tamnes, 2019). From the mid 90's the self-imposed restrictions were adjusted, to be more general in character, and to open Norwegian territory to further integration in NATO activities. The more open policy Norway carried out towards NATO, was in line with the zeitgeist and resulted in Norway being able to influence allied politics so that they safeguarded Norwegian interests to a greater degree. The move towards more integration and less reassurance towards Russia, is closely linked with the perceived increase in threat from the East and how Norway interpret the allies interests and support of Norway (Hilde, 2019).

#### **4.2.1 Analysis of Norwegian security policy development**

Before WWI, Norway wished to remain a neutral ally with its main security benefactor. Great power protection has been an ever present driving force of Norwegian security policy. First with Great Britain, then after WWII, on grounds of the US overtaking Britain as the most powerful western state, sought guarantees from the US. A realization by the Norwegian government, that Norway lacks the necessary capabilities to deter possible threats, and is incapable to provide for its own security. Consideration of this nature, where Norway sought great power protection, in order to balance the fear of domination and destruction by the Soviet Republic and other possible threats, can be explained by realist theory.

Norwegian support of a liberal rule based world order, with emphasis on international law has also been a constant aspect and driving force behind Norwegian foreign, and security policy. Support of collective arrangements. As Keohane (1989) put it, institutions are created by state actors to facilitate the achievement of their joint interest This is the core of liberal

institutionalism, international actors should promote institutionalization as a means to promote the collective interest in international stability. It can be argued that Norwegian support, and approach to NATO and the UN, is best explained by a liberal institutionalist perspective.

Another driving force behind Norwegian security policy development, is the structure of European security. When the European security structure broke down with the outbreak of WWII, Norway abandoned ambitions of neutrality, and was part in the formation of NATO. The integration and cooperation was deeper and of a more binding form. I argue that this is an example of what Waltz in his neorealist theory claims. Structures Waltz argue “defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of the system” (Waltz, 2010). A restructuring of European security took place after WWII and hopes of remaining neutral was no longer an option. The new structure limited Norwegian possible choice of action. A consideration that was behind Norwegian neutrality policy, was the fear of being drawn into great power conflicts, this fear is present even today, and was all through the Cold War. Highlighted by Norwegian self-imposed restrictions on allied activity on Norwegian territory. Norwegian balancing between deterrence and reassurance towards the Soviet Republic and later Russia, is explained by Snyder in his neorealist take on alliances and the security dilemma; For the small states of the world, they could easily find themselves in another dilemma. As they lack deterrence capabilities, they may be forced to join alliances with more powerful states in order to have a reliable capacity to deter perceived threats. A consequence of joining an alliance for a small state, is that the state becomes too dependent of its alliance partners, and in fear of abandonment may be drawn into their conflicts (Snyder, 1984). One could also argue that this Norwegian policy, is an example of defensive structural realism. Where states seek just right amount of power, as to not provoke, and cause a possible escalation of tensions, eventually leading to an arms race or worst case armed conflict.

The breakdown represented a new structural reorganization of the European security architecture. The balance of power was not as relevant, as there was no one to balance against. The world was now led by an allied hegemon. At this point, Norwegian traditional security policy approach was conflicting with the new NATO low activity reality. Established collective security arrangements were all but decommissioned. Norway carried out a more open policy towards NATO in this period. The move towards more integration and less reassurance towards Russia, is closely linked with the perceived increase in threat from the East and how Norway interpret the allies interests and support of Norway (Hilde, 2019). Fear



of abandonment is identified as a main driving force behind no longer having the same level of self-imposed restrictions. Norway fully relies on NATO's principle of collective defense, as means of deterrence and now as a small state with large scale structural changes to its main source of security NATO, Norway sought to find its place among more powerful actors, and uncontrollable forces. The effect of fear of abandonment is best explained by realist theory.

After the next great change in Europe in this chapter, the period after Russian intervention in Georgia and the annexation of Crimea. NATO shifted its focus back from out-of-area to in-area focus. Norway in this period emphasized its belief and support in international law and liberal values, basing its security policy on the UN pact. Within NATO, Norway focused on creating further support of collective security. The driving forces; collective security and support of international law and a rule based international order are mechanism best explained by liberalism, and liberal institutionalism.

One possible factor behind Norwegian strong support of liberal values and a rule based world order, could be American abdication from the role as the main promotor and source of those values. Thereby weakening the community of liberal values.

#### **4.2.2 Summary Norwegian security policy development**

Changes in the international structure drove Norway to move away from a neutrality policy, towards an joining an alliance. Limited capabilities, and fear of abandonment has caused Norway to seek at first great power protection, then to seek security through collective security. Decreased American support of the liberal values community has caused Norway to enhance its support of liberal values and international law, as means to secure self-interests.

The driving forces behind Norwegian security policy in part one is not fully explained by a single IR theory, both realism and liberalism has some explanatory power.



## 5 NATO`s Return to Europe

This segment aims to provide context on how external and domestic factors effected Norwegian security policy arena. How Norway had their possible actions limited by elements out of their control. It will highlight consequences of the NATO summit in Wales (2014), and developments in Norwegian US, and NATO relations. With limited influence in determining where NATO focuses its attention, developments in NATO priorities will have a large impact on Norwegian security policy priorities.

The main driving forces, and mechanisms will be derived from this segment and will complement the rest of the empirical material in the analysis, where the main driving forces and mechanisms will be analyzed in a theoretical perspective to see whether *Norway is in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus?*

### 5.1 NATO`s Return to Europe and conflicting interests in Norway-US relations

The NATO Wales summit in 2014 represented a formal return to Europe for NATO, and larger efforts from the European member states was necessary. More cooperation, larger budgets, more in-alliance solidarity, and development of deterrence capabilities against a revisionist Russia was needed.

A new spearhead of military capabilities was formed and was named Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, more frequent training exercises and a larger NATO presence in Eastern-Europe. Norway participates in NATO`s enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic states and Poland, that serves the purpose to signal that the alliance is watchful and as a signal to reassure members that article 5 is still very much relevant. Norwegian membership in NATO, has had for the most part had a high level of support domestically, nonetheless it has sparked critique and debate in the domestic political scene. “Sosialistisk Folkeparti” now “Sosialistisk Venstreparti” a political party on the left side of the Norwegian political axis was formed in 1961 With resistance on NATO membership as the main political cause,” *Nei til atomvåpen*”, a political organization that has banishment of nuclear weapons as their goal, among others represent much of resistance towards NATO, a debate that again was mobilized when Norway participated in NATO`S intervention in the Balkans in 1999 (Græger, 2019).

The main criticism of the Balkan intervention was that it did not have the backing of a resolution from the UN Security Council. Most of the criticism was based in the notion that there was no longer a need for NATO, and that it was no longer a defensive alliance, therefore it had lost its purpose and was not only an instrument in the war on terror (Græger, 2005). The re-adjustment of the balance between reassurance and deterrence towards Russia, after Russian aggression in eastern Europe, it has been claimed, that it would be more provocative and therefore, not strengthen, but weaken Norwegian security (Børresen, 2018). This criticism was quashed from the Norwegian government, and that such decisions was made in line with the self-imposed restrictions, and that they were paramount for Norway's ability to its defensive capabilities (SMK, 2018).

The deterrence measures taken by NATO, came as a response to the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula, but the criticism highlights the challenges in balancing collective security and allied reassurance on one hand, and the potential negative effect increasing deterrence capabilities can have on Norwegian Russian relations. Norwegian-US relations was in this period, and has been for a long time been characterized by the asymmetry between Norway, a small state, and the US, a superpower. Norwegian dependency of US security guarantee has always marked Norwegian-US relations.

Still, the relationship has been under criticism. The absence of a credible threat after the end of the Cold War, resulted in more criticism, and under the guidance of president George W. Bush Jr (2001-2008) the US carried out a security and foreign policy, which challenged the Norwegian standpoint about fundamental pillars of international and transatlantic cooperation, such as a rule based world order and adherence to international law (Græger, 2019). Despite the harsh criticism of US foreign policy in the George W. Bush Jr era, Norwegian US relations in practical terms mostly carried on as they had in the past. There was contact and dialogue on all levels, and in many forms between Norway and the US, and the extent of contact, have de-politized the many issues and relations between the two countries, and the fact that day to day operations are unaffected by the noise created by REALpolitik and troublesome situations, show the depth in the bilateral relations (Græger, 2005).

One major bump in the relationship which tested the NATO cooperation and the transatlantic relations was the unilateral intervention in Iraq in 2003, a situation where the Norwegian Prime Minister's phone call to President George W. Bush Jr, where he explained that because his conscience based on his religious conviction he could not endorse Norwegian

participation in the operation. It has later been claimed that this maneuver by the Norwegian Prime Minister was essential in not harming the bilateral relation too much (Berthelsen, 2005). The Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen also frequently underlined that good friends, had to be able to handle differences and conflicting interests, without endangering the friendship (Græger, 2005). During the next decade, Norwegian US relations were tested further, when several issues, such as the missile-defense program, the use of cluster bombs, and the withdrawal of staff officers from Iraq, Jens Stoltenberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister (2005-2013) was the first Norwegian prime minister not to be invited to the White House by the US president, he did not meet President Bush in the period they both were in office as President and prime Minister. The day to day operation between the two countries cooled, and communication on all levels was limited (Græger, 2005).

President Obama (2009-2017) reached out to Europe, and the bilateral contact resumed to former states of close relations. Now, under President Trump, who has a more personal, and unpredictable behavior, who has made surreal statements in which he has tried to glorify and put the Russian President Putin in a good light (Zapfe et al., 2017). Statements of that character has the ability to cause instability within NATO and uncertainty about US commitment, even undermine past efforts made in the spirit of in-alliance solidarity. The US President seems to be in opposition to the foundational liberal values that form the basis of Norwegian and European-US relations.

## **5.2 Analysis NATO's Return to Europe and conflicting interests in Norway-US relations**

The asymmetry in Norwegian-US relations, the total dependency Norway has of the US its main security guarantor, created fear of abandonment and marginalization when NATO concentrated on out-of-area operations. Fear of abandonment as a driving force was part of Norwegian reasoning for participating in the Balkan war. In a realist perspective, Norway felt compelled to contribute, to secure Norwegian security interests, despite the intervention not being sanctioned by the UN Security Council.

Structural change of European security, as a driving force and the resulting absence of a credible threat to Norwegian security, created opportunity for critique of American unilateralist policy the under the guidance of president George W. Bush Jr (2001-2008). The

US carried out a security and foreign policy, which challenged the Norwegian standpoint about fundamental pillars of international and transatlantic cooperation, such as a rule based world order and adherence to international law.

A driving force is the ideational factors such as norms and identity. As they are central to the constitution and dynamics of international politics, and that security is a social construct. Relations between Norway and the US was not broken down, but several issues, such as the missile-defense program, the use of cluster bombs, and the withdrawal of staff officers from Iraq, and refusal to participate in the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 highlighted differences in values and in support of international law. This driving force is further highlighted in European uncertainty about US commitment caused by statements made by President Trump. They could even undermine past efforts made in the spirit of in-alliance solidarity. The US President appears to be in opposition to the foundational liberal values that form the basis of Norwegian and European-US relations.

### **5.3 Summary analysis NATO`s Return to Europe and conflicting interests in Norway-US relations**

Fear of abandonment and continued dependency still mark Norwegian-US relations. Structural change and lack of credible threats to Norwegian security opened opportunity for critique of American unilateralist policy that was conflicting with Norwegian liberal values and identity. Conflicting interests on fundamental issues, cooled Norwegian-US relations, and could be a driving force that leads Norway closer to allies of a more like-minded nature as itself. Realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism appears to have some explanatory power of this segment.

## 6 Security challenges and development in NATO and the EU

Despite Britain's exit from Europe (Brexit), Europe is continuing with its Europeanization project, with increasing political and economic integration within the EU combined with NATO framework, which includes an American presence (Brown, 2014). After Russian aggression in Ukraine, NATO at the Wales summit (2014), agreed to several developments to counter Russian aggression, among them "*Assurance Measures*" meant to underscore alliance solidarity and "*Adaptation Measures*" a signal that the alliance is willing to adapt to challenges of today and the future (NATO, 2014). The measures agreed upon at the Wales summit, was for some countries not adequate to reassure NATO's most eastern members, and not adequate to deter Russia in a continuous tense security policy situation. Therefore at the NATO summit in Warsaw, NATO decided to escalate its adaptive measures in order to handle challenges, from both South and East "*The changed and evolving security environment demands the ability to meet challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction*" (NATO, 2016).

The European Union has parallel with the developments in NATO broadened its joint defense and foreign policy. Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has developed to be the body that handles projects and agreements on defense and security policy issues, it is also aligned under the *High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security*. The establishment of European Union External Action Service (EEAS) the foreign affairs service of the EU, was created as a support organ to better organize and develop the joint policies. Further developments was the formation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO, a multilateral agreement, with a main objective to facilitate development of armaments, increase effectivity, operational capacity and general increase in European defensive capabilities. In 2016 the *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* was adopted. This new strategy contains new political targets and ambitions on European ability to take responsibility for its own defense and security, also on cooperation between the EU and NATO (EEAS, 2016).

Many allies are preoccupied with other serious security threats, in addition to the existential threat from Russia. The southern-most members are facing massive waves of immigrants, Belgium with Jihadist terrorism, France with Jihadist terrorism and its commitments in the Sahel region in Africa, where France have more than 5000 soldiers, and seem stuck in a never

ending conflict (Maclean, 2020). France refused to lead one of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence battalions on grounds of lacking necessary resources (Zapfe et al., 2017).

## **6.1 Analysis Security challenges and development in NATO and the EU**

After the Russian annexation of Crimea, the NATO member agreed at the Wales summit on developing initiatives to deter Russian aggression. Increased deterrence towards Russia, is a driving force best explained by realism. The driving force of structural change in Europe, where Russia again posed a perceived threat to the existence of many NATO members, and the following balancing by Europe towards Russia is best explained by structural realism.

The measures agreed upon at the Wales summit concerning reassurance and adaptation of NATO, I argue are best explain by liberal institutionalism because the European NATO members are willing to cooperate with each other, without the members themselves gaining any relative power. The gains are absolute and the situation is win-win. They cooperate for the common good, and collective security. The EU has further developed strategies and structures with the ambition of taking more responsibility for European security. The driving force behind EU strategy and structure development is based on the Europeanization idea, of greater integration of regulations, norms, and values inside the EU. The security policy is based on cooperation in international institutions, integration, democratization, conflict resolution, and by the rule of law. These driving forces are best explained by liberal institutionalism.

## **6.2 Summary analysis Security challenges and development in NATO and the EU**

After Russian annexation of Crimea, both NATO and the EU are developing initiatives and capabilities to counter the Russian threat. EU are continuing its development of a comprehensive strategy and approach to defense and security policy. With the ambition of taking more responsibility for security itself. The trends are not explained by a single IR theory, Increase in hard power (deterrence capabilities) as a driving force is best explained by realism. The effect of structural change as a driving force is best explained by structural realism. That NATO does not choose to develop as much power as possible, but rather just



enough to reassure alliance members, and to deter Russia, is a mechanism best explained by defensive structural realism.

Integration and cooperation through international institutions and regimes for the common good, and collective security, not for relative gains of power, is a driving force best explained by liberal institutionalism.



## 7 Burden sharing and Norwegian contribution

Burden sharing is as such not a new phenomenon in NATO history, the principle is the foundation of article 3 of the treaty (NATO, 1949). Article 3 compels the members to both by themselves and in cooperation with each other to sustain and develop their individual and collective capability to resist attacks through self-help and mutual support (Thies, 2003). The alliance has never been able to reach a formal principle for burden sharing. During the Cold War there came regular warnings from the US to its European allies to increase their defense expenditure or compensate the US in a different fashion for their military presence in Europe. Ever since Russia's intervention in Georgia, and specifically after the Ukrainian crisis, NATO shifted focus back to "in-area" and the collective defense of Europe. The issue of trying to reverse decreasing defense expenditure, and inadequate budgeting regained momentum. Russian aggression in eastern Europe has been the basis of a growing concern among the allies, there exists doubts about European defensive capabilities and its capability to deter a resurgent aggressive Russia.

The US reiterated that Europe must take more responsibility for its own security, as well as do their share in "out-of-area" operations. At the same time more and more of US focus is towards Asia, where Chinese growth challenges the regional balance of power. There is growing concern that Europe no longer can take US ability and commitment to the collective security community for granted, as it could in the past (Oma, 2019). There are limits to American capabilities.

During the Cold War, Norway was described as a net-importer of security, Norwegian defense budgets were under constant pressure for being insufficient, but defense of Norwegian territory was nonetheless highly prioritized by NATO in this period. Because of the Norwegian geo-strategical position. The north represents the shortest route for bombers and missiles between the Soviet Union and the US (Tamnes, 2019). After the end of the Cold War, Norway's special strategical significance to NATO diminished, with the shift in direction to "out-of-area" operations and diminished threat from the east. Norway opposed this shift in strategy, because it could undermine collective security efforts, but came to the realization that in order to retain its relations with the US and in order to secure the continued existence of the alliance (Liland, 1999). During the second half of the 1990's Norwegian authorities acknowledged that relevant contributions and a more active role in NATO

operations was necessary to counter possible marginalization of Norway's position within NATO (Oma, 2019).

The war on terror presented new possibilities for Norway to show itself as a valuable and trustworthy partner to its allies, and specially to the US. The Al-Qaida attacks on the US marked the first time NATO's article 5 was activated, and Norway deployed substantial capabilities to join Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This effort was commanded by the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who credited Norway for “*wonderful cooperation and support*” (Oma, 2019).

At times Norwegian participation in the war on terror was limited due to the domestic public opinion, Norway did try to compensate for the limited contributions with putting capabilities at allied disposal for non-combative operations (Oma, 2014). It was important for Norwegian participation in the intervention in Libya, that the operation had legitimate support from the Security Council and where the liberal Right 2 Protect principle was the foundation for the intervention, Norway joined the coalition and was ready to show that Norway would to its share of the work. Norway dispatched fighter planes, and stood for approx. 15% of all air strikes, in the initial phase of the intervention, and took upon themselves highly politically sensitive missions, that other coalition members would not, or could not carry out (Henriksen, 2013). The Norwegian contribution was on many occasions commended, and even though Norwegian contribution was based on support of a UN led liberal world order, it was also regarded to be advantageous to Norwegian security policy (Oma, 2019).

Norway in recent years have continued its engagement with support and training contributions in Afghanistan and in the international coalition fighting The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The Norwegian Ministry of Defense reports that this continued efforts, active role and support of international operations is recognized and appreciated by Norwegian allies (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2018-2019).

Even with substantial contributions to international operations and large scale investments in armaments procurement, Norway is one of the countries that is considered as mediocre in the burden sharing debate on the grounds that Norway is falling behind in reaching the 2% goal of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense budgets. Norway has tried to counter claims of mediocracy and failure in reaching agreed upon defense expenditure with arguments about that high growth in GDP, has led to a sinking percentage of GDP being used on defense, even

if defense budgets in absolute numbers are growing (Oma, 2019). Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, in an interview stated that “ *targets set in percentages are nonsense, the goal should not be percentages, but as much defense as possible*” (Solberg, 2016). With the implication, that it is all about how the money is spent, not necessarily how much money is spent. It is quite possible that explaining failure to reach agreed upon defense expenditure targets on grounds of high economic growth, might not sit well with allied countries, who might not experience the same level of economic growth. Further, President Trumps tendencies to engage in bilateral relations, and focus on a single parameter of contribution, could place Norway in a vulnerable position and sideline Norway within the alliance. Norway has been sidelined before, and the debate on burden sharing today, could in combination with changes in US strategic priorities, signal a lesser commitment from the US regarding collective security of Europe (Oma, 2019).

## **7.1 Analysis Burden sharing and Norwegian contribution**

NATO after Russian annexation of Crimea, was forced to increase its hard power and deterrence capabilities. Alliance solidarity and cooperation was needed if NATO was to have any credible developments in its capabilities. European defensive budgets had been in decline for a long time, and many economies were still recovering after the financial crisis of 2008. Combined with pressure from the US on Europe, to take more responsibility. The US pivot to the Pacific, further underlined the necessity of European efforts. The driving forces behind NATO burden sharing, is identified as limited resources, collective security through cooperation in international institutions, by integration, and by the rule of law, states can achieve security. These driving forces are best explained by liberal institutionalism. Other driving forces are identified as, self-help and fear of abandonment. These driving forces are best explained by realism.

The US expects European allies to take more responsibility for European security, and also to do their share in out-of-area-operations. Norway, after shift in NATO focus after the breakdown of the Soviet Republic realized that it needed to contribute to remain a relevant partner in NATO. At times Norwegian contributions to the war on terror was limited by domestic opposition to participate in conflicts not sanctioned by the UN security council. In these cases Norway attempted to compensate by putting non-combative capabilities at allied disposal. When article 5 in the NATO charter was activated, Norway contributed substantially

to the operation in Afghanistan. The same reasoning was part of the decision to participate in the intervention in Libya. When there were out-of-area operations, sanctioned either by the UN security Council, or article 5 in the NATO charter, Norway contributed as much as it could. It was important to show the US Norwegian value as a partner. The driving forces behind Norwegian contributions to international operations are identified as, fear of abandonment and marginalization, collective security and support of liberal values.

Fear of marginalization and fear of abandonment are best explained by realism. Support of liberal values such as International institutions and the authority given to the UN Security Council, international law and collective security are best explained by liberal institutionalism.

## **7.2 Summary analysis Burden sharing and Norwegian contribution**

Fear of marginalization and abandonment are powerful driving forces behind Norwegian contributions in international operations. They are also relevant to explain European willingness to take greater responsibility for its security, in light of US pressure and pivot to the Pacific.

Using institutions to facilitate cooperation with limited resources to sustain collective security are best explained by liberal institutionalism. Europe continues to develop capabilities to be its own security guarantor, while the US shifts its focus to the Pacific. Norway does what it can to remain a valuable partner to the US, but at the same time seeks cooperation with the EU.

## 8 Norway and EU relations

The EU has become one of the most important Norwegian partners, but the partnership is not limited to trade only. After becoming a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), Norway has had to align itself to comply with EU law and regulation on a number of areas of society. The EEA agreement covers the four freedoms of the EU; free movement of goods, free movement of persons, freedom of establishment and the right to provide services, free movement of capital, and many other policy issues. Developments in security and defense policy in the EU will have a large impact on both Norwegian security approach.

This chapter will focus on Norwegian EU relations, and on developments in the EU's approach to security and defense policy. It also aims to provide further relevant data, to provide a solid base to answer the research question this paper poses. *Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus?*

### 8.1 Norwegian EU relations and developments in EU approach to security and defense policy

Norway joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960, and when Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland applied for full EU membership in 1961, Norway did as well. The application stalled when the French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed Great Britain's application (Græger, 2019). At the next crossroads, Norway held a referendum (1972) concerning EU membership where the majority voted against joining the EU (Kristoffersen, 2015).

After the end of the Cold War numerous European organizations were regarded as security policy instruments, such as the Conference of Security and Cooperation (CSCE) the precursor to what became Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), and the North-Atlantic Council (NAC), the Western European Union (WEU) and the EU. The fact that there existed several organizations regarded as security policy instruments reflected a new and broader security policy agenda in the 1990's, which focused mainly on political integration. Among others, mainly the former Warsaw pact members (Græger, 2019). When the Norwegian government put together a defense commission to assess main tasks, functions and structure of the Norwegian armed forces, in light of new security, and economic frames. The

commission concluded that the EU would, to an increasing degree become an instrument for security and stability, as a complimentary organization to NATO and CSCE (*Forsvarskommisjonen av 1990, 1992; Græger, 2005*).

Even though Norway voted against EU membership in the 1994 referendum, Norway developed a close relationship with the EU through the EEA agreement of 1992, the Schengen agreement, and also through cooperation with the European Defense Agency (EDA), on matters of participation in both civilian and military crisis management operations, and sharing of classified intelligence material.

Norway has carried out an active EU policy, but the Norwegian relations to CSDP has been characterized by disappointment rather than positive results. Norway was denied any influence in the decision-making process, instead the EU established other forms of political contact with third-party countries. After the Lisbon treaty of 2009, that reformed EU policy on security, foreign, and defense issues, there no longer existed a permanent structure for dialogue on these issues with non-member states. This development had a negative effect on Norwegian access to the inner workings of the EU, and it has not been regarded as very attractive for Norwegian officials to travel to Brussels just to be informed of EU decisions (Græger, 2018). Norway`s contribution to EU operations, with troops, air, and naval capabilities have not resulted in any form of influence or codetermination, opposed as with NATO operations were Norway is a member. This underlines the irrelevance of Norway to the EU, and that the EU is to a less degree important for Norwegian security. Until 2017 there was one exception, Norwegian cooperation under European Defense Agency (EDA) which allowed Norway to take part in certain capability development projects (Græger, 2019). Norway is the only non-member of the EU that has a cooperation agreement with the EDA.

The gradual strengthening of Europeanization project with further integration of policy areas inside the EU has made it increasingly difficult for Norway to obtain arrangements that can provide influence. As various Norwegian governments have continued to express their willingness and ambition to contribute to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP, these efforts have yielded little in kind of the status and success they had hoped for. The fact the High Representative of Foreign Affairs, has been unwilling to engage in bilateral arrangements with third party countries, but rather is in favor of a common agreement with the whole group of third party countries, is problematic for Norway as long as Greece is reluctant to give Turkey any entry to decision-shaping forums (R. M. Allers et al., 2014). This



lack of gaining any significant influence on decision-shaping or in the decision-making processes has not affected Norway's willingness to seek closest possible association with the EU on security and defense policy issues.

In 2017, a new EU initiative PESCO was formed as a part of *EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EEAS, 2016)* with the ambition of creating a cohesive, coordinated and powerful EU, that could be a serious actor in matters of security policy. France was initially in favor of a smaller and more exclusive structure, while Germany was in favor of a more including structure, with possibilities for cooperation with selected third-party countries (Bendiek et al., 2018). The privileged PESCO partnership by third party countries has been named "The Norwegian Model" (Koenig & Walter-Franke, 2017). As EU NATO cooperation has gradually increased, Norway has actively used this as a back channel for influence and access to the EU (Græger, 2018, 2019). Norway seek cooperation with as many partners as possible, and participates in multilateral defense cooperation outside the frame of EU and NATO as well, with The North Group and the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFECO) (Græger, 2018).

The Berlin Plus agreement, which gives the EU access to NATO resources in operations where NATO does not wish to engage itself, was designed to complement European capabilities in crisis management (EU & NATO, 2002). After the Ukraine crisis, this cooperation gained momentum and today the EU and NATO cooperate on all levels from informal levels to diplomatic high politic coordination, on many different forms of security threats, a well-functioning NATO EU cooperation, will increase Norwegian contact and relations with EU diplomats, bureaucrats and elected officials, and could serve as an arena to reduce tensions between the EU and third party countries.

EU ambitions on constructing a has existed for a long time, and plans for a purely European defensive community since 1950 (Pleven plan), this plan was unfruitful, but later lead to the establishing of the WEU in 1954, and was a collaboration between the European Economic Community (EEC) members and NATO members with different affiliation. Norway was a member of the WEU until EU took charge and incorporated into EU policy. The EU has been in the developing stages of a common EU security strategy and policy for decades, and the development of a common EU defense and security policy (CFSP, common security and defense policy) gained momentum in 1992 (Maastricht summit), and further attention was given the issue after the 1999 summit in Cologne. The Helsinki summit concluded with the

establishing of a 60000 soldier strong EU force (Græger, 2019). Since 2003 the EU has implemented more than 30 civilian and military operations in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Gulf of Aden, Afghanistan and African countries, with crisis management as the foundation. The number of operations and willingness to take action, signals intent from the EU to continue its rise towards becoming a major international security actor.

The Norwegian EU relations have mostly been in the domestic policy arena through the EEA agreement, but despite Brexit and weak support for the European integration project, the EU are steadfast in continuing to develop defensive and military capabilities, and the stated goal of “strategic autonomy” (EEAS, 2016). This grand strategy is highly relevant for Norway, since it opens up for greater cooperation of defense political issues, and a greater flexibility to incorporate differentiated integration of third party countries. For Norway the possibilities of cooperation through the PESCO, this program opens up the possibility for EU countries to engage in binding agreements to develop common capabilities and armaments programs, etc.

There are limits to how far the integration into PESCO for third party countries, the process is based on invitation to participate in certain projects, without any real possibility to gain access to the decision-making process (Hillion, 2019), and the prospect for Norway to gain any special arrangement, is highly unlikely, as the EU does not wish to create any precedence in the Brexit negotiations.

Norwegian foreign policy the last decade, has for a large part been centralized around European questions and relations, and the cause of the Euro-centric policy attention is mostly a result of external factors. International incidents and developments that directed Norwegian attention closer to home and Europe. The migration-crisis of 2015 and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 are examples of major international incidents that affected Norwegian foreign policy in this period (Haugevik & Græger, 2018). When Foreign Minister Børge Brende made his first official statement in march of 2014, the Ukrainian crisis was dominating the agenda, and suddenly foreign- and security policy had its focus on Europe again. Cooperation between the EU and NATO, and other European partners was identified as paramount in making a sufficient response to Russian aggression by the Norwegian government (Brende, 2014). In his next yearly statement to parliament Brende (2015) stated that Europe is Norway's economic and political main focus, and that Norway will continue to expand deepen its relations with the EU (Brende, 2015).. The statements to parliament in 2016 and 2017 continued in the same manor, focusing on European developments and trends,

expressing concerns about the future of the EU regarding the possible exit of Great Britain (Brende, 2017). The Norwegian government further underlined the importance of focusing on Europe, and areas close to home in the governmental white paper on foreign and security policy (Utenriksdepartement, 2017).

Despite Norway being left in the hallway when the EU makes its decisions, Norway are closely linked and are among the most diligent in implementing EU regulations into domestic practices through the EEA, and is as integrated in EU on a number of areas as many of EU member states. In addition to implementing EU regulations, Norway has been seeking to formalize its cooperation with EU member states, as far as it is possible. Norway has been especially vocal and regular in its support of foreign policy statements made by the EU, (Svendsen, 2016). The same trend can be identified in defense and security policy issues, where Norway has signaled interest in contributing to the EU Battle Group. Norway signed an agreement to contribute and participate in EU-controlled operations and became an associated member of the EDA (Haugevik & Græger, 2018).

Even though EU membership has not been on the domestic political agenda in Norway since the early 1990's, the Norwegian government has made it clear that Europe is our neighbors, friends and most important trading partners, and therefor Norwegian foreign policy must begin in Europe (Regjeringen, 2013). Norway has sought ways to use the access granted through the EEA to participate and make use of all possible channels of influence, both official and unofficial, in order to strengthen coordination and governmental handling of European matters (Regjeringen, 2013).

The Norwegian government created a new ministerial post and appointed an European Minister, to relieve the foreign minister in EU and EEA matters. Given the structural constraints of Norwegian-European politics, the appointment of an European minister, it would seem, did not increase Norwegian influence, rather it was a symbol of Norwegian intent on being active and wanting to be included in a greater capacity on EU matters (Haugevik & Græger, 2018). International incidents and external factors have affected both EU approach to security matters, and Norwegian security policy, driving their attention to a focus on returning home to Europe and close to home areas.

The fact that Donald Trump was elected as president of the United States in 2016, and his administration carrying out an America First policy, both in economic but also in

international relations issues, combined with what can be characterized as a lack of interest in NATO, and controversial statements, appears to have created an understanding of the necessity of creating solid European security arrangements (Haugevik & Græger, 2018). The possibility of Great Britain to leave the EU, being a member with considerable military capabilities, was a contributing factor in creating the understanding within the EU, that the EU needed to continue developing its plans to become a security actor.

Great Britain's then possible exit from the EU caused the Norwegian government to signal, that it would prefer to keep its strong relations with both parties, but if it has to choose sides between Great Britain or the EU during the Brexit negotiations, it would prefer to keep its relations with the EU (Haugevik & Græger, 2018).

## **8.2 Analysis Norwegian EU relations and developments in EU approach to security and defense policy**

Ever since the EU started expanding, there has been an interest in Norway to cooperate, and to join. The two referendums in Norway, both were in favor of remaining on the outside of the EU. Nonetheless, Norway has had, and still have a very close relationship with the EU. Through the EEA agreement, Norway gained access to the inner market in the EU, but it meant that Norway had to implement EU regulations on matters concerning the agreement. The EU has been restrictive in giving any special arrangements to third party countries, the EU argument is that in order to have a say, you need to be a member. As the EU has developed its security and defense policy, Norway has sought close cooperation through the EDA, and later through CFSP. A new EU initiative PESCO (was formed as a part of *EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EEAS, 2016)* with the ambition of creating a cohesive, coordinated and powerful EU, that could be a serious actor in matters of security policy. Norway has been very active in its efforts to participate and contribute to EU initiatives, so much in fact that the privileged partnership in PESCO for third-party countries is called the "Norwegian Model". Germany was the main EU actor to open up for such third-party cooperation in PESCO.

NATO-EU relations became further integrated as it was accepted that combined efforts were needed to balance against, and deter the Russian threat to European security.

As part of its security policy strategy, the EU has set strategic autonomy as a goal. The number of EU led operations especially crisis management, signal intent from EU that they working on creating capabilities that ultimately will allow them to reach strategic autonomy eventually. The US pivot to the pacific, President Trumps statements on an obsolete NATO and Brexit has increased EU determination on becoming a major security policy actor.

The EU is Norway`s most important trading partner, so it is in Norwegian interest to keep as close and good relations as possible. It is a focus-area for Norway to expend and deepen its relations with the EU. Norway has signaled that if it had to choose between keeping its good relations with Great Britain or the EU after Brexit, Norway would choose the EU. The identified driving forces behind EU development as a security policy actor is; Shadow of the future, fear of abandonment, increased deterrence capabilities, structural change, and collective security. The EU cannot be certain of future American commitment to Europe, after the pivot to the Pacific and derogatory statements on NATO by the American President. Fear of abandonment, is a driving force best explained by realism.

Fear of abandonment cannot tell the entire story, the mechanism introduced by neoliberal institutionalism as “the shadow of the future” where states are incentivized to cooperate for future gains in fear of what lay ahead, has driven the EU member states to cooperate for future gains. If NATO does lose its position, the EU will be prepared.

A further driving force behind EU policy development is institution-building. Institutions are created by state actors to facilitate the achievement of their joint interests. The EU has created institutions to develop, coordinate, and facilitate cooperation in matters of security and defense policy. This driving force is explained by neoliberal institutionalism. The joint interest in this case, is collective security, a driving force explained by liberalism.

The driving forces behind Norwegian approach to the EU is identified as fear of abandonment and marginalization, shadow of the future, interdependency, like mindedness and trust.

The same reasoning as with the EU on doubts about future US commitment to Europe is valid here on fear of abandonment and marginalization as a driving force. As with shadow of the future, it would be in Norway`s own interest to cooperate with the EU for future gains, as Norway does not know the future. Interdependency is also identified as a driving force, Norway-EU relations are to an extent asymmetrical, Norway needs the EU more than the EU

needs Norway, but Norway has its focus on being as important partner as it can be to the EU, to balance some of the symmetry. Interdependency is explained by liberalism.

Norwegian Foreign Secretary Brende, stated that the EU were Norway's friends and most important partner. The EU and Norway also base their security and defense policy on the same liberal values. A driving force explained by constructivism is like mindedness. Like mindedness allows for a better relationship and facilitates for better cooperation.

### **8.3 Summary analysis Norwegian EU relations and developments in EU approach to security and defense policy**

The EU has set a policy target of strategic autonomy, and are creating institutions to aid them in reaching that target. Increased uncertainty on US commitment to Europe, and shadow of the future drives Norway to cooperate with the EU, and drives the EU to more both internal and external cooperation on security policy. The theoretical drivers in this part can best be explained by a combination of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism.

## 9 Norway, Europe, USA and the community of liberal values

As former foreign minister Johan Jørgen Holst once stated «*for a small country in a vulnerable position... disagreement about the main policy lines may become costly*» (Græger, 2005; Holst, Heradstveit, & Andvig, 1985). Norway has always promoted a strong position in favor of the traditional liberal values. Democracy, free trade, international law, and global governance. The liberal values are important for Norway, because they are the foundation for collective security. Building the world order after those values is by Norway considered the best action possible to secure global peace and prosperity.

If visions of how to structure international relations, on what a state can, and cannot do becomes incompatible, trust and cooperation may suffer. As implied by the former Foreign Minister Holst, if Norwegian allies and partners no longer share the vision on main policy lines, Norway would be in a difficult position.

Shared values, shared principles based on international law matter. Liberal values and democratic principles are a major part of how Norway identities itself. This chapter will take a closer look on developments in the liberal values community, in order to form part of foundation that will answer the research question “*Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus*”? Further the main drivers and mechanisms will be examined in a theoretical perspective, to find out which of the chosen IR theories have the most explanatory power of Norwegian security policy.

### 9.1 Norway, Europe, USA and the community of liberal values

The new American administration has taken a position on the transatlantic alliance, that to Europe is thinly veiled threats. It has taken a more isolationist stance on trade and has openly complimented totalitarian leaders. Actions that are in contradiction to the liberal vales the transatlantic cooperation is built on (B. Williams & Cilizza, 2019).

Norway finds itself in a position where it is totally dependent on the US as the main security guarantor, but tensions have arisen between what Norway sees as its fundamental values and new policy lines from the US. With the backdrop of dependency towards the US, there exists

a fear of not criticizing, but if Norway remains silent it could possibly effect both Norwegian self-image, as well as the image the world has of Norway (Holm, 2017). This tension between Norwegian values and the US, puts the Norwegian government in an uncomfortable position. As the normal state of affairs, is that the security community and the value community is one and the same.

After the Cold War, the rhetoric on transatlantic cooperation, has first and foremost been based on common values, such as democracy, human rights, governing principles and the rule of law. From the Norwegian perspective, it has for a long time considered itself as a liberal nation-state based on these fundamental principles, and as such been part of the liberal world order that has ideologically dominated the international scene these past decades. The partly anti-liberal politics carried out by the Trump administration, is part of a larger anti-liberal international trend, both in domestic but also international relations (Holm, 2017).

Maintaining very good relations with the US has always been of the utmost importance for Norway, and the dependency Norway has of the US has been in the background of all Norwegian security policy priorities (Holm, 2017). Sometimes these priorities can be seen explicitly, as in the case of purchasing the a lot more expensive F-35 from the US instead of the Swedish JAS Gripen alternative, correspondingly Norwegian military engagement in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria partially been justified with keeping the close and good relationship with the US (Græger, 2016).

The US is regarded as the single most important actor for Norwegian security and as Norway`s most important ally (Brende, 2016). For Norway and Europe, President Trumps statements has put collective defense and article 5 into question, and have created unpredictability and uncertainty among American allies in Europe.

The main focus in Norwegian foreign policy has been on classic liberal conceptions, having faith in international cooperation, liberal democracy, rule of law principles and a set of values linked to individual rights. On one side, the large international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN have to a large extent been dependent on US backing and endorsement.

Human rights as both the means and as the end in itself became the main focus of Norwegian foreign policy in a 2015 g foreign policy statement by the Norwegian government (Holm, 2017). There has existed a joint perception on what are the “right and good” values across



political party lines as well as across borders. It has been stated that the Norwegian fascination of the US, does not stem from its military capabilities, rather from its crucial contributions to spreading of freedom and democracy (Holm, 2017).

For many the initial real shock of that there were threats against the liberal world order, for the first time since the Cold War was the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Then the isolationist Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as president of the US (Holm, 2017). Before Brexit, there was a widespread assumption that any threats to the liberal world order would be external, such as Russian and Chinese resistance against American hegemony, but tensions and resistance have to a large degree been internal (Holm, 2017).

Supranationality is increasingly described as a negative, and 25 years of growing economic disparity in the US and parts of Europe, have eroded the credibility of elites and globalization (Niblett, 2017). Some claim it is a backlash against progressive values on issues such as immigration and acceptance of cultural diversity, and that this is the reason for the wave of right wing populist politicians gaining momentum in the US and parts of Europe (Holm, 2017). Those liberal values Norway and many other countries have treated as universal, are facing resistance. More and more countries are experiencing this resistance against the liberal democracy and against traditional liberal values, there are trends of unliberal foreign policy, and it would be easier for Norway if it was connected closer to countries that carry out policies and stand for values more in line with what is considered to be the values Norway stand for, than the values and policies the US administration currently have and carry out (Holm, 2017). The lack of faith in international institutions and agreements is easily identified in US foreign policy, examples of this kind of policy is;

The US withdraws from the “Open Skies” agreement, an agreement struck with the goal of reducing tensions and reassurance between NATO and Russia (Kruse, 2020).

Furthermore as indication of limited support to the UN, is the US withdrawal from WHO, a highly controversial decision, and the American reasoning for withdrawal, was that the WHO was in China`s pocket and had not managed to create reform during the Covid-19 crisis (McNeil Jr & Jacobs, 2020)

## 9.2 Analysis Norway, Europe, USA and the community of liberal values

The liberal values community is experiencing developments. Under the new administration in Washington DC, the US is at the moment moving towards a more isolationist policy, not only on trade. The slogan is “*America first*”. President Trump has on a number of occasions been vocal in his praise and support of totalitarian leaders. This is troubling for Norway, as a large part of the Norwegian identity is based on liberal values. Norway has increasingly emphasized human rights as a core value of in the liberal world order. In light of President Trumps admiration for totalitarian regimes, this underlines the conflict within the liberal values community. Norway and Europe has been accustomed to the liberal values community and the security community being one and the same. The conflicting policies between the US and Norway and the EU has caused tensions inside the community. As the US is still the undisputed most important actor in guaranteeing Norwegian security, critique of the new US policies, has to be carefully done. The US part of a growing trend against traditional liberal values, and many countries are facing resistance against the values they regarded as universal. As former foreign minister Johan Jørgen Holst once stated «*for a small country in a vulnerable position... disagreement about the main policy lines may become costly*” (Græger, 2005; Holst et al., 1985). Norway would benefit from closer relations with partners more likeminded.

Driving forces identified in Part 6 is: Fear of abandonment, like mindedness, friendship, and liberal values. Fear of abandonment is the main driving force of Norwegian procurement of jet-fighters from the US, and is explained by realism. Like mindedness was a driving force behind the liberal values community, this driving force is explained by constructivism. Shared understanding of what is right, shared norms and identity are central to the dynamics in IR.

## 9.3 Summary analysis Norway, Europe, USA and the community of liberal values

The like mindedness that was a driving force behind the success of the liberal values community, has been somewhat replaced by conflicting interests between the US and Europe. The liberal values community with shared norms and understanding of what is right, and what is wrong is under pressure, and it needs to stand together if it is continue to dominate world order.

## 10 US-NATO relations

As a continuation of the previous chapter, where the liberal community of values was looked at. I will in this chapter take a look on US-NATO relations, and the developments in that relationship. US-NATO relations are essential for Norwegian security policy, since the US is by far the largest contributor to the alliance, financially and with military capabilities. As presented earlier in these context chapters, Europe has on account of being concerned about US commitment to the alliance, started the process of taking more responsibility for its own security. If there is decreased commitment, and if such a development were to continue it would have a massive impact on Norwegian security policy priorities. The material in this chapter also aims to contribute in providing a solid foundation in order to answer the research question this paper poses. “*Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus*”? Further they will be examined in a theoretical perspective, to find out which of the chosen IR theories have the most explanatory power of Norwegian security policy.

### 10.1 US-NATO relational development

With a new and unpredictable administration in the US, the current and future relationship with its European allies is unclear, and the European allies are understandably concerned. The incoherent communication from the White House has not made the issue any clearer. In an interview with *The Times* and *Bild* Trump referred to NATO as obsolete, but also that the alliance was very important to him (Masters & Hunt, 2017). These comments, are in direct contrast with what the then Secretary of Defense General James N. Mattis stated when he in a hearing before the US Senate, that the alliance was essential for American security (Kaufman, 2017). This form of double communication, is from a European NATO standpoint not ideal, as former Secretary General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen underlined, that the world needs a policeman, and that the only reliable, capable, and desirable candidate is the US, the world needs determined American leadership (Kaufman, 2017).

As a result of the terrorist attack on the US 9.11.2001, the US forged a new foreign policy direction, away from an almost isolationist policy that the George W. Bush administration initially implemented. Now the US was back on the international stage, with its “you are either with us, or against us policy” (Bush, 2001).

When the US decided to invade Iraq without approval from the UN Security council, it caused tension within NATO, France and Germany both voiced concerns of the justification behind invading Iraq, only Great Britain expressed unequivocal support in favor of the US (Kaufman, 2017). The choice of going at it alone, without legitimate international support created further tensions and division between the US and its European allies, bar Great Britain (Kaufman, 2017).

Under the Obama administration efforts were made to regain confidence and unity within the alliance. End the war in Iraq, close down the prison in Guantanamo Bay, and President Obama declared in his inaugural address that the US were ready to climb back to the position as the leader “ *We are ready to lead once more*” and that “ *America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation*” (Obama, 2009).

President Obama was very popular in Europe, but he soon learned that Europe no longer was willing to go along with whatever the US wants, or wherever the US leads. Europe, as well as being one bloc, clearly was made up of independent countries, that have differences that are not easily bridged with the US. Further questions were raised concerning US commitment to Europe as a result of “pivot to the Pacific”, an US policy shift, created to counter growing concerns on the growth of China in Asia and the possible regional instability. The US also had a responsibility to reassure its close Pacific partners (Kaufman, 2017).

The pivot, according to an article from the Institute for National Strategic Studies in 2014, and the subsequent deployment of forces in Asia, was feared could lead to an escalation of tension between the US and China by European allies. Also the fact that the European allies felt that the US had not sufficiently consulted its European counterparts in advance of the policy direction, caused discontent (Michel & Przystup, 2014). One perhaps unintended consequence of US Asia policy, has been witnessed in Europe. There has been a shift in EU policy towards China. Both Germany and France have pursued broader and deeper trade, and diplomatic relations with China. One possible negative outcome of European pivot to Asia, could be to undermine US security ties to Europe. If European countries continue to pursue their own interests at the expense of common goals (Twining, 2015).

The US, as a consequence of Chinese rise to power in Asia and North Korean nuclear developing capabilities, feels obligated to reassure its closest allies in the region, South Korea and Japan, and to safeguard US interest in the region (Blagden, 2015).

Under the following Trump administration, as mentioned earlier, communication from the White House regarding NATO and European security, have not been of the reassuring kind. An example of this form of communication during Trumps campaigning, is when he was asked questions on his commitment to NATO, and to defend allies if they were attacked, his answer shocked European allies. The response from Trump was that he would only consider coming to the aid of allies that has fulfilled their obligations to the US. The statement was consistent with earlier statements where Trump threatened to withdraw American forces from Europe if the allies in question did not pay more for American protection (Sanger & Haberman, 2015). The blatant threats of not committing to the collective defense of Europe, struck hard with the NATO allies, already concerned about US commitments, and in face of a resurgent Russia. Trumps support of the Russian President Putin, have caused much uncertainty and unpredictability in future US Europe relations. The policy direction of President Trump has contributed to undermine confidence in US ability and willingness to “lead again”. Undoubtedly, the individual that holds position as President of the US has a direct impact on relations (Kaufman, 2017).

## **10.2 Analysis US-NATO relational development**

President Trump has caused much uncertainty and confusion amongst the European allies, and despite efforts made by US officials to downplay the presidents incoherent statements, the EU is not convinced of US commitment. Europe is still dependent on US, as the former Secretary General of NATO Fogh Rasmussen stated that the US was the only state capable of acting as the police officer of the world. A role that the US has gradually moved away from the last decades.

When President Obama declared the US ready to lead again, after a period of growing tensions and division caused by American decision to invade Iraq despite the UN Security Council did not sanction it, President Obama experienced that Europe was no longer willing to go along with whatever the US wanted. The US also has limits to its capabilities, and US needs to protect its own interests in the Pacific as well as US allies in the Pacific also has need

for reassurance and deterrence capabilities, as they feel that the regional stability is threatened by China, and a nuclear North Korea.

Driving forces identified here are; shared norms, identity, shared values, trust, limited resources, reassurance and increased deterrence capabilities.

Relations between the US and Europe has changed dependent on who is in charge in the US and in European states. The driving force behind the changing character of US-EU relations is identified as shared norms, global governance, institutional support and like mindedness. With President George W Bush, American-EU like mindedness decreased. US support of global governance based on liberal values decreased. With President Barack Obama, there was more like mindedness, shared norms, values and shared identity, which relieved much of the tension and division that had characterized US-EU relations. The relations are again characterized by tension and uncertainty, on grounds of not sharing values, norms and identity with the current President Donald Trump. These driving forces are explained by constructivism.

The driving forces identified behind the US pivot to the Pacific are identified as; limited resources, ally-reassurance, increased deterrence capabilities. US allies in the pacific are also in need of assurance of American commitment, and limited resources imply that the US does not have the capabilities to have the level of presence everywhere that their allies wish. Limited resources and reassurance of allies are driving forces explained by liberalism. Increasing deterrence capabilities was also a driving force behind the pivot, the US, in order to secure its own interests as well as interests of its partners in the region. Deterrence is a driving force best explained by realism.

### **10.3 Summary analysis US-NATO relational development**

US-EU relations have on grounds of uncertainty in the EU of US commitment to NATO, and at times conflicting interests and values been characterized by tension and division, for many years. The US also needs to prioritize other regions.

## 11 Norwegian-German relations

As one of Europe's largest economies, and the main promoter of integration and cooperation on defense and security policy in the EU. Germany has positioned itself as a partner to lean on, and as a state willing to take responsibility of being a leader. Germany has had close relations with Norway for a long time, Germany also stands out as a state that is like-minded with Norway regarding the fundamental belief in liberal values and an international rule based order. For Norway to move its security and defense policy closer to Europe, Norway needs a solid partner, one that opens up and can drive European security cooperation further.

Germany could be that partner, therefore it is relevant to look closer on Norwegian-German relations and the development of that relation. For Germany's priorities has the power to affect Norwegian security priorities. The main drivers of and mechanisms behind Norwegian-German relations will be derived from the following chapter in order to form part of foundation that will answer the research question "*Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus*"? Further the main drivers and mechanisms will be examined in a theoretical perspective, to find out which of the chosen IR theories have the most explanatory power of Norwegian-German relations.

### 11.1 Development in Norwegian-German relations

Norwegian defensive capabilities are strictly based on alliance membership in NATO with the deterrence capabilities that NATO membership entails. In the long-term plan by the Norwegian Ministry of Defense (FD, 2016), international cooperation, with the goal to contribute in defense- and security policy area is marked as a priority by the Norwegian government. The long-term plan for the defense sector, accentuate the priority of allied countries which are relevant for a bilateral reinforcement of Norwegian security, One of the few countries mentioned as a possible partner in bilateral reinforcement agreement was Germany (FD, 2016). When the Norwegian government presented the white paper *Et forsvar for vår tid* (FD, 2012) they highlighted Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFECO) under the framework of the NATO initiative SMART DEFENSE, as a cooperative project that has brought positive results. The Norwegian government felt that it would be advantageous to explore other possible capability development agreements, under the framework of both SMART DEFENSE, and the EU program of POOLING & SHARING, the government wish

to proceed with these cooperative projects, since it is in the state of Norway self-interest to participate as close as possible with its European partners in security development (FD, 2012).

The Norwegian official position towards the importance on cooperation in the security sector has consistently been firmly placed with the understanding that cooperation is a necessity. In *Omlegging av forsvaret i perioden 2002-2005* (2001) the Norwegian Defense Ministry stated *”Multinational solutions must to an increasing degree, be established in connection with research and development, procurement, day to day operations and maintenance, strategic transport, logistical support, command- and control systems, and operative units from all branches of the armed forces”*.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017 identified German as one of five essential allied countries which Norway seek to develop an especially close military relationship with (Utenriksdepartement, 2017). Bilateral and minilateral collaboration with selected countries in Europe is now regarded by the Norwegian government as a valuable security supplement, it could reduce the risk of marginalization, add extra strength to the defense of Norway, and also soften the impression of being overly dependent upon USA (R. M. Allers et al., 2014). To further cement the Norwegian position on cooperation, it has been acknowledged that Norway is a firm believer in binding agreements and cooperation. The ground principles of the EU, are as such, more in line with Norwegian political tradition and norms, than the more pragmatic case to case approach, military solutions and bilateral agreements favored by the United States (Græger, 2019). The significance of Germany as a defense- and as a security partner cannot be underestimated, the countries are in close geographical proximity, and have developed a close relationship built on decades of cooperation. Germany have been an important economic partner since the 1950`s when Germany experienced a rapid economic growth, and soon Germany was Norway`s second largest trading partner, and export market (R. M. Allers et al., 2014). On the strategic level, it exists a joint perception that the two countries are likeminded, and that they have an open dialog on all levels. Both countries seek to have a comprehensive approach to crisis-management, and believe that all military action should take place in accordance with international law, moral and ethical principles.

From a German perspective, there is great interest in developing closer relations with Norway, according to German Secretary of Defense, Ursula von der Leyen, Norway is the dream partner to join in a close defense collaboration (R. Allers, 2018). Former German



chancellor Gerhardt Schröder once described German-Norwegian relations as “ *the only problem with German-Norwegian relations, is that there are no problems*” (R. M. Allers et al., 2014).

## **11.2 Analysis Development in Norwegian-German relations**

Norwegian defensive and deterrence capabilities are fully linked with NATO membership. That is one reason behind the Norwegian priority of focusing on and expanding international cooperation, with the goal to contribute in defense- and security policy area. The NORDEFECO experience has yielded positive results and functions as evidence for the Norwegian government that cooperation is the way forward. Closer collaboration with essential allies could reduce Norwegian risk of being marginalized. One of the identified essential allies is Germany. Both Norway and Germany share a conception of each other as a solid partner, as like-minded. Both countries seek to have a comprehensive approach to crisis-management, and believe that all military action should take place in accordance with international law, moral and ethical principles.

From a German perspective, there is great interest in developing closer relations with Norway. The two countries also has a long history of cooperation and trade.

Collaboration with Germany is possibly easier than with the US, as the ground principles of the EU, are as such, more in line with Norwegian political tradition and norms.

Identified driving forces are; Shared norms, values, trust, like mindedness, collective security.

The joint understanding and support of international law, morals and ethical principles, and a long history of good experiences cooperating is driving Norwegian- German relations closer. The driving factors are explained by constructivism. Fear of being marginalized is another driving force at play, and is part of the explanation why Norway seeks to cooperate on as many fronts as possible, with whom Norway considers essential allies. Fear of marginalization is explained by realism.

### **11.3 Summary analysis Development in Norwegian-German relations**

Joint perception of like mindedness, shared norms and values, long history of successful cooperation, has created relations between the countries that favor close collaboration.

Germany is geographically near, Germany has risen as a leader on security issues in the EU, so close and good relations with them is important for Norway.

## 12 German security perspective

Germany has risen as the EU leader in security policy, and is one of Norway's closest allies and partners. German perceptions on collaboration and the future of security community will have a large effect on Norwegian security policy, and therefore The German perspective on security, is relevant to take a closer look at. To assist in laying the empirical foundation for answering “*Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus*”?

The main theoretical driving forces behind German security perspective will be identified and applied in the analysis.

### 12.1 German security perspective development

The Neue Mitte or Third Way initiative was meant to put British-German relations of a firmer foot, but British failure to commit more fully to European integration, as demonstrated with British departure from the EU, caused Germany to look elsewhere. The Weimar Triangle, of France, Poland and Germany has taken on greater significance (R. M. Allers et al., 2014)

There has been a central theme to Germany's foreign policy narrative, of willingness to take greater responsibility in defense and security policy matters, as Germany's relative power has risen (R. M. Allers et al., 2014). After the Euro crisis, calls from within NATO and the EU for Germany to take more responsibility coincided with the perceived willingness of Germany to do exactly that. From the mid 1990's Germany was faced with the challenging task of following a double strategy, if seeking cooperation on defense and security policy issues did not lead to any tangible success, Germany would look outside the Union for bilateral or minilateral cooperation should it be necessary (R. M. Allers et al., 2014). A sign of Germany ascendancy to become a more active player in European security is when it proposed the FNC initiative (Framework Nations Concept) (Zapfe & Glatz, 2017) FNC has the possibility to change European the character and structure of European armed forces within NATO and beyond (Zapfe & Glatz, 2017). Germany has taken leadership of one group, based on a pillar of *coordinated development of capabilities* (Zapfe & Glatz, 2017). FNC timelines and objectives are closely linked with Bundeswehr plans. The central points of Bundeswehr planning is to return to collective security, and Germany plans to continue to increase expenditure on defense and security capabilities.

One reason for German reinvigorated determination to develop a solid foundation for European security is the growing European fear of a Yalta II, an agreement made between the US and Russia over the heads of the Europeans. Senior American administrations officials have claimed to reassure its European allies, that the President is not serious with his threats. Another motivation behind German increase in its defense expenditure and activity is that they are not only relieving some of the American pressure on Europe, but also hedging its security policy options, if the time comes when the US no longer is the continents security guarantor (Zapfe et al., 2017).

Berlin is pursuing ambitious plans for security and defense, with the long-term potential of the Bundeswehr becoming Europe's indispensable army. Germany has in the past, and not without reason been suspected by some of its allies of favoring military integration, in order to use it as symbolism. The FNC is not of a symbolic character, it is a systematic and structured approach to gradually build European forces within NATO (Zapfe & Glatz, 2017).

The German rise to leadership has taken place parallel with calls from Europe for Germany to take more responsibility. Germany has emerged as the central European security player in American foreign policy. This puts Germany central to both Europeans and Americans, and this position is at the moment for the most part uncontested. Even though Germany has been restrictive in its participation in international coalitions, Germany is at the center of global governance debates, and plays a leading role in transforming and promoting the liberal world order (R. M. Allers et al., 2014).

Former German President Joachim Gauck at the 2014 Munich security conference held a speech where he called for continuing to take more responsibility on security issues “ *More responsibility does not mean more throwing our weight around. Nor does it mean going at it alone! On the contrary, by cooperating with other countries...Germany gains influence*” (Gauck, 2014, p. 3). The German President further underlined that the ability to cooperate is becoming a trademark of international politics, and that responsibility is always shared responsibility. Gauck also described a Germany with doubts on the direction of the US regarding both the alliance and on global governance “*We're not calling the alliance with the United States into question, but we have observed symptoms of stress and uncertainty about the future. We have great respect for the rules-based world of the United Nations*” (Gauck, 2014, p. 2).

Germany has proven to be a protagonist of military multinationality and proven its commitment to multilateralism and has as evidence of that integrated all of its armed forces into multinational structures. The current German defense policy guideline clearly state that the Bundeswehr will remain geared towards multinational deployments within the framework of worldwide crisis management (UN, EU, NATO, OSCE) (R. M. Allers et al., 2014).

## **12.2 Analysis German security perspective development**

In later years there has been an increasingly willingness from Germany to accept responsibility as one of the leaders in the EU. Germany's relative power in the EU has risen and many members of the EU are still not fully recovered from the financial crisis of 2008. These countries have called for Germany to take the role as leader and subsequently take more responsibility. The FNC highlights German ambitions. Another motivation behind German increase in its defense expenditure and activity is that they are not only relieving some of the American pressure on Europe, but also hedging its security policy options, if the time comes when the US no longer is the continents security guarantor. The German plans for its armed forces and its security policy is to return to collective security. Germany has emerged as the central European security player in American foreign policy. This puts Germany central to both Europeans and Americans, and this position is at the moment for the most part uncontested. Even though Germany has been restrictive in its participation in international coalitions, Germany is at the center of global governance debates, and plays a leading role in transforming and promoting the liberal world. This central position Germany is in, makes it very important for Norway to keep its good relations, and as motivation to form closer ties.

Driving forces behind German perspectives on security; Collective security, institutional support, integration and cooperation, relative power.

As Germany has grown in relative power in Europe, the gain in relative power has played part in Germany accepting they have to take more responsibility. Relative power as a driving force is best explained by realism. Collective security, institutional support, shadow of the future, integration and cooperation as, are trademarks of German identity. That Germany is willing to take responsibility and increase its expenditure on security, not with its own security in mind, but for the common good and the collective security, since its only when everyone is secure,

that Germany is secure mentality. Collective security and common good as driving forces are best explained by liberalism. Institutional support, integration, cooperation, and shadow of the future are other driving forces at play. Germany is a strong supporter of global governance, and since Germany does not know if US commitment to Europe will remain at a high level, it is in Germany's interest to cooperate to secure future gains.

### **12.3 Summary analysis German security perspective development**

Neoliberal institutionalism, structural realism and constructivism all have explanatory power to a degree. The driving forces of fear of abandonment, structural change of European security system with the rise of Russia, and of Germany's gains of relative power are best explained by structural realism. Neoliberal institutionalism explains German strong support of international institutions, collective security and integration. Constructivism has explanatory power on the aspect of German realization of changing identities of some of its allies.

Germany has ascended as Europe's leader on global governance and security policy. The responsibility-taking and increased willingness to be a leader, increases the possibility of Germany and EU becoming a credible security player and in the future. It also increases the value of developing closer relations with them for Norway.

## **13 Norwegian-German submarine development agreement**

The Norwegian/German submarine collaboration is a major deal for Norway, it is the second largest armaments procurement deal in Norwegian history.

Germany was chosen as Norway's preferred partner and in the previous chapters provided a solid foundation for the final part of the analysis. I will analyze this chapter on the submarine development agreement in light of the derived driving forces and mechanisms from the previous chapters, to form the basis for the conclusive answer to my research question "*Is Norway in the process of shifting its main security and defense policy focus away from a transatlantic focus, towards a continental Europe focus*"? We will see if this deal is an indicator of a new direction of Norwegian security policy, or rather a continuation of traditional Norwegian approach to security and defense policy with close alignment with Norwegian allies.

### **13.1 Joint Norwegian-German submarine collaboration**

The aging Norwegian submarines are in need of replacing, and Norway does not have tradition for, or the industrial infrastructure to carry out such a large scale project on its own (Wahlund, 2019). Norway has decided to acquire four new submarines, to replace the outdated existing operating submarines. The duration of the collaboration on submarine development, is set to last the entirety of the expected life time of the submarines, approximately 30 years.

Another important part of the cooperation, is that Norway included a buy-back clause in line with official guidelines set by the Norwegian government. The buy-back clause guarantees that Germany will have to place orders from Norwegian suppliers in the same amount as the Norwegian government has placed orders in from Germany. There have been made progress on that front with The German navy decided to install missile systems from the Norwegian weapons manufacturer Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace. The order size from Germany is expected to gross over 10mrd NOK (Dalløkken, 2020). Such a deal will secure a large number of high technological and industrial Norwegian jobs, for many years to come (Dalløkken, 2017). The agreement must be seen in light of a major German armament reform (Agenda Rüstung) from 2014. International collaboration in defense and security issues are a

central part of the reform. There is appreciation from the German side of Norwegian support and contribution to FNC. There is a common perception of Norway as a reliable, like-minded ally, that takes responsibility for NATO's north-Atlantic flank.

The two previous classes of submarines Kobben and Ula were both assembled at German shipyards. The close ties between the Norwegian and German navy have developed through more than 50 years of Norway operating German built submarines, have resulted in a mutual understanding of each country's culture and demeanor. The high level of common understanding can be seen in formalizing incorporation of cooperative bodies, exchange of personnel and the use of liaison officers at an early stage of the program (Wahlund, 2019). To cooperate at such a close level, as Norway and Germany are on a strategic asset, such as submarines, is quite unique, even among allies (R. Allers, 2018). All aspects of the agreement, from producing spare parts, training, and operational aspects was formed bilaterally from the early beginnings of the program. The cooperation on naval armaments procurement, is not placed in the framework of special programs, such as FNC, rather, they are placed under the more flexible framework of the Smart Defense initiative. The Norwegian Minister of Defense at the time, Ine Eriksen Søreide stated in a press-release that *«Et omfattende ubåtsamarbeid med Tyskland, vil sikre at Norge får de ubåtene vi trenger, samtidig som vi bidrar til Smart Defense og et mer effektivt materiellsamarbeid i NATO»* (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2017, p. 1). The quote states that the Norwegian government, with a comprehensive collaboration with Germany on submarines, will secure Norway the submarines they need, and at the same time support the Smart Defense initiative, also contribute to increase efficiency on armaments cooperation within NATO.

Submarine capabilities are expensive, it is expected to exceed 41mrd NOK (Forsvarmateriell), making it the second most expensive armaments deal in Norwegian history, after purchasing new F-35 fighters from the US. With that in mind, the buy-back clause (industrial protocol), played a decisive part in Norwegian governments basis for choosing Germany as a strategic partner in the naval armaments program (Wahlund, 2019).



## **13.2 Analysis Joint Norwegian-German submarine collaboration**

Norway and Germany are capable of joining in a such a deep and comprehensive agreement, because they have long experience of cooperating on submarines. What is new in this agreement, is the level of integration between the two nations navies and industry. The high level of common understanding can be seen in formalizing incorporation of cooperative bodies, exchange of personnel and the use of liaison officers at an early stage of the program. To cooperate at such a close level, as Norway and Germany are on a strategic asset, such as submarines, is quite unique, even among allies. Germany`s willingness to cooperate with Norway is part of the explanation as to why Germany agreed to the Norwegian buy-back clause.

The driving forces identified behind the Norwegian-German submarine joint collaboration is; Trust, shared understanding, like mindedness, good past experiences, limited resources.

Limited resources as a driving force can be identified by the acknowledgement by Norway and Germany that they themselves does not have the required capabilities to take on the project themselves. Limited resources is also manifested in the financial aspect, it is less costly to share development costs, and to procure material from whichever partner has the best knowledge on the field. Limited resources is best explained by liberalism. The high level of trust, shared understanding, joint perception of like mindedness, good past experiences as driving forces has led to stabile social relations between Norway and Germany on all levels, and has led to agreements on many fundamental issues in security policy.

## **13.3 Summary analysis Joint Norwegian-German submarine collaboration**

The high level of trust, shared understanding, joint perception of like mindedness, good past experiences as driving forces has led to stabile social relations between Norway and Germany on all levels, and has led to agreements on many fundamental issues in security policy. Also the strong focus on collective security and need for cooperation as a means of increasing European defensive capabilities in both states defense and security policy are driving forces explained by neoliberal institutionalism. The joint submarine development agreement, and the

depth of the agreement, is a sign of increasingly strong relations between Norway and Germany on security policy.

## 14 Results

Norway is moving closer to its geographically close allies in mainland Europe, predominately closer to Germany, but not away from the transatlantic security cooperation. By utilizing IR theory outlined in the theories chapter, to analyze the empirical data, this thesis have found key driving forces and mechanisms behind Norwegian security policy development.

Realism has explanatory power of some key aspects: fear of abandonment is a strong driving force, as showed by the admission of the Norwegian government, that the need to show itself as a solid partner was part of the reason for Norwegian participation in Libya. Great power protection, strong driving forces behind the Norwegian security policy foundation.

Neorealism explains how the changes in structure have limited the possibilities of Norwegian security policy. The breakdown of the Soviet Union affected the structure of the international system, and NATO, then the rise of Russia, again changed the structure. Structure is considered a strong driving force behind Norwegian security policy development.

There exist a possible argument for offensive structural realism to have explanatory power of Norwegian willingness to cooperate on security matters with as many partners as possible, a Norwegian power maximizing. But the data collected for this thesis, rather supports that it is a collective security mechanism behind this willingness to cooperate. Defensive structural realism is regarded as having explanatory power on the balancing policy Norway as carried out towards the Soviet Union and somewhat carried out towards Russia. The balancing was in practice carried out by implementing self-imposed restrictions on allied activity in Norwegian territory, in fear of escalating a security dilemma to an arms race or worse.

The analysis of this thesis points to neoliberal institutionalism, as the IR with greatest explanatory power of Norwegian security policy development. Norwegian strong support of institutions such as the UN, support of a global order governed by liberal values. The principle of collective security is regarded as a strong driving force, as much of Norwegian contribution does not directly increase Norwegian security, but rather a means of showing alliance solidarity and towards the common good. Shadow of the future is another powerful driving force, in the European pivot of Norwegian security policy.

Constructivism is also regarded as having explanatory power of certain aspects and powerful driving forces of the development of Norwegian security policy: The division and tensions in the community of liberal values, is not exclusively a consequence of American focus on Asia,

but a the result of a, changing of identity and changing of norms in the US, and more isolationist policy direction. The community has changed, and the actors who are of a like mind, have common identities, shared norms and expectations of what is the right way forward, appear to be forming closer ties.

The scope of the Norwegian-German submarine development collaboration is a sign of a persistent strategy to form closer ties with Germany. Norwegian contribution and willingness to participate in as many EU security policy areas as possible, serves also as a sign of Norwegian focus on Europe. Norway and Europe are still strongly connected to the US as their main security provider. Yet efforts have been made over many decades to bring more balance in the symmetry of power between US and Europe. With uncertainty and shadow of the future looming over the trans-Atlantic liberal community of values, and over American commitment to Europe, and in face of a resurgent Russia, The EU has accelerated it development towards strategic autonomy. The liberal community of values are threatened. For Norway, and the EU, it is increasingly difficult to relate to shifting American foreign and security policy priorities. Which drives EU to take more responsibility for its own security.

The Norwegian security policy journey is characterized by two mainstays, great power protection, and support of a rule based world order governed by international law. As there are no credible alternatives to great power protection, Norway remains by America`s side. Changes in US identity, and a growing EU role as a security actor, and as a more likeminded actor on the importance of continued support of international institutions and a global governance by international law, drives Norway closer to mainland Europe. Norway as well as the EU are not actively departing from the transatlantic community, the analysis show they are rather hedging their security bets, as they do not know the future, it brings strong incentives to cooperate with partners of a like mind.

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