Security Under Construction
A Bourdieusian Approach to Non-state Crisis Centres in Northwest Russia

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Abstract:

This study examines the work of non-state crisis centres for women in Northwest Russia by asking “How do non-state crisis centres for women in Northwest Russia produce security?” The work of Pierre Bourdieu contributes to an analytical approach that illustrates security practices in regard to this context. On the basis of interviews conducted with crisis centre representatives, Moscow-based national women’s groups and Norwegian collaborators in Northern crisis centre work, this analytical approach is used to explain the dynamics of the local security production. Three thinking tools in Bourdieu’s work, field, capital and habitus are used in this study. The concept of field defines an analytical framework characterized by the relations between the crisis centres and local stakeholders as well as between the crisis centres and their clients. The concepts of capital and habitus depict the objective constraints and subjective aspects relevant to the local security production. In result the study illustrates that crisis centres in Northwest Russia manoeuvre in the field on the basis of their social capital. This implies in this context that security production is ad hoc and personalized. Most centres do not offer a physical shelter but nonetheless provide a discursive space and an information hub for victims’ process of re-describing self and thus recreating a situation of security. This novel analytical approach to examining local security practices and the work of non-state crisis centres displays a de-militarized understanding of security. This conceptualization of security reflects human security and its concern with people-centred security. A weakness in human security research however concerns empirical study, and this is addressed in this case study of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia. The study contributes by making visible ongoing practices of security production that define people’s security reality and thereby challenges pre-conceived conceptions of security and its connection to the use of military force.
1. Introduction

1.1. Research questions and relevance

Violence against women is an insecurity with which many women have learned to live as a way of life:

“The mother says, “Show patience, daughter.” The history is as such that the grandmother lived like that, there is nothing to be afraid of, and [the mother] lived like that too.” (Informant 9/2006)

The establishment of non-state crisis centres in Russia during the 1990s is changing such naturalized understandings of violence against women. Crisis centres provide to victims of violence against women a place to meet people who are familiar with women’s experiences of domestic violence. These centres in northwest Russia are small entities with a minimum of infrastructure, mostly run on the basis of voluntarism. Most are not able to offer a shelter, a safe place to stay for women who are in an acute threat situation, which in the development of crisis centres in Western Europe from the 1970s used to be the cornerstone of such centres. Non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia have nonetheless changed the context in which women who become victims of violence against women aspire for security in their lives. Crisis centres constitute a hub of knowledge and advice for the victims. Studying the practices of crisis centres exposes that security in regard to violence against women is related to change also on an individual level:

“A woman who has lived in a condition of violence, she will never be just like the others. (…) Not that she is bad because she is being beaten, but [she] needs to learn [to know] her individuality.” (Informant 9/2006)

Crisis centres work to institute dependable structures of assistance while also addressing such individual processes of re-describing self that the women go through in order to create a new and secure life-situation. These practices are the focus in this study of non-state crisis centres as security producers.

The analytical interest concerns how security is produced, and this is addressed in regard to non-state crisis centres as examples of local security producers. Such an analytical focus on local and people-centred security has in recent years been discussed in debates on the human security concept. The 1994 report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Human Security Now” (UNDP 1994) introduced this term to contemporary security discussion and has subsequently spurred debates on what is and what is not security in this people-centred conceptualization of the term. This concept introduces a wide variety of security realities and experiences into the security debate, and critics have responded with
demands for delimitations and specifications of issues, causal inferences, thresholds and values encompassed by the concept (Buzan 2004; Mack 2004; Owen 2004a; Paris 2004). It is however noted that the people to whom human security matters are mostly passive subjects in the discourse (Krause 2005:6), and that directing the focus of research towards these can contribute to altering the understandings of security (Darby 2006:467). A bottom-up and people-centred perspective of human security research is called for (Krause and Jütersonke 2005; Ewan 2007:187). This is the imperative of this project that aims to contribute to the security concept debates by analysing security production relevant to victims of violence against women. The empirical case study addresses how local actors of security, in this case non-state crisis centres, produce security.

This project suggests an analytical perspective on the basis of which such local security production is examined by means of specific concepts, designated as “thinking tools” (Bourdieu 1985a:18; Wacquant 1989:50). These are drawn from the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) and have been developed throughout his research by being adopted and made use of in regard to various empirical issues. The three core terms from his work that are made use of in this study are field, capital and habitus. They form a conceptual core that aims at defining practice. In particular, these concepts define an analytical focus aimed at overcoming the antinomy between objectivism and subjectivism by integrating them into a single model of analysis. This antinomy permeates the human security debate as the concern with indexes, thresholds, and similar measures, excludes subjects’ views and assessments. The current status of human security concept debates is an opposition between a technical, objectivist based focus versus an interest in people’s experiences and perceptions, thus a subjectivist perspective. The concern with the subject is however pointed to as among the most difficult aspects of human security research (Glasius 2008). In this study the use of Bourdieu’s concepts provides an analytical approach to the question of identifying both objective and subjective aspects in regard to security. This approach is applied because it offers theoretical tools that suggest a way of abridging the antagonism of subjectivist and objectivist modes of knowledge production. This theoretical-analytical interest defines the concern with how security is produced in this study. The approach is employed in an empirical case study for the purpose of making sense of security as a local practice. By outlining, applying and assessing this analytical approach to local security production this study aims to contribute to the human security debate with an alternative analytical approach. The objective of the case study is to make use of Bourdieu’s conceptual tools in order to make visible and illustrate contingencies on security production in a specific empirical case. A
systematic, empirical analysis based on the three core concepts of Bourdieu’s work is conducted. The aim is to address the human security debate and its research practice by means of a systematic analytical approach to an empirical case study. A key concern is to demonstrate how these concepts are made use of to explain the practice of the local security agents. A main argument is that it is to this process and practice of research that human security research must direct attention. To this end therefore this study addresses the two research questions:

(1) Applying a Bourdieusian approach, how do non-state crisis centres for women in Northwest Russia produce security?

(2) How does a Bourdieusian approach to the analysis of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia contribute to the conceptual debate on human security?

1.2. Analytical interventions: Crisis centres and security

A novelty of this study is that the Bourdieusian theoretical approach, with a focus on (three of) the thinking tools, is invoked in regard to human security and with a focus on local security practices. This study has a main focus on the work of Bourdieu and is thereby connected to ongoing developments in security theory. Bourdieu’s work and thinking tools have gained increasing attention in security studies over the last few years (Bigo 2001, 2006; Leander 2005; Pouliot 2004; Villumsen 2008; Williams 2007). This illustrates an interesting development of new theories in security over the past decade. Bourdieu-inspired studies of security are characterized by an analytical interest in expanding knowledge of security actors and their doings. The views of security practitioners such as military and police (Bigo 2000; Bigo, Bonelli et al. 2007), diplomats (Pouliot 2007a), and private military companies (Leander 2005) are examples of studies that examine actors in an expanding field of international security. In the present study, security actors and their doings are also the main concern, albeit with a focus on non-state crisis centres as experts and providers of security locally. The field is thus localized with an emphasis on security production for women in the

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1 Theoretical development of security studies over the last two decades encompasses a number of perspectives, and Wæver (2004) annotates some of these in terms of their cities of origin, such as Paris (Didier Bigo), Copenhagen (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver), and Aberystwyth (Ken Booth; Keith Krause; Richard Wyn Jones; Michael C. Williams).
communities in which they live. The recent security studies that have also applied Bourdieu are drawn upon in the process of adopting this approach to the specific context of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia. One of the key concerns of Bourdieu was that his work, and in particular the concepts of field, capital and habitus are adaptable to various contexts and empirical issues. This implies that the logic of application and adaptation of the concepts need to be explained in regard to the specific empirical material that is studied. This forms a considerable part of this project, and both Bourdieu’s own use of the concepts as well as the use of Bourdieu in recent security studies is discussed to find the necessary approaches in this study.

In this study the field is dominated by local security agents but is also characterized by transnationalism, both in terms of cooperation on campaigning (Johnson 2007a), funding (Henderson 2002), as well as transmission of values (Joachim 2003; Keck and Sikkink 1998). An international actor group that has been actively involved in the development of the local centres in Northwest Russia has then also been interviewed as means to gaining further perspective on the local security actors. These are Norwegian participants in the Network of Crisis Centres in the Barents Region (NCRB). Interviews with three Norwegian NCRB participants as well as three Moscow-based women’s groups contribute to broadening the perspective and understanding of the local security production. The key informants are however local women’s groups. In total seven crisis centres across three regions in Northwest Russian, Murmansk, Archangelsk and Karelia have been interviewed (see map 1 for locations of field research). The interviews were conducted in 2006, with preparatory field research in 2005 and follow-up interviews in summer 2008. The methodical approach of interviewing two groups of actors in addition to the key informants aims to ensure a rich discussion of the context of local security practices on violence against women in Russia. The primary sources are subjected to content analysis on the basis of the thinking tools. In addition, secondary sources on the empirical context are used, such as detailed studies of the Russian women’s movement (Molyneux 1990; Sperling 1999; Stites 1990, orig. 1978.), the crisis centre movement in Russia during the last 15 years (Hemment 2004a, 2007; Henderson 2002; Johnson 2006, 2007a, b; Richter 2002; Sundstrom 2002, 2005), as well as post-Communist gender studies (Kay 2004).

By analyzing the security practices of women’s groups in Russia that work on violence against women, I examine an agent of security that is rarely paid attention to in international security studies. Within a narrow state-centred conceptualization of security, violence against women is not a security issue. Violence against women affects women around the world
however, and this has spurred initiatives by the international community to address this issue, as visible in United Nations (UN) resolutions and documents. For example, in 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 48/104 “Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against women”, and in 2000, UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security also identified women’s security concerns. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is the most significant international document addressing women’s concerns with discrimination but violence was first addressed within the context of this declaration as a result of international feminist campaigning during the 1980s (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Although this struggle for acknowledgement of the issue of violence against women led to results, the issue does not dominate the global security agenda. As one Russian NGO activist on violence against women explained, other security issues mostly gain more attention:

“Today here [in Russia], [and] equally in the whole world, questions of terrorism etc. are bigger. That’s probably the case in many societies. The thing is that preventive measures are more difficult to [present] than reactive. That is, reaction is easier. Or at least, the problem becomes more visible when you react. And preventive [action] is invisible.” (Informant 10/2006)

In popular discourse security is a special domain associated with the state. This study however directs attention to other processes of security that are often not embraced in the popular, state-centric security debates. The choice of analysing security on the basis of non-state women’s group and their work to remedy violence against women reveals a concern with analyzing security based on accounts of other actors than state representatives. Such an actor perspective has been advocated and applied by feminist international relations since the 1970s (e.g. Ackerly and True 2006; Enloe 1996; Sylvester 2004). In addition, the people-centred conceptualization of security as human security motivates this focus. I argue that because of the concern with empowerment, this conceptualization brings an emphasis on how security is created to debates on violence against women and security.

In Russia non-state crisis centres were established in the 1990s on the initiative of local women’s groups and funded and encouraged by foreigners. Women’s groups represent an active civil society actor that is acknowledged as strong and stable (Johnson 2006; Richter 2002; Sperling 1999; Sundstrom 2002). For the research strategy of this project, it has been important to examine the work of an actor that is considerably stable and active in the non-state domain in Russia, and women’s groups are such an actor.

With the use of a Bourdieusian approach and the conduct of an empirical analysis, this study aims at intervening in two fields: The study contributes to understanding the work of
local crisis centres in Northwest Russia and also intervenes in security conceptual debates on human security.

1.3. Outline of study

The study is structured to facilitate discussion of the work of crisis centres in Northwest Russia and security concept debates. This research objective was laid out in this chapter and the study proceeds in Chapter 2 by addressing the conceptualization of security that is the basis for the empirical focus on non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia. This chapter, “Conceptualizing Security for Non-state Crisis Centres” introduces the issue of violence against women and discusses it in regard to human security debates. It is reviewed how violence against women has become increasingly acknowledged as an international security concern. It is argued that a discourse on violence against women is established that is not reflective of the complexities of women’s lives because it designates women as victims. By bringing the human security debate into this discussion, attention is directed at security locally and the question of local empowerment for security production. This I argue establishes a basis for examining security contingencies in regard to violence against women without the tendency of victimization. A human security perspective directs attention to dynamics of security in the social context in which people live and thereby also to the complexities in people’s life-world. I therefore use the human security debate as basis for introducing an analysis of the local security production of non-state crisis centres.

In Chapter three, the analytical approach in this study is explained. The chapter first connects the choice of theoretical perspective to the dichotomy of subjectivist and objectivist modes of knowledge production in the human security debate. This is the premise for introducing this theoretical approach and Bourdieu’s work to human security thinking. A further concern that connects this approach to the human security debate is the emphasis on empirical work. This analytical approach provides thinking tools that require adaptation and interpretation in order to be made use of in regard to the specific research interest. This chapter, “Local Security Practices: A Bourdieusian Approach” outlines how the approach interconnects with the human security concept debate and the interest in understanding the practices of local crisis centres. In this chapter I explain the methodological background for the structuring of the analysis in this study. It is emphasized that in order to make use of the thinking tools, these need to be explained and adapted on the basis of the specific empirical case. In Chapter 3.3., I review how this is conducted in the recent studies of security that employ a Bourdieusian approach. I explain differences and similarities between these studies.
and the approach in this study. Of primary importance is the definition of the thinking tools in regard to the empirical context. The definition of these concepts and how they are used in the empirical analysis is explained in the same chapters as the analysis. This structure is chosen because of a concern with achieving an interconnection of theory and empirical analysis, which is a basic prerequisite of Bourdieu’s epistemological viewpoint. The key concern is that the concepts of field, capital and habitus structure the analytical process of uncovering the security production that non-state crisis centres conduct. A key methodological concern is the idea of a continuum that shifts between experience-near and experience-distant perspectives.

While chapter three creates a theoretical basis for analysis, Chapter four introduces the methodical sources that are used in the analysis. I outline the methodological considerations, methodical challenges and solutions that have defined this project. I explain how the interview guides were structured. The actor perspective was broadened while in the field, and this development is explained and justified in this chapter. Overall, this chapter “Method: Interviewing on Practices of Security” illustrates how the project was dominated by an ongoing process of interpretation and re-interpretation in all its phases. A key concern in this project has been to lay open every step of the process of interpretation: the formulation of the research question; how the human security debate is interpreted into a consideration with objective and subjective aspects; how interviews were planned and conducted; and how the concepts of field, capital and habitus are used in the analysis to construct an understanding of the production of security.

Chapter five is the first of three chapters analysing the work of non-state crisis centres for women in Northwest Russia. These are structured on the basis of a concern with combining an analysis of experience-near and experience-distant perspective on the work of the crisis centres. The chapter “Local Security Agents: Women’s Groups in Northwest Russia” begins with an introduction of these local centres and why they are interesting to examine in regard to local security production. It is established that these centres are novel actors, but that they are amongst the most stable and successful civil society actors in Russia, and that their consistent work over the last decade has altered the basis of establishing security for victims of violence against women in Russia. The seven local crisis centres in Northwest Russia that form the core informants in this study are presented. The concept of field is used to define an analytical framework that addresses the relations between crisis centres and local stakeholders on the one hand and between crisis centres and victims on the other. In this manner chapter five specifies the analytical focus of the study. In Chapter six, a broader perspective is introduced that provides an understanding of the national context and history in
which these local crisis centres have developed. In this chapter, “Genesis of crisis centres in Russia”, the historical context that made it possible for these centres to emerge is reviewed. A retrospective glance at the Soviet period establishes the dualism of formal declarations of equality between men and women versus continued discrimination of women in practice. This historical context is important to the task of understanding how violence against women is addressed. The Soviet legacy of women’s groups created a basis for the growth of a women’s movement in Russia subsequent to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The politics of glasnost was particularly important and the range of informal meetings as well as formation of new initiatives and groups (neformal’nye) at this time gave impetus to discussing and addressing violence against women. A first hotline for victims of violence against women was set up in Moscow in 1993, and soon initiatives in other cities were also established. International funding was crucial in this process, and overall, the development of work on violence against women in Russia was a transnational process. These processes are examined on the basis of secondary literature, and then in the latter half of this chapter, key concerns regarding how this issue of violence against women is discussed on the national level is analyzed on the basis of the interviews with the three Moscow-based women’s groups. These groups expel the lack of a systematic approach and a weak understanding of this issue among public authorities. Through their activities these groups have contributed to establishing violence against women as a contested issue in the post-Soviet era. The national women’s groups are key narrators of the issue, and by focusing on their work, the national debates which provide a broader context of the work of local crisis centres is explained.

**Chapter seven** is divided into two parts, examining the concept of capital in chapter 7.1., and habitus in chapter 7.2. These are the two building blocks for the analysis of the security practices of local crisis centres. The title of this chapter is therefore “Security Practices of Local Crisis Centres.” According to the discussion in chapter three, the analytical concepts are explained as thinking tools, adapted to the case and made use of in this chapter. To begin with, it is explained that capital addresses the various forms of power that crisis centres have at hand to produce security for women. Two species of capital are addressed, economic and social capital, and from the analysis it emerges that symbolic capital is important. Crisis centres are associated with symbolic capital because they receive approval and recognition of their work. For victims, there are a series of practical challenges that need to be surmounted in order to establish security, and the crisis centres provide advice and knowledge as well as a discursive space for discussing their own situation for these women. The analysis of habitus and subjective aspects exposes the importance of traditional norms
and habits that imply that the action that crisis centre representatives demand of their clients is not always acclaimed. It is established that for the victims the security production in which the crisis centres involve them is a struggle for re-description of self. Information security is a term that describes the kind of security production in which these local crisis centres are involved. They inform state stakeholders on the issue of violence against women and address weaknesses in the system. On the other hand, they inform victims on the choices they have and the strategies they may pursue in order to establish a secure life-situation. In this manner, crisis centres contribute to security production albeit without, or only seldom offering a physical shelter. Because of their knowledge, experience and information, non-state crisis centres establish a “shelter without a shelter”\(^2\) because they offer a discursive space in which victims can seek advice and make choices pertaining to their insecurity.

In the final Chapter eight, the use of the Bourdieusian approach is reviewed, the adaptation of the thinking tools to the case and their empirical interpretation is discussed. It is argued that this approach exposes how non-state crisis centres have established a space of manoeuvring despite their weak economic capital in this particular field. It is emphasized that this study has directed the analytical perspective at how security is produced and that this differs from the tendencies of aiming to establish means and criteria of defining and delimiting what is and what is not a security concern that dominates human security concept debates.

\(^2\) This characterization originates from Janet Elise Johnson’s presentation “Women’s Crisis Centers in Russia: How Transnational Collaborations Can Work”, 8\(^{th}\) Annual Aleksanteri Conference, Helsinki University, Finland 10-12 December 2008.
2. Conceptualizing security for non-state crisis centres

Violence against women is a form of insecurity that affects women around the world. Many of these women find help and support at non-state crisis centres for women. Such centres emerged in Northwest Russia during the last decade. Through their work many women have been able to find ways to create security in their life. The dynamics of security production that defines the work of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia is the empirical object of analysis in this project. This chapter addresses the conceptualization of security that is the basis for this empirical focus.

In international politics, violence against women has during the last decades achieved increasing acknowledgement as a security concern. The work of the international women’s movement has been crucial in setting the topic on the international agenda. But the successful agenda setting also contributes to the construction of the problem, and critics emphasize the static representation of women as victims in international documents (Nayak and Suchland 2006; Shepherd 2005; Shepherd 2007). The argument presented here is that a human security perspective shifts the focus away from a sole emphasis on victims because of its concern with protection as well as empowerment in regard to security. Human security conceptualizes security in terms of people and communities, and is therefore an attractive starting point for an analysis of local security dynamics related to the work of non-state crisis centres. A need for empirically grounded studies of security is acknowledged in the human security debate and this chapter prepares the ground for conducting such a study.

2.1. Violence against women and security

“[The problem of violence against women] is not declining. If we speak in terms of geopolitics, we may say that it is the real question of social security. It is not less important than the security of our borders.” (Informant 3/2006)

This informant aims to underline the importance of her work on violence against women by comparing the security of women to the security of states. Set up against spirals of insecurity and use of force between states, can women’s suffering from physical and psychological violence from a man close to them be analyzed and discussed as security? Amnesty International is among the international advocacy groups engaged in documenting and reporting on women’s suffering from violence against women. They accrue international
attention to the insecurities experienced by individual women around the world. For example, Amnesty International reports on Anna’s experience of violence in Russia:

“The first time Anna’s husband hit her, he apologized. The couple had married in 1986 and have two sons aged 12 and 19. Later he made a habit of beating and insulting her, and whipped the children for minor offences. Several times, the bruises on her face left Anna too ashamed to go to work. For years, Anna tried to live with the problem, ordering the children to be silent in their father’s presence and trying to avoid potential conflict. But when Anna’s husband lost his job in 2003 due to alcoholism, he drank even more and his aggression increased.

In December 2003, after her husband had threatened to set her on fire, Anna finally decided to file for a divorce. Incensed at her action, her husband destroyed the family’s possessions, including dishes and clothes.

In March 2004, a week after the couple had been officially divorced, she returned with her older son to the flat, as she had nowhere else to go. Her ex-husband told her that he did not recognize the divorce and that he was going to have sex with her. During the incurring argument he doused her with inflammable liquid and tried to set her alight. While Anna had witnesses who could confirm what had happened, the police told her they could not do anything, because “he had not committed a crime.” According to Anna, the police did not pay attention to the fact that he had a lighter nor did they check her coat which was soaked in the liquid.

Anna believes that her decision to divorce him exacerbated his behaviour. “While we are living together we were like marionettes for him,” she said, “what he demanded we would do. Now we were moving out of his control and he could not accept it.” (Amnesty International 2005a:4)

Individual women around the world are affected by violence the likes of which were experienced by Anna. The quote directs attention to the power and control that is linked to the use of violence. The victim adjusts behaviour and constrains her action in order to try to avoid the violence from happening. Violence against women involves psychological violence but as described in Anna’s case, also extreme forms of physical violence. For the women the likes of Anna, this is an extreme situation of insecurity.

With its 1994 report “New Dimensions of Human Security” (UNDP 1994), the UNDP took a leading position in advocating an ideological change from security in terms of state and territory to community and people (cf. Karamé 2005:56). The UNDP directed attention to conditions within states, and argued that it is not sufficient to focus on the survival of the sovereign state as the essential aspect of security. Instead, people are at the core of security. At the very beginning of the report it was declared that “[t]he world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives.” (UNDP 1994:1) For victims of violence against women such as exemplified with Anna’s story, the family, normally a unit of community and security constitutes the threat. Security in this context is for example dependent upon protection from the ex-husband and the arrangement of a secure place to live. Security in regard to violence against women is therefore critically linked to women’s daily
lives. Human security directs attention to this immediate social context, in which security is experienced. The concept therefore opens up for analyzing and discussing violence against women in a security perspective. Violence against women as a human security issue is thus the starting point of this study.

2.2. Human security and people’s security reality

Over the course of this project, I have experienced that a security analysis of violence against women is often met with bewilderment. My informants were puzzled by my interest in the concept of human security. They did however also talk about violence against women as security. “Security in the family. Time to act.” was for example the title of a recommendation prepared by the Russian Association of Crisis Centres (RACC) in 2003 that aimed to inform legislative and executive powers on how to improve the efforts to prevent violence in the family in Russia. This shows that the concept of human security is not theorized and discussed in this empirical context, suggesting thereby that not only is the realization of human security localized but also its theorization. In scholarly responses to my project hesitancy has been expressed with respect to how the case of violence against women fit in with the concept of human security. In contrast, Caroline Bunch in fact stresses violence against women as the epitome of a human security issue:

“Yet, if you look at definitions of human security, there is no better paradigm for human insecurity than violence against women, which directly and indirectly affects a vast number of people.” (Bunch 2004:32)

She suggests that the human security concept is means to examining fundamental threats to security inherent in the everyday violence of domestic abuse. Because of the tendency to ignore women’s lives in security analyses this will contribute to an improved understanding and consideration of a comprehensive human security reality (ibid.). Such an interest in learning about the complex reality of human security is in the conceptual debate on human security set up against demands for a delimitation of the concept, in terms of issues, causal inferences, and values (Buzan 2004; Krause 2004; Mack 2004; Paris 2004). The empirical descriptiveness of the concept, the number of issues that it can potentially describe and incorporate into security thinking, is identified as a problem.\(^3\) Specifically in regard to the concern with interconnectedness of threats in the human security concept, Andrew Mack

\(^3\) In regard to the descriptiveness of the concept, Andrew Mack (2004:367) in fact argues that “[i]f the term ‘insecurity’ embraces almost all forms of harm to individuals – from affronts to dignity to genocide – it loses any real descriptive power.”
(2004:367) notes that this is an ‘unhelpful’ jargon because “[a]ny definition that conflates dependent and independent variables renders causal analysis virtually impossible.” The focus on conceptual clarification is a focal point of critique against the concept of human security. Sabina Alkire (2004) remarks that there are thirty or more definitions of human security, and that the key conceptual challenge is to name priority issues that represent the vital core of security. This character of the concept is basis for a critical view of human security as a framework of analysis because the concept is considered too vague to generate specific research questions (Paris 2001). Kyle Grayson underlines that the politics involved in delimiting and defining human security need to be openly and critically assessed:

“[I]t is imperative that ‘the aspiration to power’ that is inherent in any definitional claim be exposed and debated in terms of both what is being positively affirmed as comprising human security and what is concurrently disqualified; there must be analytical sensitivity given to the people, places and things that are marginalized when an ‘expert’ claims to be providing an precise/scientific/workable definition of human security that is of practical use” (Grayson 2004:357)

Any delimitation of human security aimed at making the concept analytically useful therefore entails a political positioning. One way in which many have dealt with the problem of conceptual clarification is by defining human security in terms of a limited set of issues. For example, in the Human Security Report 2005, the first annual report of the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia in Canada, human security is defined in terms of political violence. Their aim is to map “the incidence, severity, and consequences of political violence around the world” and thereby to provide “data and analysis that is essential to evidence-based security policy.” The measuring of political violence is linked to a threshold of 25 deaths (Human Security Centre 2005:67). In order for human security to be

6 Political violence is subdivided into three categories: First, state-based armed conflicts encompassing both intra-state conflicts and conflicts between a state and a non-state actor; second, non-state armed conflicts, in which no government is party to the conflict, and third, one-sided violence, e.g. genocide. The three categories of political violence are linked to a threshold of 25 deaths (battle-related deaths in the two first categories, and civilian deaths in the case of one-sided violence) (Human Security Centre 2005:67). In addition, the Human Security Report includes two further measurements of human security focusing on human rights abuse and the probability of a government becoming destabilized.
7 For the purpose of this global mapping of political violence, a new dataset was set up in cooperation between the Human Security Centre and the Conflict Data Program of Uppsala University, Sweden. This dataset is based on the conflict data that Uppsala University has developed together with the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) that counts inter-state wars and armed conflicts in which the state takes part on at least one side. The new
quantifiable, it must be defined and operationalized, and thus, a narrow conceptualization is needed in order to employ quantitative measurements. In addition to being a narrow conceptualization of human security, the focus of the Human Security Report has rightly been recognized as being “broadly within the realist rubric” (Roberts 2006:257) with a focus on ‘hard security’ in terms of political violence. Alternatively, Booysen (2002) operationalizes human security by including all the seven components listed by UNDP (economic, food, health, environment, political, community, personal). An Inefficiency Ratio is calculated, which expresses “the extent to which efforts at human security are translated into actual achievement.” (ibid. 274)

Other attempts at composite indexing, e.g. Steve Lonergan et.al. (2000) and Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray (2001/2002), also display the difficulties of choosing among dimensions to include and importantly, problems in regard to the availability of reliable data (cf. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007:241). The indexing is a task of the researcher(s), as seen in King and Murray’s (2001/2002:592) technical definition of human security: “We define an individual’s human security as his or her expectation of years of life without experiencing the state of generalized poverty. Population human security is then an aggregation of individuals’ human security.” Further suggestions for mapping human security link the specification of human security to a certain threshold (Owen 2004a, b) or to a scale of severity (Roberts 2006). The rationale behind the threshold based definition put forward by Taylor Owen is that openness to all threats that people possibly experience is crucial. Instead of listing specific threats to human security and thereby narrowing down the possible threats to humans, an open approach “allows all possible harms to be considered” (Owen 2004b:381). Consequently, all threats should be considered potential human security issues and it is their indexing in terms of whether they cumulate to a certain threshold that decide whether they are acknowledged as human security issues. “[O]nly the most serious [threats], those that take or seriously threatens lives, are included.” (ibid. 383) For the purpose of establishing the truth about human security, rules such as a specific threshold to be

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8 The indices measure the performance of one country relative to the other countries in the study, but this is admittedly a crude measure of human security (Booysen 2002:288). A crude overall conclusion is that “[N]ations that are ethnically more homogeneous are more likely to make better efforts at and to achieve higher levels of human security.” (ibid. 292)

9 Lonergan et.al. explain that ”most countries did not have complete time series [1970-1995] for most indicators”. King and Murray (2001/2002:601) indicate difficulties related to data collection when noting: “Measuring population human security requires as its starting point good information on the current and past levels of income, health, education, democracy and political freedom.”
observed empirically are suggested and employed. These delimitations of the human security concept are analytically motivated and explained. Threshold-based definitions allow the number of 25 deaths to be considered for the human security concept, as seen in the definition of the Human security report project. Although such delimitations are explained in regard to analytical usefulness, it needs to be acknowledged as emphasized by Grayson (2004) that these suggestions of a “precise/scientific/workable” definition of human security exclude 24 civilian deaths. The exclusion of these deaths defines the understanding and knowledge production of the comprehensive human security reality as such criteria defined from above and operationalized in indexes dominate empirical human security research. Security is then examined from the top-down. Such a focus on indexing as exemplified with the Human Security Report and the work of Booysen and Owen, among others, reveal an objectivist bias that is not uncommon in security research (cf. Pouliot 2007b:377).

Analytical sensitivity to people, places and things in regard to definitions of security is aimed at in Annick Wibben’s (2008) call for an “opening” of the security debate to discussions of meaning(s) of security. It is acknowledged that human security opened the debate and allowed “for the participation of usually marginalized political voices.” (Büger 2006:15) Understood as an alternative epistemological outlook (Burgess 2007:12; Hoogensen and Stuvøy 2006), human security implies openness to meanings of security. This involves little control over the interpretation of security but it is a basic positioning for beginning to examine the comprehensive human security reality. In regard to research, the question then becomes one of re-thinking knowledge production of human security (Büger 2006). The concern with delimiting the concept attracts attention away from the need for a people-centred empirical approach, which has the potential of providing insight on the comprehensive human security reality. In this project therefore the aim is to examine local practices of security and thereby to contribute to comprehension of people’s human security reality. In human security research, such a bottom-up and people-centred perspective is called for (Ewan 2007:187; Krause and Jütersonke 2005). This is because “the people to whom “freedom from fear” matters are mostly passive subjects in the human security discourse.” (Krause 2005:6) Phillip Darby (2006:467) also argues that “groundedness in lived experience is a vital corrective to the faceless, placeless narratives so characteristic of security texts.” Empirical groundedness and engagement with the viewpoints of local people are thus identified as weaknesses in

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10 Wibben notes that she is not the first to have used the term opening in the security debate, and underlines that her concern is to dispel the rationalities that frame the thinking of security.
current human security research. A people-centred approach is characterized as “one of the hallmarks of a growing body of work on human security, which differs from standard, state-centric conceptualizations of security.” (Risley 2008:599) Therefore, in this project an empirical case study is chosen as method for furthering human security research. Non-state crisis centres are identified as local security agents, and the analytical focus is how they produce security.

In this project therefore the human security concept provides the starting point for examining the work of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia. The objective of the project is to bring local work on violence against women into the security debate.

2.3. An international security agenda on violence against women

The adoption of UN conventions and resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly has during the last few decades brought women’s security concerns to the highest level of international politics and established a security perspective on violence against women. A first significant document in this regard is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Adopted in 1979, the CEDAW convention recognized inequalities and discrimination of women on many fronts in society. Violence against women is not mentioned specifically in the CEDAW convention, but was “read into” the convention due to the pressure from the international women’s movement in the late 1980s (Keck and Sikkink 1998:180) Violence against women then became a specific issue on which the parties to the CEDAW Convention were to report every fourth year.

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11 The CEDAW Convention addresses women’s human rights specifically, and declares in the preamble that: “discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of humanity”. This so-called ”women’s convention” is considered a part of human rights legislation, but it varies whether it is incorporated into national legislation. The Russian constitution declares in Article 15, part 4 that international agreements are a part of national legislation and the declaration therefore has the force of law. CEDAW Assessment Tool Report for the Russian Federation, February 2006, p. 7.

12 The Convention was ratified in 1981, and in April 2008, 185 countries have signed the Convention. See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm

13 CEDAW signatories are obliged to report on “the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and on the progress made in this respect” (Art. 18). A Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, established in Art. 17 of the CEDAW Convention, is tasked with overseeing and managing the reporting procedures. The CEDAW Committee comprises 23 members tasked with overseeing the reports submitted to it by states. The members of this surveillance committee are nominated by their respective countries and elected on state-party meetings (two annually). The members serve for a period of four years, with replacement of committee members every second year. The CEDAW Committee is institutionally linked to the UN Division on the Advancement of Women,
National action on violence against women is thus subject to international scrutiny, thereby impinging on state sovereignty (Joachim 2003:248). The international feminist activism was important for the increasing attention given to the issue of violence against women within the UN system during the 1990s. In 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 48/104 “Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against women”14 (DEVAW). In 1994 violence against women was recognized as an international human rights phenomenon when the Geneva-based UN High Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur to report on and examine the causes and consequences of violence against women.15 When the UN Security Council in 2000 adopted resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, women’s security concerns were firmly brought to the highest level of international politics. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1820 on women, peace and security in 2008 reiterated this concern and acknowledged the lack of achievement of security for women in regard to violence against women. These documents together form the crux of an institutionalized core of international practices addressing women’s security from violence.16

The processes through which violence against women became acknowledged as such a common global concern provide a frame of reference for the work on violence against women worldwide. Feminist international activism brought the issue of violence against women on this international agenda of policy-making. The “loud voices” (Shepherd 2005:381) of women activists were heard as the issue of violence against women achieved a level of legitimacy that justified institutionalized international responses. It was a political process of agenda setting (Keck and Sikkink 1998) that launched the topic of violence against women onto the international policy agenda. This became possible because the women’s movement consolidated on this issue. In the mid 1970s violence was not on the agenda of the Western

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14 UN Document A/RES/48/104.
15 This appointment took place in 1994 in the 56th meeting of the Commission on Human Rights, see resolution 1994/45. 53 states are members of the Commission which meets annually in regular sessions in March/April. The mandate of the Rapporteur was extended in 2003, in resolution 2003/45 adopted in the 59th session of the Commission.
16 Currently, a further broadening of the CEDAW reporting system to also include developments relevant to Res. 1325 is in the debate. This illustrates that the reporting is thought to ensure accountability and the importance that is attached to this.
women’s movement. However, in local communities, women organized to provide assistance to victims of rape and domestic abuse\textsuperscript{17}, also in the developing world (ibid. 175). This issue represented an everyday experience of many women, and it is acknowledged that because violence against women touches women’s lives everywhere it helped bridge north-south division and cultural differences among international women’s activists (ibid. 171, 197). Violence against women was a category that came to embrace various practices, both wife-battering and rape, female genital mutilation, and dowry death. This was a strategic asset to the international women’s activists in the early 1990s because as a category, violence against women could bring women across cultures and states to rally to end violence against women. Through various public actions, such as 16 Days no to violence (25\textsuperscript{th} November -10\textsuperscript{th} December), the international women’s movement attracted media’s attention to their concern with women’s rights as human rights (Joachim 2002:37). Violence against women is therefore a prime example of how political activism exerts issues onto an international agenda.\textsuperscript{18} One arena on which the activists could exert their influence was in the international conference-diplomacy. The international system established a basis for exchange among multiple actors engaged in activities to eliminate violence against women world wide through the arrangement of a series of conferences on women’s issues. The first UN conference on women’s issues convened in Mexico 1975, as delegations from 133 states gathered to discuss gender equality. One year later the International Tribunal on Crimes against Women gathered non-governmental representatives in Brussels. The UN conference diplomacy thus mobilized both state representatives and non-governmental activists, and this “helped women activists lobbying inside the UN win institutional allies.” (Joachim 2003:256) Deliberations continued in Copenhagen in 1980, and in Nairobi in 1985 the “Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies to the Year 2000” were adopted. In this document, “governments identified violence against women as an obstacle in the realization of equality, development, and peace.” (ibid.) This concern with the interconnection between violence against women and peace is a comprehensive way of thinking about security. The human security concept includes this concern with the interconnection between local livelihoods and peace. In this international

\textsuperscript{17} The first shelters for battered women were opened by activists in London in 1971 and in the United States in 1974 (Keck; Sikkink 1998:175).
\textsuperscript{18} The same processes can exert certain issues onto a global human security agenda. It can be suggested that the norm of R2P – responsibility to protect - has emerged as such a framing. For example, in May 2008 the cyclone in Burma evoked arguments that the UN has a responsibility to protect the Burmese people and therefore is entitled to overrule the sovereignty of Burma to provide assistance to the population in Burma, because they are suffering from the junta’s inability to take care of their security.
context, violence against women was thus already in the mid 1980s addressed in terms of security.

In Vienna in 1986, a gathering of experts contributed to diagnosing the problem and suggested a problem-solving approach to violence against women (ibid. 256-258). The action suggested in Vienna was to criminalize violence against women, thereby mobilizing the significant instrumental and symbolic role of the legal system to address the issue internationally. The importance of action on the domestic level was also underlined, and here, local activists and their role in working for national strategies and implementation were emphasized. The international commitment to eliminate violence against women thus incorporates a comprehension of the need to complement international conventions and reporting systems with action on the national, regional and local level. The 1993 General Assembly resolution on violence against women for example acknowledges the necessity of achieving changes in the legal, political, administrative and cultural fields on the national level. It is argued that the work of NGOs contributes to increasing awareness of the problem world wide, and the General Assembly aims to “facilitate and enhance the work of the women’s movement and non-governmental organizations and cooperate with them at local, national and regional levels” (Res 48/104). Women’s groups and NGOs are thus granted particular agency in regard to addressing violence against women.

As a basis for collaboration in the international women’s movement, the issue of violence against women created solidarity across cultural divides. In their detailed study of transnational advocacy networks, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argued that the bodily protection of women came to function as a “basic common denominator” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:172) of the global women’s movement and that this made it possible to circumvent splits in the movement. The “the north-south” split circumscribed divisions over discourses of discrimination and development but this did not divide only northern and southern groups as it also defined divisions within these groups (ibid. 170). Violence against women abridged these divides and became a key mobilizing issue of the international women’s movement during the 1980s. By the mid 1990s violence against women had become the topic that integrated these activists on one common agenda. (ibid. 184, 196).

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19 The expert meeting gathered social scientists, including sociologists, lawyers, and criminologists. The organisers were the UN Branches for the Advancement of Women and for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Joachim 2003:256.
The international community has established reporting structures, monitoring mechanisms and complaint procedures to address violence against women. The two reporting systems of CEDAW and the Special Rapporteur contribute to the dissemination of information but also create expectations on behalf of multiple actors in terms of observing developments in specific regions. A further advancement of international efforts to address violence against women was introduced in 2000 when the mandate of the CEDAW committee was broadened to include also a complaint structure. Individuals and groups can according to The Optional Protocol to the Convention, which entered into force in December 2000, submit complaints of violations of the Convention in a specific state to the Committee. The Optional Protocol thus makes it possible for an individual woman to complain if she finds that national legislation and/or legal practice is not in accordance with the Convention. The requirement is that the state has ratified the Optional Protocol, and that the violation took place after ratification. The Optional Protocol also opens for the possibility of the Committee itself to launch investigations into grave violations of the Convention in a specific state.20 In this manner the international administrative bureaucracy for dealing with violence against women expands.21 This institutionalization of efforts to take action to eliminate violence against women on a global scale over the last two decades is overall a clear signal of the recognition by the international community of the problem of violence against women. A web of international treaties and conventions today recognize and address violence against women as a public and international security concern.

2.4. Human security and local practices on violence against women

Living in constant anxiety of becoming a victim of gender-based violence is recognized as a serious limitation of women’s life situations. In the 1993 UN General Assembly resolution, DEVAW (Res. 48), violence against women is for example condemned and outlined in this manner:

“Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term “violence against women” means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological

20 The Committee has so far considered a handful of complaints. A main concern was in these processes the admissibility of the complaint, as the domestic legal system must have been fully exhausted for the complaint structure of the CEDAW to take on the case. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/
21 An effort to coordinate measures to address violence against women in armed conflicts and post-conflict situations has been initiated, the “United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict.”
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.”

Violence against women thus encompasses physical, sexual and psychological violence, and the occurrence of these forms of violence in the family, within the general community and perpetrated by the state, are all incorporated into the resolution (Article 2). A similar definition is the basis for the work of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission:

“[The Commission on Human Rights]
4. Affirms that the term “violence against women” means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life, and including domestic violence, crimes committed in the name of honour, crimes committed in the name of passion, trafficking in women and girls, traditional practices harmful to women, including female genital mutilation, early and forced marriages, female infanticide, dowry-related violence and deaths, acid attacks and violence related to commercial sexual exploitation as well as economic exploitation;” (Commission on Human Rights 2003: Res. 45)

In addition to the general reference to physical, sexual and psychological violence both in domestic and public spheres, this definition is more specifically citing forms of violence that in light of the contemporary discussion have generated attention, such as honour killings, female genital mutilation, and trafficking. In both definitions there is a concern not only with the execution of direct violence but with threats of use of violence against women. Feminist critique has pointed out that these international documents describe women and violence in a manner that is not reflective of the complexities of women’s lives. Laura J. Shepherd stresses that in DEVAW women are constructed as a homogenous group, vulnerable, exploited and subject to male power, and they must be protected, always and in any spheres:

“In DEVAW, women exist, and so must be secured against the many and various acts of violence that they may encounter at any moment, in any sphere of their lives.” (Shepherd 2005:384)

The document fixes gender relations not only by representing women only as vulnerable to violence, but also by representing men as benefactors of such violence because they are elevated to a superior position (ibid. 388).22 Such “temporary binding of identities to bodies” (Shepherd 2008:400) that is evoked when the term violence against women is used, can ensure strategic gains. This was seen in the successes of the international women’s movement that used the term strategically to raise awareness of the issue. But the successful agenda setting of the international women’s movement in regard to violence against women

22 In DEVAW gendered violence is not described as perpetrated by men (Shepherd 2005:388).
established a firm discourse on the topic that also contributes to the construction of the problem and its representation (Nayak and Suchland 2006; Shepherd 2005; 2007).

Critical feminist analyses have therefore emphasized that definitions of violence against women in international documents provide a static view on women as victims:

“The conceptualization of ‘violence against women’, while it attempts to raise the profile of such violence, also functions to construct violence against women.” (Shepherd 2005:394)

Shepherd critically notes that “thinking about ‘violence against women’ as a research approach is congruent with accepting existing gender narratives in which ‘men’ are those who are empowered, controlling and active, as well as aggressive.” (ibid. 385). It is a “hegemonic project” that furthers a specific representation of practice (Nayak and Suchland 2006). I suggest that the preoccupation with women as victims in international documents and declarations can be nuanced with a human security perspective. Both protection and empowerment are emphasized in the 2003 UNDP report “Human Security Now”, and a human security framework thereby shifts the focus away from a sole emphasis on victims. Individuals need protection but also empowerment as means to furthering human security:

“It [the human security framework] also emphasizes both protection and empowerment, unlike some debates where victimization and agency are set up as opposites rather than two parts of reality, both of which need to be addressed – often simultaneously.” (Bunch 2004:30)

A human security framework on violence against women brings women’s empowerment also into the discussion of security. The focus of human security is then not security as a normative concept of rights. Instead this understanding of the human security framework directs attention to how security is created. In this manner the human security concept provides the starting point for examining the work of non-state crisis centres.

Although women are generally portrayed as vulnerable to violence in DEVAW, women’s agency is nonetheless acknowledged. Agency is outlined in regard to women’s movements and their work on the issue (Shepherd 2005:397). Collaboration between state and non-state actors is envisaged to effectively address the issue. The rhetoric of DEVAW demands radical reform in regard to how to approach the issue of violence against women focusing on women’s agency and state-non-state collaboration. The national level is however emphasized as most important. Shepherd argues (ibid. 394) that this reproduces the primacy of the state over the international in regard to work on violence against women. By directing attention to the local context and the work of non-state crisis centres for women, I return however to the site in which activism on the issue of violence against women originated. In the 1970s women first began to organize to provide assistance and services to victims of rape and domestic violence in their communities. Such local practices form the empirical focus of
this project. Activities initiated by women on a local level to provide assistance and support to victims of violence against women are examined and discussed as strategies of security. The analytical focus is on the local security production by non-state crisis centres and the constraints on security production for local women in this context.

The feminist critique of definitions on violence against women in international documents stresses the empirical complexity of violence against women. This complexity is for example addressed in terms of changes to cultural perceptions that are required in order to deal with the issue of violence against women. As argued by Caroline Bunch, security for women is tied to “real cultural challenges”, “at least as long as the culture- one’s family, community, friends, colleagues, and religion – generally accepts it” (Bunch 2004:32). This reiterates the concern with how security is produced for women in local contexts by directing attention to how traditional ways of looking at and dealing with this issue are challenged. Violence against women has developed from being a tacitly accepted form of behaviour to being defined and condemned as a form of violence. In Russia, this development, the struggle for condemnation of violence against women gained impetus in the 1990, and the crisis centres are a key agent in this regard. A conceptualization of security that directs attention to local strategies of security is here used to address dynamics of security production in regard to violence against women. The human security debate inspires an empirical and people-centred analysis of security agents and this is used to direct attention to how security is produced in people’s immediate local contexts, exemplified in the case study on non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia. It is acknowledged that this is a specific starting point for a security analysis. The concern is that in order to come closer to describing the comprehensive human security reality, a perspective that addresses how human security is practiced and produced broadens insights on empirical security dynamics. In order to analyse human security on the basis of these motives, a Bourdieusian analytical approach is suggested. This is the topic of the next chapter.

The research interest in this study is to examine security empirically in a local and people-centred perspective. This interest challenges the antagonism between subjective concerns and objective measures of threats and thresholds in security debates. Drawing upon the work of Pierre Bourdieu, an approach to security is introduced in this chapter that is reflective of both subjectivist and objectivist approaches. Bourdieu introduced in his work a set of thinking tools that aimed at integrating both aspects, and the suggestion here is to make these useful for an empirical security study. Recent applications of Bourdieu’s work in security studies provide inspiration and guidance on the use these tools in regard to the work of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia. This chapter therefore introduces and justifies a Bourdieusian approach in this study by reviewing Bourdieu’s work and the use of his work in security studies. Based on these reviews and discussions, in the final section the further steps of the research process are explained.

3.1. Connecting with human security: objectivism and subjectivism

To discuss security in terms of people and subjective experiences of security is the novelty of a human security perspective. Marlies Glasius (2008:37) explains that to some it is in regard to the focus on subjective security that “the concept [of human security (KS)] really gets out of control.” The focus on people and subjectivity is a main source of conceptual debates as it creates methodological challenges. It also confronts established traditions of security research that emphasize the objective mapping of global security. The concept of human security is thus defined by tensions between concerns with objectively, top-down defined criteria and individual-oriented, bottom-up perspectives on security. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy describe how this affects the study of human security:

“Thresholds and measurements of human security are especially complicated, given the distinction between objective (real) and subjective (perceived) fear, because security, on any scale, will remain a feeling, and because thresholds of tolerance can be different and culture/space/time/circumstance specific.” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007:241)

To combine and integrate objectivist and subjectivist modes of knowledge is a key concern in the work of the acclaimed French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. This is why I will argue that Bourdieu’s work is particularly interesting to human security research. The concern with integrating both objective aspects and subjects’ perceptions is the crucial aspect of Bourdieu’s
relational perspective on social reality. It entrenches his view on how to establish the truth of the social world:

“It is this double truth, objective and subjective, which constitutes the whole truth of the social world.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:255)

To circumvent the thinking in antagonistic pairs such as objectivism/subjectivism, micro/macro, empirical/theoretical was a key object of Bourdieu’s scientific practice (Bourdieu 1988; Wacquant 2008, 2nd ed.) His concepts of field, capital and habitus are set to overcome what he considered the “rock bottom antinomy” between objectivism and subjectivism by integrating both into a single model of analysis (Bourdieu 1988:780, 782).

Bourdieu’s concern is to obstruct the artificial distinction between a subjectivist and objectivist mode of knowledge because both are required. By making use of the concepts of field, habitus and capital, the objective of this study is to achieve such a single model of analysis of security practices in a local context that accounts for objective and subjective aspects. In order to explain how to do this, I begin by discussing Bourdieu’s view on subjectivist and objectivist modes of knowledge.

The subjectivist mode of knowledge rests on a phenomenological approach that makes primary experiences of the social world explicit, while the objectivist mode addresses objective relations that structures practices and representations in the social world (Bourdieu 1973). Bourdieu associates the objectivist position with Emile Durkheim and the guideline to “treat social facts as things” (Bourdieu 1988:781). This position aims at uncovering objective mechanisms and deep, latent structures, and does not reflect on how the social objects are objects of knowledge. The subjectivist position is concerned with uncovering the mere representations agents have of things. Bourdieu emphasizes that it is important to “take up, describe, and analyze” agents’ points of view, but it is equally necessary to consider the position from which this viewpoint is expressed. These two modes of knowledge, subjectivist and objectivist, are therefore drawn upon in the study of practices, also called the praxeological approach. 23 The aim of the praxeological mode of knowledge is “to make possible a science of the dialectic relations between the objective structures to which the objectivist mode of knowledge gives access and the structured dispositions within which those structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them.” (Bourdieu 1977:3)

23 Bourdieu realizes the praxeological mode of knowledge throughout his massive work, but the term is not continuously used. His work is known as a theory of practice, which recurs on the term praxeology meaning the science of human action.
point is that objective structures and subjective perceptions are interconnected because the positions that actors occupy within a certain structure affect their points of view while at the same time affecting the constitution of these very structures:

“On the one hand, the objective structures that the sociologist constructs, in the objectivist moment, by setting aside the subjective representations of the agents, form the basis for these representations and constitute the structural constraints that bear upon interactions: but, on the other hand, these representations must also be taken into consideration particularly if one wants to account for the daily struggles, individual and collective, which purport to transform or to preserve these structures.” (Bourdieu 1989:15)

As a consequence of this way of seeing reality, as constituted by the interconnection between objective structures and actors’ perceptions, the logic of analysis is to examine practice (modus operandi), and address the interconnections of the objective structures (opus operatum) and the perceptions of the actors (cf. Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:242f.). The dialectic relations are the key analytical concern. Because, argues Bourdieu,

“without falling back into a naïve subjectivism or “personalism,” one must remember that, ultimately, objective relations do not exist and do not really realize themselves except in and through the systems of dispositions of the agents, produced by the internalization of objective conditions.” (Bourdieu 1968:705)

Bourdieu was thus sympathetic to a subjectivist mode of knowledge, but argued that objective aspects also must be considered. For example, Bourdieu commended the phenomenological achievement of coming “close to the real” (Bourdieu 2000:147). Developed by the turn of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), phenomenology defines human experience as a key to knowledge. The assumption is that social phenomena come into existence through human experience of them. What is real is what is perceived in the so-called life-world. A life-world perspective was for Husserl an alternative to the objective scientific method, and this demanded a different research method:

“[T]he title “life-world” makes possible and demands perhaps various different, though essentially interrelated, scientific undertakings; (...) And perhaps the scientific discipline which this life-world as such, in its universality, requires is a peculiar one, one which is precisely not objective and logical but which, as the ultimately grounding one, is not inferior but superior in value.” (Husserl 1970:124)

With the life-world perspective Husserl challenged “the modern ideal of objectivity” because it treats with disdain anything addressing the subjective and relative (ibid. 125). When thinking about this in regard to human security, it can be noted that the concern with people, their subjective views and experiences in this security perspective, (re-)emphasizes the relative in regard to defining security. Husserl’s aim was to present, in opposition to the
objectivism of the natural sciences, an alternative method for establishing scientific truth of reality that takes as its starting point the subjective experiences of reality. The concept of life-world directs attention to subjective experiences and illustrates a concern with lived experience as basis for establishing knowledge of the social world. Bourdieu is sympathetic to engaging people’s subjective views, but critical of the methodology of a phenomenological research practice. In particular this concerns how to access primary experience. Bourdieu’s point is not to argue against the possibility of the phenomenological analysis of primary experience, but to emphasize the need of critical, methodological reflection.

In particular, Bourdieu argues that an objectivist perspective involves a break with lived experience and subjectivity:

“The break with the spontaneous philosophy of knowledge of the social world, represented by the decision to give methodological primacy to objective relations as against the agents entering them and the representations they may form of them, constitutes an inevitable moment on the progress of any science of man.” (Bourdieu 1968:703)

Bourdieu’s critique of the life-world perspective is thus not aimed at avoiding a subjective focus, but is a reminder of the need to also consider objective aspects. Both subjective and objective aspects are relevant to understanding social reality. In regard to human security and its entanglement in debates between subjective (“perceived”) and objective (“real”) criteria of measurement of security, I therefore suggest that Bourdieu’s work provides a basis for accounting for both subjective and objective aspects relevant to security.

The interest in bringing Bourdieu’s work into the human security debate is thus based in a concern with stepping away from the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism. But Bourdieu was himself criticized in regard to whether he in fact achieved an integration of objectivist and subjectivist modes of knowledge in his work. It is suggested that his outline of

24 A critique of objectivist research practices was the basis for Edmund Husserl’s introduction of phenomenology. Husserl developed his argument through a discussion of René Descartes’ (1596-1650) interest in eradicating doubt from scientific knowledge by means of a deductive method. Husserl shared the same intention as Descartes aimed at finding means of establishing the truth through scientific method. But Husserl advocated a different approach to the establishment of knowledge. Through his discussion of Descartes, Husserl elaborated a turn away from the concern with ‘objective’ reality that Descartes was preoccupied with towards a focus on subjectivity (Husserl 1995 (1931)).

25 The point is that critical reflection on the conditions under which this can take place is required. Bourdieu explains that the phenomenological mode of knowledge “excludes the question of the conditions of possibility of this experience, namely the coincidence of the objective structures and the internalized structures which provides the illusion of immediate understanding.” (Bourdieu 1990b:25f.)

26 As an example of the break with primary experience, Bourdieu cites Claude Lévi-Strauss’ criticism of Marcel Mauss’ theory of gift exchange, in which Levi-Strauss argues that it is the constructed object and not the individual action of gift exchange that constitutes the core social phenomenon. While the phenomenological viewpoint addresses gift exchange as experience, the gift is in an objectivist analysis observed from the outside (cf. Bourdieu 1977:4f.).
a research practice aimed at integrated the two perspectives is more of an addition of two fundamental research perspectives (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:244). In particular in regard to studies of the education system, it is emphasized that determinism becomes evident in Bourdieu’s work (Jenkins 1982). Despite his concern with integrating subjectivism and objectivism, it is therefore argued that a tendency of objectivism dominates his work because of the manner in which habitus is defined by the incorporation of objective structures (ibid.). It is also suggested that Bourdieu’s stylizing of objectivism and subjectivism as two opposite poles is simplistic (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:241)\(^27\), and also that his treatment of subjectivism in terms of phenomenology is a misunderstood synthesis (Endress 2005).\(^28\) I agree with Fuchs-Heinritz and König (2005:241) however that Bourdieu’s outline of modes of knowledge clarifies what he distinguishes himself from in his work. This is also clarifying in regard to my concern with making use of Bourdieu’s work in regard to human security. The tendency within the conceptual debates on human security to advocate indexes, mapping, thresholds, and similar measures, excludes subjects’ views and assessments. In this project my concern has been to focus on subjective views and assessments in context of a specific local security structure. There are both objective, structural contingencies as well as subjectively perceived constraints on the security production in this context. My research interest is to make use of Bourdieu’s conceptual tools in an empirical analysis of local security production in order to be able to make visible and illustrate these contingencies of security in a specific empirical case. A main analytical novelty of the empirical analysis is the illustration of the subjective security production in terms of processes of re-describing the self. This process is particularly important to security production in this context because of the weaknesses in the objective security structure.

Making use of Bourdieu’s work therefore implies transforming his ideas to my specific research interest. Paul DiMaggo (1979:1472) noted that such a transformation involves a process of assimilation and productive misreading. This is necessary because Bourdieu does not suggest a systematic methodical approach to employ in empirical analyses. It is suggested that the usefulness of a Bourdieu-inspired process of knowledge-production is assessed in

\(^{27}\) Bourdieu himself noted that “[a]dmittedly, the two opposing perspectives are very rarely found in the pure form I am describing.” (Bourdieu 1988:781)

\(^{28}\) Endress (2005:65) notes that Bourdieu does not overcome the methodological critique that he puts forward against phenomenology as “essential aspects of the methodological problems of the social sciences remain which merely acquire a new garb with his metaphor of a new ‘praxeological’ cognitive mode.” In conclusion, Endress suggests that “Bourdieu should avoid overemphasizing the difference between what he calls “subjecti-vism” and his own approach.” (70)
terms of the specific analysis and not in regard to theory-building (Müller 2002). This is evident for example in Trine Villumsen’s recent study (2008). She underlines that she chooses and discusses those of Bourdieu’s concepts that make sense in regard to her research interest in studying the link between NATO and theory, and quotes Bourdieu to legitimize this approach: “… one can think with a thinker against this thinker.” (quoted from Villumsen 2008:62) Anna Leander, who has recently made extensive use of Bourdieu’s work in international studies, explains that Bourdieu’s “approach is helpful for those who have accepted that meaning and representation play a central role in social life.” (Leander 2006:2)

This is also important to my decision to use Bourdieu in an empirical study of local security practices. An objective of this project is to contribute to the discussion of human security by examining the doings of a local actor and use Bourdieu’s analytical tools to construct an understanding of the local security dynamics. The concern is that this may inspire empirically oriented debate on the concept and its research practice. A key concern for me throughout this project has been to make my thoughts, interpretations and struggles with the empirical data visible so as to explain the practice of constructing the knowledge of this particular case. I argue that it is to this process and practice of research that human security research must direct attention if it is to usefully discuss how both objective and subjective aspects define human security. Therefore, drawing upon and adjusting Bourdieu to my research interest in local security production, the next step is to explain how I have extracted from his work certain steps of analysis that guide my work. The first step is the empirical approach.

3.2. A Bourdieusian empirical approach and subjectivism

Bourdieu used a core set of concepts for the conduct of a research practice that integrates both subjective experiences and objective aspects. In this study, field, habitus and capital are the three thinking tools that are applied. A field describes objective relations and these are enacted through forms of capital, which is power. Habitus is defined as incorporated and embodied conceptions that determine people’s action. The habitus mediates between the system of objective structures and the system of social conduct observed, and is the condition for the production of actors’ perceptions and assessments (cf. Bourdieu 1968:105f.).

Bourdieu used the concepts of field, capital and habitus in his own empirical research, and the concepts in fact emerged as a result of his back and forth between empirical

29 Other core concepts in Bourdieu’s work are for example doxa and interest.
observation and theoretical reflection. The development of the concepts was thus embedded in
Bourdieu’s practical realization of a praxeological mode of knowledge. This involved
continuous reflection on the construction of the object of research. Also, Bourdieu applied
various forms of data collection, such as quantitative methods, qualitative interviewing, and
document analysis. Bourdieu’s concern with intertwinement of theory and empirical research
as well as his focus on how theory contributes to the construction of the research object
implies that the concept of habitus but also field and capital are not ready made receipts for
empirical research and analytical depth. Bourdieu emphasized however that the three concepts
field, capital and habitus are open and mouldable to various empirical settings. When using
these concepts in an empirical analysis of local security practices, I am focused on these
concepts as reflecting an epistemological understanding of social reality, but otherwise empty
of meaning. My task is to fill the concepts with context specific meaning. Considering the fact
that these concepts over the years have been used in multiple empirical studies, this is
important to reiterate. Critical assessments of Bourdieu’s work address for example the focus
on reproduction of domination, as seen for example in Distinction (1984). These are well
known empirical results of his work that have formed the specific understanding of how these
concepts structure and explain social reality. The focus is on reproduction of established
power hierarchies. Change then seems inconceivable, and the concepts are thus considered
static and deterministic. Because of how the results of Bourdieu’s empirical analyses have
been interpreted in regard to the definition of concepts such as habitus, the theory import that
I attempt - to take epistemologically defined concepts that have been used to explain
observations made by Bourdieu in various empirical contexts and to give them contextual
meaning - can be misunderstood. My starting point is not the results of Bourdieu’s empirical
analysis however. As evident from the literature on Bourdieu used for this project, the focus is
on his epistemological writings and also on how he has operationalized the concepts in
empirical research, for example in regard to research methods and use of sources.

The idea in this project is thus to use these three concepts, field, capital and habitus in an
empirical analysis. The empirical focus is on non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia, and
the question is how do they produce security? Non-state crisis centres interact with
stakeholders such as police, medical personnel, the juridical and educational systems, as well
as political representatives. They also work on an individual level with the victims of
violence. The argument is that the non-state crisis centres for women are therefore located at
the intersection of objective and subjective constraints on action: through their interaction
with local stakeholders and the wider community they address societal structures that define
the life-world in which women experience violence, and through their work with individual women they are exposed to subjective experiences of violence. The key analytical interest is how these interactions with stakeholders and victims define the security practices of non-state crisis centres. The abilities of non-state crisis centres to create security, to manoeuvre in the field, are defined by constraints and capabilities formed in these interactions. By focusing analytical attention at these interactions, the question is what are constraints on security practice? The aim of the empirical study is to specify empirically such constraints, objective and subjective, that affect the work of non-state crisis centres for women. The analytical interest is in the space of manoeuvring for non-state crisis centres. My starting point for using Bourdieu is therefore that both objective structures and subjective viewpoints define the dynamics of security production in the life-world. Concerned with non-state agents and practices of security, I aim to engage their viewpoints and explain how objective structures as well as subjective aspects define the production of security for victims of violence against women. Thus, it is Bourdieu’s epistemological interest in incorporating both objective and subjective modes of knowledge in the research process that guides my exploration of the security practices of non-state crisis centres for women.

The three concepts of field, capital and habitus are the building blocks for an analysis that accounts for both subjective and objective aspects. They are employed in various steps of the research process, but cannot be fully understood without being considered in relation to each other. Notwithstanding this hermeneutical understanding, the research process encompasses two analytical steps:

“On the one hand, the objective structures that the sociologist constructs in the objectivist moment by sweeping aside the subjective representations of agents (...) provide the foundation of these subjective representations and determine the set of structural constraints that bear on interactions. On the other hand, however, these representations themselves must, in a second moment, be reappropriated into the analysis if one wants to account for the everyday struggles in which individuals and groups attempt to transform or preserve these objective structures. In other words, these two moments, the subjectivist and the objectivist, stand in a dialectic relationship.” (Bourdieu 1988:782)

There is thus first a concern with reconstructing the objective structures without regard for actors’ views and assessments, and then in a second step this reconstruction of the social object is supplemented with actors’ views and assessments of those very structures (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:243f.)

A Bourdieu-inspired methodical-practical explication of double hermeneutics that outlines three steps of research was recently introduced by Vincent Pouliot (2007b). As a philosophical idea of how social objects are related to each other, hermeneutics and in
particular the hermeneutical circle, explains that the comprehension of one unit is not possible without linking it to the unit as a whole, and also the unit as a whole is incomprehensible without linking it to the smaller units. A hermeneutical understanding of social science attends to the need of interpreting in order to understand social reality. In Max Weber’s Verstehen methodology, the research premise is to anticipate and comprehend the meaning behind actors’ actions. Meaning is not limited to the actor itself (idiosyncratic), but has significance for other actors as well as observers, and thus has a specific role and function in society. A question in such interpretative science would be why a red light becomes a signal to car drivers, i.e. out of what context has this sign (convention) developed (cf. Guzzini 2000:161). When scholars engage in interpretation of such practices, it involves making sense of the practices in people’s life-world as well as in terms of scholarly terminology, and then double hermeneutics is practiced. Stefano Guzzini explains:

“We have to think of the two levels of action involved in a scientific explanation – the level of action proper and the level of observation. In both instances we interpret, at one time making sense within the life-world of the actor, and at another time making sense within the language shared by the community of observers. We interpret an already interpreted world.” (ibid. 162)

This is also the essence of subjectivism as introduce by Pouliot. Subjectivism reflects the basic premise that subjective knowledge about social and international life needs to complement objectified knowledge. Subjectivism involves moving along a subjectivist-objectivist continuum and engaging both “experience-near” and “experience-distant” concepts (Pouliot 2007b:360). Moving along such a continuum implies the application of both an inductive and a deductive logic of research. In regard to an inductive logic, subjectivism implies engagement with agents’ own understanding of reality, thus a bottom-up interpretation of meaning. In a subjectivist research agenda objectifying methods supplement such a concern with subjective meanings, and these methods pertain to engagement with context and history. Objectifying subjects’ knowledge is means “to learn something other than what agents already know by connecting subjective meanings with context and history.” (ibid. 374) The practice of objectifying is required in order to avoid taking subjects common sense as the sole basis of reasoning. Power relations are a key concern that motivates this approach:

“Most problematically, inductive methods that exclusively center on recovering subjective meanings are usually not attentive enough to the larger picture (context and history) and tend to miss crucial social structures such as distributions of power.” (ibid. 370)

Objectifying methods move beyond subjective reasoning and establish meanings that do not belong to subjects but are intersubjective and stand in relation to others (ibid. 372,374). Because “objectifying meanings in their context produces a fairly static form of knowledge” (ibid. 372), it is necessary to introduce time and history in order “to historicize
intersubjectivity so as to account for the temporal dimension in the mutual constitution of social reality and knowledge.” (ibid.) To account for the temporal dimension is to consider the change meanings are undergoing. The three steps of the the subjectivist research practice therefore encompass analyses of subjective views, context and history (change).

The image of the inductive-deductive continuum is not to be confused with a linear development of the research process. Instead, subjectivism is an iterative research practice as the researcher moves back and forth from subjective meaning to context and history. This is because engagement with context and history may help uncover subjective meaning, i.e. each step of research “mutually enlightens the others.” (Pouliot 2007b:374) These are established principles in Bourdieu’s work, and the concepts of field, capital and habitus are the tools for the conduct of such a research practice. By using these three concepts in the empirical analysis, I seek to realize a research practice that takes account of both objectivist and subjectivist aspects relevant to the object of research. This requires that the concepts of habitus, field and capital, which are the means by which Bourdieu’s epistemological viewpoint is operationalized, need to be explained in terms of how they guide my analysis. Bourdieu’s writings are important in this regard but also the increasing interest in Bourdieu in IR security studies is here relevant. These studies provide important knowledge on security and are also useful examples of how to make use of the Bourdieusian perspective on various research interests in security. Some of the key studies within this category are therefore examined in the next section. This makes visible both where I draw inspiration from but also displays the differences between those studies and the present one.

3.3. **Bourdieu in IR security studies**

A key aspect of Bourdieu-inspired work in IR is to sociologically expand the discipline through detailed engagement with actors and their doings and to use this as a basis for discussing macro-ideas, e.g. security, territoriality, security community. In security studies, a central concern is therefore to integrate micro-sociological studies of practice to thinking about the idea of security. Examples of empirical research on security in which Bourdieu’s theory is applied are found in case studies on Private Military Companies (PMCs) (Leander 2005), international security cooperation among states (Pouliot 2007a), security entrepreneurs in Europe (Bigo 2000), and NATO (Villumsen 2008; Williams 2007). This is however a
growing area of research and this listing is not exhaustive. Further studies to mention are for example Stefano Guzzini (2000), who highlights the relevance of Bourdieu to studying diplomacy, as well as international media, and Klaus Schlichte (1996) on the use of Bourdieu in conflicts studies. Peter Jackson (2008) explains Bourdieu’s relevance to international history, and explicates this on the example of the practice of diplomacy. Richard K. Ashley is considered one of the earliest users of Bourdieu in IR (Ashley 1987, 1988, 1989). Ashley argued that realism and its emphasis on sovereignty and anarchy has become naturalized: The opposition between inside the state and the international realm defines sovereignty as the ordering premise of international politics. This antagonistic understanding is not necessarily the truth about the organization of international life, but it is the dominant understanding upheld by both theorists and practitioners. A key concern for Bourdieu was that such oppositions, dualisms, construct social reality:

“These paired oppositions construct social reality, or more accurately here, they construct the instruments of construction of reality: theories, conceptual schemes, questionnaires, data sets, statistical techniques and so on. They define the visible and the invisible, the thinkable and the unthinkable; and like all social categories, they hide as much as they reveal and can reveal only by hiding.” (Bourdieu 1988:778)

As a consequence of the dualistic inside/outside conception of IR, change is difficult to imagine (cf. Leander 2006; Villumsen 2008). Bourdieu’s critique of dualisms and antagonistic pairs was important to Ashley’s argument. In security studies the recent and increasing interest in Bourdieu has contributed to expanding knowledge of security actors and their doings by means of in-depth empirical studies. In these studies Bourdieu’s thinking tools are made use of in regard to various empirical cases, actors and issues. These studies are therefore interesting and important as examples of how the thinking tools are made use of. I will therefore focus on some aspects of these security analyses and explain how the use of Bourdieu in these studies provide insight relevant to my study. The review of these studies also contributes to clarifying differences between these Bourdiesian approaches in recent security studies and the approach in this study. The novelty here is that the theoretical approach and three of Bourdieu’s thinking tools are invoked in regard to human security and with a focus on local security practices.

30 A related development in the IR discipline is the discussion of “relationalism” as a new approach to international politics, or a new “Columbia school of IR”, associated with Peter T. Jackson. The focus here is on the recent security studies that draw on Bourdieu, and since this is less visible in this new relationalism, it is not further dealt with here.
One researcher who has taken Bourdieu’s practice theoretical approach to security into an empirical realm of security practices is Didier Bigo (2000, 2001, 2006). He examines the practices of security agents such as the military and police to explore how the relations between the macro-concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and identity are affected by the micro-practices of these security professionals. His conclusion is that there is a “new topology of security” (Bigo 2001:113). Topology refers to the expansion of the practices of the security agents into a space that no longer respects sovereign borders (ibid. 115). Internal and external security practices are increasingly enmeshed and have contributed to reshaping the boundaries between an inside and an outside. State frontiers are transcended by practices of security professionals. As a consequence “security is not only a state affair, it is a boundary function” (ibid. 91). This character of security practices enforces a change in the notion of sovereignty because it makes it impossible to distinguish between an outside, sovereign state security and an inside societal/identity security. As an alternative to the inside/outside visualization of security, Bigo therefore suggests the Möbius ribbon as a more appropriate metaphor because it “gives sense to the merging of the inside and the outside.” (ibid. 96) The main characteristic of the Möbius ribbon is that directional orientation is inconceivable: to distinguish between an upside and a downside, a front or a back of a Möbius ribbon is impossible. Similar logics, defined by the opening of sovereign borders and processes of globalization in the contemporary world, imply that security is no longer directional (Ibid. 115). Bigo applies the metaphor of the Möbius ribbon to explain that in the contemporary world, security is not linked to institutional structures such as sovereign borders as the discourses of internal and external security professionals are merging. Security is today transcendental, to be found in all societal spheres, and this implies an enlarged field of security (cf. Leander 2006). Bigo advocates the analysis of practices, their heterogeneity, adaptations, and how they constitute the social object of security. This concern with how practices determine what is thought of as security situates his research in opposition to security approaches that naturalizes security. Bigo expresses a critical view on such approaches and defines a different focus of security research:

“The history of security and its various forms is explained as an anthropological need, as a legitimate demand on behalf of citizens, or as a speech act that varies with time; rather, the (nondiscursive and discursive) practices of securitizations/insecuritization and the

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31 A main critique of IR security studies concerns the inside/outside model of security according to which sovereignty is the ultimate definition of borders, thereby reifying an understanding of dangers as coming from the outside, not from the inside (Bigo 2001:114; Walker 1993).
configuration of the balance of social forces that enables the imposition of these practices should be analyzed.” (Bigo 2001:99)

Methodically Bigo examines the views of various security practitioners (Bigo, Bonelli et al. 2007), and in regard to the application of Bourdieu in security studies, Bigo reiterates that engagement with (the social and political) practices of many agents is required (Bigo 2007).32

Bigo’s research thus addresses both empirical and methodical aspects of contemporary security research. Similar to Bigo, Vincent Pouliot is also concerned with the method of studying security practices. In his work on security communities, Pouliot (2007a, b) suggests to study these empirically by engaging the viewpoints of the actors that interact in a community. Security communities are conceptualized as “groups of states whose peoples have developed dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Pouliot 2007b:375). The interest in examining the points of view of actors engaged in the community is based on the acknowledgement that “to date none has grounded the analysis [of security communities (KS)] into the subjective meanings held by practitioners.” (ibid. 377) As method for studying actors’ subjective meanings of security communities he suggests the conduct of qualitative interviews with government representatives and diplomats to establish how they think about their counterpart and their assessment of policy options in regard to a specific issue. Records of government meetings, cables etc. may also provide insight on these aspects as can also participant observation in intergovernmental networks, transnational cooperation programs or NGOs. Such observation provides insight on subjective meanings by observing what agents do (ibid. 375f.). Such multiplicity in methods is a key concern of Bourdieu, who was not preoccupied with specific kinds of sources but with how the various methods fit the problem at hand (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:30). Also in this project this is a question considered throughout the research process.33

In regard to the specific security community between Russia and the transatlantic community, Pouliot outlines that “a shared track record of peaceful change” (2007a:609)

32 The argument is that Bourdieu inspired work requires vast empirical engagement and thus collaboration in research groups is the best strategy. Bourdieu himself relied upon a large number of collaborators and assistants. Bigo expresses concern that this need for collaboration and also time to gather and analyse vast amounts of empirical material is not easy to do within a research sector dominated by a pressure for quick publications.

33 To put these subjective meanings in context, a subjectivist research practice implies also engagement with traces of collective identification among the various actors engaged in the security community. Official speeches, political debates, media, literature and cinema are texts, in which collective identification can be identified. The intersubjective context of a security community is further comprised of a shared language for identification of threats and compatible values, and in addition to these immaterial aspects, material forms of interaction such as defence cooperation and institutionalized procedures of interaction also define this context. This underlines the multiplicity of methods involved in Pouliot’s research.
defines the interaction, and this is of such a character that it is described as a “nascent security community”. He identifies convergence in regard to the identification of threats, in particular after 9/11, on “[a] militarized understanding of the ‘war on terrorism’, the belief in the legitimacy of pre-emptive strikes, and the aggravated fear of nuclear proliferation” (ibid. 611). Disagreements subsist but Russia now has a position in the transatlantic debates on threats and is involved in practices of managing disagreements, he argues. This is crucial because such practices define interstate peace. These interactions persist despite the lack of collective identification. As a consequence of these observations, Pouliot rejects the view that security communities are based on collective identification, as argued by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998). Their constructivist concern with whether people share a collective identity takes precedent over an interest in how interaction is enacted. Alternatively, Pouliot instead highlights the importance of addressing practices. Actors’ practices are informed by taken-for granted background knowledge and this is particularly evident in a security community defined by peaceful change because here diplomacy - the non-violent settlement of disputes between states – “becomes the self-evident practice among security elites to solve disputes.” (Pouliot 2007a:618) This, Pouliot argues, is the case in the Russian-transatlantic security community because although disputes continue to surface - a characteristic of all forms of social interaction - diplomacy has become the self-evident means of interaction. The dominant expectation is that this peaceful coexistence will persist:

“The embodiment of the diplomatic practice in the form of background knowledge renders unthinkable any violent practice, threatened or enacted: it is simply not part of the horizon of possibility anymore.” (ibid. 618)

Pouliot’s analysis of the Russian-transatlantic security community uncovers how security is produced through agents’ action. The analytical focus on practices and agents contributed to revising the constructivist concern with collective identification, and thus expanded the knowledge of how security communities function. The focus on micro-practices thus...

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34 Pouliot underlines that this convergence is most visible between the USA and Russia, while the Europeans and Canadians are more reserved.

35 Collective identification in the Russia-transatlantic security community is by Pouliot examined by focusing on poll reports, e.g. the ‘thermometer of nations’ by the Program of International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) to examine Western views of Russia, and polls from the Levada centre in Moscow to examine Russian views of the West. This is supplemented with scholarly literature, and in sum, the conclusion is that there is a low level of collective identification, which questions “the dependability of mutual expectation of peaceful change.” (Pouliot 2007a:616)

36 A return to practice is broadly advocated in ongoing IR discussions. Key reference points are the work of Iver Neumann, Ole Jacob Sending, Robert Jackson, Michael C. Williams, as well as Vincent Pouliot. This concern with practice is a broad ranging and growing debate within the IR discipline, and I here engage more narrowly the application of Boudieu’s practice theory to security studies.
contributed to advancing knowledge of the functioning of the macro-idea of security communities.

Anna Leander (2006) observes that the nature of change in international security observed by Pouliot and Bigo differs. Pouliot recognizes a naturalization-process of diplomacy within a specific security community and Bigo emphasizes the enlargement of the field of (in)security (ibid. 14). The different practices that have been observed open up for such diverse analytical results (ibid.). In her own work, Leander (2005) has also identified specific effects on security on the basis of an analysis of practices of security agents. In her analysis of private-military companies (PMCs), the change that is observed concerns the emergence of a technico-managerial domination in security thinking. Leander examined forms of interaction between PMCs and states, and addressed the capacities of PMCs to shape understandings of security. Analytically, attention is directed at how PMCs affect the dynamics of the security field through the practice of defining security concerns by informing and setting agendas. Companies’ practices of consultation and lobbyism shape preferences and identities. They advocate certain security measures and Leander sees this in connection with changes on the macro-level in the field. Through their practices, PMCs are engaged in a struggle for production of legitimate knowledge of security. They utilise epistemic power, defined as the power to affect the meaning of the (security) discourse (Leander 2005:811). As a consequence, Leander explains that

“PMCs contribute to the reproduction of a highly specialized security field in which ‘experts’ authorize an increasingly technical, managerial and military understanding of the field, which, in turn, empowers PMCs.” (ibid. 805)

Drawing on Bourdieu, Leander directs attention to the impersonal, structural power of “how social practices constitute what counts as legitimate expertise.” (ibid. 825) The focal point is the “field of security expertise” and how this is reproduced. If PMCs reinforce or alter a certain understanding of security expertise, they affect the habitus (internalised dispositions) of the actors in the security field (ibid. 812). If this effect legitimates the kind of services PMCs provide, it is the (tacit) exercise of power that emerges as a consequence of developments in the field. Leander assesses this by addressing how different discourses relate to each other and form the dynamics of the field (ibid.).

37 PMCs have an interest in framing security issues as questions of efficiency in management and technical competence because

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37 Leander (2005:812) comments on the limits of her own analysis: “A full fledged analysis of the relative weight of discourses would require an analysis of the ‘field’ of security, the habitus of all its actors and the weight of different forms of capital within it.”
then PMCs can provide effective and economically interesting solutions to problems. If an issue is better solved by means of diplomacy and economic aid for example, PMCs have no role to play. Their job is to identify security problems and then to provide their expertise of technico-managerial solutions, thereby deleting any concerns regarding whether or not this is really a security issue and whether or not a military solution is adequate. As a consequence, argues Leander, the field of security is increasingly dominated by technical, managerial and military understandings of security. This tendency has commonalities with the focus on a technical and manageable operationalization of the concept of human security. This reflects on the antagonism of technical (objective) and experiential (subjective) approaches to security.

In contrast to Bigo’s engagement with multiple actors, both Pouliot and Leander are narrower in their actor focus. Leander’s focus only on PMCs is comparable to my engagement with one primary security agent, non-state crisis centres. There are more differences however between the security practices that I examine in this study and the practices studied in these Bourdieu-inspired security studies. For example, Leander engages an agent of security that belongs to an international context of military, diplomatic and policing activities. Trine Villumsen (2008:55) notes in regard to Bigo’s work that it discusses “the role of expert knowledge in the construction of social reality in a rare manner.” As an alternative expert knowledge, local non-state crisis centres hold a type of expert knowledge and is a type of security agent seldom invoked in IR security analyses. By focusing analytical attention on their struggles to establish security for women against violence locally, I also draw upon expert knowledge, albeit in a different setting than in the other Bourdieu-inspired security studies that dominate the increasing interest in this approach to security.

The fields of security observed in these Bourdieusian analyses of international security are inter- or transnational fields. Villumsen (2008:77, 85) explains that this demarcation of fields, with an inter- and transnational focus, differs from Bourdieu’s work. Bourdieu developed the concept of field within the confines of the nation-state. Defined as a set of relations between agents, Bourdieu was critical of the existence of such relations between agents in an international context, although he remained open to the possibility of the emergence of such fields. For example, Bourdieu could imagine the emergence of transnational scientific fields. Villumsen argues that because of this character of international fields, a primary task of research is to map the interconnections between the transnational actors. She defines the mapping of practical patterns of interaction as a basis for circumscribing the transnational field, thereby avoiding and even rejecting a priori definitions.
A back and forth between empirical observation and theoretical discussion defined Bourdieu’s development of his thinking tools, among them the concept of field. Although a field cannot be delimited a priori to empirical analyses, it is clear that the concern with agents and interrelations direct the analytical attention when aiming to delimit a field empirically. The emphasis on interrelations between agents makes it possible to examine how agents and connections in the specific empirical context of interest have been described in previous studies with a similar empirical focus. Although these studies may not have applied a Bourdieusian approach, interrelations are displayed in these as well. For example, in my review of the literature on non-state crisis centres, it was evident that the work of crisis centres is formed by the interconnection with a set of actors in a public domain, such as media, police, justice system, the health system, etc. and that the crisis at the same time work closely with victims. From my review of this literature therefore, my attention was early directed towards these kinds of interrelations. The specific form of these interactions, and thereby the forms of capital that define the dynamics in the field that is examined here, was however only identified on the basis of my primary empirical material, the interviews. It is therefore a back and forth between the empirical context and theoretical exegesis of the concept of field that have contributed to my delimitation of field. This project therefore is connected to developments in the IR subfield of security studies in which the concept of field is a tool applied for the purpose of specifying the empirical focal point of security studies. But the field in this study differs from the transnational fields in focus in other Bourdieu-inspired security studies.

In this study the field is located within the confines of the nation-state. International actors, who have been actively involved in the local development, have been interviewed in order to be informed about various views and perspectives on this local development. This focus is reminiscent of the fields that Bourdieu most commonly studied, but different from other recent applications of Bourdieu in security studies, which address transnational fields. Despite this difference, I draw inspiration from these studies, in particular in terms of how methodical choices are explained. This will be outlined in chapter six where I more clearly specify the field in this study. The specific field approach in this study is defined by the research interest in local dynamics of security. Although Bourdieu is used in security studies, his work is seldom used in connection with human security. The new twist to Bourdieusian IR security discussions that this study aims at is to bring Bourdieu into the discussion of human security. This is done by using his concepts in an empirical study of security in which focus is not on “looking up” (at states, institutions, etc) but “down” (at people’s security in the life-
The concern is that Bourdieu’s terminology contributes to a systematic empirical analysis of security practices in the life-world. The status of the debate on the human security concept is an opposition between a technical, threshold and objectivist based focus versus an interest in people’s experiences and perceptions, thus the subjectivist perspective. The research interest in this project is to attempt to integrate these two perspectives in an empirical study of security dynamics in people’s local context. My contribution to the human security concept debate is the conduct of a systematic analysis based on the three core concepts of Bourdieu’s work. The concepts of field, habitus and capital form a single model of analysis that account for both objectivist and subjectivist aspects of security production in a local context. The analysis exemplifies the functioning of three forms of capital, economic, social and symbolic, as well as aspects integrated in the habitus that contribute to defining the constraints and possibilities of a local security producer.

3.4. Security Practices of non-state crisis centres

The first step of an analysis of the work of non-state crisis centres is the delimitation of an analytical framework by means of the concept of field. In the empirical analysis of the specific field, the concepts of capital and habitus define the focus on interactions between the core agent of non-state crisis centres and their interlocutors, stakeholders and victims. The definition of these concepts and how they are used in the empirical analysis is explained in the same chapters as I conduct the analysis. The purpose is to attempt to achieve an interconnection of theory and empirical analysis, which is a basic prerequisite of Bourdieu’s epistemological viewpoint. Also, I thereby avoid a separate discussion of theory. The aim is to avoid “methodologism” and “theoretiscism”, which by Bourdieu was characterized respectively as reflection on method separate from scientific work and a cultivation of method or theory for its own sake (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:28). The concepts are therefore explained and made analytical use of in the same chapter: the concept of field is introduced, discussed and applied in chapter five; capital in chapter 7.2., and habitus in chapter 7.3. This is my attempt to make the contextualization of the concepts most clear. The concern is that the analysis of these concepts uncovers the practice of non-state crisis centres according to the formula [(field)(capital)] + habitus = practice (Bourdieu 1984:101).

The concept of field defines the framework for the analysis. After the introduction of this framework, the historical emergence of non-state crisis centres in Russia is examined in chapter six. This provides a broader perspective on the context within which field dynamics
unfold. This chapter does not explain the local dynamics, but it contributes as a basis for research and is a prerequisite for the researcher’s examination of subjective and local meanings. The analysis of the genesis of non-state crisis centres as local security actors in Russia is important background knowledge for the analysis of the local developments. Also, on the basis of interviews with representatives of national organizations addressing violence against women, the second part of chapter 6 (6.4. and 6.5.) examines the struggles for identification of violence against women in a national context in Russia. These two developments, the genesis of crisis centres and prevailing discourses on this topic in the national debate, form important historical and contextual knowledge for the analysis of the local security production.

The delimitation of the concept of field as analytical framework for local security practices in chapter five is thus followed by an examination of the history and context of the work of Russian non-state crisis centres. From this broader perspective, the next step is to narrow the analysis to local dynamics. In chapter seven, the forms of capital are first examined (chapter 7.2.), which contributes to contextualizing the structures in this specific field. In a second step, chapter 7.3., habitus is examined in terms of actors’ subjective perceptions of the field of security production. In this manner, the concepts of field, capital and habitus structure the outline of the thesis and the process of uncovering the local security dynamics, while context and history are also accounted for. The outline of the empirical analysis reflects the concern with both objectifying methods and discussion of agents’ own understanding and assessments. The idea of a continuum that shifts between experience-near and experience-distant perspectives defines the practice of re-interpreting the already interpreted world. In result, non-state crisis centres are described in regard to the dynamics that define their local security production.

With this Bourdieusian approach, human security as a research agenda demands a constant reflection upon methods throughout the research process. To Bourdieu the link between theory and the practical dimension of research was particularly important, and he was critical of the institution of theory as a separate, self-referential discourse (Bourdieu 1992:26ff.). Bourdieu’s methodology is here taken into a specific life-world context to examine how and what dynamics of human security are uncovered with such an approach. In the following chapter I explain the methods of my empirical research. A key concern is to make visible how the research objective of examining local security production with a Bourdieusian approach has been formed into a focus on interviews with representatives of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia.
4. Method: Interviewing on practices of security

This project was part of a larger initiative at the University of Tromsø examining the relevance and application of human security in a Northern context. The project I had applied for, and was awarded, was to some degree pre-determined as it reflected a research interest of the broader initiative, in human security, gender and Northwest Russia. I was initially very intrigued by the idea of empirically investigating and applying a security perspective to a Northern context, in this case North West Russia, but was less familiar with the more specific agenda pertaining to security issues emanating from the experience of women in the region. The main empirical parameter that was set before I developed my research design was this northern focus, and the specification of actors and issues relevant to my research interest was for me to define, within this geographical location.

In this chapter I explain the research design that I developed to examine human security empirically. One is reminded that there are many complexities involved in empirical research:

“To be able to see and describe the world as it is, you have to be ready to be always dealing with things that are complicated, confused, impure, uncertain, all of which runs counter to the usual idea of intellectual rigour.” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon et al. 1991:259)

A main starting point of the research project is the interest in empirical human security research, and I think few doubts that the human security reality is complicated, confused, impure, and uncertain. In order to describe and make sense of this reality in one specific context, this project applies a specific methodological approach, as explained in the previous chapter. The concern is to examine security empirically in terms of objective and subjective constraints on the security production for victims of violence against women. This is then to be discussed in terms of how the empirical and analytical insight contributes to the human security concept in terms of a people-centred approach. The research design is a key element to this research interest and to explain this is the task of this chapter.

This chapter outlines methodical choices and explains the practical steps of research. Thoughts behind the interview guide and development in the process of data collection are discussed, with the aim of creating transparency and thereby, a basis for critical reflection on the research process. The chapter ends with a summary of the epistemological underpinning of the project.
4.1. Entering the field and defining the case

The development of a research design in this project rests on the interest in expanding human security methodologically\(^\text{38}\), with a particular interest in human security as practice. A key question for the research design was therefore who practices security? In this section I outline how I set out to identify a local security producer. One of the most obvious, but also challenging, approaches to security of women in Northwest Russia involved the issue of violence against women. I therefore decided to study local security production for women who become victims of violence against women. Non-state crisis centres for women are the key security producer in regard to this issue in Northwest Russia.

This was however not clear at the outset of the project. To begin with, I was hesitant at engaging the issue of violence against women. I had never thought much about this issue before. Also, I was concerned about challenges in regard to approaching people for interview, as I brought with me only some interview experience. During my three-month research trip to Russia in fall 2005, I quickly overcame my worries in regard to conducting interviews in Russia. That fall I met with women activists in St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk. I talked to them about their work, and through these conversations, I gathered information and learned what women activists in Russia do. I was met with an attitude of gratitude for my questions. The activists were helpful in sharing information and I experienced that this was a joyful task.

When I returned in spring 2006 to conduct the first full-scale interviews with representatives of crisis centres, I was therefore very excited. This time I was nervous about how they would respond to my questions and whether I would be able to ask adequate follow-up questions. I had prepared myself by reading about violence against women and women’s groups in Russia, but felt both fear and excitement about engaging experts on violence against women in interviews. As things happen, I had quite a straight forward first interview on the issue: The interview was interrupted three times due to an incident of domestic violence in the family of the person who I was interviewing. Considering how I had been troubled about approaching this issue in the beginning, it was a very informative and impactful start. I received a brief glimpse of how an incident of violence abruptly interrupts and changes the

\(^{38}\) Methodology is here understood as reflections on the relationship between epistemology and method. Ackerly et. al. explains methodology as the intellectual process guiding reflections about the relationship among epistemology, ontology, method and ethics (Ackerly, Stern et al. 2006b:6). Another phrase explaining methodology is “applied ontology and epistemology” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006a:xviii). Reflections on the relationship between epistemology and method inform my treatment of methodology in this chapter.
situation you are in. It requires immediate action. For such action to be straight forward and effective, non-state crisis centres in Russia strive to erect and institutionalize a response system for victims of violence, and it is these efforts at improving women’s security that lie at the heart of this research project.

4.1.1. Getting ready: Preparatory field research

The question that guided my research stay in St. Petersburg in the fall 2005 was thus: “Who are non-state actors of security in the life-world?” On the basis of my reviews of the human security concept I had already opted for actors in the non-state domain. The idea is that human security is a concept of security that opens up for the consideration of other actors of security than the state, but leaves open how they in fact conduct security to empirical research. With an interest in a non-state actor of security, I began to explore civil society actors in Russia. The initial proposal for the PhD project was entitled “Human Security and Gender”, and I therefore began to look for women’s organizations. To begin with I was critical of the idea of focusing on women. I felt that drawing upon women’s experiences of insecurities to extract a gendered concept of human security implied a victimization of women. To frame their daily practices of organizing life, ensuring food security and financial safety for the family for instance, in terms of security (in the sense of identifying only threats) would draw attention away from how they are in fact dealing with these issues amid the difficulties experienced in context of the transition in Russia during the 1990s. Projecting the concept of human security onto women’s situation automatically attaches to their situation the negative charge of insecurity as opposed to the positive focus on how they are in fact taking care of these challenges. Disclosing forms of oppression is a feminist means of emancipation. But in the particular case of women in Russia, who have dealt with enormous disruptions of families and socio-economic structures, I questioned whether it would be adequate to focus on insecurities when the impression I had from travelling in Russia and talking to Russians was mainly about women’s responses to economic and social challenges. Thus I was personally concerned with their inventive life strategies. Such strategies were immediately evident to me as a visitor to Russia in the early 21st century as women dominated the market place in the streets, ran (very) small businesses, worked several jobs, while also engaging and running social activities, schools etc.. During the initial steps of approaching the empirical field, thinking about the context made me critically reflect on security as negative. This enforced a positive perspective asking not how insecurity is felt but how security is produced.
Notwithstanding my scepticism, I identified two factors that made it more relevant for me to focus on Russian women’s groups: the focus on violence against women within Russian women’s groups and the international networking of the Russian women’s movement. I soon came to realize that women’s groups were recognized by international authors, Valerie Sperling (1999) in particular, as the most consistently organized actor within Russian civil society. Engaging women activists would thus relieve me of concerns about the stability of the actor and allow me to focus on how to engage them in regard to human security. This was important because of the critical assessment of Russian civil society that questioned whether NGOs really existed or were simply paper tigers. Women’s groups were in the literature identified as rather exceptional in comparison to other Russian NGOs. I soon noticed that women in Northwest Russia are organized in specific civil society groups aimed at putting women’s issues on the political agenda and began to think about how women’s security is reflected in the work of these groups. Addressing women actively engaged in women’s groups is both useful and practical, I reasoned, as they can be identified relatively easily, and approached for the purpose of interviews. But what women’s groups should I approach and how do women organize in Russia in the 21st century? These were practical empirical issues I set out to explore during the preparatory research trip in fall 2005. I set out to “identify and locate” actors, women’s groups specifically, that I thought might know something useful to my analytical interest.\(^{39}\) This interest was captured in the question “how is security produced for women in Northwest Russia?”

During a three months research trip to St. Petersburg in the fall 2005, I established the first contact with Russian women’s groups. I also attended Russian language courses this fall in order to improve my language skills and be better prepared for interviewing. I began this research project with a trip to St. Petersburg in 2004 however. I then also underwent language training, improving the skills that I had acquired as a student of Russian in Germany.\(^{40}\) In 2004 I was three months into the project, and my main focus in addition to language training, was to acquire information about research institutions and libraries in Russia. One year later, in 2005, it was clear that my interest was in women’s capabilities and skills in tackling security as well as how women’s groups work to improve women’s rights. Strategies employed by women’s groups to address insecurities experienced by women could then be

\(^{39}\) Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006b:117) characterize “identifying and locating” as a method for accessing data in the exploratory phase of a research project.

\(^{40}\) My first trip to Russia was in 2001. I attended two months of language training.
examined with the aim of accessing women’s own conceptualization of insecurities. There were quite a few and rather diverse women’s groups however. In the process of deciding what kind of women’s groups to focus on, I considered studying human security by looking into women’s job security in transition. Women’s groups addressing women and employment offer courses on job skills and how to set up a business, among other things. In addition to job (or economic) security, I noticed however that violence against women was an issue very much present in the activism of Russian women’s groups. I therefore decided to pursue the issue of violence against women by visiting a crisis centre in St. Petersburg.

In October 2005 I visited the Petersburg’s Centre for Women (Institute of Non-discriminative Gender Interrelations (INGI)/Crisis Centre for Women). Here I made my first acquaintance with a crisis centre not only in Russia but in general. I had found the address of the centre at a website[^41], and after a phone call, I was given the secret address. Over a cup of tea, I was given an introduction of their work, their various services as well as the networks that the centre and its leader in particular was a part of. One particular network was the Network of Crisis Centres in the Barents Region (NCRB), including crisis centres in Russia, Sweden, Finland and Norway. This was for me a trigger to try to get an overview of the networks of crisis centres that address violence against women in Northwest Russia and their Nordic collaborators. From now on I continued to track women’s groups working on violence in particular.

In November 2005 I travelled to Petrozavodsk in the Republic of Karelia and visited the Karelian Centre for Gender Studies and the Petrozavodsk Council of Women. From reading I had gained the impression that Karelia was a rather active region in terms of women’s activism, something I can confirm on the basis of my field work. I reasoned therefore that a trip to Petrozavodsk could provide various possibilities of identifying and locating agents relevant to my analytical interest. I retrieved the contact details of the Gender Centre from the website of the NCRB project[^42], and the leader of the Centre pointed me to the leader of the Council of Women. Contact was established by first making a phone call and then scheduling

[^41]: [www.peacewomen.org/contact/europe/russia/rus_index.html](http://www.peacewomen.org/contact/europe/russia/rus_index.html) (page not available now, 2008, but I have a print-out available of the list that I used, printed July 13, 2005.

[^42]: From the website [wwwedu.oulu.fi/ktl/NCRB/MAIN/CC/CC_INFO.HTM](http://wwwedu.oulu.fi/ktl/NCRB/MAIN/CC/CC_INFO.HTM) (retrieved 01.11.05) I acquired the list “Contact information of crisis centers and shelters involved in the NCRB-project.” A print-out of the list is available. Other useful websites on Russian women organizations were [www.owl.ru](http://www.owl.ru) and [www.wcons.org.ru](http://www.wcons.org.ru)
a meeting, and this was throughout the fieldwork the main technique for accessing women activists.\footnote{Most of the time, the interviews took place already in the first meeting scheduled. Then I most often brought an information letter (see appendix) with me to the meeting, or if e-mail was available I sent it electronically prior to our meeting. On other occasions, a first meeting was scheduled on phone and then after having met, a new date for an interview was scheduled. Then the information sheet was handed out in the first meeting. E-mail was used to establish contact, but the phone was most effective.}

In the meetings with the representatives of these three organizations in St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk, I gained my first personal impression of women’s groups in Russia. Topics of discussion in these conversations were the origin of these organizations, their activities, and their collaborators. My main concern was to get an impression of what they do. Beyond that, I was interested in information on other women’s groups with which these groups collaborated, and to find out how to get in touch with these. During these meetings, I was always given a lot of Russian-written material, booklets, information brochures, statistical leaflets, and this proved very useful in these first efforts at establishing an overview of women’s groups relevant to my study. One particular booklet was an overview of all women’s groups in Karelia that I obtained from the Council of Women in Karelia. The booklet provided great insight into the varieties of Russian women’s groups and was very helpful to my work. This first phase of approaching the field in fall 2005 was thus used to find contact persons and to get a first insight into how women’s groups work to address the issue of violence against women in Northwest Russia. Beyond that however, my first personal meetings with Russian women activists proved to be a testing ground for me. I tested myself and how I responded in the interview situation, my nervousness, my articulateness and my responses. Basically, I was getting to know myself in a new context.

During these conversations in St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk I was exposed to the first personal statements of Russian women activists. Among their core concerns were the precarious security situation that many women live in and the inability of the state to sufficiently address violence against women. On the basis of the knowledge that I gathered during this trip, I therefore decided to proceed by approaching women’s groups that specifically address violence against women. My first-hand experience with Russian women’s groups in the fall 2005 was thus a basis for deciding on the specific focus on violence against women.

The next task was to specify an interview guide. For that purpose I used the knowledge gathered in these conversations with Russian women activists, but I also reviewed secondary
literature. In addition, the booklets and brochures that I had collected during the research trip in 2005 provided me with information on the existence of women’s groups in Northwest Russia and their work. I then decided to use this knowledge as basis for developing interview guides for the conduct of an interview project on security, interviewing representatives of women’s groups working on violence against women in Northwest Russia. This empirical focus was thus decided on the basis of the 2005 research trip to Russia, supported by the review of secondary literature.

4.2. Interviews as source

The methodical technique by means of which I accessed women activists’ experiences is interviews. As Tami Jacoby (2006:154) asserts however “experience is a problematic unit of analysis.” The recording of experiences through interviews is formed by the relationship between interviewer and interviewee. This empirical research technique is not a matter of going into the field and collecting data, as Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Swartz-Shea (2006a:xviii) remind us, but a matter of observing and making sense of the observed. It is therefore not people themselves, events or conversations, but the researcher’s recording of these that constitutes the “data” as the data is coproduced in the conversational interaction between researcher and researched (ibid. xix). In regard to how interviews constitute a source of knowledge, my concern is that there is always a constructed representation of reality and in this particular interview project of security the interview situation is the crux of that construction.

4.2.1. Date and scope of interviews

For this project I have conducted interviews with representatives of seven local crisis centres in Northwest Russia. Between May 4th and June 26th 2006, I interviewed representatives of seven non-state crisis centres, and all interviews were conducted in Russian. I interviewed the leader of all the centres, but at three occasions also psychologists working at the centres. The interviews with the psychologists are used as background information and are not included as informants. There are nine informants from the seven local crisis centres. This is because from two crisis centres I have two interviews (with different people) among the informants. In one interview with a local crisis centre, two people were involved. During the interview they

\[44\] Yanow and Swartz-Shea therefore speak of “accessing” as opposed to “collecting” data.
complemented each other’s representation of the crisis centres, and I have therefore chosen to register this interview as one informant.

Through the interviews with local crisis centres I realized that the view from “the centre”, i.e. from Moscow, could further my knowledge of the work on violence against women in Russia. Although local women’s groups are in networks with both Moscow-based NGOs, regional and international groups, I identified that their main work is directed at local processes, addressing the local stakeholders and victims. In order for me to understand their local work, I found it necessary to improve my knowledge of the national context. It was then while being in the field and thinking about the information yielded in the interviews with local crisis centres that I decided to broaden the actor perspective and conduct interviews with national, Moscow-based NGOs and also with Norwegian representatives of the regional network, the NCRB.

During September 2006 I met with representatives of three Norwegian collaborators in the NCRB: the Crisis Centre for women in Tromsø; the NORA centre in Kirkenes, and the Feminist University in Steigen that had an organizing and evaluative role in the project. In October 2006 I travelled to Moscow where I stayed for a month, 9 October – 9 November 2006. During this time I interviewed representatives of three national, Moscow-based women’s groups: The national centre for the prevention of violence ANNA, Consortium of non-governmental organizations, and the Russian Association of Crisis centres. Also in one of these interviews two people were involved. In this case one person totally dominated the interview, and this is therefore referred to as one informant. But in this particular case, I went back to talk to the person that did not say much in the first interview. This was because I was informed she has special expertise on legal issues. This interview is noted as a further informant. Therefore I have in total four informants from three national, Moscow-based NGOs.

In addition, I have throughout the field work interviewed people that my informants or collaborators told me were relevant. These include a representative from the worker’s union, two representatives from the regional administration, as well as a leader of a municipal crisis centre in Sortevala.

Finally, in June 2008, I went back to the field. I stayed in Archangelsk from 24 June -11 July 2008. During this time I interviewed two representatives from two local crisis centres that I had already interviewed in 2006. I then finally also attempted to interview victims of violence. I met with two, but only one interview with one client was conducted.
Altogether this implies that there are 21 informants: nine from local crisis centre, four from Moscow-based organizations, three from Norwegian NCRB participants, four unspecified as well as one client of a crisis centre. The three informal interviews conducted during the preparatory research trip in 2005 are in addition to these 21 informants. They gave me important background knowledge on the basis of which I developed an interview guide, but were not used in the further content analysis. The shorter interviews with psychologists are also not included among the 21 informants. The interviews are referenced as “Informants” with a number as well as year in which the interview was conducted, e.g. Informant 1/2006.

Interviews have not been conducted with representatives of the state, neither on a national or regional level. There are two exceptions to this: in Murmansk, the leader of the Kola Peninsula Women’s Congress, who I interviewed, was simultaneously the coordinator for NGO activity within the regional administration. In Archangelsk, I met with the regional manager of issues concerning women and youngsters in the regional administration.

4.2.2. Interview guide

After my trip to Russia in fall 2005, I went back to Tromsø and began working on how to transfer the analytical concern to practical questions for the conduct of interviews with representatives of NGOs working on violence against women in Russia. In order to make visible how my thinking about practices of security has been translated into a practical interview guide, I explain my step-by-step approach to the field.

A theoretical interest concerned with locating and identifying “practices of security” in the life-world informed my entry into the field. Following Joe Soss (2006:142), in-depth interviewing is methodically a “good fit for interpretive projects in which researchers are concerned with hard-to-locate phenomena.” The adaptation, or translation, of my theoretical-analytical interest into an interview guide was in fact not effortless. I could not ask for example “what is human security to you?” because human security is not a term used in this context. I needed to translate it into practical questions relevant to how security is produced by the women’s groups in this particular context. My theoretical interest in subjective and objective constraints on security could also not be directly transferred to practical questions. For example, a question such as “What are subjective constraints?” would not make much sense, I reasoned. Instead I decided that I wanted the women activists to talk to me about their work, achievements, challenges and disappointments, and thereby provide me with situations that I could subsequently analyse by means of my analytical apparatus. But how could the interview guide represent a system of questions drawn from the research problem? This
concern with how the object of analysis is constructed through the kind of information that is collected is by Bourdieu et. al. (1991:248) emphasized as a key to questioning. In my work on grounding human security empirically this was a task to be struggled with: I found it difficult to pin down the questions that would be most relevant to my analytical interest. The challenge was to find out what questions would allow me to get a depiction of how security is produced for women in this specific context.

When I began to contact non-state crisis centres they were beyond their first initial phase of establishment. They had already considerable experience, had established extensive networks, both locally with stakeholders of municipal and regional authorities, nationally through women networks and internationally with funders and collaborators. This state of affairs was summarized by an informant:

“[Q]uite a lot has already been done. [W]e already established many connections, conducted many programs with the police, and educational seminars. A great number of this has been done. Many directors of various local crisis centres they work with local government. Our status already improved. (…) And now, how we may sustain this is difficult to say.”

(Informant 12/2006)

I thus approached the field at a point in time at which the first phase of euphoria, enthusiasm, and starting from scratch for the crisis centres had passed. I soon became aware of this and decided that the purpose of my interviews would be to learn from these experiences of the activists in the women’s groups in Russia during the last decade. The idea was to use their assessments of their work and the processes of institutionalizing an assistance structure for victims of violence against women as basis of interpretation regarding my research interest.

I therefore designed an interview guide with the aim of addressing the experiences of the past achievements and wanted the activists’ own reflections on their activities, struggles and achievements so far. The overall interest on which the interviews should shed light was how non-governmental crisis centres establish security in the local context. By asking the representatives of women’s groups to explain their form of interaction and experience with local stakeholders, I aimed to get to grips with constraints and capabilities in the context surrounding these groups and their work. By addressing the experiences of the crisis centre representatives with victims, what stories the victims convey to the crisis centre co-workers, I aimed to address experiences of victims. In this crude manner, the theoretical-analytical interest unfolded on my work with the interview guide.

It is clear therefore that my concern with the interviews was to direct them towards my focus on security practices. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea label this “purposive conversation” and emphasize that open-ended interviews most often have such a direction to them
In order to make my way of giving the interviews direction transparent, it is necessary to clarify how my research interest directs the interview guide. The process of translating the research interest into a set of practical questions is thereby laid open to critique. This way of explaining my conduct of research is also a way of trying to create trustworthiness of my work however. The concern with how to develop the research interest into a set of practical questions did not imply attempts to transfer the analytical concepts of field and habitus into the interview guide by means of for example operationalizing habitus on the basis of specific parameters. Such an operationalization would imply a technification of method, as Bourdieu describes it (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:28). Bourdieu’s own coining of the concept of habitus, to which I will come back in chapter five, in fact grew out of practice, i.e. the practice of research. Pinning habitus down in terms of neat categories is as such detrimental to the expressiveness of the concept. The reason why Bourdieu collects empirical material of both quantitative and qualitative data is because of a concern with a thick description of reality, for the purpose of which multiple empirical material are collected that can shed light on empirical reality from various viewpoints. In regard to my research interest, I opted for an in-dept qualitative approach by means of semi-structured interviews that aimed at achieving interpretive ground for operationalizing field, capital and habitus in the analysis. It is this operationalization that is the method for specifying subjective aspects and objective relations in regard to the security practices of non-state crisis centres. The format of semi-structured interviews is particularly useful for creating such an interpretive ground for analysis, or rather for creating “text” or “word data” (Schwartz-Shea 2006) to be analyzed.

The basic idea for the interview guide was thus how women’s groups work to improve the security situation for women, and then to depict concrete, practically oriented questions for interviews. The first question in the interview guide addressed the objective of the centres. This was followed by a question on the personal motivation of the interviewee and why she began to work on this issue. I thereby addressed the intertwine of personal and institutional history when it comes to the establishment of crisis centres. In order to get an understanding of how crisis centres work to improve the situation for victims of violence

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45 It is therefore not correct, as Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006b:118) underline, to depict “open-ended” interviews as the opposite of “close-ended” survey questionnaires, thereby leaving the impression that “open-ended” interviews are without direction and structure.
46 All my informants are women.
against women, I first wanted to learn more about the issue itself. I therefore asked crisis centre representatives to tell me what forms of violence they address and their views on causes, and if they are concerned with regional specificities. Statistical information, publications etc. produced by the respective crisis centres were also asked about, in order to improve my understanding of their work and also the scope of the issue and their activities.

A further focus in the interview guide addressed interaction between the crisis centres and victims. I decided not to talk directly with victims of violence. Being a newcomer to the field as I began this project, I had ethical concerns about talking directly with victims. Although some victims of domestic violence may find therapy in narrating their experiences to others, I did not consider myself cognitively capable of imagining how I would feel if I would be a domestic violence victim being interviewed by a total stranger about my personal, intimate violent experiences. I consider these ethical concerns still valid also subsequent to the conduct of the interview project. I opted to speak with representatives of crisis centres and engage these local experts, use their professional experience, to learn about their experiences with the victims. I thus argue that engaging victims is not immediately necessary as data material to address the research question. I asked local crisis centre representatives about their experiences with victims and their situation. For example, I asked what victims of violence accentuated in their stories when coming to a crisis centre. I asked how women find their way to the crisis centres, what hindrances they may experience in approaching a crisis centre, and how they begin to unravel their stories to the personnel at crisis centres. The crisis centre representatives were asked to describe their way of working with the victims, to explain the way they go, i.e. how they consult victims to create security in their life-world. In this manner the crisis centre representatives were my conveyers to knowledge about victims’ situation. This was the manner in which I addressed subjective aspects in regard to violence against women and the security practices of non-state crisis centres. The aspects recognized as particularly difficult to victims in regard to the process of creating a more secure life-world, are therefore accentuated by and mediated through the crisis centre representatives. I find this

47 Joe Soss (2006:14ff), reflecting on the emotional content of his interviews with welfare recipients, underlines that his interviews consistently presented challenges in particular in regard to how to respond to the “emotional intensity” in the interview encounters. His concern is to be prepared for emotions by knowing your limits as a researcher, acknowledge your human role, and thinking about emotions as advancement instead of a threat to good research. My initial hesitation to interviewing victims was then a reflection of my recognition, or maybe even fear of, my own limitations as a researcher. I needed to learn more, in order to make myself prepared for such an interaction, which I then aimed to implement by conducting interviews with victims at a later stage in the research process. I followed up on this in summer 2008, see below.
legitimate because I rely upon the expertise and professional knowledge of experienced crisis centre workers. At the same time, this makes visible a weakness of the qualitative interviewing. I am interested in the interactions between crisis centre representatives and victims in regard to how victims experience their situation, but I am not near to the observation of these interactions. By focusing on interviews, I rely on an indirect basis for accessing interactions that I seek to interpret (cf. Soss 2006:139).

Through the interviews with crisis centre representatives I also wanted to get an understanding of the various actors involved in working on violence against women, in particular, how women activists interact with government entities. Although the women’s groups have been established to work on an aspect of security in which state efforts are weak, this does not imply that the state is absent. The women’s groups constitute a link between civil society initiatives and the state in the governance of security. My concern was to get an understanding of what the exchange between local authorities and non-state crisis centres consists of, how contact is established, how they interact, and to hear about their experiences from joint projects for example. From the point of view of the crisis centres, I wanted assessments on this interaction in terms of how this contributes to, constrains or furthers their work to improve women’s security. A concrete topic such as the availability of a shelter was particularly addressed in this regard by asking “Have you collaborated with local authorities on specific issues such as the establishment of a shelter?”

At the outset of the interviews I did not have an overview of the form of collaboration between crisis centres and local authorities. It was therefore important to improve my knowledge on the kind of collaboration in place. I was quick to realize that I had been naïve about the interactions with authorities. For example, knowing that local crisis centres had active exchanges with both national and international women activists, I was to begin with keen to learn how the CEDAW Convention as a key document in the international advocacy on violence against women, was translated into a local context. By addressing how such international documents are used locally, the idea was that the deepening of this human security issue, from an international arena to the local level would be made (more) tangible. Although the CEDAW convention was a part of the vocabulary of local activists, I soon learned that it was not a key to their mobilization or for holding authorities accountable. I also learned during the first interviews that local crisis centres direct their work almost exclusively at local authorities, leaving the national agenda out. This motivated me however to conduct interviews with national, Moscow-based umbrella organizations on violence against women,
to learn more about the broader context relevant to the work of local crisis centres. My methodical approach thus developed while in the field.

4.2.3. Step-by-step in the field: broadening the actor approach

Through the interviews with local crisis centres on their collaboration with local authorities, I realized that there were further actors I could fruitfully engage in order to broaden the viewpoints on the local field of security production that my interest was directed towards. I engaged the viewpoints of Moscow-based activists as well as transnational agents, represented by Norwegian collaborators and their views on the work of local crisis centres. In this manner I could complement and/or contrast the viewpoint of the local activists on their achievements and obstacles in the local context with assessments of external experts. Drawing upon various actors and their viewpoints ensures multiple sources of data. While the external actors may not have the detailed overview of local activists, their year-long experience would maybe let them see things differently, and I was eager to learn from their expertise. In essence, I have interviewed three different actor groups with different locations. The primary actor group of non-state crisis centres was located in five cities in Northwest Russia. The two other actor groups were located in Moscow and in Norway respectively and were asked to convey their views on developments in the regional context to me. The Moscow-based organizations were asked about the national context of working on violence against women in order to improve my understanding of relations between the local and national work. Diversity in actors and their locations thus characterized the sources. Non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia constitute the primary source, while Norwegian NCRB participants and Moscow-based umbrella organizations contribute to broadening the reflections on the local field. Interview guides gave direction to my interviews with representatives of local crisis centres - the primary actor of this study -; Moscow-based umbrella organizations, as well as Norwegian NCRB participants.48

In the interviews with Moscow-based activists, I was going after their birds-eye perspective. These groups were the first that began working on violence against women in

48 See appendix for interview guide to interviews with local crisis centres. The English version of the interview guide is included in the appendix alongside the Russian version (appendix IV). The English version is longer because it entails some remarks on ideas and aims connected to interviewing as method. The Russian interview guide is not a direct translation of the English version, but a translation into Russian both in terms of language and culture, to facilitate a better basis of communication. Interview questions guiding the interviews with representatives of Moscow-based women’s groups and Norwegian NCRB participants are available upon request.
Russia in the early 1990s, and they were key collaborators of international donor agencies in dispersing financial assistance to the regions in the latter half of the 1990s. The Moscow-based activists travelled to the regions and arranged seminars with local crisis centres on how to organize and conduct their work. Due to this experience, I was interested in the assessment of the development (regionalization) of crisis centres in Russia from the perspective of the experienced Moscow-based activists. My assumption was that the views of these experts would give me valuable insight and reflection on the struggles that local crisis centres are engaged in. Questions therefore addressed the assessment of these experienced Moscow-based activists of the system of assistance for women that local crisis centres have established; the difficulties faced by crisis centres in Russia today; and the role of women’s groups for changing authorities’ view on violence against women in Russia during the last decade. A further set of questions addressed state institutions, such as legislation and the juridical process, and their (the Moscow activists’) suggestions for solutions to obstacles faced in these settings. Also in regard to these activists in Moscow I addressed their institutional history, their objectives, examples of specific projects and the status of their current work. A key concern was to have them assess their own work, and I asked for example whether there were some specific achievements they would like to bring forth.

Moving to interview the Moscow-based activists in the fall 2006, I was in one way looking to test and eventually get my, to that day formed impression of the work of local crisis centres confirmed, rejected, and/or nuanced. On one occasion I took the opportunity to meet with one of the Moscow-based organizations a second time. This gave me the possibility to clarify certain issue, intricacies of the legal process and legislation pertaining to violence against women in Russia for example, as well as discuss my thoughts further. In this manner the interviews were an ongoing process of interpretation for me as I used the opportunities that I saw in order to further discuss the viewpoints I formed along the way, both immediately in the interview and by meeting repeatedly with interviewees. Interviewing is in this manner a technique for revising the knowledge that the researcher produces, i.e. takes with her from the interview: “By conveying to our interlocutor what it is that we just understood of what we were told, we check on our interpretations.” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006b:119) I aimed to continuously improve my understanding of the work of the crisis centres, and tried to ask for confirmation, rejection or further clarifications in all my engagements with interviewees. For example, in one of the interviews I asked for confirmation of my understanding:

“That means that it is difficult for women to come to the crisis centre, yes?” (to Informant 7/2006), and for further elaborations: “And you are saying that it would’ve been better if the
problem of violence would ... [interrupted with response]“ (in interview with Informant 10/2006).

I would also critically engage an interviewee’s point of view by drawing upon the knowledge I had gathered through other interviews:

“But why are you saying that a shelter is not needed, especially in [your city]?” [Answer followed, before I asked a further question:] “People often tell me that a shelter is an important structure that enables women to leave their men. Maybe it is different in [your city]?” (questions directed to Informant 7/2006)

Similarly in another example where the knowledge I had gained from the interviews were brought to bear on other interviews, e.g.:

“That’s what I heard in the regions, that the most pressing problems for women are housing and unemployment.” (my comments to Informant 11/2006).

Most often however, my questions were phrased to make the interviewees reflect upon their experience:

“You’ve been working on this issue for seven years already. What do you think, has the problem worsened or changed during this period?” (question to Informant 6/2006).

Altogether these interjections were aimed at improving my understanding of what is going on, what crisis centres activists do and how they think about their work. Notwithstanding these attempts to test my comprehensions of what was being said in the interviews while interviewing, the subsequent analysis is based on my interpretation of the transcribed interviews, and the interviewees may disagree with that analysis. I carry full responsibility for the analysis.

Meeting with representatives of local crisis centres in the Russian Northwest and talking to them about their form of funding and the kind of international collaboration they were engaged in during the first round of interviews, it was soon evident that the Network of Crisis Centres in the Barents Region (NCRB) has contributed particularly to regional and transregional networking on violence against women. Considering the differences in historical origin, duration of experience and resources available to the Nordic representatives in the project compared to the Russian women activists, I wanted to draw upon assessments by Norwegian experts to further my understanding of the work of local crisis centres in Russia.

This external viewpoint is an additional perspective from which to examine and understand the dynamics of the security field in which the local crisis centres are embedded. The NCRB has facilitated various meeting places between local crisis centres and women activists from Russia, Norway, Sweden and Finland, and through such exchanges, external actors are actively engaged in a practice of instituting norms and establishing new practices (of security) in their partnership country. Their inclusion into the project design is thus justified by their
contribution to local organizations. This is seldom a straightforward process but involves discussions and disagreements, and is a process in which differences often become vivid. I wanted to interview the Norwegian NCRB collaborators to learn about their reflections, thoughts and critiques of their Russian counterparts and their work. Overall, the interview guides were all three designed to acquire personal assessments, reflections and differing views on the efforts to address violence against women and provide help to victims.

Questions posed to the Norwegian representatives addressed how they had been involved in and worked with non-state crisis centres in Russia. On the basis of their interaction with these centres, I asked them to describe the challenges Russian crisis centre activists are facing, from their point of view. I asked the Norwegian representatives about differences in perceptions of the problem of violence against women, causes and ways of working, formed on the basis of their collaboration. One concrete topic in this regard was for example diverse assessments of the need of shelter. I also asked these external collaborators to assess the role of non-state crisis centres in addressing violence against women in Russia. In regard to their collaboration, I asked about expectations, experiences and summaries, all questions aimed at broad assessments articulated by these experts. I was also interested in hearing whether the Norwegian collaborators engaged local authorities. I asked these activists about their experiences and asked them to explain to me the eventual changes in their viewpoints and assessments resulting from their cooperation with the Russian partners. Also these interviews were therefore aimed at giving me the possibility to broaden my views, assessments and reflections on the dynamics of the work in which non-state crisis centres in Russia operate, the constraints and capabilities that define their practices.

Overall, the engagement with further groups of actors beyond local crisis centres was motivated both in the concern with broadening viewpoints and assessments as well as in the concern with reassuring me as the researcher in my own interpretation and understanding of the field. In this manner my interview project on security was characterized by a step-by-step format, and this implies that an inductive logic defined the progress of the field research as various empirical viewpoints were consulted for the purpose of gaining an understanding of security practices and their social context.

4.2.4. Assessing data and final return to field

In the conduct of this project a main task was the operationalization of the theoretical concepts of field, capital and habitus on the basis of the interpretation of empirical material, in particular interviews. A particular methodical concern in this regard was when and if I had
sufficient data. Although there is no absolute rule to this, the kind and amount of data upon which the analysis rests and from which conclusions are drawn, need to be sufficient for the analyst to make a consistent and substantiated line of argumentation. When meeting challenges in the operationalization of the analytical concepts, one concern may be that the amount and form of empirical data is insufficient. In regard to my analysis, I was concerned with such contingencies of my analysis, but when I decided to go back into the field, there were additional concerns that weighed in. I knew from my interviews with non-state crisis centres that their financial situation in Russia was precarious and they were struggling to uphold their activities. But how much were they struggling: were they in fact inactive? I wanted to go back to Russia, to one city, to again interview representatives of crisis centres and find out how they were doing, whether they were still active. This also provided me with an opportunity to ask questions about certain aspects that I had not understood well while being in the field at earlier occasions, such as for example the role of the so-called ombudsman (on regional (oblast) level overseeing human rights development) and Justices of the Peace Courts.

Throughout the project I had thought about whether it would at some point be possible for me to approach victims of violence, the clients of crisis centres to have first hand experience with their views.\textsuperscript{49} When I decided to go to Archangelsk in June 2008, I also asked my contacts at the local crisis centres if they would let me meet with some of their clients. This proved impossible for one crisis centre and for the second, they emphasized that they do not store any contact information of the clients. They are concerned with anonymity and therefore the clients can contact the centre, but the centre cannot contact the clients. But, many clients use the centres on several occasions of course, so contact could be established. The crisis centre representatives tried hard to meet my requests. For example, they invited me to sit in on consultation sessions. I think that if the project should have engaged victims directly and more thoroughly, this would have been one way of doing it. I could have attempted to sit in on counselling hours for some time, and thus be more ethnographic in my approach. Instead, for this project I ended up with one interview with a client of a crisis centre that I use only illustratively in the analysis. This is to provide some further understanding of

\textsuperscript{49} This thought was important to the aims of the project. But also, in the research on non-state crisis centres in Russia and their role in civil society, the clients of crisis centres are hardly approached. This was also noted by Kristen Ghodsee (2008), who asks for more information about the views of the Russians who benefit from the work of women’s groups and crisis centres.
the issues involved in improving women’s life-situation in regard to domestic violence. I use this single interview carefully, to enhance points that I see in the data material more broadly.

From this fourth and final phase of interviewing, 24 June – 7 July 2008, I had the impression that the informants very much appreciated that I came back to them again. It had been two years since the first trip, which took place in spring 2006.

4.3. Interpretation while in the field and beyond

As the field work progressed my engagement with informants was followed up by adjustment of the interview guide and exploration of new and additional questions that I found more appropriate or interesting at the time. In this manner my thinking about practices of security has continuously been shaped by interactions during field work. This underlines that interpretation of interview material begins already when they are collected, while still in the field. But the adjustments to the interview guide that were made while in the field, did not lead to any dismissal of the initial interview guide, as in fact the direction I had given to the interview guide followed me in all the interview sessions. Adjustments were for example made to open up for more elaboration by the interviewees. Although the interview guide was aimed at giving impetus for the interviewees to explain and reflect upon their work, I sometimes adjusted the questions because I thought a different way of asking would make it easier for the person to respond.\(^5\) This sometimes implied asking more questions. This aimed to ensure that the interviewee felt comfortable in the interview situation. In this manner, the interview setting demanded both me and the interviewee to give of ourselves to facilitate the interview. This also defines an unpredictable character of interviewing as it for example implies that the order of questions set up in the guide may be shifted around. On other occasions the interviewee could talk for a long time with no interruptions, leaving me as an active listener attempting to process the information, making sense of the assessment made, and in follow up questions, seek to have assessments specified, broadened and to have my impression of the viewpoints considered. This illustrates how interviewing “means working

\(^5\) Such a thought, or rather a gut-feeling can occur because of the signals expressed and exchanged in such a setting: “The interview is not just an exchange of words, but also an exchange of physical gestures, silences meant to signal, uses of voice, tone, and laughter – all of which must be attended to by the researcher.” (Soss 2006:135) I am not paying particular attention to these issues in this methodological discussion of the project but I hereby acknowledge the many uncontrollables in an interview setting. My concern with giving the interviews direction through a thought over interview guide does not eliminate uncontrollable effects in an interview setting. I acknowledge this, but in my analysis I focus on the interpretation of the word data established through the interview as this is most importantly reflecting the research question.
hard to encourage elaboration, clarification, reflection, and illustration.” (Soss 2006:136)

Through these mechanisms of being able to give the interviewees time to develop and dwell on their own experiences, inventively post new questions, and follow lines of argumentation that broadened my views, this format of interviewing was means to continuously think about and develop my analytical interest in exchange with the empirical field. This is a process that Soss describes as circumscribing more than the act of interviewing:

“[In-depth interviewing] is an evolving dialogue between fieldwork and framework, mediated by concrete activities of transcription, memo writing, purposive reading of literatures, and the like.” (ibid. 137)

I also transcribed, wrote memos and read literatures attained locally. In addition to a kind of triangulation of actor groups as sources, which grew out of the empirical engagement, additional sources in my study are therefore documentary sources, in particular information material, analyses and brochures produced by my Russian contacts. While being in the field, I used the opportunity to search for information material, visiting libraries in St. Petersburg and in Moscow. I thereby continued to explore the theoretical-analytical framework while in the field, which contributed to facilitating the kind of exchange Soss points at between fieldwork and framework. These processes were a part of my endeavour of conceptualizing human security as practice.

It is also argued that interpretation begins when transcribing interviews (cf. Soss 2006:136). I conducted all the transcriptions myself, and transcribed in Russian. When quoting the interviews in the analysis, I have translated these transcriptions into English. Listening to the interviews and transcribing them was an opportunity to think about and assess my technique for asking questions. It might be possible to analyse me as the interviewer and critically assess what topics I covered and how questions were phrased, topics pointed to by Soss (ibid), but the main concern for me was to do the transcription for the purpose of immersing myself completely into the data material I had gathered in order to be best prepared for the content analysis. While transcribing I often got ideas on how to pursue with the analysis, and therefore, although strenuous, transcribing was for me an important analytical activity. The systematic in-depth analysis of the content of the interviews, guided by the theoretical concepts, was therefore not conducted while in the field. Although field research implied discussing my research and engaging various sources that demanded me to continuously reflect on my overall analytical-theoretical interest, these exchanges did not

51 All translations from Russian literature sources are also mine.
provide me with a ready understanding of my analytical results at the end of field work. Soss is for example critical of the “narrative of progressive enlightenment in the field” (ibid. 137) which he finds misleading. It is misleading because it understates the importance of systematic analysis after having exited the field. It is through such processing of the empirical material, i.e. in-depth content analysis on the basis of specific analytical concepts, that I re-interpret and convey my understanding of how security is produced in this specific context. This focus on content analysis explains why I have not aspired to collect a large number of interviews but instead to focus on in-depth engagement with the views and reflections of the representatives of the three actors groups.

4.4. Synopsis of research design

Considering this research design, conceptual and geopolitical margins are locations from which security is discussed in this project. The conceptual margin is a bottom-up human security perspective that defines the concern with local knowledge as a basic methodical idea. The geopolitical margin is the north, the Russian Northwest in particular. Although the North currently receives increased attention in regard to security, due to the interest in oil- and gas development and the role of the Arctic for global security, this location constitutes a margin in human security research. In feminist IR methodology such margins are considered “fruitful standpoints from which both to disrupt dominant knowledge claims and to produce gender-sensitive knowledge.” (Ackerly, Stern et al. 2006a:261) The justification of my starting point is attached to assumptions about how to establish knowledge of human security, i.e. epistemological concerns. The idea motivating my research is to use this location to construct knowledge of human security in people’s life-world on the basis of a specific interpretive apparatus. This choice can in itself be seen as a critique of mainstream locations simply because of its location. The aim is not to disrupt dominant knowledge claims by means of deconstruction, but to produce, i.e. to construct, a story of security on the basis of a local actor-approach.

I have interviewed activists on violence against women and listened to their articulations of their work, their struggles. For IR feminists this is a methodological choice “that not merely describes and explains global politics but that contributes to the transformation of

52 The joint Norwegian-Canadian project “The Impact of Oil and Gas Activity on Peoples in the Arctic Using a Multiple Securities Perspective” (www.ipygaps.org) also addresses a human security perspective by taking a community based approach to security in the Arctic.
global politics through its own theoretical practice.” (Ackerly and True 2006:243)

Considering the definition of ontology by Ackerly et.al. (2006b:6) as “an understanding of the world; for instance, what constitutes relevant units of analysis”, the choice of non-state women’s groups as a relevant unit of security analysis reflects an ontological position-taking. A key characteristic of feminist IR research is the empirical engagement with unconventional units of analysis. This purports an objective of challenging established viewpoints. For example, Stern explains that her “frustration with theories about global politics that are based on a view of the world and the relevant actors in it that excludes women and the feminine from the picture (...) led me to look for articulations of (in)security in (for IR) unlikely and often silenced spaces.” (Stern 2006:196) Stern has also elsewhere elaborated on this starting point of research, its justification as well as contribution in international studies:

“One can learn surprising things, and disrupt existing theories that purport to explain ‘reality’ from grounding an inquiry in an ‘empirical’ material that is otherwise silenced or ‘evacuated’ from the authorized subjects of research. If nothing else, such research prompts the recognition that alternative accounts may exist and that dominant discourses requires hard work to sustain a semblance of natural-ness.” (Stern 2001:70)

Such a grounding of an inquiry is here pursued. Specifically, this study is grounded in the experiences of women activists on violence against women and these experiences are collected by means of qualitative interviews. The accounts of these women activists are subjected to content analysis based on the concepts of field, capital and habitus and aims to disentangle constraints on practices of security as they pertain to objective and subjective aspects.

For the analysis, I have relied upon the transcription of the stories constructed in the interview settings. It is thus a constructed reality that is being reinterpreted through the application of the theoretical tools of field, capital, and habitus. The operationalisation of these thinking tools in regard to the specific empirical context guides and structures the analysis. This is my technique for making my reading of the interviews transparent and thereby dependable. By explicitly outlining how I transfer the analytical categories to the empirical context I provide an example of how to use this analytical apparatus. This may provide an example that can be transferred to other studies and contexts.

One assumption guiding my research design and directing my attention to non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia in particular was that in this local context, I presumed that I would experience that their views on conditions defining their struggles would be readily and openly expressed. Through interaction with international women campaigners many women’s groups based in the urban centres in Russia have become acquainted with international views
on the issue, and have adopted the language of human rights, patriarchy, etc. This is pointed out for example in Sarah L. Henderson’s study (2002:161) outlining how Russian women activists are at home at international conferences but distant from their local communities. Focusing on marginal actors in a marginal space, I found this compelling in regard to the purpose of engaging local experiences of security because I assert that these are less absorbed by, but not unacquainted with, the rhetoric of international campaigners than their fellow activists in the urban centres. The location at the margins is considered a position from which I can engage these women in interviews and have them speak their mind. I thereby accord legitimacy to these local women’s groups and their experiences in their life-world (Yanow 2006:22f.). In this manner I aim to make the local knowledge the subject of reflection and discussion. This I argue is an approach to human security distinct from top-down defined concerns with for example establishing parameters on when to come to the rescue of local people. It is however not an approach devout of theoretical thought guiding the research. I acknowledge the expertise of my interlocutors, their knowledge of their own situation, and thereby the legitimacy of their local knowledge (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006b:119).

Giving priority to encountering interviewees’ understandings on their own terms does not imply acceptance of their descriptions of their understandings (cf. Soss 2006:133). Soss emphasizes that engaging local knowledge involves “carefully distinguishing” between insider’s conceptions and the interpretation of these in terms of social scientific concepts. This distinction is entailed in the understanding of the importance of carefully distinguishing between emic (insider) views and etic (outsider) concepts in interpretation.53 The point is that congruence between emic and etic views and conceptualizations is not necessary for proceeding with analysis of local knowledge, but rather can be an element of analysis (Soss 2006: 133; footnote 8, p. 147). For the analysis, I rely upon the agents’ description of reality54, but these are critically engaged by means of operationalizing the thinking tools of field, capital and habitus. Through this operationalization, I construct a story of security as practice that shows how this outsider understanding is constructed through the practice of research.

Through the application of the theoretical tools of field, capital and habitus I aim to delimit the constraints on practices of security in the life-world and specify the practice of

53 Soss (2006) for example explains that he applied the concept of “political action” to his interviews, while many interviewees conceived of themselves as apolitical.
54 Pouliot argues that “research must begin with what it is that social agents, as opposed to analysts, believe to be real.” (2007b:364)
security in which non-state crisis centres engage. In this manner I construct a representation of
the representations that I collected by means of interviews. This makes me as the researcher a
part of the process of knowledge construction. A key component of Bourdieu’s work is that
this practice of research ought to be subjected to theoretical reflection, in Bourdieu’s
terminology reflexivity. Key aspects of Bourdieu’s concern with reflexivity is that it is a
collective enterprise and that the process of reflecting aims to strengthen the epistemological
underpinning of the study (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:36). This alludes to a logic of
validity, and this is captured also by Kevin C. Dunn: “My goal as a researcher is to provide an
argument about why my interpretation is valid, so that I can convince others that mine is one
of the best interpretations out there.” (Dunn 2008:92) For the purpose of ensuring discussion
of the research practice and ensure transparency and thereby validation (conviction), it is
essential to make explicit the choices and explanations for choices made in the practical
conduct of the study and of accessing empirical data.

Having now explained the research design and my epistemological position, the focus
turns to the empirical context and how I use the analytical tools to construct an understanding
of constraints on local security practices.

55 On various understanding of reflexivity, see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:36ff.
5. Local Security Agents: Women’s groups in Northwest Russia

When one thinks of violence against women, although it is recognized to affect women around the world, there are certain parts of the world we are still less likely to think about than others, but which can possibly provide new insights into the issue. When the terms “Russia” and “security” are invoked, it is probably safe to say that violence again women, is not the first thought to come to mind. Instead, Russian territorial security (traditional), and ethno-national disputes in Chechnya and elsewhere in the Russian Caucasus are dominant Russian security images, possibly closely followed by energy security and protection of energy resources. Even when thinking about Russia itself, Moscow defines the agenda, and little is known about both the regional and international engagement and local life-world experiences within the diverse peripheries of the world’s largest country. The question therefore is why are women’s groups in Northwest Russia of interest to an empirical security study?

Non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia strive to establish assistance for victims of violence against women in their local communities and thereby struggle for the institutionalization and recognition of their work. In this chapter the concept of field is introduced and it is explained how the local non-state crisis centres are part of a struggle that defines a field of security from violence against women. The chapter begins with explaining the interest in women’s groups in Northwest Russia in this study and outlines the field in focus. In the final section, the local actors in this study are introduced.

5.1. A stable and inventive civil society actor

Since non-state crisis centres began to emerge in Russia in the early 1990s, they have achieved a great deal of international attention. They are by Western researchers described as a vital agent of civil society development in Russia (Johnson 2006; Richter 2002; Sperling 1999; Sundstrom 2002). In the analyses of the Russian women’s movement, the crisis centres are overall assessed as a particularly successful actor within civil society activism in Russia (Johnson 2006:268). The level of institutionalization and organization of the Russian women’s movement makes them particularly useful for a study of a civil voice of security as it is in this explorative project valuable to draw upon an actor group that is rather well-established. Amid the concerns with a weak civil society development in Russia, the general agreement of the firmness of women’s groups that is present in the literature allows me to
focus on the research method and not on insecurities about the actor. Regional differences are however vast and therefore the ultimate characterization of the specific local actors in this study needs to be based on my empirical observations.

The development of non-state crisis centres in Russia was instigated by the inflow of money from foreign sources. They are considered a successful achievement of the international gender cooperation that emerged with the end of the Communist era and the Soviet Union. This international aspect of their emergence has had profound effects on the kind of groups that developed in Russia. International benefactors had specific motives with their funding, pertaining to political and social agendas reflected in their programs that aimed at promoting democracy, civil society, and a free market (Kay 2004:250). Further, many funding bodies assumed the flow of knowledge to be unidirectional from the West to the East (ibid.). The demands of the foreign funders, in regard to the development of organizational structure and requirements of grant applications, significantly impacted on the development of Russian women’s groups. The informal entities women engaged in during perestroika (neformal’nye) were soon enforced to formalize, register as NGOs and professionalize (Hemment 2004c:316). Julie Hemment identifies frustration among women activists in regard to the agendas of international collaborators. For example, the foreigners emphasized the importance of violence against women, but local women activists were sceptical to crisis centres because “they did not think gendered violence was the most pressing issue facing Russian women and expressed concern that so many resources were put into it.” (Hemment 2004a:823) For example, crisis centres are premised on a Western view presuming women’s economic dependence on men and that women are stuck in the home. Hemment emphasizes that “[t]his was not true for Soviet women, who were brought into the workforce and guaranteed formal equality by the socialist “paternalist” or “parent” state.” (ibid. 823) Also, the nuclear family was hardly realized in Soviet times, due to housing shortages, and the extended family was frequent. “For all these reasons”, explains Hemment (ibid.) “domestic conflict most commonly expressed itself in the form of tension over rights to living space, interpersonal strife, or alcoholism.” For Russian women there were therefore a varied set of issues that comprised the “crisis” they found themselves in, and when crisis centres began to emerge in Russia, they approached the centres with all these crisis situations, not only domestic violence.

Although the crisis centres were set up to address violence against women, a wide array of issues were thus raised on their phone hotline service. Local activists’ then became critical of the effects of the international intervention in their work. Their practical experience with
immediate service provision thus created a space for critique and invention. As practical experience broadened, also regionally, the impact of the international agendas and restrictions was challenged. James Richter recognized that the expansion of donor funding beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg facilitated the emergence of local crisis centres that developed forms of assistance and activism beyond donor restrictions (Richter 2002:39). Although also non-state crisis centres in the regions are connected to international trends of women activism and agendas, they have through their practices of immediate service provision been oriented towards practical challenges and grassroots needs in their performance. They are concerned with directing their work at local challenges. I find that their viewpoints and assessments of local dynamics are of particular interest in an empirical study aimed at identifying constraints on local security practices. Notwithstanding the impact of the international agenda on violence against women and the Western funding for democracy on the genesis of Russian non-state crisis centres, the local positioning of research and discussion of local views are conducive to examining the viewpoints of the activists. While keeping international donors pleased, local crisis centres are committed to objectives of altering the immediate life-situation of vulnerable victims. The distinction between the Western NGO bureaucracy and the local livelihoods inspires the crisis centre representatives to critical reflection on own work. Drawing upon extensive research in post-Soviet Russia, Julie Hemment acknowledges the influence of the international agendas on local concerns but advocates exactly such a local lens:

“[I]f we pay close attention to what is happening on the ground, we will see that this [the dominance of the international agendas (KS)] is not the whole story. First, NGOs are diverse in status and form and their members are not solely elite. Second, although international aid certainly exerts a powerful influence on group activities, it does not determine them. In the nongovernmental sphere, Russian women draw on international aid to strategize and make sense of the realignments in their lives and to articulate a way forward. What comes into view if we shift the lens?” (Hemment 2004c:316)

Hemment shifts the lens in order to examine conceptions of violence against women and democracy development on the local level. For my focus on security in the life-world, I thus learned from Hemment’s, but also Richter’s work (2002) that this lens can be particularly fruitful because local activists develop own strategies independently of international demands and donor requirements. As basis for exploring local security production, I therefore find it interesting to examine how non-state Russian crisis centres strategize in the local context. The women’s groups in this study formulate a specific objective of addressing violence against women and establish and provide assistance to victims of violence with the aim of institutionalizing a dependable system of response for victims. To this end they interact with
victims and local stakeholders, and in this work they are inventive in adjusting to local challenges. Local logics and challenges define their work, and the work of non-state crisis centres is therefore a suitable case for examining local security production. There is also a characteristic of the crisis centres in Northwest Russia in particular that makes this case attractive; their novelty.

5.2. A novel actor in Northwest Russia

Three regions of the Russian Northwest, Murmansk oblast, Archangelsk oblast, and the Republic of Karelia are in focus in this study. In this region, the first non-state crisis centre was established in Murmansk in 1997. The centre was established with support from the Norwegian Council for Equality (Likestillingsrådet) and the Barentssecretaartiat\(^{56}\). A starting point for focusing on Northwest Russia in this project was the observation of such cross-border cooperation between Norway and Northwest Russia on women’s issues. The Barents cooperation established in 1993 included funding to so-called people-to-people projects, and women’s issues were a prominent topic in the development of this cooperation. Women’s issues and violence against women in particular, were topics that tied this peripheral northern region to the global context of women’s rights. A key argument of both the human security discussion and women’s rights discourse is that activism and practices on a local level are essential to the multi-level approaches that these issues demand. Non-state crisis centres address the global issue of violence against women in a local setting, in women’s immediate life-worlds. It is to the local dynamics that affect their practices this study directs attention.

Within Russia, the Russian Northwest can be classified as a rich region. The region underwent radical modernisation in the early decades of the Soviet regime (e.g. Blakkisrud and Hønneland 2006). Specific benefits such as generous payments as well as pensions were established exclusively in northern regions in order to make it attractive for workers from other parts of the Soviet Union to relocate to the north. When the Soviet Union collapsed, these benefits were not upheld and economic misery weighed down the region, but more recently oil exploration is bringing prospects of greater wealth to the region. The Putin administration (2000-2008) announced a renewed focus on the north in 2007, both due to the

\(^{56}\) The Barents Euro-Arctic Region was launched in 1993 with the objective of enhancing integration in the Barents-region, incorporating the 13 northernmost counties of the countries in the Barents region; Norway, Russia, Finland and Sweden. The Barentssecretariat is located in Kirkenes, in the north of Norway, with regional offices in Russia (Murmansk, Archangelsk, and Naryan Mar).
development of the oil- and gas industry and for military reasons. Although these regional developments form a backdrop of this project, regional characteristics are not the reason why non-state crisis centres in this region are particularly relevant to this study of security production in a local context. In regard to the specific actor focus in this project the interest in the Russian Northwest in particular is because of the recent development of these crisis centres.

In Northwest Russia, institutional responses to the issue of violence against women have been established only during the last decade. One of the most recently established crisis centres in the Northwest region, the “Severodvinsk city societal organization for women - Cabinet of psychological help for women in crisis situations” (Cabinet), speaks to the recent recognition of this issue:

“When we [in 2001] began to work on this program [on the improvement of women’s situation], we were the first in the city to address the problem of violence against women. Because, in principle, earlier no one ever talked about it.” (Informant 7/2006)

Although the first crisis centre in the Northwest region was established in 1997, the Cabinet in Severodvinsk exemplifies that the work on violence against women in the region was established rather recently. This does not mean that the problem is unacknowledged. Citing a Russian study of violence in the family and society, Janet E. Johnson (2007a:40) notes that according to a 2001-2002 survey, 87 percent of men and 93 percent of women agreed that violence against women in the family is a problem. Recognition of the issue is however not synonymous with institutionalization of an assistance structure for women. The establishment of non-state crisis centres in Russia in the 1990s changed the field of security for women because they gave women a place to seek help and support (beyond family and friends). They therefore represent a new agent within the field of security for women in Russia, an agent of change. In Northwest Russia such crisis centres began to emerge in the latter half of the 1990s. The novelty of these local crisis centres and the ongoing work to establish structures to help victims of violence against women in which they are involved, make a local setting a particularly interesting site in which to explore local practices of establishing security for women.

58 Sundstrom refers to a 2003 survey of about 2000 respondents around the country that found that 43 percent still felt that a man beating his wife was a private matter (Sundstrom 2005:433), but also notes that on this specific aspect, change has been observed (441).
In their efforts to improve the life situation of victims of violence, the crisis centre representatives are involved in finding new paths and collaborators to create a structure of assistance for the victims. In this work, the crisis centres are involved in an ongoing struggle for the acceptance of and support for introduction of measures on violence against women. A basic characteristic of field as defined by Pierre Bourdieu is that there are struggles ongoing for recognition and differentiation that define the logic of the field. I argue that this is the case in regard to the work of non-state crisis centres to establish assistance for victims of violence against women in these local, northern communities. The next section addresses in greater detail how I interpret the concept of field in regard to the specific empirical focus on non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia.

5.3. The Field of Security from Violence against Women

The vast majority of studies on non-state crisis centres in Russia examine their role as agents of democratic development and civil society building. Non-state crisis centres address violence against women in terms of human rights’ advocacy and as a crime, but also as security. In this study their work is examined as practices of security. For that purpose the concept of field is used as analytical framework. I develop this argument by focusing on the notion of field in Bourdieu’s work, its definition and operationalization. I also review Didier Bigo’s adaptation of the concept of field to security analyses because it provides inspiration for the use of this concept in regard to the specific empirical focus in this study. By focusing on uses of the concept and methods for knowing fields, I explain how the particular interpretation of the field in focus here is developed. In regard to the use of the concept in this study, there are two relations that demarcate the empirical field. These are first, relations between non-state crisis centres and stakeholders, such as the police, municipal authorities, medical personnel, etc., and second, relations between non-state crisis centres and victims. This subsection outlines how this particular exposition of a field both draws upon other uses of the term and adjusts the notion of field.

5.3.1. The notion of field as framework of analysis

The concept of field is “a mode of construction of the object” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:228) and this is linked to a set of theoretical and analytical principles of research and

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59 Bourdieu also used the term space or social space interchangeably with field.
analysis. As mentioned earlier, field is not a predefined concept, but its application aims to reflect specific principles of thought about the social world. This conceptual openness is “a permanent reminder that concepts have no definition other than systemic ones, and are designed to be put to work empirically in systematic fashion.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:96) This is why it is crucial to explain how the concept of field is used in regard to the research interest in this study. To begin with, a classic element in Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to social reality is a concern with comprehending social reality as a system of relations, and this relational thinking is essential to the definition of a field: “To think in terms of field is to think relationally.” (ibid.). Bourdieu describes this as “the hallmark of modern science.” (ibid. 97)

Fields then are constituted by objective relations that define the relative positions of agents in the field. Social agents thus occupy specific places within fields, and their positions are defined by their relative positions vis-à-vis other occupants in a field (Bourdieu 1985b:724) The relative position is described by the volume of capital, which implies that field and capital are interconnected concepts. Since social fields are not impermeable but open to influences from other fields, stocks of capital and objective relations are subject to change. The theoretical ideas of the constitution of social fields are used to create the analytical framework of a field of security from violence against women, but to begin with I find it useful to consider how Bourdieu has displayed the relations that constitute fields.

Bourdieu basically demonstrated two different forms of presenting the constitution of a field in his work. One form is the visualization in a diagram that illustrates the total volume of overall capital along one axis and the distribution of specific forms of capital that are at stake in a specific field on the other. This method dominates the work in “Distinction” (1984) in which he studied the field of culture in France. The positions of the agents are determined in this diagram by distributing them in relation to the two axes; overall volume of capital along one axis, and the relative weigh of the various field specific forms of capital along the other.

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60 Bourdieu has applied the concept of field on various research objects, most famously perhaps on the field of culture in his seminal work “Distinction” (Bourdieu 1984), and most recently in an analysis of the field of the housing market (Bourdieu 2005). He has also studied fields of artists and intellectuals, class lifestyles, academia, religion, the field of power, the field of law, see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:94 for a detailed listing.

61 Bourdieu associates the relational mode of thinking with the work of Ernst Cassierer and also Norbert Elias, and considers it a way to move beyond Aristotelian substantialism (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:97).

62 Social agents “may be isolated individuals, groups or institutions.” (Bourdieu 1983a:311). The term agent underlines that subjects are “socially constituted as active and acting in the field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:107), but their ability to act is constrained by their stock of properties (capital) that limits their potential action. Bourdieu notes that in addition to social agents, also things occupy fields “in so far as they are appropriated by them and therefore constituted as properties.” (Bourdieu 2000:134).
The plotting of agents’ possession of capital according to these two dimensions is based on a reading of statistics and analyses of correspondence between a set of agents and various properties, i.e. capital. These various coordinates are then used to define the position of the agents in relation to the variables along the two axis (cf. Bourdieu 1985b). Those properties that differentiate the greatest number of agents are used to present the variation among agents (cf. Swartz 1997:62)\textsuperscript{63}. The correspondence-analysis is thus one form on the basis of which Bourdieu accounts for and presents the constitution of a field and the positions of agents.\textsuperscript{64}

Such an interest in agents and positions has by Didier Bigo (2006) been transferred to the study of a field of security. In his study, security production encompasses private and public actors such as private security companies, police, customs, secret services, EUROPOL and others, what he altogether describes as “professionals of management of unease” (ibid. 6). Bigo places these agents within a diagram similar to Bourdieu’s. The location of the agents is defined in regard to a vertical axis of private versus public references of legitimacy, and a horizontal axis representing the “power to kill” versus the (soft) “management of life” (Ibid. 47). This security field is defined by “the capacity of the agents to produce statements on unease and present solutions to facilitate the management of unease.” (ibid. 22) The agents are engaged in competition for “the authority to impose their definition of who and what inspires fear.” (ibid. 25) Bigo does not use forms of capital, as does Bourdieu to indicate the basis for the positioning of the agents within the diagram. Bigo reconstructs the field by focusing on practices: “My method consists, instead, of describing the relations that derive

\textsuperscript{63} This analytical concern with differentiation between agents is described as means to constructing the object (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:230): Bourdieu suggests to place all relevant social agents on a horizontal line and to add a column for each property necessary to describe one of them. The other agents are then questioned in terms of whether or not they comprise this property. Those properties that are structurally or functionally equivalent between the agents are erased. Remaining are those properties that distinguish the agents, and these are the analytically relevant attributes. This focus on differentiation as means of interpretation is also underlined in regard to the elaboration of the conduct of qualitative interviews in “Weight of the World” (Bourdieu et.al. 1999:612, footnote 4): When interviewer and respondent are a “perfect match” (overlap in terms of social proximity) many things are left out because they are considered tacit knowledge (goes without saying), and hence, the analytically distinct elements are left out. Differentiation is a key interest in field analysis.

\textsuperscript{64} Correspondence analysis is a statistical technique developed by the French physicist Jean-Paul Benzécri in the 1960s. His concern was to develop a statistical technique to uncover latent structures in language. The model must follow the data is the credo, and with an inductive logic, the technique aims to extract structures from the data material. This was Bourdieu’s main interest in regard to the analysis of life-style and culture in “Distinction”. The distribution of different life-styles was collected and typical combinations of various life-styles were uncovered (e.g. why do leading managers in private businesses prefer tennis, boulevard theatre, and whiskey while farmers enjoy football, rugby and country wine, bread and potatoes? (Fuchs-Heinritz; König 2005:46). The question then was why specifically such and such combinations exist.
from practices (of surveillance, of control, etc.)” (ibid. 31). In the European level, the management of unease comprises security agents, both private and public, at different institutional positions, and the field is defined by interactions between these security experts. In order to disentangle the field, it is necessary to go beyond “inventoring the agencies” (ibid. 33), and “to describe the effects of the field by giving examples and showing how they act”. (ibid.) From Bigo, the following task of a field analysis can thus be exerted:

“We need indeed to set the constraints and opportunities that the field gives to the agents – effects that are visible.” (Bigo 2006:33)

In Bigo’s study, the focus on interactions between agents of security is means to disentangling such effects. Bigo explains this approach on the basis of the transversality of the field: the security agents that he addresses interact beyond national borders, in cross-border networks, and this creates a new social space in which security in Europe today is defined. Bigo does not address forms of capital to dispel constraints on action in his study of security entrepreneurs. He asserts that the concept of capital is not useful for the purpose of differentiating the positions of agents within that specific field:

“[T]he bureaucratic milieu under study here [policing/police co-operation in Europe (KS)] does not have different types of capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) which would permit us to differentiate the positions. Rather we have a distribution of positions depending on types of knowledge (for threat management) which permit types of statement (…) which each agency is trying to promote.” (Bigo 2000:87)

In his application of Bourdieu’s conceptual tools, Bigo has thus adapted the form of data material laid to ground for a field analysis, from quantitative sources to a focus on practices of interactions between agencies. The means of visualizing the field are also adjusted, from types of capital to types of knowledge. Bigo underlines that to extract the distribution of positions within the field there is a need to study in detail the micro-practices of agents, and as a result of that, the empirical parameter(s) of differentiation can be asserted.

Bourdieu himself also introduced an alternative visualization of the field (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:137). In his work “Weight of the world” (Bourdieu et.al. 1999) the

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65 In this quote, the word “instead” refers to a focus on "national cultures" that Bigo rejects. He rejects this because a main proposition of his work is that the “managers of unease” today are enmeshed in transversal relations, i.e. networks crossing national borders.

66 Trine Villumsen (2008:55) argues that this concern with how experts are involved in a practice of upholding a specific understanding of the security reality is a “fundamental and innovative challenge” that pushes IR towards sociology.

67 This is similar to Bourdieu’s description of a field as “the sum of the structural constraints on the action of its members.” (quoted from Jackson 2008:167, original source: Chose dites, p. 134/86). I cite this because the concern with constraints on action expressed in this definition of the field is important to the use of the concept in this particular empirical setting.

68 Bigo (2000) characterizes his approach as “a fusion or crossed reading” of Bourdieu and Foucault.
data material comprises qualitative interviews on the subject of social suffering. The interview objects are not necessarily proximate, neither geographically nor in terms of their social engagement but they share a willingness to take part in the interviews and share their life-stories. By studying the statements in the interviews, specificities in a person’s way of thinking about suffering that differs from others is illustrated (ibid. 618). The points of view are not explained separately, but are juxtaposed. This confrontation between various viewpoints is means to illustrating a multilayered representation of reality. Since articulations on the same realities may be different and are sometimes irreconcilable, it is necessary to “work instead with the multiple perspectives that correspond to the multiplicity of coexisting, and sometimes directly competing, points of view (Ibid. 3). The focus is thus on “the plurality of perspectives that make up the complexity and ambiguity of human experience.” (Ibid, footnote 1, p. 3) This research practice, described as perspectivism, uncovers differences and conflicts in contemporary society:

“It [the perspectivist approach (KS)] is based in the very reality of the social world, and it helps explain a good deal of what happens in society today, in particular, much of the distress caused by clashing interests, orientations, and lifestyles.” (Bourdieu et.al. 1999:4)

Thus, because it juxtaposes various points of view, perspectivism displays differences. In “Weight of the World” this idea is basis for analyzing the interviews and illustrating various views on social suffering. The interviews form the data material for positioning the various views on suffering in regard to the social structure to which the agents belong. It is evident that Bourdieu uses a plurality of methods, both quantitative and qualitative in his work to decide on the field. There are thus many variants in regard to the empirical sources used to analyse logics of fields and thus determine the objective relations:

“Thanks to the tools of statistics, ethnographic description, or formal modelling, the external observer can decode the “unwritten musical score according to which the actions of agents, each of whom believes she is improvising her own melody, are organized.” and ascertain the objective regularities they obey.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:8)69

Several rounds of interviews or ethnographic observation could be conducted for collecting empirical material for analysis. One difficulty in regard to this plurality of methods is that the analytical concepts, such as field and habitus, have not necessarily been operationalized in the same manner in Bourdieu’s various empirical studies (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:47).
This again underlines the importance of clarifying the use of the concepts in regard to the case here, the security practices of non-state crisis centres.

In the study “Weight of the World”, the idea is that by exposing various views on suffering, suffering can be grasped as “positional suffering”. The focus is thus not on a specific definition of suffering for example according to material poverty, which excludes and includes experiences of suffering according to a specific measurement. Instead, the focus is on agents’ own descriptions:

“[U]sing material poverty as the sole measure of all suffering keeps us from seeing and understanding a whole side of the suffering characteristic of a social order which, although it has undoubtedly reduced poverty overall (through less than often claimed) has also multiplied the social spaces (specialized fields and subfields) and set up the conditions for an unprecedented development of all kinds of ordinary suffering.” (Bourdieu et.al. 1999:4)

A specification of suffering according to material poverty creates a representation of the world that is unable to grasp “ordinary suffering”. For that purpose, it is necessary to make a place for “social categories that are particularly exposed to this ordinary suffering.” (ibid.) This resonates well with the concept of human security. The conceptual development of human security emanates from a concern with exposing ordinary positions of insecurity. Therefore, drawing upon agents’ own descriptions and emphasizing similarities and differences in their viewpoints can in a similar manner contribute to exposing the multilayered representation of reality that defines security. Exactly this methodical aspect of the book (Bourdieu et.al. 1999) is however an object of critique. Angela McRobbie (2002:131) notes that the “proliferation of voices (…) fill an absence in current sociological and social policy writing”, but these many-sided personal recollections are left rather uncommented and the lack of historical and cultural contextualization is problematic for their interpretation. In this study, the analysis of the interviews with representatives of non-state crisis centres in various cities in the Russian Northwest is conducted on the basis of a consideration of the historical genesis of these centres (chapter 6). In this manner I aim to ensure such contextualization of which McRobbie speaks. For the purpose of examining local security production on the basis of the work of non-state crisis centres, the rationale for studying ordinary suffering in “Weight of the World” is thus important but still needs adjustment to the empirical case of non-state crisis centres.

Learning from Bigo’s adaptation of Bourdieu’s theory to his specific empirical focus, I also design the field in regard to my specific empirical case. In order to make transparent how I read from qualitative interviews the objective relations that define the field, I use Bourdieu’s concepts to post questions towards my empirical material that aim at the specification of security practices and agents’ possibilities of manoeuvring in the field. Of particular concern are the means of security production based on the distribution of forms of capital. A relevant
aspect is also potential changes to these means and forms of capital over time. This analytical interest aims at examining the field as a “certain arrangement of agents and properties.” (Bourdieu 2000:134) The field of interest here includes state and non-state institutions, groups and individuals. Through the interviews I have for example identified as relevant local actors state stakeholders, such as the police, justice system, health system, and educational institutions. Non-state crisis centres have a contender position in the field as these centres first emerged in the latter half of the 1990s in Northwest Russia. Their establishment challenges the way the state has previously dealt, or rather not dealt, with the issue of violence against women. Bourdieu emphasized fields as dynamic terrains of struggle (Leander 2008:17), and the genesis of non-state crisis centres in Russia illustrates such dynamism. Within fields agents employ strategies that constitute struggles for social positions: “The social positions (…) are also strategic emplacements, fortresses to be defended and captured in a field of struggles.” (Bourdieu 1984:244) The analytical focus should then be on the strategies employed in order to achieve distinctive positions, i.e. differentiation. Differentiation refers to the distribution of properties (capital), as defined by the kind of properties available within the specific field (cf. Bourdieu 1985b:724f.). The agents in the field aim to differentiate themselves from their rivals by establishing or monopolizing control and thereby to reduce competition within the field (cf. Wacquant 1989:39). It is this struggle for differentiation that defines the logic of the field. In regard to the work of non-state crisis centres, the analytical interest is how they from their contender position have instituted an assistance structure and worked with individual victims of violence against women. Their work both in regard to interaction with stakeholders and individual victims are important to the security production in this field. As they strive to institutionalize a permanent assistance structure and reliability in the system for victims of violence against women, non-state crisis centres challenge the dominance of the state in regard to how this issue is addressed. Thus, the state power to define the (non-)response to violence against women is challenged by non-state crisis centres. Juxtaposed to the state, non-state crisis centres are in a position of non-dominance, and the objective relations of the field are thus characterized by dominance versus non-dominance. The concern is that even in the position of non-dominance, non-state crisis centres actively use their resources to create a system of assistance and security for victims of violence. The question in regard to this specific field is therefore, in their non-dominant position what

70 In Bourdieu’s work “Distinction”, the notion of field is means to comprehending the ongoing struggle of upholding distinction between various social classes as defined by life styles and taste.
resources do non-state crisis centres have at hand and what are the constraints on action? It is in regard to this analytical interest of identifying constraints on action that the concept of capital is useable. Agents’ strategies within a field are constrained and enabled by the distribution of capital. The capacity of the agents to act within a field is dependent upon the appropriation of capital, also described by Bourdieu as “accumulated labour” and “social energy” (Bourdieu 1983b:241). Capital is “the set of actually usable resources and powers” that agents within a field possess and employ in their strategies (Bourdieu 1984:114). The distribution of capital thus defines agents’ strategies within the field. This implies that defining the field is dependent on the interconnectedness of field and capital:

“In empirical work, it is one and the same thing to determine what the field is, where its limits lie, etc., and to determine what species of capital are active in it, within what limits, and so on.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:98)

The specific species of capital within a field are thus to be determined empirically (cf. Wacquant 1989:39). The field dynamics are defined by this capital distribution, and therefore it is one and the same thing to determine the field and the forms of capital active in it. Nonetheless, the concept of field is here used to create and demarcate an analytical space, and then in the further analysis to focus on the possession of capital and its effects. The field is used as an analytical framework that helps construct a social space for studying local security production. The relations between non-state crisis centres and stakeholders, and between crisis centres and victims, are studied as constitutive of the empirical field. The field analysis is thus limited to a concern with particularly these relations. They enable an analysis of structural as well as subjective constraints on action pertaining to security for women against violence. The two basic constraints on action in Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, objective and subjective, are uncovered on the basis of examining these two sets of relations that define the work of non-state crisis centres. Objective constraints are examined on the basis of the concept of capital, and subjective constraints on the space of manoeuvring are subjected to analysis through the concept of habitus, which is outlined and explained in chapter 7.3. Although the objective relations in the field have here been described as dominance/non-dominance, the analysis shows how non-state crisis centres in their practice have a space of manoeuvring because of resources attained in the interaction with victims. My emphasis on this relation of dominance/non-dominance suggests that I do not leave the definition of the

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71 The concept of capital is briefly introduced here because it is relevant to how field is used in this context. However, further outline of the concept of capital in regard to its analytical use follows in chapter seven.

72 In chapter 7.3. I also explain the interconnection of field and habitus.
objective relations of the field open to empirical analysis, and therefore I mention this aspect of the analysis. The complexities and dynamics of the field and its objective relations unfold in the analysis. The concern with this relation of dominance underlines the empirical context of the field, and here the novelty of non-state crisis centres in regard to women’s security in Russia have been emphasized. It also however stresses how I need the concept of field to construct a social space for studying security production in this particular context. A problematic issue is that other fields affect the practices studied here, but they are not acknowledged (identified or other ways discussed) throughout the analysis. Also this is explained by the need to focus the analysis and thus the concept of field to the research interest in local security production.

To summarize, the field is for analytical reasons based in the research interest in local security production defined as comprised by two sets of relations; between crisis centres and stakeholders, and between crisis centres and individual victims of violence. The concepts of capital and habitus are employed to the analysis of these relations. The concept of field is thus used as means to defining an analytical framework for examining the interviews with non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia, the group of actors in the centre of this study, in regard to objective and subjective constraints on security production in regard to violence against women. This is the field of security from violence against women.

5.4. The local security actors in this study

The seven non-governmental crisis centres that I have visited are located in five cities in Northwest Russia. These are Murmansk, Archangelsk, Severodvinsk, Petrozavodsk and Sortevala:
In these locations, representatives of the following crisis centres have been interviewed:

In Murmansk:

Prijut – “Crisis centre for women – victims of violence “Prijut” (Shelter)”.

CKANNA - “Centre for social-psychological and legal support – Say no to violence!”

In Archangelsk:

Nadeschda – ”Our Archangelsk regional NGO, crisis centre Nadeschda (Hope)”.
Mosti miloserdija – “Archangelsk regional NGO, women crisis centre Mosti Miloserdija (Bridges of Mercy)”.

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73 This map is modified to display the locations of the crisis centres and NGOs interviewed in this project. The original map was designed by Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal and downloaded from the website of the UNEP/GRID-Arendal at http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/barents_region_topography_and_bathymetry3 (accessed January 6, 2009). UNEP/GRID Arendal thankfully encourages such use and modification of their maps.

74 CKANNA is an abbreviation of “Say no to violence” in Russian; скажи нет насилию.

75 Obschestvennaja organizatsija is here and elsewhere translated NGO.
In Severodvinsk:

The Cabinet – "Severodvinsk city NGO for women, cabinet of psychological help for women in situations of crisis”.

In Sortevala:

Nadeshda – “Local NGO, Council of women – Nadeshda”

In Petrozavodsk:

Maja – “Karelia regional NGO “Maja””.  

In Murmansk I met with two different groups, “Prijut” and “CKANNA”. The women’s group “Giliyana” is also working on the issue of violence against women in Murmansk, but an interview could not be conducted because of busy and overlapping itineraries. Both Giliyana and CKANNA have reduced their activities due to end of funding. CKANNA was established in 1999 and worked actively until 2003 when funding ended. The leader of CKANNA was previously leader of the crisis centre Prijut in Murmansk, and because of this extensive experience with the work of crisis centres, she was interviewed and her views appreciated. In addition to the one still actively operating crisis centre Prijut, there are three more crisis centres for women in Murmansk oblast. These are located in Severmorsk, Apatity and Polarnie Sori. The crisis centre in Severomorsk is a non-governmental organization, while the others are municipal crisis centres (Informant 3/2006).

In contrast, in Archangelsk oblast there is no municipal crisis centre for women. A municipal centre worked in Archangelsk from 1999 till the end of 2005. It was closed in 2005 in connection with a reorganization of municipal and oblast responsibilities. The municipal crisis centre was reinvented as a social centre for protection of children from violence, but there are plans to re-establish the women crisis centre under the authority of the oblast administration (Informant 4/2006). The reintroduction of the municipal crisis centre as a regional entity is considered to be long in coming, and therefore the employees at the municipal crisis centre decided to continue their work directed at women under the auspices of a non-governmental organization. In January 2006 they registered the civil society organization (obschestvennaja organizatsija) and crisis centre “Nadeshda” (Hope). In

76 This is still the status quo summer 2008.
addition to Nadeschda there is in the city of Arkhangelsk also the non-governmental crisis centre “Mosti miloserdija” (Bridges of Mercy). Right outside of Arkhangelsk, in the city of Severodvinsk77, a consortium of women’s groups is running a non-governmental centre for women in crisis called ”Severodvinsk city NGO for women, cabinet of psychological help for women in situations of crisis”, here referred to as the Cabinet. In Arkhangelsk oblast there are thus in total three crisis centres for women, and they are all non-governmental.

In the Republic of Karelia the situation is the opposite. Here there are two municipal crisis centres, one in the regional capital Petrozavodsk and another in Sortevala, a city located in the western part of Karelia, close to the Finnish border. Today, there is no non-governmental crisis centre for women operating in the Republic of Karelia. However, the municipal crisis centre in Sortevala was initiated by the non-governmental organization “Nadeschda”, that also ran the centre until the municipality took over in 2004. In Petrozavodsk the non-governmental organization “Maja” ran a crisis centre for women in the period 2000-2005. For my empirical research, I met with the leaders of Maja in Petrozavodsk and Nadeschda in Sortevala. Although they are not crisis centres anymore, both Nadeschda and Maja continue to work actively in terms of information campaigns to alter values and perceptions of the issue of violence against women, as do also several other women’s groups in the Republic of Karelia. 78 For example, the Karelian Centre for Gender Research addresses the issue of violence against women in lecture series at the State University of Karelia, through publications and research projects. The women’s movement “Jaroslavna” in Kostomyksha in the northern part of Karelia, also actively addresses the issue. A primary focus in Kostomyksha in recent years has been trafficking in women.

Among the seven non-state crisis centres in this study, the genesis of the very first centre in the region, Prijut in Murmansk in 1997, as well as Nadeschda in Sortevala in 1999 was based on collaboration between local activists and activists from bordering countries, Norway and Finland respectively. CKANNA was established in Murmansk in 1999 as a result of a

77 Severodvinsk was until 1990 a so-called closed city, a status given to various strategically important cities in the Soviet Union. Severodvinsk for example hosts a main port for nuclear submarines. Although the city is not closed, access for foreigners, is restricted. Since I did not have the time and possibility to acquire a necessary permit, the two representatives of the Severodvinsk Cabinet travelled to Archangelsk (about an hour bus ride) to take part in the interview. The status of closed cities in northwest Russia is undergoing change, and increased commercial activities in northern harbours set this administrative structure under pressure because mobility is needed.

78 The activities of many women’s groups in Karelia are documented in the booklet “Initiatives of women associations on Karelia” published by the Council of Women in Petrozavodsk. The booklet is available with the author.
grant won in a grant competition, and also the erection of Maja in Petrozavodsk in 1999 was a result of such a grant. Both CKANNA and Maja received a grant from IREX\textsuperscript{79}, and their establishment was a result of the regionalization of civil society assistance that international funders in Russia pursued at this time. An international grant was also the basis of the establishment of the crisis centres in Severodvinsk (the Cabinet), and this grant was received later, in 2003 from a different source, the Nordic Council of Ministers. Nadeschda in Archangelsk originated as a municipal centre and has not acquired international funding, besides being a collaborator in the Network of crisis centres in the Barents region (NCRB). Mosti Miloserdija in Archangelsk deviates from the others in regard to its history of origin. This organization was initiated on the basis of concerns of a local professor of social work, but on the basis of this initiative, contact was established with experts in St. Petersburg and soon, Mosti Miloserdija was integrated into the NCRB network of collaborating crisis centres in the north. The seven non-state crisis centres in this study were thus ingrained in an international context of collaboration and exchange. The key concern here is how the non-state crisis centres conveyed their knowledge, manoeuvred and strategized in the local context.

The importance of the work of crisis centres is underlined when confronted with official data on domestic violence in Russia. In its 1999 report to CEDAW, the Russian government reported that 14,000 women are killed by their husband or other male relative in Russia each year, and 30 percent of married women are regularly subjected to violence (CEDAW 1999).\textsuperscript{80} Every fourth Russian woman is subjected to violence, and half of the victims of violence do not contact the justice system because they fear moral judgement and not to be believed by the police (Pokrovskai\textsuperscript{a} 2008). It is stated that in the Russian society today, “there is an insufficient understanding of the actuality and necessity of all means of fighting this social illness.” (ibid.) The dynamics of this struggle for security is here the object of study. To understand the local security dynamics, it is necessary to have an understanding of the context and the history of this struggle, and this is the topic of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{79} International Research and Exchange Board (IREX), is a US-based development organization that was actively involved in projects addressing women and violence against women in Russia during the 1990s.

\textsuperscript{80} The Interior Ministry in 2008 reiterated that 14,000 women die at the hands of their men (Iurschina 2008). As in most quantifications of violence against women, there are uncertainties connected to these numbers. This will be examined in the next chapter when considering how representatives of women’s groups view this.
6. Genesis of crisis centres in Russia

The central methodological approach of this project is an empirical focus on practices of security, supporting my claim that to know security one must see how it is created in practice. The question in focus is how non-state crisis centres address the security of victims, and to understand why non-state crisis centres operate as they do, it is necessary to consider the processes through which these centres were established. Drawing upon the work of Bourdieu, agents’ practices are approached with a concern for the social context and history. The idea of objectivism, introduced in chapter 3.2 underlines that accounting for context and history are important objectifying techniques: in order to establish an understanding of women’s activism in Russia today and the particular role of non-governmental crisis centres in the women’s movement, it is necessary to review the context in which they emerged. This is reflected in the structure of the following empirical chapters. To begin with, the history of the Russian women’s movement is discussed and the context of the development of activism on violence against women in the 1990s is examined. Then, in chapter seven, the local field of security is in focus.

The account of the historical emergence of the contemporary Russia woman’s movement is based on review of secondary literature on women’s organization, gender structures and civil society in Russia. The objective is to explain how today’s women’s groups in Russia are formed historically. Russian crisis centres are situated in regard to the international context, as interaction with international feminists and financiers was crucial to their emergence. This interaction was made possible because of the historic changes of glasnost, and this locates the genesis of crisis centres also in regard to Russia’s history. This historical experience was important to many individual women who used their personal networks and individual experiences in their activism. The review illustrates how women’s issues and violence against women in particular, have previously been largely ignored in Russia. When reflecting upon this historical experience, the uniqueness of the work of non-state crisis centres in Russia since the 1990s becomes evident. These are new entities in the field of women’s security in Russia.

This chapter also addresses how women activists, represented by three Moscow-based NGOs, assess the responses of public authorities to the issue of violence against women. By addressing their work on violence against women on a national level, the distribution of power between women’s groups and public authorities, and between public authorities and
victims of violence is displayed. This concern with context and history thus helps uncover the structures that define the struggle to address violence against women in Russia.

6.1. Feminist Activism and the Soviet experience

In the social atmosphere of vast societal changes, economic difficulties, and increased openness in the early 1990s, women’s groups in Russia began to proliferate. The perestroika introduced by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986 enlarged the space for civic engagement. Women’s groups came to form a significant actor in the emerging civil society during the 1990s. Committed to advancing democratization in the post-Soviet era, Western donor agencies began to funnel support to Russian women’s groups, considered a key actor in advancing democracy through civil society development. Among the various women activists in Russia in the early 1990s, feminists found themselves in an advantageous position to interact with Western donor agencies. Highly educated, often working in research institutions, with knowledge of foreign languages, acquainted with Western and liberal ideas and with experience of travelling, these feminists were welcomed partners (Hemment 2004a:822; 2004b:231). On the basis of their collaboration, violence against women emerged as a key issue of Russian women’s groups. Hemment explains:

“For complex reasons, violence against women is not an issue that local groups were likely to have raised by themselves. The meeting of Western feminists and Russian women activists in the early 1990s discursively created the issue.” (Hemment 2004a:822)

One aspect relevant to explaining why gendered violence grew out of the discursive meeting between Westerners and Russians at the outset of the post-socialist women’s movement was the lack of a common perception of gender discrimination during Soviet times (ibid. 823). Both sexes were considered equally constrained and victimized by the state, denied freedom of self-expression and self-realization. There was thus no impetus for mobilizing on women’s issues in particular.

In regard to the discrimination of women, one of the early achievements of the new socialist state was the abolishment of the so-called “Woman Question” (zhenskii vopros). According to Richard Stites (Stites 1990) the “woman question” was one of the fundamental questions regarding life and social organization that emerged in tsarist Russia during the reform era of the mid-1800s. It began with critical remarks on the education of women, which

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81 According to Julie Hemment (2004b:218), the term civil society (grazhdanskoe obschestvo) entered Russian political discourse during perestroika
was limited to specific schools for the gentry aimed at preparing women for life as mother and wife. Later the “woman question” broadened “into a full-scale anthropological discussion of woman’s peculiar genius and destiny.” (ibid. 30) In this reform era of mid-nineteenth century, women participated actively and radically in political protests. This movement later came to the support of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 (Weir 2002:159).

Subsequent to the 1917 revolution, a number of laws regarding women’s rights were adopted during the first years. Women’s rights to vote (1918), equal pay for equal work, liberalization of laws on the family and marriage were established, and equal opportunity in education was promoted (Molyneux 1990:15; Sundstrom 2002:224). These legislative changes were historically significant. In addition to the role of ‘mothering’, the Socialist state emphasized women’s role in production, towards the realization of which the state contributed with child care facilities (Molyneux 1990:25). Socialist emancipation for women implied the inclusion of women into paid employment and also emphasized the dual role as worker and mother/housewife. How the segregated, hierarchical workforce and the sole responsibility of women for the household affected emancipation were however not raised. The particular interest in women’s issues that Lenin expressed was rooted in a concern with the “practical revolutionary expedience” (Stites 1990:341). The instrumental aim was to build support for the revolutionary aims, and establishment of special women’s groups and forms of organization under the leadership of the Communist Party was one way of doing that (ibid.).

Maxine Molyneux (1990:26) argues that from the beginning of the Soviet period, “women and the family were kept subservient to broader economic goals, and changed in accordance with them.” In consequence, gender inequalities survived the substantial social transformation of the Soviet society.

The gender differences are particularly visible when considering the formal representation of women in the Soviet political system. In the Soviet Union, women achieved the right to vote and to be elected and were encouraged to take actively part in political activities. By 1970, women in the Russian part of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics had achieved parity with men in terms of higher education (Kay 2000:19), but this record of equality in education was never followed by equality in terms of political representation. Only one woman, Ekaterina Furtseeva who served as Minister of Culture under General Secretaries

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82 Kimberly A. Weir (2002:159) explains that two important movements that emerged in this reform era were the Russian Women’s Mutual Philanthropic Society and the Moscow Suffragists Movements. Radical movements were suppressed by Tsar Alexander III but this did not silence women’s protest.
Nikita Khruschev and Leonid Brezhnev, ever became member of the Politburo (1957-1961) (ibid.). Through the quota system that guaranteed women up to 33 percent representation in the Supreme Soviet and 50 percent in local soviets, women were formally represented (Molyneux 1990:35; Weir 2002:172). In 1981, 26.6 percent of 5002 delegates to the Party Congress and 3.1 percent of the Central Committee were women (Morgan 1984).

The institutionalization of women’s activism in specific women entities in the new communist regime served the purpose of channelling women’s contribution to the overall revolutionary goals. In 1919, special women’s sections or departments were established under the Central Committee Secretariat. A network of local departments under the leadership of “womorganizers” (zhenorganizatory) was set up, and this hierarchy of women’s departments was collectively known as zhenotdel (Stites 1990:331). Within the Bolshevik Party this network of the zhenotdel was considered central to consolidating support of the revolutionary aims and as means to monitoring women activities (Kay 2000:18; Weir 2002:159). The zhenotdel provided a variety of services, such as child and orphan care, school service, food distribution, housing supervision, health assistance, etc., including mass propaganda for every campaign initiated by the party. It helped “unlock the energies of the most backward and remote communities of Russia’s women” through the interaction with local populations and “served not only the cause of women’s liberation but also the regime as a whole by helping to create new reserves of skilled and politically conscious labor.” (Stites 1990:341) This party machinery for work among women was however abolished in 1930. Discussion on the role and function on the zhenotdel amounted during the 1920s, and one explanation of its abolition was that the zhenotdel was no longer needed because the party as a whole continued the work on women’s issues.83

In 1931, Stalin established women sections, zhensektory that should function as special entities within the Communist party for mobilizing women (Weir 2002:160). The zhenotdel was thus succeeded by the zhensektory, and political work among women continued albeit with a consideration of general concerns of the nation and the Party more than the interests of women. During the industrialization of the 1930s, women’s activities were firmly directed at the needs of the nation, in particular the craving for the labour of the entire population. Autonomous political activity for women was not further embraced, and in this manner the abolition of the zhenotdel was a political act (Stites 1990:344). At this time, Stalin declared

83 For more elaboration of the discussion regarding the “liquidation” or dissolution of the zhenotdel, see Stites (1990:342ff.).
the woman question “resolved”, and in the 1936 Constitution equality was formally declared. Stites explains that the first wave of Bolshevik liberation, 1917-1920, suddenly gave women civic, legal and political rights. The second wave, dominated by the establishment of zhenotdel and women releasing “revolutionary euphoria”, “was by far the most important in terms of women’s auto-emancipation – and the most different one from Western experience.” (ibid. 418) The 1930s however were dominated by men, and in this phase “women’s self-emancipatory impulse was largely missing.” (ibid. 419) Within two decades therefore the feminist initiatives of the pre-revolutionary phase had been depoliticized and formed into an instrument of the regime. Women’s issues and equality were fitted into the needs of the regime, and Stites (ibid.) emphasizes that “[t]his put an undeniably manipulative stamp upon the Soviet experience”.  

In the continuation of these processes, the Soviet Women’s Committee (Komitet sovetskih zhenschin) was established as the sole legal representative of women’s interests in the Soviet Union (Sperling 1999:108). The Women’s Committee was set up in the wake of the Great War of the Fatherland (1941-1945) as an antifascist women’s organization. It functioned under the auspices of the party committee and worked to bolster the regime’s international image (Richter 2002:33). During Khutschev’s “Thaw” (1953-1964), women councils, zhensoveti, were established, reviving the zhenotdel of the early revolutionary phase (cf. Sperling 1999:108; Weir 2002:160). These councils where integrative parts of all Soviet factories, industries, and offices, and counted hundreds of thousands (Sundstrom 2002:215). They constituted a “transmission belt” (Sperling 1999:108) for diffusing information and mobilizing support of party policies. The zhensoveti where concerned with social assistance, and for example helped families with spaces in children’s summer camp, or provided warm shoes in the winter (ibid.). Such practical assistance was a way of helping women combining work and family-life. The primary function also of these zhensoveti was therefore to serve the revolutionary aims.

As all social organizations in the Soviet Union, the women’s groups were subordinated to the Communist Party. In addition to their role in assisting Soviet women, the political-ideological role of the women’s groups was directed at the non-communist world. They were evidence of the great achievement of equality for women under Communism and

84 Stites (1990:419) also draws the parallel to later stages of Stalinism: “[T]his manipulative tendency accounted for many of the regressive measures enacted in the last decade of Stalinism.”
communicated this to an international audience, on conferences and at international
organizations (Sperling 1999:108; Sundstrom 2002:216). The United Nations Decade for
Women (1976-1985) in particular created vast opportunities for the display of the
achievements of Soviet women’s high political and economic status, and the Soviet Women’s
Committee was particularly active internationally (Sperling 1999:108) While largely
unacquainted with the debates in the international feminist movements of the 1970s, these
international appearances were a basis for commencing exchanges (Molyneux 1990:31).

The message of egalitarianism in the Soviet ideology imprinted a façade of equality. The
message was that the woman question was already solved. For feminists therefore there was
no need to argue the need for change (Weir 2002:162). This is of particular relevance to the
issue of domestic violence. The official language of having established equality and solved
the women question, made it difficult to critique gender relations, and issues in the private
sphere were particularly contentious. Weir explains:

“Because the “women question” was considered to be moot prior to glasnost, private-sphere
abuses were regarded as privacy issues. The closed system did not allow space for women to
bring these issues to light.” (ibid. 165)

A dichotomy between official statements and continuing practices of discrimination against
women was evident. Discrimination was manifested in restrictions on women’s involvement
in shift work, overtime and business trips – regulations that contributed to establishing women
as a "special category" in the workforce\(^85\) – and in views on domestic violence and continuing
presumptions of women as the sole housekeeper. Rebecca Kay (2000:24) therefore argues that
the egalitarianism of Soviet rulers was “painted over” a pre-existing gender order without
contributing to substantial alterations.\(^86\) The special adjustment for women in employment,
exemplified by restrictions on women to conduct certain jobs, has been explained by women’s
reproductive role. The restrictions functioned ‘to protect their maternal function’ (Molyneux
1990:29). This focus on women’s biological role gathered increased political concern in the
Soviet Union during the 1970s, because of the decreasing birth rate especially among the
European or Slavic part of the Soviet population (Kay 2000:23; Molyneux 1990:27). The
same concern surfaced in the early 1990s, when decreasing birth rates coincided with a sharp

\(^85\) A peculiar regulation in this category of work-related specifications for women, was the 1932 regulation
forbidding women to carry weights over 20 kilograms (cf. Kay 2000:22).

\(^86\) Kay (2000:15) notes that the same assessment is made in regard to the impact of feminist activism on gender
relations in western societies: "[T]he underlying gender order remained essentially the same throughout Soviet
and into recent Russian history despite the efforts and achievements of revolutionaries and reformers, just as
Segal points out that it has in western societies despite the struggles and achievements of the feminist
movement.”
decline in life expectancy, resulting in predictions of sharp decline in population numbers. More recently, in 2005 President Putin established incentives such as a monetary stipend of 250,000 rubles for the second or third child. The biologically determined role of women in society was by Gorbachev in 1987 used to justify the call for women to return to their “mission”, whereby women were encouraged to leave their jobs in public sector for men, and to focus instead on the unpaid work of being mothers and wives (Sperling 1999:153; Weir 2002:166). Notwithstanding this gendered rhetoric, Gorbachev’s reforms also established significant changes that contributed to raising women’s issues, in particular the ability to establish societal organizations (obschestvennyi organizasii). This is shown in Sperling’s vast and detailed study of the formation of a women’s movement in Russia in the early 1990s. Sperling (1999:103) notes: “In short, glasnost provided an opportunity to put women’s issues on the agenda in a more public and contested way.”

6.2. Perestroika and feminist initiatives

A forerunner to women’s feminist activism during perestroika was the 1970s underground work of feminists. Elena Zdravomyslova (2002:35) explains that the contemporary feminist movement in Russia has its origin in the self-made, underground publications (samizdat) that were circulated in Leningrad in 1979. In the samizdat journals “Almanac: Women and Russia” and “Maria”, issues such as discrimination of women in Soviet society, problems of reproductive health, abuse of women in prisons, rape, and domestic violence were touted (ibid). Three additional feminist volumes were published, but the activists could not escape the censorship, and some of the writers were forced to emigrate (Sperling 1999:101; Weir 2002:161). Their impact was however not feeble, as Molyneux explains:

“It was such groups, along with writers and film-makers, who, prior to perestroika, began to challenge the orthodox line that the woman question had been ‘solved’, and in some cases sought to define a programme of reform that was aware of, but not uncritical about, the situation of women in the West.” (Molyneux 1990:33)

The reform policies introduced in the mid 1980s grew out of these developments as well as the amounting social problems relating to family life. High divorce rates, alcoholism, rising

87 This use of the allowance is restricted to three alternatives: housing, the child’s education, the mother’s retirement. All women who give birth to child number two or three from 2006 onward can receive the allowance, the payment of which is scheduled to begin in 2010 (Izvestija, October 13, 2006).
88 These samizdat journals were published by Tatjana Mamonova, T. Goricheva, V. Malokhovskaya and Ju. Voznesenskaya. Mamonova is described as the leader (Weir 2002:160; Zdravomyslova 2002:35).
89 Three of the women who contributed to “Almanac”, split off to form the Mariia club (Sperling 1999:101). Weir (2002:161) notes that the organization remained active throughout the 1980s.
crime, falling birth rates, increasing infant mortality and high number of abortions were among the problems. When the control of the press was relaxed in the 1980s, these problems surfaced and became the topic of public debate (Molyneux 1990:34). Gorbachev addressed women’s challenges in combining work life and motherhood, and re-established zhensoveti, women’s councils, in work places as means to addressing and providing practical solutions to social problems (ibid.). The collapse of the Soviet Union conditioned a restructuring of the social services, and in this process, the former social guarantees in the Soviet system, including the right to education, health care and child-care, eroded (Hemment 2004b:218).

The women’s councils (zhensoveti) in workplaces addressed the corresponding social difficulties. On January 1, 1989 there were about 240,000 zhensoveti, with an estimated 2,3 million activists spread around the country (Melnikova 1999:47). However, in the subsequent years until 1991 this number declined (ibid.). It is argued that the onset of the transformation impacted on the zhensoveti because there was a discontinuation of the understanding of the social mechanism that such entities fulfilled (Informant Petrozavodsk, 2005). Social safety nets were steady eroding in this period and people struggled with challenges of unemployment and hyperinflation (Hemment 2004b:218). Although zhensoveti were affected by these drastic developments, Valerie Sperling (1999:23) explains that they, as well as the Soviet Women’s Committee, acted as “incubators for women’s groups that later emerged as organizations no longer run by the state.” For example, numerous women’s councils were transformed into informal (neformal’nyie), non-state groups. These groups and also academic institutions were sources of activists that established non-governmental organizations in the new era. Since their activism in the Soviet era was within a confined state-run space, it is argued that civic organization, understood in terms of a civil society occupying a territory between the state and the household, did not exist under Soviet rule. Therefore, explains Sperling, it is problematic to argue that existing civic organizations formed the basis for post-Soviet non-governmental organizations (ibid.). It is also argued that because of how all socio-political activity was under the control of the state in the Soviet system, the independent civil activity that emerged with perestroika, is “a result of the democratization and the pluralisation of society” (Salmenniemi 2005:737). The changes that perestroika defined were crucial in opening the sphere for non-state civil organization. But activists in the post-Soviet era used the networks they had available, and these of course often included previous, Soviet-era
acquaintances. It this manner, the Soviet tradition of state-run organizations did function as a home-grown (indigenous) basis that formed the basis for social movement networking (cf. Sperling 1999:23).

This can be exemplified by the establishment of a Council of Women in Petrozavodsk in the Republic of Karelia in 1997. The Council was set up as a result of pressure from local women to invoke the Soviet tradition of zhensoveti (Informant Petrozavodsk, 2005). It is now an umbrella organization comprising 16 organizations in Karelia that are engaged in work aimed at improving women’s situation in different ways. Among the issues are women’s rights, equality, providing information and help to women in need, women in business and in journalism, and women with children with special needs. The organizations work with local government in order to make sure that help is available. In this manner, women’s groups that functioned as instruments of the Soviet regime put in place a form of civic engagement that has survived the instrumentalist understanding of their work during the Communist era. The local organization of women that is seen in the contemporary Russian women’s movement is therefore in many ways a prolongation of the local women’s groups in the Communist era.

In the early 1990s there was not only a transformation of local level organizations but also the higher echelons of women’s organization. The Soviet Women’s Committee disintegrated alongside the Soviet Union in 1991. Its legal rights and property - among them an office building in Moscow - was taken over by the Union of Russian Women (URW, Sojus Zhenshin Rossij) (Sperling 1999:185). At one point this successor organization gathered over one hundred local councils (soveti) within its organizational structure (Sundstrom 2002:215). In distinction from the Soviet Women’s Committee, the URW was established outside of any party structure. But in the wake of the December 1993 elections that were announced by President Boris Jelzin only two months prior to the elections as a consequence of the attack – taking place on his orders – on the Russian parliament building (the White House), the URW initiated the political party Women of Russia (WOR). In the 1993 elections, WOR achieved

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90 It is argued that the successor organizations of the Soviet zhensoveti face a “public opinion” problem because of their historical background as Soviet organizations (Sundstrom 2002:216). Although the dichotomy between traditionalist, soviet based women organizations and modern, feminist and Western-oriented activism may hinder a cohesive Russian women’s movement from emerging, as pointed out by Sundstrom (ibid.), the question is whether one should rather wish for an energetic and diverse Russian women’s movement where women believe in what they are doing, even if (neo-)traditional and (hardcore) feminists then continue to co-exist and disagree.

91 In addition to URW, the Union of Navy Women and the Association of Women Entrepreneurs joined to register the political party WOR. The registration was made on the basis of the legal requirement that in order to register a political party or social movement must be registered with the Ministry of Justice at the federal level.
8 percent support. This spectacular success could not be repeated in the elections in 1995, as the WOR failed to cross the 5 percent threshold. Since then, the WOR has not had political representatives on party lists in the Duma.

While represented in the Duma in the period 1993-1995, the WOR contributed significantly to the establishment of various committees addressing discrimination against women. For example they worked actively towards the establishment of the Duma Committee on the Affairs of Women, the Family and Youth and also actively lobbied the executive branch. The WOR also facilitated meeting places between the emerging independent, women’s movement and state representatives by arranging conferences. Nonetheless, the WOR was associated with a Soviet traditionalist viewpoint on women, and therefore did not gain credence with the feminist oriented women’s groups that emerged in the early 1990s (Sperling 1999-129).

Notwithstanding the positive implications of perestroika for women’s organization, the reforms had significant negative consequences for women as the drastic increase in unemployment impacted women particularly severely. Statistics from January 1994 show that women accounted for almost 70 percent of the unemployed (Sperling 1999:150, see also Weir 2002:166). In the Soviet Union, every citizen was by the Constitution declared a right to work, and unemployment was practically unknown. Women’s participation in the labour force in Russia during the Soviet reign was high, at about 90 percent (Sperling 1999:150). In order to come closer to imagining the severe impact that the transition from a centralized socialist to a market economy had on women, which was a central motivating factor in the women’s mobilization in the early 1990s, the example of an individual is valuable to consider. For example, in Murmansk, an educated engineer, female, with many years of job experience, describes the fact that she lost her job in the early 1990s as the worst kind of violence. In order to make ends meet, she was both innovative and adventurous when she decided to travel across the border to Norway to pick strawberries, a summer job activity young Norwegians (including myself) used to take part in, that during the 1990s was left for “professional” Eastern Europeans fruit pickers. During her work in Norway, she was approached by a journalist from the local newspaper. In her recollected description of this interview, the

have political activity assigned in their charter, and display 100,000 signatures. The three organizations fulfilled these requirements, and collected the necessary signatures mainly through the URW network of subsidiaries. See Sperling 1999:119.

92 In 2007 the threshold was raised to 7 percent.

93 Molyneux (1990:27) cites a 70 percent female participation rate in the labour force in the USSR in the 1980s.
responses of the journalist make visible how unimaginable the idea of becoming an unemployed engineer, turned strawberry picker is, however not only to someone having lived and been socialized in the Soviet Union:

“I remember when I became unemployed, in the summer I picked strawberries [in Northern Norway]. For me this was a great opportunity to relax, work and earn money. One day a young journalist approached me. He began to ask questions: why does a women, your age pick strawberries? I answered that, firstly, I relax and earn money. We lived in a school that was especially rented for us, it was great. And he said, “You know, Russian women they are doing prostitution. What do you think is better, to pick strawberries or get into prostitution?” And I said, “Young man, when your mother has no food to feed her children, then ask her what [she thinks] is better, to get into prostitution or to pick strawberries for 30,50kroner per bowl?” He answered that in Norway, it is impossible that such a situation will occur, in which a mother has nothing to feed her children. I told the sweet youngster that I also lived in a country and believed, that in my country, it is impossible that such a situation occurs that I, senior engineer, go to Norway to pick strawberries for 30,50kroner each bowl. But here I am.”(Informant 5/2006)

The initiative shown by this woman to find original ways to overcome unemployment was in a broader context important to the establishment of women’s groups in the post-Soviet era. Economic constraints were a key mobilizing factor for women. The alleviation of the economic difficulties of the transition was an important factor in the organization of women’s groups in Russia. Sperling finds that almost half of the fifty women’s organizations she interviewed between 1994 and 1996 stated that their purpose was “at least in part to combat women’s unemployment or other effects of the economic crisis.” (Sperling 1999:163) The economic incentive for creating collective organizations for mutual help served as a distinctive motive for some of the women’s groups, but the women’s groups that emerged in the early 1990s addressed a variety of women’s issues. In addition to the economic situation and unemployment, they formed groups that addressed the concerns of rural women, soldiers’ mothers, mothers of many children, health, and violence against women (ibid. 9). The zhensovety thereby stopped being the sole representative of organized women’s interests (Melnikova 1999:48).

Two Independent Women’s Forums arranged in the city of Dubne outside Moscow in 1991 and 1992 were the two first major women gatherings in the new era. On this first Independent Women’s Forum, 200 activists representing 45 women’s groups from across the country gathered, thereby paying witness to the many grassroots initiatives that had emerged during perestroika (Sperling 1999:160). Under the slogan “Democracy without Women Is Not Democracy”, the participants discussed multiple forms of discrimination in Soviet society. Special attention was directed at the problem of unemployment, and in workshop sessions, solutions were discussed on how to start a business, networking etc. (Weir 2002:170). On the
second Forum in 1992, 500 activists gathered under the motto “From Problems to Strategy”. The aim of this Forum was to develop a strategy for putting women’s issues on the political agenda (Sperling 1999:9). These two Women’s Forums manifested the emergence of a new character of Russian women’s groups: feminists. The initiators of the First Forum in 1991 were feminist activists that had come together and formed independent women’s groups in the latter half of the 1980s. While working on the reconstitution of the political system in the late 1980s, the state and the Communist Party arranged seminars and conferences on topics such as women’s status, and these gatherings accidentally came to function as meeting places for feminist activists (ibid. 103). Julia Brygalina and Anna Temkina therefore identify the period 1985-1991 as the preliminary stage of the feminist movement characterized by mass mobilization following the political liberalization. They explain: “This stage created the preconditions for the emergence of a feminist movement. New ideologies and discourses began to circulate and women’s problems were again articulated in public.” (Brygalina and Temkina 2004:211) This initial period was followed by the emergence of new women’s groups (1991-1995), before a period of institutionalization followed (1995-1999). Finally, in the period 2000-2003, a transformation of women NGOs took place which was defined by increased co-operation between the state and NGOs and a decline in international support (2000-2003).94

Among the new organizations that emerged around the 1990s was for example the League for Emancipation from Social Stereotypes (LOTOS). This organization was established in 1989 by a handful of women who had met continuously at various seminar and academic discussions in the era of rapid transformation (Sperling 1999:104). Their affiliations to various research institutes exemplify the dominance of well-educated and academic women in the resurging women’s movement of the 1990s: Olga Voronina of the Institute of Philosophy at Moscow State University; Valya Konstantinova of the Academy of Social Sciences; and Natalia Zakharova and Anastasiia Posadskaia, both working for Natalia Rimashevskaia at the Institute of Socio-Economic Population Problems at the Russian Academy of the Sciences. As a result of the contribution of the prominent academic Rimashevskaia to “The State Program to Improve the Status of Women, the Family, and the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood” in 1989, the institute of Socio-Economic

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94 This timeline rests on the observation of women’s groups in St. Petersburg, and although development of women’s groups in the regions lags behind in time, it follows a similar pattern that is also visible in regard to the crisis centres in this study.
Population Problems received additional resources. With Rimashevskaia as the director and
the LOTOS members as staff the first gender research institution in the Soviet Union was
established, the Moscow Centre for Gender Studies (MCGS) (ibid. 105).

These activists of LOTOS and MCGS joined forces with other feminist groups (e.g. the
Independent Women’s Democratic Initiative; the Free Association of Feminist Organizations
(later called FALTA, the Feminist Alternative), and initiated and organized the 1991
Women’s Forum in Dubne (ibid. 106). From the two Forums in Dubne 1991 and 1992, an
umbrella organization emerged that was associated with a split among the activists. This
pointed to the competition over access to foreign funding that has subsequently been
recognized as a problematic issue for the organization of the Russian women’s movement
(Richter 2002). An idea of the initiators of the first Forum to register an umbrella
organization, the International Women’s Forum, did not materialize before other initiators had
emerged and, with the aid of a grant from the Ford Foundation, registered the Information
Centre of the Independent Women’s Forum (Sperling 1999:190). Within a short period of
time, the women’s movement had gained credence and at the same time become a space for
power competition.

6.3. International funding of the Russian women’s movement

The international funding that was funnelled to women’s groups in Russia in the early 1990s
was based on the ideology that actors such as women’s groups contribute to building viable
civil society and advancing and deepening democracy. The Russian women’s movement has
subsequently been subjected to various analyses in regard to the impact of external
involvement on the development of the movement (Hemment 2004b; Henderson 2002;
Richter 2002; Sperling, Ferree et al. 2001; Sundstrom 2002). Among the Western funders of
the NGO sector in Russia, the USA was prominent. In the period 1992-1998, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) distributed approximately 92million
USD on civic initiatives and NGO sector support projects. In addition, private foundations
such as the Soros Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation provided
generous funding (Henderson 2002:141). For example, the establishment of the Consortium

95 This argumentation is for example highlighted by Weir (2002:157): “No discussion of civil society and the
search for justice in post-Soviet Russia can be considered complete without examining the role and status of
women. The full participation of women in civil society is an essential component of democracy, as participation
and equal treatment of women determines to a large degree the extent to which democratic values will become
entrenched in any society.”
of Women’s Non-governmental Association was made possible by grants received by the Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Since then the Consortium has received funding from various USAID programs (Noonan and Nechemias 2001:221-224).

Aimed at stabilizing democracy through building a vivid civil society, funding ideally requires a commitment to long-term engagement as such societal development takes time. In regard to funding of civil society in Russia, the USAID began however with a five-year commitment in 1992, which they extended to a 2001 exit-strategy (Henderson 2002:157). This exit was enforced with the reorientation of US foreign policy priorities subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. On the side of the funders therefore, the struggle between idealism and real politics determined the engagement, but it is the receiving end, the women’s groups in Russia that are in focus here.

Critical analyses of the emergent post-Soviet civil society have generated a “consensus portrait” (Hemment 2004b:221) of this sector. According to this portrait, explains Julie Hemment, Russian civil society was created by international donor agencies and has contrary to the Western aim of generating grassroots civic engagement, contributed to reproduction of former elites and exacerbated competition between groups (ibid. 217). On a positive note, it is identified that Western assistance has provided tangible equipment and training that has increased the organizational capacities of the groups that have received aid (Henderson 2002:140). But there are unintended consequences despite the good intentions of contributing to civil society development. Sarah Henderson (2002:142f.) outlines four effects of foreign aid on Russian NGOs. First, they lack a visible constituency. The people they claimed to represent were absent from the organizations, and the organizational aims were directed at the funders instead of being oriented towards the ideas and needs of their members. Second; a distinct elite has developed within the NGO community that cherishes its partnerships with the West and facilitates centralization of resources, which creates differences between the haves and the have-nots, the regions and the centres. Third, groups pursue individual gains instead of collective, long-term goals. This is visible for example in tendencies of holding back information and competing instead of collaborating with other groups. Fourth, Henderson (2202:1555) accentuates: “Thus although many activists are dedicated to the development of a third sector in Russia, nonetheless they are also first and foremost dedicated to their own survival and subsistence.” Hemment (2004b:230) argues that the material vulnerability of the local NGO activists tends to be ignored, and therefore outcomes, such as when NGO activism is a piece in a larger strategy of networking for personal successes, are not contemplated.
strategies for developing into wealthy, centralized, and bureaucratized “corporate” NGOs dominate the Russian groups (whereby they mimic their Western counterparts), and such strategies contrast the concern of Western funders and collaborators regarding the development of “bottom-up” democracy from the grassroots. Instead of facilitating horizontal networks, a vertical organization dominates the civil society sector. Henderson therefore ascertains: “Yet ironically, although aid has been crucial in expanding NGO capacity, it has discouraged groups from functioning as civil society.” (Henderson 2002:143)

The allegiance with foreign funders has been a primary concern of Russian NGOs because of the dire need of finances. This relationship is dependent upon reporting back on successful program implementation, and from this, specific logics in the behaviour of NGOs emerge. For example, the need to display goal achievement in regard to the project proposal induces a tendency to focus on numbers, e.g. number of seminars held, number of women trained etc., rather than long-term civic development (ibid. 153). To qualify for funding, NGOs frame their projects in a way that is attractive to their funders, not necessarily to the constituency. The need of short-term, quantifiable goals fosters a similarity between the grant projects, as they all entail components such as seminars, round tables, publications, newsletter, training, conferences, and data bases (ibid.). These tendencies are also visible in the work of the women’s groups interviewed for this project, as they engage local stakeholders in round tables, seminars, train counsellors, provide job training especially for women etc. The dire need of attracting foreign funding has directed the allegiances of Russian NGOs outwards, towards the funders, with the consequence that the civic elite has developed into a client of the international funders. Henderson pins it down:

“A civic community does exist in Russia, but it is a civic community more comfortable at international conferences with fellow Western audiences than at home working among the local community.” (ibid. 161)

Ties and allegiances to foreigners were also key aspects in President Putin’s argumentation for introducing a new legislation on Russian NGOs in 2006. Based on her research, Henderson explained the consequences of foreign funding on the Russian NGO sector as an avenue for the representation and facilitation of US interests:

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97 The economic growth in Russia in recent years may over time make more national funds available, and in my interview material there are examples of this. There are however so far no analyses that display any significant change in regard to the logics of the Russian NGO elite as a consequence of reduced availability of foreign money. Improved economic conditions in Russia imply that NGO activists can find their job options improved outside of the NGO sector, allowing them to work voluntarily in the NGO sector, as many have done before. There are vast regional differences in regard to the upswing in the Russian economy, and no analyses displaying any impact on the NGO community as such.
“Consequently, funders are not free agents: rather, they are the expressions and facilitators of U.S. interests as well as the monetary engine behind Russian civic organizations.” (ibid. 146)

This was the argument that President Putin used when his administration in 2006 introduced a new legislation that demanded NGOs to re-register and in this process, to a greater extent than before, to inform about their sources of funding. The legislation has been assessed as an attempt to establish increased control over civil society in Russia (Machleder 2006; The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2006; United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 2007). As a result of this legislation, Russian NGOs report that they experience an increased bureaucratization of the registration process (Human Rights Watch 2008). In regard to women’s groups, Lisa Sundstrom (2005) finds that their advocacy of a universal norm against physical harm, as seen in work on domestic violence, is acknowledged as a serious and important problem and it is suggested that women’s groups are not thought about as political agents and this may explain that few women’s groups have experienced trouble as a result of this legislation. However, it is reported that organizations working on violence against women and who are strongly connected to the global women’s movement in winter 2008 are experiencing difficulties (Johnson, Dracheva et al. 2008). For the women’s groups in this study however, this new legislation was not a main concern, but the lack of funding, which was already precarious prior to the introduction of this new legislation, was, and this defined their main material constraint.

Interaction with foreign grantees has undoubtedly affected the Russian women’s movement. At the same time it is recognized that civil society groups experience or take advantage of a space for innovation in local contexts. First, elitism is acknowledged as a consequence of the logic of interaction with foreign grantees:

“Foundation support to women’s groups has given rise to a small and elite stratum of NGO professionals or career feminists. Those who put out the literature, control the technology and “live on grants” are increasingly distant from the societal organizations in whose name they speak.” (Hemment 2004b:234)

Recognizing these logics should not make forget that Russian NGO activists are involved in civil society development not as merciless money-makers, but actually trying to do good (Henderson 2002:163). In fact, many have seen their desires to advance democracy crushed:

“Collaboration with donor agencies led them [women activists] to formalize, register and professionalize their formerly loose clubs and groups, transforming their activism in troubling ways. Now NGO professionals, they felt sharp disappointment at the third sector, at the same time as they reaped its considerable rewards (good pay, travel, professional status). Their work

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98 This conference paper is a preliminary analysis of survey data from crisis centres in Russia, and I thank the authors for allowing me to refer to their ongoing work.
directly engaged the riddle of the third sector and I found them to be some of its most sophisticated theorists.” (Hemment 2004b:231)

The international aid to civil society development in Russia creates contradictions that local actors are well aware of. In fact, Hemment (ibid. 236) finds that these contradictions induce local activists to rethink forms and logic of political activism, and that they engage in improvised action that imply that there is not one single mode of civil engagement. This activism and how the activists assess constraints of action is the focus of attention in the study of non-state crisis centres as security producers. But before I turn specifically to those agents on the local level, it is necessary to address the question how the issue of violence against women became the dominant agenda of the Russian women’s movement. Foreign involvement was also not unimportant in this development.

6.4. Organizing Against Domestic Violence

The amounting global campaign on violence against women in the early 1990s was brought to Russia by means of international advocacy networks that aimed to bring their ideas into the former Communist bastion. Western activists were backed up with funding, and external donor support was a crucial factor in the development of Russian crisis centres in the early 1990s (cf. Hemment 2004a:822). When the very first Russian crisis centre opened in Moscow in 1993 it was however not funded, but based on a personal initiative to set up a phone hotline. But throughout the 1990s international funding arrived and was distributed first in the major cities and later also to the regions. This led to the establishment of many more crisis centres that altogether represent a specific branch within the post-Soviet, Russian women’s movement. The Russian crisis centre network has been recognized as among the most successful collaborations between Russian NGOs (Hemment 2004c:322). These developments are described as contributing to a qualitative shift in the character of Russian women’s groups in the mid 1990s as international funding bolstered groups addressing violence against women:

“[I]n the midnineties the antiviolence campaigns in Russia underwent a qualitative shift. As “violence against women” became an international development issue, more funds were allocated to it and crisis centers moved from being small, rather peripheral offshoots of the women’s movement to become third-sector heavyweights, a central plank of the independent women’s movement and a showpiece of foundation-NGO relations.” (Hemment 2004a:824)

A key resource, in addition to the material resources brought to Russia with the transnational campaign, was a model of organization, exemplified with booklets on how to create a crisis centre. One of the leading donor countries was the USA, and US donors such as USAID, the US State Department and the Ford Foundation had by 2006 distributed more than 10 million
USD to organizations addressing violence against women (Johnson 2007a). This kind of democracy assistance had by 2004 led to the establishment of two hundred organizations on violence against women in two-thirds of Russia’s regions (ibid.). International funding to this priority issue of violence against women lasted less than a decade however. Hemment (2007: footnote 25, p. 311) outlines the timeframe: “The issue of gendered violence was a central policy issue for international donor agencies through the 1990s; by 2001, support for this issue had been substantially cut back.”

The emergence of non-state crisis centres in Russia showed the active adaptation and response by social agents to a new social context. The international context of global activism on violence against women and the keen interest among Western donors in “funding for democracy” were particularly important aspects to the genesis of Russian crisis centres. But the politics of perestroika was essential for these external factors to impact on Russia and Russian civil activists. This reform period established new possibilities for social organization. On the basis of these altered conditions, the availability of international funding and collaboration that emerged in the 1990s provided beneficial opportunities. Women were especially hard hit by high unemployment in the early 1990s, and the loss of positions for many implied searching for new opportunities. Working in a crisis centre was for many an opportunity to find personal fulfilment in a difficult period of change. Educated, middle-aged post-Soviet women found an outlet for their social responsibility in these groups and also found personal fulfilment through this social engagement (Hemment 2004b; Johnson 2004; Kuehnast and Nechemias 2004:12,17). In this manner the international support co-existed with certain subjective conditions among women that explain the development of non-state crisis centres. This important aspect of the emergence of non-state crisis centres in Russia is also reflected in my material:

“As of 1993 I was a representative in the district council of people’s representatives. Perestroika pushed us to participate in societal activities in the democratic movement. (...) In 1993, after the dissolution of the council of people’s representatives in Russia, the result was kind of that my social function was not anymore required. To the extent that I had been active since childhood, I really wanted to find a place for my aims. I met with [other activist], and together we began to work to help women. The situation in Russia was difficult, and we created an exhibition where women presented their handicraft, their works of art. … Later, after 1995, an understanding emerged that there are deeper problems and there’s a need to work to change relations to women, to make women equal to men.” (Informant 17/2006)

Johnson explains that by 2001, the key issue of international funders had shifted from sexual violence to sex trafficking (Johnson 2004:234). Although both issues are within the framework of gendered violence, Johnson is concerned that this can cause a decline in the effectiveness of crisis centres in dealing with both sexual and domestic violence.
The experience of being ousted from a public position was characteristic for many women in the post-Soviet era. Overall, the onset of reforms brought many women to engagement in civil society because they were excluded from key aspects of public life, formal politics and new businesses (Hemment 2004c:316). The decline in women’s representation in formal politics corresponded with what has been called a “feminisation” of the third sector (Kuehnast and Nechemias 2004:10). Drawing upon discourse analysis, Suvi Salmenniemi (2005:748) explains that civic activity is associated with femininity and institutional politics with masculinity in Russia, and that the spheres are represented as distinct from each other. The “feminine” civil society sector is characterized by limited societal influence and scarce material resources, but it is also described as enterprising. This is what makes actors in this sector relevant to security production.

6.4.1. Three Moscow-based NGOs addressing the system

The first crisis centres in Russia emerged in the main cities, in St. Petersburg and Moscow. It was only in the latter half of the 1990s that crisis centres began to emerge also in the regions. International funding was also channelled via Moscow based organizations to the regions. Among the women’s groups that emerged in Moscow in the early 1990s, some have been involved in transferring money and knowledge to regional centres by means of for example training seminars. With their involvement in developing regional crisis centres, these organizations have attained an umbrella character of the nation wide work on violence against women. In their work they address both the concerns of local centres and lobby politically in Moscow. Three such organizations have been interviewed for this project, and provide insight on the difficulties in the national context that belong to the framework within which local crisis centres aim to produce security locally.

A fundamental concern of the three Moscow-based organizations, Russian Association of Crisis Centres (RACC), “National centre for the prevention of violence - ANNA” (Азоциация нет насилию) and the Consortium of Women’s Non-governmental Associations (Consortium) is multi-agency as a basis for effectively addressing violence against women. The projects and campaigns of the Moscow-based associations addressing violence against women:

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100 Salmenniemi (2005) explains that actors engaged in the “feminine” civic sector are characterized by a set of attributes such as self-sacrifice, persistence, patience, collectivism, respect for individuality, responsibility, morality and solidarity. Among their aims are achievement of the ‘common good’, freedom of self-expression, equality, democracy and pluralism.

101 This is confirmed also by other research, e.g. Kay (2000), but at the same time regional diversity is important when discussing NGO activism in Russia.
women point to a multitude of projects involving a range of actors and stakeholders that are all involved in the context in which victims of violence seek to manoeuvre in order to regain security in their lives. In regard to their educational programmes for crisis centres in the regions, a main focus of all actors has been the key role of the local crisis centre as a facilitator of exchange and cooperation between various local agencies. The organization of round-tables that gathers local stakeholders such as municipal representatives, police, procurator, doctors, and teachers has been a method applied for the positioning of local crisis centres among the multiple actors that affect the system to which a victim of violence turns. As explained by a representative of ANNA:

“We always began educational programs (campaigns) with a discussion on the situation in the region. And subsequently the discussion turned to what they may do together.” (Informant 10/2006)

In addition to such educational programs, lobbying, information campaigns and contact with journalists and editors are among the activities that these organizations have conducted. The decrease in funding makes it difficult to uphold the level of activity from previous years however. It is lamented that it is difficult to see how the various programmes and reports that have been produced can be made useful also in the future:

“How we will be able to maintain this is very difficult to say.” (Informant 12/2006)

The Moscow-based NGOs are concerned with the way ahead for women’s organizations and their work on violence against women. For example, for the RACC finances are meagre and this hampers new initiatives and projects. These difficulties are considered symptomatic of many of the member organizations as well, and this underlies the comment that “now [2006] is not the best period” for the women’s movement (Informant 12/2006). When talking about the past, their achievements, their positive contributions are highlighted. Despite the current insecurity, this is an important history of past achievements of the women’s groups.

The idea for the establishment of a national umbrella organization for crisis centres, the RACC, in 1999 grew out of the increasing interaction between local crisis centres that emerged throughout the latter half of the 1990s. The existence of overlapping activities and various forms of cooperation was the basis for the creation of this network organization that was established to represent the local crisis centres on the federal level. It also aims to further communication and cooperation between various women’s groups. The establishment of the

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102 The establishment of RACC in 1999 was assisted by foreign sources of funding, in particular from the Ford Foundation.
RACC network\textsuperscript{103} was the result of an increasing awareness among women activists in the late 1990s about the need for representation and advocacy of their interests on the federal level. Therefore, a central representation was established in Moscow. The members of the coordinating council represent the various cities and regions of the member organizations. As a network organization, the RACC therefore brings together and represents the views of various regional organizations. In 2006, there are approximately 50 member organizations.\textsuperscript{104}

Through a number of projects, the RACC has aimed to establish, change and enhance knowledge about violence against women, both in Moscow and in the regions. These projects have been directed at a variety of stakeholders within the field. The RACC explains that their programmes have been directed at the police, the procurator, educational institutions, medical personnel, and journalists. For example, in a cooperative project with the Russian Association of Journalists, the RACC in 2003 arranged a competition in which they looked for the best coverage of violence against women in Russian newspapers. The best contributions were collected and published in a booklet (Azhgikhina, Abubikirova et al. 2003) that was made use of for information and educational purposes (Informant 12/2006). The RACC considers the recommendation “Security in the family - time to act” in 2003 as one of its major achievements to improve women’s security.\textsuperscript{105} The recommendation is an example of work conducted by the national umbrella organization aimed at lobbying and affecting decisions and actions taken on the level of the federal government, thereby positioning itself within the field.

The “National centre for the prevention of violence”, or ANNA in short, has grown out of grassroots engagement. The first phone line (telefon doverija) that began to operate for victims of domestic violence in Russia was established in Moscow in 1993 by Marina Pisklakova, who later established ANNA. The hot-line was located in the premises of the Institute of socio-economic problems of the people at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, which made a room and a phone available. A Swedish volunteer trained Pisklakova, whose engagement was motivated by her attentiveness to the stories of abuse and violence that she

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{103} The organizational structure of the network comprises a president, a coordinating council and an executive director. The concern with regional influence on RACC was formalized in 2002 when it was decided that the director should be from one of the regional member organizations, and not from Moscow or St. Petersburg. The executive director is however located in Moscow, and has since 1999 remained the same person, Natalia Abubikirova.

\textsuperscript{104} Some of these are regional networks, e.g. “Do not wait” from Voronezh, which comprises 30 organizations, indicating that the number of organizations connected via the RACC network exceeds the number of registered member organizations.

\textsuperscript{105} The brochure with these recommendations is in the author’s possession.
\end{footnotesize}
had heard from colleagues and acquaintances as well as her participation in feminist seminars during perestroika. Today, Pisklakova is the director of the national umbrella organization ANNA. What began as a hotline operated by one person has developed into a strong umbrella organization that employs eight consultants and acquires finances from various international sources. ANNA operates a crisis centre, encompassing a hotline, and, when finances allow, individual psychological and juridical consultation. This is thus the prolongation and professionalization of the hotline that Pisklakova began to operate in 1993. The second, and now largest, tier of ANNA is a national education centre. On the basis of finances received primarily through foreign grants, ANNA employs a handful of program coordinators that plan and conduct various projects directed at enhancing knowledge and awareness among various stakeholders within the field of violence against women, such as local crisis centres, students at police academies, politicians and the broader public. For example, in 1994 training programmes were initiated, at first for volunteers of the Moscow crisis centre, and later also for regional crisis centres. Representatives from ANNA travelled to crisis centres in the regions, such as for example to Ekaterinburg in central Russia in 1995 and organized seminars on how to run a NGO, addressing issues such as management, fundraising, and public relations. At first this training for regional crisis centres was conducted without financial support, which made ad hoc solutions such as staying over with acquaintances necessary. But around 1996, a grant from the European Commission financed a training programme for ten regional crisis centres. The funding situation in the latter half of the 1990s allowed for the initiation of a number of programs. For example, in 1997 a national educational program was initiated that aimed at improving the status of regional crisis centres by means of encouraging interaction with regional stakeholders. Round-table meetings were organized with the aim of exploring the possibilities for collaboration on violence against women in the regions, and these meetings brought together representatives of the municipalities, police, procurator, doctors and teachers. Following this initial focus on the centres in the regions, training programmes were directed specifically at stakeholders such as the police, doctors and other medical personnel and in 2006, the courts and lecturers of social work at universities and colleges came into focus. The concern is how such stakeholders approach the issue of domestic violence, for example, how doctors talk to their patients about domestic violence. This concern with how the issue is approached is also applied in ANNA’s interaction with crisis centres in the regions. A particular concern is that the international human rights framework that provides recognition to issues of gender discrimination, i.e. the CEDAW convention, is weakly applied by the regional centres. To locate the national struggle to
eliminate violence against women within the international human rights framework is a major concern of ANNA. They have conducted several training seminars on this issue, and in 2007 they continue these efforts with the launch of a new project in Rostov oblast. The aim is to educate a larger number of NGOs in making use of human rights standards in their work.

Over the years ANNA has in total conducted educational campaigns in 70 cities throughout the Russian Federation. Overall, these projects direct attention to a concern with multi-agency in addressing violence against women: The need to make various entities cooperate, create collaborative projects and transparency on the various functions that each fulfils. While the focus in these ANNA projects has been on multi-agency on the regional and local level, the Consortium of Women’s Non-governmental Associations (Consortium) addresses multi-agency on the national level, by means of advocacy. The Consortium was established in 1994 and functions as a network of women organizations, including crisis centres. The initial idea was to establish a network of Russian and American women’s movements, and during the first two years, the Consortium was headed by an American, Martina Vandenbergh, who in 1996 was replaced by a Russian, Elena Ershova. Various projects of the Consortium have been directed at enhancing communication and contact between various Russian women’s groups. The main task of the Consortium is thereby to provide information, through a website and by means of publishing activity, e.g. publication of brochures and books that are disseminated to the women organizations. The overall objective of the Consortium is to protect women’s interests and improve their status. For that purpose, the Consortium actively strives to advocate their concerns towards representatives of the Duma, for example in connection with legal initiatives concerning the status of women, including violence against women.106 The Consortium is thus not a national organization that addresses exclusively violence against women but is concerned with violence against women within the context of discrimination against women in general, and aims to further their viewpoint towards political stakeholders at the national and regional level.

In their concern with impacting the formal political domain in Moscow, in particular the legislative branch (the Duma), the Consortium is concerned with violence as one particular form of discrimination against women. This concern with impacting the formal political domain is also reflected in projects that the Consortium offers to representatives of women’s

106 Because of the foreign funding that the Consortium is relying on, the emphasis is on advocacy and not lobbying, as lobbying financed with foreign money would suggest involvement in a state’s internal affair. (Noonan and Nechemias 2001:223).
organizations. For example, they have conducted training seminars specifically for women leaders in order to prepare women to take on official political positions. Concerned with the low political representation of women in the Duma, the Consortium is engaged in analytical work aimed at dispelling the gendered bias of Presidential and Parliamentary elections in terms of who stands for election. This concern with advocacy towards the formal political sphere also motivated the initiation of specific seminars for regional human rights ombudsmen in 2006 focusing specifically on gender issues.

The Consortium has functioned as an active participant and commentator in various state advisory committees addressing women’s issues. During the last years, however, the women’s committees that were established on the Presidential and ministerial levels have been dismantled. For example, the Commission on Women, Family, and Demography that was established on the basis of a presidential initiative (decree/ykas) in 1993, seized to exist in 2000. The Commission on Improving the Status of Women that was created by the government in 1997, as a response to the UN Beijing conference on women’s issues, was dissolved in 2004. The then remaining round-table organized by the Ministry of Labour, gathering various women’s organizations, was also dissolved. The Consortium ascertains that the only remaining state institute towards which to effectively direct their advocacy is the institute of the ombudsman. The Consortium has therefore initiated seminars specifically for local ombudsmen. Subsequent to the disengagement of the Presidential commission on women’s issues in 2000 and the government commission in 2004, the Consortium assessed the situation and concluded that the ombudsman had become the primary state entity to which they could direct their advocacy:

“We therefore [subsequent to the disengagement of the two state commissions (KS)] evaluated the situation and concluded that the only state entity to which we can somehow appeal is the institution of the ombudsman. Today, in 350 regions there exist regional ombudsmen. And we began a project on gender education of ombudsmen and women leaders in these regions. This was not only to inform them, but to let them get to know the women organizations and teach them how to work together.” (Informant 11/2006)

The Consortium organized the first such educational gathering, comprising a two-week seminar, in 2006. A concrete result was also already accomplished, as one such gathering in Krasnodar krai instigated the ombudsman to uncover sufficient money and establish a shelter for women.

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107 The position of national ombudsman was established in the early 1990s, but has been subject to controversy (Finkel 2006). Ombudsmen have been introduced in Russia during the last decade also on the regional (oblast) level to hear complaints on human rights issues.
The three umbrella organizations ANNA, the Consortium and the RACC have all received external funding of their activities. In the case of ANNA, the first years were characterized by self-support, but from 1995 onwards, ANNA has successfully acquired international grants. The Consortium has, since its erection in 1994 as a joint US-Russian collaboration, continued to receive funding from US funds. Although the financial situation has generally grown more difficult, ANNA and the Consortium nonetheless continue to have a project portfolio funded by grants. The RACC however has no incoming project money, and the representative of the RACC states that “for us, for our Association, the most important question concerns finances.” (Informant 12/2006) The assessment is that the priorities of the international funding organizations have changed:

“I simply look at the position of the American embassy, which always assisted gender programs, and now they practically don’t want to hear about it, about gender. And further, I don’t know how this is in Europe. You see, this is very contradictory. On the one hand we move towards power, to pick the president, members of government, and then on the other hand, in regard to the rights of general women, the changes are incremental.” (Informant 11/2006)

The NGO representatives explain that the reduction in funding is caused by changes in the priorities of international funding organizations away from Russia towards other international regions, and away from the issue of violence against women towards other issues such as international terrorism. The difficulties activists experience in gaining attention and acquiring financial support are thus explained by reference to the general situation in the world, thereby pinpointing a cause out of reach that cannot be impacted by the activists themselves, and render them with no influence. This financial situation that circumscribes the activities of women’s groups in Moscow is a fundamental characteristic common to most Russian activists on violence against women. They express concern about the effects of this precarious funding situation on the further work on violence against women in Russia:

“All our members face the problem of finances - the most pressing problem. Because a lot is already accomplished, many relations built. There have been many programmes and trainings. A great number has been accomplished. Many directors of various crisis centres go to the local administration. We already achieved status. Status as societal organization, association and network – that is generally achieved. And now, how we may maintain this, that is difficult to say (predict).” (Informant 12/2006)

6.5. National representation of violence against women in Russia

Notwithstanding the difficult financial situation, the three Moscow-based NGOs are unison in their positive assessment of their own contribution to enhancing understanding and knowledge of the problem of violence against women in Russia over the last decade. Particular emphasis is on their role in breaking the silence circumscribing this problem, and to
begin to talk about this issue. But the crisis centres thereby also fulfil another task, as they are engaged in practices of defining what the issue is about:

“You know, [NGOs] have many roles, in my view. Our first task was of course in general to demonstrate that the problem exists. That was the first. That is, to make the invisible visible. Second, to explain what the talk [issue] is about. Explain how to address the problem. To explain this both to society and professionals who respond to this problem.” (Informant 10/2006)

The NGO activists work to place the issue on the agenda. They address how to deal with the issue, prescribe solutions, and thereby try to establish power to define the issue. A major concern in this regard is to transfer their knowledge to entities within the state structure:

“We conducted a number of programs when we had the opportunity to it and our projects attracted finances, but a primary task was how to transfer [these tasks (KS)] to the state structures, because they have greater possibilities. They can learn from our experience.” (Informant 12/2006)

Through these efforts of placing the issue on the agenda, prescribe solutions and suggest means of behaviour, the crisis centres position themselves vis-à-vis the other occupants in the field of security production. The NGOs in Moscow strive, through their interaction with agents in the field to describe the problem. What is their representation of the issue of violence against women? Two issues stand out from the interviews: first, concerns about quantifying the issue, and second, concerns regarding the qualitative classification of the issue in regard to legislation.

6.5.1. Quantification - claims and confusion

“You probably ran into the numbers 12,000 and 14,000 victims per year. Well, I have not been able to gain knowledge of from whom and from where these numbers originated. That’s not statistics. You know according to the old saying, “there’s statistics, and there’s a big lie.” Well, in our case this is in my view one and the same thing.” (Informant 11/2006)

In response to my question of how serious the problem of violence against women is in Russia, representatives of women’s groups and non-governmental crisis centres frequently responded by citing this number of 14,000. Alternatively, it was noted that 30 percent of women has definitively been subjected to violence. These two numbers were presented by the Russian government to CEDAW in 1999, in its fifth periodic report. The Russian Federation presented the number of women killed in specific relation to the perpetrator, the husband or another relative:

“Cruelty and violence towards women, especially routine violence in the family, remain a serious problem. Every year, 14,000 Russian women die at the hands of their husbands or other relatives. Sociological surveys show that 30 per cent of married women are regularly
subjected to physical violence. The situation is exacerbated by the lack of statistics and indeed by the attitude of the agencies of law and order to this problem, for they view such violence not as a crime but as “a private matter” between the spouses.” (CEDAW 1999:37)

The numbers reported to CEDAW seem to have great legitimacy, but as seen in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, there are also critical concerns. The main objection from critics is that the documentation of this number is lacking.

In a 1998 Human Rights Watch report, the head of President Jelzin’s Commission on Women, Children, and Demographics, Yekaterina Lahkova is cited as source of the information that 14,000 women are killed by their husband or a family member each year in Russia (Human Rights Watch 1998). The Moscow Helsinki Group cites the Russian Ministry of the Interior (Ministerstvo Vnytrennih del, MBD) as its source for this number of 9,000 killings in 2003, but a specific written document or person as origin of the number is not cited. In the RFE/RL note it is also reported that the Ministry of the Interior informs that 36,000 incidents of family violence have been reported in 1997. In 2003 the Moscow Times cited the NGO initiative Stop Violence run by the RACC, and Amnesty International when reporting that “every day, 36,000 women in Russia are beaten by their partners.” (Merrill 2003) Amnesty explains that “every hour a woman in the Russian Federation dies at the hand of a relative, her partner or former partner.” (Amnesty International 2005a:1) In its country report on human rights practices in Russia in 1996, the US State Department refers to the Ministry of the Interior and presents the estimate that “80 percent of violent crime occurred in the home.” (U.S. Department of State 1997) In comparison, the Soviet Interior Ministry estimated in 1987 that 70 percent of all murders are carried out in the home (Sperling 1990:21, citing Cockburn, 1987).

Statistics on the number of Russian women killed by their husband or a close relative every year seem to offer documented and objective data on violence against women, albeit on one specific form - homicide. Gondolf and Shestakov (1997) explain however that the statistics on spousal homicide rates are problematic because of difficulties and variations in classification of the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator (husband or close

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108 In May 2007 the Russian Federation was due to submit the sixth country report to CEDAW, and the question is what numbers are reported there. The report is not yet publicly available (August 2008).

109 The source of Lakhova’s statement is Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL 1997). The paragraph in the RFE/RL Newsline cites an article from Vecharnaia Moskva from 18. October 1997. I have not been able to trace this article (1997 edition not available on EastView). HRW index number is lacking on the report.
relative) and the cause of death (accident or suicide). Such classification issues are also relevant to the concern with documenting victims of violence against women in a variety of senses. For example, it is reported that 30 percent of married women are regularly subjected to physical violence (see quote above), while 70 percent have been subjected to some form of violence:

“Recent independent research conducted by the Council for Women of Moscow State University revealed that 70 percent of married women had been subjected to some form of violence by their husband.” (Amnesty International 2005b)

The numbers reflect difficulties in the questions asked to extract this information, for example in regard to differentiation between being regularly subjected to violence and having been subjected to violence once or more. Such difficulties are always entailed in data extracted from self-reporting. From the viewpoint of women activists, the preoccupation with numbers conceals the important social consequences on all family members beyond the immediate victims:

“The numbers reflect difficulties in the questions asked to extract this information, for example in regard to differentiation between being regularly subjected to violence and having been subjected to violence once or more. Such difficulties are always entailed in data extracted from self-reporting. From the viewpoint of women activists, the preoccupation with numbers conceals the important social consequences on all family members beyond the immediate victims:

“MBD [Ministry of Interior] cites this number, but beyond that they never in my view published any documentation. Subsequently, you know, I never deal with only violence against women. I always [look at] family violence. Because in families the victims are elderly regardless of sex. Most horribly suffer the children. And clearly the woman also. So the main issue is not how many [victims].” (Informant 11/2006)

This suggests that advocacy groups work with an open conception of violence against women. Their concern is that the frequently cited number of 14,000 victims that the MBD prepared prior to the women’s conference in Beijing 1995, addresses murders exclusively, and there are many more victims in a variety of sense and it is to these crisis centres direct their security measures:

“No one counted. It is not a crime - violence in the family. In regard to statistics, it is not possible to draw conclusions because there is no category [on the basis of which to count (KS)]. They counted the number of murders. That’s all.” (Informant 12/2006)

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110 A further problem is encountered because “Russian homicide statistics are compounded by the combination of attempted homicides and actual homicide.” (Gondolf and Shostakov 1997:64) This is rarely noted in NGO reports and newspaper articles. But this data problem seems odd when considering the reports of the Russian government to the CEDAW in 1999, where the number of women dying at the hands of their husband or another relative is put to 14,000, and these data concerns, that would indicate that the number was too high, are not called attention to. The concerns regarding classification point not only to the difficulty of extracting reliable data on one country, but also suggest a difficulty in comparing statistics on violence against women across countries. This is the focus of research of Gondolf and Shostakov, who, for the purpose of acquiring valid comparisons, adjusted the data on the basis of their interpretations of shortcomings. For example, in the case of Russia, they reduced the homicide statistics by one-third to account for the estimated attempted homicides included in the official Russian statistics. These are estimates and it is therefore cautioned for the fact that the 30 percent of attempted homicides included for homicides in Russia in general, may be different in regard to spousal homicides (Gondolf; Shostakov 1997:67f). In result of analysis, they conclude that “[t]here may be as many as 1.7 times more spousal homicide rates in Russia than the United States.” (ibid. 70)
The lack of a category to register victims of violence against women demonstrates the failure in collecting and documenting this security issue. Violence against women or domestic violence is also not cited specifically in the Russian legislation. This weak categorization has consequences on how this issue is dealt with in the justice system. This is a second overarching aspect to which the national umbrella organizations point.

6.5.2. Legislation – lack of qualitative characterization

“...You know what the problem with the justice system is? The justice system functions very badly here. (...) They generally do not want to deal with such issues [as violence against women]. They strive to stay away from that.” (Informant 11/2006)

This assessment bluntly describes the justice system as defunct in regard to the issue of violence against women. Beyond this fundamental and general judgment lie a number of critical concerns regarding how violence against women is dealt with in legislation and in the process of preparing a court case on domestic violence. The difficulties begin with the legislation.

In 1995, the drafting of a law on domestic violence, “On the Prevention of Violence in the Family”, began in Russia. The State Duma Committee on Women, Family and Youth administered the drafting process. The law was re-drafted multiple times, and throughout this process, it also changed its designation to “On the Fundamentals of Social-Legal Protection from Violence in the Family”. But in 1999 the law was considered “buried” (Sillaste 1999).111

For NGOs working on violence against women, this failed process of preparing a specific law on domestic violence was particularly disappointing. The continuous development of new drafts was judged harshly:

“There were 43 drafts, versions. One worse than the other. The very first one was the best of all. That was the UN version. That was the best law. But it was not likeable. The State Duma did not endorse this, and began to order one version after the other. There were 43. The 43rd was such that when we organized a conference and discussed it, the women immediately came to the realization that it is better without any law at all than with such a law! (...) Also important are the mechanisms and guaranties of realization [implementation]. Therefore we do not have any law on violence against women. We need to use only the criminal-family codex that is available to us.” (Informant 11/2006)

The attempt to introduce a specific law on domestic violence failed utterly. In regard to the draft versions, disappointment was expressed in regard to the suggested shift in responsibility for responding to domestic violence from law enforcement to social service. The use of criminal sanctions was continuously toned down in the new drafts, and this signalled that

111 Galina Sillaste, a well-known sociologist, headed the Moscow-based organization “Women and Development” that was founded in 1992 (Noonan and Nechemias 2001:350)
criminalization of perpetrators of domestic violence was not a priority (Human Rights Watch 1997). This underlined that among law makers the distinction between violence in the private sphere that did not require criminalization, and in the public sphere where perpetrators of violence in the streets are as a matter of fact criminalized, continued to reign. They do not acknowledge domestic violence:

“Our policemen do not to this day have a clear understanding [of domestic violence]. Because, if he, someone, beat the wife in the staircase [outside the apartment], it’s a criminal case. If he beat her in their kitchen, then it’s already interruption of privacy. Therefore, the police refuses to take on such cases.” (Informant 11/2006)

From the experience of NGOs, public authorities respond with opposition to the issue. The protection of privacy is a cornerstone. This is a widespread view among authorities.

Commenting on the abandonment of the draft legislation, Sillaste pointed out that among the two most fervent opponents of the adoption of legislation on domestic violence were the procurator general and the Russian Supreme Court. The experience of this kind of attitude led her to conclude:

“Civil servants/bureaucrats do not want new responsibilities. (…) Even in the Duma, many deputies, including women [deputies], represent a patriarchal position: “We do not aspire to interfere in family issues. She [the family] takes care of everything on her own.” The pity is that a significant part of the Russian public opinion shares this conservative opinion.” (Sillaste 1999)

The draft legislation process showed a lack of recognition through a series of suggestions. For example, the draft legislation proposed the earmarking of shelter services to those with very low income. This would exclude working women who would have to prove that they live in imminent danger in order to acquire space in a shelter. Women’s organizations also doubted that the allocation of funding for the social services that was suggested in the draft would materialise. More fundamentally, the draft legislation suggested a licensing system for crisis centres that would require crisis centres to have at least 20 employees, some with specific degrees, and provide services to a range of clients, not only battered women (Human Rights Watch 1997).

The bottom line is that there is no specific legislation on domestic violence in Russia today.\(^\text{112}\) The existing legislation, to which victims of violence against women can turn are specific articles within the general criminal codex. The current criminal codex, in its Russian

\(^\text{112}\) There is no specific legislation on domestic violence on the federal level, but on the regional level there is at least one to me known exception, and that is the legislation adopted in Archangelsk oblast in 2003. This legislation is explained by women activists in Archangelsk to have had no impact so far.
abbreviation YK\textsuperscript{113}, was adopted in 1996. The criminal codex entails one general part and one special part, and it is in the first part of the latter, entitled “Crimes against the person” that incidents of violence against women are addressed under the heading “Crimes against life and health” (section 16). There are in particular three articles that are in focus in regard to violence against women: article 115, 116 and 119. These pertain to different juridical procedures: Articles 115 and 116 are applied in private prosecution cases, while article 119 implies a public prosecutor. The distinction between private and public prosecution cases affects the preparation of the court case. This is important to victims of violence against women as it is particularly their role that is affected as they prescribe two different procedures for bringing a case before court.

Article 115 addresses “intentional causation of mild damage to health, causing short term damage to health or slight permanent loss of general working ability, - “. Article 116 addresses “causation of battery or execution of violent action causing physical harm, but not leading to the consequences punished under article 115 of the present Codex.“ The harm punished under article 115 is damage to health that affects working ability, while the harm inflicted upon the victim and punished under article 116 is “physical harm”.\textsuperscript{114} These articles, 115 and 116, prescribe private prosecution cases. This implies that the victim must charge the perpetrator – possibly the husband, and or another close relative or friend – with the crimes described in article 115 and 116. These articles are only invoked when the victim herself initiates it. In contrast, article 119 pertains to a public prosecution case. It reads: “Article 119. Threatened homicide or causation of severe damage to health, if there is reason to fear that the threat will be carried out.“ Article 119 is invoked when the procurator asserts that this is a criminal case. This implies that a public prosecution case is opened, and consequently, the initiation of a court procedure is not dependent upon the woman and her charge against the perpetrator as this is now handled by the procurator.

Both in a private and in a public prosecution case there is a need of evidence of the inflicted harm. This evidence is acquired by the woman through interaction with medical and police personnel. This is the crux of the treatment of incidents of violence against women by

\textsuperscript{113} Ygolovni kodeks.
\textsuperscript{114} The form and degrees of punishment are similar, but with the possibility of a longer duration in 115 than 116. The level of punishment is of concern to women’s groups but their main focus is that preventive action is a key to securing women. This will be showed with examples of NGO programmes addressing the justice system and their processes of approaching this issue. This is the reason why I do not discuss the issue of levels of punishment further.
public authorities. Drawing upon their interactions with victims, NGOs describe these experiences as expressions of incompetence and lack of compassion. Evidence of an incident of domestic violence is documented in two declarations, one from a medical doctor and one from the police. In practice, the woman contacts, in parallel, both medical and police personnel immediately after an incident of domestic violence. The optimal place to go is the local emergency room (Travmpunkt), because here the medical personnel are obliged to contact the local police when experiencing incidents of domestic violence (Informant 13/2006). This implies that the woman can acquire both the two necessary documents, from the medical services and the police, by contacting only one entity. Women activists explain:

“We always say that she should go to the emergency room (travmpunkt), because then she acquires the paperwork.” (Informant 13/2006).

This is however the ideal situation. Asked if the system works as prescribed, the concern is the coincidentally and lack of predictability in the system:

“She [the system] works, but not very good. Because here, unfortunately, the doctor may write down this, this and that, and may not write it down. It’s all dependent upon his own [personal] attitude towards it [the issue]. He’s obliged, in principle, but who makes sure (verifies)?” (Informant 13/2006)

The documentation from the doctor is particularly important, because this is the only proof of what happened. A failing or insufficient medical document severely impedes the possibility of justice:

“The problem is that they [the doctors] sometimes do not accurately, [but] incorrectly, document corporeal harm, and without this fundamental document; the court is not an expert (phone115)... And it is not able to draw conclusions, in order to classify the incident in order for it to be understandable and for it to be possible to reach a verdict.” (Informant 13/2006)

This medical documentation is the fundamental documentation of the woman’s statement upon which the court is to act. The two essential documents, from the doctor and the police, are inevitable both in a private and in a public prosecution case. The difference is that in a private prosecution case, the woman must herself provide this proof to the court. In a public prosecution case, the public prosecutor collects the required documents and conveys this information to the court:

“That is, that article [119], when already the procurator himself brings about [initiates] a criminal case, then already nothing is dependent on the woman.” (Informant 13/2006)

This is drastically different in a private prosecution case. The documents prepared by the medical personnel and the police are not handed out to the woman:

115 The phone rang and interrupted the interview.
“From there the documents can only be received upon request by the court or the police. If a criminal case is initiated. She is given nothing just like that (in her hands).” (Informant 13/2006)

When a private prosecution case is initiated on the basis of articles 115 or 116, the woman makes a statement, and then needs to provide proof, among them the two documents, but also witnesses or other evidence. In the process of preparing a private prosecution case, the woman is entitled to assistance. However, what this assistance comprises is a key question for women activist:

“Great question – what does it mean to provide assistance? I understand in this manner, that the woman herself is supposed to contact the court, some kind of secretary – I don’t know – and post questions to her.” (Informant 13/2006) (7:20)

The key concern is that it is not clear, to whom victims of violence who initiate a private prosecution case ought to turn within the legal system in order to acquire the necessary documents for the case. Every single women who takes upon herself the task of going before court needs to find her way through the justice system in order to acquire the necessary documentation concerning corporeal harm. But this is a complicated process:

“It’s necessary to be aware of what steps to take. It’s already a very complicated system, the legal system…lawyers make mistakes. And women, who never possessed such experience, are not able to make everything right. For that, you need special juridical knowledge.” (Informant 13/2006)

An especially assigned responsibility for the provision of assistance in private prosecution cases is, according to the national specialists on violence against women, nonexistent. Alternatively, the women activists therefore encourage the woman to record personal data of the doctor that conducts the medical examination:

“We tell them [victims of domestic violence] all the time, to request if they may have the surname, first name, fathers name of the doctor whom they are consulting, day, time, maybe the number of the card, then it would be easier to acquire the documents. She is not given anything just like that (in her hands).” (Informant 13/2006)

This again underlines the dependency on personal relations: the weaknesses in the system are to be circumscribed by appealing to the specific persons that are engaged in the work. The systemic weaknesses are a major concern of Moscow-based activists. The weak functioning of the justice system impedes justice for victims of violence against women. Systemic problems are at first identified in the existing legislation, as there is no specific legislation on violence against women. Domestic violence is not designated as a crime in any specific article but the criminal Codex entails articles that can be made use of both for private and public prosecutions of incidents of domestic violence. It is thus possible to pursue justice on violence against women in the court system. This requires that either the woman herself or the public prosecutor gathers the required documents for the case. Major systemic problems are
identified in the functioning of the system however and the view of the women activists is that there is no systematic approach to dealing with cases of violence against women in the justice system. This is evident in terms of confusion regarding what kind of help the victims are entitled to from the court when initiating a private prosecution case and where they may achieve this assistance. The difficulties begin with the two specific documents from the doctor and from the police that are difficult to obtain for the women. As means for working around this system the women activists suggest to appeal to the responsibility and empathy of specific individuals that work within the system. The dependency on personal relations in the preparation of a court case indicates that victims of violence need to appeal to the empathy of people in the system. While this may in some cases lead to success, it is overall an expression of systemic weakness. This overall concern with a weak systemic approach to violence against women is further illustrated by article 117 in the Criminal Codex. This article addresses repeated incidents of violence but is very seldom used in public prosecution cases on domestic violence, explain the NGO experts, because the crime of domestic violence is not considered in regard to its systematic character:

“Because this issue is treated as a separate crime, as separate incidents. They [the legal system, police] do not treat this as a system. Well, that’s the issue.” (Informant 13/2006)

The failure to comprehend the systematic character of violence against women increases women activists’ already critical view of the treatment of violence against women in the justice system. The special character of violence against women must be acknowledged because this is a key to begin to address it properly. A specific legislation is demanded:

“This [violence against women] is a distinctive crime that [is] committed against a person close to you. This should not be considered within the framework of the general criminal codex.” (Informant 13/2006)

At the same time however, it is noted that criminalization of violence against women constitutes an obstacle to early measures in terms of prevention:

“It’s understood, that a law is urgently required. (…) Our legislation today only provides criminal [prosecution]. Beyond that, these are criminal [cases] with medium harm, medium strength. That’s something considerably serious. Preventive measures are within the framework of our legislation generally not conceivable. We’re experiencing a criminalization of the problem. Today it’s understood that we only respond. The efficiency of such response is dependent on whether or not the women consult us. Therefore, it’s necessary to change the whole system.” (Informant 10/2006)

116 “Article 117. Torture. 1. Causation of physical or psychological suffering in the form of systematic causation of battery or violent action, if not leading to the consequences punished under articles 111 and 112 of the present Codex.”
One of the consensus issues that emerged from the international women’s movement’s work on violence against women in the 1980s concerned the need to criminalize the problem. The emphasis on violence against women within the human rights framework furthered the concern with criminal punishment. Increasingly it was acknowledged that this was symbolic politics that entailed the danger of not being effective for prevention and treatment (Keck and Sikkink 1998:198). As Keck and Sikkink (ibid.) emphasize, the criminalization approach implies privileging lawyers and legal expertise and for NGOs and crisis centres such a focus on the legal procedures can imply that their role is diminished, because of limited access to the legal system, protection of personal information etc. The critical assessment of criminalization among Russian activists seems to reflect such concerns.

Women’s groups have acknowledged the symbolic importance of the legal system. They have organized various programmes aimed at inducing change in the system and the approach of public authorities to the issue. For example, women organizations are especially concerned with projects engaging medical personnel, as it is of fundamental importance that they understand the importance of the written documentation that they are obliged to provide. Concern with such hesitancy among employees of the medical profession and the police to address and act according to prescribed duties of their job when confronted with incidents of violence against women formed the basis for a project proposal of the Women’s Consortium. The aim was to create role models:

“Physicians do often not provide documentation in which they fix this and that beating. Subsequently you do not receive any documentation from the police. Therefore, the Consortium suggested the organization of such a project: write two textbooks. One textbook for the policemen in the district. For those, who at the first instance should be aware of the issue with these women; the second for medical personnel. We [the Consortium] even made agreements with the governor of Samara oblast [name mentioned], that in the higher federal school of police and in medical school, we were ready to try this out. And receive the comments of the listeners, the teachers, work this out, and give [the textbooks] to our Interior Ministry and Ministry of Health. We could not find money. We could not find money for this. Such a project is important, so that the (...) policemen knew their duties, understood what they do, who they defend, and how it all ought to be. Because now, I tell you, very many of them simply do not understand how it is possible, if he hit her in the home, to declare a criminal case.” (Informant 11/2006)

In essence, the women’s movements explain that acquiring justice in a case of violence against women requires a proof of corporeal harm which is difficult to acquire because of neglect by individual physicians and police officers on the one hand, and because of structural, systemic weaknesses in terms of comprehending the duties of their professions on the other. This project proposal of the Consortium aimed to institute agents of change within the system through the means of educating role models. These would be introduced to new
practices that would enable them to respond differently when confronted with an incident of domestic violence.

Also ANNA has in recent years defined the justice system as a key target of their activities. They have for example developed seminars for Justices of the Peace Courts (Mirovoi sud), and are in a pilot phase applying this in cooperation with the courts in Ural. The aim is to challenge the categorization of violence against women as a private matter, and through the training, teach the (employees of the) court system “to acknowledge signs of domestic violence earlier, on an earlier stage.” (Informant 10/2006) In this manner they also aim to institute agents of change within the system.

Women’s groups have established procedures that help display the problem with interaction between victims and the justice system. They have for example established a practice of accompanying victims to court:

“[C]risis centres can accompany women to court. Earlier this was not possible. When we in 1996 for the first time were present in court, we wrote a letter. That is, we called upon the President, and told that this had become possible. We went to try out this right. We did not have that. Gradually this became [established] practice, [and] this became adopted in the whole country. But the first steps were very difficult. To change the relations of the police, the procurator, and the courts to this problem so that the woman was not blamed, [that they] didn’t say that it was her fault. Because when we began [our work], the basic thing was that she was to blame.” (Informant 10/2006)

But the concern remains that there is a need to address violence against women on a whole different level, that of prevention. This explains the apprehension against criminalization. The argument is not that a new legislation addressing violence against women specifically excludes prevention, but that the specificities of violence against women require a specific legislation, and that this legislation ought to address preventive measures. Such preventive measures can circumscribe the erection of special agencies dealing with violence against women:

“Here [in cases of domestic violence] there are very strong specificities. And here [in Russia] we have not learned that. But if there were a special police, - a brigade that responded to, [and] worked specifically with issues related to domestic violence – then it would already be easier, because then we would have specialists educated specifically for [dealing with] this problem. They would understand the specificities. They would understand what is going on. They would

117 Justices of the Peace Courts represent the lowest level of trial courts in Russia and have been in operation, on paper, since 2000. These courts exist on the local level of political subdivisions, i.e. on the level of the city or region, but may also combine more than one such entity. Areas of jurisdiction comprise divorce (where no dispute over child custody), property disputes, labour relations. Possible sentence does not exceed three years (Burnham, Maggs et al. 2004:73). Although formally in place, the Justices of the peace Courts do not operated in all local towns and are not necessarily well-known. For example, in Archangelsk in 2008, one crisis centre was not aware that Peace Courts exist, and the other was aware but critical of their work.
understand how to respond particularly in the interests of the woman. But, that we don’t have.”

(Informant 13/2006)

The women activists in Moscow thus hold that a new legislation particularly addressing violence against women complemented with specifically educated personnel within the police agencies will provide a systematic approach to violence against women that can also ensure a response at earlier stages, and hence, preventive action. In addition to contributing to instituting such preventive measures, it is also envisaged that a specific legislation would address and improve the coordination between different (state) agencies:

“We hope that when there is a law on domestic violence, in my view, it encourages systemization [sistemnost]. And all agencies, they will be united under this law. Then there will be a complex approach, [including] police, the court, medical personnel, attorneys, and pedagogues – then they will all understand their aim and their actions. Because now, in my view, specialists do not understand where they move [in what direction], and what their aim is.” (Informant 13/2006)

A specific legislation on violence against women is here envisaged as means to uniting agencies that are today dispersed. Legislation is suggested as means to establishing cooperation between multiple agencies. This concern with the effectiveness of legislation as means to creating a common ground and functioning as basis for complex coordination in essence suggests that legislation eliminates the basis for conflict by staking out an overarching direction and establishing a common basis for work against domestic violence. This is however contentious. Difficulties with achieving a coherent and systematic approach to violence against women are then also alluded to in the interviews by pointing at the role of mentality and culture. Obstacles to instituting a different approach to violence against women are not only identified at the level of the state (public) bureaucracy. As noted above, a victim may be assisted by a person within the legislative system, and then the current framework is sufficient. But, as expressed in the following exchange between me and an interviewee, there are also other concerns pertaining to how to create security for women from violence:

“[Question (KS):] If she [a victim] meets a person, who wants to help and understands the situation, he may act within the framework of the current legislation, yes?
[Answer (Informant 13)]: Yes. The law makes it possible to respond great and qualitatively. But the public opinion, the awareness of the specialists, who are situated close to them, they themselves hinder the process. They often view the situation differently. For example, they may tell the women, - well, your husband drinks [a lot of alcohol, and is a drunk]. Why did you not teach him not to? Or, you yourself behaved in such a manner that, well, it [incident of violence] was provoked. And this [is] of course an impediment.” (Informant 13/2006)

The quote expels how responsibility is directed at the individual woman. Struggles for respect and recognition define the space in which victims of violence against women are to be made secure. This underlines that a further examination of practices that define the struggle to establish security for women against violence requires a focus on dynamics in the context in
which the women live. For that purpose, the analysis continues in the next chapter with an account of local practices of security. One concern is to see how systemic weaknesses outlined in regard to the approach to violence against women on the federal level function but are also countered in the local context. The focus thus turns to the local space of manoeuvring in regard to establishing security for women in the life-world.

6.6. Narrating the problem

This chapter has showed how violence against women has become a contested issue in post-Soviet Russia. The new possibilities for civic engagement that were granted in the late 1980s inspired women to organize. Through interaction with international women organizations, violence against women emerged as an issue for mobilization for the Russian women’s movement. Violence against women was a topic on the basis of which foreign finances could be attracted. This development testifies to the active adaptation of women’s groups to new opportunity structures, both within a national and international context. This ability is now again required as Russian women’s groups seek to find alternative sources of funding and ways to preserve and advance their achievements so far.

The Moscow-based women’s groups emphasize that violence against women is a crime conducted by someone close to the victim, most often repeatedly, and it affects not only the individual victim but the family with personal, emotional and social consequences. Their understanding of violence against women is holistic, and this is for example reflected in their concern with multi-agency as approach to dealing with violence against women. In regard to security production, their assessment addresses a series of structural weaknesses in the system.

Women’s groups are close observers of how public authorities respond to cases of violence against women. They have identified a tendency of public servants, police and medical personnel, to attempt to stay away from dealing with the issue. Considerations of domestic violence as an issue of the private sphere, as in traditional approaches to the issue, are still prominent. The draft legislation process showed a lack of interest by legislative authorities in establishing a category of violence against women that addressed this as a specific crime. Also, the process displayed a view on the provision of assistance to victims of violence that was not contributing to solving the real problems of victims or the work of crisis centres. This was evident in the suggestion of an income-adjusted right to housing provision for victims, and the suggestion of formal requirements of crisis centre organization (e.g. 20 employees with special education). This is very different from the reality of current crisis
centres run by a number of volunteers and only a handful, if any permanent salary-receiving employees.

The national women’s groups describe the lack of a systemic approach to violence against women among public entities. For example, they outline how victims of violence experience difficulties with obtaining evidence required for a legal case. They blame this on individual medical and police personnel that do not properly understand the role that their individual work has in the system as a whole. Representatives of women’s groups also experience that some of these people, who are supposed to assist victims, aim to personally avoid the issue. Women’s groups point to a lack of understanding of the role that these individual public servants have in regard to a broader societal problem. Although it is technically possible to address incidents of violence against women within the current legislation, the failure to do so shows the weak comprehension of the issue, both on the level of the system and on the level of the individual public servant, explain representatives of national women’s groups.

Women’s groups have achieved a key role as narrators of the problem of violence against women in Russia. Through their work they have contributed to making violence against women a contested issue in the post-Soviet era. In their role as narrators, women’s groups describe the problem. They do this by gathering knowledge of how the victims of violence are treated when interacting with public authorities. Women’s groups describe the practice of public servants. For example, the legislative system is entitled to provide help to victims of violence, but women’s groups have observed that it is incomprehensible how this help can be attained. The women’s groups are particularly experienced on how victims are met when interacting with medical and police personnel. Among the difficulties is the failure to document the harms done to a victim, thereby creating difficulties in regard to a legal process. Also, the tendency of domestic violence to be repeated is not acknowledged, and law enforcement fails to act on an early stage. This information gathering by women’s groups represent a form of immanent critique of the work of the authorities on this issue. By describing the difficulties of victims in interacting with public authorities, the women’s groups provide a contested perspective on how women and violence against women are dealt with in Russia. This important practice is backed up by a series of projects by women’s groups aimed at inducing change. For example, women NGOs have attempted to imprint agents of change in the legal system, through the education of role models. As opposed to the exposition of practices of neglect by public authorities, these projects are constructive in the sense that they aim at institutionalizing new approaches to the issue in practice.
In their problem description, women’s groups emphasize what is not functioning. This is a terrain that women’s groups have gained control over. Women’s groups have introduced violence against women to the broader public debate. This is a symbolic power of importance. So far however, there is still little to be said about how this has created formal changes. Compared to the silence on the issue in the Soviet era, the last two decades of women’s activism have induced openness in regard to addressing the issue, and detailed knowledge of the difficulties in approaching, documenting and addressing it has been collected. Women’s groups have taken the opportunity to create this openness. There is however also disagreements among the women’s groups. For example in regard to criminalization, where some argue that a specific legislation is crucial to effectively approach the issue, and others are against this. Women’s groups also engage in competition for grant money.

To sum up the problem description of Moscow-based women’s groups, two challenges to security production for victims of violence against women are outlined. First, there is a lack of systemic recognition in terms of establishing procedures and clear rules of engagement. Second, in interaction with individual servicemen, a critical concern is their lack of concern and willingness to take care of and bring reported cases of violence against women further in the system. Individual bureaucrats do not comprehend the role of their work in a larger context but are not sanctioned in the system. Their neglect does however not go unnoticed. These practices have been observed and documented by women’s groups. Continued neglect can be problematic as the issue of violence against women gains even broader awareness.

The question now is how local crisis centres work in regard to overcoming the systemic obstacles. How can security for women be created locally amid these difficulties? What are the views of the victims of these and other constraints on security? The question is thus how the struggles play out locally and define the security practices of non-state crisis centres. This local focus is the concern in the following chapter.
7. Security practices of local crisis centres

Through their services of assistance to and therapy for victims of violence against women, crisis centres address the particular situation of specific women. Compared to advocacy work aimed at reforming the political and juridical approaches to the issue of violence against women that national women organizations concentrate on, such work with specific women in their local community addresses concrete women and their specific life-situation. A women group’s representative in Moscow explains this difference between advocacy addressing the political system and therapeutic work directed at specific women and their situation:

“Every law enforcer is supposed to follow the law, but no one does it. And you [as an activist] cannot do anything, of course. There are many such incidents when you in fact are not able to do anything. But that is in regard to juridical issues. Those are juridical issues, when you are against the system… The system, as we know, is not always treating you “loaly” (kindly), let’s put it that way. But when there is psychological work, then it concerns women who are invisible. They are not heard, they are not on stages, not on radio, not in newspapers. Because very difficult cases can of course not be explained in newspapers, on television. (…) When they contact us, we guide them psychologically and also [attempt to guide them] juridically. (…) So in general, there are many difficulties, but in that [crisis centre assistance] there is, I think, a result. Concretely for women.” (Informant 12/2006)

Crisis centres are here outlined as agents that through their assistance to individual women provide help that gives results for specific women. Such practices by local crisis centres in the Russian Northwest are in focus in this chapter.

For this study, the framework of analysis is a field of security defined by two sets of relations, between crisis centres and stakeholders, and between crisis centres and victims (see chapter five). The historical and national context outlined in the previous chapter forms a background for understanding the work of the local non-state crisis centres. The concern now is how local constraints affect practices of security. The achievements of the non-state crisis centres, how they amid constraints on action have managed to establish an assistance structure for victims in their immediate local context, are in focus. In the analysis I draw upon the interviews with local crisis centre representatives and Norwegian representatives of the Network of Crisis centres in the Barents region (NCRB), and also use the one interview I conducted with a victim.118

The object of analysis is to explain how non-state crisis centres practice security. Their practices are constrained and the concern is to identify these constraints within the field of

118 See chapter four for details on the conduct of interviews.
security from violence against women in Northwest Russia. The means of identifying these are Bourdieu’s conceptual tools of capital and habitus. The analysis will show the use of theory in the interpretation of the empirical material. This application of a Bourdieusian approach aims to contribute to discussion on the methodology for establishing knowledge of security in people’s life-worlds. The concepts of capital and habitus are successively introduced and explained in this chapter. A main concern when making use of these concepts is to explain how they are adapted to the specific empirical case in focus. As seen in chapter five on the concept of field, Bourdieu’s concepts are not codified in terms of strict rules of application, something Bourdieu rejected as a “scholastic endeavour” (Müller 2002:169) to empirical data. Instead, these concepts are characterized by an openness that requires specification and adjustment to the concrete empirical context in focus. This is also the case with the concepts of capital and habitus. The concepts are open categories for the application and adjustment to specific empirical contexts. This flexibility allows application of these concepts to different empirical fields but also demands that the concepts are explicated specifically in regard to the field on which they are to shed light. This makes the specific arrangement of theory and empirical material in the same chapter necessary: By presenting the concepts and explaining how they are transferred to the specific context, the aim is to have a proximity that ensures that theory functions as tool and guide to understanding the empirical material. The field within which non-state crisis centres manoeuvre to establish security is thereby systematically constructed by means of these thinking tools.

The concept of field provided the starting point for working with the empirical material, as introduced in chapter five. Bourdieu emphasized that the concepts are elements in a theoretical system, and therefore the notion of field needs to be understood in combination with other concepts, those of capital and habitus (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:96). A key point in regard to the concept of field is that analytical attention must be directed at the agents and their characteristics, in Bourdieu’s conceptual language - capital. This is means to comprehending the specific field. In this chapter therefore, the focus is first on capital (7.1) and then on habitus (7.2.). In the final section (7.3.) these parts of the analysis are brought together to explain how non-state crisis centres practice security.
7.1. Forms of capital and security practices

The concept of capital is important to understanding practices of security because it defines the abilities of action. The possession of capital describes agents’ possibilities of manoeuvring within the field:

“Capital (...) is a force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally possible or impossible.” (Bourdieu 1983b:241)

Agents’ possibilities of action, their strategies, are dependent upon their appropriation of capital. The agents are engaged in a struggle for what is at stake in the field, and for that purpose, “[t]he objective of human activity is the accumulation and monopolization of different kinds of capital.” (DiMaggio 1979:1463) The forms of capital are convertible and cumulative, and the space of possibilities for actors is therefore delimited both by the total amount of capital and the possession of different forms of capital. The structure of distribution of capital at a certain moment in time, “represents the immanent structure of the social world, i.e. the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of the world, which governs its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices.” (Bourdieu 1983b:242) The question in regard to my analysis is what forms of capital affects non-state crisis centres’ security production.

Throughout his work Bourdieu introduced various forms of capital. Economic, cultural and social capital are, depending on the field, the three principal forms of capital (ibid. 243). Other forms of capital that have been analytically deciphered by Bourdieu are symbolic, family, religious, political, moral and state capital. Paul Di Maggio (1979:1463) also lists linguistic capital as a form of capital identified by Bourdieu.¹¹⁹ David Swartz (1997:79) argues that the forms of capital have proliferated in Bourdieu’s work, and is concerned that this proliferation of forms of capital devalues the concept as an analytical tool for comprehending power because “there emerges a tendency to see power everywhere and, in a sense therefore, nowhere – an extreme diffusion of power that Bourdieu himself rejects.” (ibid.) To study the distribution of capital and its effects in terms of practices is to study power dynamics, as capital is power (Bourdieu 1983b:243). Capital is the means that the agents in a field have at hand to achieve their ends. In regard to analyzing security, Anna Leander (2005) has shown a specific use of Bourdieu’s work with a focus on power and the

¹¹⁹ It is noted that although these multiple forms of capital remain unsystematic, they reflect a research practice that is flexible in regard to aims of research and the specific fields (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:161).
production of knowledge of security (see also ch. 3.3.). In her analysis of the field of security expertise and the role of private security professionals, she made use of Bourdieu to draw attention to how agents’ practices collectively serve to reproduce a specific kind of knowledge. She argues that the practices of private security professionals invigorate a certain expertise of security that furthers a technico-managerial focus on security. The private security professionals present their knowledge by providing information and setting agendas, which amounts to cultural capital, and by lobbying and consulting their customers, among them politicians, which is the use of social capital. The focus on hyper-efficient and low cost solutions coupled with a problem-solving attitude, are key elements of the technico-managerial focus lobbied by the private security professionals. Leander argues that the increasing weight on such issues in public discussion about security illustrates the shift from public to private security discourses and this reinforces a re-militarisation of security. Because

“[w]hen a problem is not a security problem or would be better responded to by way of diplomacy or economic aid or a re-regulation of markets, the services of PMCs are not needed. It is therefore not surprising that the firms tend more often than not to treat issues as security problems and then proceed on the assumption that what is called for is a technico-managerial solution.” (Leander 2005:824)

She argues that it is ingrained in their logic of existence to “frame security issues as questions of managerial efficiency and technical competence.” (ibid.) In this manner they ensure that their services are needed. This is a tacit way of authorising a specific approach to security, and drawing upon Bourdieu, Leander explains this as an instance of power (Ibid. 825). As a response to Swartz’ concern with diffuse power everywhere, it is necessary in the analysis to display the specific effects of power through practices, such as exemplified with Leander’s analysis. This emphasis on empirical illustration can in my view accommodate concerns with a diffuse power concept. Leander does not use the concept of capital explicitly in her analysis, but by thinking with Bourdieu, she illustrates the power of private security professionals by focusing on their cultural and social capital and how this defines the knowledge they legitimate. The importance of Leander’s study in regard to the task of outlining capital as analytical category here is to emphasize the need to empirically illustrate the functioning of the forms of capital. This also contributes to explaining why I focus on economic and social capital. Drawing upon the available empirical material, two basic forms of capital, economic and social capital, are identified as key to the attempts to institutionalize a response system for victims of violence against women in Northwest Russia. These are the forms of capital that I can illustrate with the empirical material. Also, I have throughout the analysis strived to stay open to new, field-specific species of capital. For example, the concept of symbolic capital is
relevant to the kind of practices studied here, in which a civil society actor strives to increase the knowledge of a societal issue and their work. Such activities can be understood as ongoing symbolic struggles over the power to produce and to impose the legitimate vision of the world (Bourdieu 1989). The analysis shows the importance of symbolic capital in the security production of non-state crisis centres, but also exposes difficulties in this field of security.

The concept of capital is thus used as technique for analyzing the empirical material, and focus is primarily on economic and social capital. In Bourdieu’s work economic capital encompasses all forms of material possession that are convertible into money. Bourdieu considered economic capital the most important form of capital, which lies behind all other forms of capital (Bourdieu 1983b:252; cf. Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:161). While emphasizing the importance of the material conditions in social reality, the social world is not reducible to it:

“It is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognized by economic theory.” (Bourdieu 1983b:242)

This makes clear that the concept of capital does not refer exclusively to monetary capital. The concept of social capital, together with cultural capital expresses the importance of immaterial aspects in Bourdieu’s theory. Social relationships are a primary characteristic of social capital. The class is one way in which such relationships are socially instituted and guaranteed, as are also the family, tribe, school, or party. Social capital is dependent on the social networks to which the agent belongs:

“The volume of social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected.” (ibid. 249)

To comprehend social capital it is thus necessary to establish the networks to which the agent is connected. The establishment and reproduction of such relationships are dependent upon action that establishes subjectively felt obligations. This is accomplished by producing a social relation that is endlessly reproduced through exchanges of for example gifts or words. Since “exchange transforms the things exchanged into signs of recognition” (ibid. 250), exchanges are the means by which relations or group membership are re-produced. The reproduction of social capital thus requires a continuous series of exchanges, and this demands economic capital:

“This work [the reproduction of social capital (KS)], which implies expenditure of time and energy and so, directly or indirectly, of economic capital, is not profitable or even conceivable unless one invests in it a specific competence (knowledge of genealogical relationships and of real connections and skill at using them, etc.) and an acquired disposition to acquire and
The process by which social capital is reproduced directs attention to how relationships are transformed into lasting connections. The interconnection between social and economic capital, that the investment in social capital requires economic capital, is important to the specific field of non-state crisis centres security production. The economic capital base of non-state crisis centres in Russia today is weak. Considering the interconnection between social and economic capital, this is particularly detrimental because it is a potential threat to the social relations that the crisis centres have built during the last decade. Their social capital is an important aspect of their security production, and albeit a continuing weak economic resource base, to uphold this important power basis can be difficult.

On a collective level, in regard to groups, such as for example crisis centres for women, the concentration of the social capital of a group is made possible through institutionalization. For example, mechanisms of delegation and representation ensure the concentration of a group’s social capital. One person is mandated as the legitimate representative of the group. Such a position entails power, and in regard to internal developments within a group, this power position may contribute to internal competition that may threaten the conservation or accumulation of the social capital of this group. It is therefore important to “regulate the conditions of access to the right to declare oneself a member of the group and, above all, to set oneself up as a representative (delegate, plenipotentiary, spokesman, etc.) of the whole group, thereby committing the social capital of the whole group.” (Bourdieu 1983b:251) Such a struggle for positions of representation is present in the empirical material on non-state crisis centres: one crisis centre was in particular characterized by internal struggles, fragmentation and re-establishments. The main analytical concern is however how the centres manoeuvre in their interactions with stakeholders and victims, and this internal struggle is not further examined.

The concern in regard to the specific empirical context of women’s groups and security practices is to identify the possession of capital and look at how it works to enable and constrain security practices. This implies that the specification of species of capital relevant to the empirical field in question must be contextually specific, and here these are, as stated above, economic and social capital.
Over time, the distribution of capital may change. The legitimate means and stakes of
the struggle in a field are subject to constant struggle, and “therefore subject to variations in
the course of the game” (Bourdieu 1984:246). As agents’ resources for action can change
over time, this may change the constraints on action, and ultimately the objective relations in
the field. The analysis of capital in the specific empirical field in focus here addresses agents’
capital endowment and how this affects their practices of security as explained in interviews
at one specific moment in time. In the interviews, I also asked the informants to assess
whether and how they over time have observed changes in regard to women and security,
with a particular emphasis on local responses. Agents’ experiences of change have been used
to assess what they consider possible action and if these possibilities have undergone change
throughout their time as activists. This is how I have attempted to get near to assessing
changes in capital possession. One difficulty in regard to assessing change over time is that
other factors, such as for example overlapping fields, may affect changes observed in the
interactions analysed here. If the legitimate means of the struggle have changed, i.e. if the
understanding of how to address violence against women is undergoing change, this may
therefore be observable in this specific empirical context, but can maybe not be explained
exhaustively in regard to its causes.

In the following analysis, the concept of capital is used to analyse the security
production of local crisis centres by emphasizing how economic and social capital enables
and constrains action. Addressing access to capital in various forms and relevant to the
struggle in the field is analytical means to uncovering agents’ resources for action. The
possession of capital exposes the structural position from which agents act. Analysing forms
of capital thus provide insight on the objective relations that define structural constraints on
agents’ action.

### 7.1.1. Violence and politics in Northwest Russia

The establishment of local non-state crisis centres provided a structural incitement for change
to victims of violence. The centres represent a physical space in which victims can meet with
people who are familiar with women who experience domestic violence. In Northwest Russia

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120 This alludes to the fact that change is conceptualized also within Bourdieu’s theory. Many critics are
concerned with what they consider determinism and endless reproduction of status quo in terms of social
differentiations in Bourdieu’s study. My view on this is that static reproduction is not a predefined assumption
entailed in the epistemological underpinning of the concepts. Reproduction is a result seen in specific empirical
analyses that Bourdieu conducted, and this is particularly visible in the empirical studies of for example the
school system, academia and the cultural field.
these centres are small entities with a minimum of infrastructure, e.g. office space, phones, computers. They are mainly run on the basis of voluntarism, drawing upon “professional volunteers” and other volunteers. A shelter, a safe place to stay for women who are in an acute threat situation, is available only at the crisis centres Murmansk and in Sortevala. In Sortevala the shelter was set up by the NGO but is now run by the municipality. The other crisis centres negotiate with the municipal authorities to make use of municipal shelters available to homeless people. This is an example of struggles for acquiring resources for improving the security situation for victims of violence against women. Local crisis centres possession and use of economic and social forms of capital are important factors in this struggle.

Material resources: voluntarism, creativity, and survival

“Enthusiasm – that’s great! But there is a need to provide some material assistance of some kind.” (Informant 6/2006)

When non-state crisis centres first emerged in the Northwest part of Russia in the latter half of the 1990s, a range of enthusiasts was engaged. For the establishment and persistence of such local initiatives of assistance, a (continued) material basis is essential. The possession of economic capital affects the resources and powers of an agent in a field and this becomes visible in terms of their ability to employ their strategies. For the non-state crisis centres in focus here, two sources of funding have dominated: foreign and state funding. Foreign funding has been acquired through grants to which the crisis centres have applied. This has been a main source of finance for Russian crisis centres in general:

“If [you look at] Russia as a whole, the majority of crisis centres was opened on the basis of grants that non-governmental organizations attracted.” (Informant 7/2006)

This confirms the discussion in chapter six. The grants that the crisis centres that I interviewed have acquired originate from a wide range of sources, such as IREX, TACIS (EU)\(^{121}\), the Council of Ministers of Nordic Countries, Fond EURASIA, the Solidarity Foundation (Helsinki), the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Barentsssecretariat, and NCRB. The NCRB was initiated in 1999 and has provided travel grants and support for the organization of conferences, and has not been involved in financing the day-to-day activities of local crisis centres. The Russian Association of Crisis Centres (RACC) has distributed grants that have been acquired on a national level for the purpose of contributing to the

\(^{121}\) TACIS is the EU’s program for reconstruction of Southern and Eastern Europe, Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS).
advancement of local crisis centres. Funds from IREX have for example been distributed through this channel. Although grants may finance the work of the crisis centre, concerns are also expressed about this form of finance, as it is not easily acquired: “We have a few grants that we wrote. But that is so difficult!” (Informant 2/2006)

There is a regional funding pattern that is particularly visible in the Russian Northwest, and this is characterized by funding from Norwegian and Finnish donors, as well as joint Nordic financial assistance through the Nordic Council of Ministers. One particular example of this regional pattern of funding is evident in the establishment of the crisis centre “Prijut” in Murmansk in 1997. This crisis centre is a result of a joint cooperation between the Kola Peninsula Women’s Congress and the Norwegian Council of Equality. The immediate prelude to the erection of the crisis centre Prijut in Murmansk was a conference on April 19-20, 1996 on the role of women in the development of the north.122 During the two initial years of the project, 1996-1997, the project received a total of 405,000NOK (circa USD70,000).123 A Norwegian crisis centre located in Tromsø functioned as project leader with the task of overseeing the development of the project over a three year period, 1997-2000. From the opening of the crisis centre Prijut on April 20, 1997 until 2000, the activities and the budget of Prijut were followed up with, among other things, three visits by the Norwegian project leader and joint attendances at conferences in Norway. Also, five women from Murmansk worked as interns at the crisis centre in Tromsø during the three year period.124 Having a Norwegian project leader implied that a Norwegian crisis centre model was paired with an emerging Russian one. In the final report the critical adaptation of the Norwegian experience to Russia was reflected:

“The Norwegian crisis centre model, which was the basis of the project, was difficult to adopt without changes to the Russian context. Therefore it is nice to be able to conclude that it has

122 This was a particularly large conference with about 130 Norwegian participants and 300 Russian, among them senior representatives from the Norwegian Council of Equality and Russian regional administration. In addition to plenum sessions, the conference entailed a range of smaller seminars on issues such as organization-building and networking; education; employment; family and society; and health and welfare (From a summary of the conference authored by the delegate from the crisis centre for women in Tromsø, of which a copy is available with the author). Preparations for this conference, which was funded by the Barentssecretariat and headed by the Norwegian Council of Equality in the project ”Work and Welfare for Women in the Barents-region”, went on throughout 1995. Local enthusiasts in Murmansk actively attended the four open planning sessions, which is estimated to have included a total of 300 participants.

123 Numbers collected from the Project catalogue 1997 of the Barentssecretariat, dated 20.02.98. A copy of this source is available with the author.

124 Information from the final report of the project leader to the Barentssecretariat in Kirkenes, dated 23.05.00, a copy of which is available with the author. This and the sources mentioned above were kindly conveyed to me by the Crisis Centre for Women in Tromsø. The following outline of the finances that contributed to the establishment of Prijut in Murmansk is based on this archive material.
become a lucky structure, and that there are more skilled personnel involved in the group, who can use both their juridical and psychological education in their interaction with the “users”.\textsuperscript{125}

In this reflection the challenges related to external funding, pertaining to the development of local solutions as opposed to use of external models is commented upon in terms of how it has led to the development of a particularly satisfying structure. The funding from the Barents secretariat provided the necessary resources for acquiring an apartment as well as various materials such as a washing machine, furniture, kitchen utensils and other house wares as well as data equipment. With the assistance of carpenter students, the apartment of the crisis centre was equipped with bunk beds, which could then function as shelter for the women. This financial basis and collaboration with Norwegian partners ensured a successful start-up of the crisis centre for women, Prijut, in Murmansk.

The Prijut crisis centre has later acquired finances also from other sources. For example, in 2000 the centre received a grant from IREX for the conduct of an educational seminar on women’s self-esteem, called “Become successful!” Since 1999 Prijut has also been involved in the NCRB, which throughout its two project periods, 1999-2002 and 2002-2005, has contributed with financial support for the organization of conferences and travel and lodging costs related to conference attendances. At the time of the interview, spring 2006, the crisis centre Prijut was preparing a project proposal for submission to a municipal grant procedure. The local administration has signalled that there will be a grant application process for local non-governmental organizations, but neither the deadline of application, the requirements or priorities of such a grant scheme were made known in spring 2006 (Informant 3/2006). The planned project addresses violence, because this is identified as of strategic importance to the local administration:

“Because here this [violence against women] is more realistic, we already understand, to what the power [local administration] will give money. There is a need of course for a family shelter for women, their work, and so on. The first emphasis is on this.” (Informant 3/2006)

Since its initial assistance from the Norwegian Council of Equality and the funding from the Barents secretariat, the crisis centre in Murmansk has thus become concerned with other sources of finance such as foreign grants and most recently, the possibility of state funding.

In Sortevala in Karelia, state funding of the crisis centre has in fact become a reality, but also here foreign funding with a regional character was crucial for the establishment and initial operation of the crisis centre. The women organization Nadeschda in Sortevala is a

\textsuperscript{125} Quote from the final report of the project leader to the Barents secretariat in Kirkenes, dated 23.05.00.
traditional Council of Women that in 2003 was invited by the Solidarity Foundation from Helsinki to establish a project on violence against women. Located in the western part of the Republic of Karelia, previously in Finnish Karelia and today on the border with Finland, Sortevala has become a resort for Finnish tourists (among them sex tourists). Together with the Finnish partners and financed through the TACIS programme of the EU, the establishment of a crisis centre for women in Sortevala began in 2003. In this case, the local administration contributed with infrastructural assistance in the form of a house. The project money financed a renovation, and as a result, during the years 2003 and 2004 the Finnish-Russian partnership had resulted in a house dedicated to the crisis centre that also included a shelter with two rooms for women and children. The crisis centre was then taken over by the local authorities and is today financed and operated by the municipal authorities (Informant 8/2006).

State funding is thus the second element in the financing of local non-governmental crisis centres. Generally, the local authorities contribute with material assistance in various forms, for example by providing rent-free office space in some cases, local phone lines, assistance in connection with conferences, among other things. This combination of finances acquired through international grant application procedures and material assistance from local administrative authorities have consequences for the form of organization of the non-governmental crisis centres: none of these financial sources are permanent. The project based financing often implies that payment of personnel is not a priority. The crisis centre Prijut for example has permanently paid a bookkeeper as well as the leader of the centre. Other personnel that are vital to the functioning of the centre, such as psychologists and lawyers, are most often not paid. Such “professional volunteers” are also running the Cabinet in Severodvinsk. This implies that consultants work evenings, because at day-time they have their salary-providing jobs to fulfil (Informant 7/2006). In Archangelsk the municipal crisis centre was in fact administered away as a result of a re-organization of the local administration in 2005. However, the work of the crisis centre did not end:

“Well, enthusiasts remained, specialists remained, who already worked with me many years, and we decided to register officially a crisis centre, non-governmental, societal organization.” (Informant 6/2006)

The municipal crisis centre was thereby transformed into a non-state crisis centre called Nadeschda. The previous municipal crisis centre was re-established as a municipal “Department for the protection of children’s rights from violence”. This did however not affect the local provision of services because the co-workers continued on a voluntary basis with a crisis centre for women on evening hours:
“They [the local authorities] gave us permission to work here [in the premises of the local authorities] on evenings in this organization. [Their response was] really great because in essence, they understand that we also work for [the benefit of] the city, for our population, for our people, and therefore they responded normally [when we decided to establish a non-governmental organization], very well.” (Informant 6/2006)

At the time of interview in 2006 and also in a second interview summer 2008, the non-governmental crisis centre Nadeschda in Archangelsk continues their work by operating a phone line on evening hours and agreeing on personal consultations at times suitable, all run by eight volunteers who receive no payment:

“Today there is none [no financing]. Everyone works for free. We strive to do some kind of projects or something, in order to acquire some kind of financing. But now the work is totally without payment, we do not have any finances.” (Informant 6/2006)

This is also the case with the other crisis centre in Archangelsk, Mosti Miloserdija. This crisis centre is located in the premises of the State university of Archangelsk, at the Department of Social Work, and infrastructure in the form of a small office space, a computer and phone lines, is thus provided by the state. The crisis centre comprises one director, who is employed as university professor, and volunteers, among them a professional psychologists and a lawyer. The majority of the volunteers are students of social work and psychology, who wish to acquire work practice. Volunteers are sometimes motivated by having experienced violence in the family, but another important factor also attracts volunteers:

“Since that time [of the establishment of the centre] I have been asked many times why volunteers work for free? When there are such serious conditions. First, the volunteers experienced at some point violence. That was the first intake. Beyond that, they either watched violence closely, and therefore they were such convincing helpers, and they very much wanted to begin to help women. Later, the preparation we gave was great. Several trainings were organized. And Swedes arrived here, trainers, and from St. Petersburg, from Finland, and they understood the practice well. And later a stream of volunteers arrived. (…) In our women crisis centre, please, there is as much practice as you can wish.” (Informant 1/2006)

The final sentence makes visible that there is no shortage of demand of the crisis centre and the work of its volunteers. Because of the incentives of attending qualified, professional training seminars and gaining relevant working experience, volunteers are attracted to become engaged and work for free at the crisis centre.

Voluntary, unpaid work is overall the primary means through which local crisis centres in the regions have built and run a structure of assistance for victims of violence. This voluntarism fulfils a weakness in the state social structure but also eventually eschews political discussion on division of responsibilities and tasks between local crisis centres and governmental entities related to the challenge of addressing violence against women. This political aspect of voluntary work is not addressed however. But the economic aspect of voluntarism is an object of concern:
“I always strive to avoid that the volunteers, who generally do not receive anything from their work, do not receive anything. Because I think that people should receive something from their work. In this programme there were always money, but beyond that I always welcomed it if there were another pay check, another kind of work… This [crisis centre work] is not from morning till evening. Therefore it would be best to avoid that the pay check is only dependent on this. Because the programme ends and then you need something to eat. So, he [the worker] needs to, needs to receive [payment]. If that is not money, or only very small money, I tried to achieve for example in our organization that all the women travelled abroad with the programme. For some of the women this was the first time in their life… A free trip, that’s great. Then travelling to Moscow, for discussions there, learning how to work on a computer. Work needs to be (...). People, who worked here and took part in training and seminars, later found work. They already began to work and were invited [to work] by government entities. They found work because they had worked here.” (Informant 9/2006)

A primary concern is that the material needs of the volunteers are met. The crisis centres functioned as an arena for acquiring relevant qualifications that opened up possibilities for other work, as emphasized here within the regional administration, or as in Murmansk, work in other non-governmental organizations, e.g. Norwegian or other international associations. In this manner crisis centres contribute to self-fulfilment of the women who are trained and acquire working experience at the centres. Their material needs could maybe not be pleased at first instance, but their self-esteem could:

“Now [2006] there are 10-15 volunteers. Earlier there were more, until 47. That was during the first years, when there was no work but [people] wanted to work. Wanted to, were ready to work without pay. There was an understanding that everyone was in the same situation, it was difficult for everyone, hard, everyone in the country was in one and the same social-economic situation. And here they kind of decided their psychological problems. Materially they could here in reality not solve anything. We do not provide jobs.” (Informant 3/2006)

In the late 1990s, the socio-economic situation was particularly precarious as evident in the 1998 devaluation of the rouble. It was in this context therefore that the voluntary work at a crisis centre provided an opportunity for an employment that, if it did not contribute to covering material needs, it did contribute to self-esteem. The experience and networks established through work at a crisis centre even proved transformable into other, paid employment opportunities. The main concern here however is that the voluntarism of the women enabled the crisis centres to establish a structure of assistance for women. It is however acknowledged that the funding situation implies instability:

“… [A] crisis centre for women should of course be state assistance. That kind of services such as a shelter for women, crisis centre, phone hotline, they should not be dependent on projects, that after a year… That is, of course, […] when she [the assistance system] is governmental, that implies that she works continuously.” (Informant 9/2006)

The crisis centre representative thereby acknowledges the instability that defines their work because of the precarious finance situation, and the state is called upon to provide stability:

“Crisis centres should be municipal entities.” (Informant 4/2006). This is a statement supported by a majority of the informants, calling for increased state action. Among the seven
crisis centres interviewed in the Russian Northwest, two, Maja (2000-2005) in Petrozavodsk and CKANNA (1999-2003) in Murmansk have terminated their activities when funding ended. The material conditions defined the stability and persistence of the non-state assistance system. Both the two crisis centres that ended their work in 2003 and 2005 respectively, explain that they continued to receive calls from victims asking for their help. Their phone numbers, as well as the people behind the organization, had become well-known, and therefore people continued to call.

For the majority of the crisis centres with which I met, the access to economic resources affected the provision of services in terms of opening hours of the hotline, although they avoided ending their services. In particular, both Mosti Miloserdiya and Nadeschda in Archangelsk continue their work unabated without any financial support. From a state perspective, this is convenient and practical. Any concerns about the political effects of voluntary work were however subordinated to concerns with helping women in need. As explained by one crisis centre representative, such political consideration of their work is to her irrelevant:

“I help every concrete woman to decide her problem. If I were to think about women rights in general, then it would not suffice me with concrete [experiences]. I on my part decided, that I will not fight against the big machinery of our state.” (Informant 2/2006)

Others are concerned that their activities are focused on providing information, educational seminar etc. aimed at changing attitudes towards the problem, and question what else they may contribute with:

“What can we do only on the basis of volunteers? Nonetheless need to attach specialists to money. That’s primary.” (Informant 8/2006)

Another crisis centre in fact took upon itself a particular responsibility in regard to the spending of state money, and was critical of the idea of asking for public money from the municipal budget to establish a shelter in the community:

“To erect a crisis centre in the form of a shelter or something that we do not need [here] - it will not be required. These are nonetheless budgetary [state] money, and I would not like to spend them [like that]. (…) For municipal money, we today would definitively not open such a structure. Today that would be a violation of the budget. We also have laws that we have a duty to implement. Within the framework of the budget we cannot do that today.” (Informant 7/2006)

On the other hand, the costs of not doing anything are also emphasized:

“They [the bureaucrats] tell us “no money”. To open a shelter – no money! We say, let’s count, how much money we need, in order to help women to decide their crisis situation today, and [compare this to] how much money our city, our republic, our country spends, when a women is beaten to death, dad goes to prison, child to children’s home… How much are we then spending? Or, a woman, who continuously lives in a condition of violence: What kind of
co-worker is she at work? How does she raise her children? How much do you need to spend of state money, in order for it to become a valued issue of society?” (Informant 7/2006)

There are thus various viewpoints among crisis centre representatives on their economic situation and the responsibility of the authorities for this situation. Displaying the cost of inaction may be a powerful image in a political discussion. Others are concerned with showing how they constrain themselves in order to act responsibly for the budget as a whole. Overall, however, the scarce economic resources of local crisis centres has affected the continuation of activities as some crisis centres have seized to exist as grants terminated. Local governments have contributed with rudimentary, but basic material resources as they have made premises and office supplies available to women’s groups. International grants have made the conduct of educational seminars and campaigns both addressing women in immediate crisis as well as preventive work directed at local stakeholders available. During the last years the possibilities of applying for and receiving international grants for local Russian crisis centres have declined however. Voluntarism is the primary feature of all the non-governmental crisis centres. The economic situation has thus clearly impacted the institutionalization of crisis centres. The centres have been kept active on the basis of women’s creativity, both in writing grant applications and in attracting women who are willing to give of themselves to help other women in crisis. This focus on economic capital has illustrated distress by women’s group activists concerning the lack of state funding, the reluctant channelling of money to these centres and also meagre national grant opportunities as well as changes in priorities of international grant givers who have made the situation more difficult for Russian non-governmental crisis centres. In this situation, the institutionalization of structures addressing women’s security in the life-world is weak. As a counterweight, in the next section it will be uncovered how non-state crisis centres nonetheless are engaged in multiple forms of interaction with local stakeholders. Thus, the focus is on social capital, i.e. the network of connections that is mobilized by non-state crisis centres.

**Local Networking and Self-presentation**

As a part of their efforts to produce security for women against violence, local crisis centres establish contact with multiple local stakeholders. Through these contacts they address immediate concerns of establishing security for victims as well as long-term value changes on the issue. Such interactions are in Bourdieu’s conceptual vocabulary described as social capital. It refers to the social networks with which agents interact. In this section therefore attention is directed at how non-state crisis centres mobilize their network connections: How do the local crisis centres interact with local stakeholders and how do they assess this
interaction? A particular concern is also how the crisis centre representatives assess changes over time in these interactions. This may indicate whether patterns of interaction have been established with local stakeholders that induce a certain obligation to respond to the issue of violence against women. Such obligation is the key to social capital because it induces reciprocity. Social capital is thus here to be examined on the basis of how crisis centre representatives outline and assess the realization of multi-agency in the regions.

Non-state crisis centres engage in direct dialogue with state entities by partaking in and organizing conferences, meetings and round-tables. For example:

“[We organize round-tables] specifically for the police, [and] specifically for various high-level state entities. On 20th February 2005 we organized a high level conference on trafficking, to which we invited all representatives of the regional power, from the [regional] Duma (…), executive power (regional government), and the governor and employees, all committees that have a relation to the problem of trafficking, and the police. And because of that, we established more close contact with the police.” (Informant 3/2006)

This form of exchange is typical of the interaction between municipal authorities, municipal leaders and police, and non-state crisis centres. Also less formal interaction are used to alert local authorities to the issue of violence against women and crisis centres:

“I met a lot with [representatives of] state structure, gave them, including the police, our coordinates [names, addresses, phone numbers]. I always gave them our coordinates in order for them to call us.” (Informant 9/2006)

In Severodvinsk, a conference on women’s issues in which the mayor participated, is particularly highlighted as a successful point of interaction. At this meeting the mayor called upon the women to develop a municipal programme on women’s issues. This initiative of the mayor derived from the need to respond to the national and regional plans on women’s issues. A national plan was adopted subsequent to the 1995 UN conference on women in Beijing (Sperling 1999), and a regional plan of Archangelsk oblast was adopted in 2000. Women activists in Severodvinsk organized three round-tables, and through these discussions the issue of violence against women was for the first time established as a concern in the city. This provided the basis for initiating measures on the issue within the framework of the municipal plan on women’s issues. To this end the local municipalities contributed with financial help in the form of an office and a phone line. The crisis centre representative summarizes the relations with the local municipality by emphasizing trust:

“The fact that the mayor immediately participates in practically all the arrangements we organize that is an indicator of the trust of the authorities, the mayor, in the activities that the organization initiates.” (Informant 7/2006)

Dialogue with local stakeholders was also a crucial element when the women’s group Nadeschda in Sortevala began its work on violence against women:
“Our objective is as such: first, at the very beginning [we] attracted attention to [the fact] that there is such a problem. When we began our work, we shouted at the top of our voices all over, on radio, in newspapers, in various articles, once a month we had a radio broadcast about the fact, that there is such a problem. We organized seminars, invited all specialists, invited representatives of the administration, so that they would know that we address this problem, that such a problem exists, and that this problem needs to be addressed complexly, then it can be solved. We are kind of the information provider or guide between the people and the power.” (Informant 8/2006)

In 2003, a crisis centre was erected in Sortevala with the assistance of the Finnish Solidarity Foundation, and after two years, the municipal authorities took over and began to run the crisis centre. The municipal crisis centre is now well established with two rooms for women and their children, and four employees. Although this is a successful result of the work of the local NGO, concern is expressed about the vigour and efficiency of the local authorities in addressing the issue of violence against women. To the question “what do in your opinion local authorities do in order to address the problem of violence against women”, the response is critical:

“For the time being, they’re at an initial level. At the beginning. You see, crisis centres are needed in all… we need such a structure, to establish a crisis centre in every district (rayon). Unfortunately, there is only a crisis centre here and in Petrozavodsk. There are not more of them. Even they were established on the basis of projects, international projects.” (Informant 8/2006)

An explanation for the passivity of local authorities is provided:

“Well, they [local authorities] don’t have money. They cannot [help]. They say, yes, you go ahead [with your projects], we help you, assist you, but we don’t have money.” (Informant 8/2006)

The financial constraints of municipal authorities is a main characterization that local crisis centres stress in their explanation of the form of interaction they have with local authorities. Practically all representatives of local crisis centres explain that “no money” is the message they receive from local authorities. For example, the women’s group in Severodvinsk explains:

“In the administrative structure municipal authorities can today only do that, which is put down in legislation. In principle we are now experiencing a reform of local administration, and a budget reform; we are experiencing a number of reforms. And in principle the authorities are only supposed to do that, which is prescribed. That means that to open a crisis centre for women is today not permissible. To open a new museum or library that is today a question of local authority. We are supposed to solve the problem of domestic violence within the framework of the municipal services, that structure, which already exists.” (Informant 7/2006)

On the subject of lack of money, it is noted that clever bureaucrats would know that they can personally gain from interacting with local women’s groups:

“They [local authorities, bureaucrats] participate in local seminars where they can hear concrete women [talk about] how they consider this issue, what they think about it. That’s all great. And clever bureaucrats, who are interested in developing the self and would like to gain
more authority, clever leaders of the region, they get civil society organizations used to working with them as partners. They see that that is preferable to them.” (Informant 9/2006)

Interaction with civil society organizations can be means to climbing a career latter. This might be a contributing factor to the positive relations between crisis centres and municipal authorities, as non-state crisis centres generally find that they are met with understanding when meeting with local authorities. As opposed to the earlier denial of the existence of the problem, the issue of violence against women is now being discussed. But initiatives on behalf of local authorities to establish a structure of assistance for victims of violence are meagre. The following description by the representatives of the crisis centre Prijut in Murmansk reflects a common understanding among the crisis centre representatives:

“Morally, the authorities help. (…) Deputies in the oblast, local Duma of the city of Murmansk and Murmansk oblast, they are really on the right track, understand the activities of the centre. Because we [crisis centre representatives] distribute information especially for them. We invite them to our arrangements, conferences, and round-tables. When they can, generally speaking, they provide assistance/help us.” (Informant 3/2006)

Such forms of interaction with local authorities are characteristic of the work of all the regional crisis centres. Because they have established such meeting points with local stakeholders, crisis centres have through their work established valuable networks. This has been a deliberate strategy since the beginning of the crisis centres. The local crisis centres evaluate that, as a consequence of the interaction with local authorities, the issue of violence against women is today met with a lot more understanding and concern on behalf of local authorities. This interaction seems however also to have created understanding on behalf of local NGOs of the financial situation of local authorities. As seen in the previous section, one local NGO explains on behalf of the local authorities why money for a local shelter would not be the correct way to spend public finances (Informant 7/2006). This indicates that the interconnections between local NGOs and municipal authorities are many and intertwined. In this particular case, the crisis centre representative talks of the municipal authority in terms of “we” because she has previously worked in the local municipality. Despite concerns about constrained municipal budgets, women activists stress that compared to the earlier rejection, they are today presented with a different view of the issue when they engage local authorities. The activists emphasize that a change has in fact occurred on behalf of local authorities:

“There’s a new comprehension (in the authorities). You can see that they listen to you. Well they don’t react, don’t answer the way you would like [them] to. There was a period when no one wanted to listen to you. Did not want to listen. Talked, talked, and talked – it was simply like air. But now they listen.” (Informant 1/2006)

Despite the unison assessment that local authorities are getting the message, that they now have an understanding of the existence of the problem of violence against women, there is
also a concern among women activists that this understanding differs from their own. One crisis centre representative emphasizes the need to speak the language of the bureaucrats in order to be heard:

“I understood that to bureaucrats you need to talk only in their language. No one likes it when you arrive as such a clever one. (...) We talk to the bureaucrats in a language of numbers.”  
(Informant 9/2006)

The argument is that in the exchanges with local authorities and bureaucrats there is a need to be very concrete. This is also a reason why the CEDAW convention is only of limited use and usefulness to the activists in the regions: although it provides a normative basis for the work of crisis centres, it is not a document that can help them and make them heard by local authorities. For that purpose, as argued in the quote above, a more specific, concretized language is required. Although not commenting on the specific form of language, how information is provided to local authorities is a particular concern:

“We established a specific language between each other, in interaction with the authorities. (…) If there is such a common information basis in terms of language after we’ve worked a couple of years, then I think that is a result.”  
(Informant 3/2006)

Developing common phrases is important to the activists as it creates a mutual understanding among them and ensures coherence in information provided to authorities.

Although local authorities now generally acknowledge the problem of violence against women, crisis centres express a concern about how they understand and approach the issue:

“The understanding of social problems, and this also characterizes the problem of women, is completely different among state and societal [non-governmental] organizations. The state understanding that is strict instructions. For example, a woman receives help from the state if she has a small income or if she is raising a child. That is, there are specific parameters on the basis of which they help her. Of course that is not the way it ought to be. And non-governmental organizations they don’t do that. For them it is not important how much she earns. For them it is important what kind of problem she has, that she contacted them [the non-governmental organization/crisis centre] with that problem [and that] she needs help.”  
(Informant 9/2006)

This resonates with the earlier assessment that administrative instructions define the range of possibilities of local authorities. Rules define whether or not they respond to the calls of activists at local crisis centres. While emphasizing such distinctions, it is acknowledged that they may reflect different tasks that state and non-state entities can fulfil in order to respond effectively to the issue of violence against women. Crisis centre representatives emphasize both the material and moral support that local authorities provide. The logic of their activities is however to demand and hope for more pro-active engagement with local authorities.

As local authorities continue to be slow to react, there is reason to question why crisis centre representatives emphasize that change has occurred in their approach to violence
against women. Is it in the interest of local crisis centres to claim that such change has occurred? Frustration concerning the lack of action is however also expressed:

“I think that some kind of understanding exists, people discuss with the one and the other representative of a committee, and they understand well. In principle, a general understanding is present, and both the major and governor know about the problem. And that’s all they say.” (Informant 3/2006)

To understand a problem, to express concern, is by this crisis centre representative not considered synonymous with taking serious action on the issue of violence against women. In order to receive such an assessment, there needs to be more than the talk about how they comprehend the problem. Crisis centre representatives stress that success in interaction with local stakeholders is when they receive assistance:

“Since the year 2000, we conducted various projects: [we organized] 16 days no to violence, round-tables, press conferences, and worked with the media. We also worked with civil servants, arranged personal meetings, [and] some kind of agreements to use in practice. If he, the bureaucrat, helps us, in that [assistance] there’s a success.” (Informant 3/2006)

Although such assistance exists, these local crisis centres in Northwest Russia have not benefited from systematic assistance from local authorities. Network connections between local crisis centre representatives and local authorities are established, but they continue to be characterized as ad hoc. In Murmansk, the representative of Prijut notes that all relevant local stakeholders are a part of their network, but to mobilize for action is difficult as they are constantly put on hold:

"Municipal organs of authority – the city council, mayor, governor – and beyond that, the social protection in the region (oblast) and in the city, well they express that yes, there is such a problem, but there is no money. That’s all. [You need to] be patient. Wait. And that’s all.” (Informant 3/2006)

The local crisis centres continue to address their networks in order to mobilize multiple stakeholders but overall the experience is that the response is on a case-to-case basis, and with very little systematic support. The returning key issue is money.

The crisis centre in Sortevala forms an exception. In Sortevala the crisis centre was founded by the local NGO with assistance from Finnish activists, and later taken over by the local authorities. The municipality in Sortevala took responsibility and continued the already

126 In contrast to this experience of local non-state crisis centres Northwest Russia that they have not benefited from systematic state support, Johnson (2006) argued that that work on violence against women in Russia is a success because of institutionalized support to crisis centres. Drawing upon Johnson, Olga Avdeyeva (2007) lists the nationwide awareness campaign by the Ministry of the Interior and government support of shelters as examples of such institutionalized support. As is evident in this analysis, these forms of support are not affecting the work of the local centres in this study. Analyzing the impact of foreign funding on promotion of norms, Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (2005) argues that the violence against women campaign in Russia has gained acceptance because it promotes a universal norm against physical harm.
established structure of the centre. Although frustration is expressed in regard to the sluggishness of local authorities, it is also acknowledged that work on violence against women implies deep, structural change:

“At least not only we began to address this [issue] totally alone, as legislative organs already look differently at this, and also the juridical practice. [But] of course, to decide this problem requires broad action.” (Informant 8/2006)

Although acknowledging this need to address fundamental structures in regard to the issue of violence against women, the local NGO in Sortevala has been successful in institutionalizing a local structure of assistance. First, they established a system of assistance, and then the key part of this system, the local shelter, has been taken over and now forms a part of the municipal social system. In the case of Sortevala therefore, the interaction with local authorities has been institutionalized.

Generally, all local crisis centres have wide networks and engage in multiple forms of interactions with these, but from the characterizations of crisis centre representatives these are not systematic. Rather, they are sporadic but continuous and can also be characterized by hesitancy. Although not regular and stable, there are however also examples of inventive forms of interaction. For example, the women’s group in Sortevala explained that they had experienced that access to health care services was a major challenge for women living in remote villages, and because of this, they put a new system in place: they established a “travelling” examination room. They bought and renovated a bus, and in cooperation with local health care, they created a system by which women could call the crisis centre, schedule an appointment and then the bus, with a doctor, would travel to the village. This system was required because of the remoteness of the area and the difficulties with transportation to an examination room. This is an example of how cooperation between the local women activists and local stakeholders led to the establishment of a new structure to the benefit of women.

All crisis centres also have experience with successful news coverage of their work in local media. It is particularly to the end of informing about the “positive news” of the crisis centres, e.g. their campaigns, that interaction with media is highlighted. Beyond the immediate interest in publicity, interaction with media is also means to addressing violence against women as an existing societal structure: To reach out through the media is means to challenging the public discourse on this issue and to inform about the assistance that can be provided. Practically all local crisis centres explain that interaction with media on a broad scale is an important aspect of their work, and particularly in the initiation of their work. The activity exemplified with the following quote is characteristic of the situation that the local crisis centres experience:
“When we began our work, we by all means everywhere, in radio, newspapers, in several articles, and every month we had a radio broadcast informing about the existence of this problem (in our community). [We] conducted seminars, and invited all specialists, leaders of the administration, in order for them to know that we are working on this problem.” (Informant 8/2006)

This work is considered crucial, as information is key, argue crisis centre representatives:

“If you are informed, it means you’re protected.” (Informant 9/2006)

In this regard there are particular local challenges however. For example, the local NGO in Sortevala began their work on violence against women by informing about their work in the local newspapers. They soon acknowledged that to reach out by means of newspapers is a challenge:

“In our case, we experienced that it was difficult even with information. Families, in which violence occurs, they live (far away) and do not read newspapers. Then in regard to television, they often do not have a television at home. Therefore we began to use a very simple form of broadcasting/information provision, such as radio. [This] is practically available everywhere, in all villages. Radio is for free. Later [we spread the message] through our volunteers, locals. Through the library, because people often go to the library.” (Informant 8/2006)

In regard to their work with media, the challenge is thus not in the interaction with the media as stakeholder but to reach out to women that need to know that assistance exists and that they can get help. This speaks to the novelty of crisis centres in Russia. In this particular case of Sortevala, the NGO began working on the issue of violence against women in 2003. A primary challenge, as observed in this quote, has been to reach out and to inform about their work in the many local villages in their remote district. For that purpose, they mobilized the existing network of women involved in the Council of Women. This network enabled broad presence:

"We began to build a system through which we could be able to help women in every situation if she contacted us. They [women] could contact us or call us. Beyond that, they could contact volunteers that live in the village. We had people in the villages that everyone knows. People with authority. In every village there is such a woman that has great authority. That is, in the village generally they know about this.” (Informant 8/2006)

By drawing upon members of the Council of Women, a broad presence of activists working on violence against women was enabled. As explained in chapter six, this woman organization has its root in the Soviet period, and in this case therefore a traditional social network was mobilized as means to addressing violence against women. Such a traditional network also formed the basis for the establishment of the crisis Cabinet in Severodvinsk, and the woman network Congress of Women on the Kola Peninsula, formed the basis for the initiation of the crisis centre “Prijut” in Murmansk. The Congress was established in 1992, but rested also upon the Soviet tradition of Councils of Women. In these three cases therefore, traditional social networks were mobilized for the work on violence against women. These
networks have contributed to access to a great number of volunteers, and their involvement has also contributed to a continuity of women’s activism. This becomes particularly visible when comparing these crisis centres that are based on traditional women’s networks to the crisis centres that have been established on the basis of reception of foreign grants. For example, both CKANNA in Murmansk and Maja in Petrozavodsk seized to exists when grant money were spent. In regard to Maja, a vast local network involving multiple stakeholders and forms of exchange led to continued societal engagement by the leader of the organization, but failed to ensure long-term existence of the crisis centre. There is thus a difference between the “modern” induced organizations that are linked to international funding patterns and organizations in addition involve traditional social networks. This is however not a strict distinction, as the crisis centre “Prijut” in Murmansk draws both upon the network of women in the Congress as well as upon foreign funding. To learn more about networks in the field and how this contributes to the forms of capital of crisis centres as local actors of security, I now turn to examine the Barents cooperation NCRB.

7.1.2. Cross-border collaboration and perspectives on local security practices

The establishment of local crisis centres in Northwest Russia was encouraged, financially and ideologically, by international partners. In regard to the development of crisis centres in Northwest Russia, regional collaborators were particularly relevant, among them Finnish activists:

“We were invited by the Solidarity Foundation in Helsinki. They worked in Third World countries, in Africa, on the same issue. They invited us. We know that there is such a problem here, so we decided to try it out. The only new element that we suggested was to buy a bus [that could bring help also to the remote villages.]” (Informant 8/2006)

The NCRB was however the most prominent example of Finnish and broader Nordic activism on violence against women in this regional context. Initiated by Finnish activist and researcher Aino Saarinen in 1998, this network brought together crisis centres from Northwest Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norway, and thus established collaboration among crisis centre representatives and activists engaged in work on violence against women across the Barents region. As seen in regard to the establishment of the crisis centre in Murmansk in 1997, Norway actively promoted gender issues within the framework of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. The increasing focus on the Barents region was also influential when a network of
women scholars and activists, the Femina Borealis\textsuperscript{127}, decided to expand their initial regional focus on the Nordic countries to also encompass Northwest Russia (Saarinen, Liapounova et al. 2003:13). This Femina Borealis network was a precursor to the NCRB on the basis of which activists in the region were brought together at various conferences, for example in Turku (Finland) in 1994, Oulu 1995, and Tromsø 1997. The NCRB was a Femina Borealis development project (ibid. 13). In regard to the initiation of NCRB, Aino Saarinen therefore argues that “we were not entering the field. We had been there for many years due to the Femina Borealis network.” (Saarinen 2004b:77) Many Russian members of Femina Borealis were engaged in work on crisis centres in Russia and this particular topic was thus familiar to the network. As the Nordic Council of Ministers in the late 1990s approached the Femina Borealis network and explained their concern with putting pressure on Northwest Russia in regard to this issue, the project of NCRB materialized (ibid. 77).

The NCRB built its collaborative network on the basis of already existing centres. The network comprised twelve crisis centres in Northwest-Russia and seven in the Nordic Barents region (Saarinen, Liapounova et al. 2003:19). The network built upon the idea of “empowerment by collaboration across the border” (Saarinen, Yukina et al. 2003:7). A key objective was to bring together various crisis centres as particularly the local Russian crisis centres at the end of the 1990s were unaware of each other. The NCRB organized training programs, arranged conferences and initiated campaigns on the issue of violence against women, and thereby facilitated contact and exchange between crisis centres in the Barents region. The NCRB has through these activities both utilized and contributed to social capital amongst crisis centres in the Barents region. The NCRB organizers, the bilateral project team located in Oulu and Archangelsk assisted by the Feminist University in Northern Norway (in Steigen outside Bodø), set agendas and arranged training programs aimed at increasing the competence of employees and volunteers at crisis centres in the region (cf. Saarinen 2004a:276; Vardehaug 2005:3). In this regional context they acted as global governors who in the period 1998-2005\textsuperscript{128} exercised power and legitimacy across borders in the Barents region.

The NCRB was however not a top-down organized network. The form of project organization was aimed to ensure inclusion of grassroots units, i.e. local crisis centres, and

\textsuperscript{127} This term means “a northern woman” and expresses the idea of a common northern identity. Saarinen 2004b:77, footnote 1.
\textsuperscript{128} The NCRB was initiated in the late 1990s, and received its first funding in 1998. It came to a pause in 2005, but the NCRB continues to work in the region, albeit with scattered finances and thus level of activity.
representatives of both East and West. As a result, the NCRB working group tasked with organizing conferences, “included all the four respective nationalities and experience and expertise in crisis centre work and women’s movements and in academic and practice-oriented training.” (Saarinen 2004a:276) When arranging conferences, this working group collaborated with the local women’s group that hosted the conference. The location of conferences rotated, and this form of project organization ensured “rooting” of the project objectives in a local context while the participants practiced “shifting” as they travelled to various places that hosted NCRB participants, and listened to different viewpoints. In the period 1999-2000 the NCRB organized five conferences all in different locations, Apatity (Murmansk oblast, Russia), Steigen (Norway), Petrozavodsk, Luleå (Sweden), Archangelsk (Saarinen, Liapounova et al. 2003:Appendix 4, p. 204). The practice of “rooting” and “shifting” built upon a particular theory of political mobilisation according to which these are techniques that operate as means by which perspectives are altered (Saarinen 2004a:273). This had the effect that the NCRB induced a space of interaction beyond national borders. The interaction between Nordic and local Russian crisis centres created a space in which multiple viewpoints, norms and attitudes met, and distinctive aspects characteristic of the various cultures surrounding local crisis centres surfaced. This character of the field is here used to gain perspective on the local practices of crisis centres in Northwest Russia. To engage various perspectives was defined as an aim of the NCRB. Transversalism, understood as a particular ethical practice in international cooperation, was defined as an explicit aim: “In short, transversalism encouraged exchange of perspectives, a continual process of so-called rooting and shifting, in which participants first openly speak about their own values, experiences and aims and then listen – with empathy and respect – to the other participants.” (Saarinen 2003:87) Based on this idea the NCRB critically questioned “one-way transmission of ideas and institutions and all dependency of Russian units on their Western counterparts.” (ibid.) By creating a space for articulation of multiple voices, the NCRB strived for a dual learning process that could not only increase knowledge and information but create greater understanding of work on violence against women across borders in the Barents region. The

NCRB did thus not aim at instituting Western norms in Russia\textsuperscript{130}, but nonetheless acquainted divergences in its work, pertaining in particular to the diverse organization of crisis centres, not only between East and West but within national cultures as well. Further differences emerged in ideology, daily routines and the institutional setting (Saarinen 2004a:274). In the assessment of the first phase of NCRB 1999-2001, this is highlighted:

“In conclusion, when reflecting on the exercises in networking and institution building across the post-bipolar divide and the multiple institutional boundaries in the Barents, it is not justified to speak about any unified and harmonious community.” (Saarinen, Liapounova et al. 2003:56)

This character of the NCRB makes it particularly relevant here because it is a space in which divergences in concerns regarding the work of crisis centres become visible. As outlined in chapter four, I interviewed three Norwegian collaborators of the NCRB, two of which represent crisis centres and one who represents an educational institution that is a key collaborator within NCRB, the Feminist University in Steigen. One of the crisis centres, the crisis centre in Tromsø, had been part of regional collaboration with Russian partners prior to NCRB, and thus had a longer reference period for their viewpoints on their Russian collaborators. My interest was in their assessment of the work of local crisis centres in Russia. I aimed to utilize their expert knowledge for understanding the work of Russian crisis centres. Also, on the basis of their Western/Nordic/Norwegian reference for work on violence against women, I wanted to learn about the aspects they considered specific to the work of Russian crisis centres. The NCRB has expressed their viewpoints, explained their objectives and evaluated their work in a number of publications, including an especially assigned publication series of the Pomor University of Arkhangelsk.\textsuperscript{131} The Feminist University in Steigen has published conference proceedings and project reports on NCRB. The vast majority of the material on NCRB is self-reflective in the manner of explaining and assessing their work. The NCRB has thus been productive in writing its own story. My interest is in NCRB and their transversal activities in regard to reflection on security and security practices. In regard to security, the NCRB in fact defined it as one of its aims “to challenge the military-based and state-centred concepts of security safeguarded both by “malist” theories of international relations and ‘high politics’ in an area that, during the Cold War, was one of the most highly

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\textsuperscript{130} The NCRB acknowledged its affinity with the idea of infusing development from the West to the East as many of the local crisis centres in the Russian Barents were established on the basis of foreign grants. The NCRB initiators established that the Russian crisis centres could be well connected to their foreign partners but unfamiliar with other Russian centres in their own neighbourhood, and this was also a motivation for the establishment of the NCRB (Saarinen 2004a:273).

\textsuperscript{131} The publication series is entitled “Gender Research: methodology and practice”.
militarised places on the globe.” (Saarinen 2004a:272) This particular objective is however not assessed in any of the NCRB assessment reports, and it remains a rather unsubstantiated statement. As security and security practices of local Russian crisis centres is the key interest here, it is interesting to note that the NCRB in fact defined security thinking as one aspect of consideration in its regional networking although its effects remain analytically unaddressed. I have not conducted interviews with the Finnish-Russian NCRB project team but I have made use of available published material on NCRB and interviewed Norwegian participants in NCRB. Drawing upon these interviews, the question here is what are the distinctive aspects that these external actors have observed with local crisis centres in Northwest Russia?

**Lack of structures defining expectations**

The NCRB comprised two phases. From 1999-2002 the aim of the project was to facilitate exchange between the participating actors in the Baltic region. In the second phase, 2002-2005 the project comprised an educational training program designed particularly for the Russian crisis centres. Co-workers at Russian crisis centres were interns at Norwegian centres. The format of the second phase re-introduced a concern with the East learning from the West. At the same time it facilitated closer collaboration between Russian and Norwegian crisis centre representatives. A main concern was that the heterogeneous character of the NCRB (Saarinen, Liapounova et al. 2003:55) provided a space for the participants to reflect on similarities and differences of their practices. By engaging these in this analysis, the characteristics of the security production of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia become more visible.

As a result of the first phase of NCRB, a conclusion was drawn about the meagre changes but continuing hopes regarding institutionalization of new practices:

“No immediate changes took place concerning the most fundamental pre-existing differences in ideas and institutional practices and structures. However, as to the East-West asymmetries, we are sure that NCRB did take some important steps towards making the one-way transmission of ideas and institutions from the West into the East more multi-directional and, thereby, enabled a more reciprocal flow of experiences.” (ibid. 56)

On an institutional level, the NCRB included both state and non-state crisis centres. A central idea that pre-existed the NCRB and continues to characterize the network is crisis centres’ different approaches to men. In Sweden crisis centres are critical to working with male

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132 Both the Nora centre in Kirkenes and the crisis centre for women in Tromsø had Russian interns, and both these Norwegian centres were interviewed for this project. Because of this exchange program, these centres had specifically close contact with their Russian collaborators. An evaluation report notes that this contact was characterized by language difficulties (cf. Stemland 2003:71).
perpetrators. Norwegian centres are forthcoming as are Russian centres also on occasion. At the other end of the spectre are Finnish crisis centres that allow men to stay in shelters to receive treatment as objects of violence and abusers (Saarinen 2004b:79). These differences displayed internal tensions within NCRB but Saarinen suggests that this disparity “freed the NW Russian units – hopefully for good – from the idea that there exist some authorised Western models for crisis centres.” (ibid. 85) The diverse institutional structures within NCRB also made one-way transmission from West to East difficult. Russian non-state crisis centres may entail state elements, as they are hosted in state premises or represent a restructured state entity, as established in the previous chapter. This institutional unorthodoxy is an obstacle that ensures that Western ideas and experiences are not directly transmittable to the East (ibid. 76). In this manner, the heterogeneity of NCRB ensured discussion and multidirectionality among the participants. As a concrete result it is noted that the participation in multi-national group work facilitated mutual understanding and respect of each other’s reasoning (Stemland 2003:74).

The evaluations of NCRB direct attention to institutional and ideational differences between the participants in the network. The interest is here however in the viewpoints on differences observed in practice. When talking to Norwegian NCRB representatives about their Russian colleagues and their practices, the Norwegian context automatically functioned as reference point. Both scepticism and humility characterized the assessments made by Norwegian NCRB representatives. Their scepticism was fundamental as it questioned the kind of help crisis centres in Northwest Russia provide. The centres are seldom equipped with a shelter, and the assistance and consultation they provide take place on the premise that the woman continues to live in her violent home environment (Informant 15/2006). Upon this basis, a critical concern from the Norwegian perspective was expressed:

“There’s something with what they council to, what options you have.” (Informant 16/2006).

Despite this scepticism, it is pointed out that the Norwegian crisis centres only a short time ago had similar start-up difficulties:

“We’re there now [showing with hands (far ahead) (KS)] compared to them, but we were there only 20 years ago. We have a very short history too.” (Informant 16/2006)

During this short history, a terminology has been reworked and new issues such as incest have been addressed as they came to their attention during their work (Informant 14/2006). The exchange facilitated by the NCRB has contributed to such a process of increasing knowledge of terms and phrases in their work in a regional Barents context. As stated by one of the collaborators:
“We talk about abuse, make words, phrases – what it is that we are doing, that is, building.” (Informant 16/2006).

This suggests that meaning-making is a key to their practice. These are practices through which security issues in the life-world are shaped, through words and meaning-making.

Information work is a key activity of all crisis centres. Information work is a task that all crisis centres share as women in crisis need guidance on what options are available to them to alter their life situation, and this kind of information is provided at crisis centres. This shared view on information as crucial to their practice was shared across the Norwegian and Russian border. There were however more similarities in the way of thinking about their work that became visible in the interviews. Asked about expectations to the cooperation with Russian crisis centres, commonalities in the thinking about their work were pointed out:

“[It] should be so simple that there should be a woman centre, where they should take care of women only, use the justice system and police the way we do it in Norway. It was satisfactory to see that they think actually just like that those women too. They were able to find an apartment in immediate proximity to the police station.” (Informant 14/2006)

To establish cooperation with actors outside of the crisis centres such as the police can be challenging, however, and this is also a shared concern of crisis centres. For example, in order to establish political support lobbying is required, and this kind of activity needs to be balanced with the daily concern for the women that need their urgent assistance. This need to balance their priorities is challenging and a task shared by the various national actors in the NCRB (Informant 16/2006). Despite these similarities between the Norwegian and Russian crisis centres, there are vast differences related to structural and cultural aspects.

The differences are expressed in dichotomies between two different forms of practice. In regard to the practice of consultation, it is stressed that in Russia the main concern is on the acute phase of violence:

“They work more with the acute phase of violence while we can work more with after-care, recovery, conversation, individual conversations and in groups in regard to rape. … Not acute and doctor and remove the black eye, and maybe place in a different apartment. We work more long-term. We see the socio-economic consequence of people having to work through psychosomatic problems that occur when living in a situation of violence.” (Informant 16/2006)

In their interaction with the Russian collaborators, the Norwegian representatives experienced that in Russia the main concern was therapy aimed at calming the immediate situation. This primary and prioritized concern exclusively with therapy was explained as a result of a standpoint according to which change was not possible. Focusing on therapy was the best option as changes to legislation and how police personnel approach the issue, were considered impossible (Informant 15/2006). The tangible difference between Russia and Norway in
regard to the availability of shelter affects the kind of assistance that can be provided. It also displayed differences in regard to the use of a shelter however. In Norway the shelter is a possibility that the woman may use when she considers it necessary (Informant 16/2006). The woman defines her needs. In exchanges with their Russian colleagues who were interns for a shorter period of time at Norwegian crisis centres, questions were raised by Russians regarding the actual needs of women they saw living in Norwegian shelters. Differences in mindset were visible: the Norwegians considered it the prerogative of the woman to define her needs, but this approach was questioned by their Russian colleagues. According to this informant, this was questioned due to the lack of visible suffering, e.g. black eyes and bruises. This illustrates different views on the physical and psychological harm of violence against women and thus short and long-term perspectives. From the Norwegian perspective it is emphasized that the long-term psychological and as a consequence of that, the socio-economic effects are a major concern. The suggestion is that the focus on the acute phase of therapy in the Russian context does not give priority to such long-term concerns. The Russian viewpoint of scepticism towards the Norwegian practice in regard to shelters is however related to conditions in the Russian context: it is rather inconceivable in the reality in which Russian crisis centres conduct their work. In regard to the need of shelters, the Russian crisis centre representatives do not allow themselves to think that it is possible that they will have such rooms available as seen in Norway (Informant 15/2006). The deviance in their concern with shelter directs attention to how structural differences and the experience with structural conditions over time affect the thinking about what is possible.

A further main dichotomy is between a rule-based approach and the use of ad hoc, personalized relations. In Norway state guidelines direct the work of crisis centres. It is a rule-based approach that implies that when public entities, for example the police are contacted and the situation is explained, all information is protected by laws on professional secrecy. In Russia, they often turn to the personal network first, and here no promise of secrecy exists. The Russian crisis centres also utilize personal networks in order to make state entities act on their behalf. This is problematic, as one of the Norwegian crisis centre representatives explains:

“They are so dependent on there being one person in that entity who’s willing to spend time on it. But here [in Norway] it’s “that’s the way it should be”. (…) Here it’s all so strict. [Information] cannot move on. You are protected by law with the information you give. It should be “like this and this”. But over there it is scary I think, that it’s not regulated by law how things should be. Do you trust the person in the police organization if it is his brother, the wife of the brother that comes to the crisis centre and is subjected to violence? How do you behave then?” (Informant 16/2006)
This quote expresses concern both in regard to the lack of rules and with difficulties related to the operation of a crisis centre in a small community where the chance of knowing both victim and perpetrator is considerable. The Russian collaborators of these Norwegian centres emphasized their use of networks and the need to establish ad hoc solutions for individual women. In the interviews it was commented that this approach has consequences for the treatment of information. Based on observations during the engagement with Russian crisis centre representatives, a Norwegian NCRB participant comments that the lack of rules for the work of crisis centres in Russia implies that professional secrecy is less sturdy and not as fundamental as in Norway (Informant 16/2006). In a system in which you need to use your personal relations to achieve results, information is a lubricant. The difference between a rule-based opposed to a network-based model of crisis centres implies fundamental differences in the functioning of the security system. It is suggested that there is more safety implied in a rule-based system:

“...[T]he topic on their agenda is what do we get money from? From Sweden today? Yes, that is trafficking. Then we work on trafficking, as long as those money last, yes. Can we acquire money from the Barents secretary for working on sexual abuse, then that is the topic. And that is not the way to work. It’s like a pop-up window on your computer, right? You work with it to survive. (…) Suddenly we can see our collaborators working with [some other organization] because then they have received money. If they just get money they can take any topic and represent it, and that in a way does not work because not everything is consistent.” (Informant 16/2006)

The Norwegian NCRB participants emphasise the effect of the absence of rules and the weak structures on the functioning of Russian crisis centres. Material differences are the most vivid between the two contexts however, and this affects views and assessments on security production. For example, in regard to shelters, Russian crisis centre representatives are hesitant in their approach to using shelters in their work because they are unfamiliar with a structural situation in which a shelter is a permanent inventory (Informant 15/2006). For the Norwegians, the availability of a shelter is a precondition. The Russians however do not allow themselves to design their work on the basis of a situation in which a shelter could be taken for granted. In this manner the structural conditions define their practices. This is also evident in regard to how the financial situation dominates the agenda of Russian crisis centres. The constant need to acquire financial resources defines their priorities:

“…[T]he topic on their agenda is what do we get money from? From Sweden today? Yes, that is trafficking. Then we work on trafficking, as long as those money last, yes. Can we acquire money from the Barents secretary for working on sexual abuse, then that is the topic. And that is not the way to work. It’s like a pop-up window on your computer, right? You work with it to survive. (…) Suddenly we can see our collaborators working with [some other organization] because then they have received money. If they just get money they can take any topic and represent it, and that in a way does not work because not everything is consistent.” (Informant 16/2006)

The concern is that the consistency of the crisis centre work is submitted to the financial needs of acquiring grants to project. Financing also affected the NCRB internship program. Although the NCRB project did not imply a transfer of money from West to East, this was
among some of the Russian collaborators nonetheless expected, or at least this became visible during exchanges. During the internship at a Norwegian crisis centre, some participants lost interest in their host institution when learning that there were no possibilities of acquiring project money. They began instead to visit other entities that they thought could provide financial support (Informant 16/2006). When your primary concern is the lack of material resources, it is imperative to find such sources and this becomes very visible in Norwegian NCRB participants’ reflections on their Russian collaborators. They outline how structural conditions affect behaviour and this importance of the material conditions were also crucial in regard to the thinking about what is possible, as the example with shelters above showed.

Inexperienced in what it means to have such structures as shelters and a basic budget available, the Russian crisis centres cannot relate to a situation in which this could be taken for granted. While the Norwegians are concerned with their rule-based approach, the Russian crisis centres actively engage the transformational context of their society and operate by means of their social capital. The lack of structures in Russia, in terms of finances and state guidelines, corresponds to a habitus that responds to this situation. The Russian crisis centre representatives innovate on an ad hoc basis in response to the specific needs of the situation that they are facing. In the language of the concept of habitus, they have incorporated an understanding of the lack of a rule-based approach. They respond to situations by drawing upon, utilizing and continuously expanding the existing connections in their network.

Also on the individual level of the victims this has an effect. As noted by a Norwegian NCRB collaborator, the lack of institutionalized structures of assistance affects expectations:

“Well, I don’t think they’re different inside, but they may steel themselves because they know nothing is developed around them. If they are to survive, simply, take care of the kids, then they must invent some survival-strategies that we may not know much about because we have never needed them. They cope and may run on auto-pilot longer than we do.” (Informant 16/2006)

The interviews with Norwegian NCRB representatives have made the point regarding how structural prerequisites affect the thinking about options available to local crisis centres particularly visible. This is in regard both to crisis centre activists and their clients, as alluded to in the last quote. The Russian crisis centres are affected by this as they form their expectation on what is achievable in regard to establishing security for victims of violence on the basis of the structural conditions defining the reality that they operate in. The interviews with the Norwegian NCRB participants displayed that the assistance they provide as well as their thinking of what kind of assistance is possible to provide in Russia are defined by the structural conditions that characterize the environment they operate in.
As the quote above explains, the behaviour of the victims is also influenced by the material conditions that define their life-world. By means of the concept of habitus, in the next chapter I examine the relations that define practices of security on a subjective level. The outline of the field in this section has made visible how habitus is relevant to the functioning of the field and therefore why habitus needs to be discussed in combination with objective structures and this aspect of interconnection is further outlined in the following section focusing on habitus.

7.2. Habitus and analyses of subject and security

Through their work with victims, crisis centre representatives are exposed to various subjective experiences of violence, and in the interviews I asked them to describe these. These are now used to analyze the concerns of the subjects – the victims. The attention is directed at the experiences that victims of violence have disseminated to the crisis centre representatives. I now therefore move the analysis to the level of the subjective level. What do the victims explain regarding obstacles to tackling the issue of violence against women? What are their experiences?

The concept of habitus attends to the phenomenological element in Bourdieu’s social theory and addresses the viewpoints of the individual. With the concept of habitus as analytical tool, focus is on the socially acquired dispositions that affect how people act. The analytical interest in this section is therefore on experience-near reflections on constraints on security production in the field. Individual experiences are here analysed on the basis of the interviews with representatives of non-state crisis centres about their knowledge of victims’ concerns. Victims’ experiences are thus mediated through crisis centre representatives, who draw upon vast experience and relate individual experiences to an overall context. The social context in which individuals act is a key aspect of the concept of habitus, and I therefore consider this mediation of individual experiences that is laid to ground when focusing on interviews with crisis centre representatives an acceptable methodical choice. This is a fundamental methodical assumption of the following analysis. This argument reflects the interconnectedness of context and individual experiences in the concept of habitus.

The term habitus is not new, but recurs, as designated by Bourdieu, on the Aristotelian notion of hexis, referring to habit, which in scholasticism was termed habitus. Husserl referred to the concept of habituality, and a contemporaneous of Bourdieu, Norbert Elias, widely applied the notion of habitus. The geneology of the term points to the fact that the concept preexisted Bourdieu, but he nonetheless coined the term for his specific epistemological project of research, and this is what is in focus here.
conceptualization of habitus as means for analyzing subjective aspects of practices is based in a viewpoint according to which the individuated, or isolated, individual is renounced. This is important in regard to human security as the security of the individual is always experienced in a social context. At the same time it however incorporates a concern with how objective structures affect behaviour. This is why habitus is a useful focus for an analysis of local security practices. The level of observation is the social field in which the individual conducts its practices. I argue that it provides an analytical approach to discussing subjective aspects of security. Therefore this chapter begins with an explanation of the concept of habitus, also one of Bourdieu’s flexible concepts, and how it is made use of in the empirical analysis. The task is to explain how the concept of habitus will guide the reading of the empirical material. In order to find access to indicators of habitus in the empirical material, it is necessary to be well-informed about the concept. Also, it is necessary to consider what empirical expressions of aspects of habitus are relevant to the research question. After an introduction of the concept and a discussion of its application in the research process, it is suggested how habitus can be made useful to thinking about security in this particular empirical field.

The concept of habitus directs attention to the subject as an active, creative agent. The term agent is used to underline that the practices of individuals are formed by their embeddedness in a social context. Individuals are defined as socially constituted subjects, ingrained in the process of Vergesellschaftung, i.e. the socialization as members of society (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:114). The concept of habitus expresses the socially acquired and internalized constraints of social life that affect subjects’ practices. Because such constraints are internalized, embodied in the individual, the habitus is an individual endowment that operates on the level of the individual.

The habitus as internalized social life represents a “system of acquired dispositions” (Bourdieu 1990a:13) within biological individuals. Dispositions are “a past which survives in the present” (Bourdieu 1977:82), and represents principles of continuity, regularity and transformation (ibid.). Hence, dispositions, referred to as habitus, can shape action both by reproducing social positions, by pushing for or resisting forms of change (Leander 2006:7). The dispositions, constituted in practice, generate effects in practice as “categories of perception and assessment or as classificatory principles as well as being the organizing principles of action.” (Bourdieu 1990a:13) As an organizing principle of action, the habitus is a matrix that triggers ad hoc responses in the encounter with a particular field. The creative and inventive responses produced in this encounter are limited by the structure of the habitus, “the embodied sedimentation of the social structures which produced it.” (Bourdieu and
Thus, the habitus is “the system of structured, structuring dispositions.”

A now well-known definition of habitus is:

“systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.” (ibid. 53)

As evident in this quotation, the concept of habitus opposes the utilitarian explanation of human action as a result of calculation aimed at maximizing output. Instead, habitus suggests that rationality is based on internalized experience, an acquired “‘feel’ of the game” (Bourdieu 1985a:14) that guides and directs practices. This feel of the game, in the form of dispositions, entails schemes of perception, thought and action. These schemes define parameters for strategies of social action (cf. Jackson 2008:164).

Bourdieu introduced the term habitus in opposition to the structuralist paradigm. In contrast to the conception of agent as a carrier of structure, Bourdieu emphasized the creative, active and inventive capacities of habitus (Bourdieu 1985a:13). With this notion Bourdieu wanted to avoid what he considered a fetishist concern with the subject entailed in the concept of homo economicus. In distinction from homo economicus, the concept of habitus does not define rational action as a fundamental anthropological constant. The logic of action is explained as a result of incorporation of certain historical-economic conditions which form the habitus of agents (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:125). The term habitus is therefore Bourdieu’s means to opposing structuralism and the model of action entailed in homo economicus and methodological individualism. Habitus reflects a different epistemological viewpoint and is a rejection of various models in the social sciences: “[T]he notion of habitus expresses first and foremost the rejection of a whole series of alternatives into which social sciences (...) has locked itself.” (Bourdieu 1985a:12) For example, Bourdieu introduced habitus as means to transcending the view of an opposition between individual and society (ibid. 31): defined as incorporated social life that is an individual endowment.

Bourdieu’s theory of practice is concerned with understanding “the logic of all the actions that are reasonable without being the product of a reasoned design.” (Bourdieu 1990b:50) The habitus is the tool that guides people to act rationally, not only in economic-rational terms.

Bourdieu distinguishes the idea of habitus as a practice generating principle from the concern with universal structures: “I wanted, so to speak, to reintroduce the agents that Lévi-Strauss and the structuralists, among others Althusser, tended to abolish, making them into simple epiphenomena of structure. And I mean agents, not subjects. Action is not the mere carrying out of a rule, or obedience to a rule. Social agents, in archaic societies as well as in ours, are not automata regulated like clocks, in accordance with laws they do not understand. In the most complex games, matrimonial exchange for instance, or ritual practices, they put into action the incorporated principles of generative habitus.” (Bourdieu 1990a:9)
unfolding in the social field through agents’ practices, the concept combines a concern with social life and individual practices. The concept offers a critical view on the construction of knowledge of social reality by addressing “the irreducibility of social existence to the models that can be made of it or, (…) the gap between real practices and experiences and the abstractions of the mental world.” (Bourdieu 1990a:21) This, explains Bourdieu, is the reason why it is essential to ask informants to explain their views on the social object under study, to ask them to explain “why” instead of imposing upon them ex-ante formulated explanatory variables. This view on the production of knowledge allows for engagement with the plurality of worlds (ibid. 20) In the same way as the concept of field is a “thinking tool” (Bourdieu 1985a:18) defined in order to discover the properties of various fields, the concept of habitus therefore also represents a certain epistemological stance aimed at uncovering the plurality of viewpoints on the social world.

The concept of habitus reflects an understanding of theory as a guide to empirical analysis: theory “is a temporary construct which takes shape for and by empirical work and which gains less by theoretical polemics than by confrontation with new objects.” (ibid. 12) Also this concept therefore illustrates the interconnection between theory and empirical consideration in Bourdieu’s work. This preoccupation with the practical application of theory lies behind the demand for inventive reactivation of concepts in regard to different research objects (ibid. 15). The concept of habitus is thus defined as applicable to multiple social contexts and research questions (cf. Leander 2006). When the concept is imported into different empirical settings, the basis for doing so needs to be explained, but it is noted that the concept has the drawback of being difficult to capture and generalize (Leander 2002, cited from Villumsen 2008, p. 64, footnote 63). In regard to the application of this concept to the field of security from violence against women, the main concern is that the concept describes a certain way of thinking about how social reality is constituted and what it is that determines how people act, their thoughts and perceptions. The idea is to draw upon the epistemological views that the concept is defined to express and to make use of these in the specific empirical setting. I will therefore now discuss some further details about the concept before

136 Bourdieu with this notion directed attention to “the agent, in its truth of a practical operator of object constructions.” (Bourdieu 1985a:14)
137 For more discussion on concerns regarding such an import of the concept and making use of it in various empirical settings, see the journal “Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning” (Journal of social research), No. 4 in 2007 and No. 2 in 2008.
explaining how it directs my approach to subjective aspects in regard to crisis centre’s local security production.

One question that informs the basic understanding and epistemological viewpoint of the concept is how dispositions are structured, i.e. produced. The basic starting point is that agents’ dispositions are “produced by the internalization of objective conditions.” (Bourdieu 1968:705) These conditions, “conditions of existence” (Bourdieu 1990b:54), are “the product of economic and social processes.” (ibid. 50). These external conditions become internalized and thus, embodied:

“[n] reality, the dispositions durably inculcated by the possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and prohibitions inscribed in the objective conditions (which science apprehends through statistical regularities such as the probabilities objectively attached to a group or class) generate dispositions objectively compatible with these conditions and in a sense pre-adapted to their demands.” (ibid. 54)

The argument is that social and economic conditions guide practice through the internalization of external constraints into the habitus. Practice is attached to constraints that are the result of internalization of externalities. These are social determinants of action, and this acknowledgment, argues Bourdieu, frees us “from the misplaced belief in illusory freedom.” (Bourdieu 1990a:15) Embodied in the individual subject, the habitus generates both individual and collective practices. This is observable in practices of co-ordination, and serves to explain why, when apparently acting only on the basis of individual choice, agreements with others is reached (Bourdieu 1990b:54, 59).

There are diverse individual forms of habitus, but there exist similarities across these individual forms. In the pursuing empirical analysis, both diversity and similarities in viewpoints of the victims will be

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The habitus is inclined to protect itself from crisis and critical challenges by prevailing in an environment to which it is pre-adapted (Bourdieu 1990b:61). This suggests that the habitus is inclined to seeking security. The tendency is to strive for a condition in which the habitus can function without difficulties. There is not only an individual habitus, but also a class habitus: “A social class (in-itself) – a class of identical or similar conditions of existence and conditions – is at the same time a class of biological individuals having the same habitus, understood as a system of dispositions common to all products of the same conditionings.” (Bourdieu 1990b:59) The class habitus is “a subjective, but non-individual system of internalized structures.” (ibid. 60) Although it cannot be assumed that individuals have had the exact same experiences that produce the dispositions of the individual habitus, belonging to a certain class implies that the singular individual habitus are united through their similarities. They are connected through a relationship of similarities amid diversity, called homology – “diversity within homogeneity reflecting the diversity within homogeneity characteristic of their social conditions of production.” (Bourdieu 1990b:60) Individual habitus is thus a structural variant of class, or group, habitus. Bourdieu notes that there are “experiences statistically common to members of the same class” (ibid.), thereby suggesting the application of statistical methods for the abstraction of class habitus. The concern with class habitus is however criticized because it assumes coherence in the practices of individuals and groups, and this is not empirically proven (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:130).
illustrated and studied. This reflects the concern that it is important to record multiple individual perceptions that “speak for” social reality.

The processes by which the dispositions become internalized are not a topic elaborated in detail by Bourdieu. He has not conducted studies of the family, considered the primary field in which social agents are constituted, but the effects of the educational system on secondary socialization is one of his key topics (Liebau 1987a, b). Bourdieu has in fact noted that there exists a black box in regard to internalization: there is a lack of explication of the interconnection between objective structures and the incorporated, embodied structures (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:136). As a consequence, the habitus does not represent a social-psychological theory and Bourdieu does not elaborate a theory of how objective relations become incorporated as dispositions. At the same time as this process of incorporation remains unknown to the researcher, the content, from where and how the features of the habitus are incorporated, as well as the functioning of the habitus remain unknown to the subject. How the habitus operates on the subjective level within every individual biological being is thus not addressed. It has therefore been argued that the concept represents a highly plausible concept, though not proven through own research on its psychological functioning (ibid. 138). A crucial point in regard to habitus is however that although it exists on the level of the individual, within every human being, it unfolds in the social field. It is the function of habitus on the societal level and not individual psychology that is in focus. This is a key to the application of habitus here. In this particular empirical case, the concept of habitus is employed on interview material focused on interaction between agents. The question is what subjective viewpoints unfold in the interactions between crisis centre representatives and their clients.

In order to apply the concept of habitus to the empirical material, a further question is how the habitus, by means of incorporated dispositions, performs the function of structuring practice: How can the effects of habitus be observed? A practical relation to the world has to define the research process. This rests on the assumption that “the objects of knowledge are constructed, not passively recorded.” (Bourdieu 1990b:52) The habitus produces practices, thought, perceptions, action, and these are a result of the dialectic of objective structures and incorporated structures (ibid. 41). Bourdieu explaines:

140 When comparing the concept of habitus to the rational choice theory that it opposes, the question is if the latter has been tested in the manner demanded of the habitus, and if not instead both need to be acknowledged as assumptions regarding human behaviour, i.e. researchers’ models?
These practices can be accounted for only by relating the objective structure defining the social conditions of the production of the habitus which engendered them to the conditions in which this habitus is operating, that is, to the conjuncture which, short of a radical transformation, represents a particular state of this structure. In practice, it is the habitus, history turned into nature, i.e. denied as such, which accomplishes practically the relating of these two systems of relations, in and through the production of practices.” (Bourdieu 1977:78)

The habitus, the result of life conditions and experience always structures practices, and it is by observing practice and looking for the principle of action that the habitus becomes tangible. This implies on a general level that the concept of habitus can be put to work in various specified field. The effects of the habitus are simultaneously infinite and diverse:

“[H]abitus, like every ‘art of intervening’, is what makes it possible to produce an infinite number of practices that are relatively unpredictable (…) but also limited in their diversity.”
(Bourdieu 1990b:55)

Analytically speaking, the effects of the habitus can be delimited in regard to the specific conditions in which it operates. From the quote above it is evident that on the one hand, there are the social conditions that generated the habitus and on the other, there are the social conditions in which the habitus performs. Bourdieu describes this as “the two states of the world” (ibid. 56), and notes that the habitus performs the interrelationship between these two states. It is the study of this relationship that can explicate the principle of practices:

“The principle of practice has to be sought instead in the relationship between external constraints which leave a very variable margin of choice, and dispositions which are the product of economic and social processes that are more or less completely reducible to these constraints, as defined at a particular moment.” (ibid. 50)

When observing practices and looking for the principle of action defined by habitus, attention has then to be directed at how the habitus, a product of previous socio-economic processes, performs in a specific setting defined by certain economic and social processes. Emphasis is on the interrelationship between the conditions in the past that produced the habitus and the present performance of habitus through practice:

“[Practices] can only be accounted for by relating the social conditions in which the habitus that generated them [the practices] was constituted, to the social conditions in which it is implemented, that is, through the scientific work of performing the interrelationship of these two states of the social world that the habitus performs, while concealing it, in and through practice.” (ibid. 56)

The habitus is concealed because it is a result of the naturalization of history: “The habitus – embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history – is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product.” (ibid.) This draws attention to the

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141 The word “instead” here refers to the construction of the concept of habitus in opposition to rational choice theories of action, and separates the concept of habitus from the concern with action as a consequence of the free, informed calculation of the rational subject.
question of observing habitus and how it constitutes a principle of action. This is extracted on
the basis of analysis of the interrelationship between the conditions that produced it and the
practices it creates in a specific setting, defined by certain socio-economic conditions. Habitus
is indeed a thinking tool about how practices come about on the basis of embodied history as
people’s practices, thoughts and expectations are influenced and defined by their previous
experiences. In this manner, habitus is seemingly applicable to all social contexts. A question
is then what habitus cannot explain, and what sources are used to portray its effects. This
ambiguity regarding what it is that habitus explains is further underlined when considering the
interconnection between objective structures and practice in the definition of habitus. The
habitus is defined by a close connection between the objective structures in the field and how
these structures function as generative principles of habitus, which does not determine but
structures practice. With a concern for developing a “genetic structuralism”, Bourdieu
underlined that the analysis of the objective structures, how they generate dispositions and
function in structuring practice, is analytically inseparable:

“I am trying to develop a genetic structuralism: the analysis of objective structures – those of
different fields – is inseparable from the analysis of the genesis, within biological individuals,
of the mental structures which are to some extent the product of the incorporation of social
structures; inseparable, too, from the analysis of the genesis of these social structures
themselves: the social space, and the groups that occupy it, are the product of historical
struggles.” (Bourdieu 1990a:14, italics in original)

This concern with the objective structures that generate dispositions which again produce -
through the functioning of the habitus - social structures, certainly establishes habitus as a
holistic concept. Dispositions are constituted by practice and are also producing practice. This
implies that as a guideline to the analysis of practice, habitus at best provides a very general
guideline. The concept describes a certain way of thinking about how social reality is
constituted, what it is that determines how people act, their thoughts and perceptions.

In regard to habitus and the security production of non-state crisis centres, it is important
to note that the concept underlines that individuals experience, express and make sense of
security through interactions in the social field. People’s practices are produced on the basis
of their historical experiences, incorporated in the habitus as dispositions, and these guide
their responses to security in the life-world. People’s responses to insecurities are thus formed
by the internalization of objective structures. This does not determine people’s responses but
provide guidance on how to act. Therefore, in regard to women who are victims of violence,
the concept of habitus serves the function of placing the active, inventive agent within the
theoretical framework of analysing social reality without excluding structures. Located on the
agent-level, the concept of habitus addresses the dialectic between objective structures and
subjective practices. Action is a result of internalized dispositions that structure, but do not determine practices. It is the focus on dispositions that structure practice that guides the analytical focus to subjective sources of action.

One of the first uses Bourdieu made of the concept was for the purpose of expressing and describing the lack of congruity between the pre-capitalist habitus of Algerians and the introduction of capitalist structures through colonialism (Bourdieu 2000:159; Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005:122). In this situation the incorporated dispositions (habitus) were not in congruence with the capitalist structures: habitus and objective structures did not fit. Bourdieu explains that the concept of habitus “originally forced itself upon me as the only way to understand the mismatches which were observed, in an economy like that of Algeria in the 1960s.” (Bourdieu 2000:159). This situation thus made the habitus become visible. The concept was thus established in the process of research, because of the lack of an explanatory concept for the action observed. The observed mismatches occurred “between the economic institutions imported and imposed by colonization (…) and economic dispositions brought to them by agents formed in the precapitalist world.” (ibid.) The behaviour that this resulted in was described as “lapses from rationality” and “resistance to modernity”, and explained by “mysterious” cultural factors, i.e. Islam (ibid.). This led Bourdieu to question the universality of economic rational dispositions, and also to interrogate about the conditions that give access to such dispositions. The point is that it takes time and in fact it is a historical process involved in shaping people’s dispositions.143

A situation of misfit between dispositions and field structures can occur when a disruption such as a major crisis affects the field. This might alter the regularity and even the rules governing the field (ibid. 160).144 As the Algerian society underwent a fundamental process of transition to a monetary economy and capitalism induced by colonialism, a radical incoherence between habitus and social structures occurred, and because of this misfit, the functioning (effect) of habitus was observable in practice. In regard to the case in focus here, I suggest that the transformation in Russia is also a situation in which such misfits are at

142 Bourdieu’s study of developments in Algeria was first published in French in 1963. In 1979 a revised English edition was published (Bourdieu 1979, orig. in French 1963).
143 The ahistoric assumption prevailing in standard economic theory concerning rational economic behaviour is thus denied.
144 Situations, in which the ingrained dispositions in the habitus reflect other structures than the ones occurring in the field, are called hysteresis.
In regard to violence against women, historic conditions and viewpoints on how this issue should be dealt with have defined the cultural conditions that have shaped habitus. When victims contact a crisis centre, they actively break with such conditions that represent constraints on their practices: when they decide to contact a crisis centre they actively break with the predominant cultural conditions in their life-world. By specifically addressing the experiences that victims have conveyed to crisis centre representatives regarding their obstacles to initiating contact with a crisis centre and the struggle that then begins to alter their life, I gain access to constraints that affect agents in their active invention of a new way of life and a new security situation.

The analysis explains how establishment of crisis centres provided a structural incitement for victims of violence. The centres represent a physical space in which victims can meet with people who are familiar with women suffering from violence. This can be thought of as an inducement to changing habitus because it provides new experience that revises expectations about how the issue is approached. Bourdieu describes that the habitus may be subject to a range of incremental revisions in such instances:

“Habitus change constantly in response to new experiences. Dispositions are subject to a kind of permanent revision, but one which is never radical, because it works on the basis of the premises established in the previous state. They are characterized by a combination of constancy and variation which varies according to the individual and his degree of flexibility or rigidity.” (Bourdieu 2000:161)

In regard to the work of non-state crisis centres for women in Russia, their work in the Northwest region was, as explained above, initiated in the latter half of the 1990s, with the first centre being established in Murmansk in 1997. Since then, many have followed but the structure of assistance for victims of violence against women is rather novel in this region. There might be a great divide therefore between the views on crisis centres amongst the co-workers at crisis centres and their clients in the broader public as they are unaccustomed with the existence of such an assistance structure. It can therefore be assumed a lack of congruity between the habitus of victims and the introduction of a structure of assistance.

Representatives of crisis centres are here mediators of victims’ perceptions, and I have asked them to describe the troubles they experience that victims have when contacting them. The concern is thus that when victims meet representatives of the crisis centres, this is a form of interaction in which the habitus unfolds. I assume that this is a situation in which the

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145 Bourdieu (2000:161) notes that “habitus may, in many cases, be confronted with conditions of actualization different from those in which they were produced.”
embodied history that defines victims’s life-world interacts with a new structure, the crisis centres. The analysis therefore uncovers some aspects that were addressed in the interviews, and in this manner provides a basis for showing empirically some aspects that define subjective constraints relevant to non-state crisis centres’ security production. I have thus interpreted how the concerns expressed in the interviews reflect socially acquired and internalized constraints of social life, hence dispositions. The concept of habitus thus provides a mode of thinking about the sources of victims’ concern. The concept is means to thinking about the expressed subjective concerns of victims and to discuss these in regard to their constraints on security practices. Habitus does not invite further step-by-step analytical operationalization beyond the theoretical stance that people’s actions are formed by dispositions that interact with structures in the field. Bourdieu explained that his “thinking tools” take “shape for and by empirical work and become “visible through the results they yield” (Wacquant 1989:50). He was therefore particularly concerned with confronting these tools with new objects and in fact noted that “these concepts do not gain much by being resituated vis-à-vis previous usages.” (ibid. 51) In the following analysis therefore, I present my reading of the interviews with crisis centre representatives. I also draw upon secondary literature as I find this useful for the purpose of gaining further insight on some of the aspects raised in the interviews, such as for example gender relations. I have throughout the project thought about the interviews in regard to the theoretical concern of understanding what conditions define subjects’ concerns in regard violence against women. My interest is to experiment with the use of the mode of thinking implicit in the concept of habitus in an empirical study of local security practices. The question then is how subjective experiences illustrate dynamics of local security production empirically. The notion of habitus gives this exploration into these empirical dynamics a systematic character by means of providing a mode of thinking about what it is that guides people’s practices, their perceptions and viewpoints. The concern now is to present the result of this exploration.

7.2.1. The victims and understanding of self

A key motive of this project was to examine an “experience-near” conceptualization of security. Methodically I decided to draw upon the expert knowledge of representatives of non-state crisis centres and their experiences with victims’ concerns. I decided not to approach victims directly because I did, as explained in chapter four, not feel comfortable with such a situation. I was concerned that I would somehow negatively affect the victims, by for example unwillingly say something they might find hurting but that I could not
comprehend. As the project proceeded however, at a late stage I found that first, I was now better prepared to talk to victims because of what I had learned about violence against women and crisis centres throughout the project. Second, I began to feel that it was necessary to at least have tried to talk to clients of crisis centres. I was curious about what clients say about their interaction with crisis centres, and if this may even present me with surprises or be an interesting eye-opener. One reason why I began to think that this was necessary was because of the challenges of analysing subjective aspects of security on the basis of the interviews with the crisis centre representatives. The analysis did generate a set of impacts relevant to victims’ action, but I continued to feel that there was more to be said. It became clear to me that it was not obvious what kind of story I was developing on the basis of an analysis of subjective aspects in the empirical material. A patchy picture may be the reality of subject’s security experiences. The interviews with the crisis centre representatives had however yielded some common characteristics, but I did not have much impression of victims’ various life-stories and hence differences. These distinctions are concealed in victims’ understanding of self (subjectivity). This is a key focus that crisis centres express. The one interview with a client of a crisis centre that I conducted, pointed my attention to this common theme that the crisis centre representatives had also introduced me to: changes to the understanding of self. In the analysis of the interviews with crisis centre representatives I had already noticed their concerns with clients’ self-understanding, but my re-entry into the field further sharpened my attention to this point. I therefore begin this explanation of victims’ space of manoeuvring by pointing out that understanding of self is an underlying theme of the security production in which crisis centres are engaged. This is now illustrated empirically.

In the interview with a client of a crisis centre, the interview situation was defined by nervousness, both on my part and hers. My nervousness was expressed in the form of (for myself) awkward responses, such as “yes, yes, yes, yes, yes”. I also found myself commenting very positively on some of the things she said, like “I really like your answer. I also think that’s important.” These responses were my way of abridging the hesitancy that I felt on her behalf. She on her part answered in very short sentences, and I did at first not get much impression of her experiences, her story. When re-listening to the interview I noticed how my awkward responses did make her talk more and her answers gradually became more detailed. She was at first very hesitant, and did not describe her actions very much. Then, with a bit more time, a key aspect that she stressed in the interview was her role as an acting subject, a facilitator of change:

“[KS] Did you personally experience problems with housing for example?
- Yes, I personally decided [those problems].

[KS] And economic problems as well?
- On my own.

[KS] And how did you solve those difficulties?
- I worked.

[KS] OK. Great. Those are the kinds of troubles that a lot of women experience.
- (at the same time) Yes, a lot of problems.

[KS] And you’re saying that work, that helps.
- Of course. If there is a possibility to work and earn money.

[KS] And you had such opportunities?
- Well, I created such conditions for me.

[KS] Great. And you also created such… When you for the first time called the crisis centre, you already began…
- (at the same time) I was looking [for such opportunities] because I understood that I cannot solve these issues on my own. Those pathways, which were used prior to that, did not satisfy me. Nonetheless it was necessary to get out of the situation. I myself looked [for opportunities].” (Informant 21/2008)

This quote also illustrates how the conversation is characterized by short responses on behalf of the interviewee. The main concern that she conveys throughout the interview, and which is exemplified with this section, is how she took action, how she made the conditions right for herself in order to change her life situation. From the interviews with the crisis centres, it is clear that they on their part are very concerned with invigorating this kind of action. Their argument is that victims are not to think of themselves as causes of violence, but are to focus on working on themselves. In this work, crisis centre representatives provide assistance, support and advice. Crisis centre representatives demand agency from the victims:

“To say that yes, here we have a shelter for women, come here, here’s great – that’s not [the] correct [approach]. To let someone decide your problems in life for you, no one will do that. It’s not only your rights but also your responsibility [to decide your problems yourself].” (Informant 9/2006)

Crisis centres aim to help victims with entering a new life-situation. Contacting a crisis centre signals readiness for change:

“If they [victims of violence] come here, they are definitively ready [to talk].” (Informant 2/2006)

At a crisis centre, victims receive assistance in finding the options best suited for them. They are informed (educated) on how to make choices on behalf of themselves and their life. A main concern thereby is to balance the special life-experiences of victims with demands for a new start and decisions that incur change. A crisis centre is a place where help to find ways to change the life-situation can be found but crisis centre representatives emphasise the
importance of victims’ individual choice. From the point of view of the crisis centre representatives they assist their clients in personal development; development of the subject. Their starting point is that the experience of violence affects the self-understanding of victims. They underline that victims of violence have a very special life-experience. It is therefore important to re-define the self:

“A woman who has lived in a condition of violence, she will never be just like the others. Need to help her to understand her individuality. Not that she is bad because she is being beaten. Need to learn [to know] her individuality.” (Informant 9/2006)

For a victim of violence to establish the initial contact with a crisis centre is a critical move in the process of redefining individuality. For the victims this is the first step to changing the life-situation. A great threshold must be overcome by the individual to initiate such a contact:

“Very many are embarrassed to acknowledge this [that they live in a situation of violence against women]. Further, if she has this problem in the family, then the woman does not always dare to talk about this, but may tell the parents.” (Informant 8/2006)

Acknowledging that you have a problem that not everyone else has, can be difficult:

“I’m not like everyone else. They don’t have that, and I have such a problem. That is difficult.” (Informant 8/2006)

This directs attention to concerns with the social context within which action takes place. The victim defines herself as different from “the rest”. A dividing line is thereby created between the victim and the “non-victim” society. This may further exacerbate a feeling of being not a part of the bigger collective. Such dividing lines can on the level of the subject constitute obstacles in the process of re-shaping an understanding of self. Local crisis centres assist in such processes as they guide their clients’ search for a new life-situation. It is in this process that the balancing between enforcement and individual freedom and choice unfolds:

“Crisis centres always work on the basis of the needs of the victims. We can never take action against her choice. We always follow up on her choice. We help her throughout this process. We do not have the right to intervene against her will.” (Informant 10/2006)

Crisis centres thus work with victims of violence and invite alternative ways of living. At the same time they are sensitive to the importance of actively making a choice to get out of a violent relationship. The responsibility of the subject is stressed. The subjects’ willingness to take action is attached to multiple layers of fear and insecurity however:

“Notably, when a woman’s patience is overflowing, that is, the woman lives in such a situation of violence, that when she calls and comes [to the crisis centre (KS)], she is already prepared to talk about her situation. She is prepared to talk, that is one thing, but is she ready to move [make changes]? Sometimes the woman is psychologically prepared to talk, to talk for a very long time about her problems, but she is not always also ready to take this further and defend her rights, for that she is not always ready. Then, we may ask for her decision, what is she prepared to do in order to put an end to the violent situation, but that is her freedom of choice.” (Informant 6/2006)
The freedom of choice is with the individual woman, and the right choices can establish security. The crisis centre is the hub of information for the woman in which she can orient herself in regard to the choices she may make, but the ultimate decision and thus responsibility lies with her. The key concern in regard to the subject and security to which the crisis centre representatives are alerted, is that their clients are engaged in processes of changes to their understanding of self. The crisis centres see themselves as a kind of conductor that helps facilitate changes to the life-situation of the subject and thereby also to the understanding of self. To contact a crisis centre is a signal that initiates a re-description of self. This re-description aims at producing a more secure life-situation for the client. This process involves reflection on the norms and traditions that have defined the violent life situation. The incorporated and embodied experiences are challenged in such a re-description of self. These processes, their developments and results, contain differences and variations in victims’ experiences. Since these processes of challenging past experiences are not subject to analysis here, this variety of experiences are not brought into the analysis. The point is that when recognizing that change is needed to facilitate security, the incorporated experiences are challenged, and when these processes begin to unfold, these are steps that initiate security.

The empirical material conveys that this subjective level of change is defined by interaction between crisis centre representatives and their clients. The material does not provide basis for further evaluation or discussion of this interaction because of the one-sided focus on the views of the representatives of the crisis centres. The focus on development of self and balancing between individual action and crisis centre enforcement stresses a discourse that undergirds the more specific constraints on subjects’ action however. Therefore the attention now turns to a series of challenges that impinge the security production for victims.

**7.2.2. Material concerns, tradition and new practices**

This section explains concerns that constrain the initiation of the process of re-describing self. An individual’s responsibility to actively act to change one’s life-situation is constrained both by material and symbolic aspects. Stigma connected to the individual’s choice of seeking help and advice directs attention to societal norms and the hegemonic culture that can affect individuals’ practices. The context within which women, who seek the support of a crisis centre act and challenge social norms and traditions in Northwest Russia is for most defined by limited material conditions. The material conditions under which women have to make decisions are by some emphasized as a more significant element of their trajectory than other
aspects. The reason is that the woman has nowhere to go if she is to leave the housing she shares with the husband. Only two of the crisis centres among the seven crisis centres interviewed here have a shelter. They cannot offer alternative housing. The material conditions under which women will attempt to alter their life-situation when contacting a crisis centre are therefore often very rudimentary. If the woman is accustomed to the husband providing for her, this becomes a very difficult situation for her. Many crisis centre representatives explain that many women therefore opt to stay in the situation. Economic dependency is a key factor as well as the housing difficulties. These are structural constraints to which all interviewees directed attention, and these are on a general level the conditions that circumscribe people’s freedom of choice. At all local crisis centres economic concerns and unemployment in particular are considered specific to the region:

“In our region – we’re agricultural province. In Moscow and Peter there are no difficulties with finding work, but the issue is how much payment. And here generally jobs are hard to find.” (Informant 8/2006)

The unemployment pattern is regional and gendered:

“With us there is a very high, in comparison to the whole country but also in regard the Northwest, female unemployment.” (Informant 3/2006)

Considering the prospects of an improved economic situation in wake of the oil- and gas development in the region, the role of gender relations are reiterated:

”There might be an increase in unemployment, in particular women unemployment, in regard to the development of the oil industry. Because in research the talk is that here they will establish in particular male work places [in wake of oil development]. At the same time, if this will be mechanized work, also women may conduct these jobs.” (Informant 3/2006)

The impacts of economic development on gender relations are also put forward to explain violence. For example, it is on the one hand emphasized that economic development in recent years has created greater opportunities for women. This makes men jealous and challenges stereotypical gender relations. On the other hand, it is argued that economic development implies greater options for men in doing business, and if women are given the chance, they are nonetheless paid less, thereby sustaining stereotypical gender relations. While economic aspects do not explain violence in particular, on a general level patterns of interconnection between the economic situation and levels of violence are observed. On the basis of observation of numbers of calls to the hotline, the argument is that in periods of socio-economic stability, there are fewer reports of incidents of violence. This is not a rule, but a pattern observed by a crisis centre representative. On the level of the individual, macro-economic improvements do not necessarily affect the specific life-situation of the victim of violence. A main concern of the crisis centre representatives is that victims of violence have a
very limited resource base on which they can take decision to improve their life-situation. The
access to money and a place to live are essential needs, and fears about such material concerns
define the context in which subjects decide to contact a crisis centre. In other instances
however, as one interviewee states, victims of violence have no difficulties with contacting
crisis centres for help (Informant 6/2006). When contacting a crisis centre, a first threshold has
been overcome, and as noted above, it signals a readiness to initiate change. But this does not
come about easy, the crisis centre representatives explain:

“Psychologically the woman always hopes that if someone talks to him, works with him, he
will change behaviour. We explain that if violence has been endured for a period of a few
years, if you don’t break this circle, he will continue. The violator already established such a
form of behaviour. He doesn’t know any other way. Plus, you don’t do anything. That is, [the
situation] will nonetheless continue. If you are not going to do anything, we tell the women
straight on/in their faces, you will continue to live in this situation.” (Informant 6/2006).

When contact with a crisis centre is established, a first step is accomplished, but as this quote
illustrates, the crisis centre workers are intended to help the victims to take many more
decisions necessary under their advice. If not, it is explained that women are confronted with
the effects of inaction. Nonetheless, the context within which women have to take action to
escape the life-situation defined by violence, is one in which they risk loosing the house they
have called home and jeopardize their economic well-being. Therefore, in their work with
victims of violence representatives of crisis centres experience these material concerns that
burden subjects in their attempts to alter their life situation.

For a victim deciding to initiate fundamental changes to the life-situation implies
manoeuvring within a confined space of action. Representatives of crisis centres are also
confronted with immaterial constraints on subjects’ action. Fear of consequences, for example
in regard to societal status, is one intimidating factor:

“For a woman to come to a crisis centre is very difficult. If she is the wife of a director, if this
women is afraid of losing her status, afraid of losing her children… it is very difficult.”
(Informant 9/2006)

In small communities in particular the practice of a crisis centre faces the challenge of
keeping the service anonymous:

“One are silent, they don’t talk. Because the smaller the city, the more difficult it is for such a
small service to work. Because it is more difficult to make such a service anonymous.”
(Informant 9/2006)

The crisis centre is however also described as an escape from constraints such as social
judgement:

“[The crisis centre] helps in getting out of some kind of difficult situations that other people
cannot help you escape. Here [at the crisis centre] the people are not specifically interested in
you. They do not express their personal opinion, but [they] help the person professionally to get out of the situation.” (Informant 21/2008)

The crisis centre is not interested in the individual in terms of judging it, but is here outlined as a place where professional advice and treatment is offered. To get out of the situation however, a range of choices have to be made that do not only risk jeopardizing the material situation but also the social position of the women who are victims of violence against women. Concerns about status and anonymity are here mentioned as particularly relevant, but overall this points to the role of tradition and cultural explanations in defining the space of manoeuvring for victims in regard to security production. On the basis of the interviews I have extracted in particular three illustrations of such constraints that impede victims’ space of manoeuvring. First, there is a critical concern with the overall comprehension of what violence against women is. Second, gender relations are critical. Third, the local crisis centres in the Russian Northwest have expressed concern with a regional aspects, in particular the specific characteristics of “northern women”. I will refer to this as “northerness”.

A primary concern of crisis centre representatives are difficulties related to “naming”, i.e. the recognition of violence. Crisis centre representatives note that victims have expressed difficulties with defining violence against women. Victims often do not understand that they are subjected to violence. A major issue for the crisis centres representatives in Northwest Russia is therefore to make the women, who become victims of violence, able to recognize that they are in fact victims of violence:

“The majority of violence emerges without the woman knowing. The man hurt her, scold at her. She does not understand that she is a victim of moral violence. … Therefore, for us emerged another problem: how can we make women in younger generations understand what violence is.” (Informant 8/2006)

The difficulty of acknowledging a situation of violence in the partnership is based in traditional conceptions of what is ‘natural’ in a family relation. By educating younger generations on the issue, crisis centres aim to impact on the naturalization of violence in the family. One example of this is how a lack of understanding of violence is explained by reference to tradition:

146 In an analysis of the development of crisis centres in Norway, Elin Johnsen (1985) draws attention to the historical development of understanding this kind violence from a means of disciplining the wife to actually naming this practice ‘violence against women’. Johnsen argued that Norwegian crisis centres contributed to a change in perception of this kind of violence. Crisis centres were active contributors to this overall norm change. This symbolic effect of the work of non-state crisis centres is important in defining acceptable behaviour in a family, and thus women’s acknowledgement that their life-situation is a situation of violence against women. I come back to this crucial symbolic effect of crisis centre’s work in the conclusion.
“They [young women] say that the stroke doesn’t mean anything. He loves you, he regrets, he may hit you once and there’s nothing to be afraid of. Well that is propaganda from the upbringing.” (Informant 8/2006)

Such customary viewpoints help explain why victims hesitate to take action that uproot their life as they know it, despite the critical situation they are in. Interviewees refer to the tendency of victims not to take immediate action but to return to the husband, repeatedly. The violence takes place in the home which is a place that is attached also to nice memories. When opting to stay with or return to a violent partner, victims in their action draw upon customary and traditional perspectives towards this situation. They consider what response is rational in regard to those parameters. In victims’ cultural context staying with the husband therefore can represent a form of conscious action.

The historic context of recognizing domestic violence in Russia is, as we have seen in previous chapters, linked to processes of international recognition of the issue. In this context, gender relations, their constitution and change in Russia are influential:

"[Knowledge of gender issues] is kind of new in Russia. (…) Regardless of the declaration of equality between men and women in all normative documents, even in the Soviet era, discrimination nonetheless existed, but we did not link this to infringements of human rights of women. There was no such comprehension. Such comprehension emerged to us, to the members of the Congress [of women of the Kola peninsula] mainly after 1995, after the Peking Conference, when we became more deeply acquainted with the documents of international society on women’s rights; when we met researchers on women issues in 1993 at the first independent women’s forum in Dybnya [Russia], when we began to address these questions more deeply, we kind of revised our position on women’s issues.” (Informant 17/2006)

Gender relations are highlighted and patriarchal traditions are cited as cause of violence in interviews. A prominent explanation of violence against women is that gender stereotypes define the accepted roles of men and women and that these traditions continue to provide excuses for men and to express an understanding of their violent behaviour. Asked to outline causes of violence against women, particular emphasis is by non-state crisis centre representatives placed on the role of upbringing and childhood experiences:

"[There are] very many causes. Social situation. And not well-off families. And parents’ alcohol misuse, of one or both. And a very great role here, I don’t know how it is with you, but here family traditions play a great role, when from generation to generation they are becoming used to deciding difficulties with some violent methods, because, as we always say, if the child is brought up in a family where it is accustomed to only violent forms of upbringing, then clearly he will build such a family himself, similar to the model of family [that he’s experienced]. If he watched violence in his family, then he will become violator in his future family. He watched it all in his childhood.” (Informant 6/2006)

The family as a unit for learning and practicing violence is also reproduced through generations. The Orthodox Church is referred to as another such unit for defining and reproducing gender relations. It is pointed out that myths of the Orthodox Church prolong
traditional views on the role of women and acceptance of violence (Informant 9/2006). Such viewpoints have also been reproduced publicly. For example, Rebecca Kay (2000) calls attention to President Jelzin’s speech on International Women’s Day in 1995. In this speech he described women as morally superior to men due to their maternal role. This view on women is however combined with a similar naturalistic view on men’s behaviour, including men’s violence against women:

“The flip side of this coin, however, is an apologist approach to male aggression and immorality which was similarly presented as given by nature and intertwined with the male role as hunter or provider and with men’s natural sexual urges which, it was suggested, could only be controlled by female restraint and morality.” (Kay 2000:30)

Such conservative gender attitudes are however reiterated through women’s own approach to violence. Their own views on how women should ‘correctly’ respond to incidents of violence are important in defining the societal context in which victims take action:

“When mum says, “Show patience, daughter”, when the history is as such that the grandmother lived like that, [there is] nothing to be afraid of and I lived like that [too].” 

(Informant 9/2006)

This illustrates the cultural acceptance of violence among women. Violence is normalized. At the same time this speaks to the lack of acknowledgment and understanding of violence against women. Customs in regard to the relation between men and women defined by social canons such as the church and parents and the older generation thus define cultural predispositions relevant to subjects’ practices. These dispositions do not determine their practices, but help explain constraints on action relevant to many victims.

The role of tradition is however put in perspective by comparing local experiences to developments elsewhere. Crisis centre representatives underline that these are common characteristics to incidents of violence everywhere:

“[Delivering traditional approaches to violence from generation to generation] [t]hat is general explanations. When talking to colleagues in all countries, in principle it’s the same there.”

(Informant 6/2006)

Notwithstanding similarities in gender roles and their importance to violence against women everywhere, responses may differ. It is in this regard that a concern of non-state crisis centre representatives with the northern woman and her characteristics becomes relevant:

“In Finland, in Norway, or in Karelia, that is northern people are more bound together. Probably they will (...). They will have more patience in the family. It’s more difficult for them to talk about it. It’s more difficult for them to express this/get this out. Beyond that I think that the status of women in northern regions (…) is higher.” (Informant 9/2006)

The northern woman is described as patient and inexpressive. Also a situation of gender equality characterizes her life-experience. Concerns with the special character of northern women are further outlined in regard to effects on the interaction with crisis centres:
“With us women in the north – that is a strong woman. For them it is very difficult. If something happens, and they have some sort of problem, but mainly there are problems with conflict. Women come [to the crisis centre] and for them it is very difficult to begin to talk. They are used to taking care of their problems on their own.” (Informant 2/2006)

These characteristics of patience, inexpressiveness and strength impacts women’s approach to seeking help at a crisis centre. But these characterisations of northern women are not brought up by the crisis centre representatives as a negative attribute. Rather it is an explanation for the constraints on action pertaining to relations with crisis centres that are considered peculiar to women in the north. These concerns were also used by crisis centre representatives to explain general characteristics of the problem of violence against women in the region:

“But in the north traditionally there was a family system, in which in principle the woman taught the man patience and tolerance. To put it differently, the traditional northern family is [based on] respect of the mother.” (Informant 7/2006)

From this the conclusion is that violence against women is a worse, more serious problem in other regions of Russia. Nonetheless, in the life-world of the individual victims this is an acute situation. This acuteness explains why also northern women contact crisis centres. In fact, the crisis centre representatives have observed considerable change in regard to the number of women contacting them:

“Earlier they did not call. No one contacted us. We could sit for a few days and no one contacted us. And then about 1000 phone calls arrive.” (Informant 8/2006)

Similar increases in the number of people contacting them are also experienced by other crisis centres. This illustrates increased knowledge of the issue and of the existence of crisis centres and is not necessarily a proof of increase in the number of incidents of domestic violence. It illustrates that the establishment of an assistance structure in the form of non-state crisis centres has induced a change in the environment that defines the context in which victims take decisions. A structural aspect in the form of non-state crisis centres is now in place. This allows victims to act in disaccord with habitus, defined by cultural norms on gender relations and societal pressure of the need to endure in a violent partnership. These cultural aspects define the habitus, but are here not studied in regard to their specific effects on one person’s practices. The role of gender relations and tradition in regard to violence against women are not unknown empirical findings. But here they are evoked in a different analytical setting. The identification of these aspects is based on what the non-state crisis centre representatives have observed in terms of victims’ action. Crisis centre representatives are well-informed about these aspects because these are the conditions that they meet in their work with clients. Thus, on the basis of the interviews with representatives of non-state crisis centres these aspects have been identified as relevant to subjects’ behaviour. They affect the level of the
individual and therefore constrain security production on the subjective level. How they constrain action in specific situation for specific individuals are however not studied because the data material is not concerned with individual’s own explanation of contingencies of their action.

7.3. Local security practices on violence against women

The emergence of non-state crisis centres in Russia in the 1990s represented a challenge to traditional practices of silencing the issue of domestic violence. The state, with its power to define legitimate social concerns and problems, dominates decisions relevant to addressing women’s security situation. The emergence of non-state crisis centres implied that a challenge to this dominant position was introduced from a non-dominant agent. I have explained in chapter six how women’s groups are key narrators of the problem of violence against women in Russia. They describe the responses of public servants to victims and are making knowledge of victims’ experiences publically known. In this chapter the analysis has showed empirically some aspects that define constraints on the production of security for victims of violence. The first research question regarding the use of a Bourdieusian approach to explain how non-state crisis centres for women in Northwest Russia produce security, is now summarized. A key interest is in how the forms of capital and the dispositions together constrain and define the space of manoeuvring for security in this context.

Non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia are preoccupied with their financial situation. As seen in the interviews, they are concerned about their resource base, and about the inability of local authorities to make resources available. The material resources of all local crisis centres in Northwest Russia comprise a basic infrastructure. To set up such an infrastructure and initiate their work, the funding that crisis centres received in the initial phase was essential to their establishment. In contrast to the more generous financial situation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the work of the local crisis centres is today characterized by lack of resources. Lack of resources constrains predictability in the work of the crisis centres. Among the seven centres interviewed in this project two have terminated their work completely because of the end to finances. In Murmansk and in Petrozavodsk where this has been the case, there are other centres, non-state and municipal to which victims of violence can turn. To specify how constraining this situation of weak economic capital is, there are however more perspectives to be considered. Even without any material resource base beyond a rudimentary infrastructure, crisis centres uphold their work. Some crisis centre representatives even express reservation in regard to claiming more resources from local
authorities. They wrap this in an attitude of social responsibility towards the budget limits of the municipality, and also discuss how pressing the needs of the crisis centre are. Despite the difficult economic situation, the women’s groups continue their work, and this is clearly to the benefit of victims who can still draw upon the human resources of these centres. It becomes clear that the work of the crisis centres involves symbolic capital that outweighs the weak economic capital base. The symbolic capital consists of the possibilities to achieve approval. The security practices of non-state crisis centres do not generate economic resources and are continued without material resources because they generate prestige. The symbolic capital entails the possibility of affecting views on the issue of violence against women, to establish recognition of their work and the suffering of the victims. This consideration of symbolic capital makes empirically evident the logic of the security practices of non-state crisis centres.

The lack of shelters defines the material conditions of the space within which victims of violence take action on their security situation. Crisis centres have little help to provide in terms of material support, and also few alternatives to suggest. The field in which security is to be produced for the victims is constrained by such limitation in the economic capital base. A vulnerable economic situation and housing difficulties are the most important issues. The main security strategy that crisis centres offer is an invitation to an alternative way of living. This comprises a set of choices that the victims have to make. In regard to the economic challenges that need to be surmounted in such a process, the crisis centres thus offer little tangible help. Practicing security in this field basically involves a re-description of self and in this process the crisis centres offer their resources. This also involves advice and suggestions on how to solve legal and economic problems. These challenges also demand specific action by the victims however as they are the ones who need to take action to change the situation. The crisis centres describe that they point out to the victims the various options they have available but choices need to be taken by the victim, who in this process produces the new self.

The process of understanding and re-describing the self is one in which the subject is confronted with a range of immaterial constraints. Empirically these are in the analysis seen in the form of for example the social pressure that intimidates the victims. They fear consequences such as social judgement and loss of status. This directs attention to how the actions of victims are ingrained in processes that define the symbolic meaning given to people’s practices. It is identified in the interviews that victims of violence face a first challenge in the naming of their situation, i.e. the recognition that they in fact live in a situation of violence. Local crisis centres experience that the naming of violence against
women is contested. This is associated with the continuing tendency to explain and express understanding of men’s violence. The question is if this affects the individual victims and their way of making sense of their own situation and the context in which choices are made. Such sense-making is furthered also by traditional views expressed by women, emphasizing a woman’s need to be patient. The analysis has also showed how such gender roles are also predominant in public discourse. Thus, their impact on the individual level is not improbable, but unpredictable.

Action taken by a woman to actively change her life-situation into a situation in which violence and insecurity does not define her life-world anymore is, drawing upon these experiences, not necessarily associated with symbolic meaning such as prestige and social recognition of her action. In regard to subjective constraints therefore, the analysis shows that women’s individual action does not entail a reconstructive or positive symbolic power. When crisis centre representatives demand women to act, to consider the choices outlined before them by crisis centre representatives, they confront a difficult situation. Crisis centre representatives have in the interviews been keen to underline the importance of making individuals take the decisions themselves, thereby emphasizing the “freedom of choice” of the victims. The material and immaterial constraints on action are forceful and constrains their freedom to choose however. The victims do not occupy symbolic capital that gives them a position to impose recognition of their action. In this they differ from the crisis centres and their possession of symbolic capital. In this particular field therefore, the security practices of crisis centres are associated with symbolic capital and recognition of their practices while the individual victims are on a subjective level exposed to traditional norms and habits that do not acclaim such action that the crisis centres demand of them. This habitus does not determine but structures choices of action.

The work of non-state crisis centres functions despite weak material capital because of the various ways and means of interacting with local stakeholders. In addition to the interaction with victims, interactions with stakeholders, local authorities, other activists and international collaborators define the security production of non-state crisis centres. These activities are conducted on the basis of social capital, a form of capital that through the continuation of such interactions is continuously reproduced. This implies the establishment of trust. In regard to the interaction with local law enforcers, crisis centre representatives have different views and assessments, but trust has also been acknowledged as a key to this kind of collaboration. The analysis has thus established that social capital is the form of capital that defines and empirically describes the non-state crisis centres as security producers.
Crisis centre representatives are keen to emphasize that there has been a change in the recognition that they experience from local authorities. This process has developed from a situation in which crisis centres were neglected, to a situation in which they are both listened and talked to. Through these interactions crisis centre representatives have acknowledged a set of differences in regard to how the issue is approached. From the perspective of crisis centre representatives, local stakeholders conceive of the issue of violence against women in terms of numbers and administrative instructions. Crisis centre representatives explain that they are confronted with a threshold based understanding of the issue according to which responses to an incident of violence against women is defined on the basis of specific parameters. This contrasts strongly with the approach of crisis centres. They take care of those who contact them, regardless. In their own words, open-mindedness and empathy are characteristics of their approach. Crisis centre representatives describe that they are focused on informing the public about their work and that they strive to establish broad networks. This self-presentation is put in perspective when considering the assessments of Norwegian NCRB collaborators. On the basis of their interaction with Russian crisis centres, they describe the local centres by contrasting them to their own work. Emphasis is then placed on the lack of rules in the Russian system. For the local crisis centres in Northwest Russia personal networks, their contacts in police and health departments etc., are key nodes in their work. Such relationships are used to find solutions on an ad hoc basis for the victims, and in this work, trust is the sole key to the functioning of the assistance system where in Norway rules guide the work considerably. In addition to these two distinct strategies for engaging the broader societal context of security for victims, there is also a major distinction in the immediate interaction with the victims that was highlighted in the interviews. According to the Norwegian crisis centre representatives, their engagement with victims is in a long-term perspective. Through conversations they engage victims’ experiences and assist in immediate recovery as well as in long-term aftercare. In contrast, the emphasis in the Russian context is recognized to be on the acute phase. The aim is to calm the situation, and a short-term perspective defines their approach. The options for engaging the social context, in which victims live in Russia, in terms of addressing the issues of housing and finances, are less approachable to the Russian crisis centres than in the Norwegian context, because of the lack of transparent rules. This is why the Russian crisis centres in their accounts emphasize their contact with the victims and how they are emphatic and open-minded in these interactions. Those are the resources they have in abundance.
Non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia nonetheless conceive of themselves as a guide between people and power:

“We are kind of the information provider or guide between the people and the power.”
Informant 8/2006

This description as guide also defines the crisis centres as local security producers. As interlocutors between people and power, crisis centre representatives draw upon their understanding of the victims and their situations, as well as their experience with local stakeholders. In their role as a guide therefore, crisis centre representatives use their social capital. The knowledge they have established on the basis of their experience both with victims and with stakeholders is the key resource in their security production. Material capital constrains their activities, also their interaction with their networks. Since social capital is their main resource for assisting the victims in finding a new way of organizing their lives, non-state crisis centres are vulnerable as security producers because they work on a case-to-case basis. They individually adjust their security practices to the needs of the victims but also need to strategize in regard to how their personal connections can be used to acquire help from stakeholders in individual cases. But their work also may remain concentrated only on the victims and personal therapy. Although this implies instability of their practices, over time the crisis centres gain routine.

In regard to victims, crisis centres are a cornerstone. Whether short-term or long-term, the crisis centres are there for therapeutic work. The crisis centres gather knowledge on the basis of the stories they hear from victims and become experienced in working with victims. This experience is a key resource for crisis centres. They are aware of the suffering and the struggles of individual women, and convey their understanding of these difficulties to a broader public. This is the essence of their involvement in the symbolic struggle for power to produce a vision of the world of violence against women. By using their experiences to promote advocacy of violence against women, they also use this knowledge and experience to the benefit of other women that may experience violence.

Describing how security practices are conducted does not explain what kind of security is produced. A few quotes from the interviews do however suggest some key issues to the kind of security established by crisis centres. For example, it is said that “We talk about abuse, make words, phrases – what it is that we are doing, that is, building.” (Informant 16/2006). This implies that a key activity is to make sense of the kind of insecurity experienced by people in the life-world. The importance of such meaning-making is underlined by the experience of Russian crisis centres pertaining to women who do not
acknowledge that they live in a situation of violence. Making words to describe women’s insecurities in situations that were previously naturalized, is therefore a key aspect in the development of the work of non-state crisis centres in Russia. Closely connected with this is access to information. In one interview it was stated that:

“If you are informed, it means you’re protected.” (Informant 9/2006)

This encompasses information to acknowledge that you are a victim of violence. Beyond that however, information is security because it implies that a victim knows where help can be achieved and who to contact how. Such action requires however a belief in the functioning of the system. Here, it was in an interview commented that “They [Norwegian women] are more confident [than Russian women] that they will receive help.” (Informant 16/2006) The kind of security produced by non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia is tied to processes of meaning-making and information provision that requires confidence.
8. Conclusion

The research questions in this study opened up for two analytical interventions regarding first, the understanding of the work of crisis centres in Northwest Russia and second, conceptual debates on security. It was argued that the human security concept emphasizes a subjective dimension in security research that is neglected in attempts at operationalizing the concept. This reproduces an objectivist bias in security research, and implies continued exclusion of the people to whom security matters. The work of Pierre Bourdieu addresses this particular problematique of subjectivism and objectivism and it was therefore suggested that this provides an interesting approach to an empirical study of security practices in a local context. Bourdieu’s work is increasingly applied in an expanding domain of security research, and the available examples of analyses of security actors and their doings were discussed and drawn upon to design this particular study. The novelty in this study is that the security practices of non-state crisis centres are addressed with a Bourdieusian approach and in regard to security theory. The use of Bourdieu is in this study for the first time discussed in regard to human security. The theoretical tools applied in this study are considered means to circumventing the antinomy of subjectivism and objectivism by providing an integrated analysis. The first research question was “Applying a Bourdieusian approach, how do non-state crisis centres for women in Northwest Russia produce security?” and aimed to show how such an approach structured an understanding of local security practices. To begin with in this conclusion, the understanding of the security practices of non-state crisis centres formed on the basis of the use of the Bourdieusian thinking tools field, capital and habitus is therefore summarized. Following this, the adaptation of these tools to the specific case is reviewed. This leads then to the concluding discussion of the second research question; “How does a Bourdieusian approach to the analysis of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia contribute to the conceptual debate on human security?” The implications of this case and the analytical approach in regard to the human security debate are discussed in the final section. The analytical results of this specific case, the assessment of the thinking tools as well as my experience with the research project are brought together to discuss how this study contributes to a de-militarized conceptualization of security.
8.1. A Bourdieusian approach to crisis centres and security

The concepts of field, capital and habitus have in this study been used to analytically approach and understand the security production of non-state crisis centres. It was established that in this specific field, non-state crisis centres are over-all equipped with a rudimentary material resources base. Only one non-state crisis centre, the centre Prijut in Murmansk, today offers a shelter to victims of violence against women. In order to find solutions to the material difficulties of their clients, the crisis centres’ guide their clients on how to change their life-situation. The centres are concerned with guiding and providing assistance to the victims by interacting with the police, justice and health systems. Through their interrelations with such stakeholders, the crisis centres have established a social capital base that is crucial to their security production. The use of Bourdieu’s thinking tools displayed therefore how the non-state crisis centres have established a space of manoeuvring despite their weak economic capital. In their own assessments however the non-state crisis centres strongly emphasize material constrains on their work. The question then becomes if they do not recognize the space of manoeuvring that they have created by means of social capital. In the interviews with representatives of non-state crisis centres, the need to concentrate on efforts to work on the security of individual victims is balanced against concerns with long-term political work and public campaigns on violence against women. A weak economic capital base explains why many crisis centre representatives find it difficult to combine these two tasks. In their practical work with victims, main structural constraints are acknowledged in the relations of crisis centres to stakeholders. This impedes the assistance they can provide and gives it an ad hoc character. At the same time, it is here that their social capital provides room for manoeuvring. This form of capital has been accumulated over the years as the crisis centres have addressed the issue of violence against women in gatherings with various stakeholders, in seminars and at round-tables. Through such experience in interaction with stakeholders, they have accumulated social capital. The analysis pointed to concerns however about the ability to uphold this capital base. This illustrates the interconnection between economic and social capital: A weak economic capital base affects the abilities to accumulate social capital and thereby limits the kind and number of activities that crisis centre representatives can accomplish. In regard to this context this is now a pressing issue. How crisis centres’ assess their space of manoeuvring is also a demonstration of their non-dominance in this field. Their achievements in terms of knowledge production, information provision and developments of
self for the victims have not changed the struggle they experience in interaction with local stakeholders, which continues to be characterized by ad hoc and personalized relations.

The crisis centre representatives have explained that for victims of violence against women, the guidance and assistance that they receive from crisis centres initiate a process of re-describing the self. This process is aimed at creating a new, secure life-situation in which the victims challenge the norms circumscribing the previous, insecure life-situation dominated by violence. Re-describing self is thus a process that involves an adjustment of habitus to a new situation. On the subjective level there are various constraints that make the initiation of this process difficult. For example, material concerns related to the difficulties of ensuring economic resources and a place to live are major obstacles for victims of violence recognized by all Russian actors. Because of a tradition of negligence and naturalization of violence against women, a societal pressure to endure in a violent relationship is acknowledged. Gender relations have contributed to these traditional understandings, and are reproduced both on the subjective level as well as in public discourse. Influences that contribute to changing gender relations have been identified, in terms of women’s activism and inspiration from international advocacy, e.g. the UN women’s conference in Beijing 1995. The naturalization of violence is for example observed by crisis centres in the tendency of victims not to recognize and understand that they are victims of violence. A key function of crisis centres is therefore to talk about this issue and to make words heard that describe this kind of violence. In this manner the crisis centres create a framework within which the victims can talk about their experiences and make sense of these. This is a first step towards a new life-situation for victims. This exposes the important symbolic effect of the work of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia today.

For the victims the crisis centres open up a discursive space for re-describing self. A number of choices are however needed in order to achieve a new state of security for the victims. Crisis centres provide information, but there are contingencies in the interaction between victims and crisis centres that are important to the kind of security production that takes place in this case. Crisis centres emphasize that victims who contact a crisis centre have a responsibility for changing their life-situation. At the same time, it is the choice of the victims if and how they want to act. They have freedom of choice. For crisis centre representatives their concern is to guide their clients, but they cannot demand action from the victims. They therefore need to balance between guiding and demanding action from victims. In this context therefore, the security production of crisis centres is characterized by a balancing of responsibilities, between the victims and the centres.
In context of the weak material conditions in this particular field, the security production for victims of violence against women is concentrated on such developments of the self. Through processes of re-describing the self, clients of crisis centres aspire to a new, secure life-situation. It is in this process that the crisis centres provide help, in providing support and advice to the women when they have to make difficult choices in their lives, but also in suggesting and guiding the women in the institutional landscape that defines the specific local context in which these women live. The crisis centre representatives emphasize their role in guiding and informing their clients. Because of the experience they have gathered over the years with the institutional apparatus in the local communities, they have knowledge of its functioning and have established personal contacts. These function as entry points in the interaction between victims and the institutional apparatus, e.g. personal contacts within the police who have collaborated with crisis centre representatives on prior cases. This knowledge is also a basis for advising victims on how to interact with representatives within the system, e.g. asking about copies of files, names of officials in charge, etc. As already established, the social capital of the crisis centres is crucial in regard to this interaction with stakeholders, and they gather experience and build trust through their work, hence accumulate social capital. Their vast experience and knowledge is a resource that can make the victims trust the guidance of crisis centres. In their words, crisis centre representatives describe this part of their work as “information provider or guide between the people and the power.” (Informant 8/2006) However, crisis centre representatives widely express discontent in regard to the status of their interaction with stakeholders. Their interaction continues to be characterized by ad hoc solutions, despite the concentrated efforts of crisis centres to inform and motivate stakeholders to establish more permanent forms of assistance to victims of violence against women. Local authorities are forthcoming in expressing their understanding of the issue and underlining the importance of the work of the crisis centres, but they cannot provide economic support to the centres. The crisis centres on their behalf, are hesitant toward demanding material support from authorities as they balance the need for action to their support with acceptance and acknowledgement of the importance of other issues as well. The interaction between crisis centres and stakeholders is a balancing act between crisis centres taking responsibility for victims of violence against women but also for other needs in society. This illustrates that security production in this case is defined by a balancing between demands for support and action on the one hand, and reservation due to the acknowledgement of other pressing, and thus competing, societal needs on the other. In their relations to stakeholders and victims, the position of crisis centres can then be described as defined by continuing
practices of ad hoc balancing between different considerations. They balance their roles as guide and informer against their role as advocate that demands further action.

Given this, information is a cornerstone of the security production of local crisis centres in Northwest Russia:

“If you are informed, it means you’re protected.” (Informant 9/2006)

Crisis centres provide much needed information, because earlier this issue was silenced. Crisis centres contribute to making alternatives known and available to victims of violence against women. Their work therefore challenges the naturalization of this form of violence and the perspective that over generations women are to endure this. Crisis centres provide a space in which victims receive information to make sense of their experiences and begin to develop a new, more secure life-situation.

8.2. Bourdieu and local security production

The use of a Bourdieusian approach to the work of non-state crisis centres was chosen because of the interest in conducting a systematic, empirical analysis of security relevant to people’s life-world. This analytical approach asks how security is practiced locally, and defined a main focus on non-state crisis centres as an example of a local security agent. Methodically, it was decided to conduct interviews with crisis centre representatives but also other agents relevant to this field in order to broaden the interpretive basis upon which to make sense of the local security practices. With one key informant group and two additional informant groups as well as secondary literature on crisis centres in Northwest Russia, various sources were used to analyse the local security production in experience-near and experience-distant perspectives. Other local stakeholders involved in work on violence against women, such as the police and representatives of local authorities, would have been possible informants as well but were not included in this particular study. The emphasis was on informants that work as closely and directly with victims of violence against women as possible. Local authorities were therefore not included in this study. As a consequence of this choice, specific, local arrangements that particular police departments have initiated on one location of this study, such as the establishment of a specific police brigade on violence against women, are not addressed. These initiatives underline however the ad hoc and personalized aspects of the local security production.

Relying upon this particular extract of primary sources, adapting the thinking tools to the case has been a main concern. Reviewing how this has been done is important in order to underline how the analysis was conducted. It was emphasized that the use of Bourdieu in
regard to non-state crisis centres is different from the analytical interest in international fields and agents of security in most other Bourdieu-inspired security studies. As this is an expanding area of research, methodological reflection on the various uses of Bourdieu in regard to security contributes to understanding how and what kind of knowledge of security is produced. In a first step towards answering research question number two on how a Bourdiesian approach to non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia contributes to the conceptual debate on human security, I now review the use of the thinking tools in this study.

8.2.1. The concept of field and crisis centres in Northwest Russia

The analytical starting point for examining the viewpoints of representatives of non-state crisis centres and their work on violence against women was specified by the concept of field. A field is defined as a configuration of a set of objective relations between agents. Within fields, agents struggle for differentiation, and in this struggle they employ certain strategies to achieve distinct positions. The interest here was in examining the experiences of the crisis centres as an example of local security production, with an emphasis on their assessments of achievements, constraints and possibilities of their practices. Drawing upon Bourdieu’s work, it was established that the concept of field had been used to study agents’ own descriptions and views (Bourdieu et.al. 1999). The confrontation of various viewpoints is means to illustrating a multilayered representation of reality. This corresponds well with concerns about a multifaceted human security reality. It was therefore argued that the concept of field opens up for examining various viewpoints on developments in specific contexts. Most famously, Bourdieu however used quantitative methods for analysing correspondences between possessions and positions in fields (e.g. Bourdieu 1984, 1996). Using Bourdieu in security studies, Didier Bigo (2000, 2006) has however suggested a focus on the micro-practices of agents as means to asserting empirical parameters that define agents’ positions within the field. By studying micro-practices, effects of the field can be assessed by examining constraints and possibilities in the interactions between agents. Bigo therefore directs attention specifically at interactions between agents, and this provided a basis for specifying the field in this particular context. Bigo’s operationalization of the concept of field was thus used as inspiration and a focus on constraints on security production in regard to the agents in this field was thus suggested. A focus on interactions between agents is therefore a key to the delimitation of the field in this study.

In this particular empirical context, the important practices of interactions for non-state crisis centres were identified as on the one hand between crisis centre representatives and
stakeholders, police, and justice and health system, and on the other with victims of violence against women. The field analysis was thus limited to a concern with particularly these two sets of relations. Prior to field work secondary literature on non-state crisis centres was examined and the importance of these kinds of interactions to the work of crisis centres was acknowledged. The exact interactions and views on these that were studied were determined on the basis of the interviews with crisis centre representatives and who they explained that they interacted with in order to address violence against women. The delimitation of the field was thus defined by a back and forth between the theoretical definition of field, Bigo’s operationalization, literature in the specific field and the unique interview material collected during field work. In the end, the field was in this study of the security practices of non-state crisis centres defined in terms of two sets of relations: First, relations between non-state crisis centres and stakeholders, and second, between non-state crisis centres and victims of violence against women. This formed an analytical framework for examining constraints on the security practices of non-state crisis centres.

In this field, non-state crisis centres have a contender position. In Northwest Russia these centres first emerged in the latter half of the 1990s. They aim at institutionalizing a permanent, reliable assistance structure for victims of violence. The local crisis centres challenged the neglect of this issue within local administrations, and also the dominance of the state in defining how to deal with this issue. The analysis was based on this recognition of non-state crisis centres as non-dominant in comparison to the dominance of the state in regard to deciding how to approach this issue within this field. The field is thus defined by a specific relation of dominance/non-dominance. In their position of non-dominance, crisis centres actively use their resources to create a system of assistance and security for victims of violence. The analytical focus was on assessing these practices by examining their interactions with stakeholders and victims of violence. To examine these interactions, the concepts of capital and habitus were employed.

**8.2.2. Capital and habitus in security production**

The concepts of capital and habitus were operationalized by first, conferring the theoretical definitions of these concepts. Thinking about these in regard to the empirical material, questions were formulated that aimed at putting the concepts to work in the analysis of the empirical material. In this manner I used the concepts of capital and habitus as thinking tools for analyzing the dynamics in the specific field. The definitions of capital and habitus clarify that field dynamics are determined by structures of distributed means to act (capital) and
incorporated norms structuring how these field structures are responded to (habitus). Together capital and habitus are concepts aimed at defining action.

The action in focus in this specific field was how non-state crisis centres produce security for women who have become victims of violence. These practices have been analyzed and explained by emphasizing how capital distribution constrains and enables action. Capital is defined as means to an end within a field. It is capital possession that defines agents’ possibilities of action, and capital is therefore power. Based on the empirical material, I identified economic and social capital as the two principal forms of capital in this specific field, and from the analysis symbolic capital emerged as important as well. Economic capital is the set of material resources at hand, while social capital is defined by social connections and networks. In order to uncover the distribution of capital and its effects, the first analytical question that was formulated as guide to the analysis addressed the possession of economic and social capital respectively. The second question addressed how capital works to constrain security practices. These two questions assisted and guided the use of the concept of capital in the analysis, and the purpose was to explain the structures that constrain security production in the field.

The forms of capital are convertible and cumulative. The structure of the field that defines the possibilities of action may therefore change and this may affect constraints on action. A most significant change that has affected the security production in this field during the last few years is the decrease in available external funding. This has affected the services of some centres, but generally, the crisis centres in this study have continued their work albeit with a lack of funding. This underlines the point that it is not the economic capital base but the social capital that defines the security production of these centres. Important to note is that this is possible because the centres never became used to large funds. In a recent survey of crisis centres in Russia and Northwest Russia in particular, non-state crisis centres report to have a budget varying between USD 400 and 40,000 (Johnson, Dracheva et al. 2008).147

Habitus is defined as incorporated norms, traditions and lived experiences that form contingencies and structures (but does not determine) action. These dispositions are a past that survives in the present and form principles of continuity, regularity and transformation. They form a scheme of perceptions incorporated in individuals that generates effects in practice. The concept directs attention to social attributes relevant to individuals’ practices, and is

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147 In this survey of crisis centres in Russia, only 6 out of 22 centres so far responded to this particular question of annual budgets. The analysis is ongoing.
concerned with the interconnection between social structures and individuals’ action. The concept therefore expresses a certain way of thinking about how people act. Although the habitus is an individual endowment incorporated within each individual, its functioning unfolds in the social field. It was therefore suggested to study the effects of the habitus on practices by focusing on interactions between crisis centre representatives and victims. The situation in which victims of violence against women contact a crisis centre is characterized by a break with conditions that have defined their life-world. I have therefore argued that this is a situation in which the cultural dispositions that define victims’ life-world interact with a new structure. According to Bourdieu, situations of misfit between the structures in the field and habitus are situations in which the habitus can be observed in response to changes in the field structure. I have therefore argued that this situation in which victims meet crisis centre representatives is such a situation of misfit in which the habitus can be observed.

I have talked to crisis centre representatives about their experiences with victims and examined challenges faced by victims on the basis of these interviews to establish dispositions that define action. The guiding question has been: What are the subjective constraints addressed in the interactions between victims and crisis centres? This is a general guideline to the analysis, and it was acknowledged that the contribution of the concept of habitus to the analysis is the outline of a specific view on how social reality is constituted. It directs attention to how people act, and the concern here has therefore been to engage people’s thoughts and perceptions on practice. Specifically, the concern has been to establish some of the key elements defining victims’ responses to the situation of insecurity that made them go and see a crisis centre. The aim has therefore been to examine the subjectively felt constraints on action by focusing on the interaction between crisis centres and victims of violence, and the process that victims initiate when contacting crisis centre. Therefore, in this analysis the concept of habitus addressed subjective aspects and capital addressed objective structures relevant to security practices of non-state crisis centres.

By means of these tools, a systematic approach to security practices locally have been employed that lays open how the analysis is conducted and how the specific, contextual understanding of security is analytically constructed. By means of applying Bourdieu’s thinking tools, the analytical delimitation of the security practice that defines this context is resulting from the analysis. This approach illustrates one way of avoiding a priori, technical delimitations of security. A contribution of this work is therefore that a specific analytical perspective, a Bourdiesusian approach, has been explained and transformed into an empirical analysis of local security production. The Bourdiesusian approach provides analytical tools for
examining and explaining the empirical developments. The examination of this specific case of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia with the use of the particular thinking tools of field, capital and habitus has contributed to an explanation of local security production in terms of local contingencies. With a focus on violence against women and non-state crisis centres as security agents, the study has contributed to illustrating analytically how security production is taking place locally.

8.3. Security de-militarized

This study defined an empirical and analytical interest in how security is produced locally that is a novelty in regard to human security studies. The study underlines that the understanding of security is constructed on the basis of the analysis of the empirical material in regard to the three thinking tools. The constraints on local security production are displayed by means of these tools. In this manner this study brings human security studies to a local, people-centred setting and makes contingencies in security production visible. The study has presented an analytical apparatus for studying local security practices and displayed the analytical results generated by the use of this apparatus in a specific context. The study does not contribute to the human security debate by a new delimitation of the concept, but with an analytical focus directed at local actors and their doings.

Marlies Glasius (2008) has pointed out that human security involves a shift in epistemological perspective from objectivism to an engagement with subjective views on security. Being concerned with subjective views in regard to security evokes struggles between different opinions, interests and values. What is at stake here is a struggle between a positivist critique of human security that demands analytical and substantial delimitation of the concept and an epistemological outlook that questions what defines security in the life-world of individuals. In terms of an epistemological perspective, human security therefore is the attempt to keep a technical or technocratic understanding of security at a distance (Büger 2006; Wibben 2008). The present study has shown that people’s human security reality can be studied devoid of technical delimitations.

Epistemologically this study was motivated by an interest in integrating objectivist and subjectivist impacts on security production. Empirically the analysis showed that the objective structures are of such a character that ad hoc interactions based on personal network connections are important to the manoeuvring for security in this field. A main result of the study is also that the role of the victims’ process of re-describing self for this local security production could be displayed. This underlines the complexity of local security production, as
each individual woman may choose differently in this process. This points however also to another important, but under-reflected aspect in regard to security and security policies that is implicit in the human security debate: de-militarized security practices. In regard to empirical studies on human security, a particular concern is the identification of a security issue. Who identifies what human security is in a specific empirical setting? Deliberative definition of an issue as a matter of security is a practice that a group of human security critics termed post-positivist by Ewan (2007), consider particularly problematic. The argument is that processes of securitization elevate issues on to an emergency agenda, which implies exceptional politics, in particular by military means (Wæver 1995). Human security issues are best kept off this agenda argues Buzan (2004), because they are more effectively addressed by normal politics. Such a perspective acknowledges military security policies and neglects the existence of alternative security strategies. In regard to the case studied here, such a perspective disregards the security practices of non-state crisis centres. There are however also in this specific context differing views on the issue:

“The understanding of social problems, and this also characterizes the problem of women, is completely different among state and societal [non-governmental] organizations. The state understanding that is strict instructions. For example, a woman receives help from the state if she has a small income or if she is raising a child. That is, there are specific parameters on the basis of which they help her. Of course that is not the way it ought to be. And non-governmental organizations they don’t do that. For them it is not important how much she earns. For them it is important what kind of problem she has, that she contacted them [the non-governmental organization/crisis centre] with that problem [and that] she needs help.”

(Informant 9/2006)

The problem-oriented focus reflected in the work of the crisis centres allows for pragmatic recognition of various security concerns however. Importantly, it opens up the thinking about what produces security for people locally. Ewan (2007:187) associates alternative security strategies with ethical dialogue, empathy and self-restraint, while Fiona Robinson (2008) has emphasized the importance of care in human security.148 These are but two attempts to label non-military security practices. Human security research is not substantial in its specification of what human security practices are in regard to a people-centred and not necessarily military-centred approach. This study has displayed the specific and contextual constraints on security production for women who become victims of violence against women. Following

148 Robinson is particularly concerned with establishing an alternative normative basis of human security by drawing upon a critical, feminist ethics of care, but notes also that it is necessary to “examine care as a practice and a kind of work, and interrogate how decisions about the distribution of care are made in any given social context.” (2008:27) An empirical practice approach, to which this study draws attention, is not (yet) part of Robinson’s argument.
critics of the human security concept, a relevant question to my study is if it is dangerous to label this security. I suggest that it contributes to a de-militarization of security and security politics, which is a basic premise of the human security concept and its emphasis on people’s everyday security realities. This study has contributed by analyzing ongoing practices of security production that define people’s comprehensive security reality. By making this visible the study challenges pre-conceived conceptions of security and its connection to the use of military force. In terms of people and their security experiences this may not be what is reflected on the ground.

The analytical approach to security that has been applied in this study does thus not solve the conceptual discussion of what is and what is not a security issue but it advocates an alternative analytical focus on how security is produced. Over the course of this research project, the concern with defining what security “really is” has been an issue that I have continuously been confronted with, during field work, at conferences and in other academic contexts of feedback and critique. As established in chapter two, violence against women has been acknowledged as a security concern in a number of international documents. During field work, the presentation of my research project under the heading of human security did seldom or never call forth responses of recognition by the respondents. The interviewees did, both in the interviews and in written material, refer to violence against women as a security matter, but other annotations, in particular ‘human rights issue’ is just as important, if not more than the term human security to their work in practice. In academic contexts, the bringing together of violence against women and human security in this project has also been questioned. One concern has been why the human is included, as security on its own would suffice, it is suggested. Other suggestions have been to exchange the term human security with other terms, such as safety for example. Throughout this project these debates have showed that delimiting security is a contingent task that interconnects theory and practice, the local and the international. The analysis of the work of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia exemplifies the complex constraints that define people’s security reality.
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Appendix

Appendix I: Information letter

Информация о научно-исследовательском проекте «Безопасность человека и гендер в северо-западной России» в Университете г. Тромсё, Норвегии.

О проекте

Почему безопасность человека? Безопасность, это не только суверенное, независимое государство и безопасная граница. Человеку нужно нечто большее, чтобы почувствовать себя безопасно. В 2003 году Международный комитет ООН написал в отчёте, что безопасность человека - это всесторонняя защита человеческой жизни. Что это значит? Ответ зависит от того, например, где мы живем. Вопрос о том, как сделать жизнь людей безопасной зависит не только от правительства в Москве или Осло, но также зависит от деятельности местных органов власти и организаций. В Институте политических наук в Университете г. Тромсё мы исследуем как безопасность осуществляется в разных местах, например в Арктике, в Канаде, в Северной Норвегии, и на северо-западе России. Исследовательская программа называет «Безопасность человека».

Я - Кирсти Стюэй –являюсь с 2004 научным сотрудником этой программы. Темой моего проекта в докторате является безопасность человека на северо-западе России. У меня особенный взгляд на гендерные вопросы, особенно на тему насилия над женщинами. Почему гендер и насилие над женщинами? И почему в России? Гендерные вопросы и особенно проблема насилия над женщинами являются одной из важных составляющих прав человека. Дискриминация в отношении женщин - это проблема всех стран мира. В России насилие над женщинами, как считается, является одной из серьезнейших проблем. Были созданы некоммерческие организации и кризисные центры, чтобы исследовать эту проблему. И их деятельность меня особенно интересует. Поэтому, мне бы хотелось провести интервью касательно вашей деятельности.

О интервью – теми

Мне интересует, как вы работаете, чтобы делат ситуацию для женщин лучше. У меня три главные темы, о которых я хочу задавать вопросы в интервью:

- Об организации: Цели и задачи вашей организации
- Знание о проблеме насилие над женщин (Например, собираете ли вы статистику? Каковы причины насилия?)
- Деятельность (Как вы узнаете, кто нуждается в вашей помощи? Как вы помогаете женщине, которые с вами связаться? С кем вы сотрудничаете?)

Интервью будет записываться на диктофон. Если у вас есть возражения, то ваше имя не будет упоминаться при использовании данных.

В результате моего исследования будет написана докторская диссертация, в которой я сопоставлю информацию полученную от других организаций северо-западной России, работающих против насилия над женщинами (в частности собранный в Архангельске, Петрозаводске и Мурманске). Диссертация будет закончена примерно в 2008 году.
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Тел: +7-89215967381 E-mail: kirstis@sv.uit.no

b. To Moscow-based women’s groups:
Информация о научно-исследовательском проекте «Безопасность человека и гендер в северо-западной России» в Университете г. Тромсё, Норвегии.

Почему безопасность человека? Безопасность, это не только с уверенное, независимое государство и безопасная граница. Человеку нужно нечто больше, чтобы почувствовать себя безопасно. В 2003 году Международный комитет ООН написал в отчёте, что безопасность человека - это всесторонняя защита человеческой жизни. Что это значит? Ответ зависит от того, например, где мы живем. Вопрос о том, как сделать жизнь людей безопасной зависит от правительства в Москве и Осло, но также зависит от деятельности местных органов власти и организаций. В Институте политических наук в Университете г.Тромсё мы исследуем как безопасность осуществляется в разных местах, например в Арктике, в Канаде, в Северной Норвегии, и на северо-западе России. Исследовательская программа называет «Безопасность человека».

Я - Кирсти Стувэй –являюсь с 2004 научным сотрудником этой программы. Темой моего проекта является безопасность человека на северо-западе России. У меня особенный взгляд на тему насилия над женщинами. В течение последних 15 лет в России были созданы некоммерческие организации и кризисные центры, чтобы исследовать эту проблему. Их деятельность меня особенно интересует. Весна 2006 года я сделала интервью с представителями семи женских некоммерческих объединениях, в том числе кризисные центры, в северо-западной России. Насилие над женщинами – это комплексная проблема, которая нуждается вклад разных учреждениях. Чтобы исследовать эту тему, я решила посмотреть насилие над женщинами из разных перспективах. Поэтому, мне интересует и ваш взгляд на этой теме. На пример, какие у вас возможности; как вы работаете вместе с женские организации в регионах; как вы влияете на политику; как помогают международные документы улучшить ситуаций по положение женщин в России; изменилась бы проблема насилие над женщинами в течение последних лет (успехи и минусы).

Если Вы согласитесь, то интервью будет записываться на диктофон. Если у вас есть возражения, то ваше имя не будет упоминаться при использовании данных.

В результате моего исследования будет написана докторская диссертация, и она будет закончена примерно в 2008 году.

Контакт:
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Тел: +7-926-855-9843 E-mail: kirstis@sv.uit.no
c. To Norwegian centres:
INFORMASJON OM FORSKNINGSPROSJEKT: “Human Security and Gender: The Case of Northwest Russia”, Universitetet i Tromsø

I forskningsprosjektet ”Human Security and Gender: The Case of Northwest Russia” tar jeg utgangspunkt i begrepet human security som ble introdusert i FNs Human Development Report i 1994. Her defineres sikkerhet med fokus på individer og ikke stater, slik det tradisjonelt tenkes om sikkerhet. Å forske på sikkerhet vil dermed innebære at blikket ikke rettes kun mot staten og dets sikkerhetsapparat. I mitt forskningsprosjekt har jeg derfor valgt å studere sikkerhet ved å se på hvordan ikke-statlige aktører skaper sikkerhet i folks spesifikke lokale kontekster.

I mitt prosjekt studerer jeg krisesentre for kvinner i Nordvest Russland som aktører for sikkerhet. Spørsmålet er hvordan de skaper sikkerhet. Jeg ser på hvordan de definerer problemet vold mot kvinner, deres aktiviteter, hva slags løsningsstrategier de fokuserer på og hvem de samarbeider med og hvordan.


Hittil i prosjektet har jeg intervjuet representanter for syv krisesentre i Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Severodvinsk, Sortevala og Petrozavodsk. I tillegg har jeg hatt samtaler med bl.a. representanter i fylkeskommunen i Arkhangelsk og Murmansk med spesielt ansvar for kvinnespørsoml, med medarbeidere på institutt for gender-forskning og fagbevegelsen, som har vært med på å utvide min forståelse av arbeidet med kvinnespørsoml mer generelt i denne regionen.


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Appendix II
Interview guide Crisis centres (in Russian):

1. Какова цель работы вашего центра? Почему вы работаете с этим вопросом? Когда вы начали свою работу?


3. Опираясь на ваш собственный опыт работы можете ли вы выделить основные причины насилия над женщинами? С вашей точки зрения, есть какие-то особенные причины насилия над женщинами в вашем регионе?

4. Опираясь на ваш собственный опыт, готовы ли жертвы насилия рассказать о себе и своей проблеме? Какие важные моменты присутствуют в их истории, когда они рассказывают вам как они подверглись насилию?

5. Как вы узнаете, кому нужна ваша помощь?

6. Как вы считаете, насколько серьезна проблема насилия над женщинами?

7. Как вы входит в контакт с женщинами, которым нужна ваша помощь?

8. Какую деятельность осуществляет ваш центр? Какие услуги предоставляет ваш центр? Как вы помогаете женщинам, которые с вами связываются?

9. Каким образом осуществляется финансирование вашей организации?

10. Есть ли у вас связи с другими кризисными центрами в области? В других областях? В Москве или Санкт-Петербурге?

11. С кем вы сотрудничаете, чтобы улучшить ситуацию по положению женщин? Сотрудничаете ли вы с муниципальными органами? Городскими и областными? С федеральными органами?

Есть ли у вас совместные проекты вместе с этими органами, например, открыть приют? Если есть, как вы осуществляете реализацию этих проектов? Хотите ли вы сделать какие-нибудь совместные проекты в будущем? Обсуждали ли вы Конвенцию о ликвидации всех форм дискриминации в отношении женщин (КЛДОЖ) вместе с органами власти? Используете ли вы Конвенцию в вашей работе? Как?

Как вы считаете, может ли помочь какое-то другое законодательство улучшить положение женщин? Принимаете ли вы участие в какой-либо законодательной деятельности? Например, даете ли рекомендации местному правительству об изменениях в
законодательстве с целью помощи женщинам? Приглашают ли вас местные органы управления к обсуждению проблем женщин?

12. Что делает, по вашему мнению, местные органы для предотвращения насилия над женщинами?

13. Используете ли вы какие-нибудь критерии и/или индикаторы измерения успешности вашей работы? Какие успешные проекты были у вас в центре за последнее время?

14. У вас есть в кризисном центре, какие-то особенные политические цели?

15. Последние вопросы:

16. Что вы думаете, я что-то забыла/упустила в моих вопросах? Что ещё важно, чтобы понимать как вы работаете?

17. Мои вопросы, они оправдали ваши ожидания? У вас есть вопросы ко мне?

Вы можете позвонить мне в течение следующих дней, если у вас возникнут какие-то вопросы. До 26 Мая я в Архангельске. Вы можете тоже послать мне E-mail.
Я суммирую результаты нашего интервью напишу отчет (1 страница). Если вы хотите, вы сможете с ним ознакомиться.

18. Почему? Можете ли вы делать мне точные примеры?

Draft Interview guide crisis centres, in English: Human Security and Gender: The Case of Northwest Russia

GUIDE TO THE INTERVIEWS

A general guide to the interviews is developed to ensure that specific areas of information are covered in all the conversations with all participants. Thus, the design of the guide implies that all the interviews share the same focus. The questions are open-ended (what, how etc.). This is to ensure that participants are free to choose how they answer the questions, thereby facilitating that their subjective views and representations of the issues are heard.

Who?
Russian women groups that are operating as crisis centres and working to prevent violence against women, incl. trafficking. The general criteria for the choice of actors is that the actor is organized and working to eliminate violence against women. The focus is first and foremost on non-governmental organizations that have been established to work to eliminate (prevent, help victims, etc.) violence against women. The establishment of these organizations point to a weakness in the security governance of the state. A basic assumption in my research project is that the actor(s) has recognized a weakness in how the authorities (local, regional, national) are tackling the issue, and has therefore initiated practices to create security. The main question that the interviews aim to establish knowledge about is: What is the nature of the security governance that the women groups/crisis centres are involved in? How do they promote security? In addition to addressing their knowledge (assessment of the security problem), capabilities, and resources, I will explore how they interact with government
entities. Although the women groups have been established to work on an aspect of security in which state efforts are weak, this does not imply that the state is absent. The women groups constitute a link between civil society initiative and the public sphere (the state) in the governance of security.

Information prior to the interviews:
Obtaining subjects’ informed consent to participate. This includes:
1. Inform about the overall purpose of the project
2. Inform about the main features of research design
3. Consider the risk, benefits with participation.
Securing confidentiality
Consider possible consequences of the study for the subjects (including f.ex. stress, changes in self-image).
Voice recorder: inform why. Questions?

Purpose of the project
In my research project I study how NGOs work to improve the security situation of vulnerable people. The idea is that this constitutes a new form of security policy. The aim of my research is to understand how this works. I gather information on how women groups aim to reach the objective of eliminating violence against women. I will study the work of multiple women groups in Northwest Russia; in Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Petrozavodsk. Interviews take place in the spring and in the fall 2006. The research report is expected to be finished by early 2008.

WHY RUSSIA?

Main features of design
The focus of the interview will be:
(1) objective and activities of the organization; rationale for their work,
(2) how they work; interaction with local government in particular.

What is expected of the interviewee
Time for the interview will be app. 1 hour – 1½ hour. Participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw with no repercussions. All information that you give to me, is confidential. Your name will not occur in the final research report.

Benefits for the interviewee:
I will provide a written research report taking into account the work of multiple crisis centres in Northwest Russia. I will assess their resources for and capabilities of taking action to eliminate violence against women. Since my report will draw upon the work of several women groups, my hope is that this information can be useful for you in how you conduct your work. You may contact me whenever you feel like during the process if you have any questions regarding my research project.

Formalities:
Provide my contact details.

Ethical issues:
What will be a loyal written transcription of an interviewee’s oral statements?
How deeply and critically can the interviews be analyzed?
Should the subjects have a say in how the statements are interpreted?
Report knowledge that is as secured and verified as possible.
Ongoing discussion of the ethical aspects with experienced researchers, and researchers in the community in which you are conducting interviews.
Ideal:
- Interpretation of interview throughout interview.
- Attempt to verify interpretation of subjects’ answers throughout.

Personal data:
Name:
Organization:
Position:

Questions:
What is the objective of this centre? What does the centre want to achieve (outcome)?
What are the experiences of violence against women that you are confronted with in your work?
What do you think are the main causes of violence against women? (based on the experiences from working at the centre) Are there in your view any causes that are specific to this region?
Are you compiling statistics? What kind of statistics do you have available?
What do the victims of violence think is important when explaining to you why they have become victims of violence?
Who do you cooperate with to achieve this aim? Locally, regional, federal, internationally?
More specific: Are you collaborating with the local authority on specific issues, such as e.g. the establishment of a shelter? Have you discussed the CEDAW convention with local authorities? What role does the CEDAW convention play in your work? Are you involved in work to pressure the federal government to adopt legislation to protect women from violent abuse?
How do you establish knowledge on who needs assistance?
How do you establish knowledge on the scale of the problem?
How do you reach women in need?
What are the activities of the centre? How do you assist the women that have become victims of violence?
What kind of resources do you have available for your work? What is the source of these resources?
Are you linked to other crisis centres throughout the region, or in other regions (oblasti)? Are you a part of the Angel network?
How do you measure the success of your work?
How is the government addressing the issue of violence against women in the region? What is the local government doing?
How do you work together with the local government?
What are the political concerns of the crisis centre?
What motivates the political activism of the group?

Concluding questions:
Do you think I have left out something that is important in regard to your work (on eliminating violence against women)? What?
Was this what you expected? Do you want to ask me something? Encourage interviewees to contact me during the next few days, if they think of something.
How so? Could you elaborate? Can you tell me more?
My summary: rounding up with the main points that I have learn throughout the interview.