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Department of Social Sciences

POST-TERRORIST ATTACKED AREAS

The case of Regjeringskvartalet in Oslo. Effects on the security and liveability of the city.

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ABSTRACT

On July 22, 2011, the Government Quarter of Oslo and the island of Utøya – to the northwest of the city – where political activities for young people were developed – suffered one of the major terrorist attacks in the modern history of Europe. Several years after the event, this metropolis is still affronting its consequences. The construction of the new Government Quarter and the lack of security measures around the city is making a change in the way of planning the urban future of Oslo.

Therefore, this research will explore one of the significant current challenges in the Norwegian capital: the coexistence of security measures with the liveability in the new development of the Government Quarter and the city in general terms. The main goal of this study will be to understand the insights into the security and liveability of different actors involved in the new development. Moreover, through the combination of three methods – GIS visualisation, qualitative interviews and planning document analysis – the current investigation will be carried out to answer the main research question and three subquestions elaborated to understand the problem from three different approaches.

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INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, we live in an era where urban terrorist attacks are frequent (Goldman, 2010); thus, the debate on how to deal with them has been taken to the urban planning committees in most cities.

In a European context, various cities like Paris, London, Manchester and Barcelona have been attacked in different forms, from bomb explosions and shootings to mass runovers. Its responses have varied between different countries depending on the necessities of its population. Consequently, through EU regulations, there has been a harmonization of the system in terms of financial and operational aid (Kuipers et al., 2015). In this sense, every terrorist attack can be learned to benefit another city facing an attack like this (Dyregrov, 2019).

Moreover, Oslo is an example of how a terrorist attack changed the mentality and direction of planning a city in terms of securitization. On the 22 of July of 2011, Oslo suffered a terrorist attack in Regjeringskvartalet¹ of the city and in the island of Utøya. An explosion occurred around the office of the Prime Minister at the time, Jens Stoltenberg from the Arbeidarpartiet². The area was home to almost all government buildings, from ministries to other organisations. The most damaged building was the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy headquarters. According to local media, the affected ministry was practically destroyed, and the area "resembled a war zone" because of the damage caused. After this event, a second attack happened in Utøya where a youth camp from the Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF)³ was being held. In the island, the terrorist mass shot the youngsters participating in the political event with no possibility to escape from the island.

The terrorist attack was perpetrated by Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian national with extreme right-wing ideals. By setting off a car bomb parked in front of the Prime Minister's office and subsequently shoot young people in Utøya, Breivik wanted to express his ideas against the Government's policies on immigration and the tolerance of

¹ Translated in English as the Government Quarter.

² Translated in English as the Norwegian Labour Party.

³ A young political organisation related to the Arbeiderpartiet.

foreigners, among others. In total, the attack killed seventy-seven people and injured three hundred and nineteen.

Several years after the event, the city is still affronting the consequences of the terrorist attack. There have been emerging debates on how to securitize the city in general terms, and the security of the new Government Quarter developed again in the city. Thus, this research will consist of an analysis of the case study of Regjeringskvartalet and the systems of how to plan new developments in Oslo, to understand how the city is managing a liveable city centre while creating security measures to prevent possible future terrorist events.

PROBLEM AREA

Terrorism is a recurrent term used nowadays in public opinion, the governments, or the media to discuss different topics occurring in the world. Thus, it is precise to specify a definition of the concept. The word terrorism has several connotations, definitions and interpretations depending on which part of the earth is used or the interests of powerful actors such as international organisations or governments. Moreover, the lack of a definition may facilitate the politicisation and misuse of the word to deny non-terrorist or occasionally non-criminal actions. In fact, this can result in States violating the rights of their own or other States' citizens, for example (UNODC, 2018).

Therefore, given the situation of ambiguity in the term 'terrorism', this research will understand terrorism as what Bruce Hoffman (2006, p. 40) defines as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change." The reason for choosing this definition lies in the fact that it has a good correspondence with a list of characteristics derived from other fifty different academic reports, with the top five characteristics being: violence, political, fear, threat, and psychological effects and anticipated actions (Aasland & Lygren, 2020).

As defined, the current situation of terrorism makes experts in city planning ask themselves how to combat this situation of terror in the most target places in the urban world. Nowadays, around 21.000 civils die in terrorist attacks every year (Richie et al.,

2013). Concretely, in Europe four of the ten worst terrorist attacks since the 80s, had been carried out between 2015 and 2017. However, in general terms, the number of terrorist attacks in the last decade has been declining since the number of cities applying measures that counteract the terrorist attacks have increased. One of these counteract measures is the **antiterrorist urbanism**, “architecture of threat prevention that visually and spatially expresses our fear, just as much as it expresses the risk we are exposed to” (Simpson et al., 2017, p.12). These urban interventions are applied in the metropolis' public spaces to protect them - both design and diplomacy can protect cities in an era where urban centres are rapidly transforming and increasingly in danger. Designing urban public areas in terms of antiterrorist measures is complex and depends on each case. It could be related to the regime of the country, the values, the international threats or the importance of the public space, among others.

But how are these antiterrorist measures affecting the citizens of these areas? These actions are creating more security but at the cost of the liveability of the population in the city (Simpson et al., 2017). This situation is constantly debated in countries such as Norway, attempting on the citizens' rights as a democratic state. According to dictionary definitions, “a liveable place is a place suitable for human living, worth living in” (Caves & Wagner, 2018, p. 1). Also, organisations like Partners for Liveable Communities (2017) add to the definition factors related to quality of life such as built and natural environments, economic prosperity, social stability and equity, educational opportunity, and cultural, entertainment and recreation possibilities (Ibid, 2018). Thus, it is important to understand that even though liveability is a very extensive concept touching many different aspects of public life, it always has a relation with the openness of economical, social and environmental aspects that the term of “security” could lack of.

On the one hand, **security** in its physical dimension is relatively easy to design and implement. This measure can be from the basic level of concrete blocks around pedestrian areas to complex public furniture designs such as sculptures, benches or nature to avoid mass car run-overs of the citizens, shootings or hidden bombs. Furthermore, surveillance cameras are also a recurrent way of securitising a place. On the other hand, the previously mentioned actions can conduct to significant political and economic consequences. This is especially true when it comes to democratic principles

like openness, accessibility or flexibility (Simpson et al., 2017). In consequence, security measures can affect the **liveability** of the city critically. When it comes to security, citizens tend to dislike the idea of more security guards' presence or being recorded by a camera since it makes them feel that they are part of a police state (Barry-Jester, 2017). This situation leads to less public space usage and, consequently, less liveability.

PROBLEM FORMULATION

After the events of July 22, the Norwegian population has been in fright as the Security Advisor in the Norwegian Government (2011)⁴ argued in a press conference: "[...] we never receive calls [when blue or red vans park outside government offices]. But when a white van parks in front of a government building, the department and the police receive dozens of calls from panicked government employees."

Norway has a population of 5.4 million people approximated (United Nations Statistics Division, 2019). This means that as a small country in terms of population, there are more chances of having someone related affected by the attack. Thus, there are some studies of how the feeling of insecurity by the national population raised after the terrorist attack. Proximity to a terrorist attack is closely related to the distress of the country's people, and early distress is closely related to later post-traumatic stress. The findings demonstrate that psychological proximity is more strongly associated with post-traumatic stress responses than geographic proximity and underscore the importance of differential measurements of various aspects of early distress (Thoresen et al., 2012). In conversations with locals carried out for this study, it can be seen how people were more affected by emotional and psychological closeness to people affected by the terrorist attack than by geographic proximity to the events' area.

Consequently, the Municipality of Oslo decided to design a plan that included closing streets to cars and any other motor transportation using concrete blocks around the neighbourhood. Moreover, from the local authorities, there has been a willingness to

⁴ Extracted from the book: *The city between freedom and security* by Deane Simpson, Vibeke Jensen and Anders Rubing, 2017.

protect more the city in terms of terrorist attacks and violence. Accordingly, the post-terrorist attack led the politics to rethink how to organise the Government in terms of the physical building position. Since always, Regjeringskvartalet has been a threat internationally in terms of terrorism. As Anders Romarheim – a researcher at the Department of Defense studies – stated: "If you put all the ministries in the Government Quarter, it will be enough for a terrorist to hit somewhere. You collect all the eggs in a basket, and get an attractive terrorist target." Hence, the politicians of the moment were divided into two main ideas to organise the government buildings:

- Spread the new ministries and governmental organisations around Oslo to make it more difficult to attack the Government as a whole.
- Develop a new Regjeringskvartalet where all the government buildings coexist together in the place they were before.

However, after months of debate, the final decision was to create a new Government Quarter. The reason for it was to "[...] facilitate collaboration between the ministries [...]. The new buildings will contribute to the well-being, efficiency and productivity of highly qualified employees. The goal is to build an open, safe, green government building complex that will benefit the city and the people who are going to work there." (Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development of Norway, 2020). Furthermore, gathering all the government buildings in the same neighbourhood would make easier to concentrate a very high degree of security in an only place (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018).

Once this decision was made, the question asked by the experts working on the area's new development was: how to securitise the area? Since the creation of the Norwegian State, all the rules have been created under the value of trust (Simpson et al., 2017). This value plays a central role in Norwegian society, making it challenging to create a secure space without making people aware they are being controlled. Previous studies in controlled spaces in cities reveal that installing cameras everywhere contributes to creating bad quality public spaces where citizens do not want to spend time. Stuart Kaplan (2019) argues that even though other persons might observe us in the public

space, the quality of it is lost when the observer is a surveillance camera. Ergo, how to make Regjeringskvartalet a safe place and attractive for the citizens?

This research project will try to find answers to this problem. This investigation aims to understand how the role of Antiterrorist Urbanism can securely shape the cities while making the place more liveable. The report will analyse the case of Oslo and Regjeringskvartalet, creating a precedent on how collaboration between different stakeholders can achieve the success or failure in developing a liveable and secure public space. For this reason, the research question that will guide this research is:

To what extent are security and liveability in a conflict in Regjeringskvartalet?

In addition, the next sub-questions will be answered during the analysis of the case to take a particular focus on the author's own observations, local citizens of Oslo, and Municipality of the city:

- *How is Regjeringskvartalet area currently experienced?*

Through the own observations of the author and opinions of two local citizens that have experienced the area before and after the terrorist attack, a GIS analysis has been conducted.

- *How is the Municipality of Oslo planning the new developments of the city and what are its challenges?*

Interviews with three local politicians from the Municipality of Oslo and planning documents were merged in order to answer to this question.

- *What perspectives do the local politicians and urban planners have on the security and liveability of Regjeringskvartalet area?*

Again, the answer to this question was found through the analysis of interviews with the three local politicians and the analysis of planning documents.

The municipality of Oslo is looking after the liveability of its city after a report made by Gehl People revealed Oslo's poor liveability. According to the report, Oslo's premises did not interact with the public space, becoming a place to pass through on the journey from home to work and back (Fortune, 2014). In addition, the securitization of the city, especially of the new Regjeringskvartalet, can contribute to this effect if there is an

abuse of it. From this perspective, the neighbourhood will have sophisticated surveillance cameras and controls systems in the main cars' entry to the zone.

The following chapters will consist of a theoretical framework where the concepts of liveability and security will be explained through theories to show their relation. Secondly, a methodology chapter will explain the different ways of collecting data and analysing it. Once the methods are discussed, the analysis chapter will argue the three research subquestions mentioned above as the central part of the research. Finally, the conclusion will point out the last considerations and will answer the main research question.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Currently, cities have become the central point of each nation since the United Nations fixed that 66% of the world's population will live in cities by 2050 (UNDESA, 2014). Oslo, in this case, is notable for its attractive conditions that led to its becoming the fastest-growing capital in Europe. This situation brings the city to the major restructuring since the 17th century (Savage, 2014).

The present theoretical framework will discuss the main challenges of the future of a city in terms of liveability and security. Through Jan Gehl's book *Cities for People* (2010), the good city theoretical concept of the lively city and the insights of Jon Coaffe and Paul O'Hare in *Urban resilience and national security: the role for planning*, further explorations will be made. Both concepts can lead to a conflict of interests in which the right to the city has a central role in designing an urban area with both characteristics. This section will be divided into a profound explanation of the concept of liveability, followed by the understanding of securitizing the city. It will end up discussing how both concepts can fit or discord in an urban space.

Liveability in the city

Porter (2010), in his paper about "Planning for sustainable and livable communities", argues that liveability is a concept often used to describe the various aspects of society, surroundings, and shared feelings that creates a community. Thus, the concept is focused on the human experience of a place. Moreover, it includes a wide range of economic, spatial and social components that can be tough to understand and measure in the defined world of planning and development. Therefore, liveability is better defined by the state, region, association, or community analysed. It is better measured at a geographical scale where definitional consensus about liveability could be agreed upon.

As Porter (2010) suggests, liveability is a broad concept that can mean different things depending on geographical and cultural approaches. In this case, the definition of Oslo's Municipality will be used to understand the concept from a Norwegian perspective focusing on its capital city. The Municipality perceive a liveable city as a place where there are "Open ground floor with public businesses, streets of high quality of design and well adapted for pedestrians, coherent network of pedestrian streets, public squares adapted for diverse activities [...] common principles for street use and security measures and democratic processes on the city development" (Oslo Kommune, 2014-1). Hence, for the local authorities, liveability means various activities, walkability, safety and democracy.

After the terrorist attack in 2011, the local citizens and authorities noticed the need to address a change into a liveable future for Oslo. Porter (2010) remarks that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to liveability. Every city is unique, and its particularities are the ones that will define its conditions to become liveable. In consequence, the different metropolises need to have leadership that helps them achieve the goal of becoming liveable for their citizens (Ibid, 2010).

In his book *Cities for People* (2010, p. 50), Jan Gehl applies that a "lively city sends friendly and welcoming signals with the promise of social interaction." Accordingly, he compares the lively city and the liveless city, which in the first case means a city full of life and attractive, and the opposite in the second case. This categorisation into two

different cities makes understandable how vital is life in public places as a key urban attraction. However, it is essential to understand that lively or liveless cities cannot be a matter of quantification; for instance, on the one hand, a small village with few people in a narrow street could imply a lively village. On the other hand, a crowded street with narrow sidewalks and significant motor traffic would not be a definition of a lively city (Gehl, 2010).

On the contrary, for other authors such as Porter (2010) argue that liveability is somehow an abstract concept with a wide range of definitions and a way of translating the concept into reality is by quantifying it. Through liveability indices and rankings attempting to create a manageable form of the concept, it is easier to compare and analyse this multifaced phenomenon for public discussion (Ibid, 2010). Wherefore, liveability is tangible when it becomes real in a public space, which brings difficulty in analysing the future liveability of an area under development such as Regjeringskvartalet. Though, the experiences and ideas from local citizens that have experienced the space before the terrorist attack will be a proper resource to create an understanding of it.

Moreover, while planning for liveability, it is significant to understand for who is that public space. Consequently, different recreational and social activities are mixed with space for pedestrians to participate in urban life (Ibid, 2010). In this sense, Oslo and its Municipality are working toward a more inclusive city centre. Their plan for a car-free liveability city centre is about "giving the streets back to people", as Hanna Marcussen, Oslo's vice mayor for urban development mentioned (Oslo Kommune, 2019-1). Through a democratic process, the Municipality has been trying to achieve the goal of a "lively city": "When we ask the inhabitants of Oslo what changes they would like to see in order to use the city centre more, the answer is clear: they would like more green areas, more benches and free seating, more culture and more human activity in the streets. The inhabitants of Oslo would also like better roads that accommodate cyclists, better public transport and fewer cars in the city centre." (Ibid, 2019).

"People come, where people are."

This common saying in Spanish can be a useful example of what attractive city life can make. People, in general, usually feel inspired by other people's actions and activities, and this process helps create a social life in a city. "Something happens because something happens because something happens because..." (Gehl, 2010, p. 65). It is a succession chain the responsible for creating city life.

In addition, the creation of public social activities in a city for its citizens should be logically placed. Shops, restaurants, monuments and public functions have to be planned in places where people like to pass by. Hence, the trip from one point to another will be an experience instead of a boring walk. A key element for it to happen is focusing on the city's edges. The lower floors of the buildings are important in terms of connecting the inside space of buildings with the public life outside, "where the city meets buildings" (Ibid, 2010, p. 81). The edges have to be seen as a place for sitting and staying. For instance, this area between the indoors and outdoors is where the kids start playing, taking over all the space around them. Also, people who have to wait, find a pleasant place along the edges (Ibid, 2010).

Besides, the impact of the edges on people is noticeable in streets where there are active facades (areas with extent of activities) – also called soft edges. A study conducted in Copenhagen in 2003, where streets with active and closed facades were analysed, concluded that streets with active facades create seven times more life than streets with closed facades in urban areas (Ibid, 2010).

In this case, Gehl would agree with Oslo's attempt for liveability in recently developed areas from the 90s. Aker Brygge (1984-1992), a neighbourhood on Oslo's waterfront, is an example of densification with a mix of functions and good city space. "City space is well proportioned with active ground floors frontages, and thanks in great part to the good design, the area has become one of the few new urban areas in Europe where people actually enjoy spending time." (Ibid, 2010, p. 69).

Security in the city

The idea of securitising an urban area dates from the 60s, when planners started to exploit the constructed environment to shorten opportunities for crime and disorder. Between the 60s and 70s, the architect Oscar Newman carried out research on sizeable public housing in Saint Louis and New York. Accordingly, he published his article *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design*. Through his concept of defensible space, he applied that residential environments could be remodelled, so their citizens could take control of their spaces by sharing a common terrain secured by them and not the police, becoming a liveable and still controlled area (Newman, 1972). His research impacted society, creating a public debate between crime and the constructed environment in terms of resilient communities.

In history, resilience has been understood in terms of resisting and recovering from natural hazards (Vale & Campanella, 2005). Even so, lately, the concept of urban resilience has been used to describe the wide range of security challenges that threaten cities and urban areas. From this perspective, urban resilience refers to both “the design alterations (structural, architectural, land-use planning) and managerial and governance measures that seek to prevent or mitigate the physical and social vulnerability of areas, ultimately to protect life, property and economic activity.” (Coaffee & O’Hare, 2008, p. 173). Therefore, we talk of resilient communities to prevent terrorist attacks in cities.

Security against terrorist attacks is somehow complex according to planning for people. From a national and local level, cities are planning to restrict opportunities for terrorists to complete their objectives and take measures to alleviate the impacts of successful assaults (Ibid, 2008). As Grosskopf (2006) argue, “domestic security planners have embraced anti-terrorism measures to create a human environment that is difficult to attack, resilient to the consequences of such incidents, and protective of its populations and assets.”

Nonetheless, it is essential to understand that urban resilience in terrorist attacks is only working with measures against terrorism that are not new and well documented (Graham, 2004). For instance, after the terrorist attack in Oslo, all the governmental

purpose buildings were moved to a central area called Kvadraturen⁵. There, measures against terrorist attacks such as the one lived on July 22 were considered, but no other ways of terrorism that might be new or already not invented.

The measures implemented in Kvadraturen can be described as immediate counter-terrorist security. As a general phenomenon, terrorist attacks in urban areas led to “many robust yet unrefined and obtrusive features almost literally ‘thrown’ around key sites [...] employing features that are effective, but not necessarily acceptable nor aesthetically pleasing.” (Coaffee & O’Hare, 2008, p. 176).

Planning for anti-terrorist measures also has its own risks. The militarisation of a public space can contribute to a less attractive area. Militarisation means the usage of similar military principles to counter civil disorder and violence. Based on military interventions, this way of approaching security in the public space can lead to austere forms of protection. There have been several examples of using military approaches to secure urban areas throughout history. For instance, the disputed territories between Palestine and Israel have been a heavy way of territorial defence from the Israeli authorities due to the risk of suicide bomb attacks in Palestinian territories (Ibid, 2008).

Still, the Norwegian security system is not based on the militarisation of public spaces. From an ideal perspective, the actor in charge of planning for security in Oslo is the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, in close dialogue with the National Security Authority, the Police Security Service, the Police Directorate, the Oslo Police District and the Defense Building of construction (NKSB). Additionally, there is a simultaneous collaboration with the Municipality of Oslo as the leading actor in approving the local plans for the city (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018).

In the case of the Government Quarter, all the basis for its security is written under the new Norwegian Security Act, Section 2⁶:

⁵ The addresses of the new ministries' locations can be found in the Appendix.

⁶ Available at: <https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2018-06-01-24>

Chapter 4. General requirements concerning protective security work

Section 4.2. Risk assessment

- Undertakings shall conduct regular risk assessments. The assessment shall form the basis for implementation of protective security measures.
- As part of the assessment, each undertaking shall identify other undertakings on which it is dependent for its proper functioning.
- The assessment shall be reviewed regularly, and be revised if necessary.
- The supervisory authority shall on request provide advice and guidance on the assessment.
- The King⁷ may issue regulations on the conduct of risk assessments.

The official regulations for anti-terrorist measures, such as the above-mentioned Norwegian Security Act, are a direct consequence of planning for safety and counter-terrorism after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA. Currently, the English and Norwegian policy, for example, are based on a long-term strategy for carrying out resilience against the threat of terrorism in the promotion of 'good design' and 'landscape elements'. However, it is unclear how the emerging security agenda is to strain into planning practices (Coaffee & O'Hare, 2008).

'Thoughtful planning process' can build physical and social improvements; thus, terrorist activity cannot contribute to destroying areas but rather dealing with it. As a dimension of urban resilience, these measures give planners and built environment professionals more freedom to create an urban landscape where citizens feel safe in an integrated design⁸ form (Ibid, 2008).

Approaching the conflict

The history of an area also shapes the future of the city. Oslo's recent history taught how unsecured was the city in terms of terrorism. Security is a concept that intervenes

⁷ In Norwegian legislation, the King does not have power. Thus, mentioning the King is a formality, and the central government makes the actual assessment.

⁸ Urban furniture that works as a security measure but are not identified as it by the local citizens. Through the research is also mentioned as integrated security measures or integrated safety measures.

directly in the liveability of a place. The literature review on this topic is varied in opinions and content. For instance, as Deane Simpson, Vibeke Jensen and Anders Rubing discuss in their book *The City Between Freedom and Security* (2017), "Physical security measures are as a point of departure relatively easy to plan and implement, but the political and economic consequences may be huge. This is not least the case when democratic principles such as openness and accessibility are concerned." However, Gehl proposed twelve Urban Quality Criteria for a city that combines protection, comfort and enjoyment of a place to attract people. In her criteria, Gehl shows how liveability and safety can be combined to create an urban space.

Furthermore, in this conflict, the concept of "right to the city" from David Harvey has become a central point in recent years. Regarding human rights, everyone should have access to the city no matter what. Nevertheless, the right to the city goes more profound; as Robert E. Park (1968) discuss the right to the city is the "man's most consistent and on the whole, his most successful attempt to remake the world he lives in more after his heart's desire. But, if the city is the world which man created, it is the world in which he is henceforth condemned to live. Thus, indirectly, and without any clear sense of the nature of his task, in making the city man has remade himself."

Accordingly, when we ask ourselves how we would like our city to be, we must think about whom we would like to be. As Park (1968) suggest, the metropolis is not disconnected from its people, and both concepts go hand in hand. The right to the city, hence, is more than an individual right to access the resources that a city embodies; "it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city more after our heart's desire. It is, moreover, a collective rather than an individual right since changing the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power over the processes of urbanisation." (Harvey, 2012, p. 2).

Yet, is the right to the city a central concept in shaping cities nowadays? From the beginning of the metropolises, urbanisation has been a class phenomenon. Cities have been constructed through surplus products. This means that the capital has always been lying in the hands of a few, while the surpluses have usually been taken from somewhere

and somebody. Of course, this process is led by the capitalistic approach of the current occidental societies and economies (Ibid, 2012).

This capitalistic approach creates a surplus for the elites to get reinvested again. In addition, the reinvestments create more surpluses that get reinvested too. Though, since this process of reinvestment brings to the expansion of surplus production at a compound rate, for the functioning of this process is needed profitable terrains for capital surplus production and absorption. This situation takes the capitalists to a limited situation where they find barriers to their expansion. Therefore, they try to discipline the labour or find new labour forces to create a higher surplus. It is crucial to understand how these processes create a limited situation for a region: "This puts increasing pressure on the natural environment to yield the necessary raw materials and absorb the inevitable wastes. Terrains for raw material extraction have to be opened up. [...] The coercive laws of competition also force new technologies and organisational forms to come on line all the time, since capitalists with higher productivity can out-compete those using inferior methods." If any of these pressures and barriers do not work to continue capital circulation, the system faces a crisis (Ibid, 2012, p. 3).

This capitalist approach has been shaping the cities' lifestyles in many ways. Quality of life is currently a concept just tangible for those who have the money, as the cities have been developed through consumerism, tourism, and cultural and knowledge-based industries. Now, shopping malls, multiplexes and box stores are predominant as well as the 'boutique culture'. A 'new urbanism' movement that glorifies the deal of community and a boutique lifestyle as a developer consequence to satisfy urban dreams. (Ibid, 2012).

Again, the capitalist culture brought these traditions to the cities where there should be privatisation to create a surplus. In this case, Norwegian cities, such as Oslo, led to these dilemmas regarding what should be privatised. Regjeringskvartalet is an example of new development and new ways of urbanising the city. From the Municipality, they are debating through principles in security and accessibility how can the area be safe and who can have access to it. Consequently, the Municipality wants to create integrated security measures into the street design to allow full accessibility to the public realm to

all the citizens (Oslo Kommune, 2014-1). From this perspective, the right of everyone in the city can be created by the combination of liveable measures and security in the threatened areas, which can give the citizens the right to be part of Oslo and use its public space.

METHODOLOGY

The present chapter will introduce the different methods used to analyse the case study of Regjeringskvartalet. The analysis will consist of three methods: GIS visualisation, qualitative interviews and planning document analysis.

Regarding the creation of knowledge, the research's methodological approach can be analysed through the social constructions of different actors and theories that have contributed to the history of the Government Quarter. For this reason, the fundamental process of understanding the project and its reality is through experiences, knowledge and relates from individuals involved in the project. Its dimension is added to the case study as a construction for further knowledge development.

Thus, it is crucial to understand that the election of analysing a case study is due to specificness in the topic analysed. The insights of the specific case study will help to elaborate knowledge on the concepts of liveability and security. This case can shade light to different contexts in other European cities. Also, the analysis of a case study that is still under development helps to contribute to future steps in the construction of the case. It creates further knowledge that can be used specifically for the chosen case study.

Triangulation of methods

To carry out the current research, three different methods will be developed to cover several case study's points of view. Concretely, through a triangulation of methods, the data collected will be accumulated to create a more complex and complete analysis. The type of triangulation used for this study will be the between-method triangulation. In

this sense, this process can help merge different viewpoints, data and work as a tool through which the information can be validated (Flick, 2014).

Again, the three methods used for this analysis (GIS visualisation, qualitative interviews and planning document analysis) collaborate to create an extensive view of Regjeringskvartalet development. GIS visualisation is necessary to understand the author's insights, the area's current situation developed, and the locals' experiences. Moreover, qualitative interviews will proportionate the Municipality of Oslo's perspective with the information shared by some local politicians. Finally, through planning document analysis, the perspective of the security actors involved in the project and official documents from the Municipality will help understand the process and implementation from a broader view scope.

The data collected from the three different methods can be coincident, noncongruent or complementary. The ideal situation for the research would be the complementation of information that brings a different perspective that can conclude a robust answer to the primary research question, creating knowledge of the subject studied. It is vital to notice that the difference between perspectives in the analysis mixed between the three methods should always be interpreted through the theoretical framework to connect the research with valuable insights and explanations (Flick, 2014).

GIS visualisation

The development of this method considered two different data collections: the researcher's observations in Regjeringskvartalet with its insights and perceptions and the perspective of two users before and after the terrorist attack in the area. Both points of view will lead to the common point of understanding the area in a spatial dimension where different layers can create knowledge on what is currently happening in the Government Quarter.

As defined by ESRI (2022), the Geographic Information System (GIS) developer, GIS is "a spatial system that creates, manages, analyses, and maps all types of data." This computational programme "connects data to a map, integrating location data (where things are) with all types of descriptive information (what things are like there). This

provides a foundation for mapping and analysis that is used in science and almost every industry." (Ibid, 2022). Concretely for the development of the current research, it has been used the programme QGIS.

Moreover, the GIS visualisation method has the risk of not transmitting the correct information. The key point, in this case, is the way of presenting the data. For this reason, all the layers presented will be explained in detail to let the reader understand the complexity of each one and help to visualise the map's information. Also, the range of colours used is relevant in visualising since every detail should stand out from the base map in the background. Accordingly, after several trials, the range of colours more visible has been chosen.

Each of the different layers has been created by the author, except the base map in the background. The information of each layer is taken from the author's own observations while doing ethnographic observations of Regjeringskvartalet area. As the seasonality may affect the research, the observations have been taken several times from January till May, analysing the area during winter and spring.

In some cases, the layers are combined to highlight the importance of an element in particular. Concretely, the different layers created are:

Layer name	Colour
1. Area Regjeringskvartalet	Pink
2. Car block structures	Red
3. Construction fences	Light brown
4. Construction site	Dark brown
5. Car restricted areas	Green
6. Pedestrian paths	Purple
7. The July 22 Centre before and after	Red and green

Table 1 – List of GIS layers and its correspondent colour.

Furthermore, two informal and anonymous interviews were carried out to understand the neighbourhood's perspectives of insiders or by-passers. The interviews' data

collection has been through email and the official platform of So Central as an organisation in collaboration for this research. The informal interview was executed with open questions where the interviewed people could add more information if they considered it relevant to the story experienced. Hence, questions such as "What is your perception of Regjeringskvartalet after the terrorist attack?" or "Do you find the Government Quarter an attractive area to spend time in?" were asked in a way to create a guideline for the interviewed to generate their stories and insights of the area.

In addition, all the data has been processed in databases to which only the author have had access. After processing the information, the data has been completely deleted from the database where it was stored. For this reason, while conducting the analysis, any personal information (such as names, working places or age, among others) of both interviewed volunteers has not been revealed.

Last, the main objective of this method is to visualise the own perspective of the Government Quarter and be aware of the current security situation and its consequent liveability. With two informal interviews, this method also brought up the emotions and perceptions of locals in Oslo that have been experiencing the area before and after the terrorist attack. Anyhow, it should be noted that with these informal interviews, the author does not want to generalise their thoughts to all the citizens of Oslo. Even so, both interviews are relevant for their proximity to the case study.

Qualitative interview

For the analysis of the case study from an expert perspective, the method of interviewing was used. A qualitative interview is comprehended as "a research-gathering approach that seeks to create a listening space where meaning is constructed through an interexchange/cocreation of verbal viewpoints in the interest of scientific knowing" (Miller & Crabtree, 1999, p. 89). This method helped to get information from public actors that intervene in the making process of Regjeringskvartalet; specifically politicians from the Municipality of Oslo.

Security actors such as the Police of Oslo have been contacted with a negative answer arguing that this actor has no current relevance in the case. However, it is essential to

mention that in all the planning documents from the area, the Police of Oslo, together with the National Security Authority, Police Security Service, and Police Directorate, among others with less power, are the actors in charge of its securitization. Therefore, the analysis of qualitative interviews will only consist of local politicians from the Municipality.

This analysis is concretely composed by semi-structured interviews. This type of interview consists of asking questions within a predetermined thematic framework. Though, in this method, the questions do not have an order or a concrete structure (George, 2022). In fact, a semi-structured interview works as a conversational method, differentiating itself from a structured interview. The process was conducted as a conversation where the interviewer asked general questions that can derivate a specific topic. It depends on how the interviewer interacts with the interviewee and how the method is conducted. In addition, the data collection mainly consisted of taking notes of the interview while conversating.

This method is a relevant way of approaching the research because the area's planning is still under development. A significant part of the information cannot be found on articles, planning documents or official websites. Interviewing politicians from the Municipality contributed to the investigation with specific information that can be asked directly to an expert. Concretely, the semi-structured interview played the role of a communication event, consisting of an analysis of the discourse between the interviewer and the respondent (Miller & Crabtree, 1999).

Hence, all the methods run risks that have to be taken into account to avoid major errors in the research. Phrasing the researcher's concerns into the interviewee's discourse and not giving voice to their actual perceptions is usual during an interview. "It also ignores the role of the interviewer in this meaning-making process" (Miller & Crabtree, 1999, p. 91). For this reason, during the interview, the interviewer was aware of this situation trying to formulate questions and conversations that not takes for granted any assumption. Furthermore, the formulated questions were appropriately designed to avoid yes/no answers.

- **Target actors**

Politicians in the Municipality of Oslo, as stakeholders, works for the city's planning process. Thus, the Municipality in this project plays the role of creating functional public areas, especially in the city centre, and Regjeringskvartalet, as a quarter next to the city centre. Accordingly, the public actors contacted in this case has been politicians in the City Council Standing Committee for Urban Development of the Municipality of Oslo⁹.

The various actors were contacted via email. The message explained why they were relevant for the investigation and how the interview would work. Moreover, with the help of some members from SoCentral, the actors have been contacted, making the process easier. Furthermore, all of the participants have filled out a form giving their consent to participate in the interview and show their names in the investigation if relevant. The three local politicians interviewed have been:

Ola Wolff Elvevold, a local politician in Oslo from the Sosialistisk Venstreparti¹⁰, and a member of the Urban Development Committee of Oslo. He has been working in the Municipality the recent years; thus, he has not been working directly with the new development of Regjeringskvartalet. The decisions from the Municipality for this neighbourhood last from 2019, while he was not a member of the Committee. Nonetheless, Wolff has been clear about the Municipality's challenges and gave the interviewer personal opinions on how the city securitises its most crowded and popular areas.

James Stove Lorentzen, a local politician in Oslo from the Høyre¹¹ party, and a member of the Urban Development Committee of Oslo. As well as Ola Wolff Elvevold, Mr Stove Lorentzen has not been working directly in the development Government Quarter because he has been focused on other projects from the Municipality. However, he has been able to give information related to Oslo's liveability and security in general terms, including small insights into the Government Quarter. Also, his information is valuable in terms of understanding the insights into the different political spectrums in Oslo's

⁹ List of the different politicians available at: <https://www.oslo.kommune.no/politikk-og-administrasjon/politikk/bystyret/bystyrets-utvalg/byutviklingsutvalget/#gref>

¹⁰ In English, Socialist Left Party.

¹¹ In English, Conservative Party.

Municipality. In this case, the research will be focused on the Socialist Left Party and the Conservative party as two of the main political factions in the Municipality's council¹².

Ellen De Vibe, head of the Oslo Planning and Building Agency (PBE) from 1998 to 2019. She was responsible for local and regional planning, mapping and building, and she became one of the leading planners for the new development in Regjeringskvartalet. She has a strong perspective on how the development is carried out. Therefore, it is essential to realise that the information taken from De Vibe's is based on her perspective as an insider of the project.

- **Formulated Questions**

The formulated questions for the political actors involved were majorly focused on planning for the area's liveability and security. The topics addressed were: the paper of the political actors in the development, their ideas on how to plan a public space and the security and liveability of the area. The concrete questions as a guide for the interviewer can be found in the Appendix.

To sum up, this method contributed to the research by bringing information about non-written ideas from the planning processes of Regjeringskvartalet. Having a structured conversation with three local politicians about the new development resolved some of the main wonderings of the author at the time to analyse how they plan the security and liveability of the neighbourhood. The interview worked as a path between the planning documents and the actual construction work being developed.

Planning document analysis

The present method helped the analysis by bringing technical information about the new development in Regjeringskvartalet and the general terms of planning new areas in Oslo. Moreover, from the documents, the perspective of other relevant actors, such as

¹² The Socialist Left Party is a junior partner in the Municipal Government of Oslo (they have 6 representatives and rule together with Labour, who have 12 and the Greens, who have 9). In contrast, the Conservatives are part of the opposition, although they are the largest party (15 representatives).

the security actors in the project (the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, the National Security Authority, the Police Security Service, the Police Directorate, the Oslo Police District and the Defense Building of construction (NKSB)) can be found.

The planning document analysis consisted of researching several documents explicitly chosen for the case study. The idea of choosing a case study helped the analysis "[...] to maximise the utility of information from small samples and single cases. Cases are selected on the basis of expectations about their information content" (Flyvbjerg, 2004). For this reason, the documents chosen have been assessed with what Flick (2014) would pose as "What kind of reality is the document creating?" Hence, he suggests checking the authenticity, credibility, representativeness, meaning and user of a document to decide the text's legitimacy.

The case study of the Government Quarter sometimes can be a paradigmatic case; therefore, the support of the Planning Documents as an official source of knowledge, helped the author create a framework for a future application to other cases as part of the main objectives of the current research (Flyvbjerg, 2004).

Furthermore, while analysing a document, it is essential to pay attention to the written information and the unwritten. What is not said in a document is also a relevant way of studying the case (Rapley, 2011). Concretely, understanding why several sources have been omitted in a document can explain the reality of a project. Moreover, the language of the text may also intervene in its interpretation. The three texts analysed are formulated in Norwegian. Since the author has no advanced knowledge of this Scandinavian language, the texts have been translated to English – risking its integrity in terms of content – and in some cases, the supervisor of the project's perception as a native Norwegian has been relevant to understanding the content.

The planning documents chosen for the analysis of the Government Quarter have been:

- Oslo Sentrum – gatebruk og grunnsikring (2014). This document, released after the terrorist attack, explains the reality of Oslo after the event and how the city centre and new areas can be securitised for the future of the metropolis. Concretely, the plan proposal focuses on public buildings and urban spaces in use by the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament), the Government, the Palace,

Norges Bank and other key institutions, including Oslo City Hall. All these buildings are classified as control-critical objects and national symbol buildings and must be provided with satisfactory basic security (Oslo Kommune, 2014). The document has been a collaboration of different actors from the Norwegian Parliament, the Municipality of Oslo, the Norwegian Bank, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, and the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation.

- Prosjektplan for Levende Oslo – Report from 2019.¹³ This document contains a detailed plan of the further development of the city centre in terms of liveability in connection with the Oslo car-free city centre. Levende Oslo project's main goal is to make the city centre more accessible and attractive. This is sought to be achieved through specific projects that will contribute to equipping streets, pedestrian streets and squares with emphasis on good design and aesthetics and to create and develop good meeting places (Oslo Kommune, 2019-2). Oslo's Municipality has made the document.
- Meld. St. 21 (2018-2019) Melding til Stortinget. Nytt Regjeringskvartal.¹⁴ This document explains the detailed plan for the future Government Quarter. Significantly, there is information about how the area will be secured and how the liveability of the place is taken into account. This paper has been published by the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation and is made to inform the Norwegian Parliament.

Finally, it is vital to notice that several influences may occur on the author while analysing the documents. The documents mentioned above have their authors' perspective. Therefore, the own author of this research can be biased by personal emotions or stories that have lived (Flyvbjerg, 2004). This limit cannot be avoided but contrasted with the information of the other methodologies to create partiality in the study as much as possible.

¹³ Link to the document: <https://www.oslo.kommune.no/getfile.php/13378103-1599221190/Tjenester%20og%20tilbud/Politikk%20og%20administrasjon/Byutvikling/Levende%20Oslo/Levende%20Oslo%202019.pdf>

¹⁴ Link to the document: <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e53b807bbb1e450383f21e87a8515689/no/pdfs/stm201820190021000dddpdfs.pdf>


ANALYSIS

How is Regjeringskvartalet area currently experienced?

To understand the current situation and experiences of Regjeringskvartalet, the area has been analysed through GIS and two anonymous informal interviews that have given various insights before and after the terrorist attack.

Layer 1: Area Regjeringskvartalet¹⁵¹⁶

This layer shows the total area of Regjeringskvartalet in pink. Currently, the neighbourhood is under development, making it difficult to see the actual urban space of the whole zone.




The whole central part of the neighbourhood is fenced for the area's construction, creating small paths for pedestrians and cyclists. Ethnographically, the site is very crowded during rush hours but only as a space to pass by and cross the city from north to south or vice versa.

¹⁵ **Map 1:** made by the author through GIS.

¹⁶ **Pictures 1 & 2:** made by the author.

Layers 2 and 3: Cars block structures and Construction fences¹⁷¹⁸

These layers show all the structures that block the access of cars to the area. On some occasions, these structures are doubled to create a significant sensation of security. It can be seen that all these structures surround Regjeringskvartalet area creating a shelter free of cars. All the measures that can be seen currently are provisional; however, there are some designs in the form of benches or big concrete blocks used in other city areas, creating hegemonism around Oslo. Thus, some of these designs may stay in the new development once finished.




Different ways of creating car block structures. Taking into account nature, colour and materials sustainability.

¹⁷ Map 2: made by the autor through GIS.

¹⁸ Pictures 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7: made by the author.

Layers 4 and 5: Construction site and Car restricted areas¹⁹²⁰

These two layers underline the areas that non-authorized cars cannot enter. The areas in green are the ones securitised by the block structures around the neighbourhood. Also, the brown area is restricted to everyone that is not involved in the project since it is the site under development or in current construction.



The blocks work creating peaceful public spaces where the locals can spend time and use the furniture that helps both to create liveability and security. However, after the area's observations – and also visible in the pictures – the locals do not interact with the public space at all, just using it as a way to cross the city as mentioned above.




¹⁹ **Map 3:** made by the author through GIS.


²⁰ **Pictures 8 & 9:** made by the author.

Layers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5²¹²²

By putting all these layers together, it can be seen that the Construction site layer mostly fits the whole area of what Regjeringskvartalet is. The Car restricted areas around the new development also secure other official or relevant buildings such as the Oslo District Court or Oslo City Court. However, it is crucial to understand that the current security is not finished, and it will change in the following years till the development is finally done. During the several observations of the author, there have been some changes noticeable, especially in terms of the construction site, creating new paths for pedestrians or cyclists.



This yellow design can be seen repeatedly around the city of Oslo as a way of creating secure public spaces for the citizens. Furthermore, there are cameras on the surroundings of the official buildings noticeable around all the area, creating a sensation of being controlled.





²¹ **Map 4:** made by the autor through GIS.

²² **Pictures 10, 11 & 12:** made by the author.

Layers 1, 4 and 6: Area Regjeringskvartalet, Construction site and Pedestrian paths²³²⁴

Together with the two layers mentioned above, the Pedestrian Paths in purple show all the roads, squares or other types of public space that are entirely closed to cars. The area is just available for pedestrians and cyclists. It should be taken into account that some of these places are car-free nowadays because of the construction activity in the area. Thus, there is a possibility that these zones will become available for cars at the end of the development's construction period.



The streets closer to the construction site are very limited by construction fences. These parts are not definitive, as can be seen in the pictures. It is also noticeable that small paths have been changing with time since the site's development takes more or less space depending on the needs of the current constructions.

Furthermore, it is observable that all the closed streets nowadays with provisional or definitive security measures

²³ **Map 5:** made by the author through GIS.


²⁴ **Picture 13:** made by the author.

are those that can bring direct access to the streets of Akersgata and Grubbegata. Akersgata is the main street crossing the development from north to south. Grubbegata is the one arriving at the heart of the development where Høyblokka and other governmental buildings are found.

Additionally, Akersgata used to be the neighbourhood's main street, with bus connections and several cars going through daily. However, after the attack, this street – now closed to motor traffic – will remain like it once the development is finished.


Layer 7.1 and 7.2: the July 22 Centre before and after²⁵²⁶

These two layers show where the July 22 Centre as a memorial place of the terrorist attack was placed before and after the construction activity of the new development began.



²⁵ **Map 6:** made by the autor through GIS.

²⁶ **Pictures 14, 15 & 16:** made by the author.



The July 22 Centre was opened on July 22, 2015. The centre was initially located inside the Høyblokka, but with the construction in the area, it was moved temporarily to Teatergata 10 in 2020. It can be seen that this centre works as an available memory for all Norwegians and worldwide visitors. Both interviewed people coincide that this memorial helps process the horrible event and create consciousness and strength without fear. *“It was very emotional to visit 22. Juli-senteret in*

Regjeringskvartalet and to hear the story of a close friend who was in the garage when the bomb exploded and had to find her way out in the darkness and rubble of the garage. A close colleague of her stood waiting for her outside the building and was killed.” *“Sometimes I think of the July 22 centre that was there for a good while, that I finally visited two years ago. We talk a lot about Utøya, but sometimes we forget that people died here too.”*

Observations

The analysis of the observations in Regjeringskvartalet development has been done from January to May. This means that the neighbourhood has only been analysed during winter and spring, when the weather and temperatures in Oslo are colder than the rest of the year, and it may influence the way of using the public spaces. In this case, it was noticeable that the season or the weather could change the interaction of the locals with the area.

First of all, it is visible that the security of Regjeringskvartalet is still provisional and in continuous change. During the period analysed, the paths for pedestrians and cyclists have been reconducted, and some of the streets or squares have been closed to the public for several weeks. Even so, these observations have been done during construction times. Therefore, the neighbourhood's security is not working in the definitive way.

Furthermore, there is an effort to create furniture that can work for the neighbourhood's liveability and security – Integrated design. Nevertheless, the citizens still do not interact with the area being a place where people do not want to spend time. The area is noisy and messy because of the construction machines. A positive aspect of the integrated measures is that there are other areas in the city centre where all these types of furniture are already installed, and the locals interact with them; some in the shape of the art design, others as benches, flower pots or trash bins, among others.

Additionally, the two people interviewed agree that before the terrorist attack, Regjeringskvartalet was not an area where citizens would spend time: *“it has never been an area in which I spent time outside, now or before. It did not feel like an area where you were supposed to stay and spend time.” “I never stayed in the area just to relax. It was work-related, or I went through on my way to other parts of the city. I have never thought of the area as an exciting place just to spend time, as in a park.”*

In contrast, for the future of the Government Quarter, Statsbygg – as one of the leading companies in charge of the project – states that relevant measures may be related to the design and quality of the outdoor areas, security design, the buildings' facades, lighting and art. The area will be developed to facilitate new urban and green spaces. Several safe and good walking and cycling connections east-west will be opened up in the new Government Quarter. It will be easier to move through the area (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018).

Even though Regjeringskvartalet is still under development, the present areas do not involve much nature. There are only two main places where nature can be seen: in Keyzers Gate where large concrete pots where it is possible to plant flowers or shrubbery and Høyesteretts plass where there are some trees. Though, the plans for the new development include one main big green park which will be the centre of the development. During conversations with local people in Oslo, it can be seen excitement about this park since it will be very central and could be a proper space to take a break for the office workers from the area: *“I hope the space when it opens up again feels like a welcoming, green and calming space where people actually end up spending time together. Maybe bringing a coffee to sit in the grass or at tables, or letting kids play on*

the ground, etc. It should be a space that is against the ideals of the terrorist – that he achieved none of his goals, and that we have not been scared into changing what kind of society we are and want to be. Just like Utøya has become a centre for learning about democracy, this should become a space that embodies and lives the ideals of democracy.”

In this sense, the two interviewed people admit that after the terrorist attack, they do not have fear when passing through the neighbourhood, but they do have emotional thoughts constantly. *“I always think about the attack when I pass through, in different ways. I do not feel fear, but it makes me think. [...] My aunt's friend worked in the building, and her colleague had gone outside to wait for her. She was killed, while my aunt's friend saved her life because she happened to be inside.” “I have never experienced fear going through Regjeringskvartalet after the attack, but I always think of what happened there when I go through it.” “My colleagues working in an area's office both heard and saw the explosion close by and had to run over to Regjeringskvartalet to cover the attack as journalists. I guess some of them had and maybe still have strong emotional feelings of going through Regjeringskvartalet. For me the most emotional symbol of the attack, was the splintered glass display case with that day's copy of the VG newspaper. I passed it daily in the years it was still situated just outside the newspaper entrance. (It was later moved).”*

Moreover, there are visible cameras around the zone, meaning that it is a supercontrolled area. Even though there is a sensation of control in the area, in other occidental societies, the installation of surveillance cameras has not been an issue. Big metropolis like Barcelona, Paris, Milano or New York already has a developed network of these technical systems. For instance, in the United States, a national public opinion survey reported that less than twenty per cent of the population is against the use of surveillance cameras in the public areas of their cities (Kaplan, 2014).

Another observation concerns that nowadays, security only contemplates the access blocking of cars – the kind of terrorist attack the city experienced. There are no other security ways for different types of terrorism, such as shootings. Nevertheless, during an interview with James Stove Lorentzen – a Municipality's local politician – he argues

that constantly new ways of terrorist attacks are developed. Thus, it is impossible to create a majorly secure space.

Finally, there are disconnections in planning the neighbourhood and the rest of Oslo. For instance, the city centre – next to Regjeringskvartalet – has some pedestrian streets not wholly secured in terms of access blocking to cars, although it is a risk area. After interviewing Ellen De Vibe, Ola Wolff Elvevold and James Stove Lorentzen, they explained that this disconnection is because this area is attached to the city centre but is not included in the Car-free liveability programme from the Municipality of Oslo. This means that different measures in terms of urban furniture, making pedestrian streets or blocking access to cars apply to both zones.

How is the Municipality of Oslo planning the new developments of the city and what are its challenges?

The Urban Planning of Oslo

Nowadays, Oslo is experiencing a boom in migration and high birth rates, being the fastest-growing capital in Europe. For this reason, the Municipality has several challenges to achieve shortly to fulfilling its citizens' needs. Mr Ola Wolff Elvevold talked about two different fronts: **the city centre** and **the dead areas outside the city**.

The challenges in **the city centre of Oslo** have to be more people-centred. The Municipality is trying to create more activities to offer, fewer cars and more pedestrians, among others. They created the Car-free liveability programme Oslo project for this challenge. This programme includes all the areas inside the Ring 1 (a major circular road connecting the city centre to cars and public transport), Grønland and Tøyen. The project will try to move forward from a car city to city life. The Municipality defines city life as “the result of human presence in the city and includes a wide range of different forms of human activity and movement.” (Oslo Kommune, 2019-1).

In connection to the car-free liveability programme, the Levende Oslo²⁷ project, also from the Municipality, is trying to implement liveable measures around the city centre. From their perspective, the combination of liveability and security measures would attract more people into the central area. Their assessment found a demand for visible security measures (Oslo Kommune, 2019-2).

After several years of the project implementation, various assessments have been carried out in order to see if there was an improvement in the liveability around the city centre. The document shows how the project has been a success. Pedestrian counts and stay registrations two days in June for three years in a row exposed that the use of Oslo city centre has increased by 14% more the number of pedestrians and 43% more the number of people staying in urban spaces. Through the survey, it is noticed that all the user groups found the city centre attractive. Also, Oslo's car-free liveability programme shows that the number of employees in the area has increased from 2017 to 2018, which is positive (Ibid, 2019-2).

In this sense, the measures developed by the Municipality to achieve these successful results have been drastic in terms of car accessibility. The city centre has been changed with fewer parking spaces and more space for pedestrians, residents and city life. Even though this is positive for the use of Oslo city centre and the city centre's reputation, there are still several challenges regarding driving patterns or goods delivery, for instance. After all, throughout the document, it can be seen that car-free city life has come to stay. The current situation is the first phase of the transformation of the city centre from a car-based to a pedestrian-based city centre, where residence, activity and city life are dimensions of the street design (Ibid, 2019-2).

In addition, the Institute of Transport Economics – Norwegian Centre for Transport Research (TØI), in 2018, carried out a mapping of the "best-liked" and "least-liked" street sections in central Oslo, as well as preferred route choices through the city centre. The survey shows that Torggata, Karl Johans gate (from Egertorget and westwards) and Markveien were favourite streets. These three streets have in common the activities

²⁷ Levende Oslo (in English, Living Oslo) is a private-public collaboration about making the city centre accessible and attractive.

and the housing offered – people live there and have restaurants, and shops. Storgata, Karl Johans gate (from Egertorget and eastwards) and Brugata were the least liked streets. The locals described these properties as unsafe, where people create discomfort, and they are dirty. TØI believes that the street's attractiveness is linked to the street's activity level – as Jan Gehl argues in her theory of "the good city" – more than how the street looks (Ibid, 2019-2). Again, this survey can analyse how a safe place can create a liveable area – the least liked streets were described as unsafe. Thus, security can be seen as a cause of liveability.

Furthermore, regarding the creation of new developments, James Stove Lorentzen, the Municipality is trying to create big public areas with plazas or squares where people can gather in the new big developments, such as Sørenga or Bjørvika. Moreover, they are promoting the creation of public waterfronts where people can stay and use the space, not like in Tjuvholmen, an area next to the Oslo Fjord where the waterfront is private and only opened to the public during day time. Also, the Municipality plans a detailed list of activities to keep in the ground floor of the buildings, regulating the creation of cafes, shops, restaurants or public services, among others. The main objective of this measures is to create liveability.

Referencing the **second front** mentioned above, **the outside areas of Oslo** are getting redeveloped in terms of densifying the zone and creating more opportunities. Ola Wolff refers to the term "dead spaces", saying that there is no interaction outside the city with the public space. Hence, the Municipality is also trying to create more activities and fewer cars in these places.

An example of this front could be the new area development in Grorud, an outside area in the north east of Oslo. In these developments in the outskirts of the city, the Municipality is trying to create mixed spaces where there are residential areas close to public services, shops or restaurants. Furthermore, Mr Stove Lorentzen explains that the creation of public squares, parks and green areas where people can spend time is also taken into account. The reason of these measures is the lack of liveability. Lorentzen made a comparison between the way of planning in the 70's with the current one. He mentions that during the 70's the plan was to create high rise residential buildings, ones

in front of the others, not creating liveability; what he calls a *“just boring residential buildings areas with nothing happening, no life.”*

From these two fronts, it can be analysed that the Municipality of Oslo is planning for its citizens and its liveability. The creation of new developments and the renovation of old ones from the 70's has manifested the needs of the city and how to plan for them. Therefore, from the local authorities the focus is on creating public and social activities for all the inhabitants in the city centre and the outskirts. Additionally, the Car-free liveability project, is another project that presents the challenges and motivations of the Municipality. The programme aims to make Oslo more walkable and liveable in all the city centre creating a pedestrian connection between all the different attractive areas.

In this sense, Regjeringskvartalet as a new development in an urban central area of Oslo, is a target point for the Municipality in terms of creating life and a useful public space. These two fronts can get related to Regjeringskvartalet since this area is not part of the Car-free liveability project, but it is completely attached. The central vision of Government Quarter is that it is a one purpose area. The whole place is wholly designed for governmental purposes. This means that this neighbourhood can create a dead space that is hard to avoid in all aspects. The scepticism of Ola Wolff lies in the uniqueness of the area. It will be a singular zone, *“it is quite unusual if you look to other European capitals to find a case like the Norwegian one; not that many cities have a Government District.”*

Besides, the document “Melding til Stortinget. Nytt Regjeringskvartal” shows how the impact targets for Regjeringskvartalet has a primary focus on the paper of the employers in the new neighbourhood and the efficiency of the ministries but not on liveability of the area for the locals:²⁸

- Has flexibility in terms of capacity
- Has the required level of safety
- Has high efficiency
- Has flexibility in relation to changes in structure, division of tasks and working methods

²⁸ A detailed explanation of the impact targets can be found in the Appendix chapter.

- Has a high environmental standard
- Has a good urban environment, representativeness and accessibility

From the ministry's perspective, the Government Quarter is planned to facilitate better cooperation in and between the ministries where spaces for common functions in the area are easily accessible.

Institutionalised Social Trust and the Effects in Planning for Security

This situation mentioned above has to be added to the challenge of planning for security in Norway. The Nordic region, in general, has been characterised by the social trust. It is the most valuable asset of the zone, reached through democratic decision-making processes by voluntary, local and member-based actions (Høybråten, 2017). As Mr Dagfinn Høybråten (2017), Secretary General of the Nordic Council of Ministers, explained: *"I have the pleasure of telling people from across the globe about the Nordic Region and Nordic co-operation. The responses that I get have shown me that there is one topic in particular that is always the subject of their fascination – the trust that we have in one another in our part of the world."*

The institutionalized trust creates a difficulty which makes Norway a unique place in the way of planning public spaces. Trust has been created between the national authorities and the Norwegian population. After the terrorist attack, it can be analysed that this situation has changed. As Ola Wolff Elvevold mentioned, *"Norwegians now lock the door more than they did before"*. Moreover, there has been maturing of the population in the last years: they had to accept that the national and local authorities have to make some adaptations in several areas in terms of security and control. However, as Wolff Elvevold says, *"we are not a police state, and there will always be a risk in an open democratic society"*. This is the understanding that will be integrated into the development of the new Government Quarter.

Ellen De Vibe also agrees with the fact that the terrorist attack on July 22, 2011 had a before and after effect to the trust of the Norwegian population in terms of planning the security of the Norwegian cities. The security of the town and Regjeringskvartalet

before the terrorist attack was majorly low. As the national authorities trust the Norwegian population, the areas were not completely secured in terms of terrorism because the citizens are responsible for doing the right thing.

Nevertheless, the report from the July 22 commission²⁹ stated that “the attack on the Government Quarter on 22/7 could have been prevented through effective implementation of already adopted security measures” (Kielland et al., 2012). Concretely, one example of the low levels of security was in one of the main streets of the Government Quarter. There was a risk “understood but not recognised” (July 22 commission, 2012) by the authorities. Since 2004, there have been recommendations from the Police Directorate of closing Grubbegata to strengthen its security. Even so, the process was slow, and the start-up permits to close the street to the cars were granted nine months before the attack. There were several discussions about the risk from the Municipality, but they never took a step on it because they did not want to close more the city of Oslo. Yet, other actors, such as the government and the Police Directorate, were involved, but the process was not a high priority. According to the July 22 commission report, it took two years and eight months from the zoning plan until there was a start-up permit (Kielland et al., 2012).

However, as Stove Lorentzen would argue, it is impossible to plan security for every building. He thinks that after the terrorist attack the national and local authorities still believe in the social trust to the local citizens, permitting to not secure all the areas. For instance, in the Municipality of Oslo as an official building, the security measures are inside of the building, but not in the outside to prevent car crashes or bombs. Everyone can enter to the building main areas, but the security comes when crossing the line between the public areas and the personal areas for the local politicians in the Municipality. This is when the concept of security comes. But still, as Lorentzen

²⁹ The July 22 Commission has divided its work into six sub-points:

- Surveillance, the threat picture and the role of PST.
- Access to weapons - both firearms, ammunition and dangerous chemicals.
- Physical security of the Government Quarter and other critical infrastructure.
- The role of the authorities in combating and coordinating the terrorist attack.
- The police's handling of the attacks on the Government Quarter and Utøya. They will also look at how the police cooperate with other agencies and prepare a timeline.
- The health service and the volunteers' efforts.

Source: July 22 Commission.

mentions, if someone would like to take a bomb to the Municipality, that would be possible because of the lack of security measures to avoid it.

In contrast, through the Grunnsikringsplan it can be seen how the experience after July 22 has shown that future measures should be based on unannounced threats. From risk analyses on the value of the function, current threats and vulnerability, an assessment of each building should be done. Even if this plan was unsuccessful in terms of application, it can be analysed that the Municipality in collaboration with security actors had the intention of creating safety prevention measures. Concretely, these actors were focused on accessibility for cars. Therefore, in order to establish sound ground safety, they were developing traffic regulation measures that can help prevent vehicles from getting too close to the buildings (Oslo Kommune, 2014-2).

Again, Lorentzen thinks that the answer to that lack of security measures in some areas of Oslo is the Norwegian democracy. Norway wants to be an open and transparent country in terms of government purposes. Is for this reason that most people should be able to enter the Municipality or other official buildings. This is also the case of Regjeringskvartalet; as Gudmund Stokke, principal partner of Nordic Office of Architecture told: *"We wanted to design a Government Headquarters that is an attractive place for visitors, that communicates Norwegian ideals of transparency and democracy and that is an inclusive and exemplary workplace."* These are the ideals that the authorities want to promote with the city planning.

Analysing the different opinions of the local politicians interviewed, it can be seen a tendency of the members from the Sosialistisk Venstreparti and Høyre. While the first ones agree on the loss of social trust to the Norwegian society, the second one would still say that it still exists this trust. Furthermore, having conversations with anonymous people³⁰ in the streets of Oslo it can be perceived by the researcher that the locals have learned from July 22 with no fear. The life has not changed for them in the city even though the big impact of the attack will live in their minds forever. Some of them, might say that the Norwegian trust and democracy has been strengthen after the event.

³⁰ Conversations with people around the city has been carried out to understand the opinion of the locals.

What perspective do the local politicians and urban planners have on the security and liveability of Regjeringskvartalet area?

The Project Management of Regjeringskvartalet

After the terrorist attack, Statsbygg, together with different actors, prepared the zoning plan for the new Government Quarter development, what De Vibe described as a “*very sad example of unsuccessful planning*”. The main reason was the financial method used, the Concept Selection Study (KVU), a tool to set the economic limit of a project. Moreover, the Planning system in Norway has the challenge of being deeply sectorial. There are different sectors such as ethnographical analysis or planning traffic that sometimes are on top of each other, not guaranteeing proper and developed planning.

In terms of governmental management, De Vibe agreed that the project was chaotic as well. Even though Norway's principles are based on the Nordic democratic processes, she mentioned that the Oslo's local actors involved in the project at that time, such as Statsbygg, did not follow this process. They decided to destroy the set of governmental buildings, despite the artworks on the walls and the cultural heritage included in them. From her point of view, it was not in line with the Norwegian and Nordic social democratic traditions.

Furthermore, the security management has been overriding the making-process of planning Regjeringskvartalet; for instance, the two-storey basement project, one of the major security projects in the Government Quarter. It consists of an enormous cellar underneath the neighbourhood with all sources of security and emergency exits from the different ministry offices. De Vibe explains that this project has been used as an excuse to destroy the Y-Block building, even though the actors in charge of the basement project said it would not affect the above planning of the neighbourhood.

As it can be analysed from Ellen De Vibe's perspective, the planning process of this new development has been chaotic, not always transparent and non-democratic on some occasions. These situations made Regjeringskvartalet a unique project, still under development with an extensive historical record of changes during the process. Nonetheless, it has to be taken into account that this project has been a significant

collaboration between a major number of actors. There was no precedent in planning a one-purpose area in terms of governance in Norway.

Security: the before and after effect in Oslo

Making a comparison between the before and after the attack, it can be noticed that all the city has improved drastically in security manners. After the terrorist attack, for Wolff Elvevold, the situation changed majorly. There has been a significant discussion about how to secure a city in an architectural approach; there is no absolute correct approach. Thus, it became a manner of integrated design (for example, benches where you can sit on and stop cars in this sense). De Vibe thinks that the integrated design is the right option and is less demonstrative in landscape vision than other measures. There are several examples around Oslo, which means that this type of design is implemented within the city.

In this regard, from the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation's document, it can be seen how physical security measures around the buildings and in the outdoor areas in the Government Quarter shall have the least detrimental effect on the urban environment. The historical record shows how integrated, and aesthetically pleasing solutions have replaced less attractive security measures. For example, the planners are taking advantage of natural terrain differences within the area and further use water mirrors or reinforced benches and flowerpots to take care of safety functions instead of simple and less beautiful concrete elements (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018).



With integrated safety measures, the urban environment becomes open and inviting.

Pictures 17, 18 & 19³¹ – Integrated security measures around Oslo.

From the planning documents, it can be observed that the most noticeable and visible security measure for the surroundings will be some vehicle checkpoints established on the outskirts of the Government Quarter. This is because only accredited traffic will be allowed into the area so that the requirement for a sufficient safety distance to uncontrolled traffic is met. Therefore, reasonable practical solutions and procedures will prevent unnecessary disturbance to the surroundings (Ibid, 2018).

Likewise, mentioning the city's liveability, Wolff Elvevold, also agrees with De Vibe's perspective. Integrated security measures do not have to be a problem. There are several examples in cities like London or Paris, where there are integrated security measures in the attractive areas of the city and still is one of the most popular sites. The

³¹ **Picture 17:** from the document Melding til Stortinget. Nytt Regjeringskvartal.
Pictures 18 & 19: made by the author.

problem in this sense is when the Municipality, or the actor in charge, confiscates an area to its citizens. This case is argued currently in Oslo creating a debate on where people, apart from cars, can have access; specially in Regjeringskvartalet.

Through the planning documents, it could be analysed how the Government Quarter will create closed spaces for the citizens since developing a buffer zone around the ministry buildings is needed. This will affect traffic flow and the urban environment in general, forcing the creation of private spaces where locals cannot see or stay. Also, concerning the Security Act, the ability to conduct national crisis management will be a central point. The ministries will fill several corporate governance functions that will be of such importance that the complete or partial abolition of the function will have consequences for public activities and freedom of action (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018).

Accordingly, the actors of the Government Quarter's development are mainly focused on the security of it. For the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation (2018), security shall be the basis for the planning of Regjeringskvartalet project. After several assessments, it can be seen that the new Government Quarter was declared an attractive target for threatening actors, who will be able to carry out attacks or other subversive activities with great potential for harm to the country's government.

Nonetheless, Wolff Elvevold mentions how the importance of preventing terrorist attacks is relative. Preventing actions that did not happen yet, is significantly complicated and is something that none of the worldwide cities can be prepared for daily. Every period of time, new ways of attacking cities have been designed, making it very difficult to have a system that prevents everything. Hence, although the cities have to be prepared for some manners such as cars crashing, there will always be situations that cannot be avoided; everyone should notice that, risks will always be there. This reflection can be related to Bjørvika. James Stove Lorentzen mentions two cases in this new development of the city centre that from his point of view does not have security. The Deichmann library and the Munch Museum are two open areas with no visible security. He thinks that maybe both places have hidden measures but not in a high level

of security; *“if you want to blow up one of those buildings with a car you can still do it.”* (Stove Lorentzen, 2022).

In relation, from Grunnsikringsplan document it can be seen the intentions from the Municipality and other actors involved in creating a mix between the liveable and secure city dimensions. On the one side, the city centre of Oslo is a concentrated urban structure with a diversity of activities and a vibrant city life. On the other side, security measures must provide adequate protection in the areas needed (Oslo Kommune, 2014-2).

Moreover, the Grunnsikringsplan shows how Oslo is getting information from other pioneering cities in the security aspect. Through a comparison in the document, it is noticeable that there are many other cities that have far more visible safety devices in the cityscape than the ones Norway is used to. For instance, Lower Manhattan, where the block around the police headquarters until Ground Zero is closed to ordinary car traffic, or Washington, where separate design programs for the development of terrorist-proof street furniture were developed after the 9/11 attacks (Ibid, 2014).

Planning for all these new approaches takes time. It is noticeable around Regjeringskvartalet and other city areas, where there are still provisional measures such as concrete blocks or construction objects that block cars' access and creating dead zones.

In this sense, Oslo took close contact with the security planning of London. The British capital has long experience with terrorist attacks. Security, not only related to important public institutions, but also general security design, is part of ordinary urban planning. An important principle is to ensure an open and accessible city. In London, visible and hidden security measures are built into urban space furniture and street profiles. The British also place great emphasis on the fact that the design of urban spaces can help to reduce conventional crime ('Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design', CPTED). This is done, among other things, through openness, increased legitimate use, increased sense of security and the design of structures so that opportunities to commit crime are reduced (Oslo Kommune, 2014-2).

Consequently, after the attack, an expert in security planning from London's Municipality came to visit Oslo as a petition of the Municipality. The expert noticed how the city was unprotected in liveable pedestrian streets of Oslo. A prominent example is Karl Johans Gate, the main pedestrian street in the central area of Oslo, where there were no security measures to prevent terrorist attacks. After the analysis from London's expert, the Municipality decided to start securing these main areas (De Vibe, 2022). As Wolff Elvevold and Stove Lorentzen mentioned, now it can be seen how Karl Johans Gate changed with the flower pots, not only as decoration but as a security measure, not disturbing the liveability and the flow of the street. Ellen De Vibe does not know how much these pots improve the security of the road, but at least it gives a visual effect that you cannot run straight on the street because they have applied some of the principles that she proposed. Furthermore, Lorentzen points out the improvements of integrated security measures made from the Municipality around the Storting – the Norwegian Parliament – and the Royal Castle. Now both areas have rainwater gardens and other design structures that protect these places from car crashings.

Considering more areas around the city centre, in Bank plassen, for instance, they made some designs in terms of security matters. De Vibe explains that the planning team of Oslo have asked the Central Government and the Municipality to make equally pleasant things in the rest of the city centre.

Also, as James Stove Lorentzen mentions, after the attack all the government work had to be moved out of Regjeringskvartalet. He highlights that the move to another area was quickly and efficient. All the ministries moved to Kvadraturen, a quarter in the central part of Oslo, where the Municipality "*decided to spend millions of Kroner to secure this new area for the ministries*" (Stove Lorentzen, 2022). Still, it was not a priority zone for the central government, so for De Vibe it ended up being an area with concrete blocks that are a terrible example of how to secure a neighbourhood. Even though she thinks that with time, it became better than before because there were just these triangular concrete blocks used for the construction sites or highways. The quarter has been improved with still concrete materials, but more adequately. In this sense, the application of long-term solutions in this area will take some time due to the

requirements of the procurement regulations and the fact that available products must be obtained from abroad (Oslo Kommune, 2014-2).



Pictures 20 & 21³² – Provisional security measures around Kvadraturen.



Pictures 22 & 23³³ – Integrated security measures around Kvadraturen.

In addition, Grunnsikringsplan evidences the efforts from the City Council to revitalize Kvadraturen. The action plan for the area aims to revitalize the quarter to a more vibrant part of the city centre. The plan is been continued in the public-private cooperation body 'Levende Oslo'. The move of the ministries from Regjeringskvartalet to Kvadraturen as a temporarily measure, can actually beneficiate the area ensuring a diversity of activity and increasing the customer base for shops and service companies in the area, and therefore contribute positively to the development of the city centre (Ibid, 2014).

³² Made by the author.

³³ Made by the author.

It is essential to understand that the public spaces of Kvadraturen are still under development, and it could become a future proper example to follow for the Government Quarter. The area is moving now, and the Municipality is creating more schools. They are making changes in terms of floor pavement and creating more activities. Again, for De Vibe, there is an improvement, but the problem is that all these concrete constructions to securitise the area do not make the properties attractive. These measures do not improve the area's objectives, although shops and activities are happening.

Besides, during political discussions in the Municipality, it was pointed out that the experience of the city centre depends on how the city is maintained. This also involves the maintenance of necessary infrastructure such as tram rails, sidewalks, cycle paths and streets, including publicly accessible pedestrian areas within future safety zones. Wherefore, the design of security measures for government buildings will affect accessibility in the city, but can also facilitate a well-functioning, attractive city centre (Oslo Kommune, 2014-2).

At the same time, the Municipality of Oslo made a feasibility study on how to handle the whole central zone and made a proposition for security. The project consisted of bollards that can be extended and retracted, so there is no need to construct all these concrete blocks at the entrance of the buildings. However, this project was never carried out according to De Vibe. It is important to remark that the Ministry of Defence makes the final decision for creating security measures in Regjeringskvartalet and the rest of the city; they are the experts in this manner.

In general terms, it can be seen that there has been a before and after effect in the way of planning Oslo. The measures for planning in the city centre have changed completely, creating an impact in the landscape of Oslo. Even though Regjeringskvartalet development is not finished yet, the security measures have been spread around the city. Furthermore, the Municipality is having a long-term vision lately, implementing integrated security measures that replaces the temporary ones.

Concretely, for the security of Regjeringskvartaket, an assessment has been carried out concluding that there are four main types of threats in the area. There is crime,

terrorism, intelligence activity and sabotage. Through the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, different scenarios have been analysed to understand and try to avoid the wide range of threats that form the basis for securing a new Government Quarter (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018).

The Liveability of Oslo and Regjeringskvartalet

From the making-process for planning Oslo, it can be perceived that the Municipality is the leading actor fighting for the liveability of Regjeringskvartalet and the whole city in general terms. De Vibe points out that the security measures that restrict the access of cars in the Government District will be beneficial for pedestrians and cyclists.

In addition to De Vibe's comment, from the planning documents, it can be seen how the closure of the neighbourhood to cars is expected to create a liveability in terms of more space for cyclists and pedestrians. The outdoor areas will be airy, bright, and inviting to stay and well-being with vehicle control. Besides, the securing and completely burying of Ring 1 will create space to open and green areas for the locals. Concretely, the zone will be freed up to establish a new park in the Government Quarter. The park is essential for the Government Quarter to become an attractive area for the public and visitors (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018).

Likewise, it is planned to take out all the parking for the employers since Regjeringskvartalet plan intends to follow Oslo Municipality's 'Car-free city life'. Thus, arrangements will be made for the employees to be able to use bicycles as a means of getting to work. The zoning plan stipulates requirements for bicycle parking for 2,000 bicycles with efficient parking spaces, charging points for electric bicycles and allocated space for laundry rooms and workshop stations for bicycles (Ibid, 2018). Through these car-free measures, it can be analysed how the actors of the project are trying to create a connection of Regjeringskvartalet with the rest of the city in order to delete the feeling of closeness that some locals – such as the ones interviewed – may have.

On the one hand, for both, the accessibility will be good in the neighbourhood. It will be better and more comfortable than it has been today. On the other hand, in terms of

liveability inside the neighbourhood, the main challenges will be which type of activities can be developed there. Wolff Elvevold, said that the main problem in the Government Quarter is the lack of other activities not related to the government. Even though there has been planned a green space in the area and several squares, the situation is critical in planning. In addition, Stove Lorentzen highlights the small number of citizens living in this area. Is an area where it can be found offices, a couple of churches and the old Deichmann library. He thinks that during the evenings the neighbourhood will turn into a quiet area.

On the contrary, the planning documents show that the new Government Quarter will be open, safe and green and be a well-functioning and well-secured area with good urban qualities. Moreover, the efforts of the client, in this case, Statsbygg, to create liveability can be seen in their already established sub-project. This actor created a parallel project to find suitable measures to increase the attractiveness of the area and facilitate good urban life experiences (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018).

Apart from this sub-project, Statsbygg arranged a city life seminar with participants from local businesses and activities from the Government Quarter, the Municipality of Oslo and professionals from several organisations. It is noticeable that Oslo's Municipality has several projects both thematically and geographically close to Statsbygg's urban life work intentions. For instance, the idea of a functional mix in the area to attract citizens and visitors is a shared believe of both actors (Ibid, 2018).

Additionally, from the design competition of the neighbourhood in 2017, one of the criteria for assessment was "Openness and city life". Hence, the jury mainly paid attention to establishing an open, inviting and inclusive urban area – any functions and attractions for other than the employees in the zone. Also, the jury focused on how the new development was integrated into its surroundings. Emphasis was also placed on how the participants designed the safety measures in the outdoor areas using integrated safety design (Ibid, 2018).

For James Stove Lorentzen, Regjeringskvartalet will also be an open area very walkable and cyclable not open for cars. However, it is not going to be a place where there are a hundred of people wanting to go for a drink or spend a day.

Furthermore, Oslo has been implementing the Car-free liveability project for several years. As the experts in this subject, they have been fighting for the liveability of the areas surrounding the Government Quarter. Concretely, there has been a long process and discussion between the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation and the Municipality about including Youngstorget in the perimeter security area of Regjeringskvartalet. Nonetheless, the local politicians have been negated to this proposition. Regarding this manner, De Vibe thinks that the local politicians have managed to deny this plan because Youngstorget is the main square for demonstrations, festivals and May 17 activities – is a democratic space. So, if the access to this point of the city is restricted, it will lose its symbolic value. Lately, there have been discussions between Statsbygg and the Municipality on how to handle this more efficiently.

Besides, from the planning documents, it is also perceived the willingness to create democratic spaces in Regjeringskvartalet. Quotes like “the Government Quarter is an important symbol of Norway as a democracy, and an arena where citizens and interest groups should be able to express opinions and meet the executive” can be found around the text. In this sense, the case of Storting or the mentioned above, Youngstorget, can be an example of a democratic space in a secured area.

Eidsvolls plass³⁴, for its characteristics, has become an attractive area. Also, it has to be considered that this square is located right in the city centre of Oslo, where the main tourist attractions, as well as local activities, are located. What can be learnt from this area is that even



Picture 24 – Eidsvolls plass from Karl Johan Gate

³⁴ Picture made by the author.

though it is a secure place with cameras and integrated security measures, it is still liveable and the centre for major events. Again, the place is surrounded by shops, theatres, cafes, restaurants and other leisure activities, which helps the area be pleasant for a citizen.

From the perspective of the local actors, such as the Municipality of Oslo, Regjeringskvartalet is a unique case. This one-purpose neighbourhood makes it challenging to develop the district's liveability for the city's local population. From the Municipality of Oslo, De Vibe explains that they contribute to the city's liveability by creating different activities in the public space. This situation is different in the Government Quarter because the area is only dedicated to government purposes and no other planned activities. However, the Municipality they have plans for the liveability of the area.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The case of Regjeringskvartalet has been a particular exemplar from the beginning. There are only a few cases of countries in a European context with a neighbourhood dedicated only to government purposes, such as the Government District of Berlin in Germany for instance. In the case of Oslo, it is essential to understand that from the beginning, Regjeringskvartalet area has not been an attractive area to spend time for the residents. After conversating with two locals from the Norwegian capital who experienced the area before and after the terrorist attack, they agreed that the neighbourhood has not been a pleasant space to take a coffee or sit and meet with someone because of its purpose and design of the public space.

Even so, it is noted that with the new development of the district, the actors involved are trying to create public life with several plazas, the July 22 Museum and a green area where people could spend time and enjoy the area. In the project's planning documents, it can be read that the new Government Quarter will try to create public attraction due to its central location in the city.

Moreover, through the interviews with local politicians from the Municipality and two locals of the city, it can be seen that after the terrorist attack, there has not been a change in the population's behaviour in general terms. People do not have a fear of being in public areas and at significant events. Regjeringskvartalet does not create a feeling of fear but of sad emotions and memories in the people. The area is experienced in different ways depending on the memories and situations that everyone lived in the zone. For instance, this quote from a person interviewed clarifies: "I always think about the attack when I pass through, in different ways. I do not feel fear, but it makes me think. [...]". Everyone has a different story, and as mentioned at the beginning of this research, Norway does not have a big population compared to other European countries. This means that there are more chances to have someone related who had experienced the terrorist attack from a close perspective.

Hence, it is possible to create a liveable space, as seen in the insights of the different actors interviewed. People still want to use the city's public spaces, so creating attractive areas in the Government Quarter can improve the liveability of the neighbourhood, and it can be a way to heal the wounds that the locals could have after the attack.

Even so, Regjeringskvartalet's liveability and security cannot be only analysed as a post-terrorist attacked area. As already mentioned, this neighbourhood is a one purpose area designed to host the governmental buildings of Norway. Therefore, security is a prerequisite since the zone can be a target for terrorist attacks. In this sense, through the analysis of planning documents, it can be seen how the planners in the area, even though they have a perspective on the zone's liveability, the main focus is on creating efficient cooperation between ministries. In consequence, the architecture of the place is thought to host government purposes, not city life, as in the rest of the city centre.

Nevertheless, in terms of liveability, the area, for its purpose, communicates a sense of closeness to the inhabitants. The Government Quarter does not contain housing buildings; it is a combination of public government and Oslo's Municipality buildings and private offices from Norwegian newspapers, among others. Because of these activities happening in the area, some parts are closed to the public creating a sensation of confidentiality, in contrast with the Right to the City's theory.

Additionally, through observations in the area currently under development, there are no public spaces open because of the construction site fences, and this helps to create a sense of closeness and less enjoyment of the public zones. Also, the ban on private cars in several areas of the neighbourhood also creates a feeling of privacy. This situation, combined with the lack of activities in the area for the local citizens, makes the place less attractive. Again, as the area is still under development, some of the facts mentioned can still change after the end of the project. Though, based on the planning documents, once finished the development the area is still planned to be free of cars in terms of security, and some places will be closed to the public. Still, it is unknown the future of the area, and all the assumptions are based on opinions, guessings and planning documents.

From different areas of Oslo, it could be learnt how to create the future of the Government Quarter. For example, the national parliament of Norway, the Storting, in the city centre is an area secured by cameras and integrated urban measures such as flower pots or benches that still creates attraction to Oslo's population. In front of the parliament, there is a public square – Eidsvolls plass – which has become a democratic space where people can gather to do demonstrations or festivities such as the May 17 – the Norwegian national day.

For further research, it could be discussed how to create democratic spaces in Regjeringskvartalet like the example mentioned in Eidsvolls plass. It would be interesting to understand how the architecture of the public space, as well as the location, the security and the activities altogether, can create a particular space like Eidsvolls plass as a democratic and liveable place.

Furthermore, after analysing the current research, it can be seen through the expert interviews that the Municipality of Oslo is clear on its goals of creating liveability in the city. Through the Municipality, there have been debates to exclude areas from the security project of the Government Quarter to avoid a loss of liveability. However, the conversations with the local politicians showed that Regjeringskvartalet is a matter of lack of activities. From the experts' point of view, the major problem in the Government Quarter is the activities that will be developed there, not the security at all.

There are several examples around the city where it can be seen how security measures and the city's liveability coexist. Karl Johan Gate, one of the main pedestrian streets in Oslo, has different security measures that mainly include flower pots and cameras. The measures are well integrated in terms of furniture, not creating a feeling of a barrier or closeness. As well, the area around the Storting mentioned above has the same type of measures but still creates a sensation of open space. The question that can arise from these examples is: Why is it not the same situation in Regjeringskvartalet?

This question can be answered through a comparison of the three public areas. In terms of similarities, it can be said that the three areas are possible targets in case of a terrorist attack but on different levels. Karl Johan Gate and Stortinget are areas for the locals and tourists with popular shops and tourist attractions, and the targets would be pedestrians walking around the area. Regjeringskvartalet is a target because of its importance as the centre of the Norwegian government; the target is the government or specific political actors. Nonetheless, the main difference observed is the activities happening in each area. Karl Johan Gate has a commercial purpose where people can go shopping in clothing, utilities or other kinds of shops. Stortinget, as it is right next to Karl Johan Gate, the activities surrounding the parliament are the same. However, when talking about Regjeringskvartalet, there are no activities for the locals to enjoy the area. It is relevant to remember that Jan Gehl, in his theory about 'the Good City', mentioned that one of the primary requisites to create a lively city was to create activities that attract the citizens.

In this sense, security and liveability can be mutually helpful. A securitised space in a city can become attractive to its population and thus be liveable since it is a safe space where to spend time. For instance, in Regjeringskvartalet, as the local politicians mentioned, closing the traffic in the neighbourhood to private cars can make the area more walkable and cyclable for pedestrians and cyclists, creating more liveability and quality of life in the public space. As well, it is remarkable the work of one of the leading actors of the new Government Quarter, Statsbygg. Through the analysis of planning documents, it was observed that this actor is creating a sub-project while working with the local businesses, among other activities in the area, to discuss and try to build liveability. The documents show the effort of Statsbygg in terms of the creation of liveability.

Even so, the abuse of security measures can create a contrary effect. By abuse of security measures, the author means, for example, the excess of surveillance cameras or the use of security measures that are not integrated into the public space, such as concrete blocks that can also be found on the highways. The perfect illustration of this situation can be the Kvadraturen area in Oslo. In this case, the area's security has intervened the liveability of the place. Kvadraturen, as already mentioned through the analysis chapter, is a quarter in central Oslo, where all the ministries and government buildings have been moved after the terrorist attack. The measures chosen there to securitise the governmental buildings have been nulling in integrating the furniture into the public space. The area does not create welcoming places for the citizens since concrete blocks, and construction site fences create barriers around the quarter. Therefore, the public area in Kvadraturen has poor liveability even though it is located in the city centre and several activities are happening.

To conclude, the initial research question can be answered: "To what extent are security and liveability in a conflict in Regjeringskvartalet?". First of all, it can be said that the concepts of security and liveability are not entirely in conflict in Regjeringskvartalet. The relation between both concepts is influenced by the activities developed and the sensation of closeness that the area transmits to its citizens. Secondly, from the planning documents, it can be seen that there is a willingness from the Municipality to create liveability and security in all of the city; both concepts can help mutually each other, as said before. Concretely, it can be said that the Municipality has plans to create liveability through the securitisation of public areas. Through the Levende Oslo project, it can be observed how people have a worst connotation of an area for its lack of security. Accordingly, the Government Quarter it is a complex case where liveability and security can coexist on a general level event though its structure.

Thus, the challenges arising in Regjeringskvartalet can create a precedent for the entire city's future as the local planners are experiencing how this extensive development is shaping the future urbanism of the city in terms of security.

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APPENDIX

1. Relocation of the Ministries³⁵

- Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs: Akersgata 64
- Ministry of Justice and Emergency Preparedness: Gullhaug Torg 4A (Nydalén)
- Ministry of Climate and the Environment, Kongens gate 20 (Kvadraturen)
- Ministry of Education and Research: Kirkegata 18 (Kvadraturen)
- Ministry of Trade and Industry: Kongens gate 8 (Kvadraturen)
- The ministries' security and service organization: Akersgata 64, Grubbegata 14.
- The Prime Minister's office was co-located with the Ministry of Defense.

2. Qualitative interview questions

- When planning a new development in the city what is taken into account (liveability, sustainability, green areas, etc)? What are the most important topics?
- Car-free liveability program Oslo. Does include Regjeringskvartalet inside this project? Do you know if it's considered for that or at least if it should be included?
- Do you think that the liveability of the area is taken into consideration in the planning process? Or if it's worthy to fight for the liveability of that area?
- Do you think that the terrorist attack of the 22nd of July affected the way of planning Oslo afterwards?
- Do you think that when planning new public areas in the city centre the municipality plans for its security too?
- Is there a change of the behaviour of the Norwegian population after the terrorist attack? (Fear, for instance)
- How does the "trust" in Norwegian society affect the planning process? (Does it have any affection in the way of planning the city?)

³⁵ From the document Melding til Stortinget. Nytt Regjeringskvartal.

- From your point of view do you think that there was lacking something in terms of security in the old Government Quarter that can be improved now? (What can we learn from the past of Regjeringskvartalet)

3. Impact targets³⁶

- Has flexibility in terms of capacity: The new Government Quarter handles future changes in the number of employees for the government community as a whole and for the individual ministry. The building stock has the ability to meet changing needs for areas, by e.g. to divide the areas in the buildings into separate units.
- Has the required level of safety: Safety is ensured through basic security measures and through planned emergency preparedness measures. Technical elements in the basic security are integrated into the building and surroundings and contribute to the quarter appearing open and inviting. The basic security shall contribute to reducing the risk associated with relevant threats.
- Has high efficiency: The new Government Quarter creates an efficient and well-functioning ministry community with efficiency in daily work, collaboration and extraction of economies of scale.
- Has flexibility in relation to changes in structure, division of tasks and working methods: The new Government Quarter has generality and flexibility to handle changes in the ministry structure, division of tasks between ministries, new working methods and technological development.
- Has a high environmental standard: The buildings are rehabilitated / built with a high degree of environmentally friendly materials that contribute to low energy consumption and low greenhouse gas emissions in a life cycle perspective. Buildings and outdoor areas have a high environmental standard, and environmentally friendly and durable solutions will contribute to reduced maintenance and operating costs. The buildings are planned for environmentally friendly operation, both building stock and business.

³⁶ From the document Oslo Sentrum – gatebruk og grunnsikring.

- Has a good urban environment, representativeness and accessibility: The Government Quarter is an attractive, open, well-functioning and representative area for employees, visitors and for users of streets and outdoor areas.