UiT The Arctic University of Norway

Department of Psychology

# The Shame of Buried Giants and the Courage to Dig Them Up

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## Foreword

First and foremost, a huge thank you to my supervisor, Prof. Tove I. Dahl is in order. Thanks for being my supervisor all these years, from the start of my bachelor's thesis to the end of my master's thesis. Your guidance have been immensely valuable and my respect for you and your knowledge have only grown ever since I attended your lectures in 2018. Thanks for all the conversations at the start of this project when neither of us were sure where this was going, for all the countless drafts you've read, for encouraging me to make this project my own, and for being open to endeavor unfamiliar territory. But most of all I would like to thank you for believing in me when I doubted my own abilities. This project would not have been possible, or as educational, without your help.

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| Torstein de Besche [signature] | Tove Irene Dahl [signature] | Sig. |
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# The Shame of Buried Giants and the Courage to Dig Them Up

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## Sammendrag

Når gruppen din begår en handling som du ser på som moralsk feil, kan du enten ta eierskap av det moralske nederlaget og beklage, aktivt prøve å gjemme bevis og unngå tema, eller ikke gjøre noe som helst. Vi replikerte studier på gruppe-basert skam som skiller skam inn i to forskjellige emosjonskalaer, rykte skam og moralsk skam. En konfirmatorisk faktoranalyse viste at gruppe-basert skam var best operasjonalisert som to separate emosjonskalaer, istedenfor en omnibus skam skala. Vi undersøkte også tre relevante variabler som kan påvirke motivasjon for individer til å handle prososialt (for eksempel å signere en begjæring), når gruppen din har begått en moralsk overtredelse: (1) gruppe-basert moralsk skam, (2) moralske overbevisninger, og (3) moralsk mot. Spesifikt er det et kunnskaps gap når det kommer til moralsk mot og dens plass i studier om kollektive handlinger. Vi brukte strukturell ligningsmodellering og testet vår modell (N = 269), men den konvergerte ikke. Resultater fra en alternativ modell, med god egnethet, basert på teori, viste at sterke moralske overbevisninger betydelig predikerte moralsk skam og moralsk mot. Og både moralsk skam og moralsk mot betydelig predikerte restitusjon til tross for en opplevd motstand fra gruppen sin. Resultatene støtter ideen om at når sterke moralske overbevisninger blir brutt vil individer være motivert til å handle prososialt gjennom moralsk skam og moralsk mot. Teoretiske implikasjoner, begrensninger, og praktiske implikasjoner for varsling-intervensjoner blir diskutert.

*Nøkkelord*: Moralsk skam, rykte skam, moralske overbevisninger, moralsk mot, restitusjon, motstand fra sin egen gruppe

## Abstract

When your group commits acts that you view as morally wrong, you can own up to the moral failure and apologize or make right, actively try to hide evidence and avoid the subject, or do nothing at all. We first replicated studies on group-based shame that separates group-based shame into two different emotion scales, image shame and moral shame. A confirmatory factor analysis showed that group-based shame was best operationalized as two separate emotion scales, rather than one omnibus shame scale. We then investigated three relevant variables hypothesized to motivate individuals to act pro-socially (e.g., sign a petition) when one's in-group has committed a moral transgression: (1) group-based moral shame, (2) moral conviction, and (3) moral courage. Specifically, there is a knowledge gap regarding moral courage and its place in collective action studies. Using structural equation modeling we tested our hypothesized model (N = 269); however, the model did not converge. Results from an alternative model, with best fit, grounded in theory, showed that strongly held moral convictions significantly predicted moral shame and moral courage. And both moral shame and moral courage significantly predicted motivation for restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group. In conclusion, the results of the final model support the idea that when violated, strongly held moral convictions can lead individuals to act in prosocial ways through moral shame and especially moral courage. Theoretical implications, limitations, and practical implications for whistleblowing interventions are discussed.

*Keywords*: Moral shame, image shame, moral conviction, moral courage, restitution, in-group resistance

## Introduction

In 2015, Ishiguro published a novel titled “The Buried Giant”. The book’s theme centers around the collective memories of a society. These collective memories, linked to atrocities, are called giants because of their sheer weight. The book asks whether or not we should bury these giants (forgetting them) or dig them up (remembering them). One giant collective memory being continuously dug up in today’s society is Nazi Germany and World War II. Germany themselves worked to uproot their own countrymen (Diamond, 2019). One figure in the forefront of this process was the German-Jewish lawyer Fritz Bauer. Leading the Auschwitz trials, he prosecuted not only high-profile officials, but also low-level personnel like pharmacists, clothes room managers, and doctors. Bauer chose to dig up the giant, despite meeting resistance from other Germans. Bauer was frequently the target of verbal attacks and death threats. Whether or not this was the right thing to do is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss. It is clear, however, that Bauer acted true to his own moral standards.

When your group commits acts that you view as morally wrong, you can own up to the moral failure and apologize, actively try to hide evidence and avoid the subject, or do nothing at all. Behavior aimed at restitution and behavior aimed at avoidance, respectively. In the following paragraphs, I will review relevant psychological variables that can, after a moral transgression of the in-group, motivate individual behavior aimed at restitution or avoidance. Those variables are (1) individual shame and shame as a moral emotion, (2) group-based shame, (3) moral conviction, and (4) moral courage. The introduction will end by presenting the main research question of this correlational study: What role does moral courage play in prosocial motivation after a shameful group behavior? In addition, the full hypothesized model of the relevant variables will be presented.

**Shame as a Moral Emotion**

Shame is a universal affective experience that is elicited by perceived threats to the basic human need for group membership and belonging (Brown, 2006). Shame has also often been described as a moral emotion. Moral emotions represent a crucial element of our human moral apparatus in that they regulate the link between moral standards and moral behavior.

Haidt (2003) defines moral emotions as those "that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent" (p. 276). Moral emotions have a motivational force that helps people to do good and to avoid doing bad (Kroll & Egan, 2004). Emotions are viewed as moral when they elicit concern for others rather than the self and produce motivation for prosocial acts (Nelissen et al., 2013). Shame and guilt have been thought to be two of the most quintessential moral emotions (Nelissen et al., 2013). In this study, I will only focus on shame: However, due to their similarities, an explanation of the difference of the two are in order. Feelings of shame are aroused by an evaluative focus on the self: "*I* did that horrible thing" (Tangney, 1998, p. 7). This is in contrast with guilt, which often stems from an evaluative focus on behavior: "I *did* that horrible *thing*" (Tangney, 1998, p. 7). Tangney and Dearing (2011) postulate that shame occurs when an individual recognizes that they have "committed an offense or violated a standard, and therefore perceives a threat of social rejection" (p. 4).

The information threat theory of shame argues that shame will activate in a person's mind when others learn, or might learn, negative information about that person (Robertson et al., 2018). This emotion thus serves to motivate a person to be extra careful about taking actions that might increase devaluation in what they perceive to be a precarious social situation. In addition, shame will motivate the individual to limit the spread of damaging information to more people

than already know and limit the cost of potential social devaluation (Robertson et al., 2018). From this point of view, innocent people can feel ashamed if they simply think or suspect that others view them negatively. This is due to the fact that it is primarily others' belief (not facts) that determine a person's value to others and reputation.

The use of shame as a tool for moral guidance and social control has been used to justify shame-based parenting approaches, educational practices, and religious traditions, for example, publicly exposing someone's wrongdoing or inadequacy (Tangney & Dearing, 2011). However, action tendencies that arise due to feelings of shame have often been found to be amoral in both reasoning and behavior (Tangney & Dearing, 2011). Individuals tend to respond to shame with more concern for their self-interest than the interest of others, and to impulsively avoid intensely uncomfortable feelings (Tangney & Dearing, 2011). In addition, since feelings of shame are based on the belief of a fundamental flaw of the self, a simple apology or second attempt is not likely to make the feeling of shame dissipate (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). This is prevalent when feeling shame for a criminal offense—a situation in which people often deal with their shame by denying, rather than confessing their transgressions (Gudjonsson, 2003).

Brown (2006) explains that shame arise because feelings of group membership and belonging are experienced as both tenuous and important. This view effectively conceptualizes shame as a psychosocial-cultural construct, making shame a highly relevant emotion when discussing group-based emotions. Intergroup emotions are emotions people feel based on their membership in a group they identify with and belong to (Mackie & Smith, 2018). The fundamental assumption of intergroup emotion theory entails "that the experience of intergroup emotions depends upon group membership and the pervasive normative processes that group membership entails" (Mackie & Smith, 2018, p. 2).

## Group-Based Shame and Prosocial Behavior

Shame was first thought to be an "ugly" emotion, giving rise to highly uncomfortable feelings, and facilitating avoidance behavior. However, recent studies have found that shame can act as a motivator for prosocial behavior. For example, in a study of in-group moral failure, Gausel et al. (2012) asked Norwegian participants about their appraisals and feelings regarding the Norwegian government's mistreatment of the Romani people during the 20$^{th}$ century. This included but was not limited to over 500 documented cases of forced castration, kidnapping of Romani children, and forcing Romani to stay in labor camps. Gausel et al. (2012) mapped participants appraisals and feelings of group-based shame and found that "felt rejection" best predicted self-defensive motivations whereas "felt shame" best predicted prosocial motivation.

This was expanded on in studies done by Allpress et al. (2014). They examined feelings of group-based shame, set in the context of atrocities committed by British in-group members during the Iraq war, and distinguished the feeling of shame into two categories: Image Shame, and Moral Shame. Image Shame occurs when one's social image is threatened, and Moral Shame occurs when there is a threatened moral essence. They found that Image Shame best predicted negative orientations towards the outgroup such as avoidance, cover-up, and anger. Moral Shame on the other hand, best predicted positive orientations towards the outgroup such as apology and compensation (monetary).

Becoming aware of one's own group's wrongdoing can elicit two value concerns (Allpress et al., 2014). One non-moral value concern is that of the group being well regarded in the world, having a positive collective image, though which knowledge of wrongdoing can threaten. This value is non-moral as the group would stop pursuing trying to look good in the eyes of others if it did not serve the group's interest. This can be contrasted with a moral value

concern within the in-group, linked to its perceived status as a group motivated by justice and benevolence. “These constitute paradigmatic moral concerns because they entail that they should be pursued by members of the group even in occasions in which they do not advance the interest of the group.” (Allpress et al., 2014, p. 1272). Allpress et al. (2014) propose that feelings of shame that arise from the perception that one’s social image has been compromised (image shame) will therefore have different motivational effects from shame that arises from the perception that one’s moral standing has actually been compromised (moral shame).

It is, of course, possible that feelings of image shame can lead to prosocial attitudes and motivation if this is viewed as the best way to repair a group’s reputation (e.g., insincere apologies). On the other hand, given the cause of moral shame, that one’s moral standing has been compromised, restoring this balance must necessarily be done through what the individual perceives as morally good behavior. Moral shame was operationalized by Allpress et al. (2014) by asking British participants how they felt about the prisoner abuse carried out by British soldiers in Iraq with statements like “Our treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it *means* to be British.” All statements were measured with 9-point scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Image shame was operationalized by Allpress et al. (2014) with statements like “I feel disgraced because the behavior of British people toward Iraqi people has created a *bad image* of Britain in the eyes of the world”

Studies conducted on in-group moral failures have shown that people indeed feel shame for what their group has done, even when the moral transgression occurred before the participants were even alive. Allpress et al. (2010) asked British psychology students, with a mean year of age 20, about their feelings around the colonial injustices the British empire inflicted on Kenya.

Britain maintained colonial rule over Kenya from the 1880s to 1963, and the leadup to what is called the Mau Mau revolution in the 1940s to 1950s were particularly brutal (Allpress et al., 2010). The Mau Mau were Kenyans who took an oath against the British colonial rule, most commonly members of the Kikuyu ethnic group. They started destroying settler properties in the early 1950s, killing a few white settlers and assassinating a large number of loyalists—Kenyans who profited from colonial rule through cooperation with the British. In 1952 the colonial government declared a state of emergency and increased military control in the country. Most of the Kikuyu population was relocated to detention camps that has been likened to Soviet gulags and Nazi concentration camps. Mistreatment of the detainees consisted of sleep deprivation, regular beatings, beatings of children, gang rape of female prisoners, and forced sodomy among male prisoners (Elkins, 2005). In Allpress' study (2010), on a nine-point scale, 161 participants scored a mean of 5.85 (*SD* = 2.10) on essence shame (what is termed here as moral shame), and a mean of 5.35 (*SD* = 1.97) on image shame.

A model of the summarized and relevant results from previous research on group-based shame is presented in Figure 1.

**Figure 1.**

*Group-Based Shame and Behavioral Motivation*




*Note.* Model of research conducted on group-based shame and behavioral motivation, from the perspective of an advantaged in-group.

**Moral Conviction**

Although individuals' relation to their group is important, individuals also differ from one another. One relevant way that individuals can differ are the nature and intensity of their moral convictions. Moral beliefs are often viewed as having a universal component (Skitka et al., 2005). Moral beliefs are viewed as factual belief by the person holding them, they carry with them a compelling motive, and a justification for action—and are often accompanied with emotion. Haidt, Rosenberg, and Hom (2003) explained the concept of universalism with an example:

> If one says, "I value gender equality, but others need not value gender equality." Then gender equality is a matter of personal taste. If one says, "We in our culture value gender equality, but people in other cultures need not value gender equality," then one is treating gender equality as a social convention. However, if one sees gender equality as a moral

> good or a moral truth, then one is committed to saying, "I value gender equality and everyone else should too, even in other cultures." (p. 6-7)

Attitudes rooted in moral convictions are therefore independent of other people, and cultural context. This does not mean that there are absolute universal moral truths, but rather that people experience their moral convictions as something everyone could or would be persuaded to share. Skitka et al. (2005) argues that this is because moral convictions are viewed as facts, rather than preference or taste.

Moral convictions differ from other strong non-moral attitudes because they are experienced by individuals as facts about the world. Good and bad are often viewed as objective characteristics of an event, not only as verbal labels that people attach to feelings (Shweder, 2002). However, moral convictions differ from facts in one important way: they are experienced as motivational guides. Facts such as the height of Mount Everest (8 848 meters) and the boiling point of water (100 degrees Celsius) are presumed to be independent of any motivational force. These facts do not inspire action. In contrast, a judgement that treating someone badly because of their beliefs is fundamentally wrong has an inherent motivational component. This type of judgement contains an "ought" or "ought not" that can motivate behavior.

Skitka et al. (2005) argues that moral convictions also provide a justification for their actions or response. People express their attitudes about attitude objects—things one can make a judgement about or have a feeling towards—in moral terms, such as abortion or cannibalism, by saying "It's wrong!" The question of why it is wrong would therefore be viewed by the holder of the conviction as an odd question. The fact that it just *is* wrong is justification enough (Skitka et al., 2005).

Moral convictions are also often accompanied by strong emotions (Skitka et al., 2005, Arsenio & Lover, 1995, 1997). Shame, guilt, and disgust are thought to be linked to judgements that attitude objects are immoral or moral and they can be strongly connected to morally motivated behavior.

van Zomeren et al. (2012) define moral convictions as «strong and absolute stances on moral issues" (p. 52) and argue that this is an important energizer of collective action. Collective action is any action that is enacted as a representative of the group and is aimed at improving the group's condition (van Zomeren et al., 2012). Since moral convictions are absolute stances, any violation of a moral conviction will motivate an individual who holds them to actively change that situation. Moral conviction has been operationalized in prior research by asking participants how much they agree with statements like "my opinion about the right to know has a moral character" (van Zomeren et al., 2011), where high agreement indicates a strong moral conviction.

Research on morality posits that perceiving one's attitudes as subjectively universal (absolute truths) is an important aspect of subjective morality (van Zomeren et al., 2012). When moral convictions are violated, individuals will feel the need to reaffirm their moral stance by acting on it (Tetlock et al., 2000; van Zomeren & Lodewijkx, 2005). van Zomeren et al. (2012) argues that acceptance of moral concerns as subjectively universal and thus absolute standards has crucial consequences for the psychology of social change and collective action. Once an individual has acquired moral concerns and holds them as convictions, they will override any other "lower-order" concerns. Moral convictions demand adherence irrespective of the actor or subject that concerns them. This leads to the conclusion that moral convictions depersonalize the individual who holds them. Although these convictions may have been formed as other norms,

they are placed on a higher level of importance than social identity, personal identity, and any other relational processes that may account for social order (van Zomeren et al., 2012).

Moral convictions have been integrated in the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA)—an empirically grounded attempt to integrate the psychological literature on collective action. It posits four things; (1) identification with the relevant group predicts collective action, (2) perception of group-based injustice predicts, group-based emotions such as anger that, in turn, lead to collective action, (3) individuals' group efficacy beliefs predict collective action, and (4) identification with the relevant group bridges the efficacy and injustice explanations of collective action, by acting as the psychological basis for collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2012).

The SIMCA model has generally been studied from the perspective of the disadvantaged group. However, van Zomeren et al. (2011) examined whether or not SIMCA could be applied to the perspective of the advantaged group. They argued that for the advantaged group, moral convictions are powerful motivators of collective action against social inequality. In addition, according to SIMCA, identification with the relevant group increases group efficacy and group-based anger, and all three variables predict collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2011). In this way, the advantaged can become motivated to challenge social inequality because of their violated moral convictions against social inequality because they identify with its victims (van Zomeren et al., 2011).

Using structural equation modelling (SEM), van Zomeren et al. (2011) found that moral conviction did not predict identification with the advantaged group ($\beta = .02$, $p > .05$), nor did this identification predict group-based anger ($\beta = .03$, $p > .05$), group efficacy ($\beta = -.06$, $p > .05$), or collective action tendencies ($\beta = .00$, $p > .05$). Identification with the advantaged did not

correlate significantly with any of the other variables in van Zomeren et al.'s (2011) study. They therefore argue that identification with the advantaged group is not the relevant group identity when it comes to challenging social inequality. This, however, contradicts the results reviewed earlier on group-based Moral Shame. Feelings of group-based shame arise when taking the perspective of one's in-group who committed the moral failure, suggesting that the relevant group identification might be more nuanced than what van Zomeren and colleagues concluded.

Since the behavioral motivations that are elicited from moral shame and moral convictions are similar, and since a failure to adhere to one's moral convictions are often accompanied with feelings of shame, they should be closely related. When an individual with strongly held, and activated moral convictions is faced with a moral failure of one's in-group, it will increase the probability of feeling moral shame.

Therefore, I argue that those who feel higher levels of moral shame, when faced with a moral failure of one's in-group, likely have higher levels of moral convictions related to that moral value. In addition, higher levels of moral convictions will be associated with higher levels of wanting the in-group to make restitution to the out-group.

**Figure 2.**

*Prosocial Restitution Without Resistance from the In-Group*




*Note.* Hypothesized relationship between latent variables of moral shame, moral convictions, and motivation for wanting the in-group to make restitution towards the out-group.

**Moral Convictions Against Conformity**

Bauer, the German-Jewish lawyer who prosecuted low-level Nazi officials, was frequently the target of verbal attacks and death threats (Diamond, 2019). These came from Germans who disagreed with his methods. This begs the question: What motivates individuals to act despite this resistance? What is that made Bauer persevere despite receiving death threats?

Studies conducted by Milgram (1974) and Asch (1955) have shown repeatedly that the situation holds power over the individual. In Milgram's studies, an authoritative figure commanded participants to administer painful shocks on another person. Participants complied more often than not in delivering these shocks (Milgram, 1974).

In one version of Asch' experiment, a naïve participant would show up to the lab and discover that they were the last one arriving to the session. The other eight or 10 participants were actually research assistants and had already seated themselves around a table. The naïve participants were told that the experiment was testing individual's visual judgements and that their task was to assess which three different lines matched with a fourth. On some of the trials,

the research assistants declared, one by one, that an obviously incorrect line matched with the fourth line. When it was the naïve participant's turn to judge the line, they often agreed with the majority on these trials, even though the majority of the group had clearly given the wrong answer. More than half of the naïve participants went along with the majority in these trials (Skitka 2012; Asch 1955). This led Asch (1955) to conclude that

> The tendency to conformity in our society is so strong that reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call black white. This is a matter of concern. It raises questions about our ways of education and the values that guide our conduct (p. 34).

This is a matter of concern indeed. For instance, delinquent behavior is learned through exposure to other delinquents, who can, in turn, pressure new group members to conform to antisocial norms (Skitka, 2012). Exposure to delinquent peers has even been found to be the most powerful predictor of delinquent behavior (Warr, 1993).

Meanwhile, young people are not the only victims of group conformity. For example, numerous analyses have been conducted on Enron and what went wrong there. Enron was an American energy company that used to have huge profits and growth but is now known for one of the most stunning collapses in business history (Jenkins, 2003). One of the reasons for why things went wrong at Enron was enormous pressure for employees to conform to group standards and group norms (Tourish & Vatcha, 2005). Those who didn't conform were quickly called "losers," "chumps," or worse (e.g., fired without customary formality). Employees were forced to replace their preexisting beliefs and values with those of the group, which included, that those hired were part of a special elite and the best and brightest in the world, suppression of dissent, (perceived dissenters were often fired or reassigned), lose confidence in their own views and

perceptions in favor of those of the group's leader, and a glorification of their leaders and their opulent lifestyle, with a promise that if they worked hard and adopted the same opinions and convictions as the leaders, they too would be able to live a lavish lifestyle (Tourish & Vatcha, 2005). This led to a situation that has been termed bounded choice (Lalich, 2004), a context where only a limited set of emotions, behaviors, and beliefs are permissible.

It is clear that groups can influence the individual to engage in unethical or immoral conduct. However, Skitka (2012) argues that the conclusion that people reject their moral compasses to conform to group norms in cases such as Enron, is often based on inferences, not direct empirical tests. It is most likely that at least the majority of Enron employees were initially unaware of the gradual accumulation of pressures on them to change their view—a process known as moral seduction (Moore, et al., 2006). The ethics at Enron also seemed to shift from what is morally right to what is technically legal (Moore & Lowenstein, 2004). Skitka (2012) concluded with:

> The notion that people reject their moral compasses in strong situations has often been inferred from various studies, but it is a question that until recently has seldom if ever been explicitly tested. Recent research suggests that when we directly measure whether people have a moral stake in the given situation, we find that they often muster the moral courage to resist pressures to obey legitimate authorities or follow the crowd. (p. 354)

Aramovich et al. (2012) published a study on attitudes regarding torture and group conformity. In an Asch-inspired conformity paradigm, they examined the role of moral convictions in individuals against the use of torture in resisting conforming to the majority opinion. They found that moral conviction uniquely predicted the extent to which participants expressed opposition to torture both privately and publicly. Moral convictions were

operationalized with a 5-point scale (1 not at all, 5 very much) with two items: "To what extent does your attitude about whether stress interrogation techniques should be allowed reflect your core moral values and convictions?" and "To what extent is your attitude about whether stress interrogation techniques should be allowed deeply connected to beliefs about fundamental questions of "right" and "wrong"?". Aramovich et al. (2012) provides support for what is called the morality as motivated resistance hypothesis. Research suggests that strength of moral convictions fortifies individuals to resist majority influence (Hornsey, et al., 2003; Hornsey, et al., 2007). This counter-conformity however, only reflected behavior intentions and not actual behavior.

There are numerous studies that indicate the counter-conformity aspect of moral convictions, and that supports the morality as motivated resistance hypothesis. For instance, research has shown the effect of moral conviction in resisting sources of influence like authorities or rule of law with adults (Skitka, et al., 2009; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Wisneski et al., 2009) and with children (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981, 1985). Other research has demonstrated occasions of moral resistance to normative information among college students (Hornsey et al., 2003, 2007) and to peer influence among adolescents and children (Perkins & Turiel, 2007).

Based on this, I argue that when an individual's strong moral convictions are activated and then violated, they will tend to be more motivated to act pro-socially despite perceived resistance from their in-group.

**Figure 3.**

*Prosocial Restitution with Perceived Resistance from In-Group*




*Note.* Hypothesized relationship between the latent variables of moral shame, moral convictions, and restitution despite perceived resistance from in-group.

## Moral Courage

Although research on moral convictions is promising when it comes to resisting group conformity, resistance is often expressed as a behavioral intention or as a judgement about the source of the influence, as opposed to actual behavior. People can feel a responsibility to act and believe that they have the capacity to do so, and still not have the courage to face the threat and act. Goud (2005) argues, based on a content analysis from military history and research, psychology, literature, and philosophy, that courage consists of three dimensions: fear (danger, risk), appropriate action, and purpose. Biswas-Diener (2012) argues that the ones with the most courage are able to reduce the perceived fear while at the same time increase their own sense of agency. Aristotle thought courage was a middle path between foolhardiness and cowardice (Goud, 2005).

Here a distinction of two views on courage is in order. Courage as an accolade and courage as a process. Courage as an accolade views courage as something rare, it is praise for an action that involves substantial risk in order to obtain a morally good goal (Pury & Starky, 2010). Calling an action courageous from the accolade perspective, serves as an illocutionary act.

Austin (1975) defined illocutionary acts as statements that do more than just inform the listener; they are also used with the intent to change something. For example, stating “The tea is hot” does not only describe the temperature of the tea, but is also an indication that maybe it’s best to wait a couple of minutes before drinking the tea. Calling an act courageous is similar in that it not only describes the action, but it also praises the action as morally good, or noble, in order to encourage similar behavior. From the speaker’s point of view the person acting with courage faced real risk in pursuit of a worthy goal. The underlying question that courage as an accolade poses then, is, “was that a praiseworthy instance of courage?” (Pury & Starky, 2010).

Courage as a process aims at figuring out how people come to act courageously, a fundamentally different question than the question posed by courage as an accolade (Pury & Starky, 2010). Pury and Starky (2010) compared the accolade view and the process view on courage as analogous to the difference between comprehending a cartwheel from the perspective of a gymnast judge (accolade view) or from the perspective of a kinesiologist (process view):

> Though both observe tumbling, the kinesiologist explores the physics, biomechanics, and acquisition of the skill to complete a cartwheel effectively. Because of these interests, all levels of cartwheel ability are suitable for research and the result may be used to help individuals at all levels improve their performance. In fact, failed cartwheels may be especially useful in learning the conditions needed for successful performance. Internal states such as dizziness due to vestibular and ocular disparity are of interest, as are techniques such as spotting developed to cope with them. In fact, kinesiology provides the discoveries and the tools to develop additional techniques. The gymnastic judge on the other hand, is interested in grace, form, and adherence to competition rules. Instances of flawless execution, garnering a perfect 10, are of most interest, and the emphasis is on

> how much the individual's performance deviates from the expected form. Inner states and techniques to deal with them are of limited interest (p. 76).

The process view on courage has underlying psychological mechanisms they are interested in, just as the kinesiologist is interested in physics and biomechanics (Pury & Starky, 2010). Overcoming an internal state of fear is a key component in these theories of courage as a process. This means that if someone has a fear of public speaking, they might view holding a presentation as something courageous. But people without this fear would hesitate to call holding a presentation courageous. These process approaches, tend to emphasize fear but largely ignore the more noble aspect of courage (Pury & Starky, 2010).

In this study, we aimed at investigating courage at the intersection of accolade and process. As Pury and Starky (2010) stated, this can include many courageous actions where the actor is pursuing morally good goals in line with society's morals, and that the actor finds meaningful in the face of risk that causes fear. Whether or not these conditions were met in this study is brought up again in the discussion. We also view courage as more of a malleable state-like rather than trait-like concept, in line with other scholars in the field (e.g., May et al., 2014; Kidder & McLeod, 2005; Sekerka et al., 2009).

According to Goud (2005), threats, risks, or danger are a necessity when it comes to labelling a deed as courageous (some scholars disagree with this view, see for instance Pury & Starky, 2010). These fears can vary in their intensity and have a concrete or a more intangible source. Physical fear-inducing threats can include combat, illness or severe injury, or aggressive animals. Psychological threats can for example be phobias, chronic anxiety, fears of isolation or abandonment, fear of failure in the pursuit of major goals and life dreams, and shame and disgrace.

Osswald et al. (2010) define moral courage as “a prosocial behavior with high social costs and no (or rare) direct rewards toward the actor” (p. 3). Situations in which moral courage is needed to intervene are numerous and can for example involve perceived injustice, violation of human rights, degrading and unfair treatment of others, or when nature and cultural assets are in danger. In other words, these situations are often codified as illegal business practices, bullying, sexual harassment or abuse, violence and aggression against weaker individuals, and discrimination against foreigners or other minorities (Frey, et al., 1999).

Moral courage also encapsulates situations where it is necessary to stand up to someone who has power over the aggrieved individual (like a boss) for the greater good (Lopez, et al., 2003), and has found to be crucial when it comes to speaking out about a moral transgression (Watts & Buckley, 2017; Goodwin et al., 2020; Galdi et al., 2017).

“Nothing demands more courage and character than to be in open opposition to time and mainstream, to stand up and to say aloud: No!” (Tucholsky, in Frohloff, 2001, p. 231, as cited in Osswald et al., 2010). When an in-group commits a moral failure, speaking out is one of the ways to raise awareness of the moral transgression. This has been extensively studied by investigating whistleblowing in organizations.

Whistleblowers can be defined as people who “report unethical behavior occurring within their own group to authority” (Dungan et al., 2019, p. 1). Whistleblowing plays a critical role in exposing injustice and corruption. Many whistleblowers, however, face harassment and emotional trauma (Kenny, et al., 2019; van der Velden et al., 2019), quit under duress, or gets fired outright (Bjørkelo, 2013; Dyck et al., 2010; Rehg et al., 2008). This backlash on whistleblowers might explain people’s reluctance to speak up against moral transgressions. In

one study, only 9.4 % of people blew the whistle when they had a reason to and were given the opportunity (Bocchiaro et al., 2012).

Why do some people dare to blow the whistle? Some scholars believe that whistleblowers act out of a moral concern for the well-being of others (Cailleba & Petit, 2018; Lindblom, 2007; O'Sullivan & Ngau, 2014; Watts & Buckley, 2017). At the same time, whistleblowers have to choose between loyalty to their in-group or extending their consideration to the out-group in the name of fairness (Dungan et al., 2014; Dungan et al., 2015; Hersh, 2002; Uys & Senekal, 2008). In a study by Dungan et al. (2019) moral concerns were consistently found to be a predictor for whistleblowing decisions across contexts: both for government employees and employees in the private sector, as well as in relation to hypothetical intentions and real past behavior. Moral concerns were operationalized by asking participants of their concern for others, with items like "making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements" and "I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others, even if it means I will be ridiculed" (Dungan et al., 2019). It is clear that reporting unethical behavior within your group can be motivated by moral standards yet still involve substantial risk for the whistleblower.

In a qualitative study on moral courage by White (2015), by interviewing political leaders in Myanmar (formerly Burma) working for human rights and democracy, a conceptual model of moral courage was developed. Participants reported three different types of motivation to act with moral courage: moral commitment, compassion, and feeling compelled to act. Moral commitment entails behavior preceded by a judgement regarding the rightness of an action. Behavior that includes upholding moral standards or principles such as compassion, honesty, respect, responsibility, fairness, and caring for others. The kind of activities participants reported

related to acting on moral commitment included giving aid to rape victims, documenting rape, documenting environmental devastation, training teachers, training health-care workers, training community leaders, teaching grant writing, supporting political prisoners and their families, testifying on abuse of political prisoners, and teaching and advocating for children's rights, women's rights and human rights (White, 2015).

Compassion is a distinct affective experience whose main function is to facilitate cooperation, protection of the weak and those who suffer (Goetz et al., 2010). Compassion is often linked to witnessing undeserved suffering (Goetz et al., 2010). According to Kanov et al. (2004), compassion happens in three stages: noticing someone's pain, having an emotional reaction to this pain, and acting to help those who are suffering with the pain. Many of the participants in White's (2015) study witnessed violence inflicted on others by the Burmese military. The kinds of activities participants reported related to feelings of compassion included, for instance, seeing fellow prisoners being denied medical treatment, starved, beaten, and tortured.

One participant said she had not planned to open a clinic, but when she saw refugees coming over the border in waves and in need of emergency medical care, she could not stand idly by. Especially since no other emergency medical care were available to them. Another participant with a child of his own felt compassion for the orphaned or very poor children living in monastery schools. He demonstrated his compassion and concern for the children's education by sending Buddhist nuns and abbots to other Buddhist countries in order to learn how to integrate pedagogy and principles of engaged Buddhism into their own communities and schools in Myanmar (White, 2015).

Feeling compelled to act was a third type of motivation to be brought up by the interviewees when discussing moral courage (White, 2015). Participants described witnessing an event that catalyzed one's moral courage; for instance, one of the participants said he observed a non-violent demonstration and saw a soldier gun down and kill his friend. This event was pivotal for him, as he decided to join a national youth organization, later became its director, and organized young people to oppose the military dictatorship non-violently (White, 2015). Another participant in White's (2015) study had interviewed women who had been systematically raped as part of the strategy of the Burmese military to demoralize and shame the women and their families. She said, "we ourselves are traumatized when we hear the stories of violence; but for the women to tell their stories it is very painful for them to tell what happened, painful to break the silence, but it is very important to break the silence." (White, 2015, p. 8). She felt compelled to provide assistance to these women, so she founded women's crisis intervention and social services program for refugees of a particular ethnic group that is not officially recognized as refugees in Thailand (White, 2015).

It is clear that the political leaders interviewed in White's (2015) study faced both physical and psychological risk by speaking up, and that involved some degree of moral courage to do. Although other situations of speaking up (e.g., whistleblowing or admitting to an in-group's moral failure) might not be accompanied with the same physical risks, such as imprisonment, being beaten, and tortured, I would argue that the psychological risks of speaking up are still present. The risks might include feelings of shame and disgrace, and a fear of being ridiculed and ostracized. The presence of these psychological risks and uncertainties makes moral courage a relevant variable when it comes to understanding when people choose to speak

up against a moral transgression committed by their in-group, even in less publicly treacherous situations.

Therefore, I argue that moral courage will act as a moderator on the relationship between moral convictions and prosocial restitution motivation despite perceived resistance from one's in-group. Higher levels of moral courage will be associated with a higher likelihood of acting in prosocial ways, despite a perceived resistance from their in-group.

## Social Desirability

A few quick comments about social desirability is in order here, as we included it as a control variable. Social desirability is the tendency to underreport socially undesirable behavior and overreport socially desirable behavior (Krumpal, 2013). In self-report studies, participants can often present themselves in a favorable light, independent of their true attitudes and behaviors. Participants in studies can thus distort their own answers in the direction of social norms in order to maintain a socially favorable self-presentation (Krumpal, 2013). Research suggests that misreporting on sensitive questions is a controlled and deliberate process, at least in part under a respondent's voluntary control, rather than an automatic process happening entirely out of the consciousness of the respondent (Holtgraves et al., 1997; Holtgraves, 2004). This suggests that social desirability is somewhat similar to deliberate lying. People often lie to avoid losing face in a social situation, and negative emotions of shame and embarrassment (Schaeffer, 2000). Social desirability could therefore prove a useful control variable when studying prosocial behavior.

## Research Question, Hypotheses, and Design

In this correlational research design, the intention of this self-report study was twofold: to use a Norwegian sample and see if we could replicate results from Allpress et al. (2014), using the Norwegian example of gross injustices committed by the mainstream against the national minority Romani people up until the 1970s. Results from Allpress et al. (2014) indicated that moral shame is associated with positive orientations toward a victim outgroup and inversely related to negative orientations, and that image shame show the opposite pattern.

The second purpose of the study was to investigate if participants would be motivated to act pro-socially towards the victim group even if they thought they would meet resistance from their own group, and if so, which variables would motivate them to do so. Based on previous studies on collective action tendencies (van Zomeren et al., 2012) and whistleblowing (Dungan et al., 2019), we added the variables moral conviction and moral courage. Specifically, we wanted to investigate what role moral courage play in prosocial motivation after a moral transgression committed by the in-group is made salient in individuals, and how moral courage relates to the other aforementioned variables.

As illustrated in the model below (Figure 4), the hypotheses is as follows: after making in-group wrongdoing salient to Norwegian participants, (H1) high levels of moral shame would be positively associated with motivation for restitution despite perceived resistance from the in-group, (H2) high levels of moral shame would be positively associated with high levels of moral convictions, (H3) high levels of moral convictions would be positively associated with motivation for restitution despite perceived resistance from the in-group, and (H4) moral courage will act as a positive moderator on the relationship between moral convictions and motivation for restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group.

**Figure 4.**

*Full Hypothesized SEM Model with Corresponding Hypotheses*




*Note.* Hypothesized relationship between moral shame, moral convictions, moral courage, and restitution despite a perceived resistance from in-group.

# Methods

## Participants

Participants were recruited from December 2021-March 2022 (N = 269, mean age = 29, *SD* = 14.2, range = 18-94) to answer an online survey in Qualtrics (www.Qualtrics.com) through social media (i.e., Facebook). The age frequency of the participants was distributed as follows: 18-29 (194), 30-39 (15), 40-49 (4), 50-59 (16), 60+ (19). We deliberately tried to recruit participants in different age groups due to the fact that older people might have different experiences and more knowledge of the Romani situation in Norway. Thus, age could be an important variable when it comes to feelings of group-based shame. This is investigated further in the results section.

# Materials

## Individual Self-Stereotyping

To assess identification with the in-group we used three items developed by Gausel et al. (2012): (1) “I have a lot in common with the average Norwegian person”, (2) “I am similar to the average Norwegian person”, and (3) “I consider myself a typical Norwegian.” α = .75. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

**Social Desirability**

In order to control for social desirability we added the Norwegian version, developed by Rudmin (1999) of the short-form Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale, where participants could answer either true or false on a series of ten statements: (1) “No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener”, (2) “There have been a few occasions when I took advantage of someone” (reversed), (3) “I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget” (reversed), (4) “When I don’t know something, I don’t at all mind admitting it”, (5) “There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things” (reversed), (6) “I never resent being asked to return a favor”, (7) “I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off”, (8) “I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me” (reversed), (9) “I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only get what they deserved” (reversed), and (10) “I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings,” α = .79.

**Moral Shame**

Feelings of Moral Shame was measured using three items originally from Allpress et al., (2014), but modified to describe the target group (Romani) and the in-group (Norwegians) of our study in our setting (Norway): (1) “Our treatment of the Romani people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it means to be Norwegian”, (2) “I do not feel ashamed for the

way we have treated the Romani people" (reversed), and (3) "I do feel ashamed for the aggressive tendency of the Norwegian people," α = .86. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

**Image Shame**

Feelings of Image Shame was measured using three items originally from Allpress et al., (2014), but modified to describe the target group (Romani) and the in-group (Norwegians) of our study in our setting (Norway): (1) "I feel disgraced because the behavior of Norwegian people toward the Romani people has created a bad image in the eyes of the world", (2) "To think how Norway is seen for its treatment of the Romani people makes me feel ashamed", and (3) "I feel humiliated when I think of how Norway is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Romani people," α = .92. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

**Avoidance**

Motivation for avoidance behavior was measure using four items originally from Gausel et al. (2012), modified to fit our study: (1) "If I could I would like to avoid encounters with Romani people", (2) "I would rather not get mixed up in discussions about the Romani people", (3) "If I were to confront a Romani I would control my thoughts and think of something other than the abuse", and (4) "I would like to forget about this Romani situation and everything that has happened to them," α = .76. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

**Cover Up**

Motivation to cover up the moral failure was measured using three items, originally from Gausel et al. (2012): (1) “I think that we Norwegians should make it less clear what has happened to the Romani people”, (2) “I think that we Norwegians need to be careful about the national information we share with other nations”, and (3) “We Norwegians should make this Romani story less prominent in the public consciousness”, α = .66. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

**Individual’s (Group-Based) Contrition**

Motivations for individual contrition was measured using three items, originally from Gausel et al. (2012): (1) “If I could, I would like to tell the Romani people how I feel”, (2) “It is important that the Romani people get to know that I feel bad about this”, and (3) “I would like to express my concern to the Romani people”, α = .90. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

**Group Restitution**

Motivation for wanting the in-group to make restitution towards the out-group was measured with three items originally from Gausel et al. (2012): (1) “I feel Norwegians should not compensate the Romani people financially for what has happened” (reversed), (2) “I feel Norwegians should help the Romani people, as much as they can, to re-establish their culture”, and (3) “I feel Norwegians should compensate the Romani people emotionally (e.g., offer free therapy)”, α = .73. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

**Moral Conviction**

Moral conviction was measured using three items, originally from van Zomeren et al. (2011): (MC1) “My opinion about discrimination of the Romani people is an important part of my moral norms and values”, (MC2) “My opinion about discrimination of the Romani people is a universal moral value that should apply everywhere in the world”, and (MC3) “My opinion about discrimination of the Romani people is a universal moral value that should apply at all times”, $\alpha = .92$. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

## Moral Courage

Moral courage was measured using the scale developed by May et al. (2014, based on Gibbs et al., 1986). This scale conceptualizes moral courage as a state rather than trait and is comprised of four items: (Courage1) “I would stand up for a just or rightful cause, even if the cause is unpopular and it would mean criticizing important others”, (Courage2) “I will defend someone who is being taunted or talked about unfairly, even if the victim is only an acquaintance”, (Courage3) “I would only consider joining a just or rightful cause if it is popular with my friends and supported by important others” (reversed), and (Courage4) “I would prefer to remain in the background even if a friend is being taunted or talked about unfairly” (reversed), $\alpha = .67$. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

## Restitution Despite a Perceived Resistance from the In-Group

Motivation for prosocial restitution despite a perceived in-group resistance was measured using four items, inspired by studies on collective action tendencies (e.g. van Zomeren et al., 2004), but modified to reflect in-group resistance: (RDR1) “Even if the majority of Norwegians

are against it, I would be willing to… participate in a demonstration against the discrimination of the Romani people", (RDR2) "Even if the majority of Norwegians are against it, I would be willing to… participate in raising our collective voice about what happened with the Romani people", (RDR3) "Even if the majority of Norwegians are against it, I would be willing to… sign a petition against discrimination of the Romani people", and (RDR4) "Even if the majority of Norwegians are against it, I would be willing to… participate in some form of collective action against discrimination of the Romani people", $\alpha = .93$. The participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7).

**Procedure**

The survey could be answered on any electronic device. Participants first read an informed consent form containing a few short paragraphs of the intent of the study, anonymous data management, and the possibility of withdrawing at any point in the study without consequence (see the Appendix for the full questionnaire). Participants then answered demographic questions of age and gender, whether or not they identify as Norwegian, and the individual self-stereotyping scale used by Gausel et al. (2012).

Participants were then presented with a short article. It contained a series of factual statements regarding the Norwegian government's mistreatment of the Romani people, a national minority group in Norway. The short article was provided to us by Gausel and has previously been used by Gausel and colleagues to investigate group-based shame (see Gausel et al., 2012). Specifically, the article described the systematic discrimination of the Romani people (sometimes referred to as Gypsies or Taters), committed by Norwegians and the Norwegian government throughout the 20th century. Discriminative acts included forced sterilization up until 1977; kidnapping of Romani children by state organizations and used as threats to force Romani

adults to stay in labor camps (Hvinden, 2001). Romani people were also not allowed to own animals from 1951-1974, which hindered their use of animals for transport (Hvinden, 2001).

The article presented Norwegians with factual information about their in-group's moral failure towards the Romani people. To ensure that participants read the article, they were asked to write a short summary of the article. Then participants were asked how much they knew about the mistreatment of the Romani people before they read the article, ranging from *nothing of what was written in the article* (1) to *Everything, or more than what was mentioned in the article* (7). In addition, they were asked if they knew anyone with Romani heritage, and/or if they themselves have a Romani heritage. Then the participants were asked to respond to a series of statements with response scales ranging from *does not fit at all* (1) to *fits very well* (7); all statements presented after the Romani article were randomized to prevent any ordering effects. In addition, to control for social desirability, we added the Norwegian version of the short-form of the Marlow-Crowne social desirability scale (Rudmin, 1999).

## Results

Of the 269 participants, 91 identified as male, 173 as female, and 5 as other (allowed to specify if they wished). Means, standard deviations, and correlations between the variables are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1.**

*Means of and Intercorrelations Among Variables*

| | *M* | SD | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Moral Shame | 4.00 | 1.69 | .45** | -.09 | -.19** | .44** | .39** | .39** | .23** | .41** | -.04 | .01 | .07 |
| 2. Image Shame | 3.56 | 1.76 | | -.04 | -.07 | .43** | .35** | .26** | .04 | .29** | .03 | .07 | -.03 |
| 3. Avoidance | 2.65 | 1.25 | | | .34** | -.08 | -.42** | -.19** | -.30** | .02 | .22** | .05 | .05 |
| 4. Cover up | 2.06 | 1.04 | | | | -.12* | -.29** | -.19** | -.15* | -.06 | .06 | .02 | -.10 |
| 5. Individual Contrition | 3.69 | 1.71 | | | | | .38** | .58** | .25** | .47** | .03 | -.05 | .01 |
| 6. Group Restitution | 5.23 | 1.20 | | | | | | .50** | .22** | .34** | -.06 | .03 | -.06 |
| 7. Restitution despite a perceived resistance | 4.26 | 1.80 | | | | | | | .46** | .51** | .05 | -.05 | -.07 |
| 8. Moral Courage | 5.55 | 0.92 | | | | | | | | .36** | -.08 | -.13* | .08 |
| 9. Moral Conviction | 4.79 | 1.87 | | | | | | | | | .16** | .02 | .07 |
| 10. Social Desirability | 5.33 | 2.18 | | | | | | | | | | -.09 | -.07 |
| 11. Individual self-stereotyping | 5.80 | 1.10 | | | | | | | | | | | -.02 |
| 12. Age | 26.8 | 15.7 | | | | | | | | | | | |

*Note.* * $p < .05$, ** $p < .001$. All items were measured on a 1-7 Likert scale, except age (participants were allowed to report their own age) and social desirability. The social desirability scale was answered with either true or false on ten statements where true = 1 and false = 0 for positively worded items and the reverse of this for negatively keyed items. Summated scale scores thus indicate a tendency for social desirability with a score that could range from 0-10 for each participant.

To test the hypothesized models, we conducted Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) using Mplus (Version 8.7). All models were estimated with the weighted least square mean and variance estimator (WLSMV, unless otherwise stated). CFA was used to test the factor structure of the items measuring moral shame and image shame. Factors were allowed to correlate, but no observed variable was allowed to cross-load. The hypothesized model from Allpress et al. (2014), specifying image shame and moral shame as

separate factors, yielded a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(8) = 12.40$, $p = .134$, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .999, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .012, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .045. An alternative model that specified the image and moral shame factors as loading onto a single shame factor, showed significant decrease in fit $\chi^2(9) = 195$, $p < .001$, CFI = .949, SRMR = .062, RMSEA = 0.279. The data therefore supports previous findings from Allpress et al. (2014) showing that image shame and moral shame can be regarded as separate emotion scales.

To test the hypothesized relationship between the emotion variables and measures of behavior motivation for restitution or withdrawal, we evaluated the structural model shown in Figure 4. We performed bias-corrected bootstrap to compute confidence intervals (CI), based on 10 000 bootstrap samples. All paths were specified between the emotions and the different behavior motivations. This model provided a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(120) = 217.035$, $p < .001$, CFI = .984, SRMR = .036, RMSEA = .055. As hypothesized, moral shame was a significant positive predictor of wanting the in-group to make restitution towards the outgroup (β = .51, 95 % bias-corrected bootstrap CI [.293, .722], $p < .001$), and of individual contrition (β = .41, 95 % CI [.191, .632], $p < .001$), and a significant negative predictor of avoidance (β = -.37, 95 % CI [-.629, -.128], $p = .004$), and of motivation to cover up the moral failure (β = -.58, 95 % CI [-.847, -.308], $p < .001$).

In contrast, image shame was found to be a positive predictor of motivation to cover up the moral failure (β = .27, 95 % CI [-.010, .549], $p = .060$), although falling marginally short of the cutoff p-value of .05 and having a CI that crosses zero. Image shame did not predict any other variable for behavioral motivation. Factor loadings for the latent variables in Figure 5 are reported in Table 2.

When controlling for social desirability, model fit dropped significantly $\chi^2(367) = 524.898$, $p < .001$, CFI = .973, SRMR = .180, RMSEA = .041. Therefore, we decided not to include it in the final analysis shown in Figure 5. We also dropped one item from the latent variable Avoidance as it had a very low factor loading (.27), see Table 2.

**Figure 5.**

*Relationship Between Feelings of Moral and Image Shame and Behavioral Motivation.*




*Note.* * $p < .05$, ** $p < .001$. Based on 10 000 bootstrap samples. Dotted lines represent nonsignificant relations.

**Table 2.**

*Factor Loadings for the Latent Variables and their Corresponding Observed Variables in Figure 5.*

| Latent variables | Observed variable | Observed variable | Observed variable | Observed variable |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moral Shame | Ashamed<br>.91 | Not Ashamed (reversed)<br>.79 | Aggressive tendency<br>.82 | |
| Image shame | Bad image in the eyes of the world<br>.92 | How Norway is seen makes me feel ashamed<br>.92 | Humiliated, Norway is seen negatively by the world<br>.80 | |
| Individual contrition | I would like to tell the Romani people how I feel<br>.85 | Important that the Romani people know I feel bad<br>.86 | Express concern to the Romani people<br>.91 | |
| Group restitution | Norwegians should not compensate financially (reversed)<br>.64 | Norwegians should help re-establish Romani people's culture<br>.88 | Compensate Romani emotionally (offer free therapy)<br>.74 | |
| Avoidance | Avoid encounters with Romani<br>.81 | Not get mixed up in discussions about Romani<br>.75 | Control thoughts and think of something else<br>.27 | Forget about the situation and everything that happened<br>.80 |
| Cover up | Make it less clear what happened to the Romani people<br>.73 | Careful about the national information we share with other nations<br>.48 | Make this story less prominent in the public consciousness<br>.92 | |

*Note.* The observed variable "Control thoughts and think of something else" were dropped from the SEM analysis shown in Figure 5 due to a factor loading of .27.

Given the high correlation between moral and image shame ($r$ = .72, between the latent variables, and $r$ = .45, between the observed variables, $p < .001$), we investigated multicollinearity statistics. All variance inflation factors < 1.43, and tolerances > 0.80 were found to be within normal ranges.

We tested the full hypothesized model in Mplus with latent variables (Figure 4), but the model did not converge. This could be due to a too low sample size, or that our moderator variable (moral courage) did not have a large enough range in its scores (Mean = 5.54, $SD$ = 0.92). Using only observed variables, the model did converge using the Maximum Likelihood estimator, but yielded a very poor fit to the data $\chi^2(58) = 7157.564$, $p < .001$, CFI = .023, SRMR = .464, RMSEA = .708. Suggesting that moral courage does not operate as a moderator in this model.

Omitting moral courage for one step and specifying moral shame as the exogenous variable and moral conviction as the endogenous mediator and restitution despite perceived resistance as the dependent variable, and using the WLMSV estimator, provided good fit to the data $\chi^2(32) = 40.612$ $p < .001$, CFI = .999, SRMR = .018, RMSEA = .033.

Adding moral courage as an exogenous variable on restitution to the model described above showed a decrease in model fit compared to the model without moral courage $\chi^2(72) = 306.583$ $p < .001$, CFI = .955, SRMR = .057, RMSEA = .111.

Adding moral courage as an endogenous, and mediating variable of moral shame on restitution along with moral conviction as a second endogenous, and mediating variable, did not change any fit statistics $\chi^2(72) = 306.583$ $p < .001$, CFI = .955, SRMR = .057, RMSEA = .111. That being said, the path of restitution on moral shame turned non-significant.

In this study, we have conceptualized moral conviction as the mediator for restitution and the group-based emotion moral shame as the exogenous variable. However, the integration of moral conviction into the SIMCA model operationalizes moral conviction as an exogenous variable and group-based variables such as group-based anger as a mediating and endogenous variable. That being said, it is worth to explore the differences of the variables and their respective position in the SEM model. Do feelings of moral shame inform our moral convictions, a feeling as information perspective, or does moral conviction lead to feelings of moral shame, as suggested by SIMCA? This will be elaborated on further in the discussion.

Thus, we tested a model where moral conviction was specified as the exogenous variable and moral shame and moral courage acted as the two mediators. This provided a better fit to the

data than the model discussed above $\chi^2(60) = 117.218$ $p < .001$, CFI = .989, SRMR = .032, RMSEA = .060 (see Figure 6).

**Figure 6.**

*Model With Best Fit Predicting Restitution Despite a Perceived Resistance from the In-Group, Where Moral Shame and Moral Courage Both Act as Mediators.*




*Note.* ** $p < .001$. † Restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group. Based on 10 000 bootstrap samples. MC1 was dropped due to a factor loading of .20, see materials. Dotted lines represent nonsignificant relations.

When controlling for social desirability on all variables in the model depicted in Figure 6, model fit decreased $\chi^2(277) = 697.067$, $p < .001$, CFI = .923, SRMR = .175, RMSEA = .078, and was therefore not included as a control variable, elaborated on further in the discussion. We performed bias-corrected bootstrap to compute confidence intervals (CI), based on 10 000

bootstrap samples. Moral conviction was a significant positive predictor of moral shame (β = .45, 95 % bias-corrected bootstrap CI [.280, .588], $p < .001$), moral conviction also significantly and positively predicted moral courage (β = .61, 95 % CI [.475, .716], $p < .001$). Moral conviction did not significantly predict restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group. Moral courage did, positively and significantly, predict restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group (β = .52, 95 % CI [.323, .691], $p < .001$). Moral shame was also a positive and significant predictor of restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group, though less so than moral courage (β = .28, 95 % CI [.121, .429], $p < .001$).

This suggests that moral convictions' effect on restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group is fully accounted for when adding moral courage and moral shame into the model, and moral courage contributed more to motivation for restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group than moral shame.

Although our hypothesized model did not converge, we did find support for H1, where in Figure 6, high levels of moral shame was found to be positively associated with motivation for restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group. We also found support for H2 in the same model, where high levels of moral shame were associated with high levels of moral convictions. H3, stating that high levels of moral convictions would be associated with motivation for restitution despite resistance, was not supported. As this path became non-significant when adding moral courage and moral shame as mediators. H4, where moral courage would act as a moderator, was also not supported by the data.

To test if individual self-stereotyping moderated the link between felt moral shame and individual contrition, we used hierarchical multiple regression. In the first step, moral shame significantly predicted individual contrition (β = .44, $p < .001$). In the second step, individual

self-stereotyping (ISS) was added to predict individual contrition, however it was non-significant ($\beta$ = -.08, $p$ = .328). In the third step, the interaction between ISS and moral shame predicted individual contrition. However, the interaction was non-significant ($\beta$ = -.02, $p$ = .642). This indicates that ISS does not moderate the link between felt moral shame and individual contrition.

The same procedure described above was done to investigate if ISS moderated the link between felt image shame and individual contrition. In the first block image shame was found to positively predict individual contrition ($\beta$ = .42 $p$ < .001). Both the ISS in the second step, and the interaction between ISS and image shame in the third step, were non-significant, in line with the result for moral shame described above. Taken together, it is clear that in this sample, ISS did not moderate the link between feelings of group-based image and moral shame, and individual contrition.

In addition, we also investigated the role of age on felt shame. As people who were alive at the time (1970s) might feel more responsibility than for participants who had not been born yet. Specifying age as an observed variable and moral shame as a latent variable in Mplus, we investigated if age had an effect on felt moral shame using SEM. This turned out to be non-significant $p$ = .734. Using the same procedure but switching moral shame with image shame also showed a non-significant result $p$ = .778. To sum it up, age did not have any effect on either felt image or moral shame in this sample. However, this could have been due to a low sample of older participants.

# Discussion

## The Replication of Group-Based Shame and Behavioral Motivation

From the CFA it is clear that one can operationalize group-based shame into two different emotion scales, moral shame, and image shame. When conducting a SEM analysis on moral shame and image shame and their link to behavioral motivation we found that moral shame was the only significant predictor of the behavioral motivation variables. This is in line with previous research on group-based moral shame as a variable that motivates individuals to act pro-socially and aim their efforts at restitution, after the in-group has committed a moral transgression.

Image shame did not significantly predict any of the behavioral motivation variables. This suggests perhaps that Gausel et al.'s (2012) operationalization of felt rejection and felt inferiority are important additions when predicting behavioral motivation aimed at avoidance. And perhaps that image shame is not the only variable to consider when studying group-based emotions and behavioral motivation for avoidance and cover up.

Nevertheless, our results of image shame as a non-significant predictor of motivation for avoidance behavior contradicts findings from Allpress et al. (2014). This could be due to the cultural differences of the groups being studied (Norwegians in our study, and British participants in the three studies from Allpress et al., 2014). It could also be due to the fact that Allpress et al. (2014) used residuals in their analysis to investigate felt moral and image shame and their link with restitution and avoidance motivation. They argue that a multivariate approach is important when assessing emotions that covary (Allpress et al., 2014), as image and moral shame is highly likely to do. This has been common practice in the literature since Tangney et al. (1992) suggested to study "shame-free-guilt" and "guilt-free-shame".

However, this method has a few drawbacks. First, it is difficult to know what construct an independent variable represents once the variance shared with the other independent variable is removed (Lynam et al., 2006). Second, partialling out the shared variance also has implications

for reliability. A set of scores can be divided into two variances: the variance of error, and the variance attributed to the target construct. Random error and systematic error not shared by the variables involved in partialling remains in the residualized scores and now takes up a larger part of the variable. In effect, the residualized score is less reliable than the raw score (Lynam et al., 2006).

Third, the method of using residual scores does not allow for the use of latent variables in SEM. Residualized scores are observed and the greatest liability to using observed variables in SEM is the fact that measurement error is retained within the observed variables in the structural model. Unless one uses latent variables in SEM, measurement error cannot be extracted (Stephenson & Holbert, 2003). All in all, the result of our study points to the direction of group-based moral shame as a positive predictor of motivation for individual contrition and wanting the in-group to make restitution to the out-group, and a negative predictor of motivation for cover up and avoidance behavior. Also, researchers investigating group-based shame might profit by adding felt rejection and felt inferiority in addition to image shame when conducting research on avoidance behavior.

**Moral Conviction, Moral Shame, and Moral Courage**

The fact that our fully hypothesized model specifying moral courage as an exogenous moderator did not converge calls for future research to perhaps manipulate courage in the lab (see for example Eix, 2021). Another alternative is to run the analysis with a larger sample size, which would also most likely increase the range of scores on the moral courage scale, in order to test the hypothesis of courage as a moderator.

van Zomeren et al. (2011) argues that when moral convictions are violated, individuals "experience strong feelings of anger towards moral transgressors, seeking to punish and exclude them in order to defend their conviction. … Moral conviction carry the seeds of social change by virtue of being placed on a higher level of importance than personal identity, social identities, and any other relational process that may account for social order" (p. 55-56). This is, in effect, an argument for specifying moral conviction as the exogenous variable rather than specifying moral shame as the exogenous variable. This was also supported in our SEM analysis, where specifying moral conviction as the exogenous variable yielded best fit.

However, one problem with specifying and comparing different models in SEM is that models may fit the same data equally well or nearly so (Kline, 2016). The small variation in our different models' fit could have been due to our sample. This calls for potential future research to perhaps investigate the mediation effect more thoroughly with time precedence. If variables are measured simultaneously, then it is impossible to estimate changes among these components of the indirect pathway. Although we've talked about our variables as mediators for the sake of brevity, this study only provides evidence for indirect effects as our study design did not feature any time precedence, a prerequisite for testing mediation (Kline, 2016).

The fact that our final model ended up being quite different from the hypothesized model could make a critic point out that the results are merely the chasing of sampling error (Kline, 2016). However, our results are consistent with theories on moral conviction and collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2011). Van Zomeren et al. (2011) also specified other group-based emotions such as anger as the mediator for the relationship of moral conviction on motivation for collective action. That being said, studies replicating the model in this paper is needed to draw any firm conclusions.

The fact that moral conviction as the exogenous variable yielded a better fit than moral shame as the exogenous variable does not necessarily prove any causal path. As in all quantitative analyses, we are dealing with samples of populations, not individuals. It is conceivable that an individual might feel moral shame when an in-group moral transgression has become salient in their mind, and first then attribute that to their strongly held moral convictions, which again motivates the individual to act—a feeling as information perspective.

Likewise, someone with strongly held moral convictions can, after an in-group moral transgression has become salient in their mind, be repulsed, and feel morale shame, thus being motivated to act—a view adopted by van Zomeren et al. (2011), and a view that our data supports. Future research that applies qualitative and mixed methods in the field of group-based emotions can get a better grasp of causality and mediation. Of course, it is entirely possible that the two paths can be equally present and valid in different individuals or in the same individual at different times.

The results of the final model support the idea that when violated, strongly held moral convictions can lead individuals to act in prosocial ways through moral shame and moral courage. The fact that strongly held moral conviction significantly predicts feelings of moral shame after an in-group's moral transgression, could be explained by the self-conscious (or in this case group-conscious) aspect of shame. In order to view the group as fundamentally flawed for having committed a moral transgression, one needs a moral compass to be able to make that judgement. In this way, moral shame works as a mirror for people with strongly held moral convictions; does the action of my group hold up to my moral standards? If not, moral shame is elicited. Importantly, our results show that moral shame does not motivate people to put down the mirror and forget about the issue (avoidance motivation), but moral shame motivates people

to keep the mirror there, until the moral balance have been restored, by for instance participating in a demonstration, signing a petition, or raising their collective voice about the issue.

The data also supports that strongly held moral conviction can energize people to act with moral courage. This is in line with the view of courage as an accolade, which involves praise for an action that has substantial risk in order to obtain a morally good goal. People with stronger held moral convictions are more likely to have a clearer understanding of what this morally good goal is, when compared to people with weaker held moral convictions. In addition, people with strongly held moral conviction are more likely to value this morally good goal more than people with weakly held moral conviction. These results are also congruent with the view of courage as a process, as it (at least partially) answers how people come to act courageously. This is because valuing a morally good goal can help people be sufficiently motivated to act with moral courage. Our results are consistent with theories on moral maturation and moral conation by Hannah et al. (2011), where moral maturation capacities (akin to moral conviction) lead to moral conation capacities (for instance by acting with moral courage).

Moral courage predicted motivation for restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group significantly more than moral shame did. This is perhaps indicative of the fact that we specified the questions of restitution as being against the majority opinion of the in-group. The feeling to behavioral motivation link could have been weakened by this. However, given the very nature of moral courage as persisting through risk, the moral courage to behavioral motivation link perseveres. Whether or not restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group is actually measured is brought up in limitations. All in all, in our study, moral courage seemed to be the largest predictor for restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group. And that moral courage is largely affected by strongly held moral convictions.

One interesting point in the final model is the fact that moral convictions did not significantly predict restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group directly when moral shame and moral courage were added to the model. Only through moral shame and moral courage did moral convictions motivate for restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group. This is consistent with other research on the values to behavior link. This link is often confounded by other variables such as attitude strength (Holland, & Verplanken, 2002), personal norms (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1972), the self (e.g., Steele & Lui, 1983), level of moral reasoning (Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996), attitude function (Maio & Olson, 2000), personal involvement (Stern & Dietz, 1994), and whether or not the values are cognitively activated and central to the self (Verplanken & Holland, 2002).

People do not always think about their values when making decisions in everyday life (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). For example, someone who values equality might end up eating the last piece of chocolate cake even though they've already eaten more than the others at the party. One reason for this discrepancy could be because the person might not interpret eating cake at a party as a situation where equality applies, they might not hold the value of equality as central to the self, or they might enact a competing value such as hedonism.

The fact that values central to the self predicts behavior above and beyond just values (e.g., one could hold equality as an important value, but it need not be part of one's identity and everyday life), is also evidence supporting moral shame and its place in the model of this study. As stated in the introduction, shame is often elicited by an assessment that something is fundamentally wrong with the self. Feelings of moral shame could thus help an individual know if this is a value central to their self. To sum it up, the model shows that only when our strongly held moral convictions are activated, when it elicits feelings of moral shame, and motivates

individuals to act with moral courage, does it lead to value-congruent behavior. And that moral courage is associated with motivation for restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group more so than moral shame.

**Individual Self-Stereotyping, Image Shame, and Moral Shame**

When testing for ISS as a moderator for the link between felt image shame and individual contrition, our regression analysis showed that image shame positively predicted individual contrition. Since most studies on group-based shame has found image shame to be a negative predictor of support for apology and a positive predictor of issue avoidance (see Allpress et al., 2014), this deserves a comment. Image shame is thought to be elicited by a concern for reputation, if one believes that showing contrition to the victims is the best way to restore the image of the in-group, that could explain our results from the regression analysis. Here, since the focus is on the reputation of the in-group, disingenuous apologies could arise as a strategy to improve in-group reputation (assuming that one gets away with it).

Those who are motivated to show individual contrition are the ones who feel the most shame (image and moral), regardless to which degree participants viewed themselves as stereotypical Norwegian. ISS did nothing to affect this relationship in our study. Gausel et al. (2012) did investigate if ISS had any effect on felt shame after accounting for the effect of the appraisal of the in-group as suffering a moral defect and found no effect. They concluded that "it is simply those who most appraise the in-group as suffering a moral defect who feel the most shame about the in-group's moral failure" (Gausel et al., 2012, p. 951-952). Although are study did not investigate appraisals of the in-group as suffering a moral defect, our results suggests that ISS has nothing to do with felt shame (image and moral) and its relationship with motivation for individual contrition towards the out-group.

Gausel and Brown (2012) investigated if older people who were at least 7 years of age in 1977, the year it became illegal to sterilize the Romani people, felt more shame and guilt than those who were under 7 years of age in 1977 (including those not born yet). They found a significant different between the two groups, where older people did feel more shame and guilt, and motivation for in-group change. These findings are not consistent with the result of the present study. However, our sample of participants old enough to remember the moral failure of Norway only consisted of 35 respondents (using the same cutoff point as Gausel and Brown, 2012). In this project, we did discuss and plan a second wave of data collection, using a more current case of Norwegian's discrimination against the Sami people, which still happens today (e.g., Hansen & Eira, 2021). We developed an article similar to the one provided to us by Gausel et al. (2012), just with the Sami people as the case subject. However, due to time constraints we did not collect another set of data.

One difference between this study and Gausel and Brown's (2012) that investigated the effect of age on felt shame is that Gausel and Brown collected data publicly asking participants if they could fill in a pen and paper study, while this study was a self-report administered online. Social desirability could have played a role here, although more research is needed. It is more likely that our sample did not have enough old participants to find an effect.

**Social Desirability**

The fact that controlling for social desirability in the structural equation models always provided poorer fit statistics than when this control variable was omitted suggests that it was not a good control variable and that it might create problems with measurement invariance. Becker (2005) called control variables that have little or no relationship with the dependent variable (e.g., $r \leq .10$) for impotent control variables. These control variables will not influence the results

substantially and omitting them can lead to an increase in statistical power and simplify analysis, reporting, and interpretation. This is echoed by Becker et al., (2015) and gives additional reasoning for why inclusions of impotent control variables are not recommended:

> Correlations between the CVs [control variable] and IVs [independent variables] can affect the results even when the correlation between the CV and DV [dependent variable] is zero. However, inclusion of a CV that is unrelated to the DV would not usually satisfy the purpose of statistical control. For example, consider a researcher who hypothesizes that more conscientious employees are tardy to work less often than less conscientious employees. The researcher decides to control for distance from home to work to rule out the alternative explanation that tardiness is simply a function of distance: Employees who live further away from work tend to be tardy more often. If the CV (distance from work) is uncorrelated with the DV (tardiness), then distance cannot be an alternative to conscientiousness as an explanation of tardiness. Similarly, if the correlation between distance and tardiness is approximately zero, it is unclear that including distance in the analysis produces a “more conservative” test of the hypothesized relation between conscientiousness and tardiness. (p. 160).

In our sample, social desirability only correlated significantly with avoidance and moral conviction. Suggesting that in our data, social desirability turned out to be an impotent control variable when measured with the Norwegian short-form Marlow-Crowne social desirability scale. This does not mean that social desirability doesn’t play a role in this study, and other studies of in-group moral failure. Other scales could be used to try and capture social desirability. Researchers could also apply data collection strategies such as bogus pipeline, a

procedure that is designed to trick participants into thinking that the researcher knows when they are lying or telling the truth, in order to reduce social desirability (Krumpal, 2013).

**Limitations and Future Research**

One limitation worth noting is the scale we used to measure restitution despite a perceived resistance from the in-group. This scale was developed by van Zomeren et al. (2011) to reflect collective action tendencies. We modified the questions from "I would be willing to sign a petition against this issue", to "Even if the majority of Norwegians are against it, I would be willing to… sign a petition against discrimination of the Romani people". It is not clear if this scale properly reflects a perceived resistance from the in-group from the participants' point of view. Future research could consider adopting the experimental paradigm on conformity famously done by Asch (1955) in order to reflect actual group resistance. Another solution could be to present participants with a "news article" ostensibly from a well-reputed newspaper, that in addition to having information on the moral failure of the in-group also states the majority's stand on the issue being studied. One could also add a short scale measuring felt resistance.

Investigating the role of risk more thoroughly should also be a priority for researchers who study moral courage (and courage in general). Although this study aimed to research moral courage at the intersection of accolade and process, where the actor is pursuing a morally good goal and that the actor finds meaningful in the face of risk, it is not clear whether these conditions were met. The present study has assumed that conceptually, concern for the in-group's image (image shame) and risk of being ostracized, are real threats and that courage, at least to some extent, is needed to overcome these risks. Our study did not explicitly ask participants how much these threats played in their motivation for behavior—something future research on moral courage at the intersection of accolade and process could benefit from.

One interesting avenue for future research is to investigate if historical time and age of participants have an effect on felt group-based shame. For instance, one could compare participants felt group-based shame on different moral failures in time. In Norway for example, one could compare the case of Viking raids on what is now known as the United Kingdom (beginning in 793 when the Vikings attacked Lindisfarne; Bandlien, 2009), the case of the Norwegian government's mistreatment of the Romani people in the 20th century, and the case of Norwegian's discrimination against the Sami people the past 10 years (although these actions are often individual acts of racism against the Sami people, not state sanctioned behavior like the case of the Romani people). Of course, the Viking raids would be a poor example to use in research as these people are more accurately described as Norsemen from Scandinavia, not Norwegians. Norsemen Vikings would probably not be perceived as an in-group in Norway's society today. However, it poses an interesting question, how far back in time does one have to go before group-based emotions fizzles out when individuals are faced with a moral transgression of the in-group?

Time since discovery of a moral transgression committed by the in-group could also be a relevant variable to investigate. Recently, in Canada, there have been discoveries of several mass graves at monastery boarding schools in the period from 1883 to their closing in 1996 (Austen, 2022). Information have surfaced that these governmental institutions systematically discriminated against the indigenous people of Canada. One would think that new information about moral transgression of the in-group would elicit a higher degree of group-based emotions than information about a moral transgression that are already common knowledge in society. New discoveries of moral transgressions made by the in-group could also affect group members thoughts and feelings about previous moral transgressions committed by the in-group that are

already well known. Here there are many paths future research on a group's moral transgression can take.

**Implications**

This study has shown that individuals who hold strong moral conviction against social inequality are more likely to feel moral shame, which motivates individuals to act pro-socially and are more likely to act with moral courage, despite in-group resistance and the risk of ostracism. Thus, interventions aimed at increasing strongly held moral convictions against social inequality could prove fruitful for society's endeavor for social change. But how would one go about doing this? Although more research is needed, Rokeach's (1973) work on values can point us in the right direction. In experiments designed to induce a state of self-dissatisfaction within the subject, and where the long term behavioral and cognitive effects of such an affective state were ascertained, they found evidence suggesting one can increase values such as equality and freedom long-term (for the full experimental procedure see Rokeach, 1973).

Whistleblowing has been described as an important example of moral courage (Dungan et al., 2019). Whistleblowers play an important role in exposing corruption and injustices. Although the present study did not directly investigate whistleblowing one could draw a few similarities as already discussed with the case of Enron in the introduction. Based on our results, organizations would be wise to focus on employees' moral convictions, as this drives individuals to act with moral courage and blow the whistle. People with strongly held moral convictions are also more likely to feel moral shame, which motivates us to right our wrongs. The trouble for organizations wanting to facilitate whistleblowing within their company is that these moral values have to be activated, for instance the value of equality, and this value should not compete with other values such as obedience. If the relevant values are not activated, violation of these

values might pass us by unnoticed. Here there are a few steps organizations can take: foster morality into the identity of the company, talk openly about morals, minimize risk for whistleblowers (making it more likely that people will act with moral courage), and inform employees about the role of group-based shame, why we feel it and how it motivates us to act, in order to strengthen awareness of violated moral convictions.

## Conclusion

We began with considering giants that should be buried or remembered, and the costs for those who insist on remembering — individuals like Fritz Bauer and their motives for acting against their own in-group. Our study points to moral convictions, moral courage, and the prosocial side of group-based shame as factors that might have played a role in Bauer's life after World War II. The costs for those who insists on remembering are certainly there, but perhaps there is an even bigger cost for people to throw their moral compass away in favor of a good reputation and an in-group who doesn't exclude you. When our values are activated and then violated by our group, it is perhaps a bigger cost to look away in image shame. Thus, this thesis ends with a hopeful conclusion for both science and society, that our moral convictions can lead to acts of moral courage and motivate prosocial behavior.

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# Appendix

Start of Block: Informed Consent

Q1 **Informert samtykke**

*Noen ganger skjer det ting med store konsekvenser for noen, og minimalt for andre. Hvordan oppleves det i vårt eget land?*

*Med utgangspunkt i romanifolket i Norge—en folkegruppe som noen vet mye om og mange vet lite om—vil vi gjerne lære hva du tenker og opplever. Du trenger ikke å kunne noe om romanifolket for å delta. Variasjonen i hva folk vet om dem er faktisk en fordel for denne undersøkelsen.*

***Hva er hensikten med undersøkelsen, og hva må jeg gjøre for å delta?***
*Du vil få lest en veldig kort artikkel om romanifolket i Norge og så bli stilt noen spørsmål deretter. Det er viktig at du svarer så godt og ærlig som mulig. På så måte kan vi lære mer om hvordan folk opplever og tenker rundt en situasjon i Norge som angår noen av oss mer direkte enn andre.*

*Alt i alt vil deltakelsen ta 10—15 minutter. Til gjengjeld vil alle som deltar bli med i trekning av tre gavekort på 1000 kroner fra GoGift.*

***Vi tar vare på deg og dine data***
*Hvis du er 18 år eller eldre, og identifiserer deg selv som norsk, er du kvalifisert til å delta. Deltakelsen er helt frivillig, og det er ingen risiko assosiert med å delta. Svarene dine er anonyme og konfidensielle. De blir håndtert kun av forskningsteamet og lagret på UiT Norges arktiske universitet etter strenge etiske retningslinjer anbefalt av Datatilsynet i Norge. Du kan når som helst velge å avslutte deltakelsen din uten å måtte oppgi noen form for begrunnelse.*

***Hva om jeg har noen spørsmål eller kommentarer?***
*Hvis du har noen spørsmål eller vil si oss noe kan du skrive det inn i kommentarfeltet på slutten av spørreskjemaet eller sende en e-post.*

*Beste hilsen*
*Torstein de Besche, MA student, tbe113@post.uit.no*
*Tove I. Dahl, Professor, tove.dahl@uit.no*
*Institutt for psykologi ved UiT Norges arktiske universitet.*

*Trykker du på pilen under og går videre, samtykker du til å bli med i undersøkelsen.*

End of Block: Informed Consent

Start of Block: Demographics -- Romani

Q2 Hvor gammel er du?

________________________________________________________________

Q3 Vennligst indiker hvilket kjønn du identifiserer deg med

○ Mann (1)

○ Kvinne (2)

○ Annet (spesifisér om du vil) (3) ________________________________________________

Q4 Identifiserer du deg som norsk?

○ Ja (1)

○ Nei (2)

**End of Block: Demographics -- Romani**

**Start of Block: Individual Self-Stereotyping**

Q5 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken dårlig eller godt (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jeg har mye til felles med en gjennomsnittlig norsk person (1) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg ligner på en gjennomsnittlig norsk person (2) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg ser på meg selv som typisk norsk (3) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**End of Block: Individual Self-Stereotyping**

**Start of Block: Romani/tater info**

Q6 På neste side vil du bli presentert en kort artikkel (publisert i 2012) med informasjon om Norges behandling av romanifolket, også kjent som tatere. Du vil bli bedt om å kort oppsummere hovedpoengene i artikkelen etter du har lest den.

**End of Block: Romani/tater info**

**Start of Block: Romani article**

Q7

# Nordmenns behandling av tatere

*"De sa jeg skulle opereres for brokk, men de steriliserte meg. Jeg har aldri fått noen barn"*

**Norske metoder for "normalisering" av tatere**

Det norske samfunn kontrollerte og forhindret tatere fra å kunne få barn ved å tvangssterilisere dem i perioden 1932 til 1977 (over 500 dokumenterte tilfeller). De gjorde det også ulovlig for tatere å eie dyr og de tvang taterne til å bo i arbeidsleirer hvor de mottok "arbeidsopplæring". Rundt 1500 taterbarn ble tatt fra foreldrene ved tvang. De ble plassert i barnehjem og andre "hjem" langt utenfor rekkevidde fra foreldrene. I tillegg har det kommet frem at flere av bevisene på overgrep er blitt systematisk ødelagt (Stortingsmelding nr 152).

De tragiske konsekvensene for mange medlemmer av taterne kan ses i svak sosio-økonomisk status, mistilpassethet, ensomhet og følelsesmessige problemer.

**Minoriteter med lignende historie**

Også andre norske minoriteter ble utsatt for lignende handlinger. Eksempler er "kvener" og "samer".

End of Block: Romani article

Start of Block: Summary

Q8 Vennligst oppsummer **kort** hovedpoengene fra det du leste i artikkelen

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

End of Block: Summary

Start of Block: Previous knowledge

Q9 Tidligere kunnskap om romanifolket

| | 1, Ingenting av det som stod i artikkelen (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4, Omtrent halvparten av det som stod i artikkelen (4) | 5 (5) | 6 (6) | 7, Alt eller mer enn det som stod i artikkelen (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hvor mye visste du om mishandlingen av romanifolket før du leste artikkelen på forrige side? (1) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

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Q10 Kjenner du noen med romani bakgrunn?

▢ Ja (1)

▢ Nei (2)

▢ Jeg har selv romani bakgrunn (3)

End of Block: Previous knowledge

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Start of Block: Moral Shame

Q11 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken godt eller dårlig (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vår behandling av romanifolket gjør at jeg føler meg skamfull overfor hva det *betyr* å være norsk (1) | o | o | o | o | o | o | o |
| Jeg føler meg *ikke* skamfull av å være norsk over måten vi behandlet romanifolket (2) | o | o | o | o | o | o | o |
| Jeg føler meg skamfull for de aggressive tendensene til det norske folk (3) | o | o | o | o | o | o | o |

End of Block: Moral Shame

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Start of Block: Image Shame

Q12 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken godt eller dårlig (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jeg føler skam på grunn av at atferden til det norske folk mot romanifolket har laget et *dårlig bilde* av Norge i øynene til resten av verden (1) | o | o | o | o | o | o | o |
| Å tenke på hvordan Norge blir *sett* på for behandlingen av romanifolket gjør at jeg føler meg skamfull (2) | o | o | o | o | o | o | o |
| Jeg føler meg ydmyket når jeg tenker på hvordan Norge blir *sett* på negativt av resten av verden for behandlingen av romanifolket (3) | o | o | o | o | o | o | o |

**End of Block: Image Shame**

**Start of Block: Social Desirability**

Q13 Vurder om utsagnet passer til deg eller ikke

| | Sant (1) | Usant (2) |
|---|---|---|
| Jeg er en god lytter uansett hvem jeg snakker med (1) | ○ | ○ |
| Det har hendt at jeg har utnyttet folk (2) | ○ | ○ |
| Noen ganger vil jeg heller ta igjen enn å tilgi og glemme (3) | ○ | ○ |
| Når det er noe jeg ikke vet, koster det meg ikke noe å innrømme det (4) | ○ | ○ |
| Det har vært stunder da jeg har hatt lyst til å smadre ting (5) | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg har aldri noe imot å bli spurt om å gjengjelde en tjeneste (6) | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg har nesten aldri hatt lyst til å skjelle noen ut (7) | ○ | ○ |
| Av og til blir jeg irritert på folk som ber meg om tjenester (8) | ○ | ○ |
| Av og til når folk mislykkes synes jeg de får som fortjent (9) | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg har aldri sagt noe med den hensikt å såre (10) | ○ | ○ |

**End of Block: Social Desirability**

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**Start of Block: Avoidance**

Q14 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken dårlig eller godt (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hvis jeg kunne ville jeg unngått møter med romanifolket (1) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg vil helst ikke bli involvert i diskusjoner om romanifolket (2) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Hvis jeg skulle konfrontere en romani person, ville jeg kontrollert tankene mine og tenkt på noe annet enn mishandlingen (3) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg vil helst glemme romani situasjonen og alt som har skjedd med dem (4) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**End of Block: Avoidance**

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**Start of Block: Cover up**

Q15 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken dårlig eller godt (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jeg synes vi nordmenn burde gjøre det mindre tydelig hva som skjedde med romanifolket (1) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg synes vi nordmenn må være forsiktig med den nasjonale informasjonen vi deler med andre nasjoner (2) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Vi nordmenn burde gjøre historien om romanifolket mindre fremtredende i den offentlige bevisstheten (3) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

End of Block: Cover up

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Start of Block: Individual restitution

Q16 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken dårlig eller godt (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hvis jeg kunne ville jeg fortalt romanifolket hvordan jeg føler meg (1) | o | o | o | o | o | o | o |
| Det er viktig at romanifolket vet at jeg føler meg dårlig om dette (2) | o | o | o | o | o | o | o |
| Jeg ville likt å dele mine bekymringer om dette til romanifolket (3) | o | o | o | o | o | o | o |

**End of Block: Individual restitution**

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**Start of Block: In-group restitution**

Q17 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken godt eller dårlig (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jeg føler nordmenn ikke burde kompensere romanifolket finansielt for det som skjedde (1) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg føler nordmenn burde hjelpe romanifolket, så mye de kan, for å re-etablere deres kultur (2) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg føler nordmenn burde kompensere romanifolket emosjonelt (for eksempel tilby gratis terapi) (3) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

End of Block: In-group restitution

Start of Block: Restitution despite resistance

Q18 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken godt eller dårlig (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Selv om majoriteten av nordmenn er imot det vil jeg... delta i en demonstrasjon mot diskrimineringen av romanifolket (1) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Selv om majoriteten av nordmenn er imot det vil jeg... delta i å heve vår kollektive stemme om hva som skjedde med romanifolket (2) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Selv om majoriteten av nordmenn er imot det vil jeg... signere en begjæring mot diskriminering av romanifolket (3) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Selv om majoriteten av nordmenn er imot det vil jeg... delta i en eller annen form for kollektiv handling mot diskriminering av romanifolket (4) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**End of Block: Restitution despite resistance**

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**Start of Block: Moral Courage**

Q19 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken godt eller dårlig (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jeg er villig til å stå opp for en rettferdig og rettmessig sak, selv om saken er upopulær og betyr kritisering av andre viktige personer (1) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg vil forsvare en som blir hånet eller snakket stygt om, selv om jeg ikke kjenner den som blir hånet (2) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Jeg er bare trygg på tanken om å bli med å kjempe for en rettferdig eller rettmessig sak hvis den er populær med mine venner og støttet av andre viktige personer (3) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

Jeg ville foretrukket å bli i bakgrunnen selv om en venn blir hånet eller snakket urettferdig om (4)

End of Block: Moral Courage

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Start of Block: Moral Convictions

Q20 Vurder hvor godt utsagnet passer til deg

| | Passer ikke i det hele tatt (1) | Passer dårlig (2) | Passer litt dårlig (3) | Passer hverken godt eller dårlig (4) | Passer litt godt (5) | Passer godt (6) | Passer svært godt (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Min mening om diskrimineringen av romanifolket er en viktig del av mine *moralske normer og verdier* (1) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Min mening om diskrimineringen av romanifolket er en universal moralsk verdi som burde gjelde for *hele verden* (2) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Min mening om diskrimineringen av romanifolket er en universal moralsk verdi som burde gjelde til *enhver tid* (3) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**End of Block: Moral Convictions**

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**Start of Block: Comments and giftcard**

Q21 Takk for deltakelsen! Hvis du vil være med i trekningen av gavekort, send en mail til tbe113@post.uit.no med denne automatiske genererte koden: **6538**

Q22 Hvis du har noen kommentarer kan du skrive dem her. Om du har noen spørsmål du ønsker svar på angående undersøkelsen kan du sende en mail til tbe113@post.uit.no

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End of Block: Comments and giftcard