

**Transition from Authoritarian Rule and Democratic
Consolidation: The Electoral Nexus**

An ecological study of the Spanish general elections 1977-2000

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Research questions

The overarching research question posed in this dissertation is related to our understanding of the role played by elections during processes of transition from authoritarianism and the subsequent consolidation of democratic rule. In this, the lessons to be drawn from the Spanish experience after the demise of the Franco dictatorship in 1975 will be assessed. Various researchers have pointed to the fact that the political elites that forged the transition from authoritarianism, in addition to the immediate task of restoring democracy as such, more or less deliberately sought to institutionalise a set of societal divisions into manifest political cleavages through free and competitive elections in a particular *sequential* fashion (Linz and Stepan 1995; Puhle 2005).

However, although the notion of an electoral sequence is generally well argued at the level of political elites and political parties, it is far less established in terms of the behaviour of the individual voters. The overarching assumptions guiding the investigation in this dissertation is that there must somehow have been a nexus between the elite efforts to guide the process of turning pressing societal divisions into manifest cleavages and the structuring of electoral behaviour along these very same cleavages.

In this, particular emphasis will be put on the territorial dimension of Spanish politics. It is a long-established fact the Spain has had to struggle with recurring tensions between the political Centre on the one hand and the economically advanced Basque and Catalan Peripheries on the other. In the wake of the transition, this was a pressing problem concerning the legitimacy of the very state. In fact, given the hard suppression suffered under the Franco regime, it was an open question whether the integrity of the Spanish state could be maintained when the voters after forty years of compulsory silence were given a say in politics. Another pressing issue was that of

social reform and economic redistribution, for long left more or less left unattended by the Right-wing dictatorship. And, lastly, the impetus for neo-liberal reforms that took hold internationally in the 1980s had to be dealt with also in Spain.

Thus, taking as point of departure the notion of an elite guided sequential transformation of societal divisions related to the issues of the *political regime*, the *territorial* structure of the state, the issue of *economic redistribution*, and, lastly, the impetus for *neo-liberal reforms*, all observed at the elite level, we shall probe into the question of how and to what extent this alleged sequence was reflected in terms of the structuring of voter behaviour between 1977 and 2000. Thus, the overarching research question in this dissertation can be stated as follows:

How and to what extent may electoral participation and party choice in Spain between 1977 and 2000 be understood in relation to how the parties and voters handled the problems posed by the transition from authoritarianism and democratic consolidation, with particular reference to the sequence of translation of the societal divisions into manifest cleavages?

The aim of this study is precisely to refine our understanding as to how the successful Spanish transition and democratic consolidation was achieved in relation to the structuring of the political behaviour of the masses. In this, the analysis of the dynamics of electoral behaviour at pairs of consecutive general elections to the lower chamber of the Spanish parliament will be used to assess the various aspects of this question.

The structure of the dissertation

In chapter 2, the theoretical foundations for what I have coined the *electoral nexus* in transitions from authoritarian rule and democratic consolidation are discussed. Derived from general theory on democratisation, party building, elections and cleavage formation, a set of overarching assumptions related to the loci of change and stability in newly enfranchised polities are presented. These assumptions serve as the basis for the elaboration of a conceptual framework for the study of the behaviour of the voters in terms of electoral *mobilisation*, *stabilisation* and *competition*. Then the

Spanish case of a transition from a long-lasting authoritarian regime in a polity ridden by a profound territorial problem is presented. The alleged *timing* and the *sequence* of the attempts to transform a legacy of societal divisions into manifest cleavages are discussed. In this, the territorial dimension of state- and nation building related to the Spanish case is catered to.

In chapter 3, “Data and Methodology”, the data and the methodology employed are presented and discussed. First, the datasets elaborated are discussed and evaluated. Second, the methods for estimating changes between elections in the proportions of voters tied to aggregate units are catered to. Third, the LOGIT method for cross-level inference is explained and discussed. Fourth, the conceptualisation of ‘Centre’ and ‘Peripheries’ in relation to the Spanish case is addressed and a so-called *radial* typology for the study of electoral behaviour along the territorial dimension is elaborated.

In chapter 4, a general overview over process of party formation, the official results of the Parliamentary elections and the resulting party systems during the 1977-2000 period is presented. Also the position of the relevant parties on the main cleavages of the political system is presented. In the light of the overarching theory discussed chapter 2, a set of more specific hypotheses are elaborated that, in turn, serve as the foundation for the empirical analyses that follow in chapters 5-9.

Chapters 5-9, that are dedicated to the empirical analyses proper, the patterns of electoral *mobilisation*, *stabilisation* and *competition* will be assessed and the set of hypotheses tested.

First, in chapter 5, we look into the macro level variation between pairs of elections in terms of aggregated correlations between proportions of the electorate at pairs of consecutive elections. This analysis is based on the more than 8.000 municipalities scattered across the Spanish territory. The first objective is to find out to what extent the electoral changes observed in the official results for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 4 are reflected across the Spanish territory. The second objective is to find out whether any changes in the electoral profiles of the municipalities *not* observed in the results for Spain as a whole are detected with particular reference to the sequence of

the electoral handling of the political issues. This chapter also gives initial indications as to the validity of the hypotheses elaborated in chapter 4.

Second, in chapter 6, we embark upon the analysis of the behaviour of individual voters for the seven pairs of elections between 1977 and 2000 for Spain as a whole. In this, the proportions of the electorate at the pairs of elections that mobilised, remained loyal, transferred their vote to another party or simply demobilised at the second elections are assessed. The specific role played by electoral abstention in Spain is addressed. The main focus, however, is on identifying trends and changes in the electoral profiles of the various components of the party system(s) in relation to their positions on the main political cleavages.

Third, in chapter 7, we undertake an analysis as to how electoral mobilisation and demobilisation have been structured along the main cleavages, with particular emphasis on the territorial dimension of Spanish politics. The aim is to find out how the main political cleavages are intersected with reference to political participation.

Fourth, in chapter 8, we analyse the dynamics of electoral stabilisation in relation to the territorial dimension with particular reference to the notion of *nationalisation* of party voting in terms of differentiation between the Centre and the Peripheries. Also in this chapter the main objective is to find out how the main cleavages are intersected with reference to the state-wide parties.

Fifth, in chapter 9, we embark upon the analysis of how and to what extent the electoral competition between the parties has been structured along the territorial dimension. Also here the main objective is to refine our understanding of how the main cleavages are intersected with reference to the state-wide parties.

In chapter 10 the findings are summarised and the overarching conclusions as to the research questions drawn.

CHAPTER 2

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and Democratic Consolidation: The Electoral Nexus

Third wave democracies

The breakdown of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe paved the way for the so-called Third Wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991; Diamond and Gunther 2001; Puhle 2005). This process has spawned a considerable amount of comparative research and theorising on both the nature of *transitions* from authoritarian rule and the processes of democratic *consolidation* and persistence. Research on regime transitions has gained new insights on the relationship between structure and action, both in terms of the role played by key actors and the structure of the previous regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Berglund and Dellenbrant 1994; Gunther et.al. 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; Berglund and Aarebrot 2001; Diamandouros and Gunther 2001). Not surprisingly, the literature produced by this research emphasises the pivotal role played by elections in the process of democratisation. After all, free and competitive elections are at the heart of liberal democracy. However, the main point underscored by this research is that elections not only serve as a crucial test on the institutionalisation of one of the core procedures of democracy, they also *structure* the political mobilisation of the citizens, produce political organisations in terms of *parties*, and bestow *legitimacy* on the resulting rulers. Hence particular emphasis is put on the role of so-called *founding elections* in transitions from authoritarianism (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986).

Likewise, research on the *consolidation* of democracy tends to underscore the role of parties and party systems. Linking the characteristics of party systems to democratic legitimacy has a considerable tradition in the political science literature (Tóka 1996). Political parties are also at the heart of the modern notion of liberal democracy and have been seen to serve a series of important functions in democratic societies (Diamond and Gunther 2001). From a behavioural point of view, they are

intermediary institutions that are at the same time vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-making institutions (Strøm 1990). From a societal perspective, parties may be regarded as transmission belts for social demands, and as delegates or representatives of civil society (Morlino 1995: 315). And, even though some of the multiple functions once seen to be served by traditional mass parties may have been taken over by other social institutions in modern societies, parties are still regarded as the only feasible providers of political recruits and governments in consolidated liberal democracies (Diamond and Gunther 2001).

Thus, elections, parties, and party systems play crucial roles in the stabilisation and consolidation of liberal democracies (Pridham and Lewis 1996; Puhle 2005). The specific roles of elections and parties, however, might seem somewhat contradictory and perhaps paradoxical. On the one hand, regime consolidation requires a certain degree of stability, and yet, on the other hand, no competitive democracy can exist without the explicit possibility for change. This puzzle is solved by that in consolidated democracies stability and change take place at different loci in the political system. Democratisation, then, is a complex process that operates at many levels simultaneously. There is, for example, a crucial distinction in terms of the general stability of the system on the one hand, and the changes in the composition of the legislature and the executive as a result of changing electoral fortunes on the other. When democracy is consolidated as “the only game in town”, a certain degree of systemic stability has been achieved and fluctuations in electoral volatility and party stability have lesser implications for the fate of the democratic system in terms of persistence than in regimes that have not achieved this stability (Diamond 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996).

There is a particular aspect of democratic consolidation that deserves particular attention by electoral researchers: One thing is to state that a certain combination of stability and change at different levels seems indispensable to the very concept of liberal democracy, quite another is to assess the nature of the relationship between the two. In theory, system stability could coexist with recurrent radical and sweeping changes in party system formats from one election to another, but this is hardly conceivable in empirical terms. Such a situation would not only be extremely costly in terms of time and resources wasted on behalf of the citizenry and of the elected

representatives, but it would surely undermine any long-term investments in politics. The very meaning of long-term commitments would be at stake. Thus, some sort of anchoring of electoral behaviour and structuring of mass politics in relation to social context seems paramount to the consolidation of representative democracy.

Consolidation of democracy, then, entails a multifaceted and multileveled process that relates to the *stabilisation* of electoral behaviour and patterns of partisan competition that, from a researcher's point of view, typically involves key indicators of relevant electoral behaviour such as the degree of volatility and the occurrence of critical elections, i.e. elections that lead to a fundamental restructuring of the party system and voter alignments. As the process of democratic consolidation proceeds, volatility will tend to decrease and substantial realignments will be fewer and farther between. In short, party-voter relationships will have stabilised and the range of effective electoral competition will have narrowed down and become restricted to only some parts of the electorate (Morlino 1995). This process may entail the establishment of either some sort of 'Downsian' equilibrium or a "freezing" of electoral competition (Downs 1957; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

In terms of political theory, the salience of this process of stabilisation is rooted in the notion of vertical *accountability*, i.e. that a certain level of anchoring of the vote is seen as paramount to the reduction of the possibility for political manipulation of the electorate. Research on Europe and Latin America, for example, points to the fact that the lack of a substantial anchoring of the vote is an important dimension of the weak institutionalisation of party systems in much of Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Torcal 2004, 2006). The implicit conclusion that can be derived from this line of research is that some sort of stability in terms of institutionalisation of party systems and an anchoring of voter alignments appears to be an important aspect of a country's ability to handle socio-economic and ideological transformations within a democratic context.

There are basically two explanations put forward to explain the individual voter's anchoring to the political parties and/or the party system: Identification with political parties proper and identification based on ideological orientations. In Europe, these identifications are generally explained in terms of the theory of social cleavages

and/or the theory of the Left-Right continuum as a heuristic cognitive device. According to the theory of social cleavages, citizens cast their votes in predictable ways because their position in the social structure vis-à-vis the position of others leads them to identify certain parties as the best advocates of their interests. More precisely, the individual's location in the social structure in terms of class, religion, region, and urban-rural residence provides the underpinnings for political translations of one or more 'us' versus 'them' identities into a system of parties (Sartori 1990; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In relation to the consolidation of democratic regimes, the institutionalisation of societal divisions into a set of manifest cleavages generates system level stability that in turn fosters long-term commitment and trust between the rulers and the ruled. The theory of ideological space, commonly embodied in the Left-Right continuum, offers a somewhat different approach to explaining electoral stability. In its original form it is derived from the theory of Downs in which the logic of inter-party competition is linked to the ideological positioning of the voters in a way that makes both the behaviour of the parties and of the voters predictable on rationalistic grounds (Downs 1957). This predictability enhances the possibility for the narrowing down of the electoral market and thus establishing long-term bonds of accountability between the party system and the citizenry. Conversely, in a society where only a fraction of the voters are able to locate themselves and the parties on the pertinent ideological dimensions, the electoral cycles tend to be less predictable and, in some cases, pave the way for short-term personalistic voting, populism and electoral manipulation (Mainwaring and Torcal 2004, 2006).

The theory of ideological positions has also been seen to work in combination with the theory of social cleavages. As the cleavages are limited in numbers they may themselves work as heuristic cost containing tools for the individual voter. In fact, to some scholars the Left-Right continuum itself is an expression of a combination of political values and social cleavages (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Inglehart 1977; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Klingemann 1979; Knutsen 1997; Van Deth and Geurts 1989, Anduiza and Bosch 2004: 181-190).

In short, the hypothesis is that party systems are more likely to become stable when individuals develop attachments to parties based on their location in the social

structure or their position in the cognitive ideological space (Mainwaring and Torcal 2004). This stabilisation, in turn, will make politics more accountable and enhance the building of trust in society. The ability to place both oneself as a voter and the political parties according to their positions in the cleavage structure and/or the ideological space is thus seen as fundamental to the functioning of modern democratic systems. In sum, some sort of stable and mutual understanding of one's respective social and ideological orientations between parties and voters is seen as fundamental in order to enhance vertical accountability and to enable the political parties to perform the function of creation and preservation of trust in representative democracy, as stated, for example, by Pizzorno (1990).

This general assessment, however, does not take in to account the variations in terms of context under which transitions and democratic consolidation take place, i.e. it does not say anything about which *cleavages* this process of stabilisation entails nor anything about the *sequence* of translating societal divisions into manifest parts of the political system. Nor does it say anything specific about the *content* or, indeed, the *extension* of the ideological space with reference to variations in socio-political context. In principle, there is no limit to the array of issues that could serve as underpinnings for the institutionalisation of antagonisms in a democratic system, even if there seem to be certain limits to the distribution of votes along the resulting ideological dimensions in terms of polarisation (Sartori 1976). However, as the new democracies did not emerge in a vacuum, comparative research on Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe has revealed that democratisation under the Third Wave has posed a series of more or less interrelated challenges that these countries have had to face. Apart from the establishment of democratic procedures proper, they have often entailed a transition to market economy that may or may not have occurred simultaneously with the political transition (Puhle 2005). They may also have entailed a profound problem concerning the legitimacy of the very state. Many countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, have had to deal with serious state-ness problems that have led to the creation of a series of new independent states. In some cases all of the changes have occurred simultaneously: transition to democratic rule, transition to market economy, and transition to a new state structure (the break up of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia are all cases in point). And even countries that had completed the transition to market economy long before they embarked on

the transition to political democracy, i.e., the Latin American and South European cases, have eventually had to relate to the general impetus of the neo-liberalist imperative: the ideological drive for the shrinking of the modern state apparatus. In fact, variations in terms of the specific salience and the handling of these challenges in each and one of the cases has tended to become the very basis for comparisons between the Third Wave democracies. Initial findings and conclusions have been revised and refined as the scope of cases has expanded. On the one hand, the inclusion of the former communist bloc has led to a renewed focus on the nature of the non-democratic regimes from which the new democracies emerged (Linz and Stepan 1996). On the other hand, research on the less institutionalised democracies has posed challenges to the conventional wisdoms derived from research on the well-established liberal democracies (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006).

This implies that Third Wave democratic transitions have been marked by some obviously common denominators imposed by the *Zeitgeist* on the one hand, and yet taken place in different country specific contexts both in terms of the structure of the authoritarian regime and the structure of the very state. Together, the common tendencies and the country specific variations have had their bearings on the processes of democratic consolidation and persistence in each and one of the cases.

To the extent that the assessments stated above are valid, the main electoral issues in processes of transition and consolidation will have tended to vary across countries in terms of the specific matrix of challenges that each country has had to face, as well as vary over time in terms of the sequence of the electoral handling of these challenges. Thus, variations in party system formats will to a substantial degree reflect the attempts to cope with legacies of historical, political and social divisions by means of free and competitive elections. Indeed, the institutionalisation of political antagonisms into a system of mutual understanding and trust in the rules of the game by way of such elections is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of democratic consolidation (Diamond 1997). In this process, the parties command certain leverage and can to some extent structure, and even restructure, the social and attitudinal underpinnings of the party system (Enyedi 2005).

This, then, is precisely what the electoral *nexus* implies: In the process of democratic transition and consolidation, the relationship between the handling of social and

historical problems faced by the new regimes and the electoral behaviour of the enfranchised citizenry will, at least to a certain extent, be reflected in the logic of mobilisation, stabilisation and party competition according to the *timing* of the translation of each and one of the pertaining societal divisions into manifest cleavages. Moreover, the nature of this relationship will not only tend to vary across time, but may also exhibit substantial regional variations according to the relative salience of specific societal divisions in different electoral locations. This assessment, in turn, may serve as the underpinning for the elaboration of hypotheses for empirical research on the electoral dynamics of democratic transition and consolidation in any given *Third Wave* country. A simple, and perhaps trivial, point of departure would be to hypothesise that the more complex the matrix of challenges put before the electorate, the more complex the electoral competition and the more complex the resulting party system. This, however, says nothing about the dimensions of electoral competition in terms of *direction* and *intensity*. Nor does it say anything specific about *when* and *where* the narrowing down or restriction of electoral competition will take place in a given process of democratisation. In fact, academics have tended to refrain from specific *a priori* theorising on the relationship between historical and social divisions on the one hand and the logic of electoral competition and party systems on the other, at least in terms of making predictions. And for those few who have had the nerve to embark upon such an endeavour, it has proven to be a risky business indeed. Juan Linz' bold prediction regarding the future establishment of a Christian Democratic party in Spain based on an extrapolation from the Italian experience is a case in point (Linz 1967). The *post hoc* explanation for the failure of Linz' prediction is that the religious question was more or less deliberately kept out of the matrix of issues presented to the electorate at the formative *founding* elections. In other words, one of the most important cleavages of Spain's past experience with mass democracy was simply kept out of electoral politics at the most crucial stages of the process of democratisation. Thus, the religious issue has been coined the *elusive* cleavage in Spanish politics (Montero and Calvo 2000). This, however, does not imply that the religious division could be laid dead for long. After the founding elections the impact of religiosity has steadily increased its presence in terms of party choice even without the establishment of a party of an explicit religious denomination (Calvo and Montero 2002). This is only one intriguing example of how Third Wave

transitions may yield insights on the dynamics of the manifestation of cleavages in newly enfranchised political systems.

Spain: The emblematic case

Of all the cases of the co-called Third Wave transitions, Spain arguably appears as the one that has attracted the most academic attention. This is reflected in the fact that the bibliography on the Spanish transition was for a long period the most extensive of all the cases (Linz and Stepan 1996: 87). Spain is a case of an emblematic non-violent transition that took place in an extremely complex socio-political context marked by a serious territorial problem, and yet the integrity of the Spanish state was maintained. In Spain, the elites that forged the transition towards liberal democracy had to deal with deeply rooted regional, cultural, economic and ideological antagonisms that was handled through skilful translations into the party system, or rather, as it turned out, party *systems*. Spain is also a case in which the main political party of the transition process suffered an unprecedented collapse and simply disappeared. In sum, Spain is a case of democratic consolidation in a context of diversity that has led to a process of electoral stabilisation marked by a high degree of variation both in temporal and territorial terms. In fact, this variation has not only had bearings on the process of democratic consolidation itself, but it has also had a marked impact on electoral research in Spain. For example, firm conclusions derived from earlier research on the relationship between social cleavages and voter behaviour at the different stages have been constantly scrutinised and challenged by newer research. One of the reasons for this is definitely to be found in the difficulties in coming to grips with the complexities of the Spanish socio-political history.

Spain in a macro-historical perspective

As mentioned above, Spain is a country of great regional diversity, both in terms of topography, economy and culture. Many Spaniards identify themselves more strongly with their own region than with the Spanish state. Indeed, conflicts over the very structure of the Spanish state have been a constant theme in Spanish politics since the

introduction of absolutism in Europe. In a classic study, Juan Linz portrayed Spain as a case of early state building and late peripheral nationalism against the state (Linz 1973a).

This means that, apart from the immediate task of remodelling political life according to democratic principles, the political class¹ that engaged itself in the transition towards democracy from the mid 1970s and onwards also had to confront a series of long-term problems rooted in a set of polarising antagonisms that had haunted Spain since the introduction of nationalism and industrial capitalism in Europe. The state-building elites that forged the dynastic unifications of the medieval kingdoms on the Iberian Peninsula had either lacked the ability, or the will, to introduce a uniform territorial or fiscal administration on the Spanish lands. Particular rights known as *fueros* were upheld by the inhabitants of some of the regions way into the 19th Century. The relationship between central and local authority has been a constant theme in Spanish politics and *regionalism*, in the sense that some regions claim autonomy *vis-à-vis* the central state apparatus, has manifested itself in a number of ways through the history of Spain (Heidar and Berntzen 1995: 269; Newton 1983: 98). *Nationalism*, inspired alternatively by the French Revolution² and German romanticism, was introduced on top of the regional question in the 19th Century. An uneven process of industrialisation (to a large part confined to the Basque and Catalan peripheries) added new socio-economic divisions to this pattern. In all of this, *uneven development* is perhaps the cue. Consequently, one of the most common interpretations of modern Spanish political history, repeatedly expressed both by scholars and Spanish politicians themselves, entails the notion of the *two Spains* (Juliá 2005). This understanding is part of a general modernisation perspective and implies that one of the consequences of introducing the industrial and the national revolutions onto the relatively backward and territorially fragmented Spanish society was to divide the Spanish population into two antagonistic political subcultures. These

¹An excellent definition of the *political class* is offered by Pérez-Díaz: "If the concept of the state refers to the whole collection of roles of authority and administrative functions within an association that enjoys a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, then the expression *political class* refers to the set of individuals who occupy these roles (the incumbents) plus the set of individuals that make it their business to oppose or ally themselves with these incumbents in the more or less remote expectation of being able to succeed them in their posts" (Pérez-Díaz 1993: 186-187).

²Constitutionalism was introduced by the Cádiz Constitution of 1812, and was immediately violently challenged by conservatives.

subcultures were commonly labelled *traditional* versus *modern* Spain.³ In coping with the challenges of modernisation, these subcultures would respond with *reactionary* and *radical* political strategies respectively. Hence, Spanish politics in the 19th Century was marked by two civil wars and a series of military coups. In terms of state structure, Spain swung between unitarianism and federalism, and even extreme confederalism in the form of cantonalism at one point (Newton 1983). After the abolition of the First Republic in 1875, some sort of political order was restored by the introduction of a two-party system deliberately modelled after the British system. In the long run, however, this imported system of alternating conservative and liberal governments could only be upheld by way of extensive electoral manipulation and fraud, and was eventually toppled by a military coup and subsequent dictatorship in 1923. In 1930-31 both the dictatorship and the Monarchy were abolished and a Second Republic proclaimed. The Second Republic was Spain's first real experience with mass politics, and the dynamics of maximised political positions that resulted in a new Civil War and the subsequent authoritarian dictatorship epitomised to an extreme extent the atmosphere of mutual distrust that could emerge between the political subcultures when society was mobilised in competitive elections.⁴

Consequently, during the Franco regime, intellectuals and politicians in exile commonly interpreted the defeat against the Francoist forces as the defeat of *modern* Spain by *reactionary* Spain, whereas regime supporters nurtured the idea that Franco had saved the genuine *traditional* Spain from the tyranny of radicals (Buck 1998).

Thus, on the one hand, a peaceful restoration and consolidation of democratic institutions would rest heavily on the Spaniards will and ability to overcome this polarising logic. On the other hand, the transition to market economy undertaken by the regime from 1958 and onwards spawned an unprecedented process of industrialisation and urbanisation that made Spain rapidly catch up with the Western world north of the Pyrenees. The economic changes wrought upon society had profound effects on its composition that, as it turned out, seemed to thaw up the pattern of entrenched ideological stances, at least on the part of the common citizen.

³See Newton 1983: 98; and Wiarda 1993: 35-37, for a more elaborate account on this.

⁴ This is a somewhat crude analysis. Some argue that the anarchists constituted a third political subculture in the 1930s. As it turned out, however, anarchism had become politically irrelevant by the 1970s.

New social groups emerged that posed a challenge to the existing political alliances.⁵ From a classical structural point of view, this gave hope that foundations for the polarised political positions of the Civil War could be replaced by a more civic political culture. In sum then, the political elites that were to engage themselves in the governance of Spain after Franco would have to address to sets of interrelated problems: a) the problems pertaining to the restoration of democracy, and b) find ways to institutionalise the profound territorial, socio-economic and ideological divisions that had caused so much turbulence in the past.

Democratic transition: The paradigmatic case

As it turned out, the Spanish case was to be the first in a series of non-violent transitions and soon regarded as *the* case in point of peaceful and successful transitions from authoritarian rule by way of elite negotiations. The Spanish way was pointed to as a model for others to follow. To this it should be added that Spain's was the first transition in which problems arising from multilingualism and multinationalism were preponderant. And, given Spain's problematic prior experience with mass democracy, the way in which the memory of the civil war was turned into something positive for the transition process in contrast, for example, to the impact of the memories of the Second World War in the former Yugoslavia, has further ensured Spain a special status within theories of regime transitions. From a comparative perspective, then, Spain is a case that is firmly classified within the Western and Mediterranean model on the one hand and yet, on the other hand, possesses an important property of the East European model in terms of the fundamental territorial problem. The Spanish solution to the territorial problem, the creation of the *Estado de autonomías*, enables us to study the electoral institutionalisation of profound societal divisions not only in relation to a set of functional cleavages, but also in relation a profound territorial division that challenged the legitimacy of the state itself. In fact, Spain is a case in which the installation of democratic rule and an urgent restructuring

⁵See Colomer 1986 for an excellent review on how this shaped the ideological trends in Catalonia.

of the state were intrinsically connected. The one was not conceivable without the other (Balcells 1992, 1996).

However, even though comparative research on Mediterranean Europe has shown that there is a fundamental link between a country's social structure and the structure of partisanship that underpins electoral competition, this relationship is neither direct nor deterministic – not even merely reflective (Gunther and Montero 2001). This underscores the relevance of *agency* in the process of translation of societal divisions into a system of manifest cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1990). Consequently, as discussed above, in the process of democratic transition and consolidation some latent cleavages may deliberately *not* be translated into the party system.

The actual electoral translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages in Spain followed a sequential pattern (Linz and Stepan 1996). First the regime question was handled in terms of state-wide elections for the first democratic legislature. The very task of this first legislature was to draw up a proposal for a new constitution that was subsequently enacted on the basis of a referendum. Then the territorial divisions were institutionalised in terms of devolution of powers to the regions and elections to the new regional parliaments. Then the issue of economic change and social welfare, more or less postponed during the first two legislatures (Puhle 2005), was institutionalised in terms of a landslide victory and subsequent predominance of the Socialist party. And, eventually, the question regarding neo-liberal economic reform was institutionalised in terms of a steady electoral growth and eventual executive take-over by the rejuvenated post-Francoist Right.⁶

This “founding elections from above” approach, in contrast to the electoral sequence of, say, the transition in the Soviet Union, is held to be conducive to maintaining the integrity of the Spanish state. And, even though the boundary between democratic transition and consolidation tends to be blurred (Schedler 2001), to many observers democracy was consolidated precisely when the regime question had been dealt with

⁶ This is not to imply that this was the result of a fully rational process, regime transitions seldom are, but it fits rather well with the notion of limited rationality in which actors tend to address problems in a sequential fashion (Cyert and March 1992).

and the territorial Centre-Periphery cleavage had been institutionalised. Consequently, after the failed military coup attempt in 1981, the electoral collapse of the state-bearing party of the transitional phase and the landslide victory for the opposition and subsequent peaceful takeover of government in 1982, liberal democracy faced no serious contenders (Linz, Stepan and Gunther 1995).

The careful timing of the institutionalisation of cleavages was made possible by a series of political pacts between the relevant parties. In particular, the quasi-consociational rules of the game established among the main actors of the transition were conducive to the successes of political interaction during the transitional years between 1977 and 1982. The most important aspect of this was that party leaders would abstain from maximising the interests of their respective electoral clienteles in search of an overarching consensus on vital national issues. This tended, however, to result in a *presidentialisation* of party leadership and a subsequent widespread distrust among party faction leaders towards the central leadership. Intra-party politics were sacrificed to the benefit of inter-party negotiations (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). Somewhat paradoxically, the devastating effect of inter-party consensus at the expense of intra-party institutionalisation was revealed in relation to the LOAPA⁷ process, in which the leaders of the Spanish state-wide parties came together in order to try to coordinate the handling of the translation of the Centre-Periphery cleavage into the democratic system. As the Socialist *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) abandoned the initial inter-party consensus established with the Centre-Right *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD), the UCD was left alone in defence of moderation in meeting the ever increasing demands for autonomy put forward even by regions with no prior history of such demands. Accordingly, the first autonomous elections backfired on the government and led to an irremediable abrasion of the image of the UCD on that issue. At the 1982 election it became clear that the party interests came to the fore at the expense of the inter-party consensus. This tactical shift on part of the PSOE had a strong damaging impact on the UCD and its leader Adolfo Suárez (Gunther and Hopkin 2002).

Without going further into the details at this stage, this account serves to underscore the point that the timing and sequence of translating the societal divisions into

⁷ LOAPA: Ley Orgánica de Armonización de Proceso Autonómica, i.e. The Law for the Harmonisation of the Process of Autonomy.

manifest political cleavages have had important implications not only for the anchoring of votes in the process of democratic consolidation, but also for the institutionalisation of parties as such.

In sum then, Spain is a case of a particular electoral sequence in a newly democratised country with a full-fledged market economy and at the same time a serious problem concerning the very legitimacy of the state. In this sense, Spain is fully comparable to Western Europe in terms of economic affiliation and to many East European countries in terms of a profound state-ness problem. In relation to general theory on macro-sociological modernisation, Spain offers particular set of scores on core variables derived from theories on democratisation and the structuring of mass politics that makes it particularly interesting from a comparative point of view: Early state-building and protracted problems of nation-building; a strong centre-periphery cleavage; a belated but rapid industrialisation confined to the certain peripheries; a dominant religious division and strong anticlericalism; short and violent experiences with mass politics; a cruel civil war and long-lasting authoritarian dictatorship; and a transition to democracy that has turned out to be a fundamental case for theory building within the field of regime transitions. In terms of more specific theory on elections, parties, and party systems, Spain offers a case of a plurality of party systems within one state not only in temporal terms, but also in territorial terms.

However, although the status as an emblematic case is well argued, an academic endeavour involving an extrapolation from the Spanish transition should be undertaken with great care (Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995: 77). Based on hindsight, *post hoc* modelling has tended to simplify the process (see Colomer 1996). There are still some areas of the relationship between the democratic transition and subsequent consolidation that are not fully accounted for. This also holds for some aspects of the general electoral dynamics in Spain. Consequently, the common understanding of the electoral behaviour right from the first general election in 1977 has been, and still is, subject to constant revisions and updates.

Electoral research on Spain: Party systems and voter alignments

Given the aforementioned sequence of electoral translations of societal divisions into manifest cleavages, it comes as no surprise that the majority of the studies of Spanish elections since the demise of the Franco dictatorship emphasise the *heterogeneity* of the party system. In fact, many of the prominent scholars writing on Spanish politics prefer the notion of party *systems* instead of the singular *system* (Vallés 1991, Linz and Montero 2001). The logic of electoral behaviour and party competition since the demise of the authoritarian regime has led to a differentiation along two dimensions. On the one hand, the impact of peripheral nationalism has given rise to significant variations in territorial terms. In a number of autonomous communities the state-wide ‘Spanish’ parties exist alongside local parties in distinctly regional party systems. On the other hand, a series of electoral changes or realignments since 1977 have resulted in a number of different party systems also in temporal terms (Heywood 1995, Linz and Montero 2001).

As to the structural anchoring of electoral preferences, the initial research on the topic showed that, apart from the centre-periphery cleavage, the traditional cleavages of industrialised societies were of secondary, if any, importance. Instead, the Left-Right schema tended to provide the theoretical underpinning for the study of electoral behaviour (Barnes, McDonough and Pina 1986; Caciagli 1986; Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988; Linz and Montero 1986; Gunther 1991; Justel 1992; Gunther and Montero 1994). Commonly, it has been understood that the self-placement of the Spanish electorate on the Left-Right schema reflects an ideological dimension based on two main issues: A socio-economic dimension pertaining to preferences along the traditional State versus market divide, and a moral and social dimension pertaining to a division between those who favour pluralism and tolerance on the one hand and those who support traditional values on the other (Colomer 1996: 172).

The weak or nearly non-existent correspondence between the social structure and the party system was reflected in the heterogeneous social composition of the voters supporting both the governing parties of the 1970s and the 1980s, the Centre-Right

UCD, and the Leftist PSOE (Caciagli 1986; Puhle 1986; Tezanos 1989). At the time, of course, this seemed completely in accordance with the findings produced by electoral research in the Western democracies in general from the 1970s and onwards. The weakening of the ties between social structure and party support had resulted in higher levels of partisan volatility at both the aggregate and individual levels (Crewe and Denver 1985). In fact, to some observers the major research question had even changed from explaining the persistence of contemporary party systems to explaining their instability (Dalton 1996: 151). In Spain, as the party system was born in the mid 1970s, the stability was never there in the first place. And, given the common knowledge derived from electoral research on modern *televised* politics in general, it was an open question to students of Spanish politics whether Spain would deviate from the general trend and become more stabilised in electoral terms.

However, as shown by Oñate and Ocaña (1999), a profound stabilisation of electoral behaviour had taken place in terms of the aggregate proportions of valid votes allotted to the various relevant parties between 1977 and 1996. This indicates that Spain had undergone a substantial decline in electoral volatility between elections and thus is a case that clearly contradicts the general tendency found in Western democracies in general. As mentioned above, Spain's mode of transition had heavy bearings on the institutionalisation of the parties. The elites that handled the *transition* simply had to focus on regime change more than on party building. The choice the parties made was related to the extent to which they decided to maximise short-term electoral support from marginal voters, or consolidate the long-term support of their core constituencies (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). Party building, vote maximisation and democratic consolidation were in many respects incompatible with one another. The transition became the very model of inter-party consensus in terms of concessions and compromise. This top based consensus between the leaders of the parties ranging from the post-Francoist Alianza Popular on the right to the Communists on the left tended to alienate the electoral clienteles of the parties (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). All the four major nation-wide parties faced the same dilemmas, and they all experienced major crises between 1978 and 1982 (Linz and Montero 2001). The main theoretical argument in this is that electorates with feasible alternative choices are potentially less stable than electorates more firmly divided into electoral clienteles. Consequently, as democracy became consolidated and the parties left the initial inter-

party consensus, more efforts were put into party building proper and hence the electoral stability increased.

Also the notion that social structure was of little significance, apart from the aforementioned manifestation of the Centre-Periphery cleavage, has been challenged. Torcal and Chhibber, for example, argue that after 1989 social class emerged as a manifest influence on electoral preferences regarding the by then two main parties at the national level, the PSOE, and the *Partido Popular* (PP). In particular, they concluded that the social composition of PSOE's electoral support had changed significantly. By the use of logistic regression analysis, and controlling for ideology, leadership, occupation, gender, and habitat, the finding was that the probability of voting the PSOE versus the PP among those belonging to the higher socio-economic strata of society had decreased from 0,93 in 1986 to 0,42 in 1992, for the middle strata from 0,97 to 0,77 whereas for the lower strata there was virtually no change at all (Torcal and Chhibber 1995: 27-28). Furthermore, based on observed regional differences in social and economic policy implementation, i.e. that the policies of the PSOE government were only carried out successfully in the autonomous regions also governed by the PSOE and that the increased social stratification of voter preferences had only taken place in those very same regions, it is concluded that policy implementation has had an effect on voter preferences. Although these findings need to be substantiated by further research before any firm conclusion can be drawn as to whether the Spanish electorate has moved towards an *increase* in class based distribution of electoral preferences, they serve to underscore the point that the decreased electoral volatility may partly be ascribed to some kind of structural anchoring of the vote and that regional variation should be accounted for. In spite of the fact that a wide array of electoral studies have been conducted in the two regions most marked by the Centre-Periphery cleavage, the Basque Country and Catalonia, on the grounds that these regions differ from the rest in terms of the intensity of this cleavage, the true implications of this difference seemed for a long time overlooked in Spanish electoral research. The consequences of not handling the implications of this underlying property in a systematic fashion in electoral analysis were lucidly exemplified by Gunther and Montero. By simply leaving the Basque Country and Catalonia out of the analysis on the grounds that they represent anomalies in Spain in terms of the logic of manifest cleavages and electoral competition, the findings indeed

indicate that social class had appeared as a manifest cleavage in Spanish politics right from the first general election in 1977 (Gunther and Montero 2001).

All this indicates that that the theory of cleavages and voter alignments should be taken seriously into account in that the variations in party system formats across the Spanish lands should be taken as point of departure when we try to assess the role of electoral mobilisation in the process of democratic consolidation and persistence. It is precisely the complexities of regional variations that make the Spanish case a particular challenge within this kind of electoral research. However, as it turns out, it has been not all that clear how these regional variations should be handled for analytical purposes.

The territorial dimension of democratic consolidation: Conceptualisations of 'centre' and 'periphery'.

As discussed above, Spain exhibits substantial regional variations according to the relative salience of specific cleavages in different electoral locations. At the institutional level, the crucial state-ness problem that the new Spanish democracy faced was handled by way of undertaking a profound territorial restructuring of the very political system labelled the *Estado de autonomías*. This process has not only entailed a profound decentralisation of political power, the new Constitution has also created an asymmetrical system by allowing two different roads to autonomy: The § 151 leading to extensive autonomy on the one hand and the § 143, leading to a lesser degree of autonomy, on the other. This specific territorial component of Spanish politics is seen as paramount to the understanding of the electoral behaviour. In short, it is widely held that Spain differs considerably from most other European societies as to the extent to which the centre-periphery cleavage is a source of political conflict (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988: 241; Anduiza and Méndez 1997: 265). This is reflected by the fact that in the studies employing the theory of social position, i.e. the theory of cleavages and voter alignments as outlined in Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the cleavage of urban-rural residence is found to have little or no effect on voter behaviour and instead will have to be replaced by centre-periphery location (Anduiza and Bosch 2004: 168).

All this implies that in the analysis of electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and party competition the question of *when* should be followed by the question of *where*. The problem, of course, is that it is not all that clear what *where* really entails. All relevant electoral research in Spain coincides in stating the importance of territorial location on voting behaviour, but the exact meaning of this tends to vary to a considerable degree. Consequently, no firm academic agreement exists as to which regions should be labelled the *centre* and which should be labelled the *periphery* (Anduiza and Bosch 2004: 166). The four § 151 autonomous regions, Andalucía, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, are cases in point. In terms of geographical location on the Spanish mainland (leaving the Balearic and Canarian archipelagos aside for a moment), they all clearly belong to the periphery in geographical terms. And, in terms of political autonomy, of course, they clearly constitute a category of their own. However, a closer look at their relative status reveals that their positions vary greatly. In terms of economy Catalonia and the Basque Country both occupy a privileged position within the Spanish system while both Galicia and Andalucía belong to the poorest and less developed regions. In terms of cultural differentiation, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia have their own vernacular languages (together with both the Balearic Islands and the Valencian Autonomous Community), whereas Andalucía does not possess this cultural asset. This seeming confusion leads us to the main issue of this section. The fact that there is no academic agreement as to the empirical foundation for ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ in Spain is in itself a strong indication of the fact that the very territorial distribution of political power is still a highly contested issue. Hence the very centre-periphery concept is a disputed one. In particular, the existence of both regional parties proper and so-called ‘regional-nationalist’ parties in the Spanish party system(s) seems particularly difficult to handle simultaneously within a simple centre-periphery framework. A rethinking and elaboration of what exactly the problem of state-ness entails in terms of the centre-periphery structure is therefore called for. In this, a more elaborate discussion of state and nation building seems paramount. This entails going back to the very theoretical roots of ‘centre-periphery’ as a conceptual framework in order to assess its relevance in the Spanish context. This, then, is the object of the next section

The territorial dimension of politics

The centre-periphery dimension of the modern nation-state is first and foremost linked to the works of Stein Rokkan. Rokkan took as point of departure the Parsonian AGIL scheme and identified four sub-systems in the analysis of the emergence of the modern state: The military system, the judicial system, the economic system, and the cultural system. Rokkan's most important contribution to political analysis, however, is the addition of an independent territorial dimension to politics: The *centre-periphery axis* linking the institutional architecture of a nation-state to its *territorial structure*, i.e. its given political and geographical characteristics (Rokkan 1987: 347-380; Rokkan 1999: 108-134; Taylor and Johnston 1979: 111-114). The theoretical salience of the centre-periphery nexus is that the existence of a political centre logically presupposes a periphery – and vice versa. The two are interdependent. Centre, as well as periphery, is a *dependent* variable in macro-historical terms. However, as noted by Bakka, since a preliminary definition of a political centre is that it is a *node* in a discrete network of human interaction where power resources are accumulated and projected into the network, a reasonable definition of a periphery denotes it as a *field* where exit and entry is controlled through the exercise of authoritative power by a node. In other words, centre and periphery constitute a bounded hierarchical political network. Then, of course, the logical interdependence between the two presupposes a causal relationship in which the existence of a periphery is dependent on the existence of a centre in temporal terms. Analytically, a centre-periphery relationship exists only at T_{+1} . At T_{+0} all that exist are competing nodes (Bakka 1998; Bakka 1997: 4).

The combination of the four sub-systems and the territorial axis forms a three-dimensional grid for political units. The centres and their respective peripheries are connected to each other through military-administrative, judicial-legal, economic, and cultural channels. These channels constitute four functionally differentiated segments along what is commonly labelled the functional axis in the grid. Rokkan then constructs a cumulative scheme of political processes of development: from state-building and nation-building to participation and redistribution. These processes are tied to three particular aspects of European history that can be conceptualised as *sovereignty*, *intermediate structures*, and *system-stabilisation*. In this perspective, the

stabilisation of a system is only possible if it is based on institutionalised political and social rights within a sovereign polity, understood as Weber's *Politischer Verband*. Democratisation, seen as the successive lowering of institutional thresholds leading to the eventual take-over of executive power by the opposition, is thus a prerequisite for the stability of the modern nation-state (Rokkan 1999: 227-260).

The functionalist element in Rokkan's analyses in the sense that democracy serves to stabilise the complex modern political systems has been duly criticised. Even though Rokkan himself in his analyses emphasised strategic action on behalf of social groups, the *meaning* of their actions was introduced from the outside and no analysis of their ideology, resources, and choice of strategy was ever conducted. One might conclude that even the actors themselves would have to be introduced from outside the model. (Berntzen and Selle 1988).

However, in theory, the model *does* introduce methodological collectivism in the sense that it opens for actors that move on the meso level. Thus, the determinism introduced by the functionalist elements could supposedly be balanced by the fact that it allows for voluntarism in the sense that the strategic choices made by actors are seen as an important factor in explaining a specific process of political mobilisation. What is needed, then, are more detailed conceptualisations of the strategies pursued by collective actors both in the centre and the periphery in the constituting phases of state- and nation building. This is precisely the objective of the following section.

The national dimension of politics

There are convincing arguments, both empirical and analytical, for maintaining a categorical distinction between the 'nation' and the 'state' as units of analysis in the modern polities (Nielson 1985; Linz 1993; also Østerud 1978: 101-139; Keating 2001). The state is seen as a juridical concept that links a governing organisation to a social group within a defined territory (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985; Hoffman 1988). In contrast, the 'nation', both in terms substance and extension, is much harder to define. The nation is more than a series of objective characteristics such as geography, ethnicity, language, culture and so forth. The nation is also defined by an expressed will to act. Indeed, it is "a daily plebiscite, a living soul, a spiritual principle" (Renan

1970: 80). This subjective dimension is explicitly or implicitly accepted in academic research. The nation, then, is definitely a dynamic entity in the sense that it is not a given. The fundamentally different properties of the state and the nation make them analytically distinct, and empirically the sociological borders of the nation seldom coincide with the juridical borders of the state (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985). In fact, states consisting of only one national identity, as the strictest definition of the nation-state claims, are rather the exception than the rule (see Nielson 1985).

From this follows that, as any collective distinction may serve as the underpinning for political mobilisation (Sartori 1990), differing identities may be used for the purpose of creating political movements. As a rule, political movements that perceive of themselves as representatives of 'nationalities' are based on the idea that different identities linked to cultures and territories have developed over time. Some kind of cultural and geographical identity is thus a prerequisite for the establishment of a regional nationalist movement. However, other political and economic factors may also have an impact and contribute to the mobilisation on nationalist issues. Competing historiographies contribute to the construction of national myths and the subjective dimension outlined above implies that one need not be a separatist or claim the establishment of a separate nation-state to call oneself a nationalist (Keating 2001). As will be outlined below, one might mobilise on the principle of the right to self-determination and yet refrain from full separation from the existing state.

The relative weight of culture, ethnicity and geography in nationalism is a debated issue (see Linz 1985b: 203-253; Kellas 1991: 67). While previous observers tended to take ethnic identity for granted, later research found that the identity was chosen, even 'invented', and that transfers from one identity to another was quite possible (Barth 1967). This also indicates that dual identities are fully feasible (Keating 2001; Martínez-Herrera 2002). In Spain this is underscored by the difference between the notion of *patria* (the fatherland) and the *patria chica* (the little fatherland), in which the first relates to the Spanish state and the second to the territory of the region (Heywood 1995: 13; Gallagher 1991: 125-126). This yields two kinds of territorial identity that at some point may be mobilised against each other, expressed as state nationalism and the regional nationalism. The first holds the state as its source of legitimacy and is typically sought established by central elites through the

standardisation of legal codes, education and so forth. The second builds on an idea of an ethnic, cultural and historical community differentiated from that of the state and seeks to build the regional nation on it.

Whether the regional elites choose, and succeed, in mobilising on a nationalist basis will to a large extent depend on the status of the region *vis-à-vis* the state during the various phases in the process of modernisation. In the struggle over the identity of the citizenry, the individual is subject to the pulling forces of different centres of identity building. Based on the state and the region, attitudes that compete for the individual's loyalty are created. These attitudes may also coexist in a less conflicting way and the individual may retain a multiple identity and feel that he or she belongs both to the state and the regional nation. In an ideal type nation-state, of course, the categories of regional nationalism and state nationalism coincide and the concept of 'regional nationalism' is rendered meaningless.

Many of the attempts to analyse the upsurge of regional nationalism from the 1960s and onwards saw the various nationalist movements as basically *similar* whereas the explanations put forward in relation to their upsurge were fundamentally *dissimilar*. Some saw the nationalist tendencies as a revival of old ethnicity (Connor 1972; Esman 1977), while others saw them as reactions to internal colonialism (Hechter 1975). These initial one-dimensional explanations were later revised and the empirical variations catered to by more complex typologies (Horowitz 1981; Hechter 1985). It became clear that not only did a variety of nationalisms exist, but also that different nationalisms might mobilise on behalf of the very same 'nationality' (see Tiryakian and Rogowski eds. 1985).

Nationalists often perceive of the nation as a biological phenomenon (Østerud 1984: 34) that makes it objectively different from other nations and argue that the nation constitutes the natural unit for governance and that the states be organised according to the principle of the nation-state or at least that extensive autonomy be secured for the region (Keating 1993, 2001). Thus, an important aspect of the nationalists' stance is that their political, economic and cultural claims against the state are inherently related to the thesis of national self-determination. However, a nationalist movement may have other claims that enable it to unite nationalism with other ideologies such as

liberalism, conservatism or socialism. At the same time, both liberalism and conservatism – and eventually also socialism – have embraced values that are built on the nation and its defence. Nationalism, then, may be regarded as an ideology that competes with other ideologies for social support and political power (Alter 1985: 8-9). In short, regional nationalism is intimately tied to territorial identity and can therefore be studied as an integral part of the cleavage structure of the state- and nation building processes.

As mentioned above, in Rokkan's understanding the twin concept of *centre* and *periphery* caters to the fact that the power is unevenly distributed in the modern states also in geographical terms. The basic definition of a *centre* is that it is privileged area within the state territory, whereas a *periphery* is an area that is dependent on the centre and retains minimal resources for the protection of its properties against outside influence (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 2-6, Rokkan 1999: 108-121). The concepts of *distance*, *difference* and *dependency* are typically employed to characterise the predicament of the periphery. The interaction between the central and peripheral areas takes place in terms of political, economic, and cultural transactions. In this perspective, the elites in the centre try to centralise as much power as possible and standardise politics, culture, and economy over the whole territory of the state (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 15). The relationship between the forces that work to impose political, economic, and cultural standardisation in the name of the state and the forces that strive to maintain the peculiarity of the periphery is one of mutual influence. If the central state is relatively weak, regional brokers may arise to mediate between the centre and the periphery. This is precisely what happened in most of Southern Europe: the central state, albeit omnipresent, was weak and inefficient, and a system of regional brokers – called *caciques* in Spain – was established with devastating effects for the legitimacy of the central state as the uneven process of economic modernisation took hold (Heywood 1995: 15).

These dialectics of modernisation, state inefficiency and regional political mobilisation has been pointed to as paramount to the understanding of the Spanish regional problem, and some see the attitudes of the central elites as the decisive factor in the crystallisation of Catalonia and the Basque Country as distinct nationalities (González Casanova 1979; Solé Tura 1985: 43)

However, the regional nationalist movements may not only be understood on the basis of the internal situation in the region and the relationship with the centre of power that they relate to.

Centre and periphery within the state may also be linked to centre and periphery in geopolitics (Rokkan and Urwin 1982, 1983; Rokkan 1987, Rokkan 1999). Being part of an empire was a prerequisite for the early modernisation of Catalonia and the Basque Country (Brand 1985: 287-288). Spain lost its colonies earlier than the rest of the European states and this has been viewed as conducive to the early rise of regional nationalism in Catalonia and the Basque Country in comparison to Scotland. The loss of the colonies implied, on the one hand, that Catalonia and the Basque Country were relegated from belonging to the centre of the empire to becoming two peripheries within the Spanish state. On the other hand, the defeat of the empire could serve as an inspiration for the regional elites since the colonial struggle for liberation was inspired by a nationalist awakening (Mayall 1990: 38-39). Thus, the loss of the colonies had a double effect on the geographical peripheries of the Spanish mainland.

Also, and perhaps paradoxically, the *disaster* of 1898, in which Spain lost Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico to the U.S., is seen as a major impulse for the intellectual efforts to build a Spanish identity in the modern sense. But then, of course, these efforts would have to compete with the already established efforts to build the Basque and Catalan identities (Heywood 1995: 14). Thus, it is fair to say that identity building in Spain, both emanating from the centre and from the peripheries, has to a certain extent been propelled by a notion of loss and deprivation, often exalting some sort of past grandeur (see Colomer 1986 and Juaristi 1997). From the centre this was epitomised by the rhetoric of the Franco regime, linking Spanish patriotism to the Catholic Kings and the Empire of the past in its crusade against republicanism and regional nationalism (Grugel and Rees 1997: 9-11).

As stated above, nationalism has been combined with liberalism, conservatism and socialism.

Nationalism, then, is a rather confusing phenomenon in the sense that it is both progressive and reactionary – both radical and conservative. But first and foremost it underscores that nationalism is an inherently linked to the process of modernisation (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985). This implies that variations in regional nationalist movements may be analysed in terms of the interplay between the industrial and the

‘national’ revolutions in the Rokkan perspective. Modernisation understood as a series of individual adaptations to social, cultural and physical changes, implies that the formation political identities also can be viewed as an integral part of modernisation (Tiryakian 1978, 1985). Nationalism, then, is seen equally as an active and a reactive core element in the various phases of industrialisation and urbanisation.⁸ As far as the assessments stated above are valid, we may distinguish between various forms of nationalisms within the same political system. Thus, there is a fundamental distinction between state nationalism, i.e. the nationalism of the central elites, and the nationalisms emanating from the peripheries. The three dimensional grid established by the territorial axis and the functional axis related to state and nation building may serve as the underlying structure for the categorisation of nationalist impulses in the political system. Thus, following Tiryakian and Nevitte (1985), four main forms of nationalist strategies can be identified. One emanating from the centre and the three others pertaining to the responses from the periphery. The strategy of the centre is simply called ‘state nationalism’ as an ideal type. The three peripheral nationalist strategies, called ‘reactionary’, ‘progressive’ and ‘competitive’ are also to be understood as ideal types and any nationalist movement or party might of course combine at least two of them.

a) State nationalism

State nationalism is characterised by claims put forward on behalf of the state against external or internal collectives whose territory and/or culture differ from that of the state. These claims may be of a political, economic or cultural nature, or a combination of these. Whatever their nature, the realization of the claims is oriented to increasing the autonomy and sphere of action of the national centre in relation to either other nation-states (or external collectives) or to internal political communities (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985: 71). This form of nationalism is historically not only a characteristic of the activities of the established nation-states, but also an instrument in the very creation and consolidation of the modern states:

⁸ Gellner (1983, 1987) and Kellas (1991) represent two different views on the relationship between modernisation and nationalism. While Gellner sees nationalism as a product of industrialisation, Kellas views nationalism as a much older phenomenon.

"The state building process does not have the connotations of an organic growth and it is not seen with a biological imagery that would prevail in the discussion of nationalism. The state is not associated with the idea of nature, of being born, but rather of being created. The state building process goes on for several centuries before the idea of the nation fires the imagination of intellectuals and the people. (...) However, there can be little doubt that the identification with the state by the subjects, or the loyalty to a common king of people living in the different units composing the modern monarchies was accompanied by a proto-national sentiment. Sooner or later, in many of the states, the state generated a 'state nation' building process" (Linz 1993:3-4).

From the 19th Century and onwards, 'freedom' and 'progress' have been the dominating themes of modernity. These have been employed effectively to legitimise claims on behalf of the state. For example, central elites have typically stated that an expansion of the central state is needed by claiming that peripheral cultures and peoples have been incompetent in the exploitation of their natural resources. Thus, the state will have to make them effective and productive in the name of freedom. Alternatively, 'progress' demands that borders around traditional regional markets and political institutions be dismantled. This has been the main current of nationalism in the process of modernisation and the glue that has bound together the part that today constitute the democratic nation-states.

The three other ideal types of nationalism emanate from the periphery in response to the strategies of the centre:

b) The reactionary response: Withdrawal from modernity

Against the economic, cultural and political claims of an expansive and dynamic nation-state, local elites of the peripheral society might choose to strengthen its traditional cultural heritage and reject the national project of the state. This kind of nationalism will portray the traditional culture, economy and community of the periphery as superior to the modernity of the state. Its ideology will tend to emphasise mobilisation against the tendencies of modernity to break down old social bonds. It is often based on an anti-capitalist core and promotes an economy based on artisan traditions and agriculture. This form of response is normally associated with the 19th Century reactions against the tendency of capitalism to centralise production and to replace the traditional economies. Forcing Tiryakian and Nevitte's argument somewhat, we may state that in the Spanish context this nationalist ideology will

typically have produced regional 'nationalist' parties of a rightist and conservative inclination.⁹

c) The progressive response: Taking over modernity.

Also this form of peripheral nationalism can be viewed as a reaction against the national project of the state. In this, however, the peripheral elites view the national project of the state as underdeveloped and as a hindrance for the development of the peripheral community and its participation in modernity. The centre is seen as a stagnated parasite on the periphery and not as a dynamic modernising agent. The 'modernity' of the centre is the modernity of yesteryear. The solution is self-rule for the nation of the periphery in order to develop modern institutions and values in accordance with the demands of tomorrow. This form of nationalism combines acceptance of the cultural development of the peripheral nation, including a renaissance of the language that might have been dominated or replaced by the language of the central state, in combination with a strong focus on social reform and economic and technological development to serve the very same nation. A central value in this strategy is the popular participation in decision-making in terms of mobilisation against the perceived ossified hierarchical structures of the central state. Thus, again forcing the argument somewhat, we may state that in Spain this ideology will have produced regional 'nationalist' parties of a radical and leftist inclination.

d) The competitive response: Identification with the modernisation project of the state.

This situation is characterised by the fact that the peripheral elites, however culturally, economically or territorially differentiated from the central elites, find it advantageous

⁹ All deductions on the ideological orientations of the Spanish regional 'nationalist' parties are based on readings of Rovira Virgili 1930; Candel 1965, 1972; Cruells 1965; Pi-Sunyer 1985; Pujol 1976, 1979; Vilar 1978; Botella 1985; Colomer 1986; Solé Tura 1985, 1988; Heiberg 1989; Liebert 1990; Balcells 1996; Juaristi 1997; Acha Ugarte and Pérez-Nievas 1998.

for their 'nation' to be linked to the modernising project of the state. The original peripheral nation (or group or people) is seen as contributing to the creation of a greater national community. In a given period of modernisation, when the nation-state is seen as immersed in a phase of dynamic growth that produces greater opportunities for development than offered within the periphery alone, the regional elites may claim that their contribution (or that of their regional nation) both will strengthen, and be strengthened by, a joint venture with the central regime and its national institutions.

Although this, on the face of it, might appear as a kind of cooptation, this form of peripheral nationalism is based on the notion that the peripheral groups get access to the resources of modernisation through the wider economic and political system of the nation-state. Given the unequal relationship in terms of resources and population, this is a rational choice by peripheral elites to enhance the sustainability of their nation by integrating it into a larger entity (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985: 73). Thus, again forcing the argument, we may state that this ideology in Spain will have produced regional 'nationalist' parties of a liberal inclination.¹⁰

This typology, albeit probably not exhaustive in terms of all varieties of regional nationalist movements, will serve as the basis for categorisations of the political parties of the various party systems or party subsystems of the Spanish polity from 1977 to 2000. It underscores that different actors within the same periphery may have different views on the limits, objectives and strategies for their 'national' community. Differences between actors in regard to the perspectives on what and who constitutes the nation may reflect variations in historical experiences and varying relations to the institutions and elites in the centre. In short, the argument is that a multiplicity of nationalisms may be found side-by-side within the same territorially based population sharing the common major objective characteristics (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985: 74).

In sum, this account serves to underscore that the state-ness problem identified by Linz, is a legacy emanating from Spain's troubled history of state and nation building.

¹⁰ In a typical combination of the ideal types, this category will also include initially conservative and radical parties that have come to accept the integration into the economic market of the central state, but still mobilise on cultural differences. As such, these parties may be viewed as more suitable actors for the creation of a liberal democratic system in that they to a certain extent straddle the territorial and functional axes of the party system(s).

Indeed, as noted by Linz at the eve of Franco's demise: "Spain (...) is a state for all Spaniards, a nation state for a large part of the Spanish population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities" (Linz 1975b: 423). The importance of this legacy in the process of democratic transition and consolidation could hardly be overstated.

Stating the Problem: The Electoral Nexus in Spain 1977-2000

On the basis of the discussion above, a set of general assumptions regarding the dynamics of electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition from the first democratic elections in 1977 and onwards can be elaborated. As stated in the introductory chapter, the focus of analysis in this dissertation are the eight general elections to the Spanish parliament held between 1977 and 2000. Thus, we may start by rephrasing the overarching research question posed in the introductory chapter and ask ourselves the following:

How and to what extent may electoral participation and party choice in Spain between 1977 and 2000 be understood in relation to how the parties and voters handled the problems posed by the transition from authoritarianism and democratic consolidation, with particular reference to the functional axis and the territorial axis?

Now, in order to offer a fruitful answer to this question, a series of parameters will have to be catered for. First and foremost, the fact that we have postulated that the process of democratic transition and consolidation saw a sequential process of translating societal divisions into manifest cleavages of the party system(s), implies that the behaviour of the electorate in its totality will have to be studied, i.e. not only the behaviour of those who turned out to vote. As will be shown and discussed in the following chapters, there is no doubt that changes in electoral turnout has played a significant role in this process between 1977 and 2000. Likewise, both the stabilisation of the party vote and competition among the parties will be studied in relation to the whole electorate and not only in relation to the valid votes cast. Thus,

on the basis of the theoretical discussion in this chapter, the following three aspects of electoral handling of problems will be particularly accounted for:

The mobilisation of the electorate

In the process of transition from authoritarianism and consolidation of a representative democracy, the mobilisation of the electorate is fundamental to the resulting legitimacy of the system. Now, in the crucial founding elections and the subsequent consolidation of a new democracy, there are two aspects of electoral mobilisation to consider. One is related to the overall level of electoral participation and the other to the changing composition of the electorate, i.e. the mobilisation of new voters¹¹ included in the electoral census between the elections. At the very first election all registered voters are ‘new’, of course, but the prospect of democratic consolidation over time as discussed above is also intimately linked to the political socialisation of those who reach voting age between elections. Given the sequential handling of problems, i.e. the attempts to translate the societal divisions into manifest cleavages, we shall *a priori* assume substantial variations both in the former abstainers’ and the new voters’ propensity to participate at the elections, both in terms of overall turnout and in terms of party choice along the functional Left-Right axis and the territorial Centre-Periphery axis. The theoretical account above, however, says little or nothing as to exactly *how* these variations in mobilisation will have affected the party system(s) in terms of *when* and for *which* parties. Thus, the first objective of the empirical analysis is to gain insights into to how electoral mobilisation and demobilisation affected the electoral results and party system formation in the process of democratic transition and consolidation between 1977 and 2000. This will be done by analysing the behaviour of both the new voters and abstainers between pairs of consecutive elections.

The stabilisation of the party vote

In theory, the consolidation of a new democracy entails a stabilisation of electoral behaviour as a certain anchoring of the voters’ preferences in relation to the parties is

¹¹ In the following, ‘voters’ denotes the citizens registered in the electorate regardless of whether they actually turned out on election day or not, i.e. it also includes those who opted for abstention.

developed. As discussed above, all the relevant parties went through profound crises as the main focus in Spanish party politics shifted from inter-party consensus to the building of intra-party cohesion. Thus, we shall *a priori* expect to see a gradual stabilisation of the party electorates in terms of increased loyalty rates between elections. Due to the sequential handling of problems, we should expect substantial variations in this respect with regard to the parties' location on the functional Left-Right axis and the territorial Centre-Periphery axis. Again, however, the theoretical account gives little or no indication as to *when* and for *which* parties – apart from the obvious case of the unprecedented collapse of the very state bearing party of the transition, UCD. Thus, the second objective of the empirical analysis is to gain an understanding of how electoral stabilisation and destabilisation affected the electoral results and the party system formats between 1977 and 2000. This will be done by analysing the trends of stabilisation, i.e. the loyalty rates, between pairs of consecutive elections.

Electoral competition

As discussed above, democratic consolidation entails a narrowing down of the scope of electoral competition, i.e. that voter mobility will be restricted to certain segments of the electorate. This means that voter transitions between parties will have become more predictable along the functional axis and the territorial axis over time. Thus we should assume that the transfers of votes between parties have varied substantially according to the electoral handling of problems in regard to party choice both along the Left-Right axis and the Centre-Periphery axis between 1977 and 2000. Again, however, the theoretical account gives little or no indication as to *when* and for *which* parties, i.e. to what extent we should expect specific changes in terms of *direction* along the two axis of the party system(s). Thus, the third objective of the empirical analysis is to gain insights into how the electoral competition affected the electoral results and party system formation between 1977 and 2000. This will be done by way of analysing voter mobility between pairs of consecutive elections.

Mobilisation, stabilisation and competition are of course three interrelated aspects of elections. The fourth objective of the empirical analysis is therefore to gain an understanding of the interplay between these aspects of electoral behaviour.

The general assumptions laid out here will be specified into a more detailed set of hypotheses concerning specific pairs of elections and concrete parties on the basis of the discussion of parties, elections and party systems during the 1977-2000 period presented in chapter 4.

In accord with the above, then, the research questions to be answered in this dissertation are related to our understanding of the interplay between electoral behaviour and party system formats during the process of democratic transition and consolidation both in terms of variations over time and with regard to socio-political positions in relation to the functional axis and the territorial axis. Thus, in the analysis of the dynamics of electoral behaviour between pairs of the 1977-2000 general elections, particular emphasis will be put on the *mobilisation* of the electorate, the *stabilisation* of the vote and electoral competition in terms of voter *mobility* between parties.

Levels of analysis

So far the account has dealt with possible variations in change and stability along the functional axis and the territorial axis. There is, however, another important dimension of electoral analysis that needs to be taken into account. In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the different *loci* of mobilisation, stabilisation and competition, we should bear in mind that changes at the level of the individual voters are not necessarily reflected in the electoral results at the aggregate macro level. Likewise, meso level changes in terms of territorial restructuring of a particular aspect of electoral behaviour may also not be reflected at the macro level. Thus, changes at both the micro and meso levels may occur in such a fashion that they are levelled out and not captured in the macro level data. In short, to be able to identify all the relevant loci of change and stability between the elections along the functional axis and the territorial axis, we will have to cater to variations at different levels of analysis. These levels range from that of the individual voters (the micro level), the territorial subunits of the political system (the meso level), and the system as a whole (the macro level).

Therefore, the analysis of electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition in this dissertation will, to a certain extent, be structured according to the levels of analysis. Thus, in chapter 4 that deals with parties and party system formation, the analysis is underpinned by the study of aggregate electoral percentages for Spain as a whole. In chapter 5, that deals with co-variations between proportions of the electorate at pairs of consecutive elections, the analysis is based on electoral data aggregated to the municipal level. In chapter 6, the individual level transfers between electoral options at pairs of elections are aggregated to Spain as a whole and analysed. And, lastly, in chapters 7, 8 and 9 that deal with electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition in relation to the territorial axis, the analysis is based on meso level district wise variations in individual transfers between the relevant electoral options.

The objective of analysing the behaviour of the whole electorate at different levels within the same overarching framework has particular bearings on the choice of data for analysis. Likewise, the choice of data has bearings on the choice of methods and techniques for the estimation of transition matrixes between the pairs of consecutive elections. Thus, before embarking upon the specification of the hypotheses and the empirical analyses, a fundamental question must be dealt with. What kind of data and methods could be employed to assess the variations in electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition for the electorate as a whole between 1977 and 2000, not only in relation to the functional axis, but also in relation to the territorial axis? This, then, is the theme of the next chapter that deals with the questions of data and methodology employed in this study.

CHAPTER 3

Data and Methodology

The data

The fundamental problem one has to resolve when embarking upon the task of trying to assess the variations in electoral behaviour of the Spanish electorate as outlined in the previous chapter is, of course, to find the adequate data and choose the adequate methods of analysis. Due to the aforementioned territorial diversity, conducting survey research in Spain in order to produce uniform sets of valid data at different levels of analysis is an extremely costly and laborious process. Consequently, such datasets for the period in question are few and far between. For example, surveys at the level of the 52 electoral districts has tended to be conducted by regional research institutions in a fashion that is not coordinated at the national level, i.e. that surveys exist for some or all of the elections for the electoral districts (*provincias*), say, of the regions of Andalucía, Catalonia, Euskadi, and Galicia, but not of, say, the districts of Extremadura, Castilla la Mancha and La Rioja. Apart from the fact that few surveys of this kind exist, even fewer of them are panel studies. In short, in order to conduct the multilevel analysis required to identify the foci of stabilisation and change as described in chapter 2, we would have to rely on a data source very different from the survey kind. From previous research on Spain I knew that the administrative reform conducted by Javier de Burgos in 1833 had introduced a “French” system of an elevated number of small territorial units for the local administration (Buck 1994). In fact, there are more than 8.000 municipalities scattered across the Spanish territory. So, I wondered, perhaps electoral and demographic data tied to the municipal level could be used for the analysis to be conducted?

Now, on the one hand, relying on aggregate data implies that we will have to wrestle with some well-known and serious methodological problems and to confront a profound scepticism within the social science community. On the other hand, the analysis of data tied to the 8.000 municipalities might reveal some important aspects of electoral behaviour not accounted for by the traditional survey approach. Thus, in spite of the methodological caveats, the whole idea was simply too tempting to let it

go. In addition, given the limited resources at my disposal, it was rather a question of *to be or not to be*: Either I settled for the aggregate data or we would have to give up the whole project. Therefore, after some pondering on the distribution of municipalities across the electoral districts and the types of data available at this level, I decided to rely on electoral data aggregated to the municipal level. Thus, the basic units of analysis in this study are the more than 8.000 Spanish municipalities (*municipios*) grouped into the 50 electoral districts (*provincias*) at the Spanish mainland and the Balearic and Canarian archipelagos.¹² The numbers of valid units in the datasets within each electoral district range from 32 (*Las Palmas*) to 409 (*Burgos*), with a mean of around 162 units per province.¹³ The 50 provinces are in turn grouped into the 17 Autonomous Communities (*Comunidades autónomas*, or *CAs*) with their proper regional parliaments and executives. As mentioned in chapter 2, the *CAs* are divided into two groups, the so-called § 143s on the one hand and the § 151s (*Andalucía*, *Catalonia*, *Euskadi*, and *Galicia*) on the other. The thirteen § 143s hold the elections to their regional parliaments simultaneously, whereas the other four hold their elections individually, albeit the regional elections in *Andalucía* have tended to be held simultaneously with the general elections.

The electoral data were obtained through the Ministry of the Interior and consist of the raw provisional counts for each municipality at the 1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, and 2000 General Elections to the Spanish parliament.¹⁴ For each of the elections the data files contained the number of registered citizens in the electoral census, the number of votes obtained by all the parties and the number of blank and rejected votes. The data for the elections between 1977 and 1996 were compiled, packed and stored on discs on my request in 1996 and the data for the year 2000 were extracted from the cd-rom *Elecciones a cortes generales 2000* edited by the Ministry.¹⁵

¹² For reasons that will be discussed in relation to the ECOL method for ecological inference below, uni-municipal Spanish enclaves on the African coast, Ceuta and Melilla, have been omitted from the analysis precisely because no variance can be computed for them.

¹³ See table 3.3 for an overview of the number of municipalities per electoral district.

¹⁴ The consequences having to rely on the provisional counts instead of the definitive official results will be dealt with below.

¹⁵ I am indebted to directors Félix Marín Leiva and Gonzalo de Celis for providing me with the data. All the standard disclaimers apply.

After creating SPSS syntax files in order to read, recode, compute, match, and proofread the raw numbers for the parties and electoral abstainers for each and one of the more than 8.000 municipalities, I grouped the data into seven data sets, one set for each pair of consecutive elections, i.e. that the data for the elections held in 1977 and in 1979 are listed into a data set named *gen7779* and the data for the elections held in 1979 and 1982 into a data set named *gen7982* and so forth.¹⁶

The problem of electoral censuses and changing territorial units

Studying electoral change with data tied to territorial units over time entails two sets of interrelated problems: One pertaining to the change in units and the other pertaining to the accuracy of electoral censuses. Starting with the territorial changes, i.e. splits and mergers of Spanish municipalities between 1977 and 2000, I chose to deal with this problem in the simplest manner possible: Given the fact that the grand total exceeds 8.000, I simply conducted a pairwise deletion from the data matrix of those municipalities that had suffered changes between a given pair of elections. This implies, for example, that a municipality that suffered changes in its territorial structure, say, between 1982 and 1986 has been deleted from the matrix for the 1982 and 1986 pair of elections, while it is listed in the 1979-82 matrix in its original form and in the 1986-89 matrix as a new entry. The fact is that the number of municipalities that suffered territorial changes between the elections as a fraction of the total number of Spanish municipalities is very small indeed.

Another parameter that I had to take into account was related to the accuracy of the data registered at the municipal level. In comparative electoral research, it is a well-established fact that the electoral censuses vary in regard to their accuracy and that this poses challenges to the estimation of the real size of the electorate at each election (Franklin 2004: 86-89). This affects the reliability of both the *electoral abstention* rate and the proportion of registered voters that are *new* at each election. Starting with the problem of electoral abstention, if we divide the official abstention rate into *technical* abstention and *real* abstention in which the first category denotes electoral abstention

¹⁶ The seven data sets and the **ECOL** program for analysis of ecological data are available at my web site: uit.no/statsvitenskap/931/5

due to census errors, i.e. that citizens that have passed away still are registered in the census at election time, that those who have moved away are entered in the registry on more than one location, and other errors, it is generally estimated that the technical errors amount to between a tenth of the total abstention rate registered for Spain as a whole and up to a third in some areas (López Pintor 1982; Vilas Nogueira 1992; Justel 1994: 26-27). This implies, in a hypothetical example, that an official turnout at 70 percent may indicate a real turnout at 72 – 74 percent for Spain as a whole and even up to 79 percent in some areas. The region of Galicia is particularly known for census errors (Vilas Nogueira 1992).

Furthermore, it should once more be underscored that the electoral results recorded in the data from the Ministry of Interior at the municipal level are based on provisional counts and thus differ slightly from the definitive official results. Whether there are any systematic district wise differences in this respect is unknown, but it calls for some caution regarding a too strict comparison between the official numbers and the numbers in my datasets. To this it should be added, of course, that the two tiny enclaves on the African coast have been omitted from the datasets.¹⁷ In order to assess the consequences of the differences between the counts recorded in the datasets and the official results, I have listed the relative distributions of the electorate on the main categories of electoral behaviour for all the seven general elections in table 3.1 (below).

As shown in table, the deviations from the official percentages for all the parties, except AP/PP, do not exceed one tenth of a percent point for any of the elections. For both AP/PP and electoral abstention, however, we find more substantial deviations from the official percentages. For the 1977 election the proportions allotted to AP is 0.2 percent points lower in the dataset, for the 1993 election it is 0.3 percent points higher, for the 1996 election it is 0.3 and 0.2 percent points higher for the 1993-96 and 1996-2000 data sets, respectively. For electoral abstention, we note that the 1977 data set reports a 0.3 percent point lower share than the official figures and that both data sets containing the 1979 elections report a 0.5 percent point higher share. For the rest of the elections, the shares reported in the datasets are either identical or lower, ranging from –0.1 to –0.7 percent points, compared to the official proportions based

¹⁷ Their combined electorates, however, amount to less than 0.3 percent of the total.

on the total number of voters and votes cast. On the whole, then, the deviations caused by the deletion from the data matrixes of municipalities that suffered territorial changes between pairs of elections, the use of provisional electoral counts and the omission of Ceuta and Melilla have not caused serious distortions as to the aggregate accuracy of the data, with the possible exception of the results for the AP/PP and the estimates of electoral abstention. The deviations for the latter categories will have to be taken into account in assessing the results of the analyses.¹⁸

Table 3.1: Elections to the Cortes generales 1977 - 2000 (percent of electorate)
Official proportions vs. proportions in data sets¹⁹

	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000
PCE/IU	7,3	7,2	3,2	3,2	6,3	7,3	8,1	3,8
(1)	7,3	7,2	3,2	3,2	6,3	7,3	8,2	
(2)		7,2	3,2	3,2	6,3	7,3	8,2	3,8
PSOE	22,8	20,4	37,7	30,6	27,6	29,5	29,0	23,7
(1)	22,8	20,4	37,7	30,7	27,5	29,6	29,1	
(2)		20,4	37,6	30,7	27,5	29,6	29,0	23,7
UCD	26,8	23,4	5,3					
(1)	26,8	23,4	5,3					
(2)		23,4	5,3					
CDS			2,3	6,4	5,5	1,3		
(1)			2,3	6,4	5,5	1,3		
(2)			2,3	6,4	5,5	1,3		
AP/PP	6,4	4,1	20,7	18,0	17,9	26,4	29,9	31,0
(1)	6,2	4,0	20,8	18,1	17,9	26,7	30,2	
(2)		4,0	20,8	18,1	17,9	26,7	30,1	31,0
PNV	1,3	1,1	1,5	1,1	0,9	0,9	1,0	1,1
(1)	1,2	1,1	1,5	1,1	0,9	1,0	1,0	
(2)		1,1	1,5	1,1	0,9	0,9	1,0	1,1
CiU	2,2*	1,8	2,9	3,4	3,5	3,8	3,5	2,9
(1)	2,2*	1,8	2,8	3,5	3,5	3,8	3,6	
(2)		1,8	2,8	3,5	3,5	3,8	3,6	2,9
Abstain	21,2	32,0	20,0	29,5	30,3	23,6	22,6	30,0
(1)	20,9	32,5	19,8	29,2	30,0	22,9	21,9	
(2)		32,5	19,9	29,2	30,0	22,9	21,9	30,0

*Votes cast for *Pacte Democràtic Per Catalonia* (PDPC).

¹⁸ The official definitive counts for each municipality are by 2005 available on the website of the Ministry of the Interior for the 1993 and 1996 elections. Using these, however, would have tampered the comparability with the results for the other election for which still only provisional counts are available.


¹⁹ Bold types indicate the official distribution of the electorate in percentages. (1) Indicates the percentages allotted to the various options at the first election in the pairs of elections in the data set, the '1977' in the 1977-1979 pair for example. (2) Indicates the percentages allotted to the various options at the second election in the pairs of elections in the data set, the '1979' in the 1977-1979 pair for example.

In order to clarify the problem of estimating the dynamic changes in the composition of the electorate between elections, I shall start out by identifying the categories of electoral behaviour at two consecutive elections.

A typology of electoral behaviour at two elections

In order to study the dynamic aspects of electoral behaviour at two consecutive elections, a series of parameters must be considered. The typology (fig. 3.1 below) is adopted and modified from Sani (1986: 5) and is an attempt to categorise the dynamics of voter behaviour between elections. The first dichotomy, **active** vs. **inactive**, marks the distinction between those who turned out to vote at one or both elections and those who abstained from participating at both elections. The next dichotomy, **continuously active** vs. **discontinuously active**, denotes the difference between those who turned out at both elections and those who only turned out at one of them. Among the continuously active another dichotomy is established between those who voted for the same party at both elections, the **loyal**, and those who switched between parties, i.e. those who **transferred** their vote. Among the discontinuously active I have distinguished between those who switched to or from abstaining, the **mobilised** and the **demobilised**, and those who had entered or left the electorate between the elections, the **included** and the **excluded**. As mentioned above, in general the bulk of the included consists of citizens that had reached voting age after the first election and the bulk of the excluded of citizens that had deceased after the first election.

Fig. 3.1 A typology of electoral behaviour at two consecutive elections:



Estimating the categories of the typology

The *included* and *excluded* were calculated on the basis of two data sources: 1) the changes in the electoral censuses between elections and 2) the number of recorded deaths per province per year between 1977 and 2000. These data were obtained from the data bank TEMPUS at the official web site of the *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas* (INE).²⁰

The Second Election: The excluded

For each of the fifty electoral districts the numbers of deceased per full year between the elections were calculated. For the months remaining after election day of the first election year and the months preceding election day at the second election year, the number for those years were divided by twelve and multiplied with the months that remained of the first year and the months passed in the second year, respectively. The resulting number, then, was used to calculate the deceased as a *proportion* of the first election electoral census for the whole electoral district. This proportion was then used as a *coefficient* to calculate the excluded at the second election for each of the municipalities within the province, i.e. they were added to the electorate of the second election as if they were still alive and registered in the census.

The First Election: The included

For each and one of the municipalities the change in the numbers of registered voters between the elections was calculated and this number was used to estimate the share of the inhabitants at the first election that had reached voting age by the second election. In the datasets they appear as if they were registered in the first election censuses.

Due to the aforementioned fact that the deviances between the official percentages allotted to the parties are almost negligible (the deviances for AP/PP and abstention notwithstanding), I decided not to conduct an estimation of possible additional

²⁰ www.ine.es/tempus

changes in the electorates at the municipal level stemming from migrations between municipalities between the pairs of elections. Such an estimation would have been overtly time consuming and would probably not have added very much to the accuracy of the analysis.

In order to show the relative distributions of the shares of the whole electorate when the estimated number of inhabitants that had not reached voting age is included at the first election and the estimated number of inhabitants that had been excluded between elections is included at the second election, I have listed the estimated percentages for the main categories in tables 3.3a and 3.3b (below).

Table 3.2a Percent of electorate at the first elections of the pairs of elections in dataset²¹

	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996
PCE/IU	6.6	6.8	2.9	3.0	5.8	6.8	7.7
PSOE	20.6	19.0	34.3	28.8	25.1	27.2	27.2
UCD	23.9	21.6	4.8				
CDS			2.1	6.0	5.1	1.2	
AP/PP	5.6	3.8	18.9	16.9	16.6	24.2	28.1
PNV	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.9
CiU	2.0	1.6	2.6	3.3	3.1	3.6	3.4
Other	11.5	9.0	6.0	7.3	7.6	9.6	5.6
Included	9.9	7.1	9.0	6.4	8.3	5.6	6.6
Abstain	18.8	30.1	18.1	27.3	27.6	20.9	20.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3.2b Percent of electorate in the second elections in the pairs of elections in dataset

	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000
PCE/IU	7.1	3.0	3.1	6.1	6.8	8.0	3.7
PSOE	19.9	36.3	29.5	26.6	27.5	28.2	22.8
UCD	22.9	5.1					
CDS		2.2	6.2	5.3	1.2		
AP/PP	4.0	20.0	17.5	17.3	24.8	29.2	29.8
PNV	1.1	1.4	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0
CiU	1.7	2.7	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.5	2.8
Other	9.5	6.5	7.4	8.2	10.4	6.1	7.2
Excluded	1.8	3.6	3.7	3.3	3.6	2.7	3.9
Abstain	32.0	19.2	28.3	29.0	21.3	21.3	28.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: The Spanish Ministry of the Interior and INE. The calculations are my own.

Notes: 1) For CiU in 1977 votes cast for *Pacte Democràtic Per Catalunya* (PDPC).

2) The "Other" category also includes regional parties apart from PNV and CiU that have obtained parliamentary representation at some of the elections. This category also contains blank and rejected votes.

²¹ The parties are described in a more detailed fashion in chapter 4.

As observed in the tables, the proportions of included are far greater than the proportions of excluded and reflect the growth of the electorate over the years covered in the analysis. The difference between the included and excluded is particularly great between 1977 and 1979 due to the fact that the voting age was lowered from 20 to 18 years in 1979.

So far I have presented the datasets for the analysis. In the next section I shall present the statistical methods that I will employ in order to estimate both the aggregate and individual level changes between the pairs of elections.

Modelling changes in aggregate proportions between elections

A general problem faces us as researchers when we try to model the aggregate changes in the behaviour of the electorate between elections. The statistical analysis of aggregate data for geographical units normally produces a clear pattern, but the substantial interpretation of the very same pattern is often equally unclear and controversial. For correlation and regression analysis, the choice of one mathematical model over the other substantially affects the interpretation of the results. At the heart of the matter lie our assumptions about whether linearity or non-linearity is to be expected from the data. For a long time, the aggregate analysis of electoral change between elections was branded by an unresolved problem. Commonly, the model used to describe changes for smaller parties did not fit the data for bigger parties, and vice versa. Typically, additive regression models would be seemingly fit to describe changes in the proportions of votes obtained by the bigger parties normally found in two-party systems whereas multiplicative models would seemingly better fit the data for the smaller parties generally found in multiparty systems. This paradox was perhaps overlooked or even accepted because although the non-linearity is clearly detectable for smaller parties, it is almost invisible for the middle range of the scale typically found in two-party systems where this kind of analysis was commonly employed.

The basic logic behind this problem is, of course, that the relative distributions of votes in a given polity constitute a bounded whole. A party cannot obtain more votes than the total number of voters. And, likewise, a party cannot obtain less than zero votes. This means that the distribution of votes is not an infinite continuum. This implies that in modelling relationship between the numbers of votes obtained by a party at two or more elections, techniques based on linear functions are not appropriate. However, a series of statistical models exist that take this kind of non-linearity into account. In particular, models originally elaborated to cater to the problems arising from the use of ordinal and nominal scale variables, such as logit and probit models, do by default handle the variable studied as a bounded whole. Therefore, logit models have been used in cross-level inference research. However, it was Søren Risbjerg Thomsen who first showed theoretically why non-linearity also is to be expected in the analysis of aggregate proportions as such (Achen and Shively 1995: 185). The regression of, say, a vote proportion obtained by a given party on its vote proportion obtained at a previous election will only be linear after the vote proportions have been transformed to the logit scale. The logit model of party change fits the data both for smaller and for bigger parties. Now, given the regional diversity in terms of party systems in Spain, even the bigger parties will appear as small parties in some of the regions. Indeed, when conducting scatterplot analysis for the proportions of the electorate obtained by the parties in pairs of elections without having transformed the variables to the logit scale, I detected systematic deviations from linearity in some of the electoral districts even for the biggest party. These deviations disappeared once the proportions were transformed to the logit scale.²²

Thus, for the analysis of aggregate change in the distribution of the electorate between elections, i.e. the covariations between the proportions obtained by the parties, between the parties and the proportions that opted for electoral abstention, as well as with the proportions of included voters between elections, I shall present a series of correlation matrixes between these variables after they have been transformed to the logit scale. I do so by the use of the *ECOL* program developed precisely by Risbjerg Thomsen and his colleagues. The *ECOL* program automatically transforms the raw

²² The logits are computed as follows: $Logit = Ln[P/(100-P)]$ i.e. the natural logarithm of the odds $P/(100-P)$ for the property.

data into logit proportions and computes *Pearson's r* correlations between these proportions.

This is, however, only part of the analysis that I shall present in this study. In fact, the basic objective is to try to assess to what extent the relationships identified at the aggregate level also can be said to hold at the individual level by way of cross-level inference analysis.

Cross-level inference analysis: The ecological fallacy problem

Any researcher who ventures into the realm of cross-level inferences will, by default, have to carry the burden of the ecological fallacy problem. The legacy of the ecological fallacy as a methodological obstacle is so overwhelming that it makes any attempt to even hint at possible relationships at the individual level from aggregate data a true *quixotic* endeavour. Now, the reference to Cervantes' famous novel on my part is not wholly accidental and I shall not deny that for me personally some of the attraction posed by the ecological challenge lies precisely therein. This is, however, beside the point. I would rather sum up the current state of cross-level inferences by asking the following basic question: Is there a life after Robinson?

This question stems, of course, from the enormous impact that Robinson's famous article has had on the social science community since the beginning of the 1950s (Robinson 1950). Since Robinson's lucid demonstration of the cross-level fallacy problem, social science students graduate with the fundamental understanding that one shall not draw conclusions about individual behaviour from aggregate data. This understanding tends to be passed on in such a way that it makes us deaf to the fact that substantial methodological progress that has been made within the field over the last decades. And, although I would never deny that cross-level inference *do* run against a serious logical problem, I still think it is sad to see the vast amount of spatially distributed data available deemed untouchable by electoral researchers on purely methodological grounds. Thus, given the fact that Spain's more than 8.000 municipalities exhibit an enormous wealth of spatially distributed data that is of interest to us, we should not fail to make use of it only because it entails a well-known methodological obstacle.

Several techniques for cross-level inference have been developed since the publication of Robinson's article. The bulk of these have employed variations of linear regression models, either in a simple form (Goodman 1959; Crewe and Payne 1976; Alt and Boix 2001) or in more advanced versions employing bounded regression models to ensure that the resulting estimates remain within the logical limits (King 1997). Non-linear models have also been employed, but Thomsen's logit technique for the study of Danish elections was the first, and so far the only, to be explicitly grounded on a theory of individual level behaviour (Thomsen 1987). Thomsen's logit model has since been used to estimate individual level behaviour in several countries of the world, e.g. Australia and New Zealand (Leithner 1997), Austria (Hänisch 1998), Britain (Brown, Firth and Payne 1999), Korea (Thomsen and Kim 1993; Park 2003), and in the US (Hammer and Traugott 2004). Hammer and Traugott estimated the individual voting behaviour compared to the true voting behaviour concerning split ticket voting in Oregon and proved that the results based on the logit technique were quite accurate. By and large, the logit technique seems to yield results that are generally more valid than any other technique developed so far. In addition, it seems to me more theoretically sound to work with a technique that is based on an explicit model of individual level behaviour than with techniques that lack this characteristic. The theoretical grounding of the model offers a theoretical link between the levels of analysis in the light of which the results may be interpreted in a more substantial fashion. All this will hopefully be made more easy to grasp through a discussion of the ecological inference problem and the proposed logit solution to overcome, at least in part, this logical problem.

Formal statement of the ecological problem

In this section I shall formalise the ecological inference problem. I will be using a revised version of the traditional two-party system as a theoretical point of reference. I start with a binary model based on voting the Spanish Workers Socialist Party, PSOE, vs. all other options (including abstaining). I find this more suitable for modelling in the context of the Spanish multiparty system than the traditional approaches based on two-party systems. Now, the reason for choosing one of the parties as denominator in

the model instead of, say, electoral abstention, is simply that the group of ‘abstainers’ holds a special function in the ECOL model that I discuss below.

The problem starts with a simple logical combination of two distributions of electoral choice, as shown in fig. 3.2 below.

Fig. 3.2 The logical distributions of dichotomous choice at two elections

	Psoe 1	not Psoe 1	
Psoe 2	$N_i^{\text{psoe-psoe}}$	$N_i^{\text{psoe-not psoe}}$	N_i^{psoe}
not Psoe 2	$N_i^{\text{not psoe-psoe}}$	$N_i^{\text{not psoe-not psoe}}$	$N_i^{\text{not psoe}}$
	N_i^{psoe}	$N_i^{\text{not psoe}}$	

The cell containing $N_i^{\text{psoe-psoe}}$ denotes the proportion of voters that opted for the party PSOE at both elections. The cell containing $N_i^{\text{not psoe-psoe}}$ denotes the proportion of voters that did not cast their vote for PSOE at the first election, but opted for PSOE at the second election. Likewise, the cell containing $N_i^{\text{psoe-not psoe}}$ denotes the proportion of voters that voted PSOE at the first election, but defected from the party at the second election. And, lastly, the cell containing $N_i^{\text{not psoe-not psoe}}$ denotes the proportion of voters that did not opt for PSOE at any of the elections. Given the properties of aggregate data, we have no direct knowledge of these proportions. We have only knowledge of the distributions on the marginals that are marked in bold types. The whole point in ecological inference analysis is, of course, to try and estimate the numbers of voters in cells on the basis of the marginal distributions. The objective, then, is to estimate the cell frequencies so that a simple cross tabulation can be employed.

Researchers have suggested and elaborated various techniques to that end, ranging from a set of intricate cross tabulations to different forms of correlation and regression analysis. In general, the bulk of the methods have been seen a mere techniques for estimations and have not been based on an explicit theory of electoral behaviour. Statistical models, however, are not devoid of theory and the choice of one technique over the other has theoretical implications. For example, the traditional and widely

used Goodman regression model as an approach to cross-level inference is based on manifest variables in which the aggregate election results at the second election are regressed on the corresponding results at the first election (Goodman 1953, 1959). This implies, in fact, that we are somehow postulating that the behaviour at first election is the cause of the voter's behaviour at the second election. The ECOL method, however, model the behaviour at two elections in terms of latent structure correlation instead of employing manifest variables. By employing a latent structure model we postulate that the voter's behaviour both at both elections is caused by some underlying factors not observed in the data. In addition, it is based on explicit assumptions derived from the theory of partisanship, as will be shown below.

The ECOL estimator

The ECOL estimator developed by Thomsen can be classified within the group of *continuous partisanship models* (Achen and Shively 1995: 183-188). The framework of the ECOL model is as follows: Suppose that there are just two options, *PSOE* and *NOT PSOE*, so that party identification may be expressed as a position on a one-dimensional scale. In each of the municipalities each voter has a (long term) party identification that added together produce a certain density of this identification within the municipality. This density is assumed to be normal or Gaussian, so that in each municipality party identification is distributed as a normal distribution with a mean and a variance. The variance is assumed constant over municipalities, while the mean varies. Then, the voter's decision at each time period is modelled as it would be in psychometric scaling theory. Each election is treated as if it were an «item» on a psychological test. Thus every election has its response curve, a function that gives the probability of choosing PSOE as a function of partisanship. In accordance with gaussian scaling models, the curve is assumed to be normally distributed and its argument linear in partisanship. The election is then modelled as a binary choice between PSOE (1) and NOT-PSOE (0). This yields a response curve for the relationship of vote to partisanship that in turn is affected by parameters unique to each election.²³ The individual probabilities are then averaged over the distribution of the probabilities within each municipality in order to estimate the vote. Since a

²³ $\text{Prob}(p_{soe_{jt}} = 1 | p_{ji}) = \Phi(\alpha_t + \beta_t p_{ji})$, where α_t and β_t are parameters unique to each election.

mixture of normal distributions with normally distributed means and common variances is itself a normal distribution, the vote proportions can be transformed to a scale familiar from probit analysis.²⁴

On this transformed scale, the constituency vote is linear in mean constituency partisanship. Since an equation like this holds for each election, it follows that, under these assumptions, the regression of one election on another is not linear in the vote proportions, as so much prior work had assumed (Achen and Shively 1995: 184). Instead, the regression will be linear only after the vote proportions have been transformed to the probit scale. Transformations of that kind have been used in ecological regression, since they automatically force the resulting estimates into the bounded range. But Thomsen was the first to give the specification a meaningful substantive interpretation. Since the probit transformation is nearly linear in the middle ranges, the non-linearity will be almost invisible in most two-party systems. But in systems with small parties, the model implies substantial non-linearity in Goodman style regressions. Thomsen's achievement is to demonstrate that linear ecological models are at best only approximations to the actual functions found in the data and to show theoretically why non-linearity is to be expected (Achen and Shively 1995: 185). However, Thomsen's model does not escape the well-known identification problem in ecological inference.²⁵

The crucial point is that the ECOL method hinges on an assumption of *functional homogeneity*, i.e. that the probability curves and functions for the relationship between the partisan model and the estimated transfers between elections must be isomorphous in terms of *direction*. In practice, this means that we should group the territorial units into the most functionally homogeneous clusters, that is, units that exhibit the most similar dynamics between party identification and the actual behaviour at elections in order to minimise the risk of running into such identification problems.²⁶

²⁴ $\Phi^{-1}(P_{soe_{ij}}) = \alpha'_t + \beta'_t P_j$.

²⁵ As pointed out by Achen and Shively, if, say, β is doubled while p_j and σ are halved, the probability of a vote for the PSOE is unchanged and the statistical fit will be identical. But the substantial interpretation is of course radically different in the two cases (see Achen and Shively 1985: 185ff).

²⁶ The actual grouping of the municipalities into homogeneous regions is dealt with below.

The actual estimation method of the ECOL is in fact very simple. Since the primary interest is estimating voter transition rates, the partisanship model is used as a means to that end. Under the ECOL model, the distribution of the probability of voting the PSOE is normal within each district at each time period. The underlying partisanship model creates a correlation between these two normal distributions within each district. The observed vote is just a dichotomisation of each of these normal distributions. The pivotal observation is that pairs of dichotomised, correlated normal distributions have long been studied in statistical theory under the topic of tetrachoric correlations and it is on the basis of this theory that the estimator is created. The actual estimation is done in four steps (Thomsen 1987: 55-64):

The two-option vote proportions (in this case PSOE vs. NOT PSOE) at each election are transformed to the logit scale.²⁷ Using the logit transformed vote proportions, the Pearson's r is computed between the votes at the two elections. Then Yule's Q is computed as an approximation to the tetrachoric correlation in order to transform the Pearson's r into the corresponding correlation between the individual-level dichotomous vote variables. Then the transition rates is estimated:

The proportion of voters that cast their vote for PSOE at both elections is written as the ratio of those who voted PSOE twice to the fraction that voted PSOE at the first election. Likewise, the proportion of those who did not vote PSOE at the first election but opted for PSOE at the second election is written as the ratio of those who voted PSOE at the second election to the fraction of those who did not opt for PSOE at the first elections.

The ECOL estimator for larger tables

In principle the Ecol method is based on a simple relation between a two-vote option, i.e. the 2 x 2 table presented in fig. 3.2 and its corresponding logit correlation. Now, the two-vote option is at best only an approximation of the real life situation experienced by the voters, and in multiparty systems it is not even an

²⁷ Even though logits and probits are radically different in theoretical terms, in practice they are so similar that the choice of one over the other is presumably unimportant. Besides, the logits are much easier to calculate.

approximation.²⁸ This problem is overcome in the Ecol estimates by choosing a «reference» option at each election, and then construct all possible 2 x 2 tables involving the reference option. The weakness of this approach is that the final estimate depends on which reference option we choose. The general experience, however, is that we get the most plausible results when we choose electoral *abstention* as the reference option. The main point here is that we choose a reference group that is supposedly the most heterogeneous in terms of party preferences and/or social characteristics. The problems pertaining to the Spanish electoral censuses mentioned above in terms of estimating the true proportion of the electorate that has opted for abstention at the elections, i.e. that a part of the official abstention rates are due to technical errors, adds credibility to the assumption that the group labelled ‘abstainers’ in my datasets are the most heterogeneous of all the categories. I have therefore chosen the electoral option of abstention as the reference category for the cross-level estimation of the individual-level transition matrixes to be presented in this dissertation.

Spanish municipalities and functional homogeneity

The notion of ‘functional homogeneity’ mentioned above implies that in order to make inferences with the aid of the logit technique, we must somehow group the Spanish municipalities into functionally homogeneous categories. Now, there are of course two ways of establishing categories of functionally homogeneous units of analysis. We could either apply some sort of cluster- or discriminant analysis in order to identify these categories on purely statistical grounds. Or we can rely upon geographical, institutional and political factors. I have chosen the latter approach for two main reasons. One important aspect of the Spanish elections is related to the aforementioned variations in terms of options presented to the voters, i.e. the plurality of party systems. By choosing the electoral districts as categories, we control for differences in this regard. However, there is an additional, perhaps even more important, reason for choosing the electoral districts as our functional categories, namely the well-documented district wise variations in the effects of the electoral law on the logic of electoral competition. The small average district size (6.7) and the

²⁸ Even in two-party systems abstaining remains a real option for the voter.

application of the d'Hondt formula have created substantial distortions regarding the proportionality of electoral representation in Spain, as shown in numerous studies (Gunther 1989; Oñate and Ocaña 1999). The average district size is verging upon the minimum required (6) to avoid that the electoral system acquires irremediable majoritarian effects (Montero 1998: 39). However, thirty of the electoral districts are even smaller than the threshold of six. The result is that in half of the Spanish electoral districts the MP's are shared between only the two biggest parties, which has led some observers to label the Spanish system as a district wise two-party system (Baras and Botella 1996: 104). And, according to Sartori, the Spanish electoral system should be rated as a *strong* system in terms of its impact on voter behaviour (Sartori 1994: 37). The acknowledgement of the effects of the electoral law has since the very first elections in 1977 been a constant issue in the election campaigns in terms of calls on behalf of the major parties for the *voto útil*, i.e. that a vote for the smaller parties in the smaller electoral districts would be a wasted vote in terms of representation. The variation in terms of levels of disproportionality across the electoral districts is thus a well-known fact that is widely referred to and debated in the very electoral campaigns. The immediate effects of this on the voters' perceptions and behaviour are well documented (Gunther 1989), even though the effects do not follow the district size in a purely uniform fashion. Together with the differences between districts in terms of party system formats, this implies that we should assume systematic variations in the logic of partisanship for electoral choice between the districts. In other words, that the effects of party identities on electoral behaviour, that constitute a pivotal element in the theoretical foundation for the ECOL model, tend to vary systematically between the districts.

Table 3.3 (below) presents the 50 electoral districts that will be treated as 'homogenous' regions and serve as the regional units for the estimation of the inferred transition matrixes between the pairs of elections. In the table I have also included the number of seats pertaining to the districts, the number of registered voters (in thousands) and the number of municipalities per district.

Table 3.3 The 50 electoral districts, seats, voters registered, and no. of municipalities²⁹

<i>Districts:</i>	<i>Seats:</i>	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	<i>Municipalities:</i>
		<i>Voters registered in census (in thousands):</i>								
ANDALUCIA										
Almería	5	240	278	276	314	325	349	375	394	103
Cádiz	9	560	644	651	723	749	799	847	861	44
Córdoba	7	451	513	514	554	562	583	604	609	75
Granada	7	457	525	533	583	595	613	652	671	168
Huelva	5	256	282	288	314	320	341	355	367	79
Jaén	6	403	465	449	487	482	496	508	516	96
Málaga	10	570	652	688	753	783	874	921	984	100
Sevilla	13	842	979	1002	1101	1142	1234	1314	1383	105
ARAGON										
Huesca	3	153	168	169	176	169	173	177	175	202
Teruel	3	112	122	121	126	120	120	119	115	236
Zaragoza	7	547	609	617	657	657	686	709	712	291
ASTURIAS										
	9	783	869	854	910	896	920	958	934	78
BALEARES										
	7	408	452	467	528	549	572	606	644	67
CANARIAS										
Las Palmas	7	365	421	452	504	563	597	648	710	34
Tenerife	7	398	475	434	495	526	587	628	643	53
CANTABRIA										
	5	327	376	378	405	405	420	442	455	102
CAST.-MANCHA										
Albacete	4	211	239	240	265	259	273	284	290	86
Ciudad Real	5	311	361	342	371	368	373	384	390	100
Cuenca	3	151	168	163	171	169	167	169	165	238
Guadalajara	3	95	108	108	115	116	120	128	136	287
Toledo	5	310	345	347	370	373	387	407	422	204
CAST.-LEON										
Avila	3	131	146	139	146	144	144	145	141	248
Burgos	4	239	270	274	286	285	292	301	296	371
León	5	364	410	397	429	419	429	436	428	211
Palencia	3	125	142	141	150	149	151	153	150	191
Salamanca	4	241	277	277	289	289	299	307	298	362
Segovia	3	99	111	112	117	120	122	124	124	208
Soria	3	74	82	79	82	80	79	80	77	183
Valladolid	5	295	334	343	383	380	401	416	419	225
Zamora	3	165	180	180	189	180	180	182	176	248
CATALONIA										
Barcelona	31	3005	3467	3332	3576	3618	3752	3905	3968	310
Girona	5	304	337	339	368	386	406	430	451	221
Lleida	4	242	268	268	284	283	291	301	304	230
Tarragona	6	332	372	372	408	411	433	464	483	183
C. VALENCIANA										
Alicante	11	677	763	788	870	902	963	1028	1092	141
Castellón	5	283	309	314	338	342	357	373	384	135
Valencia	16	1288	1460	1462	1590	1605	1682	1782	1846	264
EXTREMADURA										
Badajoz	6	413	462	460	498	493	502	516	525	163
Cáceres	5	279	312	306	331	325	329	340	333	219
GALICIA										
A Coruña	9	731	821	804	873	880	920	979	938	94
Lugo	4	302	329	320	339	334	326	338	313	67
Ourense	4	315	347	330	347	342	329	328	293	92
Pontevedra	8	549	617	620	686	682	719	770	749	61
MADRID										
	34	2744	3178	3275	3558	3714	3977	4200	4210	179
MURCIA										
	9	551	635	656	729	754	809	860	901	45
NAVARRA										
	5	319	364	376	399	409	425	444	453	272
BASQUE COUNTRY										
Alava	4	153	174	183	199	209	222	234	242	51
Guipúzcoa	6	438	507	501	536	537	560	572	574	88
Vizcaya	9	750	866	854	913	923	948	971	965	111
LA RIOJA										
	4	167	186	190	204	207	214	222	225	174
Mean	6.7	471	536	536	581	591	619	649	659	162
Sum	350	23525	26777	26785	29039	29530	30945	32436	32934	8095

²⁹ The municipalities listed are from 1996-2000. Although the changes between the pairs of elections have been small, some of the districts have seen a gradual reduction in the number of municipalities from 1977 to 2000 (the extreme case Burgos from 409 to 371).

In addition to the two lines of arguments referred to above, the fact that the electoral districts coincide with the administrative units *provincia* on which the new structure of *Autonomous Communities* de facto was built (all the CAs were based on either one, two or several of the already long existing provinces), emphasises the importance of the electoral districts also from an institutional perspective.

In summary, the ECOL model for cross-level inferences implies that the territorial units be grouped into functionally homogeneous categories and in the Spanish case a series of relevant arguments tend to point to the very electoral district, the *provincia*, as the categorical break variable to use in the analysis. Thus, the cross-level inference estimates that I shall present in this study are all based on the electoral districts as the break variable in computing the estimates. This also includes the estimates presented for Spain as a whole.

In the next section I shall address the question of conceptualising the territorial dimension of Spanish politics, i.e. the centre-periphery problem as discussed in chapter 2.

Measuring the Centre-Periphery dimension for electoral analysis

As stated in chapter 2, the *Estado de autonomías* was established in order to handle the state-ness problem by way of a profound decentralisation of political power that was conducted in an asymmetric fashion. It was observed that Spain differed considerably from most other European societies in the extent to which the centre-periphery cleavage was a source of political conflict (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988: 241). On the other hand, no general academic agreement seemed to exist as to exactly how this centre-periphery dimension should be conceptualised in terms of operationalisation for electoral research.

According to the Rokkanian centre-periphery theory, the Centre occupies a privileged position in the state- and nation building processes in terms of military-administrative,

legal, economic and cultural resources while the predicament of the Periphery is marked by distance, difference and dependency. In terms of the structuring of mass politics, the salience of human agency in the relations between centre and peripheries was stressed. This implies that in order to have an effect on voter behaviour, elites both in the centre and in the peripheries must somehow possess a perception of this structure and hence try to mobilise the citizenry accordingly. Thus, the voters in the peripheries would be subject to different pulling forces in terms of political identity, one emanating from the centre and the others emanating from peripheral elites. This means that ‘periphery’ as a political concept cannot merely be established on purely geographical grounds – one cannot simply put a ruler on the map of a country and draw concentric circles around the capital city in order to determine the different levels of peripheral status. Geography and distance are only important to the extent that they have hindered or thwarted administrative, legal, economic and cultural communication across the state territory at the crucial stages of nation building. To the extent that this argument is valid, it means that even though the centre-periphery axis is derived from a territorial interpretation of the state we cannot merely rely on simple geographical coordinates as a yardstick.

In addition to this there is another factor to be considered. Since the both the correlation matrixes and the inferred voter transition matrixes are based on the fifty electoral districts as homogeneous regions, we should ensure that each of the categories of the centre-periphery typology is broad enough to cover a substantial number of these very same districts. Otherwise, no or very little *a priori* variation within the categories can be expected at each point in time and hence the validity of the typology would be difficult to assess through empirical analysis. Thus, the electoral districts must be aggregated into fairly broad centre-periphery categories conceptualised on the basis of a number of variables that take into account both the territorial dimension of the four channels of communication identified by Rokkan and at the same time cater to the pivotal element of human agency.

Classical versus radial categorisation

In order to cover a number of territorial entities with proper names and histories, we must somehow undertake an abstraction of the centre-periphery concept and at the same time try to retain as much as possible of its properties, i.e. extend the conceptual

denotation so that it covers all the 50 districts and at the same time retain as much as possible of its connotation. In the method of classical conceptualisation exposed by Sartori, this is a formidable task since we cannot have it both ways. Extending the concept in order to cover different units and at the same time retaining the core of the concept implies that we have to move up the ladder of *abstraction* (Sartori 1970). Sartori's argument is that we would have to define the core concept by fewer attributes and cater to the differences by a series of second order concepts (see Berntzen, Buck and Marsteintredet 2006). In the case that one or more of the units in a category do not share a given property with the rest of the units in that category, we will have to omit that attribute from the definition of the concept, i.e. undertake a limitation in terms of conceptual connotation. In practice, however, this would imply omitting a substantial number of variables definitely associated with the Rokkanian centre-periphery concept and thwart any attempt to establish any meaningful categorisation of centre and peripheries in Spain, i.e. that the resulting typology would so abstract that it would be unrecognisable in relation to the channels of communication exposed by the theory.

However, researchers have undertaken a revision of Sartori's method for conceptualisation and have proposed a different approach based on a radial understanding of concepts and categories (Collier and Mahon 1993; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Collier and Adcock 1999). In the radial understanding, no unit of analysis is defined as belonging to the category on all of the variables, but rather on a combination of variables. This implies that a category is defined by "family resemblance", i.e. that the units belong to the same family of cases even though they are not equal on all the variables. In this conceptualisation, the abstract core of the concept is not directly attainable. Rather the units are defined as belonging to a category on variables that measure different second order aspects of the core concept.

A Broad Centre-Periphery Typology Based on Five Dichotomies

According to the theory, the predicament of a periphery is marked by distance, difference and dependency in relation to administrative, economical and cultural channels of communication. In order to cater to the problem of aggregation, i.e. to ensure that the categories were broad enough to contain more than a few electoral

districts, I decided measure the centre-periphery relationships at the level of the autonomous regions (CAs). I started out with altogether 19 variables covering territorial distance from Madrid, relative economic status, administration (e.g. degree of autonomy), status of regional language, strength of regional parties and so forth. These initial variables were at different levels of measurement and therefore difficult to handle within the same methodological framework. I therefore decided to undertake a dichotomisation of the variables and coded the units with the score ‘periphery’ as 1 and the others as 0. I soon found out that in terms of their effect on the dependent variable, i.e. centre-periphery status of the districts, 14 of the initial variables could be omitted from the matrix without altering the relative distribution of the regions in terms of centre-periphery status. I therefore decided to retain only the variables that most directly related to the centre-periphery concept according to the combined theories of Rokkan (1999), and Tyriakian and Nevitte (1985). Thus, the resulting matrix is defined by the five dichotomised variables described below.

First dichotomy: Distance

It might seem strange that the variable distance should be dichotomised into only two categories. After all, territorial distance could easily be measured in kilometres and is a naturally continuous variable. However, the most common conceptualisation of distance undertaken by the various statistical institutions in Spain entail some sort measuring the relative costs of transporting people and goods out of the provinces and into the Spanish market. Typically, the average freight cost of transporting a ton of goods per capita to the neighbouring autonomous region is calculated. This commonly yields a continuous variable on which all the provinces are plotted. A closer inspection of these measures, however, reveal that out of the 50 provinces there are only three outliers with a very high relative level of transportation costs – namely the provinces located on the Balearic and Canarian archipelagos. The fact that these are separated from the rest of the regions by sea explains why they appear as deviant cases. This means that the distribution on the initial continuous variable is strongly affected by this straightforward geographical dichotomy of *landward* versus *seaward* communication.³⁰ I have therefore chosen a parsimonious operationalisation of

³⁰ This is a recurrent theme in the Canarian and Balearic political and economical discourses, often conceptualised in the notion of *insularidad*, i.e. that they face particular problems as island regions

distance in which these two regions have been allotted the value 1 and all the others the value 0. This variable is labelled *Distance* in the matrix.

Second dichotomy: Economy

The uneven process of industrialisation mentioned earlier has created great regional differences across the Spanish territory in terms of economic development and levels of income per capita. As shown in numerous reviews,³¹ the relative income level of the wealthiest region nearly doubles the income level of the poorest region. In fact, the notion of ‘poor’ Spain versus ‘rich’ Spain is a common reference in the debate on regional economy and redistribution of funds among the regions. On the basis of the relative income distributions per capita listed for the years 1980 and 2000 in Herrero et.al 2004 (Spain = 100), I have computed the mean for all of the regions and thereafter coded the three regions below one standard deviation from the grand mean as 1 and all the others as 0. This variable is labelled *Economy* in the matrix.

Third dichotomy: Language

In terms of cultural difference in relation to the centre, a fundamental distinction can be drawn between the regions that have two official languages, i.e. that the local language has obtained official status in the administration alongside Castilian Spanish, and the other regions. Thus I have coded the regions with two official languages as 1 and the other regions as 0. This variable is labelled *Language* in the matrix.

Fourth dichotomy: Strength of principal regional party

As discussed in the theory of peripheral response to modernisation, the role of human agency in the centre-periphery relationship should be stressed. In terms of electoral mobilisation in the interest of the peripheral region, particular emphasis should be put on whether the regional elites have opted for and succeeded in establishing their own political parties in competition with the parties emanating from the centre. As regional tickets abound in the elections to the Spanish parliament, the mere existence of a

separated from the Spanish mainland. This has also been acknowledged by the central state in terms of specific measures of economic compensation.

³¹ See de Carranza 1982; Herrero, Solér and Villar 2004; and Morata 1997: 124.

registered regional party is not a valid yardstick in this respect. Therefore, I have chosen the threshold of obtaining parliamentary representation³² as the basic criterion and have coded the regions accordingly, i.e. that regions that have had one of their parties obtain a seat at one or more of the general elections as 1 and all the others as 0. This variable is labelled *Party1* in the matrix

Fifth dichotomy: Strength of second regional party

As stated in the discussion on the peripheral responses to the claims for cultural and economic standardisation emanating from the centre, these responses could take different ideal type forms described as reactionary, radical and liberal. That is, a differentiation along the Left-Right axis. From some of the regions both parties of Leftist and Rightist leanings have been able to obtain representation in the Spanish parliament. Thus I have coded the regions the have obtained seats for both Leftist and Rightist regional parties as 1 and those who have not as 0. This variable is labelled *Party2* in the matrix.

On the basis of the variables described above, the following matrix is set up:

Table 3.4 The initial centre-periphery matrix

	Distance	Economy	Language	Party1	Party2	Sum
ANDALUCIA	0	1	0	1	0	2
ARAGON	0	0	0	1	1	2
ASTURIAS	0	0	0	0	0	0
BALEARES	1	0	1	0	0	2
CANARIAS	1	0	0	1	0	2
CANTABRIA	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAST. -MANCHA	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAST. -LEON	0	0	0	0	0	0
CATALONIA	0	0	1	1	1	3
C. VALENCIANA	0	0	1	1	0	2
EXTREMADURA	0	1	0	0	0	1
GALICIA	0	1	1	1	0	3
MADRID	0	0	0	0	0	0
MURCIA	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAVARRA	0	0	0	0	0	0
BASQUE COUNTRY	0	0	1	1	1	3
LA RIOJA	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	2	3	5	7	3	

³² For the threshold of parliamentary representation, see Rokkan 1999.

In a strict radial conceptualisation, all the units in a category share an equal number of the attributes that define the category. As shown in the table, eight regions have a score at 0, one a score at 1, five regions a score at 2 and three regions a score at 3. Thus, if we label the category '0' as the Centre, category '1' as the First Periphery, '2' the Second Periphery and '3' the Third Periphery, there are four categories in the initial conceptualisation of the centre-periphery dimension. However, as the category '1' only contains the two electoral districts of Extremadura, very little variance can *a priori* be expected within this category. It therefore seems logically sound that these two provinces be placed in one of the two adjacent categories, i.e. either the Centre or the First Periphery. Now, reconsidering the initial variables employed to create the dichotomies, we note that they differ in terms of measurement level. All the variables apart from *economy* are based on some sort of either/or logic. Distance as landward vs. seaward communication, local language as official vs. not official, party1 and party2 as passed vs. not passed the threshold of representation. Economy, however, is based on the relative measure of deviation from the Spanish grand mean and is at best only a proxy for an either/or categorisation. In a stringent conceptualisation of a category, it is my firm belief that it is more logically sound to categorise the units according to an either/or measurement than according to a more/less measurement. I have therefore chosen to place the provinces of Extremadura in the Centre category.

On the basis of the argument exposed above, I have created a threefold categorisation as follows: The *Centre* (values 0 and 1) consisting of Madrid, Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla la Mancha, Castilla-León, Extremadura, Murcia, Navarra and Rioja that embrace altogether 22 electoral districts. Then the *First Periphery* (value 2) consisting of Andalucía, Aragón, Baleares, Canarias and Comunidad Valenciana with altogether 17 electoral districts. And lastly, the *Second Periphery* (value 3) consisting of Catalonia, Euskadi and Galicia with altogether 11 electoral districts.

In relation to the radial conceptualisation of the typology, an additional factor should be noted. Given the fact that the categories are based “family resemblance” as outlined above, one of the virtues of radial conceptualisations is that the units in the typology not only exhibit differences between categories, i.e. that they are different in *degree* in relation to the Centre-Periphery concept, but that they are also different in *kind* given the fact that their placement in a category is based on scores on different

variables. Thus, not only their degree of peripherality but also their different kinds of peripherality will be taken into account in the analysis. This implies, for example, that systematic differences between districts belonging to different regions within the same centre-periphery category can be attributed to the fact they are different in kind even though they are equal in degree.

Cases: Electoral districts over time

Since we are studying the dynamic relationship between electoral options over time in all the fifty districts, we shall in the following distinguish between the notion of *case* on the one hand and *district* on the other. ‘District’ simply denotes the physical territory of each and one of the electoral districts, each and one with their proper name and history. A case, however, is a relationship between two electoral options at any pair of elections in a district, whether the voters exhibit the same behaviour at both elections or have changed behaviour. Since we are dealing with 50 electoral districts at seven pairs of elections, the maximum number of cases in the analysis of a relationship is $50 \times 7 = 350$. Thus, divided into the three categories of the radial conceptualisation of the Centre-Periphery typology, this yields the following initial distribution of cases:

Table 3.5 The distribution of cases along the Centre-Periphery axis

	1977-79	1979-82	1982-86	1986-89	1989-93	1993-96	1996-00	Sum
Centre	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	154
1. Periphery	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	119
2. Periphery	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	77
Sum	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	350

In the actual analysis there are a some deviations from this initial distribution due to the fact that not all of the parties have run in all the districts at each point in time and that some of the parties did not run at all points in time. This will of course be dealt with for the parties in question in due course.

Thus, in this chapter I have discussed the data and the methodology that will serve as the underpinnings for the empirical analysis. The next chapter deals with the elections and parties that shaped the political landscape for the period to be studied in the analysis. The aim of the next chapter is to give a general description of the elections,

parties and party systems between 1977 and 2000 in light of the discussion in chapter 2. This will then serve as the basis for the formulation of a set of specified hypotheses that, in turn, will be put to empirical tests in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER 4

Parties, General Elections and Party Systems 1977-2000

In this chapter the formation of the political parties, the official aggregate results of the 1977-2000 general elections and the institutionalisation of the parties and party systems will be discussed. This will serve as a necessary background for the formalisation and specification of the overarching assumptions outlined in chapter 2 into a set of hypotheses. These, in turn, will be put to empirical tests and structure the analysis of electoral behaviour along the functional and territorial axis of the political system in chapters 5-9.

The formation of political parties

When dealing with the formation of the parties, party systems and the subsequent crystallisation of voter alignments during the twin processes of democratic transition and consolidation, two aspects of Spanish politics from the mid 1970s and onwards should be noted: First, the fact that Spain started her transition to liberal democracy in the mid 1970s implied that the Spanish ‘founding elections’ took place under the full impact of modern *televised* political campaigning. Second, the very longevity of the Franco regime implied that the parties that eventually emerged before the first general elections in 1977 emanated from two fundamentally different socio-political logics. One group of parties emanated from the pre-authoritarian heritage, i.e. parties that had been part of the democratic system of the Second Republic (1931-1936), the other group consisted of newly founded parties with no prior history. The nature of the authoritarian regime, i.e. Right-Authoritarian and Centralist, implied that the first category was overwhelmingly comprised of Leftist and Regionalist parties, whereas the second category was dominated by parties of the Right. These two features had profound bearings on the political activity at the advent of the first elections and the institutionalisation of the parties. On the one hand, there is no doubt that in terms of political organisation the Right was worse prepared than the Left for democratic elections. On the other hand, the Rightist elites emanating from the old regime were in

control of the state apparatus and had access to the state-wide mass media to an extent that could be exploited for electoral purposes (Gunther and Hopkin 2002).

Of the salient parties of the Second Republic, some of the Leftist parties had survived either underground, in exile, or both. However, also some of the Regionalist parties, among them the oldest party in Spain, the Basque Nationalist Party, had also survived. Thus, the following relevant parties with prior history took part in the establishment of the new political democracy: *Spanish Socialist Worker's Party* (PSOE), *Spanish Communist Party* (PCE), *Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia* (PSUC), *Republican Left of Catalonia* (ERC), *Democratic Union of Catalonia* (UDC) and *Basque Nationalist Party* (PNV). Only the Catalan UDC and the Basque PNV could be labelled 'Centre-Right', the others were either Centre-Left or Leftist.³³ However, one should bear in mind that on the eve of the first election only the PNV sought explicitly to emphasise its continuity with the politics of the Republic, whereas both the PCE and the PSOE tried to relief themselves of their Stalinist working class legacy and portray themselves as catch-all parties (Linz and Montero 2001: 9).

The political organisation of the Spanish Right represented a crucial question. The formation of a social and electoral block that was conservative and democratic at the same time had always been highly problematic in Spain (Caciagli 1984: 95). The Right had to improvise new parties, or, as it were, it had to carry out a profound conversion to turn large sections of the authoritarian system into suitable components for democracy (Amodia 1983: 4). As it turned out, the transition process itself produced three relevant parties of the Right and Centre-Right, Adolfo Suárez' *Union of the Democratic Centre* (UCD), Manuel Fraga's *Popular Alliance* (AP), and the Catalanist *Democratic Convergence of Catalunya*.³⁴

Compared to the political climate of the Second Republic, political moderation was

³³ *Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Partido Comunista de España, Partido Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Unió Democràtic de Catalunya, Partido Nacional Vasco (JEA).*

³⁴ *Unión de Centro Democrático, Alianza Popular, and Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC). Founded in 1974 by Jordi Pujol and Miquel Roca, the CDC became the dominant partner in the Catalanist coalition formed with the UDC in 1978. This coalition, the *Convergència i Unió*, (CiU), governed Catalonia between 1980 and 2003.

assumed to prevail in the mid 1970s. Albeit little was known of the political preferences of the Spanish electorate after forty years of compulsory silence, it was thought that the aforementioned socio-economic development had brought the majority of the voters to dread drastic and radical changes. Both within the Left and the Right, the dominant elites acknowledged that the Spanish voters of the 1970s would be substantially different from the highly mobilised masses of the Republic. Thus, even though the UCD eventually would emerge as the most Centrist of the parties at the time of the first elections, it was actually Manuel Fraga, former minister in the authoritarian regime, who first realised that Francoists could secure a political future for themselves by moving towards a Centrist position (Fraga 1975). However, after the collapse of the Navarro government, in which he had played a significant part, Fraga gave up the Centre in favour of the so-called "natural right" position.³⁵ Accordingly, when the AP was founded in 1976 it was widely considered a Rightist party staunchly defending the interests of the old regime.

Boosted by a courageous reform programme, endorsed by popular referendum in 1976, the incumbent Premier of the old regime, Suárez, set out to conquer the Centre position in the spring of 1977. In order to do this he needed an organisation around him that also included individuals with a less Francoist past. This is how UCD was born, an organisation set up by those in power with the purpose of preserving that power (Amodia 1983: 7). From the outset, the new party relied heavily on the apparatus of the old regime. The way in which the reforms were undertaken, i.e. from above and within the basic laws of the authoritarian regime, enhanced the possibility for the UCD to profit from them. The state controlled mass media and public opinion polls, and the network of governing institutions at the province and municipal level (that were not democratised until 1979) were all employed to facilitate the success of the UCD.

Even though the UCD was completely dependent upon the very popularity and success of Adolfo Suárez, it soon became clear that he and his ministers alone could not build a party that was strong enough to win the elections. In fact, during the first

³⁵This notion stems from the idea, popular among conservatives, that the Spanish electorate has an imminent rightist inclination.

six months of 1977 a plethora of embryonic parties had emerged orbiting around the centre of the political spectrum. Therefore, Suárez had his close collaborator Calvo Sotelo negotiate with all these tiny splinter groups in order to make them run under the UCD umbrella. With the possible exception of the *Centro Democrático*, each and one of these groups had no hopes of electoral success on their own due to the characteristics of the new electoral law (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). As part of the UCD machine their leaders could secure for themselves an access to political power, while they gave the UCD a much-needed Centrist profile. The UCD was founded, then, as a rather opportunistic coalition set up only weeks before the election in 1977. At the right, Suárez' loose alliance of Liberals, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Conservatives, had to compete with the AP of course. However, AP's founder, Manuel Fraga, soon "discovered" that in his own party he was surrounded by people much to the Right of himself (Vilar 1986: 49). Thus, the AP had to struggle with the impression that it was the party of the old Francoist hard-liners.

On the Left, the PSOE was boosted by substantial financial support from French and German Socialists whereas the PCE was tarnished by conflicts with its Catalan partner PSUC. These features added to the impression that the PSOE was the only solid alternative of the Left.

Table 4.1: National Election Results 1977-2000 (percent of valid votes cast):

	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000
Turnout	78,8	68,0	80,0	70,5	69,7	76,4	77,4	70,0
PCE/IU	9,3	10,8	4,0	4,6	9,1	9,6	10,5	5,5
PSOE	29,3	30,4	48,1	44,1	39,6	38,8	37,6	34,1
UCD/CDS	34,4	34,8	9,6	9,2	7,9	1,8	-	-
AP/PP	8,2	6,1	26,4	26,0	25,8	34,8	38,8	44,5
Regional*	6,9	8,8	7,7	9,6	10,9	10,4	9,9	11,1
Other	11,9	9,1	4,2	6,5	6,7	4,6	3,2	4,8

* Only regional parties that obtained parliamentary representation are included.

Source: The Spanish Ministry of the Interior. The calculations are my own.

As shown in table 4.1, the UCD won the elections both in 1977 and in 1979. Thus, the incumbent leader of the old regime also became the first Premier under democratic rule. The 1977 result in particular was remarkable if we take into account that the

party was set up such a short time before the elections. It was also seen as a personal triumph of Suárez over Fraga on the Right. The second largest party was the PSOE, three times the size of the Communists. Thus, the moderates on both the Left and the Right had polled nearly two-thirds of the votes. This result was, for all practical purposes, repeated in 1979, the first election under the new Constitution (enacted on the basis of popular referendum in 1978). In 1982, however, we note that a substantial realignment took place. Between 1979 and 1982, the UCD had split in two when Suárez left both the government and the party to form the *Centro Democrático y Social*, CDS. These two parties, UCD and CDS, together polled less than 10 percent, while the AP quadrupled its share to more than 26 percent. On the Left, the PCE was halved to 4 percent while the PSOE polled more than 48 percent and gained absolute majority in the Parliament. The subsequent peaceful inauguration of a Socialist government, apparently accepted by all relevant sectors of society, was to many observers the definite token of democratic consolidation. Also by the token of electoral support for the forces that explicitly stressed their ideological links with the old regime, the transition seemed successful. The extreme right polled 2.1 percent in 1979, its highest percentage in any national election after the abolition of the Francoist regime. Since then, the electoral demise of the extreme Right has been steady, albeit slower, also in local elections.

As outlined in chapter 2, the *sequence* of electoral handling of problems implied that the main electoral issues at the first election in 1977 were centred round the very regime transition process itself. Indeed, the first election took place *before* a new democratic constitution was enacted. In fact, the elaboration of a new constitution was the very task to be undertaken by the resulting legislature. Consequently, the Left-Right divide was not so much perceived of in traditional socio-economic terms as in the stance on *regime change*, i.e. radical rupture, reform, status quo or even brutal reaction.

The 1982 debacle was followed by a long period of Socialist predominance that lasted until 1996. However, the support for the AP and its successor *Partido Popular* (PP) on the Right made a leap from just above 25 percent of the votes cast in 1989 to nearly 35 percent in 1993. In 1996 the AP/PP won by a slight margin and formed the first government of the Right after the collapse of the UCD. In 2000, however, AP/PP

won more votes alone than the combined votes cast for PSOE and the *Izquierda Unida* (IU – an alliance dominated by the PCE, established in 1986) and gained absolute majority in Parliament. Thus, for the first time after Franco's demise, the Spanish Right could govern without the support of any other party group in Parliament.

Apart from the electoral fate of the parties and the changes in government formations, one particular aspect of the 1977-2000 elections should be noted. A quick glance at the table reveals that the level of electoral turnout suffered drastic changes between some of the elections. The first election in 1977 saw a near 79 percent turnout, which then dropped to 68 percent in 1979. The realignment election in 1982 saw a sharp rise in turnout again to 80 percent before it dropped to around 70 percent both in 1986 and 1989. As the AP/PP gained momentum in 1993 and 1996, the turnout rose above 75 percent again before it eventually dropped to 70 percent again in 2000. Thus, there can be no doubt that the changes in electoral turnout played a significant part in deciding the results of the elections in terms of the shares of the vote obtained by the various parties along the functional Left-Right axis. Consequently, on the basis of this observation, particular attention shall be paid to the role played by electoral abstention in the formation of the party systems.

Party building under democratic transition: The case of UCD

The electoral debacle in 1982 and the subsequent collapse of the UCD have received particular academic attention both within the research on political parties *per se* and on processes of democratisation (Hunnæus 1985; Gunther 1993; Hopkin 1999a; Gunther and Hopkin 2002). During the aforementioned sequential translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages, a fundamental lack of institutionalisation at the central elite level proved fatal to the survival the party. The peculiar logic of the pacted transition to democracy implied that the political parties would have to perform a series of more or less incompatible functions simultaneously. The establishment of democratic rules of the game required strong inter-party consensus that was difficult to combine with intra-party cohesion, and the search for marginal votes in order to win the elections ran to a certain extent contrary to the building of electoral core constituencies.

As mentioned above, the task that the first UCD government faced after the electoral victory in 1977 was to preside over a constituent process that would hopefully lead to a widespread support for the democratic regime. In the light of Spain's troubled constitutional experiences in the past, on the whole the constituent process supervised by the UCD must be considered a great success. Although Suárez and his colleagues did not succeed in integrating and obtaining the full support from the Basque Nationalists, the 1978 constitution had a broader socio-political basis than any previous constitution in Spanish history (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). However, the strong emphasis on inter party consensus proved to be costly for the governing party and would eventually lead to its total collapse in 1982. The electoral and institutional fate of the UCD is quite instructive in order to understand the interplay between the ideological Left-Right cleavage and the territorial Centre-Periphery cleavage in the process of creating the new political system. As pointed out by José Amodia, the UCD emerged on a concurrence of two forms of legitimacy. One pertained to the idea of continuity, the other to the idea of change. The first represented a bridging of the gap between the dictatorship and the liberal democracy that was to succeed it. This institutional continuity enabled broad sectors of the ruling class under Franco to survive politically.

"They crossed the bridge (some rather startling conversions to democracy taking place along the way), they organized themselves, and they continued to exercise power in the new democratic system, just as they had done under the previous authoritarian system with, of course, all the formal adjustments that such a radical transformation required". (Amodia 1983: 1).

On the other hand, the UCD has to be understood on the basis of the legitimacy offered by change in itself. Political reform was initiated and guided by the coming leaders of the party. In this perspective, the UCD emerged as an attempt to profit from the reform process. It was a clever and well-timed way of exploiting the exceptional circumstances created by Franco's demise. The legitimacy that democratic change afforded them and the possibility of continuing to exercise power acted as catalysts to bring together a wide range of frondes, budding parties, and public figures, all of them Right of Centre in the ideological spectrum - the exceptions being very few. In fact, of the three pillars of Francoism - financial/industrial power, the church and the armed forces - only the latter can be said not to have been directly involved in the UCD venture (Amodia 1983: 1-5).

The industrialisation, urbanisation and general increase in the popular welfare, and the clever management by Adolfo Suárez and the UCD, had to a substantial extent overcome the problems posed by conflicting interests embodied in the profound socio-economic inequalities that had exploded under the Second Republic and led to violent political confrontations and the fully fledged civil war. However, as it turned out, Suárez and the UCD were less fortunate when they tried to cope with the value based divisions, epitomised in relation to the issues of divorce and abortion, and the territorial divisions, i.e. the pending questions pertaining to the territorial structure of the Spanish state and the challenge posed by the political aspirations of the Basque and Catalan peripheries. Even before the death of Franco, the idea that without some kind of autonomy for these regions democracy would be impossible, and vice versa, was quite widespread (Balcells 1993: 62). This was due to the thesis of the two Spains and the peculiar dialectic of democracy and dictatorship on the one hand, and of centralism and autonomy on the other:

"... Spanish politics have swung between two diametrically opposed traditions: the liberal democratic, pluralist tradition, best exemplified in the social and political development of Aragón and especially Catalonia, and the unitary, centralist tradition, most recently epitomised in the Franco regime. In modern times, when the democratic tradition has come to the fore, it has always been accompanied by the pressure for some form of regional autonomy; indeed, some form of devolution has been seen as an essential ingredient of that democracy." (Newton 1983: 98).

In the general euphoria, the so-called *encanto*, of the first years of democratic rule, the territorial question was handled in a rather chaotic way. Virtually everybody seemed to think that autonomy would consolidate the democracy and solve the economic problems in the regions. This *autonomanía* made even provinces with no known history of autonomous institutions crave for their own regional parliament. The government chose to deal with the "historical" claims of the regions with national minorities, i.e. the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, on the one hand and all the others on the other in a rather peculiar way. The Constitution of 1978 differed between two roads to autonomy, the § 151 (originally designed for the regions of the cultural minorities) and the § 143 (a lesser version for the rest). However, the "non-national" regions could also achieve autonomy by the § 151, provided that an absolute majority was obtained in the referendums in every one of their provinces. This immediately sparked a fierce debate over the status of the two kinds of autonomy, to whom they should be granted and how they should be implemented. And, after a

series of turbulent debates, Andalucía was granted autonomy by the § 151 even though the required majority was not obtained in the Almería province.

The autonomy process also faced a serious problem in the dialectic between the extreme regional nationalists and the military forces. The ETA violence and the territorial differentiation were perceived by sectors within the military apparatus as decisive steps towards the total disintegration of the Spanish state, whose integrity was its very *raison d'être* (Boyd and Boyden 1985). In this chaotic situation the UCD and the PSOE came together in order to establish a pact that would "harmonise" the autonomy process. This ended in a legislative act called *Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico* (LOAPA). In general, the leaders of the nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia were extremely sceptical to the very idea of the LOAPA process, which they despicably dismissed as "coffee for everybody".³⁶ The main point, however, is that the problems which the party faced in regard to the handling of the value based issues were compounded by how party handled the question of regional autonomy. Straddling these two issue dimensions is seen as perhaps the main reason why the UCD, as a coalition of the Centre and the Right, collapsed. The party was clearly not able to handle the situation and at the first autonomous elections in 1980, each and one of the regional results backfired on the party (Vilar 1986: 112).

Thus, from a transition-theoretical perspective, Suárez and the UCD proved themselves very instrumental in the process of bridging the gap between the incumbents and the opposition in order to establish modes of political action that led to a peaceful and guided restoration of parliamentary democracy in Spain. On the other hand, the UCD was less successful in reforming the territorial administration of the Spanish state. The transfer of powers from the central to regional governments is still, at the beginning of the 21st century, a controversial question that awaits a solution. Because of this, the governing Centre-Right party between 1996 and 2004, *Partido Popular*, was only able to reach uneasy agreements with the Centre-Right

³⁶i.e. that all the regions were treated equally regardless of history and thus slowing down the transfer of powers to their own regions. See interviews with regional party leaders Xabier Arzalluz, Xosé M. Beiras, Angel Colom and Jordi Pujol in *El País* 28.3 1992, 10.5 1992, 3.10 1993 and 10.10 1993.

Basque and Catalan parties.³⁷ In fact, the PNV and the CiU preferred to keep the PSOE in power until the situation became unbearable in the mid 1990s.³⁸ This reflects a persistent lack of trust between the Spanish Centre-Right on the one hand and the Basque and the Catalan Centre-Right on the other.

In sum, the collapse of the UCD in 1982 paved the way for the socialist PSOE and for the AP/PP as the main opposing parties at the national level. And there is no doubt that the PP under the leadership of José M. Aznar went to lengths in order to occupy the Centre-Right position finally left completely vacant by the demise of the CDS in 1993.

Parties and seats in parliament 1977-2000

Apart from the parties described above, a number of other regional parties have obtained parliamentary representation at one or more of the elections. Table 4.2 (below) presents an overview of the regional representation according to the categories of the Centre-Periphery typology presented in chapter 3. As shown in the table, the state-wide parties have obtained between 315 to 326 of the 350 seats in Parliament, i.e. between 90 and 93 percent of the total. The number of seats obtained by the First Periphery parties has ranged from none to seven (2 percent of the total) and the number obtained by the Second Periphery parties from 20 to 32, i.e. between 6 to 9 percent of the Spanish total. In relation to the 125 parliamentary seats from the First Periphery, the regional parties have obtained between none and 6 percent. Of the 90 seats from the Second Periphery, the regional parties have obtained between 22 and 36 percent. This implies, of course, that the state-wide parties have faced a far stronger competition from the regional parties in the Second Periphery than in the First Periphery. In terms of the functional axis, three regions have managed to gain representation for both the regionalist Left and Right: Basque Country and Catalonia

³⁷Over the years, the AP has run under a series of labels in alliance with others before eventually establishing itself as the *Popular Party* (PP - *Partido Popular*) in 1989.

³⁸Approaching the 1990s a third phenomenon strongly affecting Spanish politics in general and the governing party, the PSOE, in particular, should be noted. This is the phenomenon of the *escándalo político*, the syndrome of political scandals, i.e. corruption and illegal funding of counter-terrorism against the ETA involving high ranking PSOE officials, that tarnished the González government in the 1990s. The effect of these scandals was most heavily felt in the capital, Madrid, where the traditional PSOE hegemony among the employees in the bureaucracy was completely eradicated, but it also tarnished the PNV and the CiU as PSOE's supporters in Parliament (Heras 1997: 510).

of the Second Periphery and Aragón of the First Periphery.³⁹ This means that the state-wide parties have faced serious competition both on the Left and the Right in these regions. In the Basque Country, the PSOE managed to merge with the Basque Left Party (EE) before the 1993 elections. It should also be noted that the IU alliance have tended to stress a federalist structure in that its various regional branches command certain autonomy vis-à-vis the central party apparatus. However, the tensions between the central apparatus and the Catalan branch culminated with the excision of the IC-V in 2000.

Table 4.2 Parties and seats in parliament 1977-2000

State-wide parties:	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000
<i>PCE/IU</i>	19	23	4	7	17	18	21	8
<i>PSOE</i>	118	121	202	184	175	159	141	125
<i>UCD</i>	166	168	11					
<i>CDS</i>			2	19	14			
<i>AP/PP</i>	16	10	107	105	107	141	156	183
Other*	7	1						
Sum	326	323	326	315	313	318	318	316
1. Periphery parties:								
<i>PSA/PA</i> (Andalucía)		5			2			1
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i> (Canaries)		1		1	1	4	4	4
<i>CAIC/PAR</i> (Aragón)	1	1		1	1	1		
<i>CHA</i> (Aragón)								1
<i>UV</i> (Valencian C.)				1	2	1	1	
Sum	1	7	0	3	6	6	5	6
2. Periphery parties:								
<i>CiU**</i> (Catalonia)	13	8	12	18	18	17	16	15
<i>ERC***</i> (Catalonia)	1	1	1			1	1	1
<i>IC-V</i> (Catalonia)								1
<i>EE</i> (Basque Country)	1	1	1	2	2			
<i>PNV</i> (Basque Country)	8	7	8	6	5	5	5	7
<i>HB</i> (Basque Country)		3	2	5	4	2	2	
<i>EA</i> (Basque Country)					2	1	1	1
<i>BNG</i> (Galicia)				1			2	3
Sum	23	20	24	32	31	26	27	28
Total	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350

*Includes the Leftist PSP-US that obtained 6 seats in 1977.

PDPC and UDC-IDCC in 1977.*ECFED in 1977 and ERFN in 1979.

In order to clarify the combined location of the parties on both the Left-Right axis and the Centre-Periphery axis, the parties in table 4.2 are grouped into six broad

³⁹ The Andalusian party ran under a socialist denomination in 1979 (PSA) and later reappeared as the Centre-Right PA.

categories of party blocs produced by the intersection of the two cleavages in table 4.3 (below).

Table 4.3 Party Blocs according to Left-Right and Centre-Periphery location

	Left	Right
State-wide	<i>PCE/IU</i> <i>PSOE</i>	<i>UCD</i> <i>CDS</i> <i>AP/PP</i>
1. Periphery	<i>PSA (Andalucía)</i> <i>CHA (Aragón)</i>	<i>PA (Andalucía)</i> <i>CAIC/PAR (Aragón)</i> <i>CUPC/AIC/CC (Canarias)</i> <i>UV (Valencian C.)</i>
2. Periphery	<i>ERC (Catalonia)</i> <i>IC-V (Catalonia)</i> <i>EE (Basque Country)</i> <i>HB (Basque Country)</i> <i>BNG (Galicia)</i>	<i>CiU (Catalonia)</i> <i>PNV (Basque Country)</i> <i>EA (Basque Country)</i>

As shown in the table, there are nine relevant parties of a Leftist orientation – two state-wide parties, two emanating from the First Periphery and five from the Second Periphery. To this it should be added that the Leftist PSP-US, established by Tierno Galvan in 1977 and merged with PSOE in 1979, also belonged to the state-wide category. At the Right we find altogether ten parties – three belonging to the state-wide category, four from the First Periphery and three from the Second Periphery. As mentioned above, it should be noted that PSA and PA is basically the same party organisation that shifted its stance on the Left-Right axis in the mid 1980s and thus appears as two parties in the typology.

From the general assumptions to specific hypotheses

On the basis of the discussion in this chapter, the set of assumptions derived from the theoretical discussion in chapter 2 can be reformulated into more specific hypotheses as to the behaviour of the electorate between the pairs of elections with regards to both turnout and party choice along the functional axis and the territorial axis. I shall start out by specifying a set of hypotheses regarding electoral mobilisation and

demobilisation, i.e. the behaviour of the new voters included in the electorate between elections and the behaviour of the electoral abstainers.

Electoral mobilisation

The first overarching assumption dealt with the mobilisation of the electorate between elections. In the typology of electoral behaviour at two consecutive elections outlined in chapter 3, we first made a distinction between those who remained inactive at both elections and those who turned out to vote at one of the elections, i.e. the discontinuously active. At the first election in a pair of elections, there are two categories of inactive voters. One category consists of those who are inactive by default in that they only reached voting age at the second election: the new voters. The other category consists of abstainers proper, i.e. those who have the right to vote but opt not to turn out.

The mobilisation of new voters 1977-2000

Making *a priori* assumptions as to the behaviour of the new voters included in the electorate between elections is a somewhat risky business due to the fact that we have no aggregate turnout rate for this category to base our assumptions on. However, in line with general findings from electoral research, we shall expect that in general the largest share of the new voters will have opted for abstention between 1977 and 2000. This assumption is rather trivial and the behaviour of the new voters in the Spanish context is far more interesting in relation to the sequential translation of the societal divisions into manifest cleavages. As noted by Franklin, members of the new cohorts of the electorate are commonly the most responsive to changes in the characteristics of elections, i.e. campaigning, degree of competitiveness and prospects for change in government (Franklin 2004: 210). As discussed in relation to the aggregate electoral results, the 1977-2000 period saw two waves of electoral mobilisation that coincided with substantial realignments of the electorate along the functional axis. The first led to the landslide victory for the Socialists in 1982 and the second to a 9 percent increase in the proportion of valid votes cast for the rejuvenated AP/PP at the highly competitive election in 1993. Thus, we shall hypothesise that the results of these two elections were in part produced by a substantial mobilisation also among the new voters. These two expectations are summed up in the following hypothesis:

H1: *In general, the largest proportions of the new voters have opted for abstention between 1977 and 2000. The realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, saw a sharp increase in turnout among the new voters.*

The next hypothesis deals with the mobilisation of new voters in relation to the territorial axis. According to the Centre-Periphery theory and the so-called *nationalisation* of the party vote, we should *a priori* expect that the mobilisation of the new voters has been much less pronounced in the Peripheries than in the core areas, i.e. the Centre (Rokkan 1970; Taylor and Johnston 1979; Caramani 2004). Thus, the mobilisation of new voters in relation to the territorial axis can be summed up in the following hypothesis:

H2: *Substantially lower proportions of new voters have turned out in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The greatest differences in turnout will be found between the Second Periphery and the Centre.*

Electoral abstention 1977-2000

Based on the discussion in chapter 2, we shall expect that the mobilisation and demobilisation of the electorate would have varied systematically in relation to the sequence of translating the societal divisions into manifest cleavages between 1977 and 2000. As for the new voters, we shall expect that in general the largest share of first election abstainers opted for abstention again at the second elections. However, as the aggregate turnout depicted in table 4.1 clearly indicates, a mobilisation far outnumbering the influx of new voters must have taken place between 1979 and 1982 and, to a lesser extent, between 1989 and 1993. Therefore, at the two realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, we shall expect that a significant part of these realignments along the functional axis were produced by a substantial mobilisation among former abstainers. These two aspects of electoral behaviour are summed up in the following hypothesis:

H3: *In general, the largest proportion of those who abstained at the first election opted for abstention again at the second election between 1977 and 2000. The realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, saw a sharp increase in turnout among former abstainers.*

In relation to the territorial axis, we shall expect this pattern to be skewed in Centre-Periphery terms. As peripheries are denoted by distance, difference and dependence, we shall expect substantially lower levels of mobilisation among former abstainers in the Peripheries than in the Centre. Now, one thing is the long established fact that in Spain the aggregate turnout has been higher in the Centre than in the Peripheries (Justel 1997). Quite another is to find out exactly how this aggregate pattern is related to the dynamics of individual level mobilisation and demobilisation between the elections. In principle, the lower aggregate turnout in the Peripheries could easily conceal a dynamic of large proportions of voters transferring to and from abstention. However, in accord with the theory on centre-periphery structures and the electoral mobilisation of the peripheries (Taylor and Johnston 1979), we shall *a priori* expect that a larger proportion of first election abstainers have opted for abstention again at the second election in the Peripheries than in the Centre. And, due to the assumption of the voters in the Second Peripheries being *more* exposed to different pulling forces of identity than in the First Periphery, we shall expect the greatest differences will be found between the Centre and the Second Periphery. These two expectations are summed up in the following hypothesis:

H4: Larger proportions of abstainers at the first election have opted for abstention again at the second election in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The greatest differences will be found between the Second Periphery and the Centre.

Electoral stabilisation 1977-2000

The general assumption outlined in chapter 2 stated that the stabilisation of the electorate would have varied systematically in relation to the sequential translation of societal division into manifest cleavages between 1977 and 2000. As noted, transitions from authoritarianism and the consolidation of democracy typically entail a narrowing down of the electoral market and a stabilisation of voter behaviour. Thus, we shall expect a general increase in voter loyalty from the first pair of elections to the last pair, i.e. that the average loyalty rate between elections will have increased from 1977 to 2000. This general expectation, however, tells nothing about exactly *how* this relates to the position of the parties on the functional axis and the territorial axis. What we do know is that all the relevant parties underwent internal crises in the

process of moving from democratic *transition* to *consolidation*, i.e. in sorting out the puzzle of inter-party consensus versus intra-party cohesion (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). The UCD, not able to handle this, collapsed completely. However, after the 1982 debacle, PSOE emerged as triumphant and was able to stay in government till 1996. We shall therefore expect that PSOE was the first of the state-wide parties to see an increase in loyalty rates between elections from 1982 and onwards. Somewhat in the shadow of PSOE, AP/PP emerged as “sub-triumphant” in 1982 (del Castillo 1994) and thereafter slowly but steadily seemed to have consolidated its electoral stance until it eventually was able to challenge the position held by PSOE from 1993 and onwards. Thus, we shall expect that AP/PP was the second state-wide party to see an increase in loyalty rates between elections. The PCE/IU struggled to regain its strength after the debacle in 1982 and was only able to do so after the formation of the IU alliance. In 1989, however, its share of the votes reached the level of 1979 again. Thus, we shall expect that the PCE/IU was the third state-wide party that saw an increase in loyalty rates. Judging from the aggregate electoral results, the CDS never managed to assert itself as an electoral force during the period it existed. Consequently, we shall expect that this party never experienced a substantial level of voter loyalty between any pair of elections. These expectations are summed up in the following hypothesis:

H5: After the 1982 debacle, PSOE was the first state-wide party that managed to consolidate its electoral constituency in terms of increased loyalty rates between elections, followed by AP/PP and PCE/IU, while the CDS never managed to consolidate in this respect.

As to the relationship between the territorial axis and electoral stabilisation we have two aspects of this to consider. The first is related to the stabilisation of the party vote for the state-wide parties. Following the general connotations of the Centre-Periphery concept, i.e. distance, difference and dependency, and the theory of *nationalisation of party voting* (Rose and Urwin 1975; Taylor and Johnston 1979; Caramani 2004), we should *a priori* expect that the behaviour of voters in the Centre would have followed the national trends to a greater extent than the voters in the Peripheries. Thus, due to the assumed impact of the Centre-Periphery cleavage in Spain, we shall expect that the increased voter loyalty commanded by the state-wide parties was far less pronounced in the Peripheries than in the Centre:

H6: The loyalty rates commanded by the state-wide parties were substantially lower in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The greatest difference in loyalty rates will be found between the Centre and the Second Periphery.

The second aspect deals with the stabilisation of the electoral constituencies of the regional parties. As described above, the territorial challenge posed by the aspirations of the ‘historical’ peripheries, Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, was the second in the sequence to be handled. Consequently, between 1980 and 1981 the three Second Periphery regions held their first elections to the new regional parliaments.⁴⁰ The establishment of these parliaments marked the fulfilment of the first claim put forward by the regionalist elites. However, due to the interplay between the territorial and functional axes as captured in the radial centre-periphery typology, the electoral fate of their regionalist parties showed a marked difference between the two economically advanced regions, Basque Country and Catalonia, on the one hand and the economically backward Galicia on the other. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, the elections were won by the regional ‘nationalist’ Right, PNV and CiU, respectively. In the Basque Country, the HB was quickly able to establish itself on the Left, whereas the ERC of Catalonia trailed well behind the CiU. In Galicia, however, the Leftist BNG became the biggest regionalist party – albeit trailing the dominant state-wide parties by a great margin. In fact, it was actually the AP/PP under the regional leadership of the former Francoist minister Manuel Fraga that was able to assert itself as the dominant electoral and political force in Galicia between 1981 and 2000. Only slowly was the BNG able to catch up and become the second biggest party in the regional elections, and had to wait until the mid 1990s before it was able to assert itself also at the general elections.

Therefore, we shall expect that the successes of the Basque and Catalan Right spilled over into the general elections and that they saw an increased voter loyalty already from the beginning of the 1980s and onwards. We shall expect that the third regionalist force to achieve an increase in voter loyalty was the Basque Left, while both the Catalan and Galician Left lagged behind in this respect.

Due to the assumption that the impact of the Centre-Periphery cleavage will have been much weaker in the First Periphery, we shall expect a rather erratic pattern for

⁴⁰ The fourth § 151 region, Andalucía, held its first regional election in 1982 and the § 143 regions in 1983.

the regional parties from these areas. These expectations are summed up in the following hypothesis:

H7: The Basque and Catalan Right saw a substantial increase in voter loyalty between the general elections after 1980. The Basque Left quickly followed suit, while the Catalan and Galician Left lagged behind. For the regional parties of the First Periphery no clear trend will be identified.

Electoral competition 1977-2000

A corollary of the narrowing down of the electoral market is that the scope of electoral competition is also narrowed down, i.e. that voter mobility will become restricted to certain segments of the electorate. In the general phrasing of the assumptions derived from theory it was stated that the transfers of votes between parties have varied systematically according to the translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages from 1977 and onwards in regard to party choice both along the functional axis and along the territorial axis. Now, since we are studying the behaviour of the whole electorate at pairs of consecutive elections, we have to take into account the party choice of both the new voters and the first and second election abstainers in addition to the direct transfers between the political parties proper.

Taking as point of departure the aforementioned assumption that the new electoral cohorts are the most responsive to the characteristics of the elections, we should expect the new voters have cast their votes according to the sequence of cleavage translation. Thus, we shall expect that the largest share of the new voters that turned out will have opted for UCD at the first pair of elections. From 1982 and onwards PSOE will surely have asserted itself as the main capturer of new voters compared to the other parties. With the recuperation of the PCE/IU, more new voters will have opted also for this party. And, lastly, with the neo-liberalist impetus also the AP/PP will have made inroads into this group of voters. This means that the mobilisation of new voters in relation to party choice will have followed a certain pattern: PSOE will have polled its largest shares of the new voters between 1979 and 1982, PCE/IU between 1986 and 1989, and AP/PP between 1989 and 1993. These expectations are summed up in the following hypothesis:

H8: The new voters' party choice will have followed the sequential translation of cleavages in that the UCD polled a large share between 1977 and 1979, the PSOE polled large shares from 1982 and onwards, the PCE/IU increased its share in the latter half of the 1980s and AP/PP became the preferred party for the new voters in the 1990s.

As to the transfers of votes between the parties, we shall start out with the rather trivial assumption that the parties that had not managed to stabilise its electorates saw a larger share of their former voters transfer to the parties that had managed the shift from democratic transition to consolidation than vice versa. i.e. that the PCE/IU saw a larger share of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP between 1977 and 1982 than the other way round. Given the salience of the Left-Right ideological cleavage, we should of course expect that the bulk of these transfers would benefit PSOE rather than AP/PP. With the creation of the IU alliance in 1986, however, we shall expect that the PCE/IU will have obtained net gains from the other parties. And, likewise, we shall expect that the main beneficiary from the collapse of the UCD will have been AP/PP. And, given its location between the Centre and the Right on the functional axis, this will also have been the case for the former CDS voters. Thus, the following hypothesis is stated:

H9: The parties that lagged behind in party building after the transitional phase (PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) saw large proportions of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP between 1982 and 2000. With the formation of the IU alliance in 1986, the PCE/IU obtained net gains from the other parties.

As to electoral mobilisation for, and competition between, the state-wide parties in relation to the territorial axis, there are various aspects to consider. Apart from the obvious fact that the state-wide parties have had to compete with a range of regional parties in the Peripheries and that therefore the logic of party competition in the Peripheries differed from that of the Centre, we shall also expect that the logic of exposure to different pulling forces of identity has had bearings on the competition between the state-wide parties in the Peripheries. Again, taking as point of departure the notion that the peripheries are marked by distance, difference and dependency, we shall expect that the trend in voter transfers between the state-wide parties will have differed markedly between the Peripheries and the Centre:

H10: *The trends in voter mobilisation and transfers between the state-wide parties have differed markedly between the Centre and the Peripheries. The greatest discrepancy in this respect will be found between the Centre and the Second Periphery.*

In accord with the above, then, in the analysis of the dynamics of electoral behaviour between the 1977-2000 general elections, particular emphasis will be put on the *mobilisation* of the electorate, the *stabilisation* of the vote and electoral competition in terms of *mobility* between parties. In this, the hypotheses H1 to H10 shall be put to empirical tests.

What may be labelled the dependent variable in the following analyses is twofold: First, it measures variations in the level of volatility in terms of correlations between the proportions of the electorate that opted for the same category of electoral behaviour at pairs of consecutive elections. These variations will be assessed by way of comparisons between the relevant electoral categories, i.e. parties, electoral abstainers and so forth, over time. Second, it measures variations in the individual level mobility of voters in terms of estimated proportions of voters that remained loyal or transferred their vote between two consecutive elections. This will be assessed by way of comparisons both over time and across electoral districts.

But first, an analysis of the aggregate logit correlations that serve as the very underpinnings for the individual inferences will be presented. These correlations will serve as an indicator as to what extent the general electoral trends identified in the previous chapters are reflected across the Spanish territory. Given the fact that the 8.0000 municipalities exhibit an enormous variation in the size of the electorates, from less than 20 voters to around two million registered voters, it is an open question *whether* and *how* the national trends are reflected across the municipalities. This will be helpful in order to help us assess the impact of the sequential translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages along both the Left-Right and Centre-Periphery axis. This, then, is the theme of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

Mobilisation, Stabilisation and Competition: Aggregate Electoral Profiles of the Municipalities

Introduction

In this chapter we shall map the patterns of aggregate electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition on the basis of the data tied to the municipal level. We shall measure the relationship between aggregate proportions of the electorate at pairs of elections according to the typology of electoral behaviour outlined in the previous chapters. Particular emphasis is put on aggregate stability and change along the two main cleavages of the party system(s): The functional axis and the territorial axis. The aim of the analysis is to refine our understanding of the electoral profiles of the municipalities before we embark upon the individual level analysis. Thus, this analysis has three basic objectives: 1) It will serve as the initial indicator as to what extent the expectations regarding the electoral behaviour outlined in the set of hypotheses are reflected across the Spanish territory, i.e. whether the electoral swings shown in chapter 4 coincided with any form of *territorial* realignments of the electorate. Likewise, 2) it will detect any electoral swings across the municipalities *not* detected in the overall results for Spain as a whole, i.e. territorial shifts in electoral behaviour that did not alter the overall relative sizes of the parties from one election to the next. And 3) it will serve to detect any particular aggregate relationships between the state-wide parties and the regional parties that will be followed up in the district wise analyses in chapters 7-9.

The first question to be answered is, of course, whether any systematic patterns of positive and/or negative correlations between the aggregate proportions of the electorate at the municipal level can be detected at all. The second question is to what extent we can detect any systematic changes over time in relation to the postulated sequential translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages. In assessing this, we should bear in mind that when we are talking of the aggregate profiles of electoral turnout and party support, the bottom line is that we are assessing the electoral

profiles of the municipalities *per se*. When, for example, the support for two parties co-vary in a positive fashion, i.e. that strong support for the one goes hand in hand with strong support for the other, we should not imply the existence any direct behavioural connection between the two parties.

The bulk of the analysis is based on tables presenting logit correlations between one option at the first election and all the other relevant options at the second election. The correlations are calculated between the aggregate proportions obtained by the various electoral options across all the municipalities in which the specific options were presented to the voters. This implies that the number of municipalities (*N*) for which the correlations are calculated will vary between the parties. The analysis is limited to the political parties that won a minimum of one seat in parliament at specific elections between 1977 and 2000. This means that some of the smaller regional parties will appear as specific entries only for some of the pairs of elections.

First, however, we shall turn to the questions of aggregate electoral abstention and party stabilisation. Table 5.1 (below) presents the logit correlations between the same categories of the electorate the pairs of consecutive elections.

Table 5.1 Aggregate stability between elections 1977-2000: logit correlations

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>Abstain</i>	.81	.69	.75	.84	.81	.69	.84
<i>PCE/IU</i>	.90	.90	.86	.90	.92	.95	.91
<i>PSOE</i>	.82	.84	.86	.92	.94	.93	.90
<i>UCD</i>	.86	.73					
<i>CDS</i>			.70	.86	.77		
<i>AP/PP</i>	.66	.66	.87	.96	.93	.96	.96
<i>CiU*</i>	.82	.82	.96	.98	.98	.98	.98
<i>ERC**</i>	.49	.77				.95	.97
<i>EE</i>	.74	.69	.91	.95			
<i>PNV</i>	.47	.93	.95	.96	.98	.99	.98
<i>HB</i>		.86	.96	.96	.98	.98	
<i>EA</i>					.97	.97	.96
<i>BNG</i>						.83	.85
<i>PA</i>					.69	.74	.68
<i>AIC/CC</i>				.91	.24	.83	.79
<i>CAIC/PAR</i>	.37			.57	.54		
<i>UV</i>				.91	.95	.97	.89

*Votes cast for PDPC in 1977. **Votes cast for ECFED in 1977 and ERFN in 1979.

Strong positive correlations indicate a high degree of stability between the two elections, whereas weaker correlations indicate that a certain degree of restructuring of electoral abstention and party choice has taken place across the municipalities.

Electoral abstention

According to the overarching assumption derived from the theoretical discussion we should expect that the mobilisation of the electorate would have varied according to the sequential translation of cleavages. As noted in chapter 4, the elections were clearly differentiated as to their level of overall percent wise turnout. Thus, the elections in 1977, 1982 and 1993 were mobilising elections in that the turnout was substantially higher compared to the other elections. On the other hand, the elections in 1979, 1986 and 2000 were demobilising elections. The elections in 1989 and 1996 were marked by stability in terms of overall turnout. Hence, as stated in the *H3* hypothesis, we should expect that the largest share of those who abstained at the first elections opted for abstention again at the second elections, but that the realignment elections in 1982 and 1993 saw a sharp increase in turnout among the former abstainers. However, from table 5.1 we note that in terms of logit correlations between the proportions of abstainers at the pairs of elections across the 8,000 municipalities, a slightly different logic appears. The two pairs of elections that show the lowest logit correlations (.69) are the ones between 1979-82 and 1993-96. The first is in line with the expectations, but the second implies that also the 1996 election saw a territorial realignment of the electorate – only that between 1993 and 1996 it took place as a change in the distribution of turnout across the municipalities in such a fashion that it did not produce great changes in the overall turnout. This indicates that PP must have mobilised a great share of former abstainers in many of the smaller municipalities. Thus, both the PSOE victory in 1982 and the PP victory in 1996 coincided with a change in the territorial distribution of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation. This is highly illuminating in relation to the postulated sequential translation of cleavages. This particular aspect of electoral behaviour in Spain has not been treated in previous research.

We find the highest aggregate correlations between the elections in 1986 and 1989 and again between 1996 and 2000. This is in accordance with the general impression

expressed by electoral observers: From the mid 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s the predominant position of the PSOE and the weakness of the Spanish Right seemed a natural fact (Montero 1989). Hence the impetus for a substantial electoral mobilisation to the benefit of the AP/PP never materialised. In 2000 something similar happened, only that this time the table was turned: The strongly wished for mobilisation of the Spanish Left turned out to be just that, wishful thinking, on behalf of the PSOE and the IU. The election in 1986 falls in a different category. The correlation between electoral abstention in 1982 and 1986 falls in between the pattern discussed above. In 1986 there was no substantial shift between Left and Right, but the party system of the Left underwent some changes in relation to the referendum on the NATO membership. The PCE formed an alliance with other leftist groups opposing the shift in the political stance of the PSOE regarding the maintenance of the NATO affiliation. This alliance, then, served as the platform for launching the *Izquierda Unida* (IU).

In sum, the pattern of *mobilisation* and *demobilisation* in terms of overall variations in the electoral turnout has to a certain extent been reflected in the patterns of change and stability across the municipalities. In addition, we have detected that the AP/PP takeover of executive power also coincided with a territorial realignment of the electorate. As to the expectations stated in *H3* hypothesis, the aggregate correlations were in line with the assumptions for all the pairs of elections except for the 1993-96 pair. As noted, the low aggregate correlation between these two elections is particularly important since it was not detected in the percent wise turnout for Spain as a whole.

Electoral stabilisation

As to the electoral stabilisation of the political parties, the expectations related to the *H5* and the *H7* hypotheses are pertinent here. The first stated that, after the 1982 debacle, PSOE was the first of the state wide parties that managed to consolidate its electoral constituency in terms of increasing loyalty rates between elections after the transitional phase, followed by the AP/PP and the PCE/IU, while CDS never managed to consolidate in this respect. The second stated that the Basque and Catalan Right saw a substantial increase in voter loyalty between the general elections after 1980, followed by the Basque Left. It further stated that the Catalan and Galician Left

lagged behind and that no clear trend could be identified for the regional parties of the First Periphery.

Considering the five relevant state-wide parties first, we note that there has been a general tendency towards increased stabilisation over time. From having only the PCE hitting the .90 mark for the whole period between 1977 and 1986, we note that only the CDS exhibits correlations below the .90 mark for the subsequent period. All the three remaining state-wide parties, the IU, the PSOE, and the PP, exhibited a substantial stabilisation of their respective aggregate proportions of the electorate across the municipalities. For the PCE/IU we note that the 1982 debacle was *not* reflected at the aggregate municipal level, i.e. that the territorial distribution of the PCE/IU vote suffered very little changes in spite of the fact that its share of the valid votes cast fell from nearly eleven percent in 1979 to four percent in 1982. With the shift from PCE to IU between 1982 and 1986, however, we note that the correlation dropped, i.e. that the territorial distribution of its aggregate proportions of the electorate shifted somewhat with the creation of the IU.

Another trend is perhaps even more pronounced, namely that the Right, or more precisely the AP/PP, experienced a spectacular increase in aggregate stability over the years. From logit correlations at a mere .66 between 1977 and 1982, its stability rose to well over .90 from 1986-89 and onwards. And for the last pair of elections, 1996-2000, it was able to maintain a correlation at .96 while the correlations both for the IU and the PSOE decreased to .91 and .90, respectively. This is, again, in accord with the notion that the decline in electoral turnout between 1996 and 2000 affected the Left and the Right in quite different ways (Barreiro 2001). While the Left was punished, it seems that the Right was hardly affected at all at the aggregate level.

Thus, for the state-wide parties, the aggregate pattern is in line with the general expectations regarding the overall stabilisation of the vote after the founding elections. As to specific expectations derived from the *H5* hypothesis, however, the pattern is less clear. After the 1982 debacle, PCE/IU, PSOE and AP/PP all exhibited the same levels of aggregate stability and only CDS trailed well behind in accord with the hypothesis. Thus, at the aggregate level, the hypothesis as such is only partially supported.

Turning to the regional parties, we note that a trend of stabilisation in accord with the expectations has taken place for the Basque and Catalan parties. PNV was the first Basque party to hit the .90 mark already in 1982, while both HB and EE followed suit in 1986. We also note that the other Rightist Basque party, EA, showed very high aggregate correlations already between 1989 and 1993. Thus, from varying levels of stability at the first pairs of elections, EE, PNV, HB, and EA alike all stabilised well above the .90 mark.

In Catalonia the CiU and the ERC experienced an increase in aggregate stability from .82 and .49 to an impressive .98 and .97 respectively. For CiU's part, it saw a substantial change from the 1977-1982 elections to the 1982-1986 pair of elections and onwards. Since the ERC dropped out of Parliament in 1986 we do not have any records from the 1982-1993 pairs.

For the rest of the regional parties, the fortunes in terms of aggregate stabilisation leave a more mixed picture. In this, it should be underscored that several of the regional parties had undergone some profound changes over time both in terms of ideological orientations (PSA/PA) and of organisation. The two possible exceptions to this, the Valencian UV and the Galician BNG, were both able to achieve some level of stabilisation from 1986 and 1993 and onwards. Thus, on the whole, the expectations derived from the *H7* hypothesis are met at the aggregate level.

We conclude that 1) the swings in electoral turnout between elections identified in chapter 4 were to a large extent reflected by the logit correlations. The only exception compared to the overall percent wise turnout coincided with the AP/PP victory in 1996 and thus shows that the last step in the crystallisation of the Left-Right cleavage, i.e. passing the threshold of executive power, was reflected in a substantial change in the territorial pattern of mobilisation and demobilisation. We may further conclude that 2) the relevant state-wide parties in general experienced an increased aggregated stability across the municipalities. The fortunes of the Left and Right, however, differed somewhat. The spectacular increase from .66 at the two first pairs of elections to .96 at the two last pairs for AP/PP implied that the state-wide Right had asserted itself as the most stable electoral option at the aggregate level. The 1982-1986 pair of elections marked a turning point in this respect in that the AP/PP for the

first time was able to achieve an aggregate stability that equalled the two parties on the Left.

For the regional parties, we conclude that 3) the parties of the Second Periphery, Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia, together with the Valencian UV of the First Periphery, also experienced an aggregate stabilisation of their electorates. The fortunes of the rest of the regional parties were far more mixed in this respect.

The mobilisation of new voters

According to the *H1* hypothesis, the largest proportions of new voters would have opted for abstention between 1977 and 2000. The realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, would have seen a sharp increase in the proportions of new voters that turned out. From table 5.2 (below), we note that correlations between the aggregate proportions of new voters and electoral abstention only exhibit two substantial relationships, namely a positive correlation 1993 and a stronger negative one in 1996. Thus, only the 1993 election reflects an aggregate pattern in accord with the expectations and no substantial change is detected for the 1982 election. On the other hand, the correlations for 1989-93 and 1993-96 serve once again to underscore the point that the elections leading up to the AP/PP take over coincided with a shift in the territorial pattern of aggregate electoral behaviour.

According to the *H8* hypothesis, the new voters' party choice should have followed a sequential pattern related to the translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages. Accordingly, the UCD would have polled a large share of new voters between 1977 and 1979, the PSOE large shares from 1982 and onwards, the PCE/IU would have increased its share in the latter half of the 1980s, and AP/PP would have asserted itself as the dominant party among the new voters in the 1990s.

On the state-wide Right, we note that the support for the UCD related positively with the proportion of new voters at both the pairs of elections it ran. On the contrary, Suárez' new party, the CDS, showed the opposite trend. In this respect, then, the aggregate electoral profiles of the UCD and the CDS differed markedly. For the AP/PP we detect an unclear and shifting trend, from no relationship at all through a period of negative relationship towards a slightly positive relationship at the last pair of elections.

Table 5.2 New voters included at the 2nd election - logit correlations

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>Abstain</i>	-.04	.04	-.09	-.01	.19	-.30	.03
<i>PCE/IU</i>	-.21	.00	.19	.31	.44	.29	.33
<i>PSOE</i>	.04	.17	.31	.21	.13	.15	.23
<i>UCD</i>	.38	.26					
<i>CDS</i>		-.21	-.02	-.06	-.14		
<i>AP/PP</i>	-.04	.06	.00	-.20	-.20	-.26	.12
<i>UN</i>	.15						
<i>CiU</i>	.18	-.12	-.19	-.24	-.27	-.11	.18
<i>ERC</i>	.20	-.16			-.15	-.25	-.65
<i>IC</i>							-.16
<i>EE</i>	.69	.07	.31	.55			
<i>PNV</i>	-.03	.15	.31	.50	.62	.59	.43
<i>HB</i>	.15	.18	.29	.43	.29	.19	
<i>EA</i>				.47	.41	.18	-.11
<i>BNG</i>					.46	.33	.31
<i>PSA/PA</i>	-.26			.43			.23
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	.29		-.70	-.44	.30	.06	.01
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	.17		-.04	-.02	.39		.67
<i>UV</i>			-.05	-.13	.14	-.11	-.09
<i>Other</i>	-.41	.02	-.14	-.21	-.37	.01	-.17

On the Left, we note a significant shift in the trend for the PCE/IU. From a negative relationship at the 1977-79 pair of elections to a steady and fairly strong positive relationship from 1982 and onwards. The trend for the PSOE is similar, apart from the fact that it never exhibited a negative relationship and never obtained positive correlations of the strength shown by the PCE/IU. Thus, at the election in 2000 for the first time all the state-wide parties had come to correlate positively with the influx of new voters. The patterns detected are in accord with the expectations with one exception: AP/PP's expected dominant position among the newly enfranchised voters as we approach the millennium is not reflected at the aggregate level.

Moving to the regional parties, the *H2* hypothesis stated that a substantially lower proportion of new voters would have turned out to vote in Peripheries than in the Centre. Hence we should expect that the support for all the parties in the peripheries should correlate negatively with the influx of new voters, including the regional parties proper. The aggregate correlations, however, show a very mixed pattern indeed. In Catalonia, we note that the support for both CiU and ECR varied positively with the enfranchisement of the young in 1979, but that this relationship turned the

other way round in the 1980s and the 1990s. And, at the last election in 2000, the two parties differed markedly in their electoral profile in this respect. While the CiU changed from the negative relationship of the two preceding decades to a positive one, the ERC experienced a negative correlation at an impressive $-.65$. Also the party that broke off from the IU, the *Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds* (IC), noted a negative correlation. Thus, for the Catalan parties, we see that for the major part of the period studied, their support tended to co-vary negatively with the influx of newly enfranchised voters.

A quick glance at the correlations for the Basque parties reveals that their trends show quite the opposite tendency compared to Catalonia. With the exception of the PNV in 1979 and the EA in 2000 (the last time it ran as an independent party), they all exhibit positive correlations, and at times very strong ones. Thus, as a general rule, the Basque parties have been able to mobilise in the areas with larger proportions of young inhabitants reaching voting age between the elections. This also holds for the Galician BNG, whereas the fortunes of the other regional parties in this respect are rather mixed. We note that the Andalusian party PSA/PA suffered a change in electoral profile from a negative to positive relationship following precisely its removal of the label 'socialist' from its name in the 1980s.

On the whole, then, the expectations regarding the regional parties are not reflected at the aggregate level. The striking differences between the Catalan parties on the one hand and the Basque and Galician parties on the other clearly defy the general assumption underlying the hypothesis.

The mobilisation of first election abstainers

The *H4* hypothesis stated that larger proportions of abstainers at the first elections would have opted for abstention again at the second election in the Peripheries than in the Centre. Hence we should expect that the support for the state-wide parties will have correlated negatively with first election abstention and that the regional parties will have correlated positively.

The general trend to be found in table 5.3 (below) is in accord with the expectations in that the state-wide parties of both Left and Right have tended to draw less support in municipalities with higher levels of abstention at the first election, the only exception being the UCD in 1982.

Table 5.3 1st election abstention - logit correlations

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>PCE/IU</i>	-.44	-.38	-.48	-.40	-.29	-.14	-.27
<i>PSOE</i>	-.54	-.47	-.36	-.39	-.40	-.39	-.57
<i>UCD</i>	-.19	.08					
<i>CDS</i>		-.10	-.32	-.17	-.22		
<i>AP/PP</i>	-.06	-.19	-.15	-.20	-.29	-.42	-.34
<i>CiU</i>	-.05	.17	.02	-.32	-.39	-.36	-.43
<i>ERC</i>	.27	.23			-.41	.58	.43
<i>IC</i>							.06
<i>EE</i>	.23	.39	.19	.42			
<i>PNV</i>	.45	.54	.28	.20	.06	.35	.24
<i>HB</i>	.48	.29	.40	.40	.13	.52	
<i>EA</i>				.43	.15	.55	.48
<i>BNG</i>					-.38	-.26	-.20
<i>PSA/PA</i>	-.18			.08			.30
<i>CC/AIC/CC</i>			.36	.22	-.36	-.42	-.45
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	-.08		-.15	-.04	.06		.22
<i>UV</i>			.04	-.19	-.08	-.04	-.01
<i>Other</i>	-.07	-.06	.04	.17	.28	-.03	-.02

For the regional parties, however, the expectation is only met for the Basque parties. All the Basque parties correlated positively with first election abstention all through the period while the rest of the regional parties show a mixed pattern. The situation in the Basque Country should come as no surprise. Taking the extreme polarisation of Basque politics into consideration, it is not far fetched to evoke the notion of social gravity in trying to explain why this is the case (Llera 1994, 1998). This aspect of the elections in the Basque Country will be dealt with in a more detailed fashion in the individual level analyses.

The conclusion, then is that two trends are detected: 1) The state-wide parties have fared better in municipalities with a higher degree of electoral mobilisation at the first elections, and 2) the Basque parties have tended to draw support from municipalities with a lower degree of electoral mobilisation at the first elections. Thus, at the aggregate level, the expectations are reflected at the aggregate level the state-wide parties and for the Basque periphery, but not in relation to the Centre-Periphery axis in general.

Electoral competition

The expectations regarding electoral competition are related to hypothesis *H9*, stating that the state-wide parties that lagged behind in party building after the transitional phase (PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) should have seen large proportions of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP, but that after the formation of the IU alliance in 1986 the PCE/IU would have made net gains from the other parties. Hence we should expect fairly strong correlations between first election support for PCE/IU, UCD and CDS and the second election support for PSOE and AP/PP in the 1980s, but that these aggregate relationships were gradually weakened as we approach the millennium.

The first election PCE/IU vote

From table 5.4 we note that there was a fundamental difference between the two PCE/IU electoral debacles in 1982 and 2000 as to how they were related to electoral abstention. For the 1979-82 pair, the first election PCE vote showed the strongest negative correlation with electoral abstention at the subsequent election recorded for the whole period studied, whereas there was virtually no correlation at all between the 1996 IU vote and electoral abstention in 2000. This aggregate change is in line with the notion of an increased propensity for first election IU voters to opt for abstention at the second election identified in electoral research (Barreiro 2001).

In terms of the hypothesised relationships between PCE/IU the other state-wide parties, we note that the correlations with the support for PSOE at the second elections dropped from .67 in 1982 to below the .40 mark from 1986 and onwards. On the other hand, the trends in the relationships with the other state-wide parties may seem to contradict the hypothesis in that the first election support for the PCE/IU has come to correlate positively with the second election support for the state-wide Right. Thus, the near aggregate incompatibility between the PCE and the UCD does not hold for its relationship with the state-wide Right in general. The conclusion is rather that over time all the other state-wide parties have come to correlate positively with the first election IU vote, even though the correlations found for the mid 1980s and onwards are substantially weaker than the ones recorded for its relationship with the PSOE at the first pairs of elections.

Table 5.4 1st election PCE/IU votes: logit correlations

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>Abstain</i>	-.31	-.50	-.37	-.27	-.20	-.17	-.07
<i>PSOE</i>	.50	.67	.47	.38	.36	.19	.39
<i>UCD</i>	-.47	-.68					
<i>CDS</i>		.01	.10	.16	.34		
<i>AP/PP</i>	-.12	-.08	-.16	-.03	.19	.15	.15
<i>CiU</i>	-.32	-.67	-.62	-.50	-.67	-.76	-.85
<i>ERC</i>	-.29	-.48			-.18	-.46	-.52
<i>IC</i>							.79
<i>EE</i>	-.71	.27	.27	-.09			
<i>PNV</i>	.08	.12	.14	-.26	-.45	-.37	-.39
<i>HB</i>	.08	-.06	-.20	-.40	-.53	-.49	
<i>EA</i>				-.51	-.61	-.51	-.41
<i>BNG</i>					.41	.52	.52
<i>PSA/PA</i>	.35			-.05			-.04
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	.37			-.54	-.39	-.39	-.54
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	-.04		-.06	-.05	.23		.61
<i>UV</i>			.22	.13	.15	.12	.15
<i>Other</i>	.16	.06	.05	-.06	-.21	.33	.36

As to the regional parties we note that both the Catalan Left and Right in general exhibit strong negative correlations with the first election PCE/IU vote, whereas the IC that broke away from the IU before the 2000 election naturally show a strong positive correlation with the support for IU at the 1996 election. For the Basque parties the trends are more mixed, but according to the general picture, the support for the Basque parties has increasingly tended to come in municipalities with relatively weaker first election PCE/IU support. In this respect, then, it seems that the Centre-Periphery cleavage had asserted its influence over the Left-Right cleavage at the aggregate level in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In Galicia, however, the BNG drew far more support in municipalities that supported the PCE/IU at the previous election than in municipalities with a weak IU support. For all the other regional parties, the trends are fairly mixed without any clear patterns.

This implies that, even though it has come to correlate positively with all the other state-wide parties, the correlations between the first election PCE/IU vote and the second elections PSOE vote dropped substantially with the establishment of the IU. This pattern is the only one that is in line with the expectation derived from the *H9* hypothesis.

The first election PSOE vote

Firstly, we note from table 5.5 (below) a clear negative relationship between the first election support for the PSOE and the tendency to abstain at the second elections. This means that even though survey research indicate that electoral abstention has become systematically skewed to the Left of the political spectrum (Barreiro 2001), this trend is not strongly reflected at the aggregate level for the PSOE. The correlations between first election PSOE vote and the support for the PCE/IU show a revealing pattern: Although all correlations are positive, the trend is clearly weakening - from an impressive .68 in 1986 to a mere .14 in 2000. The logic of the aggregate Leftist vote in the municipalities has definitely been changing over the years, from a relationship of going hand in hand towards virtually no relationship at all.

Turning to the parties of the state-wide Right, we note the negative relationship between first election support for the PSOE and second election support for the other dominant party of the transition, UCD, a weakly positive relationship with the CDS support and the unclear and shifting trend of nearly no relationship with the AP/PP. This means that even though the AP/PP by and large replaced the UCD as the party of the state-wide Right, the aggregate trends in the territorial distribution of the vote do not reflect any clear-cut Left-Right division across the municipalities. This is illuminating as the AP/PP is usually considered more rightist than the UCD. In short, the clear aggregate division between the state-wide Left and Right that existed during the transitional years simply waned after UCD's demise.

Turning to the regional parties of the Second Periphery regions, we note a substantial and increasing negative relationship between the support for the PSOE and the support for the Catalan Right (CiU). The relationship with the more Leftist ERC show a similar, but weaker, pattern. By and large, however, we may conclude that at the aggregate level, the first election support for the PSOE and the second election support for the Catalan parties have become nearly incompatible with each other. In Catalonia the municipalities tend not to change their support from the state-wide Left to the regional parties from one election to the other, quite the contrary. The only relevant regional party in Catalonia that has received more support in municipalities

with strong first election PSOE support is the *Iniciativa per Catalunya* (IC) which, as mentioned above, split from the IU alliance prior to the 2000 election.

Table 5.5 1st election PSOE votes - logit correlations

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>Abstain</i>	-.48	-.53	-.45	-.39	-.43	-.37	-.37
<i>PCE/IU</i>	.66	.55	.68	.50	.28	.35	.14
<i>UCD</i>	-.23	-.38					
<i>CDS</i>		.07	.22	.12	.08		
<i>AP/PP</i>	-.11	.08	-.01	.04	.15	.10	.01
<i>CiU</i>	-.36	-.61	-.86	-.83	-.79	-.84	-.75
<i>ERC</i>	-.33	-.45			-.43	-.42	-.14
<i>IC</i>							.35
<i>EE</i>	-.32	-.05	-.18	-.12			
<i>PNV</i>	-.33	-.46	-.51	-.43	-.46	-.50	-.46
<i>HB</i>	-.19	-.37	-.52	-.60	-.59	-.60	
<i>EA</i>				-.60	-.57	-.60	-.54
<i>BNG</i>					.08	-.01	-.09
<i>PSA/PA</i>	.19			.00			-.15
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	.51		.44	.22	.05	.06	.17
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	-.04		-.19	-.27	-.24		-.62
<i>UV</i>			-.09	-.07	-.20	-.24	-.23
<i>Other</i>	.11	-.04	.03	-.15	-.21	.07	-.24

For the Basque parties, we note that the first election support for the PSOE has co-varied negatively with all the parties of both the Basque Left and Right, although the negative correlation with the EE was insignificant for the 1979-1982 pair of elections. Particularly after the merger between the EE and the PSOE, the logic of aggregate party competition in the Basque country has been one of incompatibility between first election support for the PSOE and second election support for the Basque parties.

The situation in the third of the second periphery regions, Galicia, is quite different as there is no aggregate correlation between the first election support for the PSOE and the second election support for the BNG at all.

Moving to the parties of the First Periphery, the tendency of a weakly positive correlation with the second election support for the Andalusian Socialist Party changed to a weak, but negative, correlation after the PSA had conducted its metamorphosis into the PA. Again, this indicates that the aggregate electoral profile of the PA is different from that of the PSA. For the other regional parties, we note the positive correlations with the Canarian parties and the negative correlations both with

the Aragonese and the Valencian parties. The strong negative correlation with the new Leftist *Chunta Aragonesista* (CHA) in 2000 is particularly noteworthy as the support for this party showed a strong positive correlation with the first election support for the IU.

The first election AP/PP vote

For the AP/PP, the sole relevant party of the state-wide Right as we approach the millennium, we note from table 5.6 (below) increasingly negative correlations between the first election support for the party and the tendency to abstain from turning out at the second election. Also in this respect, the state-wide parties of both Left and Right tended to become more similar in their aggregate electoral profiles. This is also reflected by the fact that the support for the AP/PP at the first elections have gone from varying negatively with the support for both the PCE/IU and the PSOE at the second elections to a situation of no relationship or a weak positive correlation.

Table 5.6 1st election AP/PP votes - logit correlations

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>Abstain</i>	-.06	-.11	-.24	-.31	-.43	-.28	-.51
<i>PCE/IU</i>	-.22	-.17	.07	.08	.03	.13	.25
<i>PSOE</i>	-.12	-.19	.02	.10	.01	-.01	.12
<i>UCD</i>	.41	.09					
<i>CDS</i>		.42	.58	.50	.56		
<i>CiU</i>	.19	.36	.33	.33	.12	.03	-.36
<i>ERC</i>	.35	.33			-.49	-.81	-.87
<i>IC</i>							.31
<i>EE</i>	.08	.07	-.44	-.45			
<i>PNV</i>	.11	.24	-.64	-.65	-.69	-.66	-.63
<i>HB</i>	-.19	.16	-.67	-.69	-.65	-.71	
<i>EA</i>				-.61	-.62	-.61	-.56
<i>BNG</i>						-.36	-.40
<i>PSA/PA</i>	.14			-.10			-.05
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	-.13		-.30	-.57	-.43	-.25	-.35
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	.12		.25	.00	-.26		-.05
<i>UV</i>			.11	-.15	-.36	-.35	-.31
<i>Other</i>	-.05	.06	.23	.00	.41	.27	.35

The shift in aggregate electoral profile is further emphasised by the fact that with the exception of the Catalan IC in 2000, the AP/PP support at the first elections has changed towards negative correlations with the support for all relevant parties at the

second elections both in Catalonia, the Basque Country and in Galicia. Thus, the state-wide Right has over the years tended to become near anathema to the regional parties at the aggregate level with the sole exception of the new Catalan offspring from the PCE/IU. This is yet another token sustaining the impression that the Centre-Periphery cleavage is strengthened over the years, at least at the aggregate level.

The first election UCD vote

The big issue concerning the first election support for the UCD is, of course, centred around the following question: Where did the UCD voters go when the party collapsed in 1982? First, from table 5.7 (below), we see that there was no aggregate relationship between the first election support for the UCD and second election abstention. Further, the first election support for the UCD correlated negatively with the second election support for the state-wide Left and positively with the second election support for the state-wide Right.

Table 5.7 1st election UCD votes - logit correlations

	77-79	79-82	82-86
<i>Abstain</i>	-.08	-.08	.03
<i>PCE/IU</i>	-.45	-.26	-.51
<i>PSOE</i>	-.14	-.08	-.21
<i>CDS</i>		.33	.25
<i>AP/PP</i>	.23	.63	.54
<i>CiU</i>	.04	.44	.38
<i>ERC</i>	.12	.30	
<i>EE</i>	-.14	-.41	-.13
<i>PNV</i>	-.59	-.72	-.13
<i>HB</i>	-.58	-.63	-.25
<i>PSA/PA</i>	-.24		
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	.11		-.04
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	-.06		.03
<i>UV</i>			-.47
<i>Other</i>	-.21	.16	-.03

However, we note that the negative relationship with the second election support for PCE and PSOE was weaker in 1982 than both before and after. On the other hand, the positive relationship with the second election support for the AP/PP was clearly much stronger in 1982 and 1986 than at the first pair of elections. We also note that the correlations between first election UCD support and second election CDS support

were much weaker than the ones found for AP/PP. Thus, the expectation derived from the *H9* hypothesis predicting higher levels of transfers from UCD to AP/PP than to the CDS, is reflected at the aggregate level.

In the Second Periphery, we note that the relationship between first election support for UCD and second election support for the regional parties differed markedly between Catalonia and the Basque Country. Whereas both the Catalan Right and Left tended to poll more votes in municipalities that had supported the UCD at the previous elections, the situation in the Basque Country was quite the opposite. The strong negative correlation between first election UCD support and the second election support for the Basque Right in 1979 and 1982 are all the more striking when we take into account that at those pairs of elections the PNV correlated positively with the first election AP/PP vote.

The correlations with the regional parties of the first periphery leave a rather mixed pattern, with the sole exception of the votes cast for the Valencian UV in 1986.

The first election CDS vote

Compared to the UCD, the first election support for the CDS shows a stronger negative relationship with second election abstention. In terms of state-wide Left-Right, the CDS exhibit the expected positive correlations with the AP/PP and a somewhat surprising relationship with the PCE/IU of fairly marked positive correlations from 1986 and onwards. The trend *vis-à-vis* the PSOE show a tendency moving from a weak negative correlation to virtually no relationship at all.

Moving to the regional parties we note that the CDS vote exhibits strong negative correlations with all the Catalan and Basque parties from 1986 and onwards, regardless of Left-Right orientation. The situation in Galicia, however, is quite the opposite. The BNG tends to draw substantially more support in areas that voted the CDS at the previous election than in areas with little or no support for the CDS. The picture regarding the rest of the regional parties is more mixed, albeit the tendencies of co-variation tend to be negative.

Table 5.8 1st election CDS votes - logit correlations

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
<i>Abstain</i>	<i>-.09</i>	<i>-.20</i>	<i>-.24</i>	<i>-.17</i>
<i>PCE/IU</i>	<i>.05</i>	<i>.34</i>	<i>.21</i>	<i>.36</i>
<i>PSOE</i>	<i>-.16</i>	<i>.07</i>	<i>.03</i>	<i>-.02</i>
<i>AP/PP</i>	<i>.33</i>	<i>.59</i>	<i>.61</i>	<i>.62</i>
<i>CiU</i>	<i>.00</i>	<i>-.62</i>	<i>-.57</i>	<i>-.58</i>
<i>ERC</i>			<i>-.63</i>	<i>-.63</i>
<i>EE</i>	<i>-.34</i>	<i>-.22</i>		
<i>PNV</i>	<i>-.66</i>	<i>-.33</i>	<i>-.54</i>	<i>-.56</i>
<i>HB</i>	<i>-.51</i>	<i>-.65</i>	<i>-.61</i>	<i>-.62</i>
<i>EA</i>		<i>-.59</i>	<i>-.62</i>	<i>-.59</i>
<i>BNG</i>			<i>.40</i>	<i>.42</i>
<i>PSA/PA</i>		<i>-.02</i>		
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	<i>-.01</i>	<i>-.60</i>	<i>.12</i>	<i>-.06</i>
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	<i>-.11</i>	<i>.06</i>	<i>-.09</i>	
<i>UV</i>	<i>-.06</i>	<i>-.19</i>	<i>-.46</i>	<i>-.31</i>
<i>Other</i>	<i>.16</i>	<i>.06</i>	<i>.32</i>	<i>.23</i>

Thus, in terms of cleavages, the CDS exhibits a mixed pattern. A strong positive co-variation with its fellow traveller on the state-wide Right, the AP/PP, a positive co-variation with the most Leftist of the state-wide parties, the PCE/IU, and no correlation with the more moderate party of the Left, the PSOE. In terms of the Centre-Periphery cleavage, the CDS support is clearly negatively related to support for the Catalan and Basque parties, whereas in Galicia the municipalities that support the CDS also tend to support the BNG. In sum, the electoral profile of the CDS follows the pattern of AP/PP with one notable exception: They differ markedly as to their relationship with the Galician BNG.

Conclusions

In this chapter we have detected some systematic patterns and trends regarding the electoral profiles of the state-wide political parties in terms of the variations in aggregate support for each and one of them over time as well as the co-variations between the proportions of the electorate opting for the various categories of behaviour at the pairs of elections:

- 1) In terms of changes in electoral turnout between elections, the aggregate analysis produced a pattern that is generally in accord with the swings described in chapter 4. However, the logit analysis has detected that the last executive takeover in 1996 also coincided with substantial shifts in the territorial distribution of electoral mobilisation. This shift between 1993 and 1996 calls for particular attention since it was not reflected in the overall turnout and has not been treated in previous research.
- 2) All the surviving parties, with the predicted exception of the CDS, experienced an increase in the level of aggregate stability after the 1982 debacle and onwards. This trend was particularly pronounced in the case of the AP/PP. The state-wide Left experienced a downturn in stability towards the end of the period, while the stability of the AP/PP was unchanged. Thus, in general terms, the hypothesis elaborated in chapter 4 on electoral stabilisation after the first founding elections of the transitional period was reflected at the aggregate municipal level, i.e. that the main parties consolidated their electoral clienteles in territorial terms. However, in relation to the party specific expectations derived from the *H5* hypothesis, the predicted patterns were not reflected at the aggregate level in terms of the timing of the stabilisation of the PSOE, PCE/IU and the AP/PP vote.
- 3) The state-wide parties, regardless of Left or Right orientation, related negatively to electoral abstention, i.e. the lower the first election turnout the lower the second election support for the state-wide parties. The only exception being the UCD that showed no relationship with abstention, neither at the first nor the second elections. We also noted that the substantial drop in support for the PCE/IU from 1996 to 2000 coincided with a substantial drop in its negative correlations with second election abstention.
- 4) The relationship between first election abstention and support for the regional parties showed very mixed patterns. The salience of the Centre-Periphery cleavage was clearly reflected in the Basque Country. First election abstention related positively to second election support for all the Basque parties at all of the pairs of elections studied. The Catalan parties showed mixed and erratic patterns, while the support for the Galician BNG related negatively to first election abstention. This implies that there were substantial differences in the logics of electoral abstention within the Second Periphery. Thus, the

assumptions regarding the Centre-Periphery cleavage was only in part reflected at the aggregate level.

- 5) In terms of aggregate electoral competition, the patterns showed that the Centre-Periphery cleavage had become strengthened at the expense of the Left-Right cleavage as we approach the millennium. On the one hand, the negative relationship between support for the state-wide Left and Right of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s waned and even tended to turn into a positive relationship. On the other hand, we noted a steadily increasing negative relationship between first election support for the state-wide parties and second election support for the regional parties regardless of Left-Right orientation, the exceptions being very few.

Now, the question is to what extent do these aggregate patterns relate to the estimated overall behaviour of individual voters? This, then, is precisely the theme of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

Overall Individual Level Voter Behaviour

Introduction

In this chapter, we shall analyse the overall estimated behaviour of individual voters for the seven pairs of elections between 1977 and 2000 for Spain as a whole. The bulk of the analyses are based on transition matrixes calculated by way of the ECOL method for cross-level inference as discussed in chapter 3.⁴¹ The majority of the analyses are based on *conditional* percentages in terms of the estimated proportions of the electorate at the first elections that remained loyal, transferred their vote to another party or simply demobilised at the second elections. These proportions, then, are the indicators that we shall first use to assess the trends in individual level voter loyalty for the parties. For these loyalty rates also a matrix based on survey recall data is presented. We shall then proceed by presenting the estimated proportions of voters that transferred their vote from one option at the first election to the other options at the second election. This analysis will include both transfers between parties and to and from electoral abstention. In addition, the behaviour of the new voters included in the census between the elections will be assessed. Again, the main focus will be on identifying trends and changes in the electoral profiles of the various components of the party system(s) in relation to the functional Left-Right axis and the territorial Centre-Periphery axis. In addition to this, the analysis will be concluded with the presentation of estimated net flows between the state-wide options, i.e. PCE/IU, PSOE, AP/PP, UCD, CDS and abstention.

In all of this, three overarching observations from the aggregate level analysis will be followed up in particular and the pertaining hypotheses elaborated in chapter 4 will be put to empirical test:

- 1) To what extent did the increase in aggregate stability observed for all the parties (with the obvious exception of the CDS) reflect an increase in individual voter loyalty?

⁴¹ See appendix II for a complete presentation of the matrixes.

- 2) To what extent did the patterns in the aggregate relationships between the political parties and electoral abstention detected in the previous chapter reflect systematic variations in this respect at the level of individual voters?
- 3) How, and to what extent, did the observed strengthening of the Centre-Periphery cleavage at the expense of the Left-Right cleavage in terms of aggregate electoral profiles reflect an underlying tendency at the individual level?

Stabilisation: Loyalty rates

We shall start out with the loyalty rates related to hypotheses H3, H5 and H7. The first hypothesis stated that the largest proportions of former abstainers have opted for abstention again at the second elections, apart from the two realignment elections in 1982 and 1993. The second hypothesis stated that PSOE was the first state-wide party that managed to consolidate its electoral constituency in terms of increased loyalty rates between elections, followed by the AP/PP and PCE/IU, while the CDS never managed to consolidate in this respect. The third hypothesis stated that the Basque and Catalan Right saw a substantial increase in voter loyalty from 1980 and onwards. The Basque Left quickly followed suit, while the Catalan and Galician Left lagged behind. No clear trend would be identified for the regional parties of the First Periphery.

Now, moving from patterns of aggregate stability to the calculation of loyalty rates, for some of the parties and abstention we have data from two methodological approaches at our disposal. For the 1977-79 pair of elections, survey recall data only exist for three of the state-wide parties. For the elections in 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996 and 2000 the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS) conducted a series of

post electoral studies in which the respondents were asked to report their electoral behaviour both at the actual election and the previous one.⁴²

Table 6.1: Loyalty rates between elections 1977-2000: Ecol percentages.

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>Abstain</i>	61.8	33.3	57.7	59.4	50.1	64.3	69.1
<i>PCE/IU</i>	49.3	22.2	35.5	65.4	70.0	76.7	33.8
<i>PSOE</i>	56.0	73.8	58.5	70.7	80.8	83.2	67.8
<i>UCD</i>	58.5	14.9					
<i>CDS</i>			25.9	33.3	7.9		
<i>AP/PP</i>	18.5	56.1	56.0	74.1	84.3	90.5	81.9
<i>CiU*</i>	46.1	57.1	78.3	81.8	81.1	86.3	74.5
<i>ERC**</i>	13.2	23.9				61.2	59.7
<i>EE</i>	28.2	39.4	52.4	49.5			
<i>PNV</i>	54.6	72.0	62.3	63.9	86.7	89.4	69.7
<i>HB</i>		59.5	62.3	71.0	80.1	78.3	
<i>EA</i>					68.1	74.4	47.4
<i>AIC/CC</i>				40.3	51.8	79.9	74.8
<i>CAIC/PAR</i>	17.7			44.1	41.1		
<i>UV</i>				45.5	49.7	61.6	42.2
<i>BNG</i>						80.9	70.1
<i>Other</i>	13.6	11.1	18.2	25.2	20.6	16.7	26.6

Votes cast for PDPC in 1977. ** Votes cast for ECFED in 1977 and ERFN in 1979.

Table 6.2 Loyalty rates between elections 1977-2000: Survey percentages.

	77-79	79-82*	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Abstain		34.7	36.7	48.9	48.4	61.2	55.3
PCE/IU	75.7	43.7	53.8	81.1	68.4	73.0	45.6
PSOE	76.3	89.8	73.2	70.4	69.2	72.4	57.4
UCD	71.2	19.9					
CDS			60.8	65.9	24.8		
AP/PP		91.7	81.4	80.0	90.3	72.4	78.2
PNV		91.4	62.4	87.5	74.4	75.6	53.8
CiU		69.5	84.8	90.4	77.6	80.8	60.4

* The un-weighted average of two CIS recall surveys.

This implies that we can calculate the proportions of the respondents that reportedly opted for the same behaviour at two consecutive elections based on their own recollection. There are many well-known flaws to this method, but as no valid panel

⁴² CIS studies no. 1327, 1542, 1543, 1842, 2061, 2210, 2382 and 2384. The 2382 and 2384 are labelled 'panel study', but since the first was conducted in February 2000 and the second in March-April 2000, the data for the 1996 election are still based on the recall method.

studies exist for the 1977-2000 elections, the reported proportions will be presented as rough estimates that together with the ECOL results will be helpful in order to identify the trends in voter loyalty.

Given the respective strengths and weaknesses of the two methods, we shall not expect that the ECOL matrix and the survey matrix will show identical percent wise distributions, but rather that they will tend to converge in terms of the trends depicted over time.

Abstainers

Starting with the electoral abstainers, we note that the ECOL results and the survey recall results diverge in some aspects and converge in other. They diverge in terms of the estimated percentages for the 1982-86 and 1986-89 pairs in particular, and to some extent for the 1996-2000 pair. At these pairs of elections the ECOL method yield estimates that indicate that a larger proportion of those who abstained at the first elections did so again at the second elections. The methods converge both in terms of tendencies over time and for the 1979-82, 1989-93 and 1993-96 pairs of elections also in terms of percentages. We may conclude, then, that the 1982 election saw a sweeping mobilisation amongst voters that had not turned out in 1979. According to the recall data, this tendency was repeated for the 1982-86 pair of elections while the ECOL estimates indicate that this was not the case. Now, given the nearly 11 percent drop in electoral turnout, a mobilisation of the abstainers in 1986 that nearly equalled the mobilisation in 1982 depicted by the recall data does not seem very likely. This also holds for the 2000 election, which saw an overall drop in turnout of more than seven percent. Given the methodological shortcomings of the two methods, however, we have no exact yardstick by which we could decide which of the estimates that are the most accurate. Thus, the trend signalled by the ECOL method is clearly in accord with the hypothesis in that both 1993 and 1982 saw large numbers of former abstainers turning out to vote. In terms of percentages, this is corroborated by the survey results. The survey results, however, deviate from the expected overall trend in relation to the election in 1986 and, to some extent, in 1989. However, given the well-

known flaws to this method in estimating the true levels of electoral abstention, these results are simply not very plausible. Hence, we shall conclude that the H3 hypothesis is strengthened.

In addition to this, we note that the territorial shift in the territorial distribution of the proportions of abstainers between 1993 and 1996 detected in the aggregate analysis is not reflected in the tables above. This once again underscores that the 'territorial' realignment of electoral abstention between these two elections took place in such a fashion that it levelled out in terms of overall percentages.

Party Loyalty

We note that also in terms of party loyalty the two methods tend to diverge in terms of the size of the estimated proportions, but converge in terms of the trends depicted. In relation to the parties of the state-wide Left, we note that the trends are quite similar for the two methods regarding the PCE/IU. Both indicate that the party experienced its lowest loyalty rates between 1979 and 1982 and again between 1996 and 2000. They both indicate that the party struggled to maintain its grip on the voters also between 1982 and 1986. Thus, both yield results that reflect that the party went through a process of ideological reorientation and reorganisation between 1982 and 1986. For the period following the 1982-86 debacle, we see that the ECOL estimates show a trend of steadily increasing loyalty that ended abruptly at the last election in 2000. The trend depicted by the recall data shows a substantial increase in loyalty rates from the 1986-89 pair and onwards, albeit with more ups and downs. Thus, the overall tendency is quite clear: the PCE/IU went through a period of great difficulties in retaining its voters from one election to the next in the first half of the 1980s. During the latter half of the 1980s and the decade of the 1990s the party experienced a period of electoral consolidation. This trend came to abrupt end in 2000 with the aforementioned sharp drop in voter loyalty.

For the other party of the state-wide Left, the PSOE, we note that the two methods tend to converge in terms of trends (with one exception) and to diverge somewhat in the size of the estimated proportions. We observe that when the loyalty rates are low, the ECOL estimates tend to be much lower than the survey estimates. When loyalty

rates are high, however, the ECOL estimates tend to be somewhat higher than the survey estimates. As mentioned above, there is one exception to the convergence between the two methods as to how they depict the trend for the PSOE. While the ECOL estimates show a 10 percent increase in loyalty from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, the survey estimates oscillate around a loyalty rate at 70 percent for the whole of this period.

We may conclude, then, that the state-wide Left parties were able to consolidate their respective electorates from the mid 1980s and onwards, but that both parties, and the PCE/IU in particular, suffered a sharp drop in the loyalty rate at the turn of the millennium. In the analysis of voter transitions we shall see to what extent other parties benefited from this decline in loyalty or whether the PCE/IU and PSOE voters mainly opted for abstention, as stated by some observers (Barreiro 2001).⁴³

For the state-wide Right we observe that both methods capture the dramatic decline in loyalty for the UCD from the 1977-79 pair of elections to the debacle that took place between 1979 and 1982. For the CDS both methods depict a similar trend: Increased voter loyalty from 1982-86 to 1986-89 and then a sharp decline in 1989-93. Once again, however, we note the divergence in terms of the size of the proportions in that the ECOL estimates are substantially lower than the surveys percentages and that at the 1982-86 pair of elections the recall loyalty rate is even higher for CDS than for PCE/IU.

It is in relation to AP/PP that we observe the greatest discrepancies between the ECOL estimates and the recall estimates.⁴⁴ Notably, whereas the ECOL estimates show a trend of steadily increased voter loyalty between 1977 and 1996, the surveys yield a trend of ups and downs. In fact, the lowest loyalty rate to be found in the survey estimates, the one for 1993-96 at 72,4 percent, coincides with the highest loyalty rate in the ECOL estimates with 90,5 percent. Now, given the fact that the AP/PP increased its share of the votes cast and that the turnout remained virtually unchanged between 1993 and 1996, the almost 20 percent decline in loyalty observed in the recall data frankly does not seem very plausible.

⁴³ A particular aspect of the election in 2000 should be noted: PSOE and PCE/IU had established an electoral pact that, according to Sánchez-Sierra, tended to demobilise relatively more former PCE/IU voters than former PSOE voters (Sánchez-Sierra 2005: 17).

⁴⁴ It should be noted that the survey data of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s tended to systematically under-estimate the support for the AP/PP, indicating that only the most loyal AP/PP voters were captured in those surveys.

The overall conclusion regarding the voter loyalty for the state-wide parties is that the 1980s and the 1990s saw a process of stabilisation and consolidation for the two parties on the Left, the PCE/IU and the PSOE, and for the dominant party on the Right, the AP/PP. At the election in 2000, however, only the AP/PP can be said to have maintained its grip on the voters. In particular, the PCE/IU took heavy tolls in this respect. Based on a comparison with the aggregate trends depicted in the previous chapter, we may conclude that, on the whole, the increased aggregate stability for the state-wide parties was indeed produced by increased party loyalty at the individual level.

As to the status of the H5 hypothesis, we note that according to the ECOL estimates, PSOE was the first state-wide party to reach a certain level of stability, followed by the AP/PP and then PCE/IU. According to the recall estimates, however, the AP/PP had retained a high level of stability all along. Both methods indicate that CDS obtained the lowest loyalty rates of all the state wide parties after 1982 with one exception for the 1982-86 recall data. On the whole, then, the hypothesis is sustained for the parties of the state-wide Left, while its status in relation to AP/PP is less clear.

Turning to the Centre-Periphery axis, the H7 hypothesis stated that the Basque and Catalan Right would have seen a substantial increase in voter loyalty after 1982. The Basque Left would quickly have followed suit, while the Catalan and Galician Left would have lagged behind. For the regional parties of the First Periphery, no clear trend would be identified. In the table, we observe the familiar pattern of divergence and convergence between the ECOL estimates and the recall estimates for the Catalan CiU. They depict similar trends in that the party saw a steady increase in voter loyalty up till 1986-89, followed by a downturn and again an upturn. They diverge, however, in terms of the estimated percentages and in that according to the recall data the CiU held the strongest grip in its voters between 1986 and 1989 whereas according to the ECOL results the CiU experienced its highest loyalty rate between 1993 and 1996. We conclude that the party in the 1980s and the 1990s was able to command more voter loyalty than in the 1970s and thus the hypothesis is sustained. This also holds for the other Catalan party, the ECR, which according to the only estimates available (the ECOL estimates) maintained a much firmer grip on its voters at the two last pairs of elections than between the first two pairs.

On the whole, the trends for the Basque parties are rather mixed. Starting with the PNV, we observe that the estimates obtained by the recall method tend to fluctuate far more than the ones obtained by the ECOL method. Both methods depict a trend in which the voter loyalty fell from the 1979-82 pair of elections before it increased again at a later stage. However, compared to the consistently strong aggregate correlations observed in chapter 5, the patterns detected for at individual level are far more erratic. The conclusion is that the pattern of voter loyalty for the PNV does not reflect the expected overall trend in the same degree as for the other parties analysed above. To what extent this can be explained by the relationship between the support for the PNV and the levels of electoral abstention will be dealt with below.

As to the voter loyalty for the rest of the Basque parties, for which we have to rely solely on the ECOL estimates, we see that they in general follow the trend of increased loyalty through the 1980s and 1990s. However, the estimated voter loyalty dropped sharply between 1996 and 2000. To this it should be noted that the electoral situation in the Basque Country was rather peculiar in 2000 given the fact that the Basque radical nationalist party *Herri Batasuna* (HB), widely regarded as the political wing of the ETA, was outlawed prior to the election. This particular aspect of the elections in the Basque Country will be followed up in the district wise analysis.

For the rest of the regional parties, the trends are rather mixed. Although they by and large seem to have reached higher levels of stability in the 1990s than in the previous decade, the trends identified are too erratic to sustain the hypothesis.

Electoral mobilisation

In this section the mobilisation of the voters will be assessed in terms of the estimated behaviour of new voters and first election abstainers at the second elections. Particular emphasis will be put on the transfers along the Left-Right axis and the Centre-Periphery axis. In the last section of the chapter the estimated net flows between the state-wide options will be presented and analysed. We start out with the conditional percentages for the new voters.

Table 6.3 New voters included at 2nd election. Ecol percentages.

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
To:							
Abstain	36.6	18.3	33.4	37.8	23.6	30.3	45.8
<i>PCE/IU</i>	6.6	2.3	3.0	8.9	6.3	8.4	2.3
<i>PSOE</i>	19.9	41.7	30.2	20.1	22.5	27.7	18.8
<i>UCD</i>	17.3	2.3					
<i>CDS</i>		1.8	8.2	6.7	1.2		
<i>AP/PP</i>	5.0	19.9	11.8	9.9	25.5	20.9	18.8
<i>CiU</i>	0.8	1.0	2.8	3.0	5.3	1.6	1.5
<i>ERC</i>	0.2	0.2			0.5	0.1	0.2
<i>IC</i>							0.3
<i>EE</i>	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5			
<i>PNV</i>	0.6	1.4	0.4	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.8
<i>HB</i>	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	
<i>EA</i>				0.8	0.5	0.3	0.4
<i>PA</i>	2.3			1.1	0.4	0.9	1.0
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	0.2		0.2	0.4	1.9	1.2	1.0
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	0.2		0.1	0.2	0.5		0.1
<i>UV</i>			0.2	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.1
<i>BNG</i>					0.7	0.7	1.3
<i>Other</i>	7.3	9.2	7.5	7.1	8.3	4.5	5.7

The first of the pertaining hypotheses, H1, stated that, in general, the largest proportion of new voters would have opted for abstention between 1977 and 2000. The realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, would have seen a sharp increase in the proportion of new voters that turned out to vote.

The table 6.3 (above) shows the estimated transfers from the group of voters that was enfranchised between the elections. First and foremost, we note that with two exceptions their preferred option during the whole period was that of electoral abstention. The exceptions are the elections in 1982 and 1993. In 1982 an estimated 42 percent of the new voters cast their vote for the PSOE, nearly twenty percent cast their vote for the AP/PP and abstention came in only as the third most preferred option. Also the election in 1993 saw a substantial decline in the proportion of new voters that opted for abstention. AP/PP was the most preferred option, while the proportion that opted for PSOE nearly equalled the proportion that opted for abstention. Thus, the H1 hypothesis is sustained by the data.

According to the H8 hypothesis, the new voters party choice would have followed the sequential translation of cleavages in that the UCD would have polled a large share of new voters between 1977 and 1979, the PSOE large shares from 1982 and onwards, the PCE/IU would have increased its share in the latter half of the 1980s and AP/PP would have become the dominant party among the new voters in the 1990s. From the

table we observe that UCD did poll a substantial share of new voters in 1979. PSOE was clearly the party with the strongest hold on the new voters in the 1970s and 1980s, but its position amongst the young was far more contested by the AP/PP in the 1990s and in 2000. In this respect, then, we see a change in the electoral profiles of the two main state-wide parties to the benefit of the Right. However, AP/PP cannot be said to have achieved the predicted dominant position among this group after the 1993 election. Thus, the hypothesis is sustained in relation to UCD and PSOE, but not in relation to AP/PP. On the Left we note that the PCE/IU saw an increased ability to mobilise the new voters from 1986-89 and onwards in accord with the hypothesis, but that the party was not able to uphold its grip on the young at the 2000 election.

In assessing the proportions obtained by the regional parties we must bear in mind that these parties only compete in their home regions while the proportions estimated here are based on the total number of voters in Spain. Straightforward comparisons between the estimated proportions for these parties at a given pair of elections are therefore not tenable. Thus the proper test of the H2 hypothesis stating that a substantially lower proportion of new voters would have turned out to vote in the Peripheries than in the Centre will have to await the district wise analysis. What can be assessed, however, are the trends over time for each and one of the parties and, of course, the relative proportions compared with the other regional parties within each region.

Starting with the Catalan parties, we note that the CiU showed an increased ability to mobilise the new voters up through the 1970s and 1980s. This trend reached its peak in 1993 with an estimated 5.3 percent of the Spanish total. At the last two pairs of elections CiU's mobilising ability dropped considerably again. The trend for the other Catalan party, the ERC, show a similar pattern by reaching its peak with an estimated 0.5 percent in 1993. For the Basque parties, the picture is far more mixed and no general trend can be identified. The Galician BNG polled an estimated 1.7 percent in 2000, up from 0.7 percent at the two previous pairs of elections. The Andalusian PSA/PA polled an estimated 2.3 percent of the new voters in 1979, but has never been close to that mark after it gained parliamentary representation again in 1989.

Electoral abstention

In the previous chapter we noted some significant differences in the aggregate relations between electoral abstention and the state-wide parties on the one hand and the Basque parties on the other. On the basis of table 6.4 (below), we may assess the estimated capability of the parties in terms of mobilising voters that had opted for abstention at the previous election. In assessing the relative successes and failures in this, however, we must once again bear in mind the fundamental difference between the state-wide parties on the one hand and the regional parties on the other in that the number of abstainers that can be mobilised has been far greater for the state-wide parties than for the regional parties, i.e. that the percentages are not directly comparable.

According to the H8 hypothesis, the parties' ability to mobilise first election abstainers would have followed the sequential translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages in that the UCD would have polled a large share of former abstainers in 1979, the PSOE large shares from 1982 and onwards, the PCE/IU would have increased its share in the latter half of the 1980s and AP/PP would have become the dominant party among the former abstainers in the 1990s.

Starting with the state-wide Left we note that the PCE/IU was able to double its share of the first election abstainers from less than two percent in 1982 and 1986 to four percent or more at all the elections leading up to the debacle in 2000, in which it dropped back to less than two percent. For the PSOE we note a spectacular increase in mobilising ability from less than 10 percent in 1979 to more than 25 percent in 1982. During the 1980s and the 1990s, however, the flow of mobilised voters into the PSOE clearly ebbed and reached a bottom mark in 2000 with less than five percent. The trend exhibited by the AP/PP on the state-wide Right is very different from the one of the PSOE. After the peak in 1982 at nearly 17 percent, it was able to reach a second peak in 1993 with 16.7 percent and was able to assert itself as the dominant party from then on. Thus, overall, the pattern here clearly sustains the hypothesis. It also underscores the point that in the latter half of the 1990s a change occurred between the state-wide Left and Right in that the Right maintained its ability to mobilise

former abstainers while the Left clearly lost its previous grip on this group, as noted by Barreiro (2001).

Table 6.4 Abstainers at 1st election. Ecol conditional percentages.

To:	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>PCE/IU</i>	2.8	1.7	1.6	4.7	4.0	4.0	1.7
<i>PSOE</i>	9.3	25.8	14.0	10.2	11.9	8.8	4.9
<i>UCD</i>	11.8	4.1					
<i>CDS</i>		2.5	4.3	4.5	1.6		
<i>AP/PP</i>	2.9	16.6	9.7	7.8	16.7	12.6	11.6
<i>CiU</i>	0.9	3.0	1.9	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.3
<i>ERC</i>	0.6	0.5			0.4	0.2	0.2
<i>IC</i>							0.5
<i>EE</i>	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2			
<i>PNV</i>	1.1	1.3	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5
<i>HB</i>	1.2	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.2	
<i>EA</i>				0.4	0.1	0.1	0.2
<i>PSA/PA</i>	0.8			0.7	0.4	0.6	0.7
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	0.1		0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	0.1		0.2	0.2	0.6		0.2
<i>UV</i>			0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1
<i>BNG</i>					0.3	0.3	0.5
<i>Other</i>	3.5	4.5	4.6	4.5	6.8	3.4	3.8

For the regional parties we see that the CiU, after having reached the familiar peak in the mobilising election of 1982 with an estimated 3 percent, slowly lost its grip on the first election abstainers. This also holds for the ERC. Turning to the Basque parties, we observe that the parties running in 1979 and 1982, the PNV and the HB, were able to mobilise the first election abstainers at a rate that equalled their total share of the electorate. This is an impressive showing not equalled by any other party at any time. From the 1982-86 and onwards, however, these parties ability to mobilise former abstainers decreased to the general level for all the other parties. The peculiar relationship between electoral abstention and the vote for the Basque parties observed in the aggregate analysis in chapter 5 is therefore only partially reflected at the level of individual voter mobility.⁴⁵ No particular pattern can be observed for the rest of the regional parties.

⁴⁵ See Appendix IV, tables A IV.9 to A IV.12 as to how the Basque parties have related to abstention. The transfers from HB to abstention after the party was banned were extremely high.

Electoral competition: Transfers from the parties

The expectations regarding transfers between the parties are related to the hypothesis H9. As stated in the hypothesis, the state-wide parties that lagged behind in party building after the transitional phase, i.e. PCE/IU, UCD and CDS, should have seen large proportions of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP, but that after the formation of the IU alliance in 1986 they would have made net gains from the other parties.

Transfers from PCE/IU

As shown in table 6.5 (below), the transfers from the PCE/IU reveal a very interesting pattern indeed as to the relationship with its state-wide fellow on the Left, the PSOE, and to electoral abstention. Whereas an estimated more than half of the 1979 PCE/IU voters shifted to the PSOE at the latter's land-slide victory in 1982 and less than 10 percent opted for abstention, the pattern at the 2000 election was quite the opposite. While three out of ten 1996 PCE/IU voters opted for abstention in 2000, only a mere 16 percent shifted their vote to the PSOE. Thus, the hypothesis is supported and the results once again underscore the observed progressive demobilisation of the Leftist voters (Barreiro 2001).

The 1.2 percent transfer to the IC in Catalonia is quite as expected given the relative size of the Catalan electorate. The estimated 7 percent transfer to the AP/PP in 2000 might seem somewhat exaggerated to some observers but is in fact conservative compared to the 10 percent transfer rate observed in a recall survey (Sánchez-Sierra 2005: 17).⁴⁶ Anyway, the long term trends in the relationship between the PCE/IU and the PSOE follow the aggregate pattern depicted in chapter 5, from relatively high transfers in the 1977-1986 period to low transfers during the 1986-1996 period and again a rise in the proportion of voters transferred in 2000.

⁴⁶ This difference may be attributed to the fact that the transfers to abstention are notoriously underestimated in surveys.

Table 6.5 1st election PCE/IU voters. ECOL conditional percentages

To:	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Abstain	14.8	7.6	23.4	16.8	9.6	9.5	30.4
PSOE	22.6	55.0	23.6	7.3	7.6	5.9	16.5
UCD	2.5	0.4					
CDS		1.0	5.3	2.4	0.9		
AP/PP	1.3	6.5	3.6	2.4	4.8	3.4	7.0
CiU	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0
ERC	0.2	0.1			0.1	0.0	0.0
IC							1.2
EE	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1			
PNV	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
HB	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
EA				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PSA/PA	1.0			0.2	0.0	0.1	0.3
CUPC/AIC/CC	0.2		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CAIC/PAR/CHA	0.0		0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.5
UV			0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1
BNG					0.1	0.3	0.6
Other	5.7	4.4	4.8	2.8	4.6	2.1	6.1

The pattern of the relationship with the AP/PP cannot be said to directly reflect any pattern at the aggregate level as the correlation were fairly weak either way. In terms of the regional parties the transfers from the PCE/IU in general tend to be low, and if anything, decreasing over the years for the Basque parties, whereas we note an increase both in transfers to the PSA/PA, the Aragonese regionalists CHA and to the Galician BNG.

Transfers from PSOE

As shown in table 6.6 (below), the transfers from the PSOE to electoral abstention do not follow a pattern as closely linked to the demobilisation of the Left thesis as it did for the PCE/IU, but a ten percent point increase from 1993-96 to the 1996-2000 pair is still impressive, and, given the bigger size of the PSOE, contributed substantially to the increase in abstention in 2000.

The estimated transfers from PSOE to the other party of the state-wide Left, the PCE/IU follow a pattern that could be deduced from the aggregate analysis: From a fairly high level of transfers between 1977 and 1979 and then a sharp decrease from then on. A comparison with the estimated transfers to the AP/PP on the state-wide right is quite revealing as to the logic of party competition. Both in 1982 and in 2000 a substantially larger proportion of first election PSOE voters opted for the AP/PP than the PCE/IU. Again, the estimated 7.3 percent transfer to the AP/PP is somewhat conservative in relation to the nearly 10 percent observed in a recall survey (Sánchez-Sierra 2005: 17). Once again we may conclude that the Left-Right cleavage has decreased in importance over time, at least as far as voter transitions from the Left to the Right are concerned.

Table 6.6 1st election PSOE voters. Ecol conditional percentages.

To:	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>Abstain</i>	18.2	8.9	19.0	13.6	5.4	6.4	16.0
<i>PCE/IU</i>	8.8	2.6	3.3	4.3	1.7	3.0	1.4
<i>UCD</i>	5.2	0.9					
<i>CDS</i>		0.9	6.3	2.8	0.3		
<i>AP/PP</i>	1.4	6.7	4.2	2.7	3.8	3.6	7.3
<i>CiU</i>	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
<i>ERC</i>	0.1	0.1			0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>IC</i>							0.3
<i>EE</i>	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1			
<i>PNV</i>	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>HB</i>	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
<i>EA</i>				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>PSA/PA</i>	1.0			0.3	0.1	0.1	0.5
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	0.4		0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.2		0.0
<i>UV</i>			0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1
<i>BNG</i>					0.1	0.2	0.4
<i>Other</i>	5.6	3.0	4.7	2.3	4.5	0.6	1.5

Moving to the regional parties, we note that the estimated transfers to the Catalan CiU and the ERC were fairly low across the whole period studied and that, if anything, the transfers tended to decrease over time. The only Catalan party that received a more substantial part of the former PSOE votes in 2000 was the new IC. For the Basque parties, the tendency observed for Catalonia is repeated in a strengthened fashion. For

the last three pairs of elections, no transfers from the PSOE to any Basque party are recorded at all. Whether this is due to the fact that the proportions were too small to appear at this level of aggregation or whether no transfers can be detected in any of the electoral districts in the Basque Country at all will have to await the district wise analysis. The estimated transfers to the Galician BNG are noteworthy given the fact that there was no aggregate correlation between the first election PSOE vote and the second election BNG vote. This implies that the BNG have polled votes both from the PSOE and the PCE/IU.

Turning to Andalusia, we note a fairly impressive transfer to the PSA/PA in 1979 and far smaller transfers once the party reappeared as the PA in the 1990s. Bearing in mind that Andalusia is one of PSOE's strongholds, the estimated one percent transfer between 1977 and 1979 was fairly substantial in terms of votes. For the Aragonese leftist CHA we observe that there were no transfers in 2000.

Transfers from AP/PP

As shown in table 6.7 (below), the transfers from the AP/PP to electoral abstention follow the predicted pattern of relatively high proportions in the 1970s and 1980s followed by a sharp decrease in the 1990s. And, even though the general turnout fell considerably from 1996 to 2000, the AP/PP lost a substantially smaller share of its 1996 voters to abstention than the PCE/IU and the PSOE. The transfers from AP/PP to its fellow travellers of the state-wide Right reflects the increasingly dominant position of the party. In the table for AP/PP the ultra-rightist National Union (UN) is included,⁴⁷ and we note that an estimated six percent switched from AP in 1977 to this party in 1979, well below the nearly thirty percent that transferred to UCD. In terms of the transfers from the AP/PP to the two parties of the state-wide Left, we note an overall substantial decrease in the proportions across the period. It seems that while the tendency of vote transfers from the Left to the Right increased, the transfers the other way round tended to decrease. This implies that when we conclude that the importance of the socio-economic Left-Right cleavage has decreased in terms of voter transitions, we should bear in mind that the relationship between the state-wide Left and Right had become asymmetrical in this respect. Further, a few comments on the

⁴⁷ The UN has been omitted from preceding tables since the transfers to this party from all the other options treated so far were negligent.

relationship between the AP/PP and its fellow travellers on the state-wide Right in the 1970s and 1980s are called for. In the 1980s the transfers to both the UCD and the CDS were smaller than the joint transfers to the state-wide Left, indicating that the voters would rather “jump over” the UCD and the CDS when moving along the Left-Right axis.

Table 6.7 1st election AP/PP voters. Ecol percentages.

To:	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>Abstain</i>	30.1	10.8	17.8	11.2	5.1	4.5	9.1
<i>PCE/IU</i>	1.8	0.7	1.0	1.2	0.6	0.5	0.3
<i>PSOE</i>	5.6	15.7	7.5	4.4	3.0	1.7	2.3
<i>UCD</i>	27.6	2.4					
<i>CDS</i>		4.9	5.9	2.3	0.4		
<i>UN</i>	6.2						
<i>CiU</i>	0.8	1.7	1.6	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.0
<i>ERC</i>	0.4	0.4			0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>IC</i>							0.1
<i>EE</i>	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1			
<i>PNV</i>	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>HB</i>	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>EA</i>				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>PSA/PA</i>	1.3			0.3	0.0	0.1	0.2
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	0.1		0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	0.2		0.5	0.1	0.2		0.1
<i>UV</i>			0.4	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0
<i>BNG</i>					0.2	0.0	0.3
<i>Other</i>	4.2	3.7	5.0	2.2	2.7	0.8	2.4

Turning to the regional parties, we once again observe the familiar pattern regarding transfers to both the Catalan and the Basque parties. In both cases the estimated transfers decreased considerably over time, indeed in 2000 the only transfer recorded is the 0.1 percent to the newly created IC. This is also the case for the transfers to the Basque parties. Thus, the near aggregate incompatibility between the first election AP/PP vote and the second election vote for Catalan and Basque parties is clearly reflected in underlying individual level properties. Interestingly, even though the proportions are fairly low (with the possible exception of the Galician BNG), the pattern of incompatibility in terms of transfers from the state-wide Right to the regional parties does not hold for all of the regions. It is rather a question of the particular situation in the two dominant regions on the Centre-Periphery axis, the

Basque Country and Catalonia. This question will therefore be explored in more detail in the district wise analysis.

Transfers from UCD

Again, the fundamental question regarding the transfers from the state bearing party of the democratic transition after its unprecedented collapse is, of course, where did its voters go?

Table 6.8 1st election UCD votes. Ecol percentages.

To:	77-79	79-82	82-86
<i>Abstain</i>	23.8	16.4	29.8
<i>PCE/IU</i>	1.0	0.7	0.5
<i>PSOE</i>	5.7	18.4	17.0
<i>CDS</i>		3.0	8.0
<i>AP/PP</i>	3.4	35.2	30.7
<i>UN</i>	1.2		
<i>CiU</i>	0.5	2.4	1.6
<i>ERC</i>	0.2	0.3	
<i>EE</i>	0.1	0.1	0.0
<i>PNV</i>	0.1	0.1	0.1
<i>HB</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>PSA</i>	0.6		
<i>CUPC</i>	0.1		0.1
<i>CAIC</i>	0.1		0.9
<i>UV</i>			0.1
<i>Other</i>	2.8	4.2	5.6

First, in table 6.8 we note that a fairly large proportion of former UCD voters opted for abstention both in 1979, 1982 and in 1986. Then we observe that in 1979 a larger share of its 1977 voters opted for the state-wide Left in terms of PCE/IU and PSOE than the AP/PP. This pattern, however, was completely turned around both in 1982 and in 1986. In 1982 between three and four out of ten previous UCD voters opted for the AP/PP and less than two out of ten opted for the Left. The new party created by the former UCD leader, the CDS, was only able to capture mere 3 percent of the former UCD voters, whereas the CiU in Catalonia captured an impressive 2.4 percent of the Spanish total. The Basque parties were hardly able to capture any former UCD

voter at all.⁴⁸ This pattern of transfers was for all practical purposes repeated in 1986, with one notable exception: The share transferred to CDS increased to 8 percent. We also note the substantial share that transferred to the Canarian party (AIC) in 1986. Thus, we may conclude that the AP/PP was the greatest beneficiary from the collapse of the UCD, followed by the PSOE and the CiU. These particular aspects of the UCD collapse will be followed up in a more detailed fashion in the district wise analysis.

Transfers from CDS

Also in relation to the CDS we are dealing with the question of what happened to the voters of a party that disappeared, albeit to a much lesser degree than in the case of the UCD as the CDS never collapsed the way the former party did.

Table 6.9 1st election CDS votes. Ecol conditional percentages.

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
To:				
<i>Abstain</i>	31.1	26.9	21.2	39.7
<i>PCE/IU</i>	1.8	7.9	5.0	7.2
<i>PSOE</i>	10.6	9.9	12.4	8.8
<i>AP/PP</i>	17.0	9.6	26.8	29.6
<i>CiU</i>	1.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
<i>ERC</i>			0.1	0.1
<i>EE</i>	0.2	0.2		
<i>PNV</i>	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>HB</i>	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>EA</i>		0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>PSA/PA</i>		0.7	0.2	0.3
<i>CUPC/AIC/CC</i>	0.4	0.1	3.3	0.2
<i>CAIC/PAR/CHA</i>	0.3	0.2	0.5	
<i>UV</i>	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1
<i>BNG</i>			0.5	0.6
<i>Other</i>	6.8	8.2	17.7	7.8

From table 6.9 we observe that, with one exception, the largest shares of first election CDS voters transferred to abstention. The second most preferred option, also with one exception, was that of transfer to the AP/PP. This said, the perhaps most interesting pattern to be noted is that the trend in the transfers from the CDS clearly exhibits an

⁴⁸ To this it should be noted, as we shall see in the district wise analysis, the UCD did not run in all of the electoral districts in the Basque Country in 1979.

increase in the transfers to the state-wide parties in general, also to the Left, rather than to the Catalan and Basque Right. The transfers to the PCE/IU compared to that of the CiU and the PNV at the last three pairs of elections are quite revealing in this respect. At the same time we note that the transfers to the Canarian parties and to the Galician BNG were of a far more substantial nature than to the Catalan and Basque parties.

Electoral competition: Net flows

The question to be answered in this section is to what extent the conditional transfers observed above are reflected in the net flows between the options. The percentages presented in table 6.10 (below) are calculated on the basis of the whole electorate at the pairs of elections, i.e. that the relative distributions are directly comparable regardless of the size of the various parties.

Table 6.10 Ecol net flow percentages.

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
<i>PCE/IU vs. Abstain</i>	-0.5	0.0	+0.3	+0.8	+0.6	+0.2	-2.0
<i>PSOE vs. Abstain</i>	-2.0	+6.1	-4.0	-1.1	+1.9	+0.1	-3.3
<i>UCD vs. Abstain</i>	-3.5	-2.3					
<i>CDS vs. Abstain</i>		+0.8	+0.1	-0.4	-0.6		
<i>AP/PP vs. Abstain</i>	-1.7	+5.0	+1.8	+2.1	+3.8	+1.5	-0.2
<i>PCE/IU vs. PSOE</i>	+0.3	-3.2	+0.4	+1.0	0.0	+0.4	-0.9
<i>PCE/IU vs. UCD</i>	+0.1	+0.1					
<i>PCE/IU vs. CDS</i>			0.0	+0.4	+0.2		
<i>PCE/IU vs. AP/PP</i>	+0.1	0.0	+0.2	+0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.4
<i>PSOE vs. UCD</i>	+0.3	+3.8					
<i>PSOE vs. CDS</i>			-1.9	-0.2	+0.6		
<i>PSOE vs. AP/PP</i>	+0.3	-0.7	+1.4	0.0	-0.5	-0.6	-1.4
<i>AP/PP vs. UCD</i>	-0.7	+7.6					
<i>AP/PP vs. CDS</i>			-1.7	+0.2	+1.3		

As shown in the table, all the state-wide parties suffered a net loss to abstention between 1977 and 1979 in accord with the overall drop in turnout. In 1982, the PSOE and the AP/PP mobilised far more former abstainers than they lost to this group, the CDS made a net gain, while the transfers to and from PCE/IU levelled out. The collapse of the UCD is clearly reflected in a substantial net loss to abstention in spite of the overall mobilisation of the electorate. As to the trends for the parties over time, we note that AP/PP experienced net gains from abstention for all the pairs of elections between 1982 and 1996. Thus, the electoral consolidation of the party was to a great

extent linked to its ability to mobilise first election abstainers and retain a large share of those mobilised at the subsequent elections. Also for PCE/IU we note a similar trend. As the IU consolidated its electoral stance from 1986 and onwards, it experienced a positive exchange rate with abstention. This trend, however, came to an abrupt halt with the electoral debacle in 2000. As to the trend for PSOE, we note that after the victory in 1982 the party suffered net losses to abstention all the way during its hegemonic period in the 1980s. At the highly contested elections in 1993 and 1996, PSOE once again mobilised a larger share of former abstainers than it lost, particularly in 1993. The 2000 debacle, however, inflicted heavy tolls on the party in this respect. These trends, then, underscore the pivotal role played by electoral abstention in relation to the changes in the state-wide party system formats.

We observe that in terms of net flows between the parties, the relationship between PCE/IU and its fellow traveller on the Left, PSOE, was one of give and take over the years. There is no doubt that the 1982 debacle was produced by a substantial net loss to the PSOE, while the second one in 2000 was first and foremost produced by the net loss to abstention already noted. The pattern of PCE/IU's relationship with the other parties was more mixed with relatively small net flows as the general rule. There were, however, two exceptions to this: In 1989 it saw a net gain at 0.5 percent from CDS and in 2000 it saw a net loss at 0.4 percent to AP/PP. On the whole, then, the electoral fortunes of PCE/IU depended most heavily on the swings to and from abstention and to and from PSOE.

For PSOE we note in relation to UCD the party experienced net gains both between 1977-1979 and, of course, between 1979-1982. Between 1982 and 1986, however, PSOE suffered a quite substantial net loss to UCD's successor CDS. As to the relationship with AP/PP we note that the trend swung between net gains and losses during the 1970s and 1980s to steady and increasing net losses in the 1990s, culminating with 1.4 percent of the total electorate in 2000.

Whereas AP/PP saw a net loss to UCD in 1979, again there is no doubt that AP/PP was the main beneficiary of UCD's demise in 1982. We note that the swing from UCD to AP/PP produced a net gain for the latter that doubled the one experienced by the PSOE. At the election in 1986, however, AP/PP suffered a net loss to CDS – yet another token of the rather slow stabilisation of the vote at the state-wide Right. Approaching the 1990s, we see that the AP/PP took heavy tolls on the CDS.

Conclusions

On the basis of the analysis so far, we may draw the following conclusions as to the questions posed in the introduction and to the status of the pertaining hypotheses:

- 1) As to the assumptions pertaining to the increase in aggregate stability observed in chapter 5 and how this related to the individual level loyalty, we noted that the aggregate stabilisation of the electorate indeed reflected an overall increase in voter loyalty. However, the status of the hypothesis in relation to the *sequence* of party stabilisation is less clear. The prediction was that, after the 1982 debacle, PSOE was the first of the state-wide parties to see an increase in loyalty rates between elections. This was supported by the ECOL data, whereas the survey data indicated that also AP/PP quickly stabilised its electorate. Both methods, however, showed clearly that PCE/IU lagged behind in this respect. The results for CDS were more mixed. The recall method exhibited higher loyalty rates for the party than the ECOL estimates. They converged, however, in terms of the party's demise in 1993. On the whole, then, the hypothesis is clearly supported with regard to PSOE and PCE/IU, but its status is less clear with regard to the two surviving parties of the Right.
- 2) As to the role played by electoral abstention in the process of democratic transition and consolidation, we saw that the changes in electoral results and in the party system format were to a substantial extent caused by differences between the parties in relation to transfers to and from abstention. At the 1977-

79 pair of elections, which saw a substantial drop in turnout without any change in the state-wide party system, all the relevant parties lost former voters to abstention in a rather uniform fashion. At the mobilising election in 1982, the electoral gains for the winner PSOE and the “sub triumphant” AP/PP were to a large extent produced by the mobilisation of former abstainers, whereas PCE/IU did not benefit from the increased turnout and UCD suffered a substantial net loss. Thus, the change in the party system was intimately linked to the structure of mobilisation and demobilisation. Further, the reorientation of the PCE that culminated in the formation of the IU alliance was followed by period of net gains from abstention. This trend, however, came to an abrupt end in 2000. After its landslide victory, PSOE suffered net losses to abstention between 1982 and 1989. However, in facing the challenge from the rejuvenated AP/PP in 1993, PSOE was once again able to obtain net gains from abstention. This trend ended in 2000 when the party suffered a net loss almost comparable to the one in 1986. On the Right, apart from the election in 1986, CDS was never able to assert itself in relation to abstention and suffered net losses both in 1989 and 1993. The AP/PP, however, managed to obtain substantial net gains from abstention all the way from 1982 to 1996. Further, even though the turnout fell by more than seven percent from 1996 to 2000, its net losses were far smaller than the ones experienced by the state-wide Left. Thus, there is no doubt that the consolidation and growth of the AP/PP leading up to its eventual executive take over was to a great extent caused by the structuring of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation. The conclusion, then, is that the assumption regarding the pivotal role played by electoral abstention in the transition and consolidation of the Spanish democracy is sustained by the individual level data.

- 3) As to the mobilisation of new voters, the hypothesis was sustained in that the largest shares of the new voters opted for abstention at all the elections apart from the ones in 1982 and 1993. A larger share of new voters opted for both AP/PP and PSOE in 1982 and for AP/PP in 1993. In addition, the share obtained by PSOE in 1993 nearly equalled the share that opted for abstention. Thus, the hypothesis is sustained in that both realignment elections saw a substantial mobilisation of new voters.

- 4) With regard to the hypotheses on electoral competition, we saw that patterns were in accord with the expectation in that the parties that lagged behind in party building after the transitional phase (PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) saw large shares of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP. After the formation of the IU alliance in 1986, the transfers from PCE/IU to the other parties decreased substantially and it was able to obtain net gains from both AP/PP and PSOE in the latter half of the 1980s. AP/PP was the main beneficiary of both UCD's collapse and the demise of the CDS. On the whole, then, the hypothesis was sustained by the data.

- 5) For the question of how and to what extent the strengthening of the Centre-Periphery cleavage dimension observed in the aggregate analysis reflected an underlying tendency at the individual level, we observed that the transfers from the state-wide parties to the Catalan and Basque parties tended to decrease over the years. This tendency was particularly pronounced for the transfers from the state-wide Right to the Catalan and Basque Right. The transfers from the state-wide parties outside Catalonia and the Basque Country did not decrease in the same fashion. Thus, we shall expect that the relevance of the Centre-Periphery cleavage in relation to the functional Left-Right cleavage will differ markedly between the Second and First peripheries. This will be followed up in the district wise analysis.

The conclusion, then, is that the bulk of the expectations related to the hypotheses were met and thus supports the general argument. However, a few revisions will have to be undertaken. This will be done in the light of the following district wise analysis. The main point is that the findings from the district wise analysis will help us in achieving a more refined understanding of the patterns detected. In particular, the analysis of district wise deviations from the national trends will be analysed. In this, also the remaining hypotheses regarding the Centre-Periphery dimension elaborated in chapter 4 will be put to empirical test. This, then, is the theme of the following chapters.

CHAPTER 7

Centre-Periphery Patterns of Electoral Mobilisation and Demobilisation

Introduction

In the process of democratic transition and consolidation the turnout at the first critical elections is paramount to the legitimacy of the resulting legislature. Even more so in the Spanish case where, as noted earlier, elections were held before a democratic constitution was in place and where the highest priority task of the very first legislature was precisely the elaboration of a new constitutional framework. Given Spain's historical territorial problem and the sequence by which the legacy of political issues were put to the test of elections, the integration of the Peripheries in terms of electoral turnout was of outmost importance. A strongly biased turnout pattern with a substantially lower turnout in the Peripheries would pose a serious challenge to the new democracy. We know from the general distribution of turnout rates that there was a difference between the Centre and at least some of the Peripheries in this respect, but that these differences were not large enough to severely tarnish the image of a wide spread support for the new democracy in territorial terms (Justel 1995). In this chapter we shall look into a somewhat different aspect of electoral mobilisation, namely the relationships between the new enfranchised voters and electoral abstainers at the first elections and the various parties' ability to mobilise these voters at the second election. Likewise, we shall look into the first election party voter's propensity to opt for electoral abstention at the second elections. Particular emphasis will be put on whether we can detect any systematic Centre-Periphery patterns in terms of deviations from the overall average for the 50 electoral districts.

Thus, we shall try to assess the effect of the territorial cleavage on the patterns of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation. In accord with the typology outlined in chapter 3, the 50 electoral districts on the Spanish mainland and the two archipelagos are grouped into three categories: The Centre, the First Periphery, and the Second Periphery. The purpose of the analysis is twofold. First and foremost, the aim is to find out how and to what extent the behaviour of the Spanish electorate has been structured in Centre-Periphery terms in accord with the hypotheses elaborated in chapter 4. A secondary purpose is to find out if, and how, the territorial and the functional cleavages are related in this respect.

According to hypotheses H2, H4 and H10, we shall expect that the voters have showed a higher propensity to mobilise in the Centre than in the Peripheries, i.e. that larger proportions of new voters and first election abstainers will have opted for abstention at the second elections in the Peripheries than in the Centre. The greatest discrepancies will be found between the Second Periphery and the Centre. This expected pattern is straightforward and in line with a *strict* application of the Centre-Periphery concept. For the new voters' and former abstainers' party choice, however, we shall also take into account the state-wide parties' position on the functional axis in relation to the translation of the societal divisions into manifest cleavages. To the extent that the state-wide Left and Right show systematic differences in their ability to mobilise in the Peripheries compared to the Centre, the functional and territorial cleavages can be said to co-vary in a certain fashion. With reference to the discussion in chapter 4 and the notion that the state-wide Right was left alone in the defence of the harmonisation of the autonomy process, it is an open question whether the impact of the Centre-Periphery cleavage will be as pronounced for the state-wide Left as for the Right.

The indicators that we shall employ consist of identifying district wise deviations from the overall trends for all the 50 electoral districts. For each and one of the districts, the ECOL method was employed to estimate the individual level transition matrixes at the seven pairs of elections. Then the conditional percentages for the categories the electorate outlined in the typology presented in chapter 3 were calculated, and the means and standard deviations computed. On the basis of this, a series of tables showing the descriptive statistics and counts of cases more than one

standard deviation above and below the means are presented. In the analysis, the relative distributions of deviant cases in relation to the total number of cases in the Centre, First Periphery and Second Periphery will be used to assess if, and to what extent, we can detect any systematic differences between the categories along the territorial cleavage. References to particular districts and outliers are based on inspections and standard box-plot analyses of the ECOL distributions.⁴⁹

New voters

The question to be answered in this section is whether we can detect any meaningful centre-periphery patterns as to the behaviour of the voters that were enfranchised between the pairs of elections, both in terms of turnout as such and in terms of party choice. According to hypothesis H2, we shall expect that a substantially lower proportion of new voters will have turned out to vote in the Peripheries than in the Centre and that the greatest differences will be found between the Second Periphery and the Centre. This implies that we expect that the Peripheries will be over represented among deviant cases showing high levels of new voters opting for abstention. Likewise, we expect to find relatively more deviant cases showing low levels of abstention in the Centre. The corollary of this logic is that in terms of new voters opting for the state-wide parties, as stated in hypothesis H10, we expect a larger proportion of deviant “positive” cases in the Centre than in the Peripheries. As noted earlier, this second assumption might seem trivial given the competition that the state-wide parties face in some of the Peripheries, but once again it should be underscored that there is no necessary causal relationship in this and that the actual patterns can only be established by empirical evidence.

New voters opting for abstention

As shown in table 7.1 (below), the mean scores for the 50 electoral districts follow the estimated trends in the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6. At each pair of elections, the district wise mean is around 2 to 4 percent points lower than the national percentage, indicating that the new voters have been more readily mobilised in the smaller districts than in the larger ones. At the election in 2000, however, this discrepancy rose to an astonishing 27.7 percent points (45.8 vs.

⁴⁹ All matrixes for the electoral districts are listed in Appendix III.

18.1) indicating a very high level of demobilisation in the larger districts combined with a high level of mobilisation in the smaller districts. We may therefore conclude that to the extent that the new voters contributed to the overall fall in turnout, this contribution was definitely skewed towards the larger districts, i.e. the strongholds of the state-wide Left. In terms of standard deviations, we see that the variation around the mean was at its lowest at the highly contested 1993 election and reached its peak when the Left suffered its aforementioned calamity in 2000.

Table 7.1 New voters opting for abstention: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	34.5	16.2	31.5	34.0	21.9	26.9	18.1	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	9.9	8.5	9.2	8.7	7.8	9.1	10.0	
<hr/>								
ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	4	1	0	2	0	1	3	10
1. Periphery	2	2	2	4	2	4	3	17
2. Periphery	6	3	4	4	5	5	0	27
Sum	12	6	6	10	7	10	6	57
<hr/>								
BELOW :								Sum
<i>Centre</i>	4	2	7	3	3	2	1	22
<i>1. Periphery</i>	0	0	1	1	1	4	2	9
<i>2. Periphery</i>	1	0	0	0	2	0	5	8
<i>Sum</i>	5	2	8	5	6	6	8	39
<hr/>								
N (Total)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	350

Identifying the cases more than one standard deviation above the means, we observe that for the whole period studied, there are 10 out of the total of 154 centre cases.⁵⁰ The figures for the First and Second Peripheries are 17 out of 119 and 27 out of 77, respectively. This implies that 6 percent of the centre cases, 14 percent of the first periphery cases and 35 percent of the second periphery cases exhibit high levels of new voters opting for abstention. This pattern, then, is clearly in accord with the hypothesis in that there is a clear Centre-Periphery bias in the new voter's propensity to mobilise.

Looking at the cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we see that there are 22 cases from the Centre, 9 cases from the First Periphery and 8 cases from

⁵⁰ Cut off points above for new voters opting for abstention: 44.4, 24.4, 40.7, 42.7, 29.7, 36.0 and 28.1.

the Second Periphery.⁵¹ These figures amount to 14, 12 and 10 percent of their respective totals. Although the differences for the distribution of cases below are quite small, the combined pattern produced by both indicators show that there has been a marked centre-periphery bias in the new voters' propensity to mobilise between 1977 and 2000 and thus supports the hypothesis.

New voters opting for PCE/IU

Comparing the district level means for the PCE/IU listed in table 7.2 (below) to the overall estimated share at the national level discussed in chapter 6, we note an interesting pattern. Whereas the district means are lower than the overall results at the national level until 1986, the situation was the other way round thereafter. This indicates that the PCE/IU polled a greater share of the new voters in the larger district until the mid 1980s and from then on polled a greater share in the smaller districts. This is yet another token indicating that the party's electoral profile suffered a change with the creation of the IU. We also note that, on the basis of the standard deviations, any increase in the party's overall share among the new voters has been accompanied by a substantial increase in the variation between the districts, indicating that the party's mobilising ability has been unevenly distributed.

Table 7.2 New voters opting for PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	5.6	2.1	2.7	9.6	8.0	9.4	2.6	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	3.4	1.3	1.9	6.7	4.2	5.9	1.8	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	1	1	1	3	5	4	6	21
1. Periphery	3	4	4	4	1	3	1	20
2. Periphery	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3
Sum	5	6	5	7	7	7	7	44

BELOW :								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	4
<i>1. Periphery</i>	1	0	0	2	3	3	2	11
<i>2. Periphery</i>	2	4	3	4	5	4	4	26
<i>Sum</i>	6	4	3	6	8	7	6	41

N (Total)	50	48	50	50	50	50	50	348

⁵¹ Cut off points below for new voters opting for abstention: 24.6, 8.0, 22.3, 25.3, 14.1, 17.8 and 8.1.

As noted earlier, we should expect lower proportions of the new voters opting for the PCE/IU in the Peripheries than in the Centre. In terms of cases one standard deviation above the means, we note that there are 21 cases from the Centre, 20 cases from the First Periphery and three cases from the Second Periphery.⁵² This means that 14 percent of the Centre cases, 17 percent of the First Periphery cases and only 4 percent of the Second Periphery cases are in this group. The strong show in the First Periphery is due to PCE/IU's ability to capture new voters in the Andalusian districts. The rather spectacular increase in cases above the means from the Centre from 1986-89 and onwards is basically due to a change in PCE/IU's share of the new voters in the central region of Castilla-León, and underscores the familiar pattern of a change in the electoral profile with the creation of the IU. So far, in terms of deviant cases above the means, the straightforward centre-periphery logic does not apply to the PCE/IU since the pattern of the First periphery do not fall in between the Centre and the Second Periphery.

Looking at the deviations below the means, we observe that there are four Centre cases, 11 First Periphery cases and 26 Second Periphery cases.⁵³ These figures amount to 3, 9 and 34 percent of their respective totals. On the basis of the combined pattern revealed by the two indicators, then, we conclude that the general hypothesis is strengthened and that there is an overall Centre-Periphery bias in the new voters' propensity to opt for the PCE/IU.

New voters opting for PSOE

From table 7.3 (below) we note that the means for the 50 districts follow the estimated national percentages observed in chapter 6 closely, with one exception. For the 1993-96 pairs of elections the district mean is substantially lower than the percentage observed at the national level of aggregation (27.7 vs. 22.7). Together with the increase in the standard deviation, this indicates that the PSOE strengthened its grip on the new voters in the larger districts and lost out in the smaller districts in 1996.

⁵² Cut off points above for new voters opting for PCE/IU: 9.0, 3.4, 4.6, 16.3, 12.2, 15.3 and 4.4.

⁵³ Cut off points below for new voters opting for PCE/IU: 2.2, 0.8, 0.8, 2.9, 3.8, 3.5 and 0.8.

This pattern is fully in accord with the aforementioned notion of a ‘territorial’ realignment at the 1996 election.

Table 7.3 New voters opting for PSOE: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	20.0	40.7	28.0	20.1	21.6	22.7	18.1	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	7.9	10.0	9.7	7.4	11.0	12.2	10.0	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	3	3	4	3	1	1	3	18
1. Periphery	5	3	3	4	6	3	3	27
2. Periphery	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3
Sum	9	7	7	7	6	4	6	48

<i>BELOW :</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	3	1	1	0	2	1	1	9
<i>1. Periphery</i>	3	3	1	2	5	0	2	16
<i>2. Periphery</i>	5	4	6	4	2	6	5	28
<i>Sum</i>	11	8	8	6	9	7	8	53

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	350

In terms of deviant cases, we observe that there are 18 cases above the means from the Centre, 27 cases from the First Periphery and three cases from the Second Periphery.⁵⁴ These amount to 12, 23 and 4 percent of their respective totals. Thus, the pattern of positive cases refuting the hypothesis detected for PCE/IU also holds for PSOE. As to cases below the means, we find nine from the Centre, 16 from the First Periphery and 28 from the Second Periphery, i.e. 6, 13 and 36 percent of their respective totals.⁵⁵ The Second Periphery is thus grossly over represented. However, on the basis of the combined patterns of the two indicators, we will have to conclude that the hypothesis is refuted for PSOE since overall distribution is not in accord with the strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept.

⁵⁴ Cut off points above for new voters opting for PSOE: 27.9, 50.7, 37.7, 27.5, 32.6, 34.8, and 28.1.

⁵⁵ Cut off points below for new voters opting for PSOE: 12.1, 30.7, 18.3, 12.7, 10.6, 10.5, and 8.1.

New voters opting for AP/PP

From table 7.4 (below) we observe that AP/PP the mean scores for the 50 electoral districts are consistently higher than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6. This pattern clearly underscores that AP/PP showed a greater ability to mobilise the new voters in the smaller districts. Furthermore, the difference reached its peak in 1996 with nearly 7 percent points in accord with the aforementioned notion of a territorial realignment at this election. We also note the sharp increase in the variation between the districts as AP/PP strengthened its electoral stance and were able to challenge PSOE's hegemonic position from 1989-93 and onwards.

Table 7.4 New voters opting for AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	6.3	24.0	15.6	13.7	27.6	27.7	23.2	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	5.0	9.7	8.9	6.9	12.9	12.5	12.2	
<i>N</i>	47	50	50	50	50	50	50	
<hr/>								
ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	2	4	2	6	6	5	5	30
1. Periphery	0	1	1	2	2	2	0	8
2. Periphery	2	1	0	2	0	0	0	5
Sum	4	6	3	10	8	7	5	43
<hr/>								
BELOW :								Sum
<i>Centre</i>	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
<i>1. Periphery</i>	0	1	1	4	3	5	4	18
<i>2. Periphery</i>	1	6	6	5	7	5	6	36
<i>Sum</i>	1	8	8	9	10	11	10	57
<hr/>								
<i>N (Total)</i>	47	50	50	50	50	50	50	347

The table reveals that of the cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 30 are from the Centre, eight from the First Periphery and five from the Second Periphery.⁵⁶ This amounts to 19, 7 and 7 percent of their respective totals. From the district wise percentages listed in appendix III, we note that all the Second Periphery cases are from Galicia and reflect the strong position of AP/PP in that region. As for the cases more than one standard deviation below the means, there are three from the Centre, 18 from the first Periphery and 36 from the Second Periphery, i.e. 2, 15 and

⁵⁶ Cut off points above for new voters opting for AP/PP: 11.3, 33.7, 24.5, 20.6, 40.5, 40.2 and 35.4.

47 percent of their respective totals.⁵⁷ Thus, the combined pattern on the two indicators show that there is a marked Centre-Periphery bias in AP/PP's ability to mobilise the new voters in accord with the hypothesis.

New voters opting for UCD

From table 7.5 (below) we note that for UCD the means for the 50 electoral districts are higher than the percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6. This indicates that also the UCD polled a greater share of the new voters in the smaller districts than in the larger ones. The party's stance in the smaller districts is sustained by the box-plot analysis of the distributions in appendix III, showing that there are two positive outliers, both belonging to the small Centre districts north of Madrid, Ávila and Segovia.

Table 7.5 New voters opting for UCD: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	
<i>Mean</i>	20.4	3.1	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	10.6	2.5	

ABOVE :			Sum
Centre	5	5	10
1. Periphery	2	2	4
2. Periphery	0	2	2
Sum	7	11	18

<i>BELOW :</i>			<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>8</i>

N (Total)	47	50	97

In terms of deviant cases, there are 10 cases more than one standard deviation above the means from to the Centre, four from the First Periphery and two from the Second Periphery.⁵⁸ These amount to 23, 12 and 11 percent of their respective totals, showing

⁵⁷ Cut off points below for new voters opting for AP/PP: 1.3, 14.3, 6.7, 6.8, 14.7, 15.2 and 11.0.

⁵⁸ Cut off points above for new voters opting for UCD: 31.0 and 5.6

that the distribution is biased in Centre-Periphery terms. This is also underscored by the fact that of the cases more than one standard deviation below the means, one is from the Centre, four from the First Periphery and four from the Second Periphery, which amounts to 2, 11 and 21 percent of their respective totals.⁵⁹ Thus, in terms of deviations from the national trend, the combined directions of both indicators show that the Centre-Periphery logic clearly applies also for the UCD and supports the hypothesis.⁶⁰

New voters opting for CDS

From table 7.6 (below) we note that the means for the 50 districts are slightly higher than the estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6, indicating that also CDS has tended to mobilise more new voters in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

Table 7.6 New voters opting for CDS: Trend and deviant cases

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	
<i>Mean</i>	2.7	9.8	7.5	1.8	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	2.6	7.4	5.0	1.8	

ABOVE :					Sum
Centre	0	7	4	2	13
1. Periphery	0	1	1	0	2
2. Periphery	1	0	0	0	1
Sum	1	8	5	2	16

<i>BELOW :</i>					<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>8</i>

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	200

⁵⁹ Cut off points below for new voters opting for UCD: 9.8 and 0.6.

⁶⁰ In the analysis of transfers to the UCD and CDS a warning is called for. Since the total number of cases is substantially lower than for all the other options, the reader should bear in mind that in terms of percentages each single case has much greater weight for these parties. Thus, measuring the relative frequencies in terms of percentages is not the best option. For the sake of simplicity, however, I have nonetheless chosen to present the relative distributions for UCD and CDS in the same fashion as for the other options.

An inspection of the table reveals that of the cases more than one standard deviation above the means, there are 13 from the Centre, two from the First Periphery and one from the Second Periphery. They amount to 15, 3 and 2 percent of their respective totals and show a biased pattern in accord with the centre-periphery concept. This is corroborated by the cases more than one standard deviation below the means. In this group there is no Centre case, four First Periphery cases and four Second Periphery cases, i.e. 0, 6 and 9 percent of their respective totals. Thus, the conclusion is that the overall trend also for CDS reveals a Centre-Periphery pattern in relation to the mobilisation of new voters in accord with the hypothesis.

So far, we have detected that there is a marked Centre-Periphery bias in the new voter's propensity to mobilise in accord with the hypothesis. In terms of party choice, the hypothesis holds for all the parties with the sole exception of PSOE. Before we embark upon the task of drawing overall conclusions as to the patterns of mobilisation and demobilisation, we shall undertake an analysis the behaviour of those who abstained at one or both of the elections.

Abstainers

According to hypotheses H4, larger proportions of first election abstainers will have opted for abstention again at the second elections in the Peripheries than in the Centre, and the greatest differences in this respect will be found between the Second Periphery and the Centre. Thus, we should *a priori* expect to find a greater number of deviant cases showing a large percentage of first election abstainers opting for abstention again at the second election in the Peripheries than in the Centre. Likewise, we should expect to find more deviations from the average in terms of smaller percentages opting for abstention at two consecutive elections in the Centre than in the Peripheries. As for hypothesis H10 regarding the parties' ability to mobilise those who abstained at the first elections, we expect to find more deviant cases showing low transfers from abstention to the state-wide parties from the Peripheries than the

Centre. Likewise, we expect to find a larger proportion of deviant cases from the Peripheries showing high levels of transfers from the state-wide parties to abstention than from the Centre. As mentioned in relation to the new voters, in one respect the assumptions about the dynamic relationship between first election abstainers and the state-wide parties might seem trivial. As the state-wide parties compete with regional parties of substantial strength in some of the Peripheries we would assume that there would be relatively fewer former abstainers to be captured by the state-wide parties. But again, there is no automatic or necessary causal relationship in this. Electoral behaviour is not deterministic and elections never foretold. In the last resort it is a question that will have to be answered through empirical investigation.

First election abstainers remaining demobilised

Compared to the estimated overall percentages discussed in chapter 6, we note the means for the 50 electoral districts shown in table 7.7 (below) follow the national trend closely. In terms of variation between the districts, however, we note that it dropped substantially as the parties were able to consolidate their constituencies from 1986-89 and onwards, but that it increased again when the state-wide Left suffered its debacle in 2000.

Table 7.7 Electoral abstainers opting for abstention: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	61.2	35.0	56.1	57.6	49.3	61.7	65.7	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	10.4	9.5	11.5	7.8	7.1	7.3	10.1	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	11
1. Periphery	2	1	3	6	3	4	5	24
2. Periphery	4	4	5	3	3	4	0	23
Sum	7	6	10	11	7	10	7	58

<i>BELOW :</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	4	4	4	7	7	7	3	36
<i>1. Periphery</i>	0	1	4	2	2	1	2	12
<i>2. Periphery</i>	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
<i>Sum</i>	4	6	8	9	9	8	6	50

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	350

As shown in the table, there are altogether 58 cases more than one standard deviation above the district means. Of these, 11 are from the Centre, 24 from the First Periphery and 23 from the second Periphery.⁶¹ In terms of relative distributions, these amount to 7, 20 and 30 percent of their respective totals. This distribution is clearly biased in Centre-Periphery terms. This finding is corroborated by the distribution of cases more than one standard deviation below the means. Out of 50 cases, there are 36 from the Centre, 12 from the First Periphery and only two from the Second Periphery, i.e. 23, 12 and 2 percent of their respective totals.⁶² In terms of deviations from the district means, then, the dynamic aspects of electoral abstention are clearly biased according to the Centre-Periphery logic and thus sustain the hypothesis.

From an inspection of the district wise distribution listed in appendix III, it is worth noting that although the four Galician districts exhibit the highest levels of first elections abstainers opting for abstention at the second elections for both the 1977-79 and the 1979-82 pairs, this tendency waned quickly from then on. This implies that even though Galicia continued to show an 'endemic' problem of high levels of electoral abstention as detected in numerous studies (Vilas Nogueira 1992; Justel 1995), from a more dynamic perspective Galicia became more integrated into the political system in that it did not produce consistent outliers in terms of voters remaining permanently demobilised at consecutive elections during the last two decades studied.

First election abstainers opting for PCE/IU

As shown in table 7.8 (below), the means for the 50 electoral districts are slightly lower than the overall estimated percentages observed in chapter 6, indicating a slightly lower ability to mobilise former abstainers in the smaller districts.

Of the 44 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 25 are from the Centre, 15 from the First Periphery and four from the Second Periphery.⁶³ This yields the following relative distributions: 16 percent of the Centre cases, 13 percent of the

⁶¹ Cut off points above for abstainers opting for abstention: 71.6, 44.5, 67.6, 65.4, 56.4, 69.0, and 75.8.

⁶² Cut off points below abstainers opting for abstention: 50.8, 25.5, 44.6, 49.8, 42.2, 54.4, and 55.6.

⁶³ Cut off points above for abstainers opting for PCE/IU: 3.9, 2.1, 2.3, 5.9, 5.2, 5.8 and 2.6.

First Periphery cases and 5 percent of the Second Periphery cases. This pattern is in accord with the hypothesis. In terms of deviations more than one standard deviation below the means, there are altogether 44 cases of which seven are from the Centre, four from the First Periphery and 33 from the second Periphery, i.e. 5 percent, 3 percent and 43 percent of their respective totals.⁶⁴

Table 7.8 Electoral abstainers opting for PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	2.5	1.5	1.4	3.5	3.5	4.0	1.7	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	1.4	.6	.9	2.4	1.7	1.8	.9	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	2	3	3	3	3	3	8	25
1. Periphery	1	1	4	3	3	2	1	15
2. Periphery	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	4
Sum	4	5	7	7	6	5	9	44

<i>BELOW:</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	2	2	0	0	1	1	1	7
<i>1. Periphery</i>	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	4
<i>2. Periphery</i>	6	6	5	4	4	4	4	33
<i>Sum</i>	9	8	5	4	6	6	6	44

N (Total)	50	48	50	50	50	50	50	348

Thus, although the relative distribution of cases below is not in line with the strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept, the combined distributions on the two indicators show a Centre-Periphery bias. We conclude, then, that the hypothesis is sustained in that the Centre-Periphery logic applies to PCE/IU's ability to mobilise former abstainers.

⁶⁴ Cut off points below for abstainers opting for PCE/IU: 1.1, 0.9, 0.5, 1.1, 1.8, 2.2 and 0.8.

First election PCE/IU voters opting for abstention

From table 7.9 (below) we note that the district means are consistently higher than the estimated transfers for Spain as a whole discussed in chapter 6. This shows clearly that larger proportions of former PCE/IU voters have tended to demobilise in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

There are 54 cases more than one standard deviation above the means.⁶⁵ Of these, 10 are from the Centre, 18 from the First Periphery and 26 from the Second Periphery, i.e. 6, 15 and 34 percent of their respective totals. In this respect, then, the strict Centre-Periphery logic applies. More than one standard deviation below the means we find 49 cases, 17 from the Centre, 27 from the First Periphery and five from the Second Periphery.⁶⁶ These amount to 11, 23 and 6 percent of their respective totals.

Table 7.9 PCE/IU transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
Mean	20.7	10.0	27.0	24.9	13.1	12.5	34.9	
Std.dev.	11.5	6.9	10.7	11.4	7.0	6.0	11.6	

ABOVE:								Sum
Centre	2	0	3	1	2	0	2	10
1. Periphery	1	4	2	2	2	5	2	18
2. Periphery	3	3	4	6	3	4	3	26
Sum	6	7	9	9	7	9	7	54

BELOW:								Sum
<i>Centre</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>49</i>

N (Total)	50	50	48	50	50	50	50	348

Thus, although there is a Centre-Periphery bias on the first indicator, we note that the strict Centre-Periphery concept does not apply to the combined pattern for PCE/IU and the hypothesis is refuted for this relationship.

⁶⁵ Cut off points above for PCE/IU transfers to abstention: 32.2, 16.9, 37.7, 36.3, 20.1, 18.5 and 46.5.

⁶⁶ Cut off points below for PCE/IU transfers to abstention: 9.2, 3.1, 16.3, 13.5, 6.1, 6.5 and 23.3.

First election abstainers opting for PSOE

As shown in table 7.10 (below) the district means for PSOE follow the estimated proportions for Spain as a whole discussed in chapter 6 closely. We also note the drop in variation around the mean as the electorates became consolidated after the realignment election in 1982.

We find 51 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 22 from the Centre, 24 from the First Periphery and five from the second Periphery.⁶⁷ This yields the following relative distribution: 14 percent of the Centre cases, 24 percent of the First Periphery cases and 6 percent of the Second Periphery cases.

Table 7.10 Abstainers opting for PSOE: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	8.8	23.9	13.6	11.4	11.3	9.0	5.4	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	6.2	10.6	8.7	6.5	4.4	5.0	3.4	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	2	2	3	4	2	2	5	22
1. Periphery	2	7	6	1	2	2	1	24
2. Periphery	0	0	0	2	3	3	0	5
Sum	4	9	9	7	7	4	9	51

<i>BELOW :</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>62</i>

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	350

At the other end of the scale we find 62 cases of low transfers rates from abstention, 12 from the Centre, 16 from the First Periphery and 34 from the second Periphery, i.e. 8, 13 and 44 percent of their respective totals.⁶⁸ This implies that, although the second indicator does yield a pattern in accord with the strict application of the Centre-

⁶⁷ Cut off points above for abstainers opting for PSOE: 15.0, 34.5, 22.3, 17.9, 15.7, 14.0 and 8.8.

⁶⁸ Cut off points below for abstainers opting for PSOE: 2.6, 13.3, 4.9, 4.9, 6.9, 4.0 and 2.0.

Periphery concept, the combined pattern of the two indicators is not in accord with the expected pattern and the hypothesis is refuted in relation to PSOE's ability to mobilise former abstainers.

First election PSOE voters opting for abstention

From table 7.11 (below) we note that the means for the 50 electoral districts are somewhat lower than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole studied in chapter 6. This indicates that also PSOE has tended to see a relatively larger proportion of former voters demobilise in the larger districts than in the smaller ones. We observe that there are 50 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 13 from the Centre, 17 from the First Periphery and 20 from the Second Periphery.⁶⁹ These figures amount to 8, 14 and 26 percent of their respective totals and show a centre-periphery bias in accord with the hypothesis. Likewise, of the 47 cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we observe that there are 27 from the Centre, 12 from the first Periphery and eight from the second Periphery, i.e. 18, 10 and 10 percent of their respective totals.⁷⁰

Table 7.11 PSOE transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	15.7	6.9	16.4	12.7	5.1	6.3	13.5	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	6.1	3.8	6.1	3.9	2.5	4.0	6.6	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	1	2	2	3	3	1	1	13
1. Periphery	2	3	4	4	2	1	2	17
2. Periphery	4	0	2	1	3	3	7	20
Sum	7	5	7	8	8	5	10	50

<i>BELOW :</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	3	3	4	8	2	1	6	27
<i>1. Periphery</i>	2	1	0	3	2	1	3	12
<i>2. Periphery</i>	2	2	2	0	2	0	0	8
<i>Sum</i>	7	5	6	11	6	2	9	47

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	350

⁶⁹ Cut points above for PSOE transfers to abstention: 21.8, 10.7, 22.5, 16.6, 7.6, 10.3 and 20.1.

⁷⁰ Cut points below for PSOE voter opting for abstention: 9.6, 3.1, 10.3, 8.8, 2.6, 2.3 and 6.9.

Thus, although the pattern on the second indicator is not quite in line with the Centre-Periphery concept, the combined pattern on the two indicators is clearly skewed in accord with the hypothesis. One interesting observation is that the Centre district Madrid appears as cases of high defection rates at six out of the seven pairs of elections.⁷¹ We may conclude, then, that Madrid constitutes a notable exception in the overall Centre-Periphery bias in the former PSOE voters' propensity to opt for abstention.

First election abstainers opting for AP/PP

As shown in table 7.12 (below), the means for the 50 electoral districts are consistently higher than the estimated overall percentages discussed in chapter 6. Thus, we conclude that larger proportions of former abstainers have been mobilised by the AP/PP in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

Table 7.12 Abstainers opting for AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	3.6	16.7	11.4	9.8	17.8	14.7	14.7	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	2.2	6.2	6.2	5.8	5.7	6.4	7.6	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	4	7	9	6	6	6	4	42
1. Periphery	1	3	1	0	3	1	0	9
2. Periphery	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	5
Sum	5	10	11	6	10	9	5	56

<i>BELOW :</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	0	0	3	1	1	2	1	8
<i>1. Periphery</i>	2	3	2	2	3	2	3	17
<i>2. Periphery</i>	0	6	6	5	6	7	3	33
<i>Sum</i>	2	9	9	8	10	11	7	58

N (Total)	50	47	50	50	50	50	50	347

⁷¹ See Appendix III.

In the table there are altogether 56 deviant cases above the means, of which 42 are from the Centre, nine from the First Periphery and five from the Second Periphery.⁷² The relative distributions are 27, 8 and 6 percent, respectively. At the lower end we find 58 cases, eight from the Centre, 17 from the First Periphery and 33 from the second Periphery.⁷³ This yields the following relative distribution: 5, 14 and 45 percent respectively. Thus the distributions on both indicators are clearly skewed in accord with the Centre-Periphery concept and the hypothesis is sustained.

First election AP/PP voters opting for abstention

As shown in table 7.13 (below) the means for the 50 districts are consistently somewhat higher than the estimated overall percentages shown in chapter 6. Thus, the AP/PP has tended to see larger proportions of its voters demobilise in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

Table 7.13 AP/PP transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	33.3	13.3	18.7	13.4	6.5	6.2	10.8	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	9.6	5.9	5.3	6.7	4.0	3.4	5.4	
<i>N</i>	48	47	50	50	50	50	50	
<hr/>								
ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	6
1. Periphery	4	3	6	3	2	3	5	26
2. Periphery	4	1	2	5	3	3	3	22
Sum	8	4	8	8	5	10	10	54
<hr/>								
BELOW :								Sum
<i>Centre</i>	7	3	6	4	1	4	3	28
<i>1. Periphery</i>	1	0	3	3	3	1	2	13
<i>2. Periphery</i>	0	1	2	0	1	1	3	8
<i>Sum</i>	8	4	11	7	5	6	8	49
<hr/>								
<i>N (Total)</i>	48	47	50	50	50	50	50	345

⁷² Cut off points above for abstainers opting for AP/PP: 5.8, 22.9, 17.6, 15.6, 23.5, 21.1 and 22.3.

⁷³ Cut off points below for abstainers opting for AP/PP: 1.4, 10.5, 5.2, 4.0, 12.1, 8.3 and 7.1.

In the table, we observe that there are 54 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, six from the Centre, 26 from the First Periphery and 22 from the Second Periphery.⁷⁴ These figures amount to 4, 22 and 30 percent of their respective totals and the distribution is clearly biased in Centre-Periphery terms. At the other end of the scale, there are 49 cases more than one standard deviation below the means, 28 from the Centre 13 from the First Periphery and eight from the Second Periphery, i.e. 18, 11 and 11 percent of their respective totals.⁷⁵ Although this last distribution is not skewed in accord with the strict Centre-Periphery logic, the combined distribution on the two indicators clearly underscore that the strictest version of the Centre-Periphery concept applies to the behaviour of AP/PP transfers to abstention and sustains the hypothesis.

First election abstainers opting for UCD

From table 7.14 (below) we note that the means for the electoral districts are lower than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6. Thus, the UCD have tended to mobilise larger proportions of former abstainers in the smaller districts than in the bigger ones.

Table 7.14 Abstainers opting for UCD: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	
<i>Mean</i>	13.7	5.8	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	6.4	3.4	
<i>N</i>	50	47	

ABOVE :			Sum
Centre	7	7	14
1. Periphery	2	0	2
2. Periphery	0	3	3
Sum	9	10	19

<i>BELOW :</i>			<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>17</i>

<i>N (Total)</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>97</i>

⁷⁴ Cut off points above for AP/PP-abstention: 42.9, 19.2, 24.0, 20.1, 10.5, 9.6 and 16.2.

⁷⁵ Cut off points below for AP/PP-abstention: 23.7, 7.4, 13.4, 6.7, 2.5, 2.8 and 5.4.

In the table, we find 19 deviant cases above the means, 14 from the Centre, two from the First Periphery and three from the Second Periphery.⁷⁶ These amount to 32, 6 and 16 percent of their respective totals. This distribution is not in accord with the strictest application of the Centre-Periphery concept and begs an answer to the question of to what extent the former UCD voters in the First Periphery opted for the regional parties after the collapse of the party. This will be catered to in the analysis of the behaviour of the first election UCD voters in chapter 9.

Below the means we find 17 cases, two from the Centre, eight from the First Periphery and seven from the Second Periphery.⁷⁷ This gives the following relative distribution: 5 percent of the Centre cases, 24 percent of the First Periphery cases and 37 percent of the second Periphery cases. Thus, even though the distribution on the first indicator was not skewed in accord with the hypothesis, the combined distributions on the two indicators show an overall Centre-Periphery bias and thus sustain the hypothesis. The box-plot analysis of the distribution listed in appendix III showed that there was only one outlier, namely Segovia in 1979 where UCD captured around 35 percent of the former abstainers. This should come as no surprise given the fact that the party leader, Adolfo Suárez, had been designated Civil Governor of Segovia under the Franco regime and, as mentioned in chapter 2, the networks of local government was fully exploited in order to facilitate the success of the UCD.

First election UCD voters opting for abstention

From table 7.15 (below) we note that the means for the electoral districts follow the estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6 closely for the first two pairs of elections. At the 1982-86 pair, however, the district mean was nearly 22 percent points lower than the overall percentage (8 vs. 29.8) and the standard deviation more than doubled, indicating that the UCD lost heavily to abstention in the larger districts in 1986.

Out of the 39 cases identified above the means, 14 are from the Centre, 12 from the First Periphery and 13 from the Second Periphery, i.e. 21, 24 and 45 percent of their

⁷⁶ Cut off points above for abstainers opting for UCD: 20.1 and 9.2.

⁷⁷ Cut off point below for abstainers opting for UCD: 7.3 and 2.4.

respective totals.⁷⁸ This distribution is clearly biased in accord with the strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept. On the indicator below, however, we observe that the distribution runs contrary the assumptions of the strict application of the concept. Out of 11 cases, four are from the Centre, six from the First Periphery and only one from the Second Periphery, i.e. 6, 12 and 3 percent of their respective totals.⁷⁹ Thus, the combined distribution on the two indicators show that, in spite of the fact that the indicator above is skewed in Centre-Periphery terms, the hypothesis is refuted for the former UCD voters' propensity to opt for abstention.

Table 7.15 UCD transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	
<i>Mean</i>	23.0	17.0	8.0	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	6.0	6.7	15.6	

ABOVE :				Sum
Centre	1	0	13	14
1. Periphery	1	4	7	12
2. Periphery	3	3	7	13
Sum	5	7	27	39

<i>BELOW :</i>				<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	0	4	0	4
<i>1. Periphery</i>	5	1	0	6
<i>2. Periphery</i>	0	1	0	1
<i>Sum</i>	5	6	0	11

N (Total)	49	50	47	146

First election abstainers opting for CDS

As shown in table 7.16 (below), the means for the districts are consistently somewhat higher than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6,

⁷⁸ Cut off points above for UCD transfers to abstention: 29.0, 23.7 and 23.6.

⁷⁹ Cut off points below for UCD transfers to abstention: 17.0, 10.3 and -7.6.

indicating that also the CDS has tended to mobilise larger proportions of former abstainers in the smaller districts than in the larger.

In the table, there are 23 deviant cases above the means.⁸⁰ Of these 20 are from the Centre, three from the First Periphery and none from the Second Periphery, i.e. 23, 4 and 0 percent of their respective totals. Likewise, we find 15 deviant cases below the means,⁸¹ of which none are to the Centre, two from the First Periphery and 13 from the Second Periphery. These amount to 0, 3 and 30 percent of their respective totals. This implies that the pattern of the dynamic relationship between first election abstainers and CDS is markedly biased in Centre-Periphery terms and that the hypothesis is supported in relation to the CDS.

Table 7.16 Abstainers opting for CDS: Trend and deviant cases

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	
<i>Mean</i>	2.9	4.7	5.0	2.0	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	2.3	3.4	2.3	1.3	

ABOVE :					Sum
Centre	2	6	6	6	20
1. Periphery	1	1	1	0	3
2. Periphery	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	3	7	7	6	23

<i>BELOW :</i>					<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	0	0	0	0	0
<i>1. Periphery</i>	0	0	2	0	2
<i>2. Periphery</i>	0	3	5	5	13
<i>Sum</i>	0	3	7	5	15

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	200

From the box-plot analysis of the distributions listed in appendix III, we note that there are seven positive outliers, of which six are either from the party leader Adolfo Suárez' birth place Ávila or from the province where he served as Civil Governor, Segovia. This once again underscores the importance of the party leader in the UCD and ventures as discussed in chapters 2 and 4.

⁸⁰ Cut off points above for abstainers opting for CDS: 5.2, 8.1, 7.3 and 3.3.

⁸¹ Cut off points below for abstainers opting for CDS: 0.6, 1.3, 2.7 and 0.7.

First election CDS voters opting for abstention

From table 7.17 (below) we observe the familiar pattern of slightly higher means for the districts than the estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6. Somewhat surprisingly, the estimated transfers to abstention across the district were as lowest between 1989 and 1993, precisely when the party's overall share of the votes cast fell from 7.9 to 1.8 percent. This indicates that the bulk of the party's defectors had opted for other parties in 1993. This question, then, will be dealt with in chapter 9.

As observed in the table, out of 33 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, five are from the Centre, 11 from the First periphery and 17 from the Second Periphery.⁸² This amount to the following relative distribution: 6 percent of the Centre cases, 16 percent of the First Periphery cases and 39 percent of the Second Periphery cases. This distribution is clearly in accord with the strictest application of the Centre-Periphery concept and supports the hypothesis.

Table 7.17 CDS transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	
<i>Mean</i>	34.3	30.2	23.0	41.0	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	8.7	8.8	6.6	11.1	

ABOVE :					Sum
Centre	2	2	0	1	5
1. Periphery	2	5	4	0	11
2. Periphery	5	2	4	6	17
Sum	9	9	8	7	33

<i>BELOW:</i>					<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	5	5	5	3	18
<i>1. Periphery</i>	1	2	2	1	6
<i>2. Periphery</i>	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Sum</i>	6	7	7	4	25

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	200

⁸² Cut off points above for CDS transfers to abstention: 43.0, 39.0, 29.6 and 52.1.

Likewise, as 18 of the altogether 24 cases below the means are from the Centre, six from the First Periphery and only one from the Second Periphery (20, 9 and 2 percent respectively), the combined pattern on both indicators are in line with the strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept and supports the hypothesis in relation to transfers from CDS to abstention.⁸³

Conclusions

As to the new voters, the pattern of relative distributions of deviant cases shown in table 7.18 (below) reveals that there is a marked overall Centre-Periphery bias in the new voters propensity to opt for abstention. While the Centre exhibits a negative percent wise balance of deviant cases (-8), both the First Periphery (+2) and the Second Periphery (+25) exhibit positive balances. The H2 hypothesis is thus sustained. In terms of the new voter's party choice, the Centre-Periphery bias is particularly marked for the state-wide Right. For the state-wide Left, however, a slight modification of the initial hypothesis is called for. Although there is a marked difference in the relative distributions of deviant cases between the Centre and the Second Periphery both for PSOE and PCE/IU, they also show positive balances in the First Periphery – and for PSOE the greatest difference is actually found between the First and the Second Periphery. Thus, the impact of the territorial cleavage is not evenly distributed along the functional axis of the party system. This is, of course, fully in accord with the notion that the state-wide Left and the state-wide Right differ in their views on the territorial structure of the Spanish state. The combined patterns for abstention and all the state-wide parties are summarised in table 7.18 (below).

Table 7.18 New voters: Relative distributions of deviant cases⁸⁴

<i>New voters</i>	Abstention	PCE/IU	PSOE	AP/PP	UCD	CDS
Centre	-8	11	6	17	21	15
1. Periphery	2	8	10	-8	0	-3
2. Periphery	25	-30	-32	-40	-10	-7

Out of six relationships, only the one recorded for PSOE is not in accord with the expected pattern. On the basis of the combined relative distribution of deviant cases,

⁸³ Cut off points below for CDS transfers to abstention: 25.6, 21.4, 16.4 and 29.9.

⁸⁴ The percent wise distributions below subtracted from the percent wise distributions above.

then, we conclude that there is a marked overall bias in the behaviour of the new voters along the territorial axis, but that there is a certain co-variation between the Centre-Periphery axis and the Left-Right axis in terms of party choice. This difference between the Left and the Right is clearly captured in table 7.19 (below).

Table 7.19 New voters: Mean relative distributions of deviant cases⁸⁵

New voters	To all parties	To the Left	To the Right
Centre	14.0	8.5	17.7
1. Periphery	1.4	9.0	-3.7
2. Periphery	-23.8	-31.0	-19.0

In the table, the mean relative distributions of deviant cases are listed for all the state-wide parties, the party bloc on the Left (PCE/IU + PSOE) and the party bloc on the Right (AP/PP + UCD + CDS). The pattern detected for all parties together reveals a clear Centre-Periphery pattern in accord with the theory. This also holds for the party bloc on the Right. The pattern for the party bloc on the Left, however, is clearly not in accord with the expectations due to its strong showing in the First Periphery.

Also the analysis of the behaviour of the first election abstainers during the transition to and consolidation of the new democracy in Spain shows an overall Centre-Periphery bias in their behaviour. The distributions in tables 7.20 (below), show clearly that the Second Periphery has produced a substantially higher number of cases of large proportions of voters remaining demobilised at consecutive elections than cases of high levels of mobilisation. The First Periphery show the same tendency, but to a lesser degree, while the tendency for the Centre, as expected, is quite the opposite.

⁸⁵ The distributions for the parties added together and divided by the number of parties in each category.

Tables 7.20 Abstainers: Relative distributions of deviant cases

<i>From Abstention</i>	Abstention	PCE/IU	PSOE	AP/PP	UCD	CDS
Centre	-16	11	6	22	27	23
1. Periphery	10	10	7	-6	-18	1
2. Periphery	27	-38	-38	-39	-21	-30

<i>To Abstention</i>	PCE/IU	PSOE	AP/PP	UCD	CDS
Centre	-5	-10	-14	15	-14
1. Periphery	-8	4	11	12	7
2. Periphery	28	16	19	42	37

As shown in tables 7.20, out of altogether 11 relationships, eight are in accord with the expectations. In terms of shares of first election abstainers mobilised at the second elections, the state-wide parties have been far more successful in capturing the former abstainers in the Centre districts than in the First and Second Peripheries. The H4 hypothesis is therefore supported in general terms. As already noted, however, we have detected that the effect of the territorial cleavage differs between the state-wide Left and the state-wide Right. For the Left there has hardly been any difference between the Centre and the First Periphery in terms mobilisation of first election abstainers. For the state-wide Right, the relative distributions are strongly biased along the territorial axis. The patterns of demobilisation are more mixed. For both PSOE on the Left and AP/PP and CDS on the Right the patterns are in accord with the strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept. For both PCE/IU and UCD, however, the patterns of demobilisation run contrary to the hypothesis.

As captured in tables 7.21 (below), the mean patterns for all the parties and the parties of the Right are clearly in accord with the expectations, while the pattern detected for the Left indicates a stronger ability to both mobilise and retain the voters also in the First Periphery.

Tables 7.21 Party blocs: Mean relative distributions of deviant cases

From abstention	All parties	Left	Right
Centre	17.8	8.5	24.0
1. Periphery	-1.2	8.5	-7.7
2. Periphery	-33.2	-38.0	-30.0

To abstention	All parties	Left	Right
Centre	-5.6	-7.5	-4.3
1. Periphery	5.2	-2.0	10.0
2. Periphery	28.4	22.0	32.7

Thus, the conclusion is that we have detected an overall Centre-Periphery bias in the patterns of mobilisation and demobilisation for the state-wide parties between the seven pairs of elections from 1977 to 2000. At the same time, we have detected that the effect of the Centre-Periphery cleavage is unevenly distributed along the functional Left-Right axis. After UCD's collapse, for the state-wide Right the ability both to mobilise former abstainers and to retain former voters has definitely been skewed towards the Centre, while the state-wide Left has been far more successful in this respect also in the First-Periphery. All the state-wide parties, however, have struggled in the Second Periphery.

In the next chapter, we shall probe into the Centre-periphery patterns of the stabilisation of party choice.

CHAPTER 8

Centre-Periphery Patterns of Electoral Stabilisation

Introduction

As noted in chapter 4, according to the general connotations of the Centre-Periphery concept, i.e. distance, difference and dependency, and the dynamics of *nationalisation of party voting* (Rose and Urwin 1975; Taylor and Johnston 1979; Caramani 2004), we should *a priori* expect that the behaviour of voters in the Centre would have followed the national trends to a greater extent than the voters in the Peripheries. Thus, the H6 stated that the loyalty rates commanded by the state-wide parties would be substantially lower in the Peripheries than in the Centre and that the greatest difference would be found between the Centre and the Second Periphery.

This implies that we should expect a greater number of deviant cases exhibiting large proportions of first election party voters remaining loyal at the second election the Centre than in the Peripheries.

Loyal to PCE/IU

As shown in table 8.1 (below) the means of the loyalty rates for the 50 electoral districts are substantially lower than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6. This is a clear indication that PCE/IU commanded far higher loyalty rates in the larger districts than in the smaller ones. This systematic pattern is corroborated by the standard deviations that are, as we shall see, by far the greatest detected for all of the state-wide parties.

There are altogether 60 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, of which 21 are from the Centre, 39 from the First Periphery and none from the Second

Periphery.⁸⁶ These figures amount to 14, 34 and 0 percent of their respective totals. This means that the tendency of a stronger showing of PCE/IU in the First Periphery than in the Centre detected in the previous chapter is clearly underscored here.

Table 8.1 Loyal to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
Mean	40.5	19.3	24.1	47.5	58.3	68.6	28.7	
Std.dev.	20.0	12.1	18.5	22.6	20.3	17.5	12.6	
<hr/>								
ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	4	3	3	2	4	2	3	21
1. Periphery	6	5	7	5	6	5	5	39
2. Periphery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	10	8	10	7	10	7	8	60
<hr/>								
BELOW:								Sum
<i>Centre</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>36</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>57</i>
<hr/>								
N (Total)	50	48	48	50	50	50	50	346

On the other hand, there are 57 cases more than one standard deviation below the means, 12 Centre cases, 9 First Periphery cases and 36 Second Periphery cases.⁸⁷ This yields the following relative distribution: 8, 8 and 47 percent of the respective totals. Thus, seen in combination, the two indicators reveal a pattern of overall Centre-Periphery bias, but the combined relative distributions are not in accord with the strict application of the concept. The hypothesis is therefore refuted in relation to the stabilisation of the PCE/IU vote.

⁸⁶ Cut off points above for loyal PCE/IU voters: 60.5, 31.4, 42.6, 70.1, 78.6, 86.1 and 41.3.

⁸⁷ Cut off points below for loyal PCE/IU voters: 20.5, 7.5, 5.6, 24.9, 38.0, 51.1 and 16.1.

Loyal to PSOE

The means for the electoral districts shown in table 8.2 (below) follow the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole closely and thus indicate that district size had had little or no impact on PSOE's ability to retain its voters. We also note that the standard deviation reached its peak at the highly contested 1993 election.

Table 8.2 Loyal to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	59.0	74.3	59.4	70.1	79.0	82.5	67.1	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	10.9	7.8	8.3	7.7	12.1	7.9	9.0	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	5	2	2	3	0	2	4	16
1. Periphery	3	1	2	4	3	1	5	19
2. Periphery	0	3	3	1	0	0	0	7
Sum	8	6	7	8	3	3	9	42

<i>BELOW :</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	0	1	2	2	0	1	2	8
<i>1. Periphery</i>	1	2	4	2	0	1	2	12
<i>2. Periphery</i>	6	3	1	4	4	3	5	26
<i>Sum</i>	7	6	7	8	4	4	9	47

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	350

We note that there are altogether 16 cases from the Centre, 19 from the First Periphery and seven from the Second Periphery more than one standard deviation above the district means. These numbers amount to 10 percent of the Centre cases, 16 percent of the First Periphery cases and 9 percent of the Second Periphery cases.⁸⁸ Thus, the pattern is not in accord with the hypothesis.

More than one standard deviation below the means we find eight cases from the Centre, 12 from the First Periphery and 26 from the Second Periphery, i.e. 8 percent of the Centre cases, 10 percent of the First Periphery cases and 34 percent of the Second Periphery cases.⁸⁹ This implies that, although the pattern of deviant cases below the means is in accord with the Centre-Periphery logic, the combined

⁸⁸ Cut off points above for voters loyal to PSOE: 69.9, 82.1, 67.7, 77.8, 91.1, 90.4 and 76.1.

⁸⁹ Cut off point below for voters loyal to PSOE: 48.1, 66.5, 51.1, 62.4, 66.9, 74.6 and 58.1.

distribution on the two indicators is not in accord with the hypothesis and it is therefore refuted in relation to PSOE.

Loyal to AP/PP

From table 8.3 (below) we observe that the district means are slightly lower than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole reported in chapter 6. Although the differences are not great, the pattern indicates that the AP/PP was somewhat more successful in retaining its voters in the larger districts than in the smaller ones.

Table 8.3 Loyal to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	16.8	50.3	53.7	70.8	81.6	87.4	78.3	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	9.7	10.6	9.8	10.2	8.3	6.1	7.3	
<i>N</i>	46	47	50	50	50	50	50	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	3	2	4	4	4	5	2	24
1. Periphery	2	2	1	1	3	4	6	19
2. Periphery	2	2	1	0	0	2	0	7
Sum	7	6	6	5	7	11	8	50

BELOW :								Sum
<i>Centre</i>	2	1	1	1	0	1	2	8
<i>1. Periphery</i>	3	5	6	5	4	3	5	31
<i>2. Periphery</i>	0	1	2	2	3	3	0	11
<i>Sum</i>	5	7	9	8	7	7	8	50

<i>N (Total)</i>	46	47	50	50	50	50	50	343

As listed in the table, there are 50 cases more than one standard deviation above the means.⁹⁰ Of these, 24 belong to the Centre, 19 to the First Periphery and seven to the Second Periphery, i.e. 17, 16 and 10 percent of their respective totals. We note that even though there is an overall Centre-Periphery bias, the difference between the Centre and First Periphery is very small. The pattern of relatively many deviant cases in the First Periphery is underscored by the distribution of cases below the means. Out

⁹⁰ Cut off points above for AP/PP: 26.5, 60.9, 63.5, 81.0, 89.0, 93.5 and 85.6.

of 50 cases, eight belong to the Centre, 31 to the First Periphery and 11 to the Second Periphery, i.e. 5, 26 and 16 percent of their respective totals.⁹¹

Thus, on the basis of the two indicators, a strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept does not hold for the AP/PP loyalty rates and the hypothesis is refuted.

Loyal to UCD

The means for the electoral districts are somewhat higher than the estimated overall percentages reported in chapter 6, indicating the UCD was slightly more successful in retaining its voters in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

Table 8.4 Loyal to UCD: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	
<i>Mean</i>	60.0	17.8	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	8.8	7.1	
<i>N</i>	49	47	

ABOVE :			Sum
Centre	1	2	3
1. Periphery	4	5	9
2. Periphery	0	2	2
Sum	5	9	14

<i>BELOW :</i>			<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>14</i>

<i>N (Total)</i>	49	47	96

Out of 14 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, three belong to the Centre, nine to the First Periphery and two to the Second Periphery, i.e. 7, 26 and 11 percent of their respective totals. By token of the indicator above, the strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept does not apply.⁹² In terms of the indicator

⁹¹ Cut off points below for AP/PP: 7.1, 39.7, 43.9, 60.6, 77.8, 81.3 and 71.0.

⁹² Cut off points above for voters loyal to UCD: 68.8 and 24.9.

below, we note that out of the 14 cases, five belong to the Centre, three to the First Periphery and 6 to the second periphery.⁹³ This amounts to 11, 9 and 33 percent of their respective totals. Once again we observe that the strict application of the concept does not apply. Even in the Centre the relative distribution on the two indicators is negative. This should come as no surprise given the party's collapse in 1982. What is surprising, however, is the positive balance recorded for the First Periphery. Anyway, the hypothesis is refuted in relation to UCD's ability to retain its voters.

Loyal to CDS

From table 8.5 (below) we observe that the district means are somewhat lower than the estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6, indicating that also the CDS was more successful in retaining its voters in the larger districts than in the smaller ones.

Table 8.5 Loyal to CDS: Trend and deviant cases

	82-86	86-89	89-93	
<i>Mean</i>	23.8	27.8	7.1	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	13.3	11.9	4.9	
<hr/>				
ABOVE:				Sum
Centre	3	4	6	13
1. Periphery	2	2	0	4
2. Periphery	0	0	0	0
Sum	5	6	6	17
<hr/>				
<i>BELOW:</i>				<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	0	1	0	1
<i>1. Periphery</i>	3	2	2	7
<i>2. Periphery</i>	2	5	2	9
<i>Sum</i>	5	8	4	17
<hr/>				
N (Total)	50	50	50	150

⁹³ Cut off points below for voters loyal to UCD: 51.2 and 10.7.

The box-plot analysis of the distributions listed in appendix III, revealed the birthplace of the party leader, Avila, appeared as an positive outlier both in 1986, 1989 and 1993. Given the fact that the distributions are based on conditional percentages, they also reflect that Avila was *the* stronghold of the party for as long as it existed.

As seen in the table, there are 17 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 13 from the Centre, four from the First Periphery and none from the Second Periphery.⁹⁴ These amount to 20, 8 and 0 percent of their respective totals and this distribution is clearly biased in accord with the strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept. Moving to the other indicator, out of altogether 17 cases, one belong to the Centre, seven to the First Periphery and nine to the Second Periphery, i.e. 2, 14 and 27 percent of their respective totals.⁹⁵ This, then implies that in terms of both indicators the strict application of the Centre-Periphery logic applies and the hypothesis is supported in terms of CDS' ability to retain its voters.

Conclusions

As shown in table 8.6 below, it is only the Centre-Periphery distribution of deviant cases for the CDS that follow the strict pattern predicted by the hypothesis. Although there is a general Centre-Periphery bias in terms of differences between the Second Periphery versus either the Centre or the First Periphery also for the other parties, the initial expectations regarding the pattern of electoral stabilisation are not met for all the parties and the general assumption will have to be modified.

Table 8.6 Loyalty rates: Relative distributions of deviant cases

	PCE/IU	PSOE	AP/PP	UCD	CDS
Centre	6	5	12	-4	18
1. Periphery	26	6	-10	17	-6
2. Periphery	-47	-25	-6	-22	-27

⁹⁴ Cut off points above for voters loyal to CDS: 37.1, 39.1 and 12.0.

⁹⁵ Cut off points below for voters loyal to CDS: 10.5, 15.9 and 2.2.

While all the parties seen together exhibit a strongly negative balance of deviant cases indicating a generalised lower ability to retain the voters in the Second Periphery, they differ substantially as to their ability to retain former voters in the First Periphery. Whereas both parties of the state-wide Left, PCE/IU and PSOE, together with the UCD, showed the strongest ability to retain their voters in the First Periphery, both the CDS and the AP/PP showed their strongest ability in the Centre. Thus, after the collapse of the UCD, the loyalty patterns for the state-wide parties show a clear differentiation along the functional Left-Right axis. The PCE/IU exhibits a positive balance both in the First Periphery (+26) and in the Centre (+6) in combination with a strong negative balance in the Second Periphery (-47). This pattern also holds for the PSOE, although the differences are smaller than for the PCE/IU. On the other hand, both the AP/PP and the CDS exhibit negative balances both in the First and Second Peripheries, albeit AP/PP's strong showing in Galicia palliates the effect of the centre-periphery cleavage for this party to a substantial degree.

Thus far we have only studied the patterns for single parties. However, as shown in table 8.7 (below), the average relative distributions of cases for all the parties and the two party blocs reveal somewhat different patterns. Although the difference between the Centre and the First Periphery for all the parties lumped together is not very substantial, the pattern is nonetheless in accord with the hypothesis. This also holds for the party bloc on the Right, whereas the party bloc on the Left clearly deviate from the expected pattern.

Table 8.7 Party blocs: Mean relative distributions of deviant cases

Loyalty	All parties	Left	Right
Centre	7.4	5.5	8.7
1. Periphery	6.6	16.0	0.3
2. Periphery	-25.4	-36.0	-18.3

The overall conclusion, then, is that although the bias is not as pronounced as the one found in relation to mobilisation and demobilisation, the centre-Periphery logic also

holds for electoral stabilisation, with, again, a notable exception for the parties of the Left.

Thus, so far, we have seen that in Spain the hypotheses derived from the theory of Centre and Peripheries in the process of democratic transition and consolidation have, in general terms, been strengthened in relation to electoral mobilisation and demobilisation, and also in relation to electoral stabilisation – both with the notable exception of the state-wide Left. This particular aspect will be followed up in the analysis of the Centre-Periphery patterns related to party choice. This will be dealt with in the next chapter where we shall embark upon the analysis of voter transition between the parties.

CHAPTER 9

Centre-Periphery Patterns of Electoral Competition

Introduction

The first question to be dealt with in this chapter is quite straightforward: How and to what extent has the electoral competition between the parties been structured along the Centre-Periphery axis? According to the H10 hypothesis, the trends in voter transitions between the state-wide parties will have differed markedly between the Centre and the Peripheries and that the greatest discrepancy would be found between the Centre and the Second Periphery. This implies that high transfer rates from one party to another party in the Centre should coincide with low transfer rates in the Second Periphery, and low transfer rates in the Centre coincide with high transfer rates in the Second Periphery. The pattern for the First Periphery should fall in between either way. This, however, gives no direct hints as to how these differences will relate to the functional Left-Right cleavage. Based on the observation from chapter 5, that the Centre-Periphery cleavage seemingly had asserted itself over the functional Left-Right cleavage, we shall probe into the question of exactly how this is related to the position of the parties on the functional axis. In this, we could either envisage that the territorial cleavage be so strongly pronounced in the Peripheries that it overrides the Left-Right cleavage completely and hence expect a larger number of deviant cases of high transfer rates between the state-wide parties in the Peripheries than in the Centre. If this is the case, we have in fact detected that the two cleavages are intersected in an orthogonal fashion. Alternatively, and again based on the notion that the Left came to understand that democracy and decentralisation were mutually interdependent, we could envisage that the Left-Right cleavage be even more pronounced in the Peripheries than in the Centre, i.e. that the two cleavages to a certain extent overlap. Hence relatively fewer voters in the Peripheries will have transferred across the Left-Right axis than in the Centre. If this latter is the case, we are in fact implying that the Centre-Periphery cleavage and the Left-Right cleavage

have co-varied in an oblique fashion. Then, of course, the following question arises: To what extent have the former UCD and CDS voters rather opted for PCE/IU and PSOE than the AP/PP in the Peripheries compared to the Centre?

Thus, apart from assessing the status of the H10 hypothesis as such, we have two aspects to consider as to the intersection of the two cleavages. The first is related to whether we will observe a general pattern of more deviant cases of large proportions of voters shifting between the state-wide parties along the Left-Right axis in the Peripheries than in the Centre, or the other way round. The second is related to whether any 'barriers' in terms of transfers in the Peripheries are to be found *within* the party blocs, i.e. between the PCE/IU and PSOE on the one hand and between UCD, CDS and AP/PP on the other - or whether any such barriers are found *between* the party blocs, i.e. between the parties on the Left and some or all of the parties of the Right, and vice versa.

In addition to the aspects cited above, the analyses of the means for the electoral districts compared to the overall percentages analysed in chapter 6 will serve as an indicator as to whether and to what extent the pattern of transfers have undergone any 'territorial' shifts in relation to district size. With reference to the findings presented in the previous chapters, particular focus will be placed on transfers to and from the PCE/IU and the AP/PP in this respect.

Transfers from PCE/IU to PSOE

As shown in table 9.1 (below), the means for the transfers from PCE/IU to PSOE are slightly lower than the overall estimated percentages presented in chapter 6 for the 1977-79, 1979-82 and the 1996-2000 pairs of elections, while they are higher for the pairs between 1982 and 1996. Thus, once again we conclude that PCE/IU underwent a territorial shift in its voter's behaviour after the creation of the IU. This trend, however, came to an end at the calamity election in 2000.

Table 9.1 PCE/IU transfers to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
Mean	20.5	48.2	24.5	9.9	9.5	6.9	12.2	
Std.dev.	10.4	11.2	9.7	5.8	7.3	8.3	10.5	
ABOVE:								Sum
Centre	1	5	6	7	2	2	2	25
1. Periphery	2	0	2	2	1	1	0	8
2. Periphery	3	4	2	4	6	4	4	27
Sum	6	9	10	13	9	7	6	60
BELOW:								Sum
Centre	1	2	3	3	2	0	1	12
1. Periphery	7	3	3	6	5	0	2	26
2. Periphery	3	3	4	0	0	0	0	9
Sum	11	8	10	9	7	0	3	47
N (Total)	50	50	48	50	50	50	50	348

There are altogether 60 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 25 from the Centre, eight from the First Periphery and 27 from the Second Periphery⁹⁶. This amounts to 16, 7 and 35 percent of their respective totals. As seen before in relation to PCE/IU, the lowest percentage is found in the First Periphery and implies that the H10 hypothesis is not sustained by the data. Turning to the to cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we find 12 Centre cases, 26 from the First Periphery and nine from the Second Periphery⁹⁷. These amount to 8, 22 and 12 percent of their respective totals. The pattern of a greater difference between the First Periphery and the Centre than between the Centre and the Second Periphery is therefore accentuated. In terms of voter transfers from PCE/IU to PSOE, then, the H10 refuted in that the two indicators combined clearly show that the greatest difference in former PCE/IU voter's transfers to PSOE is found between the First and the Second Periphery.

This pattern of high levels of transfers from PCE/IU to PSOE in the Second Periphery was corroborated by the box-plot analysis. All of the altogether six positive outliers and extreme cases identified were from the Second Periphery regions of the Basque Country and Catalonia. And, although Guipúzcoa also appeared once as the only

⁹⁶ Cut off points above for PSOE: 30.9, 59.4, 34.2, 15.7, 16.8, 15.2 and 22.7.

⁹⁷ Cut off points below for PSOE: 10.1, 37.0, 14.8, 4.1, 2.2, -1.4 and 1.7

negative outlier identified (1979-82), it appeared again as a positive outlier both in 1993-96 and 1996-2000. Thus, by all tokens larger proportions of former PCE/IU voters have transferred to the PSOE in the Second Periphery than in both the Centre and the First Periphery.

Transfers from PCE/IU to AP/PP

As observed in table 9.2 (below), the means for the electoral districts are consistently higher than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6. This indicates that the PCE/IU have seen larger proportions of former voters defect to AP/PP in the smaller districts than in the larger ones across all the pairs of elections and that no shift in relation to district size occurred.

Table 9.2 PCE/IU transfers to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
Mean	3.2	10.9	6.5	4.6	7.2	5.5	9.1	
Std.dev.	2.8	6.6	4.5	3.8	6.4	4.6	6.9	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	2	4	7	4	3	3	3	26
1. Periphery	1	3	1	1	3	2	3	14
2. Periphery	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	7
Sum	4	8	9	6	6	6	8	47

<i>BELOW :</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>24</i>

N (Total)	47	50	48	50	50	50	50	345

There are altogether 47 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 26 from the Centre, 14 from the First Periphery and seven from the Second Periphery.⁹⁸ This yields a 17, 12 and 9 percent relative distribution in accord with the hypothesis, even though the differences are not overwhelming.

⁹⁸ Cut off points above for PCE/IU transfers to AP/PP: 6.0, 17.5, 11.0, 8.4, 13.6, 10.1 and 16.0.

In terms of cases more than one standard deviation below the means, there are 10 cases from the Centre and five and nine cases from the First and Second Peripheries, respectively.⁹⁹ Although the relative distribution below shows once again a greater difference between the First and Second Periphery than between the Second Periphery and the Centre (Centre 6 percent, First Periphery 4 percent and 12 percent from the Second Periphery), the combined pattern on the two indicators is in accord with the H10 hypothesis. In addition, we note that in contrast to the transfers to PSOE, lower proportions of former PCE/IU voters have switched to the AP/PP in the Second Periphery than both in the First Periphery and the Centre. This, then, supports the notion that the two cleavages are intersected in an oblique fashion.

The logic of difference *in kind* between Galicia on the one hand and Basque Country and Catalonia on the other as exposed in the radial Centre-Periphery typology was underscored by the box-plot analysis. Of altogether 13 positive outliers and extreme cases detected, the two from the Second Periphery were from AP/PP's stronghold Galicia. Thus, this is a clear indication of the aforementioned difference between Galicia and the two other the Second Periphery regions in relation to transfers from PCE/IU to AP/PP versus the PSOE.

Transfers from PCE/IU to UCD

The means for the fifty electoral districts are consistently higher than the estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6 and indicate that there was no shift in the former PCE/IU voter's stronger propensity to opt for the UCD in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

Out of 16 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 11 are from the Centre, one from the First Periphery and four from the Second Periphery, i.e. 25, 3 and 21 percent of their respective totals.¹⁰⁰ Likewise, of the five cases more than one standard deviation below the means, two are from the Centre, three from the First Periphery and none from the Second Periphery, i.e. 5, 8 and 0 percent of their respective totals.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Cut off points below for PCE/IU transfers to AP/PP: 0.4, 4.3, 2.0, 0.8, 0.8, 0.9 and 2.2.

¹⁰⁰ Cut off points above for PCE/IU transfers to UCD: 9.2 and 2.3.

¹⁰¹ Cut off points below for PCE/IU transfers to UCD: 1.0 and -0.1.

Thus we conclude that the combined relative pattern on the two indicators runs contrary to the H10 hypothesis and that it is refuted in relation to the transfers from PCE/IU to UCD.¹⁰²

Table 9.3 PCE/IU transfers to UCD: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	
Mean	5.1	1.1	
Std.dev.	4.1	1.2	

ABOVE :			Sum
Centre	7	4	11
1. Periphery	0	1	1
2. Periphery	2	2	4
Sum	9	7	16

<i>BELOW:</i>			<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>5</i>

N (Total)	47	50	97

However, compared to the transfers to the AP/PP, we note that the relative balances of deviant cases are strongly positive in the Second Periphery and negative in the First Periphery. This indicates that for the former PCE/IU voters in the Second Periphery the intersection of the two cleavages is placed to the right of the UCD. This pattern was reflected in the box-plot analysis that detected seven positive outliers and extreme cases: Four from the Centre, one from the First Periphery and two from the Second Periphery.

Transfers from PCE/IU to CDS

As shown in table 9.4 (below), the means for the electoral districts are consistently higher than the overall estimated percentages presented in chapter 6. Thus, the finding is that there was no shift in the general pattern of larger proportions of former PCE/IU

¹⁰² To this it should be noted that the UCD did not run in the three Basque districts in 1982.

voters defecting to the state-wide Right parties in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

There are 26 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 21 from the Centre, one from the First Periphery and four in the Second Periphery.¹⁰³ These amount to 24, 2 and 9 percent of their respective totals, and once again underscores the position of the First Periphery in relation to transfers from PCE/IU. This is even more accentuated by the cases more than one standard deviation below the mean.¹⁰⁴ Out of 24 cases, three are from the Centre, 20 from the First Periphery and one from the Second Periphery, i.e. 3, 30 and 2 percent of their totals. Thus, the combined pattern produced by the two indicators runs contrary to the expected pattern and the H10 hypothesis is refuted in relation to the transfers from PCE/IU to CDS.

Table 9.4 PCE/IU transfers to CDS: Trend and deviant cases

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	
Mean	2.0	6.2	3.7	1.5	
Std.dev.	1.6	3.9	2.1	1.5	
N	50	48	50	50	

ABOVE :					Sum
Centre	6	6	7	2	21
1. Periphery	0	1	0	0	1
2. Periphery	1	1	1	1	4
Sum	6	8	8	3	26

<i>BELOW :</i>					<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>24</i>

N (Total)	50	48	50	50	198

The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from PCE/IU

The analysis of the behaviour of the first election PCE/IU voters has revealed that the expectations derived from the H10 hypothesis were only met in relation to AP/PP and that even for this party the differences along the Centre-Periphery axis were rather

¹⁰³ Cut off points above for PCE/IU transfers to CDS: 3.6, 10.1, 5.8 and 3.0.

¹⁰⁴ Cut off points below for PCE/IU transfers to CDS: 0.2, 2.3, 1.6 and 0.0.

small. As shown in table 9.7 (below), for all the other parties, it is the First Periphery that stands out as the deviant territory.

Table 9.5 Relative distributions of deviant cases

PCE/IU	PSOE	AP/PP	UCD	CDS
Centre	8	11	20	21
1. Periphery	-15	8	-6	-28
2. Periphery	23	-3	21	7

As to the intersection of the two cleavages, we again observe a substantial difference between the Second and the First Periphery. In the Second Periphery, the former PCE/IU have far more readily transferred to all the other state-wide parties except for the AP/PP. The situation in the First Periphery is exactly the opposite. Thus, the narrowing down of the electoral produced by the collapse of the UCD and the demise of the CDS implies that in the surviving party system the overall logic of co-variation between the Left-Right axis and the Centre-Periphery axis have become more clear-cut in relation to the behaviour of former PCE/IU voters. As already noted, this should come as no surprise to observers of Spanish politics in that there is no doubt that the AP/PP has been widely regarded as the most ‘centralist’ of the state-wide parties.

Transfers from PSOE to PCE/IU

As shown in table 9.6 (below), the means for the electoral districts are consistently lower than the overall estimated pattern presented in chapter 6, indicating that there was no shift in the pattern of larger proportions of former PSOE voters defecting to the PCE/IU in the larger districts than in the smaller ones. Thus, the change related to district size in terms of transfers between the two parties is only true for the pattern of transfers from PCE/IU to the PSOE.

There are altogether 38 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 19 from the Centre, five from the First Periphery and 14 from the Second Periphery.¹⁰⁵ These numbers amount to 12, 4 and 18 percent of their respective totals. This pattern runs contrary to the hypothesis. Moving to the cases more than one standard deviation below the mean, we observe that there are altogether 16 cases, one from the Centre,

¹⁰⁵ Cut points above PSOE transfers to PCE/IU: 9.0, 2.9, 3.9, 5.6, 2.7, 4.6 and 2.5.

five from the First Periphery and 10 from the Second Periphery.¹⁰⁶ This implies that 13 percent of the Second Periphery and 4 percent of the First Periphery cases are represented in this group. Thus, although the distribution on the indicator below is in accord with the expected pattern, the combined relative distribution on the two indicators violate the hypothesis.

Table 9.6 PSOE transfers to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	5.8	1.7	2.6	3.6	1.3	2.1	1.2	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	3.2	1.2	1.3	2.0	1.4	2.5	1.3	
<i>N</i>	50	48	50	50	50	50	50	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	3	4	3	5	1	2	1	19
1. Periphery	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	5
2. Periphery	3	1	0	0	3	4	3	14
Sum	8	6	5	5	4	6	4	38

<i>BELOW:</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>16</i>

<i>N (Total)</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>348</i>

This was corroborated by the box-plot analysis that revealed that of altogether 22 positive outliers and extreme cases, 11 were from the Centre, 10 from the Second Periphery and only one from the First Periphery. From the Centre, Madrid appeared as an outlier at all the pairs of elections except for 1982-86 and all the outliers and extreme cases from the Second Periphery came from the Basque Country and Catalonia.

Transfers from PSOE to AP/PP

As shown in table 9.7 (below), the means for the districts are consistently somewhat higher than the overall estimated percentages presented in chapter 6, indicating no

¹⁰⁶ Cut points below PSOE voter opting for PCE/IU: 5.3, 0.5, 1.3, 1.6, -0.1, -0.4, -0.1.

shift in the pattern of higher defection rates to the AP/PP in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

Of altogether 52 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 26 are from the Centre, 16 from the first Periphery and 10 from the Second Periphery.¹⁰⁷ In terms of relative proportions, this amounts to 17 percent of the Centre cases, 13 percent of the First Periphery and 14 percent of the Second Periphery cases. This pattern runs contrary to the H10 hypothesis. An inspection of the district wise distributions in Appendix III reveals that all the Second Periphery cases are found in Galicia and thus again reflect the dominant position of AP/PP in that region.

Moving to the cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we observe out of altogether 48 cases, six are from the Centre, 26 from the First Periphery and 16 from the Second Periphery.¹⁰⁸ These figures amount to 4, 22 and 22 percent of the respective totals. Although this distribution is closer to the expected pattern, the joint distribution on the two indicators implies that the hypothesis is refuted also in relation to defections from the PSOE to the AP/PP.

Table 9.7 PSOE transfers to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	2.5	8.2	5.8	4.0	4.6	5.0	10.1	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	2.0	4.3	3.5	3.0	3.6	3.9	6.6	
<hr/>								
ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	3	5	0	4	4	6	4	26
1. Periphery	0	1	7	2	4	1	1	16
2. Periphery	2	3	0	2	0	2	1	10
Sum	5	9	7	8	8	9	10	52
<hr/>								
<i>BELOW :</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>48</i>
<hr/>								
N (Total)	47	50	50	50	50	50	50	347

¹⁰⁷ Cut off points above for PSOE transfers to AP/PP: 4.5, 12.5, 9.3, 7.0, 8.2, 8.9 and 16.7.

¹⁰⁸ Cut off points below for PSOE transfers to AP/PP: 0.5, 3.9, 2.3, 1.0, 1.0, 1.1 and 3.5.

Transfers from PSOE to UCD

The means for the electoral districts shown in table 9.8 (below) are higher than the overall estimated percentages reported in chapter 6. This implies that also in relation to the UCD, there was no shift related to district size in the pattern of larger proportions of former voters defecting to the Right in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

There are 20 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 10 from the Centre, six from the First Periphery and four from the Second Periphery.¹⁰⁹ This yields the following relative distribution: 23 percent of the Centre cases, 18 of the First Periphery cases and 21 percent of the second Periphery cases. This pattern runs contrary to the hypothesis. As to the cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we find that out of the total of 16, five belong to the Centre, seven to the First Periphery and four to the Second Periphery, i.e. 11, 21 and 21 percent of their respective totals.¹¹⁰ Thus, the combined pattern runs contrary to the expectations and the hypothesis is refuted.

Table 9.8 PSOE transfers to UCD: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	
<i>Mean</i>	6.3	1.0	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	4.0	.7	

ABOVE :			Sum
Centre	7	3	10
1. Periphery	1	5	6
2. Periphery	3	1	4
Sum	11	9	20

<i>BELOW :</i>			<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	3	2	5
<i>1. Periphery</i>	5	2	7
<i>2. Periphery</i>	3	1	4
<i>Sum</i>	11	5	16

N (Total)	50	47	97

¹⁰⁹ Cut off points above for PSOE transfers to UCD: 10.3 and 1.7.

¹¹⁰ Cut off points below for PSOE transfers to UCD: 2.3 and 0.3.

Transfers from PSOE to CDS

Comparing the districts means in table 9.9 (below) to the overall percentages presented in chapter 6, we observe no shift in the consistent pattern of somewhat higher defection rates from the PSOE to the parties of the Right in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

There are altogether 25 cases more than one standard deviation above the means in the table, 19 from the Centre and three from each of the Peripheries.¹¹¹ These amount to the following relative distribution: 22 percent of the Centre cases, 4 percent of the first Periphery cases and 7 percent of the second Periphery cases. Thus, the pattern also in relation to CDS is not in line with the expectations. This is definitely accentuated by the distribution of cases more than one standard deviation below the means. Out of 21 cases, 16 are from the First Periphery and only three from the Centre and two from the Second Periphery.¹¹² This implies that 24 percent of the first Periphery cases and a mere 3 and 5 percent of the Centre and Second Periphery cases are found in this category. The conclusion, then, is that the hypothesis is refuted.

Table 9.9 PSOE transfers to CDS: Trend and deviant cases

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	
<i>Mean</i>	1.2	6.5	3.0	.4	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	.7	3.1	1.7	.5	

ABOVE :					Sum
Centre	6	7	4	2	19
1. Periphery	2	0	1	0	3
2. Periphery	1	1	1	0	3
Sum	9	8	6	2	25

<i>BELOW :</i>					<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>21</i>

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	50

¹¹¹ Cut off points above for PSOE transfers to CDS: 1.9, 9.6, 4.7 and 0.9.
¹¹² Cut off points below for PSOE transfers to CDS: 0.5, 3.4, 1.3 and -0.1.

The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from PSOE

The analysis of the behaviour of the first election PSOE voters has revealed that the H10 hypothesis does not hold for the transfers to any of the state-wide parties. As summarised in table 9.10 (below), the relative distributions on the two indicators clearly show that the greatest differences in transfer rates are found between the Centre and the First Periphery.

Table 9.10 Relative distributions of deviant cases

PSOE	PCE/IU	AP/PP	UCD	CDS
Centre	11	13	12	19
1. Periphery	0	-9	-3	-20
2. Periphery	5	-8	0	2

As to the intersection of the two cleavages, we note that the relationship that exhibits a negative balance of deviant cases in the Second Periphery is the one regarding transfers to the AP/PP. The pattern of transfers from PSOE to the UCD and the CDS resemble the one found for the former PCE/IU voters, i.e. negative balance in the First Periphery and, albeit far less pronounced, a positive balance in the Second Periphery. Thus, based on the joint distributions of deviant cases from the PCE/IU and the PSOE, it is evident that after the collapse of the UCD and the demise of the CDS, the two cleavages have come to co-vary in a certain fashion, i.e. that relatively lower proportions of former voters of the state-wide Left would transfer to the state-wide Right in terms of AP/PP in the Second Periphery than both in the First Periphery and in the Centre.

Transfers from AP/PP to PCE/IU

Although the differences are quite small, the means for the electoral districts shown in table 9.11 (below) are consistently higher than the estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6. This indicates that there was no change in the pattern of larger

proportions of former AP/PP voters defecting to the PCE/IU in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

There are 37 cases more than one standard deviation above the means.¹¹³ Six form the Centre, 26 from the First Periphery and five from the Second Periphery, i.e. 4, 22 and 5 percent of their respective totals. Once again we note that in terms of transfers between the parties, the pattern runs contrary to the expectations. This is underscored by the distribution on the other indicator. Out of 19 cases more than one standard deviation below the means, 10 belong to the Centre, two to the First Periphery and seven to the Second Periphery.¹¹⁴ This amounts to 7, 2 and 10 percent of their respective totals. Thus, we conclude that the H10 hypothesis is refuted.

Table 9.11 AP/PP transfers to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	2.1	.9	1.2	1.4	.8	.8	.5	
<i>Std. dev.</i>	1.4	.4	1.0	1.6	.9	.6	.5	
<i>N</i>	48	45	50	50	50	50	50	

ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	2	0	0	0	0	3	1	6
1. Periphery	5	1	7	5	5	3	0	26
2. Periphery	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	5
Sum	8	1	7	5	5	8	3	37

<i>BELOW :</i>								<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	3	2	1	0	0	5	0	10
<i>1. Periphery</i>	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
<i>2. Periphery</i>	2	2	0	0	0	3	0	7
<i>Sum</i>	5	5	1	0	0	9	0	19

<i>N (Total)</i>	48	45	50	50	50	50	50	343

This conclusion is supported by the box-plot analysis. Out of 16 positive outliers and extreme cases, 13 were from the First Periphery, two from the Second Periphery and one from the Centre.

¹¹³ Cut off points above for AP/PP-PCE/IU: 3.5, 1.3, 2.2, 3.0, 1.7, 1.4 and 1.0.

¹¹⁴ Cut off points below for AP/PP-PCE-IU: 0.7, 0.5, 0.2, -0.2, -0.1, 0.2 and 0.0.

Transfers from AP/PP to PSOE

The district means shown in table 9.12 (below) are consistently somewhat higher than the overall percentages reported in chapter 6, and thus indicate no change in the pattern of higher defection rates to the PSOE in the smaller than in the larger districts. There are altogether 54 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 24 from the Centre, 23 from the first Periphery and seven from the second Periphery.¹¹⁵ This amounts to 16, 19 and 10 percent of their respective totals. Again we note that the pattern runs contrary to the hypothesis.

Table 9.12 AP/PP transfers to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00	
<i>Mean</i>	7.6	20.5	9.7	5.1	3.7	2.5	3.2	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	4.9	9.4	5.2	3.5	2.7	2.3	2.7	
N	48	47	50	50	50	50	50	
ABOVE :								Sum
Centre	6	5	2	3	2	4	3	24
1. Periphery	2	4	4	5	3	2	3	23
2. Periphery	1	0	2	0	2	2	1	7
Sum	9	1	8	8	7	8	3	54
BELOW :								Sum
<i>Centre</i>	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	11
<i>1. Periphery</i>	2	2	3	4	7	3	2	23
<i>2. Periphery</i>	2	5	2	2	1	1	0	13
<i>Sum</i>	6	10	7	7	9	5	3	47
N (Total)	48	47	50	50	50	50	50	345

Out of the 47 cases more than one standard deviation below the means, 11 belong to the Centre, 23 to the First Periphery and 13 to the Second Periphery, i.e. 7, 19 and 18 percent of their respective totals.¹¹⁶ Thus, even though neither of the distributions on the indicators a such are in accord with the expectations, the combined relative pattern

¹¹⁵ Cut off points above for AP/PP-PSOE: 12.5, 29.9, 14.9, 8.6, 6.4, 4.8 and 5.9.

¹¹⁶ Cut off points below for AP/PP-PSOE: 2.7, 11.1, 4.5, 1.6, 1.0, 0.2 and 0.5.

produced by the two indicators sustains the H10 hypothesis and shows an overall Centre-Periphery bias in the former AP/PP voter's tendency to opt for the PSOE.¹¹⁷

Transfers from AP/PP to UCD

From table 9.13 (below), we note that the district means are consistently slightly lower than the overall percentages and thus indicate no shift in the pattern of larger proportions of defections to the UCD in the larger districts than the smaller ones.

Of altogether 15 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 11 are from the Centre, three from the First Periphery and one from the Second Periphery.¹¹⁸ These amount to 26, 9 and 6 percent of their respective totals. This distribution is in accord with the hypothesis. On the other end of the scale there are 12 cases more than one standard deviation below the means.¹¹⁹ None of these come from the Centre while there are 10 cases from the First Periphery and three cases from the Second Periphery, i.e. none, 29 and 17 percent of their respective totals. This means that the Relative distribution of cases runs contrary to the hypothesis.

Table 9.13 AP/PP transfers to UCD: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	
<i>Mean</i>	26.1	2.3	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	11.7	1.9	
<i>N</i>	48	47	

ABOVE :			Sum
Centre	7	4	11
1. Periphery	1	2	3
2. Periphery	0	1	1
Sum	8	7	15

<i>BELOW :</i>			<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	0	0	0
<i>1. Periphery</i>	4	6	10
<i>2. Periphery</i>	3	0	3
<i>Sum</i>	7	6	13

<i>N (Total)</i>	48	47	95

¹¹⁷ See table 9.15 (below).

¹¹⁸ Cut off points above for AP/PP-UCD: 37.8 and 4.2.

¹¹⁹ Cut off points below for AP/PP-UCD: 14.4 and 0.4.

Transfers from AP/PP to CDS

We note from table 9.14 (below) that the district mean is lower than the overall percentage for the 1979-82 pair of elections and consistently higher than overall percentages from 1982-86 and onwards. Thus, after the demise of the UCD a territorial change related to district size took place in the former AP/PP voter's propensity to opt for the CDS.

Of 15 cases more than one standard deviation above the means in the table, 12 belong to the Centre and three to the first Periphery.¹²⁰ That amounts to 17 percent of the total Centre cases and 4 percent of the First Periphery cases, and none of the Second Periphery cases, of course. This distribution is in accord with the expectations. Of the eight cases more than one standard deviation below the means, one belongs to the Centre, three to the First Periphery and four to the Second Periphery.¹²¹ In other words, 1 percent of the Centre cases, 4 percent of the First Periphery cases and 10 percent of the Second Periphery cases. We may conclude, then, that the H10 hypothesis is sustained for the AP/PP transfers to CDS.

Table 9.14 AP/PP transfers to CDS: Trend and deviant cases

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	
<i>Mean</i>	3.1	6.2	2.6	.5	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	2.2	3.5	2.4	.4	
N	47	50	50	50	

ABOVE :					Sum
Centre	4	4	1	3	12
1. Periphery	1	1	1	0	3
2. Periphery	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	5	5	2	2	15

<i>BELOW :</i>					<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>8</i>

N (Total)	47	50	50	50	197

¹²⁰ Cut off points above for AP/PP-CDS: 5.3, 9.7, 5.0 and 0.9.

¹²¹ Cut off point below for AP/PP-CDS: 0.9, 2.7, 0.2 and 0.1.

This pattern was corroborated by the box-plot analysis. Out of altogether eight positive outliers and extreme cases, seven came from the Centre and one from the First Periphery.

The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from AP/PP

The analysis of the behaviour of the first election AP/PP voters has revealed that only two of the relationships met with the expectations stated in the H10 hypothesis, namely in terms of transfers to the CDS and PSOE.

Table 9.15 Relative distributions of deviant cases

AP/PP	PCE/IU	PSOE	UCD	CDS
Centre	-3	9	26	16
1. Periphery	20	0	-20	0
2. Periphery	-3	-8	-11	-10

As summarised in table 9.15, the relative balances of deviant cases were negative in the Second Periphery for all the other state-wide options. This is yet another token that the intersection in the Second Periphery is located between AP/PP on the one hand and all the other state-wide parties on the other in the Second Periphery. In the Centre, the point of intersection in relation to AP/PP is located between PCE/IU and the PSOE. The pattern in the First Periphery is very mixed indeed and no clear point of intersection can be identified.

Transfers from UCD to PCE/IU

As observed in table 9.16 (below), the district means are close to identical to the overall percentages and no change related to district size has occurred.

Out of 19 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, three are from the Centre, nine from the First Periphery and seven from the Second Periphery.¹²² These numbers amount to 5, 18 and 24 percent of their respective totals, and this relative distribution is in accord with the H10 hypothesis.

Table 9.16 UCD transfers to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	
<i>Mean</i>	1.0	.7	.6	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	.6	.5	.6	

ABOVE :				Sum
Centre	2	1	0	3
1. Periphery	2	3	4	9
2. Periphery	4	2	1	7
Sum	8	6	5	19

<i>BELOW :</i>				<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	3	1	0	4
<i>1. Periphery</i>	3	1	0	4
<i>2. Periphery</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>Sum</i>	6	2	0	8

N (Total)	49	48	47	144

Below, we observe that out of eight cases, four belong to the Centre, four to the First Periphery and none to the Second Periphery, i.e. 6, 8 and 0 percent of their respective totals.¹²³ Thus the combined distributions on the two indicators yield a pattern that is in accord with the hypothesis.

Transfers from UCD to PSOE

As shown in table 9.17 (below), the means for the electoral districts follow the overall percentages presented in chapter 6 closely, the deviation being too small in order to indicate any shift in relation to district size.

¹²² Cut off points above for UCD transfers to PCE/IU: 1.6, 1.2 and 1.2.

¹²³ Cut off points below for UCD transfers to PCE/IU: 0.4, 0.2 and 0.0.

Out of 24 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, nine are from the Centre, 15 from the First Periphery and none from the Second Periphery.¹²⁴ These numbers amount to 14, 29 and 0 percent of their respective totals. This pattern is at odds with the H10 hypothesis.

Below we find 16 cases, six from the Centre, six from the First Periphery and four from the Second Periphery, i.e. 9, 12 and 14 percent of their respective totals.¹²⁵ The combined distribution on the two indicators, then, shows that the hypothesis is not supported by the data.

Table 9.17 UCD transfers to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	
<i>Mean</i>	5.5	18.4	17.8	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	3.0	8.8	16.8	

ABOVE :				Sum
Centre	4	3	2	9
1. Periphery	3	6	6	15
2. Periphery	0	0	0	0
Sum	7	9	8	24

<i>BELOW :</i>				<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	3	3	0	6
<i>1. Periphery</i>	2	4	0	6
<i>2. Periphery</i>	1	3	0	4
<i>Sum</i>	6	10	0	16

N (Total)	49	50	47	146

This was corroborated by the box-plot analysis. Of four outliers and extreme cases, one came from the Centre and three from the First Periphery.

Transfers from UCD to AP/PP

As seen from table 9.18 (below), the district means are consistently lower than the overall percentages. This indicates that there has been no shift in the tendency of higher proportions of former UCD voters defecting to AP/PP in the larger districts than in the smaller ones.

¹²⁴ Cut off points above for UCD transfers to PSOE: 8.5, 27.2 and 34.6.

¹²⁵ Cut off points below for UCD transfers to PSOE: 2.5, 9.6 and 1.0.

Out of 21 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 18 belong to the Centre, two to the First Periphery and one to the Second Periphery.¹²⁶ These numbers amount to 27, 4 and 4 percent of their respective totals and yield a distribution that, although not far off the spot, is not in line with the hypothesis.

Table 9.18 UCD transfers to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases

	77-79	79-82	82-86	
<i>Mean</i>	3.1	32.7	29.8	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	1.9	11.5	18.4	

ABOVE :				Sum
Centre	7	7	4	18
1. Periphery	0	0	2	2
2. Periphery	1	0	0	1
Sum	8	7	6	21

<i>BELOW:</i>				<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>1. Periphery</i>	4	5	6	15
<i>2. Periphery</i>	0	2	3	5
<i>Sum</i>	4	7	9	20

N (Total)	47	50	47	144

In terms of cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we note that out of the 20 cases, none belong to the Centre, while 15 and five belong to the First and Second Peripheries, respectively.¹²⁷ These numbers amount to 0, 29 and 19 percent, respectively. Thus, the joint distribution on the two indicators clearly shows that the H10 hypothesis is not sustained by the data.

Transfers from UCD to CDS

As seen in table 9.19 (below), the district means are almost identical to the overall percentages presented in chapter 6. Thus, district size has had no bearings on the transfers from UCD to CDS.

¹²⁶ Cut off points above for UCD transfers to AP/PP: 5.0, 44.2 and 48.2.

¹²⁷ Cut off points below for UCD transfers to AP/PP: 1.2, 21.2 and 11.4.

There are only five cases more than one standard deviation above the means, two from the Centre and three from the First Periphery, i.e. 5 and 9 percent of their respective totals.¹²⁸ The distribution runs contrary to the H10 hypothesis. And, since the standard deviations are greater than the means, there are no cases more than one standard deviation below the mean and hence no relative distribution to consider on this indicator.¹²⁹

Table 9.19 UCD transfers to CDS: Trend and deviant cases

	79-82	82-86	
<i>Mean</i>	3.1	8.0	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	4.0	11.3	

ABOVE :			Sum
Centre	1	1	2
1. Periphery	0	3	3
2. Periphery	0	0	0
Sum	1	4	5

N (Total)	50	47	97

The pattern was corroborated by the box-plot analysis. In the box-plot, however, altogether six outliers and extreme cases were detected,¹³⁰ of which two belonged to the Centre and four to the First Periphery.

The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from UCD

As shown in table 9.20 (below), the analysis of the behaviour of the first election UCD voters has revealed that the H10 hypothesis was only supported in regard of one of the relationships, the one related to the transfers to the PCE/IU. For all the other parties, the First Periphery stood out as the most deviant region. On the other hand, the distributions are highly illuminating as to the intersection of the two cleavages.

¹²⁸ Cut off points above for UCD transfers to CDS: 7.1 and 19.3.

¹²⁹ Cut off points below for UCD transfers to CDS: -0.9 and -3.3.

¹³⁰ The Balears appeared as an outlier in 1982 even though its score (7.0 percent points) was within one standard deviation from the mean.

Table 9.20 Relative distributions of deviant cases

UCD	PCE/IU	PSOE	AP/PP	CDS
Centre	-1	5	27	5
1. Periphery	10	17	-25	9
2. Periphery	24	-14	-15	0

We note that the former UCD voters have shown a far higher propensity to opt for the PCE/IU in the Second Periphery than both in the First Periphery and in the Centre, whereas the pattern in relation to AP/PP is quite the opposite. The patterns for the PSOE and the CDS fall somewhere in between.

In sum, then, the behaviour of UCD's first election voters underscores the notion hinted to in the previous chapters that the party's electoral position in relation to the other state-wide parties on the Centre-Periphery axis and the Left Right axis was far less clear-cut than the electoral positions of the parties that survived the transition.

As noted in the initial section of this chapter, the crucial question of where the former UCD voters transferred to in the peripheries would be dealt with. The inspection of all the tables involving transfers to the regional parties listed in appendix IV, revealed that there was only one substantial relationship, namely the one concerning the transfers to the Catalan CiU.

Table 9.21 UCD voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86
Barcelona	6.1	30.1	41.3
Girona	5.7	28.7	18.6
Lleida	5.5	29.4	29.8
Tarragona	.9	14.1	11.5

As shown in table 9.21 (above), in Catalonia the CiU inflicted heavy tolls on the UCD both in 1982 and in 1986. Thus, in Catalonia, the collapse of the UCD benefited the conservative regional nationalists to a substantial extent.

Transfers from CDS to PCE/IU

As shown in table 9.22 (below), the district means vary somewhat compared to the overall percentages presented in chapter 6. From almost identical at the first pair of elections, it fell below at the next pair before it gradually rose above again the last two pairs. Thus, there is an indication that a short-term territorial change in relation to district size took place with the creation of the IU.

Out of altogether 26 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 10 belong to the Centre, six to the First Periphery and 10 to the Second Periphery.¹³¹ These numbers amount to 11, 9 and 23 percent of their respective totals and shows that the distribution runs contrary to the H10 hypothesis. Nor is it sustained by the distribution of cases more than one standard deviation below the means. Of 16 cases, three belong to the Centre, 12 to the First Periphery and three to the Second Periphery, i.e. 3, 18 and 7 percent of their respective totals.¹³²

Table 9.22 CDS transfers to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	
<i>Mean</i>	2.0	6.8	5.1	8.5	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	1.1	4.7	4.5	5.5	

ABOVE :					Sum
Centre	3	2	3	2	10
1. Periphery	3	2	0	1	6
2. Periphery	1	1	4	4	10
Sum	7	5	7	7	26

<i>BELOW :</i>					<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	2	0	0	1	3
<i>1. Periphery</i>	2	4	3	3	12
<i>2. Periphery</i>	3	0	0	0	3
<i>Sum</i>	6	4	3	4	16

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	200

Thus, once again the combined distribution on the two indicators underscores particular position of the PCE/IU in the First Periphery. However, the box-plot analysis yielded a somewhat different pattern. Out of nine positive outliers and

¹³¹ Cut off points above for CDS transfers to PCE/IU: 3.1, 11.5, 9.6 and 14.0.

¹³² Cut off points below for CDS transfers to PCE/IU: 0.9, 2.1, 0.6 and 3.0.

extreme cases, five were from either the Basque Country or Catalonia and only three from the Second Periphery – the last one being from the Centre.

Transfers from CDS to PSOE

As shown in table 9.23 (below), the means for the electoral districts are consistently higher than the overall percentages, indicating no shift in the pattern of higher defection rates to the PSOE in the smaller districts than in the larger ones.

Out of 32 cases more than one standard deviation above the mean, 12 belong to the Centre, nine to the First Periphery and 11 to the Second Periphery.¹³³ These numbers amount to 14, 13 and 25 percent of their respective totals. We note that the pattern runs contrary to the H10 hypothesis.

Table 9.23 CDS transfers to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	
<i>Mean</i>	14.0	11.2	13.5	10.4	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	6.6	6.5	7.1	6.8	

ABOVE :					Sum
Centre	5	3	1	3	12
1. Periphery	2	2	3	2	9
2. Periphery	1	4	2	4	11
Sum	8	9	6	9	32

<i>BELOW :</i>					<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	3	2	3	0	8
<i>1. Periphery</i>	3	6	3	6	18
<i>2. Periphery</i>	2	1	0	3	6
<i>Sum</i>	8	4	6	9	32

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	200

This tendency is even more accentuated in terms of cases more than one standard deviation below the means. Of the total number of 32, eight belong to the Centre, 18 to the First Periphery and six to the Second Periphery, i.e. 9, 26 and 14 percent of their respective totals.¹³⁴ Thus, the H10 hypothesis is refuted by the data.

¹³³ Cut off points above for CDS transfers to PSOE: 20.6, 17.7, 20.6 and 17.2.

¹³⁴ Cut off points below for CDS transfers to PSOE: 7.4, 4.7, 6.4 and 3.6.

Transfers from CDS to AP/PP

As seen in table 9.24 (below), the means for the electoral districts are lower than the overall percentages reported in chapter 6 for all the pairs of elections except for the 1989-1993 pair. Thus, a slight change in terms of districts size occurred at the 1993 election when AP/PP made its leap from around 26 to around 35 percent of the valid votes cast.

Out of 21 cases more than one standard deviation above then means, 13 are from the Centre, seven from the First Periphery and only one from the Second Periphery, i.e. 15, 10 and 2 percent of their respective totals.¹³⁵ This distribution is in accord with the expected pattern depicted by the H10 hypothesis.

Table 9.24 CDS transfers to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	
<i>Mean</i>	12.9	10.8	25.8	25.5	
<i>Std.dev.</i>	7.2	6.8	9.4	10.5	

ABOVE :					Sum
Centre	1	5	3	4	13
1. Periphery	2	0	2	3	7
2. Periphery	0	1	0	0	1
Sum	3	6	5	7	21

<i>BELOW :</i>					<i>Sum</i>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>1. Periphery</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>2. Periphery</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Sum</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>26</i>

N (Total)	50	50	50	50	200

In terms of cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we find that out of 26 cases, three are from the Centre, 14 to from First Periphery and nine from the Second Periphery.¹³⁶ This amounts to 3, 21 and 20 percent of their respective totals, and although the distribution on the lower indicator is not in accord the expected pattern, the combined distribution sustains the H10 hypothesis.

¹³⁵ Cut off points above for CDS transfers to AP/PP: 20.1, 17.6, 35.2 and 36.0.

¹³⁶ Cut off points below for CDS transfers to AP/PP: 5.7, 4.0, 16.4 and 15.0..

This was supported by the box-plot analysis. Of five positive outliers and extreme cases, three were from the Centre and two from the First Periphery.

As stated in the initial sections of this chapter, the question of where the former CDS voters took to in relation to the peripheries should be dealt with. An inspection of all the transfers to the regional parties revealed that there was only one of significance, namely the one concerning the transfers to the Catalan CiU in 1986.¹³⁷ This indicates that in Catalonia, after the realignment election 1982, the CiU benefited substantially from the unclear situation produced by the excision of the CDS from the UCD.

The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from CDS

As summarised in table 9.25 (below), the patterns of deviant cases form the overall trends for the transfers from CDS has revealed that the H10 hypothesis is only supported in relation to the party's fellow traveller on the Right, the AP/PP. The CDS voters have far more readily transferred to the AP/PP in the Centre than both in the First and the Second Periphery. The patterns of transfers to the state-wide Left, however, exhibit a completely different logic. Not only do we find that larger proportion of former CDS voters have transferred to the Left in the Second Periphery than in the Centre, but also that the greatest discrepancy in this respect is found between the First and Second Periphery.

Table 9.25 Relative distributions of deviant cases

CDS	PCE/IU	PSOE	AP/PP
Centre	8	5	12
1. Periphery	-9	-13	-11
2. Periphery	16	11	-18

In sum, the distributions show that the CDS experienced quite different logics in term of competition from the Left and the Right along the Centre-Periphery axis. Thus, in terms of transfers form the CDS, the intersection of the cleavages in the Second Periphery is found between the CDS and the AP/PP in that the former CDS voters have rather opted for the Left than the Right in the Second Periphery.

¹³⁷ See appendix IV, table A IV.23.

Conclusions: Centre-Periphery and intersection of the cleavages.

The analyses of competition among the state-wide parties along the Centre-Periphery axis have detected a very mixed set of patterns indeed. One conclusion, however, stands firm: The majority of the patterns of deviant cases for the individual parties did not meet the expectations stated in the H10 hypothesis. Out of altogether 19 relationships only five were in accord with the hypothesis. Of these five, three were inter-bloc relationships and two were intra-bloc relationships. The inter-bloc relationships were found for the transfers from PCE/IU to AP/PP, from AP/PP to PSOE, and from UCD to PCE/IU. The intra-bloc relationships were found for the transfers from AP/PP to CDS and from CDS to AP/PP. Consequently, as observed in the mean distributions of deviant cases for the party blocs listed in table 9.26 (below), the intra-bloc transfers on the Left were more pronounced in the First Periphery than both in the Centre and, of course, the Second Periphery. The transfers from the Left to the Right exhibit a positive balance both in the Centre and in the Second Periphery, while the balance in the First Periphery is negative.

Table 9.26 From the Left: Mean relative distributions of deviant cases

From the Left	To the Left	To the Right	To AP/PP
Centre	5.5	16.0	12.0
1. Periphery	16.0	-9.7	-0.5
2. Periphery	-36.0	3.2	-5.5

However, as shown when the AP/PP is singled out as the option of the transferred votes, the narrowing down of the electoral market produced by the collapse of the UCD and the demise of the CDS implied that the state-wide party system has become somewhat more clear-cut as to the relationship between the Left-Right and the Centre-Periphery cleavages. Even though the differences are not overwhelming, the pattern of deviant cases regarding transfers from the Left to AP/PP in accord with the expectation stated in the hypothesis.

Table 9.27 From the Right: Mean relative distributions of deviant cases

From the Right	To the Right	To the Left	To AP/PP
Centre	8.7	3.8	19.5
1. Periphery	0.3	4.2	-18.0
2. Periphery	-18.3	4.3	-16.5

Likewise, as seen in table 9.27, the intra-bloc transfers on the Right exhibit a pattern that is in accord with the expectations derived from the straightforward Centre-Periphery concept. Thus, we may conclude that, to the extent that the parties and the party system structure the behaviour of the voters, the logic of state-wide party competition along the two main axes of the Spanish system was rather confuse for as long as the UCD and the CDS existed. As noted in chapter 4, the attempt to straddle the two cleavages was seen as perhaps the most important factor in UCD's collapse and the findings here might indicate that this, at least in part, also can explain why the CDS never managed to consolidate its electoral stance.

In terms of the overall status of the hypotheses derived from the theory on Centre-Periphery dynamics in the Spanish process of democratisation, then, we have found that:

- 1) As shown in chapter 7, the pattern of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation along the Centre-Periphery axis for all the state-wide parties together was in accord with the expectation derived from the theory. This also held for the party-bloc on the Right. The parties on the Left, however, tended to mobilise relatively larger proportions of new voters and former abstainers in the First Periphery. This implies that the effect of the Centre-Periphery cleavage was not evenly distributed along the Left-Right axis. Thus, in relation to mobilisation and demobilisation, the two cleavages co-varied in a fashion that is in line with the notion that the parties and voters on the Left more readily came to accept that the territorial restructuring of the state was paramount to the consolidation of the new democracy.
- 2) As shown in chapter 8, although less pronounced, the pattern of electoral stabilisation along the Centre-Periphery axis was in accord with the

expectations for all the state-wide parties seen together and for the party-bloc on the Right. Again, we noted that the effect of the Centre-Periphery cleavage was not evenly distributed along the Left-Right cleavage. In line with the notion that the parties and the voters on the Left more readily came to accept the territorial restructuring of the state was paramount to the consolidation of democracy, the highest levels of loyalty rates for these parties were found in the First Periphery.

- 3) As shown in this chapter, the patterns of electoral competition along the Centre-Periphery axis were the ones that deviated most from the expectations. Again, the voters on the Left had more readily switched between the two parties in the First Periphery than both in the Centre and the Second Periphery. The only two patterns that were in accord with the hypothesis, were the ones found for the transfers within the party-bloc on the Right and for the transfers from the party-bloc on the Left to the sole party of the Right, the AP/PP. Thus, the narrowing down of the party system on the Right implies that, as we approach the millennium, the political space also in terms of state-wide party competition became structured in a more clear-cut Centre-Periphery pattern akin to the structuring of mobilisation and stabilisation.

CHAPTER 10

The Electoral Nexus in Spain: Conclusions

Synthesis and findings

The main argument in this dissertation stemmed from the notion of a particular *sequence* in the translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages of the Spanish party system(s) during the process of democratic transition and consolidation. Derived from a body of theories on transitions from authoritarianism, democratic consolidation and electoral behaviour in liberal democracies, particular emphasis was put on the idea of an electoral nexus between the elite driven transition and the behaviour of the electorate along the two main cleavages, the Left-Right axis and the Centre-Periphery axis. On the basis of this, the following question was put forward:

How and to what extent may electoral participation and party choice in Spain between 1977 and 2000 be understood in relation to how the parties and voters handled the problems posed by the transition from authoritarianism and democratic consolidation, with particular reference to the functional axis and the territorial axis?

In order to find an answer to this question, we started out in chapter 4 with an analysis of institutionalisation of parties, the electoral swings and party system formation between 1977 and 2000. In this, we concluded that the changes in electoral mobilisation and demobilisation had played a pivotal role in deciding the outcomes of the elections after the transitional phase proper (1977-1979). Then, in chapters 5-9, we embarked upon a series of extensive analyses of voter behaviour in terms of mobilisation, stabilisation and party competition for pairs of elections between 1977 and 2000. The summarised empirical findings are the following:

1) The aggregate analysis of the electoral profiles of the more than 8.000 municipalities showed that, in terms of changes in electoral turnout between elections,

the pattern was generally in accord with the swings found in the overall official election results. However, the aggregate analysis also detected that the last executive takeover by the rejuvenated post-Francoist Right in 1996 coincided with substantial shifts in the territorial distribution of electoral mobilisation. This territorial “realignment” between 1993 and 1996 merits particular attention since it was not reflected in the overall official electoral results and has not been treated in previous research.

Further, all the parties that survived the transition, with the predicted exception of the CDS, experienced an increase in the level of aggregate stability after the 1982 debacle and onwards. This trend was particularly pronounced in the case of the AP/PP. And, whereas the state-wide Left experienced a downturn in stability towards the end of the period, the stability of the AP/PP was unchanged. Thus, in general terms, the theoretical assumption on electoral stabilisation after the first founding elections of the transitional period was sustained at the aggregate municipal level, i.e. that the main parties consolidated their electoral clienteles in territorial terms. However, in relation to the party specific expectations derived from the *H5* hypothesis, the predicted pattern in terms of the *timing* of the stabilisation of the PSOE, PCE/IU and the AP/PP vote was not reflected at the aggregate level.

2) The state-wide parties surviving the transition, regardless of Left or Right orientation, related negatively to electoral abstention. We also noted that for the last pair of elections, the substantial drop in support for the PCE/IU from 1996 to 2000 was reflected in a substantial drop in its negative correlations with second election abstention.

The relationship between first election abstention and support for the regional parties showed very mixed patterns. The salience of the Centre-Periphery cleavage was clearly reflected in the Basque Country. First election abstention related positively to second election support for all the Basque parties at all of the pairs of elections studied. The Catalan parties showed mixed and erratic patterns, while the support for the Galician BNG related negatively to first election abstention. This implies that there were substantial differences in the logics of electoral abstention within the Second Periphery. Thus, the assumptions regarding the Centre-Periphery cleavage was only in part reflected at the aggregate level.

3) In terms of aggregate electoral competition, the patterns indicated that the Centre-Periphery cleavage had become strengthened at the expense of the Left-Right cleavage as we approached the millennium. On the one hand, the negative relationship between support for the state-wide Left and Right of the 1970s in the first half of the 1980s waned and even tended to turn into a positive relationship. On the other hand, we noted a steadily increasing negative relationship between first election support for the state-wide parties and second election support for the regional parties regardless of Left-Right orientation, the exceptions being very few.

4) As to how the increase in aggregate stability related to the individual level loyalty, we noted in chapter 6 that the aggregate stabilisation of the electorate indeed reflected an overall increase in voter loyalty. However, the status of the H5 hypothesis related to the *sequence* of party stabilisation was somewhat less straightforward. The prediction was that, after the 1982 debacle, PSOE would be the first of the state-wide parties to see an increase in loyalty rates between elections. This was supported by the ECOL data, whereas the survey data indicated that also AP/PP quickly stabilised its electorate. Both methods, however, showed clearly that PCE/IU lagged behind in this respect. As predicted, the results for CDS were more mixed. The recall method exhibited higher loyalty rates for the party than the ECOL estimates. They converged, however, in terms of the party's demise in 1993. On the whole, then, the H5 hypothesis was clearly supported with regard to PSOE and PCE/IU, but its status was less clear with regard to the two surviving parties of the Right.

5) As to the role played by electoral abstention in the process of democratic transition and consolidation, we saw that the changes in electoral results and in the party system formats were to a substantial extent caused by differences between the parties in relation to transfers to and from abstention. At the 1977-79 pair of elections, which saw a substantial drop in turnout without any change in the state-wide party system, all the relevant parties lost former voters to abstention in a rather uniform fashion. At the mobilising election in 1982, the electoral gains for the winner PSOE and the "sub triumphant" AP/PP were to a large extent produced by the mobilisation of former abstainers, the CDS made a net gain whereas PCE/IU did not benefit from the increased turnout and UCD suffered a substantial net loss. Thus, the change in the party system was intimately linked to the dynamics of mobilisation and

demobilisation. Further, the reorientation of the PCE that culminated in the formation of the IU alliance was followed by period of net gains from abstention. This trend, however, came to an abrupt end in 2000. After its landslide victory, PSOE suffered net losses to abstention between 1982 and 1989. However, facing the challenge from the rejuvenated AP/PP in 1993, PSOE was once again able to obtain net gains from abstention. This trend ended in 2000 when the party suffered a net loss almost comparable to the one in 1986. On the Right, after obtaining net gains at the first two pairs of elections the CDS lost its grip on the voters suffered net losses both in 1989 and 1993. The AP/PP, however, managed to obtain substantial net gains from abstention all the way from 1982 to 1996. Further, even though the turnout fell by more than seven percent from 1996 to 2000, AP/PP's net loss was far smaller than the ones experienced by the state-wide Left. Thus, there is no doubt that the consolidation and growth of the AP/PP leading up to its eventual executive take-over was to a great extent caused by the structuring of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation. The conclusion, then, was that the assumption regarding the pivotal role played by electoral abstention in the transition and consolidation of the Spanish democracy was sustained by the individual level data.

As to the mobilisation of new voters, the largest shares of the new voters opted for abstention at all the elections apart from the ones in 1982 and 1993. The main beneficiaries of this mobilisation were AP/PP and PSOE in 1982 and AP/PP in 1993. In addition, the share obtained by PSOE in 1993 nearly equalled the share that opted for abstention. Thus, the H1 hypothesis was sustained in that both realignment elections saw a substantial mobilisation of new voters.

6) With regard to the hypotheses on electoral competition, we saw that patterns were in accord with the expectation in that the parties that lagged behind in party building after the transitional phase (PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) saw large shares of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP. After the formation of the IU alliance in 1986, the transfers from PCE/IU to the other parties decreased substantially and it was able to obtain net gains from both AP/PP and PSOE in the latter half of the 1980s. AP/PP was the main beneficiary of both UCD's collapse and the demise of the CDS. On the whole, then, the H9 hypothesis was sustained by the individual level data.

For the question of how and to what extent the strengthening of the Centre-Periphery cleavage dimension observed in the aggregate analysis reflected an underlying tendency at the individual level, we observed that the transfers from the state-wide parties to the Catalan and Basque parties tended to decrease over the years. This tendency was particularly pronounced for the transfers from the state-wide Right to the Catalan and Basque Right. The transfers from the state-wide parties outside Catalonia and the Basque Country did not decrease in the same fashion.

7) As to the patterns of mobilisation and demobilisation presented in chapter 7, a marked overall Centre-Periphery bias in the new voters propensity to opt for abstention was detected. While the Centre exhibited a negative balance of deviant cases, both the First Periphery and the Second Periphery exhibited positive balances. The H2 hypothesis was thus sustained. In terms of the new voter's party choice, the Centre-Periphery bias was particularly marked for the state-wide Right. For the state-wide Left, however, a slight modification of the initial hypothesis was called for. Although there was a marked difference in the relative distributions of deviant cases between the Centre and the Second Periphery both for PSOE and PCE/IU, they also showed positive balances in the First Periphery – and for PSOE the greatest difference was actually found between the First and the Second Periphery. Thus, we observed that the impact of the territorial cleavage was not evenly distributed along the functional axis of the state-wide party system(s) due to the strong showing of the Left in the First Periphery.

Also the analysis of the first election abstainers showed an overall Centre-Periphery bias in their behaviour. The Second Periphery produced a substantially higher number of cases of large proportions of voters remaining demobilised at consecutive elections than cases of high levels of mobilisation. The First Periphery showed the same tendency, albeit to a lesser degree, while the tendency for the Centre, as expected, was quite the opposite. Thus, the H4 hypothesis was sustained by the data.

In terms of the first election abstainers' party choice, the state-wide parties were far more successful in mobilising the former abstainers in the Centre districts than in the First and Second Peripheries. The H10 hypothesis was therefore supported in general terms. This also held for the state-wide Right. For the Left, however, there was hardly

any difference between the Centre and the First Periphery. The patterns of demobilisation were more mixed. For both PSOE on the Left and AP/PP and CDS on the Right the patterns were in accord with the strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept. For PCE/IU and UCD, however, the pattern of demobilisation ran contrary to the hypothesis. Nonetheless, the general conclusion was that we had detected an overall Centre-Periphery bias in the patterns of mobilisation and demobilisation for the state-wide parties between the seven pairs of elections from 1977 to 2000. At the same time, we had detected that also in this respect the effect of the Centre-Periphery cleavage was unevenly distributed along the functional Left-Right axis. After UCD's collapse, the ability of the state-wide Right both to mobilise former abstainers and to retain former voters had definitely been skewed towards the Centre, while the state-wide Left had been far more successful in this respect also in the First-Periphery. Thus, we concluded that the Centre-Periphery axis and the Left-Right axis co-varied in a certain fashion.

8) As to the Centre-Periphery patterns of electoral stabilisation presented in chapter 8, it was only the distribution of deviant cases for the CDS that followed the strict pattern predicted by the H6 hypothesis. Although there was a general Centre-Periphery bias in terms of differences between the Second Periphery versus either the Centre or the First Periphery also for the other parties, the initial expectations regarding the pattern of electoral stabilisation were not met for all the parties and the general assumption had to be modified.

While all the parties seen together exhibited a strongly negative balance of deviant cases indicating a generalised lower ability to retain the voters in the Second Periphery, they differed substantially as to their ability to retain former voters in the First Periphery. Whereas both the parties of the state-wide Left, PCE/IU and PSOE, together with the UCD, showed the strongest ability to retain their voters in the First Periphery, both the CDS and the AP/PP showed their strongest ability in the Centre. Thus, after the collapse of the UCD, the loyalty patterns for the state-wide parties showed a clear differentiation along the functional Left-Right axis. The PCE/IU exhibited a positive balance both in the First Periphery and in the Centre in combination with a strong negative balance in the Second Periphery. This pattern also held for the PSOE, although the differences were less pronounced than for the PCE/IU. On the other hand, both the AP/PP and the CDS exhibited negative balances

both in the First and Second Peripheries, albeit AP/PP's strong showing in Galicia palliated the effect of the centre-periphery cleavage for this party to a substantial degree.

In terms of party blocs, however, the patterns were far more similar to the one detected for mobilisation. Although the difference between the Centre and the First Periphery for all the parties lumped together was not very substantial, the pattern was nonetheless in accord with the H6 hypothesis. This also held for the party bloc on the Right, whereas the party-bloc on the Left exhibited the by now familiar deviating pattern. Thus, the overall conclusion was that, although the bias was not as pronounced as the one found in relation to mobilisation, the Centre-Periphery axis and the Left-Right axis also had come to co-vary in relation to electoral stabilisation.

9) The analyses of Centre-Periphery patterns of electoral competition presented in chapter 9 detected a very mixed set of patterns for the individual parties. The vast majority of the patterns of deviant cases did not meet the expectations stated in the H10 hypothesis. However, in the analyses of the mean transfers for the party blocs we found a set of patterns that were more similar to the ones already detected for mobilisation and stabilisation. The intra-bloc transfers on the Left were more pronounced in the First Periphery than both in the Centre and, of course, the Second Periphery. The transfers from the Left to the Right exhibited a positive balance both in the Centre and in the Second Periphery, while the balance in the First Periphery was negative. However, as shown when the AP/PP was singled out as the option of the transferred votes, the narrowing down of the electoral market produced by the collapse of the UCD and the demise of the CDS implied that the state-wide party system had become somewhat more clear-cut as to the relationship between the Left-Right and the Centre-Periphery cleavages. Even though the differences were not overwhelming, the pattern of deviant cases regarding transfers from the Left to AP/PP was accord with the expectation stated in the hypothesis. Likewise, the intra-bloc transfers on the Right exhibited a pattern according to the expectations derived from the straightforward Centre-Periphery concept. Thus, we concluded that, after the disappearance of the UCD and the CDS, the logic of state-wide party competition along the two main axes of the party system had become akin to the pattern already detected for mobilisation and stabilisation.

Table 10.1 Status of the hypotheses

No.	Hypotheses	Status
H1	<i>In general, the largest proportions of the new voters have opted for abstention between 1977 and 2000. The realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, saw a sharp increase in turnout among the new voters.</i>	Sustained
H2	<i>Substantially lower proportions of new voters have turned out in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The greatest differences in turnout will be found between the Second Periphery and the Centre.</i>	Sustained
H3	<i>In general, the largest proportion of those who abstained at the first election opted for abstention again at the second election between 1977 and 2000. The realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, saw a sharp increase in turnout among former abstainers.</i>	Sustained
H4	<i>Larger proportions of abstainers at the first election have opted for abstention again at the second election in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The greatest differences will be found between the Second Periphery and the Centre.</i>	Sustained
H5	<i>PSOE was the first state-wide party that managed to consolidate its electoral constituency in terms of increased loyalty rates between elections, followed by AP/PP and PCE/IU, while the CDS never managed to consolidate in this respect.</i>	Partially sustained
H6	<i>The loyalty rates commanded by the state-wide parties were substantially lower in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The greatest difference in loyalty rates will be found between the Centre and the Second Periphery.</i>	Partially sustained
H7	<i>The Basque and Catalan Right saw a substantial increase in voter loyalty between the general elections after 1980. The Basque Left quickly followed suit, while the Catalan and Galician Left lagged behind. For the regional parties of the First Periphery no clear trend will be identified.</i>	Sustained
H8	<i>The new voters' party choice will have followed the sequential translation of cleavages in that the UCD polled a large share between 1977 and 1979, the PSOE polled large shares from 1982 and onwards, the PCE/IU increased its share in the latter half of the 1980s and AP/PP became the preferred party for the new voters in the 1990s.</i>	Partially sustained
H9	<i>The parties that lagged behind in party building after the transitional phase (PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) saw large proportions of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP between 1982 and 2000. With the formation of the IU alliance in 1986, the PCE/IU made net gains from the other parties.</i>	Sustained
H10	<i>The trends in voter mobilisation and transfers between the state-wide parties have differed markedly between the Centre and the Peripheries. The greatest discrepancy in this respect will be found between the Centre and the Second Periphery.</i>	Partially sustained

Thus, as listed in table 10.1, in terms of the overall status of the hypotheses derived from the theory on the electoral nexus in relation to the process of democratisation in Spain, we note that six of the hypotheses have been sustained by the data and four have been only partially sustained.

Of the hypothesis only partially sustained, we have seen that the predicted timing of the stabilisation of the party vote for the AP/PP stated in hypothesis H5 was not observed in the recall data. Even though there are substantial indications that the loyalty rates for AP/PP were over-estimated in surveys during the first years of democratic rule, we will nonetheless have to conclude that the hypothesis is not sustained for this party. In relation to the H8 hypothesis, we saw that, although the AP/PP made huge inroads into the group of new voters, it was not the most preferred party at the takeover election in 1996. However, in the relation to the theory on the electoral nexus, the most interesting of the hypotheses only partially sustained are the H6 and H10. By submitting these two hypotheses to empirical tests, we have learned that in the process of democratic consolidation the two main cleavages of Spanish politics, the Centre-Periphery cleavage and the Left-Right cleavage, have co-varied in a particular fashion.

Thus, briefly summarised, these two particular aspects of the Spanish experience merit particular attention: First, *electoral mobilisation and demobilisation has played a pivotal role in the formation of the party systems(s) in Spain, both in temporal and in territorial terms. The patterns of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation have to a substantial extent been structured according to the timing of the translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages along the Left-Right axis and at the same time been structured in accord with the general theory on Centre and Peripheries.* Second, *the Centre-Periphery axis and the Left-Right axis have co-varied in line with the notion that the Spanish Left came to accept that the territorial restructuring of the state was paramount to the consolidation of democracy.* Consequently, to the extent that the electoral participation and party choice in Spain between 1977 and 2000 can be understood in relation to how the parties and voters handled the problems posed by the transition from authoritarianism and democratic consolidation, the *differentiation* of the effect of the Centre-Periphery cleavage along the Left-Right axis is paramount to the understanding of the electoral nexus between the sequence of cleavage translation and the behaviour of the enfranchised citizenry in the modern Spanish democracy.

Further research

The investigation conducted and the findings presented in this dissertation have been limited to the general elections to the Spanish lower chamber. They have also been limited to the state-wide parties and only the most important of the regional parties. Also in terms of the categorisation of Centre and Peripheries the analysis conducted has been rather crude. Thus, as there are no inherent limitations to the use of the ECOL method also to assess the behaviour of voters both at the regional and district level and expand the scope of parties to include all the relevant regional parties, the first implication to be stated is that the scope of the analysis should be expanded in order to cover all the relevant parties at different kinds of elections, i.e. including the parties that have obtained representation in the regional parliaments. In particular, analyses of the dynamics of electoral behaviour between the general elections and the regional elections to the Autonomous parliaments would be extremely useful in order to assess the full impact of cleavage formation in the modern Spanish democracy. In this, both the impact of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation and the extent of transfers between the state-wide and the regional parties at the regional versus the general elections should be assessed. In addition, the extent and logics of ‘split ticket’ voting proper should be investigated. This last point is made with particular reference to Andalucía where the general and regional elections are held simultaneously.

Thus, in order to make full advantage of the lessons from Spain for possible extrapolations to other processes of transition and democratic consolidation, more extensive studies of the Spanish elections are called for.

Furthermore, as there are many countries around the world that have undergone processes of democratic transition and consolidation, the ECOL method for aggregate analysis and ecological inference could be employed to conduct analyses similar to the ones undertaken in this dissertation. The advantage of the ECOL method is that it is based on already existing electoral data tied to territorial sub units. Thus, the fact that reliable survey data tied to the level of electoral districts are often lacking in many of the pertaining countries should not refrain students from embarking upon analyses of territorial differentiation of dynamic behaviour between elections. Although there are some fundamental methodological caveats to this method in terms of estimating the true proportions of the transition matrixes, it yields results that are

fruitful in order to assess both the trends over time and the systematic differences along the territorial axis. Such analyses would be extremely valuable in refining our understanding of the electoral nexus between the behaviour of the political elites and the common citizenry as to the institutionalisation of parties and party systems in general and in the processes of democratic consolidation in particular.

Hopefully, then, this dissertation may serve as a source of inspiration for students interested in this particular role played by elections in the process of translating sets of pertaining societal divisions into manifest cleavages in many other countries of the world.

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Appendix I

Aggregate logit correlations 1977-2000:

For all pairs of elections, and the first and the second elections

(NB! Included and excluded voters are labelled 'nonvoters')

SPAIN: Logit Correlations generales 1977-1979

Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.

1979:

1977	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CD	EE	PNV	UN	CiU	ERFN	HB	PSA	CUPC	PAR	Other	Nonvo	Absta
PCE	0.89	0.50	-0.46	-0.12	-0.65	0.08	0.10	-0.48	-0.29	0.08	0.35	0.37	-0.04	0.16	-0.33	-0.33
PSOE	0.63	0.79	-0.22	-0.10	-0.26	-0.33	0.23	-0.37	-0.33	-0.19	0.19	0.53	-0.04	0.11	-0.14	-0.47
PSPUS	0.29	0.26	0.13	0.40	-0.25	-0.26	0.43	-0.28	0.18	-0.18	0.78	0.16	0.15	0.25	-0.10	-0.18
UCD	-0.43	-0.14	0.82	0.23	-0.12	-0.59	0.22	-0.05	0.12	-0.57	-0.24	0.07	-0.06	-0.21	0.36	-0.09
AP	-0.22	-0.12	0.39	0.64	0.12	0.04	0.49	0.23	0.35	-0.14	0.14	-0.11	0.12	-0.07	0.13	-0.05
IDCC	-0.53	-0.53	0.36	0.37	-0.06	0.00	0.03	0.60	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.19	0.05	0.17
PDPC	-0.49	-0.37	0.35	0.19	-0.04	0.00	0.16	0.82	0.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.30	0.18	-0.08
ECFED	0.01	-0.13	-0.07	0.04	-0.15	0.00	-0.37	-0.13	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.21	-0.28	0.29
EE	0.06	0.22	0.10	0.00	0.73	-0.36	-0.15	0.00	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.25	-0.38	-0.17
PNV	-0.14	-0.41	-0.58	0.00	0.25	0.47	-0.11	0.00	0.00	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.37	0.02	0.15
CAIC	-0.31	-0.23	0.23	-0.12	0.00	0.00	-0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.37	-0.22	0.10	-0.17
Other	-0.14	-0.05	0.02	0.23	0.68	-0.51	0.19	0.13	-0.17	-0.25	0.33	0.72	-0.03	0.42	-0.01	-0.12
Nonvo	-0.20	0.05	0.38	-0.04	0.69	-0.03	0.15	0.01	0.20	0.15	-0.26	0.43	0.17	-0.43	0.31	-0.05
Absta	-0.43	-0.52	-0.19	-0.06	0.20	0.45	-0.44	-0.05	0.27	0.48	-0.18	-0.50	-0.08	-0.06	0.11	0.80

Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.

1977:

1977	PCE	PSOE	PSPUS	UCD	AP	IDCC	PDPC	ECFED	EE	PNV	CAIC	Other	Nonvo	Absta
PCE	1.00	0.63	0.31	-0.47	-0.21	-0.50	-0.49	0.00	0.04	-0.24	-0.31	-0.07	-0.32	-0.41
PSOE	0.63	1.00	0.33	-0.21	-0.08	-0.51	-0.53	0.02	0.38	-0.27	-0.35	0.10	-0.08	-0.55
PSPUS	0.31	0.33	1.00	0.13	0.34	-0.03	-0.34	0.52	-0.01	-0.16	-0.28	0.23	-0.07	-0.27
UCD	-0.47	-0.21	0.13	1.00	0.40	0.11	-0.05	-0.03	0.06	-0.69	-0.16	0.05	0.37	-0.15
AP	-0.21	-0.08	0.34	0.40	1.00	0.49	0.26	0.06	0.13	0.04	0.05	0.15	0.18	-0.13
IDCC	-0.50	-0.51	-0.03	0.11	0.49	1.00	0.63	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.12	0.26	0.10
PDPC	-0.49	-0.53	-0.34	-0.05	0.26	0.63	1.00	-0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.20	-0.10
ECFED	0.00	0.02	0.52	-0.03	0.06	0.09	-0.18	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.11	0.12	0.25
EE	0.04	0.38	-0.01	0.06	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	-0.09	0.00	0.36	0.27	-0.34
PNV	-0.24	-0.27	-0.16	-0.69	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.09	1.00	0.00	-0.61	0.73	0.39
CAIC	-0.31	-0.35	-0.28	-0.16	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	-0.10	-0.16	-0.18
Other	-0.07	0.10	0.23	0.05	0.15	-0.12	-0.02	-0.11	0.36	-0.61	-0.10	1.00	-0.13	-0.17
Nonvo	-0.32	-0.08	-0.07	0.37	0.18	0.26	0.20	0.12	0.27	0.73	-0.16	-0.13	1.00	-0.00
Absta	-0.41	-0.55	-0.27	-0.15	-0.13	0.10	-0.10	0.25	-0.34	0.39	-0.18	-0.17	-0.00	1.00

Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.

1979:

1979	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CD	EE	PNV	UN	CiU	ERFN	HB	PSA	CUPC	PAR	Other	Nonvo	Absta
PCE	1.00	0.58	-0.34	-0.14	-0.73	0.07	0.19	-0.44	-0.27	0.05	0.20	0.18	0.00	0.10	-0.28	-0.42
PSOE	0.58	1.00	-0.00	-0.18	-0.49	-0.48	0.30	-0.36	-0.33	-0.34	-0.42	0.24	-0.30	-0.08	-0.01	-0.58
UCD	-0.34	-0.00	1.00	0.20	-0.25	-0.71	0.32	0.28	0.32	-0.64	-0.34	-0.13	-0.10	-0.28	0.43	-0.27
CD	-0.14	-0.18	0.20	1.00	0.20	0.20	0.36	0.26	0.27	0.09	0.45	0.50	0.18	0.23	-0.02	0.01
EE	-0.73	-0.49	-0.25	0.20	1.00	-0.18	0.02	-0.02	-0.17	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.09	0.03
PNV	0.07	-0.48	-0.71	0.20	-0.18	1.00	-0.17	0.00	0.00	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.49	-0.67	0.45
UN	0.19	0.30	0.32	0.36	0.02	-0.17	1.00	0.08	-0.14	-0.34	0.15	0.46	0.06	-0.01	0.01	-0.43
CiU	-0.44	-0.36	0.28	0.26	-0.02	0.00	0.08	1.00	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.24	0.09	-0.11
ERFN	-0.27	-0.33	0.32	0.27	-0.17	0.00	-0.14	0.31	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.17	0.10	0.14
HB	0.05	-0.34	-0.64	0.09	0.22	0.70	-0.34	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.41	-0.46	0.39
PSA	0.20	-0.42	-0.34	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.59	-0.11	-0.05
CUPC	0.18	0.24	-0.13	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.69	0.41	-0.44
PAR	0.00	-0.30	-0.10	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.13	-0.16	-0.05
Other	0.10	-0.08	-0.28	0.23	0.17	-0.49	-0.01	-0.24	-0.17	-0.41	0.59	0.69	0.13	1.00	-0.19	-0.03
Nonvo	-0.28	-0.01	0.43	-0.02	0.09	-0.67	0.01	0.09	0.10	-0.46	-0.11	0.41	-0.16	-0.19	1.00	-0.05
Absta	-0.42	-0.58	-0.27	0.01	0.03	0.45	-0.43	-0.11	0.14	0.39	-0.05	-0.44	-0.05	-0.03	-0.05	1.00

SPAIN: Logit Correlations generales 1979-1982

Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.

1982:

1979	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CDS	AP	CiU	ERC	EE	PNV	HB	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
PCE	0.90	0.67	-0.68	0.01	-0.08	-0.67	-0.48	0.27	0.12	-0.06	0.06	-0.27	-0.50
PSOE	0.55	0.84	-0.38	0.07	0.08	-0.61	-0.45	-0.05	-0.46	-0.37	-0.04	-0.04	-0.53
UCD	-0.26	-0.08	0.73	0.34	0.63	0.44	0.30	-0.41	-0.72	-0.63	0.16	0.30	-0.08
CD	-0.17	-0.19	0.09	0.42	0.66	0.36	0.33	0.07	0.24	0.16	0.06	-0.00	-0.11
UN	0.20	0.26	0.06	0.33	0.51	-0.02	-0.15	-0.04	-0.19	-0.50	0.10	-0.06	-0.42
CiU	-0.42	-0.59	0.08	-0.15	0.14	0.82	0.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.16	-0.19
ERFN	-0.20	-0.40	0.21	0.22	0.26	0.43	0.77	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.28	-0.01
EE	-0.71	-0.58	0.34	-0.32	-0.44	-0.19	-0.22	0.69	-0.10	0.38	-0.57	0.12	0.37
PNV	-0.05	-0.56	-0.26	-0.56	-0.54	0.00	0.00	0.62	0.93	0.55	-0.19	-0.29	0.25
HB	-0.04	-0.39	-0.26	-0.48	-0.58	0.00	0.00	0.55	0.66	0.86	-0.24	-0.11	0.32
PSA	0.05	0.21	-0.53	0.23	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.67	-0.22	-0.10
CUPC	0.00	0.38	-0.70	0.14	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.75	-0.05	-0.22
PAR	0.03	-0.08	-0.10	0.18	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	-0.04	-0.22
OTHER	0.01	0.02	-0.30	0.18	0.04	-0.41	-0.27	-0.43	-0.58	-0.43	0.26	-0.19	-0.08
Nonvo	0.00	0.17	0.26	-0.21	0.06	-0.12	-0.16	0.07	0.15	0.18	0.02	-0.13	0.04
Absta	-0.38	-0.47	0.08	-0.09	-0.19	0.17	0.23	0.39	0.54	0.29	-0.06	0.14	0.69

Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.

1979:

1979	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CD	UN	CiU	ERFN	EE	PNV	HB	PSA	CUPC	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
PCE	1.00	0.58	-0.35	-0.15	0.19	-0.46	-0.29	-0.74	0.04	0.02	0.18	0.16	-0.00	0.10	-0.07	-0.40
PSOE	0.58	1.00	-0.02	-0.18	0.29	-0.37	-0.33	-0.51	-0.50	-0.34	-0.43	0.24	-0.29	-0.07	0.08	-0.56
UCD	-0.35	-0.02	1.00	0.21	0.31	0.27	0.31	-0.27	-0.71	-0.64	-0.34	-0.19	-0.11	-0.27	0.25	-0.27
CD	-0.15	-0.18	0.21	1.00	0.36	0.27	0.28	0.18	0.25	0.11	0.46	0.46	0.17	0.22	-0.11	0.04
UN	0.19	0.29	0.31	0.36	1.00	0.08	-0.12	-0.02	-0.16	-0.32	0.15	0.42	0.06	-0.02	0.18	-0.42
CiU	-0.46	-0.37	0.27	0.27	0.08	1.00	0.34	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.24	-0.10	-0.08
ERFN	-0.29	-0.33	0.31	0.28	-0.12	0.34	1.00	-0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.18	-0.13	0.16
EE	-0.74	-0.51	-0.27	0.18	-0.02	-0.04	-0.17	1.00	-0.17	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.35	0.04
PNV	0.04	-0.50	-0.71	0.25	-0.16	0.00	0.00	-0.17	1.00	0.68	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.50	0.13	0.43
HB	0.02	-0.34	-0.64	0.11	-0.32	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.68	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.43	0.10	0.38
PSA	0.18	-0.43	-0.34	0.46	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.60	-0.08	-0.01
CUPC	0.16	0.24	-0.19	0.46	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.69	0.36	-0.40
PAR	-0.00	-0.29	-0.11	0.17	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.13	0.05	-0.03
OTHER	0.10	-0.07	-0.27	0.22	-0.02	-0.24	-0.18	0.15	-0.50	-0.43	0.60	0.69	0.13	1.00	-0.40	0.02
Nonvo	-0.07	0.08	0.25	-0.11	0.18	-0.10	-0.13	0.35	0.13	0.10	-0.08	0.36	0.05	-0.40	1.00	-0.27
Absta	-0.40	-0.56	-0.27	0.04	-0.42	-0.08	0.16	0.04	0.43	0.38	-0.01	-0.40	-0.03	0.02	-0.27	1.00

Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.

1982:

1982	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CDS	AP	CiU	ERC	EE	PNV	HB	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
PCE	1.00	0.64	-0.59	0.06	-0.03	-0.57	-0.36	0.23	0.06	-0.14	0.08	-0.21	-0.49
PSOE	0.64	1.00	-0.47	0.05	0.07	-0.81	-0.58	-0.12	-0.54	-0.43	0.05	-0.10	-0.55
UCD	-0.59	-0.47	1.00	0.02	0.26	0.26	0.19	-0.07	-0.18	-0.29	-0.03	0.40	0.26
CDS	0.06	0.05	0.02	1.00	0.46	-0.07	0.10	-0.22	-0.62	-0.49	0.20	-0.15	-0.29
AP	-0.03	0.07	0.26	0.46	1.00	0.27	0.31	-0.38	-0.59	-0.61	0.15	0.15	-0.28
CiU	-0.57	-0.81	0.26	-0.07	0.27	1.00	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.30	0.31	-0.10
ERC	-0.36	-0.58	0.19	0.10	0.31	0.70	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.18	0.27	-0.09
EE	0.23	-0.12	-0.07	-0.22	-0.38	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.66	0.44	-0.06	-0.39	0.06
PNV	0.06	-0.54	-0.18	-0.62	-0.59	0.00	0.00	0.66	1.00	0.52	-0.23	-0.31	0.31
HB	-0.14	-0.43	-0.29	-0.49	-0.61	0.00	0.00	0.44	0.52	1.00	-0.36	-0.14	0.31
OTHER	0.08	0.05	-0.03	0.20	0.15	-0.30	-0.18	-0.06	-0.23	-0.36	1.00	-0.14	-0.08
Nonvo	-0.21	-0.10	0.40	-0.15	0.15	0.31	0.27	-0.39	-0.31	-0.14	-0.14	1.00	0.16
Absta	-0.49	-0.55	0.26	-0.29	-0.28	-0.10	-0.09	0.06	0.31	0.31	-0.08	0.16	1.00

SPAIN: Logit Correlations generales 1982-1986

Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.

1986:

1982	IU	PSOE	CP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	HB	AIC	UV	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
PCE	0.87	0.50	-0.16	0.14	-0.61	0.29	0.17	-0.13	0.00	0.23	-0.02	-0.16	-0.15	-0.27
PSOE	0.68	0.85	-0.02	0.24	-0.84	-0.21	-0.50	-0.51	0.45	-0.07	-0.12	-0.04	-0.09	-0.37
AP	-0.01	-0.14	0.87	0.50	0.29	-0.51	-0.67	-0.71	-0.32	0.10	0.18	0.84	-0.24	-0.43
UCD	-0.55	-0.31	0.54	0.18	0.34	-0.15	-0.14	-0.26	-0.04	-0.48	-0.00	0.52	0.15	-0.10
CDS	0.03	-0.21	0.33	0.70	-0.03	-0.39	-0.67	-0.54	0.01	-0.05	-0.09	0.32	-0.25	-0.15
CiU	-0.46	-0.75	0.25	-0.61	0.96	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.16	-0.41
ERC	-0.24	-0.54	0.30	-0.35	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.37	0.11	-0.24
EE	-0.11	-0.11	-0.45	-0.20	0.00	0.91	0.65	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.52	-0.11	0.56
PNV	-0.32	-0.48	-0.66	-0.55	0.00	0.82	0.95	0.61	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.71	0.07	0.56
HB	-0.28	-0.45	-0.59	-0.52	0.00	0.49	0.41	0.95	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.61	0.14	0.54
OTHER	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.24	-0.31	-0.10	-0.23	-0.37	-0.53	0.58	0.07	0.23	-0.07	-0.01
Nonvo	0.19	0.30	-0.00	-0.03	-0.18	0.32	0.32	0.31	-0.71	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.32	-0.07
Absta	-0.47	-0.32	-0.15	-0.32	0.01	0.22	0.29	0.41	0.36	0.04	-0.14	-0.11	0.36	0.71

Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.

1982:

1982	PCE	PSOE	AP	UCD	CDS	CiU	ERC	EE	PNV	HB	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
PCE	1.00	0.64	-0.06	-0.60	0.05	-0.56	-0.34	0.23	0.08	-0.14	0.07	0.08	-0.49
PSOE	0.64	1.00	0.04	-0.49	0.05	-0.81	-0.57	-0.15	-0.55	-0.44	0.04	0.18	-0.55
AP	-0.06	0.04	1.00	0.27	0.46	0.28	0.31	-0.41	-0.61	-0.61	0.15	-0.12	-0.26
UCD	-0.60	-0.49	0.27	1.00	0.03	0.26	0.18	-0.09	-0.17	-0.30	-0.03	0.08	0.25
CDS	0.05	0.05	0.46	0.03	1.00	-0.06	0.10	-0.23	-0.63	-0.46	0.21	-0.31	-0.27
CiU	-0.56	-0.81	0.28	0.26	-0.06	1.00	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.29	-0.17	-0.08
ERC	-0.34	-0.57	0.31	0.18	0.10	0.70	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.17	-0.12	-0.07
EE	0.23	-0.15	-0.41	-0.09	-0.23	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.68	0.44	-0.07	0.25	0.06
PNV	0.08	-0.55	-0.61	-0.17	-0.63	0.00	0.00	0.68	1.00	0.53	-0.25	0.30	0.31
HB	-0.14	-0.44	-0.61	-0.30	-0.46	0.00	0.00	0.44	0.53	1.00	-0.36	0.30	0.33
OTHER	0.07	0.04	0.15	-0.03	0.21	-0.29	-0.17	-0.07	-0.25	-0.36	1.00	-0.04	-0.06
Nonvo	0.08	0.18	-0.12	0.08	-0.31	-0.17	-0.12	0.25	0.30	0.30	-0.04	1.00	-0.07
Absta	-0.49	-0.55	-0.26	0.25	-0.27	-0.08	-0.07	0.06	0.31	0.33	-0.06	-0.07	1.00

Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.

1986:

1986	IU	PSOE	CP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	HB	AIC	UV	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
IU	1.00	0.54	-0.08	0.18	-0.51	-0.10	-0.28	-0.32	-0.40	0.14	-0.05	-0.10	-0.13	-0.29
PSOE	0.54	1.00	-0.13	0.05	-0.79	-0.17	-0.41	-0.50	0.23	-0.11	-0.07	-0.14	0.07	-0.31
CP	-0.08	-0.13	1.00	0.46	0.26	-0.55	-0.73	-0.69	-0.57	-0.18	-0.14	0.93	-0.17	-0.48
CDS	0.18	0.05	0.46	1.00	-0.65	-0.30	-0.59	-0.60	-0.68	-0.17	-0.07	0.42	-0.29	-0.31
CiU	-0.51	-0.79	0.26	-0.65	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.19	-0.45
EE	-0.10	-0.17	-0.55	-0.30	0.00	1.00	0.79	0.54	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.61	-0.00	0.62
PNV	-0.28	-0.41	-0.73	-0.59	0.00	0.79	1.00	0.52	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.77	0.06	0.51
HB	-0.32	-0.50	-0.69	-0.60	0.00	0.54	0.52	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.70	0.15	0.56
AIC	-0.40	0.23	-0.57	-0.68	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	-0.60	0.65	0.39
UV	0.14	-0.11	-0.18	-0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	-0.05	0.09	-0.03
PAR	-0.05	-0.07	-0.14	-0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	-0.17	-0.08	-0.14
OTHER	-0.10	-0.14	0.93	0.42	0.25	-0.61	-0.77	-0.70	-0.60	-0.05	-0.17	1.00	-0.18	-0.43
Nonvo	-0.13	0.07	-0.17	-0.29	0.19	-0.00	0.06	0.15	0.65	0.09	-0.08	-0.18	1.00	0.14
Absta	-0.29	-0.31	-0.48	-0.31	-0.45	0.62	0.51	0.56	0.39	-0.03	-0.14	-0.43	0.14	1.00

SPAIN: Logit Correlations generales 1986-1989

Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.

1989:																	
1986	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	EA	HB	AIC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta	
IU	0.89	0.37	-0.09	0.12	-0.51	-0.04	-0.20	-0.47	-0.36	-0.52	0.14	-0.00	-0.05	-0.05	-0.21	-0.24	
PSOE	0.50	0.89	-0.12	0.05	-0.82	-0.05	-0.36	-0.55	-0.55	0.29	-0.03	0.00	-0.24	-0.12	0.02	-0.31	
CP	0.10	0.11	0.95	0.51	0.33	-0.43	-0.63	-0.60	-0.69	-0.56	-0.15	-0.10	0.00	0.01	0.20	-0.30	
CDS	0.36	0.07	0.52	0.85	-0.64	-0.18	-0.50	-0.56	-0.62	-0.55	-0.17	-0.02	0.06	0.06	-0.18	-0.17	
CiU	-0.66	-0.77	0.10	-0.58	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.26	0.19	-0.43
EE	-0.24	-0.26	-0.57	-0.32	0.00	0.94	0.76	0.68	0.55	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.46	0.41
PNV	-0.56	-0.52	-0.77	-0.62	0.00	0.68	0.96	0.68	0.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.17	-0.41	0.08
HB	-0.47	-0.55	-0.68	-0.59	0.00	0.45	0.40	0.78	0.97	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.47	-0.05	0.17
AIC	-0.40	0.09	-0.20	-0.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.91	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.42	0.13	0.29
UV	0.19	-0.25	-0.33	-0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.91	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.21	0.00
PAR	0.00	-0.09	-0.11	-0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.57	-0.05	-0.09	-0.08	
OTHER	0.07	0.09	0.91	0.49	0.32	-0.49	-0.67	-0.66	-0.72	-0.54	-0.02	0.16	-0.03	0.22	0.20	-0.22	
Nonvo	0.27	0.17	-0.53	-0.23	-0.30	0.65	0.69	0.62	0.60	-0.13	-0.03	0.43	-0.00	-0.17	-0.58	0.12	
Absta	-0.36	-0.36	-0.42	-0.28	-0.39	0.56	0.42	0.57	0.56	0.36	-0.15	0.08	-0.03	0.15	0.05	0.84	

Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.

1986:																	
1986	IU	PSOE	CP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	HB	AIC	UV	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta			
IU	1.00	0.53	-0.06	0.17	-0.51	-0.10	-0.29	-0.32	-0.39	0.13	-0.06	-0.08	0.36	-0.31			
PSOE	0.53	1.00	-0.10	0.06	-0.80	-0.17	-0.43	-0.51	0.24	-0.11	-0.08	-0.11	0.34	-0.32			
CP	-0.06	-0.10	1.00	0.48	0.26	-0.54	-0.73	-0.68	-0.54	-0.16	-0.13	0.93	-0.48	-0.47			
CDS	0.17	0.06	0.48	1.00	-0.65	-0.30	-0.60	-0.60	-0.67	-0.18	-0.08	0.44	-0.17	-0.31			
CiU	-0.51	-0.80	0.26	-0.65	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	-0.25	-0.44			
EE	-0.10	-0.17	-0.54	-0.30	0.00	1.00	0.78	0.52	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.60	0.71	0.60			
PNV	-0.29	-0.43	-0.73	-0.60	0.00	0.78	1.00	0.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.78	0.76	0.48			
HB	-0.32	-0.51	-0.68	-0.60	0.00	0.52	0.51	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.69	0.59	0.54			
AIC	-0.39	0.24	-0.54	-0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	-0.56	-0.22	0.40			
UV	0.13	-0.11	-0.16	-0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04			
PAR	-0.06	-0.08	-0.13	-0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	-0.16	0.23	-0.16			
OTHER	-0.08	-0.11	0.93	0.44	0.25	-0.60	-0.78	-0.69	-0.56	-0.04	-0.16	1.00	-0.49	-0.42			
Nonvo	0.36	0.34	-0.48	-0.17	-0.25	0.71	0.76	0.59	-0.22	-0.02	0.23	-0.49	1.00	0.06			
Absta	-0.31	-0.32	-0.47	-0.31	-0.44	0.60	0.48	0.54	0.40	-0.04	-0.16	-0.42	0.06	1.00			

Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.

1989:																	
1989	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	EA	HB	AIC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta	
IU	1.00	0.32	0.10	0.29	-0.65	-0.14	-0.46	-0.61	-0.52	-0.53	0.19	0.05	-0.04	0.01	-0.30	-0.27	
PSOE	0.32	1.00	0.08	0.12	-0.81	-0.14	-0.46	-0.59	-0.58	0.15	-0.20	-0.30	-0.28	-0.24	0.20	-0.43	
PP	0.10	0.08	1.00	0.52	0.15	-0.45	-0.68	-0.63	-0.69	-0.30	-0.36	-0.14	-0.17	0.02	0.17	-0.30	
CDS	0.29	0.12	0.52	1.00	-0.57	-0.19	-0.51	-0.60	-0.62	-0.74	-0.48	-0.32	-0.17	0.12	-0.10	-0.19	
CiU	-0.65	-0.81	0.15	-0.57	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.22	-0.45	
EE	-0.14	-0.14	-0.45	-0.19	0.00	1.00	0.67	0.62	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	-0.48	0.43	
PNV	-0.46	-0.46	-0.68	-0.51	0.00	0.67	1.00	0.56	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.04	-0.43	0.09	
EA	-0.61	-0.59	-0.63	-0.60	0.00	0.62	0.56	1.00	0.78	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.46	-0.26	0.16	
HB	-0.52	-0.58	-0.69	-0.62	0.00	0.46	0.46	0.78	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.48	-0.08	0.14	
AIC	-0.53	0.15	-0.30	-0.74	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.37	0.04	0.21	
UV	0.19	-0.20	-0.36	-0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.21	-0.10	
PA	0.05	-0.30	-0.14	-0.32	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.43	-0.35	0.26	
PAR	-0.04	-0.28	-0.17	-0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.02	0.00	-0.00	
OTHER	0.01	-0.24	0.02	0.12	0.21	0.06	-0.04	-0.46	-0.48	-0.37	0.20	0.43	0.02	1.00	-0.04	0.26	
Nonvo	-0.30	0.20	0.17	-0.10	0.22	-0.48	-0.43	-0.26	-0.08	0.04	0.21	-0.35	0.00	-0.04	1.00	-0.09	
Absta	-0.27	-0.43	-0.30	-0.19	-0.45	0.43	0.09	0.16	0.14	0.21	-0.10	0.26	-0.00	0.26	-0.09	1.00	

SPAIN: Logit Correlations generales 1989-1993

Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.

1993:																	
1989	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
IU	0.92	0.36	0.19	0.34	-0.67	-0.18	-0.45	-0.61	-0.53	0.41	-0.39	0.15	-0.10	0.23	-0.21	-0.15	-0.20
PSOE	0.28	0.94	0.15	0.08	-0.79	-0.43	-0.46	-0.57	-0.59	0.08	0.05	-0.20	-0.13	-0.24	-0.21	0.26	-0.43
PP	0.03	0.01	0.93	0.56	0.12	-0.49	-0.69	-0.62	-0.65	-0.11	-0.43	-0.36	-0.04	-0.26	0.41	0.08	-0.43
CDS	0.21	0.03	0.61	0.77	-0.57	-0.63	-0.52	-0.62	-0.61	0.40	0.12	-0.46	-0.15	-0.09	0.32	-0.11	-0.24
CiU	-0.73	-0.83	0.08	-0.55	0.98	0.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.49	0.26
EE	0.05	-0.14	-0.41	-0.23	0.00	0.00	0.66	0.64	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	-0.41	0.61
PNV	-0.34	-0.48	-0.63	-0.53	0.00	0.00	0.98	0.55	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.11	-0.27	0.33
EA	-0.51	-0.61	-0.66	-0.61	0.00	0.00	0.56	0.97	0.77	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.18	-0.34	0.54
HB	-0.46	-0.59	-0.73	-0.63	0.00	0.00	0.46	0.78	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.37	-0.15	0.52
AIC	-0.28	0.25	-0.61	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.59	-0.06	0.33
UV	0.22	-0.27	-0.38	-0.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.95	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.20	-0.02
PA	0.14	-0.21	-0.09	-0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.69	0.00	0.48	-0.36	0.22
PAR	-0.13	-0.30	-0.22	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.54	0.53	-0.27	-0.11
OTHER	-0.07	-0.30	0.04	0.04	0.25	0.14	-0.05	-0.49	-0.52	0.54	0.32	0.25	0.21	0.15	0.48	-0.17	0.05
Nonvo	0.44	0.13	-0.20	-0.14	-0.27	-0.15	0.62	0.41	0.29	0.46	0.30	0.14	0.34	0.39	-0.37	-0.59	0.19
Absta	-0.29	-0.40	-0.29	-0.22	-0.39	-0.41	0.06	0.15	0.13	-0.38	-0.36	-0.08	0.11	0.06	0.28	-0.17	0.81

Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.

1989:																	
1989	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	EA	HB	AIC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta	
IU	1.00	0.31	0.09	0.28	-0.66	-0.14	-0.46	-0.62	-0.52	-0.51	0.19	0.03	-0.08	-0.03	0.38	-0.30	
PSOE	0.31	1.00	0.08	0.13	-0.80	-0.14	-0.47	-0.59	-0.59	0.15	-0.20	-0.32	-0.26	-0.24	0.06	-0.43	
PP	0.09	0.08	1.00	0.52	0.17	-0.44	-0.68	-0.63	-0.69	-0.28	-0.35	-0.15	-0.17	0.05	-0.35	-0.26	
CDS	0.28	0.13	0.52	1.00	-0.57	-0.19	-0.52	-0.60	-0.62	-0.74	-0.49	-0.34	-0.18	0.12	-0.13	-0.19	
CiU	-0.66	-0.80	0.17	-0.57	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.23	-0.32	-0.40	
EE	-0.14	-0.14	-0.44	-0.19	0.00	1.00	0.66	0.61	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.52	0.41	
PNV	-0.46	-0.47	-0.68	-0.52	0.00	0.66	1.00	0.55	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.06	0.62	0.04	
EA	-0.62	-0.59	-0.63	-0.60	0.00	0.61	0.55	1.00	0.78	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.46	0.38	0.13	
HB	-0.52	-0.59	-0.69	-0.62	0.00	0.45	0.45	0.78	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.49	0.32	0.11	
AIC	-0.51	0.15	-0.28	-0.74	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.38	-0.49	0.23	
UV	0.19	-0.20	-0.35	-0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.18	-0.11	
PA	0.03	-0.32	-0.15	-0.34	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.41	0.58	0.23	
PAR	-0.08	-0.26	-0.17	-0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	-0.00	-0.07	-0.02	
OTHER	-0.03	-0.24	0.05	0.12	0.23	0.05	-0.06	-0.46	-0.49	-0.38	0.20	0.41	-0.00	1.00	-0.06	0.28	
Nonvo	0.38	0.06	-0.35	-0.13	-0.32	0.52	0.62	0.38	0.32	-0.49	0.18	0.58	-0.07	-0.06	1.00	-0.04	
Absta	-0.30	-0.43	-0.26	-0.19	-0.40	0.41	0.04	0.13	0.11	0.23	-0.11	0.23	-0.02	0.28	-0.04	1.00	

Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.

1993:																	
1993	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
IU	1.00	0.35	0.13	0.34	-0.73	-0.34	-0.33	-0.51	-0.47	0.40	-0.47	0.19	-0.03	0.18	-0.22	-0.17	-0.15
PSOE	0.35	1.00	0.09	0.06	-0.82	-0.45	-0.47	-0.59	-0.60	-0.08	-0.03	-0.26	-0.10	-0.51	-0.35	0.27	-0.37
PP	0.13	0.09	1.00	0.60	0.02	-0.54	-0.64	-0.65	-0.70	-0.25	-0.37	-0.40	0.01	-0.48	0.26	0.07	-0.44
CDS	0.34	0.06	0.60	1.00	-0.56	-0.65	-0.53	-0.61	-0.61	0.37	-0.23	-0.32	0.02	-0.30	0.28	-0.07	-0.23
CiU	-0.73	-0.82	0.02	-0.56	1.00	0.87	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.52	0.22	-0.42
ERC	-0.34	-0.45	-0.54	-0.65	0.87	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.75	-0.00	-0.35
PNV	-0.33	-0.47	-0.64	-0.53	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.55	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.13	-0.26	0.33
EA	-0.51	-0.59	-0.65	-0.61	0.00	0.00	0.55	1.00	0.77	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.22	-0.33	0.57
HB	-0.47	-0.60	-0.70	-0.61	0.00	0.00	0.40	0.77	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.37	-0.14	0.51
BNG	0.40	-0.08	-0.25	0.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	-0.38	-0.17
CC	-0.47	-0.03	-0.37	-0.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.50	-0.46	-0.25
UV	0.19	-0.26	-0.40	-0.32	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.22	-0.01
PA	-0.03	-0.10	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.13	-0.18	0.10
PAR	0.18	-0.51	-0.48	-0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.95	-0.67	-0.31
OTHER	-0.22	-0.35	0.26	0.28	-0.52	-0.75	-0.13	-0.22	-0.37	0.13	-0.50	0.21	0.13	0.95	1.00	-0.24	-0.04
Nonvo	-0.17	0.27	0.07	-0.07	0.22	-0.00	-0.26	-0.33	-0.14	-0.38	-0.46	0.22	-0.18	-0.67	-0.24	1.00	-0.22
Absta	-0.15	-0.37	-0.44	-0.23	-0.42	-0.35	0.33	0.57	0.51	-0.17	-0.25	-0.01	0.10	-0.31	-0.04	-0.22	1.00

SPAIN: Logit Correlations generales 1993-1996

Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.

1996:															
1993	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
IU	0.95	0.28	0.18	-0.66	-0.44	-0.37	-0.51	-0.49	0.52	-0.39	0.12	0.01	0.36	-0.11	-0.23
PSOE	0.32	0.91	0.07	-0.84	-0.43	-0.50	-0.60	-0.60	-0.01	0.06	-0.24	-0.24	0.05	0.01	-0.52
PP	0.12	0.03	0.94	0.18	-0.80	-0.66	-0.61	-0.71	-0.36	-0.25	-0.35	-0.10	0.28	0.18	-0.33
CDS	0.35	0.01	0.61	-0.47	-0.62	-0.56	-0.59	-0.62	0.42	-0.06	-0.31	-0.02	0.25	0.07	-0.14
CiU	-0.74	-0.72	-0.22	0.97	0.85	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.16	0.15	-0.41
ERC	-0.46	-0.17	-0.59	0.87	0.94	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.69	0.10	-0.51
PNV	-0.36	-0.41	-0.60	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.49	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.57	-0.13	0.21
EA	-0.48	-0.56	-0.64	0.00	0.00	0.59	0.97	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.38	-0.15	0.48
HB	-0.45	-0.58	-0.72	0.00	0.00	0.41	0.78	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.27	-0.01	0.47
BNG	0.44	-0.11	-0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.83	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.38	-0.27	-0.16
CC	-0.48	-0.08	-0.32	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.83	0.00	0.00	-0.22	-0.07	-0.23
UV	0.27	-0.08	-0.08	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.97	0.00	0.30	0.43	-0.08
PA	0.01	-0.19	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.73	0.68	-0.06	0.13
PAR	0.20	-0.27	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.47	0.09	-0.02
OTHER	-0.17	-0.28	0.40	-0.43	-0.58	-0.10	-0.19	-0.37	0.26	-0.33	0.22	0.52	0.25	0.17	0.22
Nonvo	0.26	0.03	-0.32	-0.33	-0.27	0.59	0.18	0.19	0.33	0.06	-0.10	0.18	0.01	-0.79	-0.06
Absta	-0.15	-0.41	-0.40	-0.40	0.57	0.35	0.55	0.52	-0.26	-0.42	-0.05	0.29	-0.03	-0.16	0.91

Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.

1993:																	
1993	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
IU	1.00	0.34	0.12	0.33	-0.74	-0.36	-0.36	-0.51	-0.47	0.38	-0.48	0.17	-0.04	0.18	-0.18	0.26	-0.18
PSOE	0.34	1.00	0.10	0.06	-0.82	-0.46	-0.49	-0.60	-0.59	-0.09	-0.04	-0.23	-0.11	-0.51	-0.32	0.24	-0.39
PP	0.12	0.10	1.00	0.61	0.02	-0.55	-0.64	-0.64	-0.69	-0.28	-0.38	-0.40	0.00	-0.49	0.29	-0.22	-0.43
CDS	0.33	0.06	0.61	1.00	-0.57	-0.66	-0.54	-0.62	-0.60	0.35	-0.24	-0.33	0.03	-0.29	0.32	-0.21	-0.22
CiU	-0.74	-0.82	0.02	-0.57	1.00	0.87	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.51	-0.13	-0.41
ERC	-0.36	-0.46	-0.55	-0.66	0.87	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.74	0.00	-0.35
PNV	-0.36	-0.49	-0.64	-0.54	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.55	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.61	0.30
EA	-0.51	-0.60	-0.64	-0.62	0.00	0.00	0.55	1.00	0.76	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.22	0.24	0.55
HB	-0.47	-0.59	-0.69	-0.60	0.00	0.00	0.39	0.76	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.38	0.17	0.49
BNG	0.38	-0.09	-0.28	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.32	-0.20
CC	-0.48	-0.04	-0.38	-0.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.52	0.06	-0.25
UV	0.17	-0.23	-0.40	-0.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.23	-0.06	-0.03
PA	-0.04	-0.11	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.12	0.10	0.11
PAR	0.18	-0.51	-0.49	-0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.95	-0.18	-0.30
OTHER	-0.18	-0.32	0.29	0.32	-0.51	-0.74	-0.14	-0.22	-0.38	0.11	-0.52	0.23	0.12	0.95	1.00	-0.49	-0.02
Nonvo	0.26	0.24	-0.22	-0.21	-0.13	0.00	0.61	0.24	0.17	0.32	0.06	-0.06	0.10	-0.18	-0.49	1.00	0.05
Absta	-0.18	-0.39	-0.43	-0.22	-0.41	-0.35	0.30	0.55	0.49	-0.20	-0.25	-0.03	0.11	-0.30	-0.02	0.05	1.00

Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.

1996:															
1996	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
IU	1.00	0.24	0.21	-0.67	-0.46	-0.36	-0.47	-0.46	0.53	-0.44	0.22	0.08	0.42	-0.12	-0.22
PSOE	0.24	1.00	0.04	-0.68	-0.11	-0.42	-0.57	-0.57	-0.06	-0.05	-0.10	-0.33	-0.07	0.21	-0.53
PP	0.21	0.04	1.00	-0.05	-0.80	-0.61	-0.61	-0.73	-0.41	-0.37	-0.05	0.06	0.36	0.24	-0.31
CiU	-0.67	-0.68	-0.05	1.00	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.34	-0.40
ERC	-0.46	-0.11	-0.80	0.89	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	-0.65	-0.02	0.44
PNV	-0.36	-0.42	-0.61	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.53	0.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.60	-0.17	0.25
EA	-0.47	-0.57	-0.61	0.00	0.00	0.53	1.00	0.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.35	-0.18	0.47
HB	-0.46	-0.57	-0.73	0.00	0.00	0.43	0.81	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.31	-0.06	0.46
BNG	0.53	-0.06	-0.41	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.49	-0.37	-0.23
CC	-0.44	-0.05	-0.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	-0.21	-0.09	-0.39
UV	0.22	-0.10	-0.05	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.29	0.47	-0.10
PA	0.08	-0.33	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.95	-0.13	0.30
OTHER	0.42	-0.07	0.36	-0.05	-0.65	-0.60	-0.35	-0.31	0.49	-0.21	0.29	0.95	1.00	0.07	-0.01
Nonvo	-0.12	0.21	0.24	0.34	-0.02	-0.17	-0.18	-0.06	-0.37	-0.09	0.47	-0.13	0.07	1.00	-0.18
Absta	-0.22	-0.53	-0.31	-0.40	0.44	0.25	0.47	0.46	-0.23	-0.39	-0.10	0.30	-0.01	-0.18	1.00

SPAIN: Logit Correlations generales 1996-2000

Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.

2000:																
1996	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	IC	PNV	EA	BNG	CC	UV	PA	CH	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
IU	0.92	0.41	0.24	-0.86	-0.61	0.82	-0.39	-0.42	0.51	-0.54	0.14	-0.04	0.63	0.26	-0.25	-0.07
PSOE	0.16	0.90	0.16	-0.79	-0.45	0.43	-0.45	-0.54	-0.12	0.19	-0.24	-0.15	-0.60	-0.18	0.23	-0.37
PP	0.30	0.23	0.97	-0.45	-0.88	0.39	-0.62	-0.56	-0.42	-0.33	-0.30	-0.01	0.00	-0.47	0.25	-0.32
CiU	-0.79	-0.85	-0.60	0.99	0.87	-0.59	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.97	-0.26	-0.77
ERC	-0.79	-0.50	-0.89	0.85	0.97	-0.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.85	-0.61	0.21
PNV	-0.37	-0.34	-0.59	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.98	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.49	0.30	0.22
EA	-0.53	-0.57	-0.62	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.96	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.48	0.12	0.65
HB	-0.52	-0.63	-0.76	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.48	0.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.53	0.14	0.85
BNG	0.44	0.07	-0.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.84	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.47	-0.34	0.08
CC	-0.36	-0.19	-0.34	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.11	-0.03	-0.41
UV	0.28	-0.30	-0.18	0.00	-0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.30	-0.12	0.11
PA	-0.15	-0.28	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.69	0.00	-0.07	0.02	0.39
OTHER	0.21	-0.03	-0.51	0.92	0.87	-0.46	-0.53	-0.43	0.51	-0.56	0.17	-0.02	0.58	0.92	-0.40	-0.02
Nonvo	0.35	0.28	0.42	-0.33	-0.87	0.11	0.56	0.04	0.26	0.07	-0.15	0.23	0.69	-0.54	-0.15	0.02
Absta	-0.22	-0.48	-0.10	-0.63	0.07	0.25	0.32	0.54	-0.24	-0.43	-0.03	0.30	0.26	-0.31	0.11	0.83

Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.

1996:																
1996	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta	
IU	1.00	0.15	0.21	-0.85	-0.60	-0.39	-0.49	-0.49	0.48	-0.46	0.27	-0.01	0.38	0.24	-0.21	
PSOE	0.15	1.00	0.13	-0.82	-0.45	-0.42	-0.57	-0.58	-0.11	-0.05	-0.31	-0.24	-0.15	0.26	-0.41	
PP	0.21	0.13	1.00	-0.43	-0.86	-0.61	-0.60	-0.73	-0.44	-0.35	-0.22	0.05	-0.49	0.40	-0.08	
CiU	-0.85	-0.82	-0.43	1.00	0.85	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.93	-0.35	-0.62	
ERC	-0.60	-0.45	-0.86	0.85	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.19	0.00	0.86	-0.87	0.12	
PNV	-0.39	-0.42	-0.61	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.54	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.53	0.53	0.31	
EA	-0.49	-0.57	-0.60	0.00	0.00	0.54	1.00	0.82	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.52	0.07	0.56	
HB	-0.49	-0.58	-0.73	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.82	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.49	0.10	0.54	
BNG	0.48	-0.11	-0.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.48	0.26	-0.28	
CC	-0.46	-0.05	-0.35	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	-0.46	0.21	-0.36	
UV	0.27	-0.31	-0.22	0.00	-0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.24	0.42	0.00	
PA	-0.01	-0.24	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.02	0.31	0.34	
OTHER	0.38	-0.15	-0.49	0.93	0.86	-0.53	-0.52	-0.49	0.48	-0.46	0.24	0.02	1.00	-0.49	-0.31	
Nonvo	0.24	0.26	0.40	-0.35	-0.87	0.53	0.07	0.10	0.26	0.21	0.42	0.31	-0.49	1.00	0.02	
Absta	-0.21	-0.41	-0.08	-0.62	0.12	0.31	0.56	0.54	-0.28	-0.36	0.00	0.34	-0.31	0.02	1.00	

Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.

2000:																
2000	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	IC	PNV	EA	BNG	CC	UV	PA	CH	OTHER	Nonvo	Absta
IU	1.00	0.41	0.34	-0.80	-0.80	0.69	-0.37	-0.46	0.46	-0.44	0.17	-0.12	0.42	0.15	-0.19	-0.16
PSOE	0.41	1.00	0.25	-0.85	-0.50	0.55	-0.37	-0.55	0.00	0.04	-0.24	-0.23	-0.46	-0.10	0.11	-0.46
PP	0.34	0.25	1.00	-0.62	-0.90	0.51	-0.61	-0.58	-0.47	-0.27	-0.35	-0.05	-0.01	-0.50	0.25	-0.36
CiU	-0.80	-0.85	-0.62	1.00	0.86	-0.62	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	-0.25	-0.81
ERC	-0.80	-0.50	-0.90	0.86	1.00	-0.41	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.86	-0.63	0.17
IC	0.69	0.55	0.51	-0.62	-0.41	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.62	-0.16	0.47
PNV	-0.37	-0.37	-0.61	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.47	0.27	0.22
EA	-0.46	-0.55	-0.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.48	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.39	0.07	0.62
BNG	0.46	0.00	-0.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.45	-0.32	0.06
CC	-0.44	0.04	-0.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.53	0.24	-0.55
UV	0.17	-0.24	-0.35	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.29	0.76	0.03
PA	-0.12	-0.23	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	-0.15	0.04	0.31
CH	0.42	-0.46	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	-0.28	-0.69	0.23
OTHER	0.15	-0.10	-0.50	0.99	0.86	-0.62	-0.47	-0.39	0.45	-0.53	0.29	-0.15	-0.28	1.00	-0.35	-0.09
Nonvo	-0.19	0.11	0.25	-0.25	-0.63	-0.16	0.27	0.07	-0.32	0.24	0.76	0.04	-0.69	-0.35	1.00	-0.10
Absta	-0.16	-0.46	-0.36	-0.81	0.17	0.47	0.22	0.62	0.06	-0.55	0.03	0.31	0.23	-0.09	-0.10	1.00

Appendix II

Complete ECOL transition Matrixes 1977-2000

Four tables for each pair of elections:

- 1. Total percentages**
- 2. Row percentages**
- 3. Column percentages**
- 4. Net flow percentages**

INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1977-1979:

Voter Mobility. . . Pct of Total.

1979:																	
1977	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CD	EE	PNV	UN	CiU	ERFN	HB	PSA	CUPC	PAR	Othe	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	3.3	1.5	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	1.0	6.6
PSOE	1.8	11.5	1.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	1.2	0.4	3.7	20.6
PSPU	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.1	3.1
UCD	0.2	1.4	14.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.5	5.7	23.9
AP	0.1	0.3	1.5	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	1.7	5.6
IDCC	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.7
PDPC	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.5	2.0
ECFE	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6
EE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.1
CAIC	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Othe	0.2	0.9	1.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.9	0.2	2.3	6.7
Nonv	0.7	2.0	1.7	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.1	3.6	9.9
Abst	0.5	1.7	2.2	0.5	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	11.6	18.8	
	7.1	19.9	22.9	4.0	0.3	1.1	1.4	1.7	0.4	0.6	1.2	0.2	0.1	5.2	1.8	32.0	100

Voter Mobility. . . Row Pct.

1979:																	
1977	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CD	EE	PNV	UN	CiU	ERFN	HB	PSA	CUPC	PAR	Othe	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	49.3	22.6	2.5	1.3	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.1	1.0	0.2	0.0	5.7	1.4	14.8	100
PSOE	8.8	56.0	5.2	1.4	0.3	0.1	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.2	1.0	0.4	0.1	5.6	1.8	18.2	100
PSPU	6.0	14.5	11.3	10.3	0.2	0.2	2.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	9.4	0.3	0.3	9.5	1.6	33.6	100
UCD	1.0	5.7	58.5	3.4	0.1	0.1	1.2	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.1	0.1	2.8	2.1	23.8	100
AP	1.8	5.6	27.6	18.5	0.1	0.5	6.2	0.8	0.4	0.2	1.3	0.1	0.2	4.2	2.5	30.1	100
IDCC	1.1	2.4	18.4	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.4	33.8	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	1.0	32.5	100
PDPC	1.4	4.7	15.1	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.3	46.1	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	1.7	22.0	100
ECFE	3.4	6.5	13.5	2.2	0.1	0.0	0.2	5.0	13.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.4	1.2	49.4	100
EE	3.4	8.7	4.2	0.0	28.2	4.7	0.6	0.0	0.0	10.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	1.6	34.9	100
PNV	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.0	1.9	54.6	0.3	0.0	0.0	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.1	26.1	100
CAIC	0.7	4.6	41.1	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.7	2.0	5.3	25.9	100
Othe	3.3	12.9	19.1	4.9	0.8	2.6	2.0	0.6	0.1	2.1	1.1	0.9	0.2	13.6	2.2	33.6	100
Nonv	6.6	19.9	17.3	5.0	0.4	0.6	1.6	0.8	0.2	0.4	2.3	0.2	0.2	7.3	0.7	36.6	100
Abst	2.8	9.3	11.8	2.9	0.2	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.6	1.2	0.8	0.1	0.1	3.5	1.9	61.8	100
	7.1	19.9	22.9	4.0	0.3	1.1	1.4	1.7	0.4	0.6	1.2	0.2	0.1	5.2	1.8	32.0	100

Voter Mobility. . . Column Pct.

1979:																	
1977	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CD	EE	PNV	UN	CiU	ERFN	HB	PSA	CUPC	PAR	Othe	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	46.2	7.5	0.7	2.1	3.9	0.4	3.0	1.0	2.6	1.4	5.3	4.9	1.7	7.3	5.0	3.1	6.6
PSOE	25.5	57.9	4.6	7.1	17.6	1.1	9.9	3.8	5.4	5.9	16.5	36.9	10.4	22.3	20.8	11.7	20.6
PSPU	2.7	2.3	1.5	8.1	2.0	0.5	5.3	0.3	1.6	0.9	24.2	4.7	7.1	5.7	2.7	3.3	3.1
UCD	3.5	6.8	61.0	20.4	4.9	1.2	20.9	6.3	10.9	1.0	11.6	5.6	15.4	12.9	27.4	17.8	23.9
AP	1.4	1.6	6.7	25.9	1.7	2.5	25.7	2.5	5.0	1.4	5.8	3.7	7.7	4.6	7.7	5.3	5.6
IDCC	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.2	13.4	6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.7
PDPC	0.4	0.5	1.4	1.0	0.3	0.0	0.5	54.1	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.9	1.4	2.0
ECFE	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	1.6	17.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.9	0.6
EE	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	21.2	1.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2
PNV	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	53.8	0.2	0.0	0.0	21.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.7	0.9	1.1
CAIC	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.1	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1
Othe	3.2	4.3	5.6	8.2	17.4	16.1	9.9	2.1	2.1	21.6	5.9	27.8	8.7	17.8	8.4	7.0	6.7
Nonv	9.2	9.9	7.5	12.6	11.0	5.2	11.5	4.6	5.7	6.7	18.5	7.5	14.1	14.0	3.7	11.4	9.9
Abst	7.4	8.8	9.6	13.5	13.7	18.3	12.6	10.2	26.7	35.2	12.4	8.8	16.9	12.7	20.3	36.3	18.8
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Voter Mobility. . . Pct Net Flow.

1979:																	
1977	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CD	EE	PNV	UN	CiU	ERFN	HB	PSA	CUPC	PAR	Othe	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	0.0	-0.3	-0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	-0.6	0.5	-0.4
PSOE	0.3	0.0	-0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.3	-1.6	2.0	0.6
PSPU	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.1	3.1
UCD	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.6	-1.2	3.5	1.0
AP	0.1	0.3	1.5	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	1.7	5.6
IDCC	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.7
PDPC	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.5	2.0
ECFE	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6
EE	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.1
PNV	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.0	0.1	-0.0
CAIC	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Othe	-0.2	-0.3	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Nonv	0.6	1.6	1.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	3.3	8.1
Abst	-0.5	-2.0	-3.5	0.5	-0.0	-0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	-1.6	-3.3	0.0	-13.2
	0.4	-0.6	-1.0	4.0	0.1	0.0	1.4	1.7	0.4	0.6	1.2	0.2	0.1	-1.6	-8.1	13.2	0.0

INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1979-1982:

Voter Mobility. . . Pct of Total.

1982:														
1979	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CDS	AP	CiU	ERC	EE	PNV	HB	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	1.5	3.7	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.5	6.8
PSOE	0.5	14.0	0.2	0.2	1.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.5	1.7	19.0
UCD	0.1	4.0	3.2	0.6	7.6	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.9	3.5	21.6
CD	0.0	0.6	0.1	0.2	2.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	3.8
UN	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.3
CiU	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	2.2
ERFN	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4
EE	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.0
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6
PSA	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	1.1
CUPC	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2
PAR	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
OTHE	0.1	2.2	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.7	4.8
Nonv	0.2	3.0	0.2	0.1	1.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.7	0.1	1.3	7.1
Abst	0.5	7.8	1.2	0.8	5.0	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2	1.3	1.5	10.1	30.1
=====														
	3.0	36.3	5.1	2.2	20.0	2.7	0.5	0.4	1.4	0.7	4.9	3.6	19.2	100

Voter Mobility. . . Row Pct.

1982:														
1979	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CDS	AP	CiU	ERC	EE	PNV	HB	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	22.2	55.0	0.4	1.0	6.5	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	4.4	2.0	7.6	100
PSOE	2.6	73.8	0.9	0.9	6.7	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	3.0	2.4	8.9	100
UCD	0.7	18.4	14.9	3.0	35.2	2.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	4.2	4.3	16.4	100
CD	0.7	15.7	2.4	4.9	56.1	1.7	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.1	3.7	3.4	10.8	100
UN	1.5	20.8	3.7	3.8	44.1	0.6	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	6.6	4.1	14.0	100
CiU	0.5	4.4	1.8	0.6	11.5	57.1	7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	3.3	11.3	100
ERFN	1.2	7.9	1.7	2.1	18.2	23.6	23.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	4.6	14.4	100
EE	0.9	17.0	0.2	1.2	5.2	0.3	0.0	39.4	8.3	4.3	2.7	2.9	17.6	100
PNV	0.1	1.0	0.1	0.4	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.9	72.0	10.1	0.8	1.2	11.3	100
HB	0.2	3.9	0.1	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.0	2.6	17.6	59.5	0.9	1.9	12.1	100
PSA	0.8	37.4	0.4	1.8	26.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.2	2.4	12.3	100
CUPC	0.0	32.0	0.2	1.5	15.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	28.6	0.9	20.9	100
PAR	1.0	23.9	1.4	3.8	49.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	4.5	11.7	100
OTHE	2.5	45.3	1.4	2.3	17.6	1.1	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.3	11.1	2.9	14.3	100
Nonv	2.3	41.7	2.3	1.8	19.9	1.0	0.2	0.4	1.4	0.6	9.2	1.0	18.3	100
Abst	1.7	25.8	4.1	2.5	16.6	3.0	0.5	0.4	1.3	0.6	4.5	5.1	33.7	100
=====														
	3.0	36.3	5.1	2.2	20.0	2.7	0.5	0.4	1.4	0.7	4.9	3.6	19.2	100

Voter Mobility. . . Column Pct.

1982:														
1979	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CDS	AP	CiU	ERC	EE	PNV	HB	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	49.7	10.3	0.5	3.1	2.2	0.9	1.3	2.2	0.4	1.1	6.2	3.9	2.7	6.8
PSOE	16.6	38.7	3.2	8.0	6.4	2.1	3.4	7.8	0.4	1.5	11.7	12.9	8.9	19.0
UCD	4.9	11.0	63.7	29.7	38.1	19.1	14.6	6.8	1.6	0.7	18.5	25.6	18.5	21.6
CD	0.9	1.6	1.8	8.6	10.7	2.3	3.0	0.4	0.2	0.5	2.9	3.6	2.1	3.8
UN	0.6	0.8	0.9	2.3	2.9	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.1	1.8	1.5	1.0	1.3
CiU	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.9	33.6	23.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.5	1.0	1.6
ERFN	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	3.5	19.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.4
EE	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	31.2	1.7	1.7	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	5.2	51.6	13.7	0.2	0.3	0.6	1.0
HB	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	7.3	47.3	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.6
PSA	0.3	1.2	0.1	0.9	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.8	0.7	1.1
CUPC	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
PAR	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
OTHE	3.9	6.0	1.3	5.1	4.2	2.0	2.0	4.6	1.8	1.9	10.9	3.9	3.6	4.8
Nonv	5.3	8.2	3.2	5.8	7.1	2.7	2.5	6.7	6.8	6.0	13.5	1.9	6.8	7.1
Abst	17.1	21.4	24.5	34.9	25.0	33.5	29.8	30.2	27.7	25.3	27.6	42.9	52.9	30.1
=====														
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Voter Mobility. . . Pct Net Flow.

1982:														
1979	PCE	PSOE	UCD	CDS	AP	CiU	ERC	EE	PNV	HB	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	0.0	3.2	-0.1	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	-0.0	-0.0	3.8
PSOE	-3.2	0.0	-3.8	0.2	1.3	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-1.6	-2.5	-6.1	-17.3
UCD	0.1	3.8	0.0	0.6	7.6	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	2.3	16.6
CD	0.0	0.6	0.1	0.2	2.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	3.8
UN	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.3
CiU	-0.0	0.0	-0.5	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	-0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.7	-1.1
ERFN	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4
EE	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1
PNV	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.3	-0.4
HB	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.2
PSA	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	1.1
CUPC	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2
PAR	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
OTHE	-0.2	1.6	-0.8	0.1	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.5	-0.7	-0.1
Nonv	0.0	2.5	-0.8	0.1	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.0	-0.2	3.5
Abst	0.0	6.1	-2.3	0.8	5.0	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.7	0.2	0.0	10.9
=====														
	-3.8	17.3	-16.6	2.2	20.0	1.1	0.5	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.1	-3.5	-10.9	0.0

INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1982-1986:

Voter Mobility. . . Pct of Total.

1986:															
1982	IU	PSOE	CP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	HB	AIC	UV	PAR	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	1.0	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.7	2.9
PSOE	1.1	20.1	1.4	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.1	6.5	34.3
AP	0.2	1.4	10.6	1.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.9	0.7	3.4	18.9
UCD	0.0	0.8	1.5	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	1.4	4.8
CDS	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.6	2.1
CiU	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	2.6
ERC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5
EE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	1.3
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.7
OTHE	0.1	1.0	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.2	1.5	4.6
Nonv	0.3	2.7	1.1	0.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.1	3.0	9.0
Abst	0.3	2.5	1.8	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	10.4	18.1
=====															
	3.1	29.5	17.5	6.2	3.3	0.4	1.0	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.2	5.6	3.7	28.3	100

Voter Mobility. . . Row Pct.

1986:															
1982	IU	PSOE	CP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	HB	AIC	UV	PAR	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	35.5	23.6	3.6	5.3	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	4.8	3.1	23.4	100
PSOE	3.3	58.5	4.2	6.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	4.7	3.2	19.0	100
AP	1.0	7.5	56.0	5.9	1.6	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.5	5.0	4.0	17.8	100
UCD	0.5	17.0	30.7	8.3	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.9	5.6	5.4	29.8	100
CDS	1.8	10.6	17.0	25.9	1.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	6.8	4.6	31.1	100
CiU	0.3	0.5	2.8	0.2	78.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	4.2	10.1	100
ERC	0.9	2.8	7.8	0.6	47.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.2	5.9	24.7	100
EE	0.4	9.2	2.5	4.0	0.0	52.4	1.6	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	1.9	23.5	100
PNV	0.0	0.3	0.9	0.3	0.0	1.5	62.3	10.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	4.0	19.4	100
HB	0.1	0.9	0.3	0.4	0.0	1.2	8.4	67.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	2.6	18.0	100
OTHE	2.4	21.3	12.2	6.9	0.8	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.6	0.3	18.2	4.5	32.0	100
Nonv	3.0	30.2	11.8	8.2	2.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1	7.5	1.3	33.4	100
Abst	1.6	14.0	9.7	4.3	1.9	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	4.6	4.5	57.7	100
=====															
	3.1	29.5	17.5	6.2	3.3	0.4	1.0	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.2	5.6	3.7	28.3	100

Voter Mobility. . . Column Pct.

1986:															
1982	IU	PSOE	CP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	HB	AIC	UV	PAR	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	32.9	2.3	0.6	2.4	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.0	2.5	0.8	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.9
PSOE	36.7	68.1	8.2	34.6	1.2	11.8	0.2	1.2	38.7	21.6	15.1	29.1	30.3	23.0	34.3
AP	6.3	4.8	60.7	18.0	9.2	5.3	0.7	0.3	14.9	34.6	39.3	16.7	20.5	11.9	18.9
UCD	0.8	2.8	8.4	6.4	2.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	2.3	1.3	17.7	4.8	7.2	5.1	4.8
CDS	1.2	0.7	2.0	8.6	0.6	1.1	0.1	0.2	3.9	2.7	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.1
CiU	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.1	61.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	3.0	0.9	2.6
ERC	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	6.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.5
EE	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	52.1	0.6	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	5.4	80.3	18.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.4	0.9	1.3
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	5.7	61.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.7
OTHE	3.5	3.3	3.2	5.1	1.2	2.3	0.3	0.5	12.3	12.4	4.8	14.9	5.6	5.2	4.6
Nonv	8.8	9.2	6.1	11.9	7.5	9.2	4.0	5.1	8.0	8.8	5.5	12.0	3.1	10.6	9.0
Abst	9.4	8.6	10.0	12.6	10.2	9.8	8.1	11.8	19.8	16.2	14.7	14.7	22.4	36.8	18.1
=====															
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Voter Mobility. . . Pct Net Flow.

1986:															
1982	IU	PSOE	CP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	HB	AIC	UV	PAR	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
PCE	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.7	2.9
PSOE	1.1	0.0	1.4	1.9	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.7	-1.6	4.0	4.8
AP	0.2	1.4	0.0	1.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.9	0.7	3.4	18.9
UCD	0.0	0.8	1.5	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	1.4	4.8
CDS	0.0	-1.9	0.4	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.6	-0.1	-4.1
CiU	0.0	-0.0	0.1	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.7
ERC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5
EE	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3
HB	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.1
OTHE	0.1	-0.7	0.6	0.2	-0.1	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.5	0.6	-1.0
Nonv	0.3	1.6	1.1	0.6	0.1	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	2.2	5.3
Abst	0.3	-4.0	1.8	0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.2	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.6	-2.2	0.0	-10.3
=====															
	3.1	-4.8	17.5	4.1	0.7	0.0	-0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.0	-5.3	10.3	0.0

INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1986-1989:

Voter Mobility. . . Pct of Total.

1989:																	
1986	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	EA	HB	AIC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	2.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.5	3.0
PSOE	1.3	20.4	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.7	0.7	3.9	28.8
CP	0.2	0.8	12.6	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.5	1.9	16.9
CDS	0.5	0.6	0.6	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2	1.6	6.0
CiU	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.2	3.3
EE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.7
AIC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2
UV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
PAR	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
OTHE	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	1.4	0.2	1.8	5.5	
Nonv	0.6	1.3	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.1	2.4	6.5	
Abst	1.3	2.8	2.1	1.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	1.2	1.4	16.2	27.3
=====																	
	6.1	26.6	17.3	5.3	3.4	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.2	5.0	3.3	29.0	100

Voter Mobility. . . Row Pct.

1989:																	
1986	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	EA	HB	AIC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	65.4	7.3	2.4	2.4	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	2.8	2.2	16.8	100
PSOE	4.3	70.7	2.7	2.8	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	2.3	2.6	13.6	100
CP	1.2	4.4	74.1	2.3	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.1	2.2	3.0	11.2	100
CDS	7.9	9.9	9.6	33.3	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.2	8.2	2.6	26.9	100
CiU	0.2	0.2	1.1	0.1	81.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	2.8	5.7	100
EE	1.5	3.0	2.8	1.9	0.0	49.5	1.4	3.2	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	1.2	30.8	100
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	63.9	20.7	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	3.1	4.8	100
HB	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.9	4.8	9.5	71.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.7	10.0	100
AIC	3.2	2.6	3.2	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	1.9	44.5	100
UV	4.5	4.7	11.5	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	45.5	0.0	0.0	6.8	1.9	23.5	100
PAR	1.4	11.5	11.1	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	44.1	1.8	7.4	20.6	100	
OTHE	5.6	8.9	9.0	6.8	1.6	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.9	4.4	0.1	25.2	3.3	33.3	100
Nonv	8.9	20.1	9.9	6.7	3.0	0.5	1.1	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.7	1.1	0.2	7.1	1.4	37.8	100
Abst	4.7	10.2	7.8	4.5	1.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.2	4.5	5.2	59.4	100
=====																	
	6.1	26.6	17.3	5.3	3.4	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.2	5.0	3.3	29.0	100

Voter Mobility. . . Column Pct.

1989:																	
1986	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	EA	HB	AIC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	32.4	0.8	0.4	1.4	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.0	0.7	0.7	1.7	2.0	1.8	3.0
PSOE	20.5	76.6	4.5	14.9	0.5	7.3	0.1	0.7	0.3	8.1	19.1	13.3	8.7	13.5	22.3	13.5	28.8
CP	3.3	2.8	72.3	7.2	2.4	3.7	0.6	0.6	0.1	4.9	18.3	7.6	9.6	7.5	15.2	6.5	16.9
CDS	7.9	2.2	3.3	37.9	0.1	4.1	0.2	0.6	0.2	2.9	3.1	5.9	6.1	9.9	4.7	5.6	6.0
CiU	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	79.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.3	2.8	0.7	3.3
EE	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	49.2	0.6	2.4	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.3
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	76.2	45.2	9.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.2	1.0
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	4.3	15.8	74.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.7
AIC	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	41.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2
UV	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2
PAR	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	43.6	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.2
OTHE	5.0	1.8	2.9	7.0	2.6	2.6	0.4	1.2	0.6	9.3	10.3	34.7	3.0	27.7	5.4	6.3	5.5
Nonv	9.4	4.9	3.7	8.2	5.7	10.3	8.6	11.0	3.8	10.6	9.5	10.4	4.9	9.1	2.8	8.4	6.5
Abst	21.0	10.5	12.3	23.0	9.0	19.9	9.0	22.4	10.5	22.0	18.7	27.4	23.5	24.5	42.4	55.8	27.3
=====																	
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Voter Mobility. . . Pct Net Flow.

1989:																	
1986	IU	PSOE	PP	CDS	CiU	EE	PNV	EA	HB	AIC	UV	PA	PAR	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	0.0	-1.0	0.1	-0.4	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.2	-0.5	-0.8	-3.1
PSOE	1.0	0.0	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	-0.0	0.2	-0.6	1.1	2.2
CP	0.2	0.8	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.5	1.9	16.9
CDS	0.4	-0.2	0.6	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.3	0.4	0.7
CiU	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
EE	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0
PNV	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.2
HB	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0
AIC	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.0
UV	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.3
PAR	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0
OTHE	0.2	-0.2	0.5	-0.1	-0.2	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.3	0.6	0.5
Nonv	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.0	0.3	0.0	1.0	3.1	
Abst	0.8	-1.1	2.1	-0.4	0.1	-0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	-0.6	-1.0	0.0	-1.8
=====																	
	3.1	-2.2	17.3	-0.7	0.1	0.0	-0.2	0.4	-0.0	-0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	-0.5	-3.1	1.8	0.0

INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1993-1996:

Voter Mobility. . . Pct of Total.

1996:																
1993	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	5.2	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.6	6.8
PSOE	0.8	22.6	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.7	1.7	27.2
PP	0.1	0.4	22.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	1.1	24.2
CDS	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.5	1.2
CiU	0.0	0.0	0.1	3.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	3.6
ERC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.9
EA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6
BNG	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
CC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6
UV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
PA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
PAR	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4
OTHE	0.4	1.1	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.0	0.2	1.5	6.1	
Nonv	0.5	1.5	1.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	1.7	5.6	
Abst	0.8	1.8	2.6	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.7	0.9	13.4	20.9
	8.0	28.2	29.2	3.5	0.5	1.0	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.4	2.8	2.7	21.3	100

Voter Mobility. . . Row Pct.

1996:																
1993	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	76.7	5.9	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	2.1	1.7	9.5	100
PSOE	3.0	83.2	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.6	2.6	6.4	100
PP	0.5	1.7	90.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.8	1.4	4.5	100
CDS	7.2	8.8	29.6	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.3	7.8	5.6	39.7	100
CiU	0.0	0.9	1.6	86.3	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.7	5.3	100	
ERC	0.1	1.7	0.8	25.4	61.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	3.0	7.3	100	
PNV	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	89.4	0.7	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	2.1	5.9	100	
EA	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	6.8	74.4	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.8	12.3	100	
HB	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	5.1	2.0	78.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.5	10.5	100	
BNG	0.7	1.1	4.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	80.9	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.4	10.0	100	
CC	0.3	3.2	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	79.9	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.8	10.5	100
UV	2.5	3.1	11.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	61.6	0.0	1.9	3.9	15.9	100
PA	1.1	1.8	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	32.8	30.9	1.1	18.3	100
PAR	2.9	9.0	49.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	3.9	24.2	100	
OTHE	6.5	18.4	25.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.1	0.2	1.0	16.7	3.9	24.6	100
Nonv	8.4	27.7	20.9	1.6	0.1	1.3	0.3	0.2	0.7	1.2	0.2	0.9	4.5	1.8	30.3	100
Abst	4.0	8.8	12.6	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.6	3.4	4.4	64.3	100
	8.0	28.2	29.2	3.5	0.5	1.0	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.4	2.8	2.7	21.3	100

Voter Mobility. . . Column Pct.

1996:																
1993	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	65.2	1.4	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	3.6	0.2	0.9	1.1	5.2	4.3	3.0	6.8
PSOE	10.4	80.3	3.4	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	10.0	3.5	2.7	9.8	6.2	26.2	8.1	27.2
PP	1.6	1.5	75.1	1.2	1.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.5	2.3	2.8	4.4	7.3	13.0	5.2	24.2
CDS	1.1	0.4	1.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.3	0.5	0.9	3.4	2.5	2.3	1.2
CiU	0.0	0.1	0.2	88.3	19.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	3.5	0.9	3.6
ERC	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.2	70.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.2	0.6
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	80.3	1.8	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.7	0.2	0.9
EA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	81.8	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.4
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	3.5	87.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.6
BNG	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
CC	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	77.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.6
UV	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	77.1	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.3
PA	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	24.5	3.4	0.1	0.3	0.3
PAR	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.6	0.4	0.4
OTHE	4.9	4.0	5.2	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.1	30.3	0.8	3.9	15.1	36.6	8.9	7.0	6.1
Nonv	5.9	5.5	4.0	2.6	1.4	7.3	5.3	2.5	5.5	9.6	3.5	11.8	9.2	3.6	8.0	5.6
Abst	10.5	6.5	9.0	3.4	6.2	6.0	7.0	5.8	10.4	6.2	8.5	32.3	25.6	34.0	63.1	20.9
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Voter Mobility. . . Pct Net Flow.

1996:																
1993	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	PNV	EA	HB	BNG	CC	UV	PA	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	0.0	-0.4	0.1	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.4	-0.2	-1.2
PSOE	0.4	0.0	0.6	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.9	-0.8	-0.1	-1.0
PP	-0.1	-0.6	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-1.3	-0.8	-1.5	-5.0
CDS	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.5	1.2
CiU	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
ERC	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.0	-0.1
EA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
BNG	-0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.0	-0.0	-0.4
CC	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.0
UV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
PA	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1
PAR	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4
OTHE	0.2	0.9	1.3	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.8	3.3
Nonv	0.4	0.8	0.8	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	2.9
Abst	0.2	0.1	1.5	-0.1	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	-0.8	-0.8	0.0	-0.4
	1.2	1.0	5.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.1	0.4	0.0	-0.1	0.1	-3.3	-2.9	0.4	0.0

INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1996-2000:

Voter Mobility. . . Pct of Total.

2000:																	
1996	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	IC	PNV	EA	BNG	CC	UV	PA	CH	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	2.6	1.3	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	2.3	7.7
PSOE	0.4	18.5	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.4	1.2	4.4	27.2
PP	0.1	0.6	23.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.9	2.6	28.1
CiU	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.4	3.4
ERC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.9
EA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.5
BNG	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6
CC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.7
UV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
PA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4
OTHE	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.8	2.3	2.3
Nonv	0.2	1.2	1.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.1	3.0	6.6
Abst	0.4	1.0	2.4	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.8	1.1	14.1	20.5	
=====																	
	3.7	22.8	29.8	2.8	0.6	0.3	1.0	0.3	0.9	0.7	0.2	0.6	0.2	3.4	3.9	28.8	100

Voter Mobility. . . Row Pct.

2000:																	
1996	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	IC	PNV	EA	BNG	CC	UV	PA	CH	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	33.8	16.5	7.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.5	6.1	3.4	30.4	100
PSOE	1.4	67.8	7.3	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.0	1.5	4.3	16.0	100
PP	0.3	2.3	81.9	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	2.4	3.3	9.1	100
CiU	0.0	0.2	1.1	74.5	6.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	5.2	11.1	100
ERC	0.1	0.4	1.0	20.3	59.7	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	3.5	13.4	100
PNV	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	69.7	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.1	24.5	100
EA	0.2	0.3	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.3	47.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	1.2	31.8	100
HB	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.5	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.7	72.4	100
BNG	0.6	3.3	4.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	70.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5	1.5	16.6	100
CC	0.1	1.2	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	74.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	1.9	17.1	100
UV	1.2	2.7	12.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	42.2	0.0	0.0	6.7	6.2	28.7	100
PA	0.4	2.1	10.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	46.4	0.0	0.0	3.9	3.5	33.0	100
OTHE	3.5	4.9	17.2	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.1	0.2	0.4	5.0	26.6	4.5	35.6	100
Nonv	2.3	18.8	18.8	1.5	0.2	0.3	1.8	0.4	1.3	1.0	0.1	1.0	0.1	5.7	1.0	45.8	100
Abst	1.7	4.9	11.6	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.2	3.8	5.5	69.1	100
=====																	
	3.7	22.8	29.8	2.8	0.6	0.3	1.0	0.3	0.9	0.7	0.2	0.6	0.2	3.4	3.9	28.8	100

Voter Mobility. . . Column Pct.

2000:																	
1996	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	IC	PNV	EA	BNG	CC	UV	PA	CH	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	71.0	5.5	1.8	0.0	0.3	26.0	0.1	0.3	5.1	0.3	3.8	4.0	18.9	13.6	6.7	8.1	7.7
PSOE	10.1	81.0	6.7	0.7	1.8	26.9	0.3	0.6	11.4	11.1	8.3	21.1	1.9	12.0	29.9	15.1	27.2
PP	2.6	2.8	77.4	0.2	0.5	6.3	0.4	0.4	8.9	2.8	3.5	7.6	6.7	19.2	23.6	8.9	28.1
CiU	0.0	0.0	0.1	90.0	35.9	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	4.5	1.3	3.4
ERC	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	52.3	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.5
PNV	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	62.2	9.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.9
EA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.7	54.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.3
HB	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	12.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	1.3	0.5
BNG	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.6
CC	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	70.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.7
UV	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	65.2	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3
PA	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	30.8	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4
OTHE	2.2	0.5	1.3	0.1	0.4	2.7	0.6	1.2	2.4	0.3	2.7	1.6	52.2	17.7	2.6	2.8	2.3
Nonv	4.1	5.4	4.2	3.5	2.9	5.8	11.5	8.2	9.5	9.4	5.2	10.8	2.7	10.9	1.6	10.5	6.6
Abst	9.6	4.4	8.0	1.9	5.8	28.7	10.4	13.1	12.3	5.8	11.2	24.2	17.5	22.4	28.9	49.1	20.5
=====																	
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Voter Mobility. . . Pct Net Flow.

2000:																	
1996	IU	PSOE	PP	CiU	ERC	IC	PNV	EA	BNG	CC	UV	PA	CH	OTHE	Nonv	Abst	
IU	0.0	0.9	0.4	-0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	2.0	4.0
PSOE	-0.9	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	-0.1	3.3	4.4
PP	-0.4	-1.4	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	-0.3	0.2	-1.6
CiU	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.6
ERC	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1
PNV	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.1	0.1	-0.1
EA	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.0
HB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.5
BNG	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.0	-0.2
CC	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.1	-0.0
UV	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
PA	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.0	-0.2
OTHE	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.3	0.0	-1.2
Nonv	-0.1	0.1	0.3	-0.1	-0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	-0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.9	2.7
Abst	-2.0	-3.3	-0.2	-0.3	-0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-1.9	0.0	-8.4
=====																	
	-4.0	-4.4	1.6	-0.6	0.1	0.3	0.1	-0.0	0.2	0.0	-0.1	0.2	0.2	1.2	-2.7	8.4	0.0

Appendix III

Loyalty Rates and Voter Transitions at District Level

Inferred ECOL percentages

**(Bold types indicate cases more than one standard deviation above the means
and italics indicate cases more than one standard deviation below the means)**

Table A III.1 New voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	33.8	10.3	35.5	47.3	25.7	27.8	19.1
Cádiz	27.9	22.5	35.8	40.4	29.4	38.6	36.3
Córdoba	26.0	9.3	24.7	32.2	22.8	32.8	17.0
Granada	33.8	9.3	26.1	26.1	22.7	18.8	23.5
Huelva	39.2	18.6	38.7	40.4	32.1	30.5	20.5
Jaén	29.7	10.2	22.5	27.8	22.8	15.8	14.2
Málaga	40.5	17.2	34.3	41.5	32.3	37.2	14.6
Sevilla	31.0	14.0	26.6	33.8	19.8	24.9	55.2
ARAGON							
Huesca	26.8	15.8	28.7	25.9	20.0	31.6	15.7
Teruel	31.0	15.0	31.7	30.3	24.1	16.3	18.1
Zaragoza	29.3	9.1	31.7	30.2	14.6	11.8	17.8
ASTURIAS	46.9	7.1	29.6	30.8	16.6	25.6	16.7
BALEARES	48.8	27.9	50.5	49.5	24.3	45.0	7.5
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	41.6	18.5	38.6	44.8	27.2	36.8	2.9
Tenerife	52.1	51.2	41.6	54.9	26.3	37.6	19.2
CANTABRIA	23.5	11.5	22.7	25.2	17.0	18.2	23.1
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	19.0	5.3	26.8	23.7	13.6	26.4	5.8
Ciudad Real	41.2	9.0	28.7	31.4	22.2	27.3	23.3
Cuenca	20.5	15.4	23.3	25.9	13.8	19.1	29.2
Guadalajara	25.0	9.2	21.2	26.9	15.4	21.3	23.5
Toledo	31.6	12.4	21.8	30.5	19.1	24.5	23.8
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	28.5	10.0	21.4	19.7	14.5	12.3	24.7
Burgos	32.8	24.7	30.8	27.2	15.1	18.8	13.3
León	44.9	16.3	36.8	28.6	15.9	19.8	12.1
Palencia	31.0	9.4	25.3	26.3	20.3	20.3	28.5
Salamanca	39.8	12.9	20.2	25.5	16.6	20.5	18.5
Segovia	29.6	14.6	20.5	29.2	15.3	20.1	24.6
Soria	31.4	11.4	26.9	34.9	23.8	25.9	21.5
Valladolid	48.1	18.8	33.0	31.9	22.5	16.9	29.5
Zamora	36.1	11.1	26.2	25.0	19.1	24.6	24.3
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	49.7	24.6	37.9	54.9	33.3	42.4	6.6
Girona	19.9	12.5	36.4	49.0	30.9	26.8	6.6
Lleida	26.3	10.1	29.0	37.8	24.9	30.4	10.5
Tarragona	43.0	16.3	31.7	47.0	29.6	38.7	10.7
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	32.3	20.2	32.8	35.8	18.2	29.8	18.0
Castellón	15.8	10.7	17.8	28.0	17.2	2.4	20.5
Valencia	20.6	13.0	28.3	22.2	13.7	17.6	42.9
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	28.5	12.9	22.2	31.5	16.7	20.5	16.3
Cáceres	30.9	15.3	23.3	29.5	17.0	21.5	22.7
GALICIA							
A Coruña	46.8	26.2	40.9	37.9	9.2	33.7	11.1
Lugo	51.4	19.0	28.4	31.2	13.7	33.8	10.7
Ourense	53.4	38.2	52.1	44.7	34.8	38.5	11.3
Pontevedra	25.2	9.4	39.2	28.1	7.5	34.3	10.6
MADRID	46.5	29.1	36.7	45.2	25.6	34.2	17.1
MURCIA	23.0	9.0	20.2	26.2	11.9	20.3	16.4
NAVARRA	29.3	14.6	39.7	35.9	27.8	38.4	18.3
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	36.1	30.6	39.4	38.6	25.2	32.4	5.4
Guipúzcoa	45.6	20.7	52.6	35.8	44.4	34.4	3.3
Vizcaya	48.2	23.6	59.4	30.5	41.3	41.4	.7
LA RIOJA	29.4	22.0	25.7	43.6	25.0	28.0	23.6

Table A III.2 New voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	7.2	3.3	2.5	10.5	5.3	11.1	1.5
Cádiz	10.7	3.4	4.7	7.9	7.5	11.7	2.8
Córdoba	15.8	4.9	8.6	31.1	9.0	16.7	4.5
Granada	7.5	3.2	5.9	26.6	9.6	21.2	3.6
Huelva	4.0	1.4	2.7	7.3	7.0	7.7	2.1
Jaén	7.9	5.1	10.5	16.8	7.3	17.6	3.4
Málaga	6.6	4.0	4.2	7.0	11.9	2.5	1.2
Sevilla	9.0	5.5	4.4	12.5	8.3	12.6	2.8
ARAGON							
Huesca	6.4	1.4	2.3	8.4	9.1	8.1	2.1
Teruel	2.2	1.1	1.1	5.3	6.1	12.4	3.0
Zaragoza	6.5	1.3	3.7	24.3	13.0	.6	.8
ASTURIAS							
BALEARES	2.7	1.3	1.7	3.4	2.7	3.8	1.6
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	1.4		1.2	.8	.5	.6	.3
Tenerife	2.7		1.9	1.8	2.2	2.0	.4
CANTABRIA							
CAST.-MANCHA	6.4	1.8	2.5	13.7	8.7	11.0	2.9
Albacete	9.8	1.9	3.7	20.3	11.2	9.9	3.2
Ciudad Real	6.0	1.8	2.2	5.5	3.5	10.3	1.2
Cuenca	7.8	2.4	1.2	8.7	9.8	9.4	2.5
Guadalajara	7.0	3.0	5.9	14.9	14.6	16.7	7.3
Toledo	7.0	1.9	2.4	9.8	6.0	8.5	2.8
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	2.6	1.7	2.3	14.6	11.2	25.0	4.9
Burgos	1.8	1.5	1.7	17.2	18.0	19.3	3.6
León	3.4	1.8	2.0	13.7	13.3	18.5	3.1
Palencia	3.1	1.7	3.2	8.1	9.3	13.1	3.6
Salamanca	2.8	1.1	1.6	12.6	14.9	15.0	3.7
Segovia	1.9	1.2	2.8	11.3	9.2	11.8	5.7
Soria	2.6	1.0	3.0	11.7	10.1	13.3	5.9
Valladolid	3.1	2.0	3.1	3.3	12.1	6.3	1.8
Zamora	2.3	.9	1.5	9.2	13.0	15.1	5.0
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	8.4	3.9	2.2	2.2	1.4	3.0	.7
Girona	11.8	2.9	1.0	3.5	2.3	4.6	1.2
Lleida	8.4	2.5	2.3	4.1	4.9	3.6	.6
Tarragona	8.1	2.3	2.1	2.9	2.8	3.5	1.0
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	7.8	2.3	2.5	6.3	3.1	4.3	1.2
Castellón	8.1	2.8	1.2	9.1	6.9	7.3	2.8
Valencia	13.5	2.0	3.8	8.1	5.0	4.8	1.4
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	7.0	2.5	3.5	12.0	11.1	10.7	2.7
Cáceres	4.7	1.1	1.8	10.6	14.2	11.4	4.0
GALICIA							
A Coruña	2.5	.8	1.4	7.0	9.8	3.8	.9
Lugo	1.1	.2	.8	3.0	8.4	1.4	.9
Ourense	1.2	.3	.7	1.5	6.5	.7	1.4
Pontevedra	4.3	1.5	.8	5.1	9.6	3.1	1.1
MADRID							
MURCIA	6.4	.9	3.8	9.7	5.0	13.2	4.1
NAVARRA	7.7	3.1	2.6	7.6	5.6	8.7	1.7
NAVARRA	1.9	.9	1.2	14.4	5.4	15.1	5.4
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	2.3	.6	.5	2.9	14.1	9.6	1.1
Guipúzcoa	3.1	1.0	.6	1.3	1.3	3.8	.7
Vizcaya	2.2	.5	1.5	1.9	1.3	4.0	.5
LA RIOJA	3.2	1.2	1.4	11.3	8.0	6.5	3.5

Table A III.3 New voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	33.4	56.5	32.6	13.4	25.0	23.9	19.1
Cádiz	<i>11.1</i>	45.5	47.2	36.6	41.3	20.8	36.3
Córdoba	16.3	46.9	37.2	14.8	47.9	12.9	17.0
Granada	25.0	54.1	35.9	14.7	33.2	15.3	23.5
Huelva	16.7	41.9	31.3	20.3	21.5	28.8	20.5
Jaén	24.3	39.5	31.9	18.3	29.4	18.1	14.2
Málaga	28.2	46.0	39.8	21.0	8.8	26.3	14.6
Sevilla	26.2	46.6	48.2	34.7	54.9	48.9	55.2
ARAGON							
Huesca	32.8	43.9	32.9	19.3	7.5	24.7	15.7
Teruel	16.6	45.0	24.7	19.5	27.3	29.1	18.1
Zaragoza	20.6	49.1	26.0	<i>11.1</i>	4.9	49.6	17.8
ASTURIAS							
ASTURIAS	24.4	56.5	18.4	<i>11.3</i>	9.1	14.3	16.7
BALEARES							
BALEARES	20.3	29.4	22.5	15.4	21.0	23.6	7.5
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	<i>10.8</i>	26.7	<i>11.2</i>	14.0	6.1	14.5	2.9
Tenerife	<i>11.6</i>	<i>12.9</i>	24.5	15.5	5.4	24.9	19.2
CANTABRIA							
CANTABRIA	22.7	30.0	41.1	24.9	33.2	32.2	23.1
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	29.0	40.9	32.2	19.9	6.4	8.1	5.8
Ciudad Real	24.9	40.3	29.3	27.1	17.9	14.0	23.3
Cuenca	32.8	44.2	32.2	24.3	29.4	26.9	29.2
Guadalajara	21.9	47.0	29.1	21.1	27.0	27.7	23.5
Toledo	21.4	46.5	35.9	27.8	29.3	24.4	23.8
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	11.9	37.3	13.2	18.9	17.7	21.8	24.7
Burgos	6.7	35.2	24.4	14.2	24.0	12.2	13.3
León	12.7	43.5	25.3	18.8	15.3	14.4	12.1
Palencia	21.2	55.8	39.1	26.0	28.2	29.0	28.5
Salamanca	14.4	42.5	28.6	15.5	13.3	15.4	18.5
Segovia	<i>10.4</i>	34.2	29.0	22.5	22.9	27.7	24.6
Soria	17.2	31.8	32.8	23.6	24.9	27.3	21.5
Valladolid	<i>11.4</i>	46.1	31.1	36.0	24.2	40.0	29.5
Zamora	16.4	43.7	22.2	26.5	29.9	22.6	24.3
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	15.5	52.7	27.1	9.2	16.5	43.7	6.6
Girona	28.4	41.0	12.5	15.2	17.9	34.9	6.6
Lleida	27.9	46.6	25.7	21.1	21.1	29.3	10.5
Tarragona	22.2	36.0	28.0	12.2	14.2	25.9	10.7
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	32.3	46.3	36.3	31.7	36.7	33.1	18.0
Castellón	32.7	48.4	20.9	18.8	20.7	17.4	20.5
Valencia	26.7	56.8	31.5	31.3	36.7	58.3	42.9
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	27.0	52.9	35.6	15.5	25.1	21.3	16.3
Cáceres	22.2	38.8	31.8	20.8	11.4	21.6	22.7
GALICIA							
A Coruña	7.3	31.1	16.3	15.9	25.0	2.1	11.1
Lugo	12.9	25.4	19.5	13.4	18.6	1.5	10.7
Ourense	<i>11.4</i>	25.0	8.4	12.2	16.0	3.2	11.3
Pontevedra	<i>11.7</i>	39.2	15.5	26.9	17.5	1.2	10.6
MADRID							
MADRID	18.1	32.8	39.1	23.2	24.0	31.2	17.1
MURCIA							
MURCIA	36.7	43.5	43.6	32.0	11.1	19.8	16.4
NAVARRA							
NAVARRA	17.5	49.1	22.8	21.4	29.4	20.1	18.3
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	20.8	23.6	20.0	27.1	19.6	10.2	5.4
Guipúzcoa	6.5	33.7	10.7	7.9	9.3	12.2	3.3
Vizcaya	<i>10.0</i>	18.5	9.6	2.9	3.5	4.4	.7
LA RIOJA							
LA RIOJA	17.7	33.7	33.9	16.9	21.0	24.3	23.6

Table A III.4 New voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	5.2	20.1	18.4	11.1	36.6	30.1	29.8
Cádiz	2.8	18.5	3.1	1.0	10.7	15.8	7.6
Córdoba	7.3	31.1	18.4	6.8	13.2	20.9	23.4
Granada	2.7	27.1	14.5	10.6	26.4	26.2	14.2
Huelva	3.6	28.3	16.2	18.0	32.8	24.6	20.9
Jaén	4.1	36.5	20.2	15.0	29.1	35.4	34.8
Málaga	2.4	24.4	11.2	9.8	37.4	13.3	14.1
Sevilla	2.5	27.9	9.1	2.4	12.7	6.4	5.0
ARAGON							
Huesca	3.6	21.9	16.1	21.9	23.7	26.5	34.4
Teruel	6.8	24.4	21.6	21.4	24.4	35.4	23.8
Zaragoza	5.9	29.1	11.4	13.3	19.9	31.6	25.6
ASTURIAS	6.7	25.0	9.7	11.3	42.6	22.0	22.1
BALEARES	2.7	21.5	7.3	14.6	40.9	23.0	26.9
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	1.8	22.2	5.1	.7	15.1	15.5	2.3
Tenerife	4.4	13.7	9.9	3.4	22.6	12.2	9.4
CANTABRIA							
CAST.-MANCHA	9.2	25.7	14.9	17.8	28.2	33.8	33.1
Albacete	3.4	41.2	19.7	14.3	52.5	48.3	47.5
Ciudad Real	6.4	31.1	18.8	17.7	46.0	40.9	31.6
Cuenca	6.6	22.4	31.3	22.4	36.7	39.9	35.1
Guadalajara	9.0	28.7	17.2	17.2	30.0	29.4	22.1
Toledo	4.5	24.1	22.9	18.2	37.6	39.1	30.0
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	5.1	34.9	21.1	21.4	44.5	35.1	42.2
Burgos	7.7	25.3	21.9	21.0	26.2	39.7	35.3
León	8.2	23.0	14.5	18.9	30.2	33.8	21.0
Palencia	12.9	24.3	13.1	21.5	24.9	30.4	16.0
Salamanca	7.5	32.1	23.0	28.4	41.4	40.4	31.9
Segovia	4.1	31.7	19.4	15.7	19.6	31.7	20.0
Soria	9.2	37.6	12.9	13.8	24.4	28.7	21.4
Valladolid	7.3	21.0	6.0	18.1	27.9	33.9	29.1
Zamora	18.1	32.9	28.6	22.0	23.7	31.5	16.3
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	1.1	2.6	1.2	1.2	6.2	1.1	3.1
Girona	1.9	11.1	5.6	6.2	10.2	8.6	7.7
Lleida	3.0	18.9	16.7	11.3	27.2	9.3	8.9
Tarragona	1.6	12.7	2.3	3.8	19.2	12.1	9.0
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	4.6	20.4	12.1	10.1	37.0	30.6	33.3
Castellón	5.2	23.9	49.6	15.1	42.9	14.6	23.7
Valencia	2.8	19.4	17.7	16.2	35.0	12.0	17.8
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	3.3	21.5	24.3	15.9	33.7	42.3	44.0
Cáceres	3.7	28.7	17.8	18.2	40.3	38.3	35.9
GALICIA							
A Coruña	10.6	30.4	12.4	14.1	11.1	40.0	27.9
Lugo	8.2	43.3	23.8	21.1	17.5	54.8	31.1
Ourense	12.5	29.4	22.1	24.8	11.1	46.4	19.0
Pontevedra	30.3	28.7	20.4	18.1	13.8	36.6	17.6
MADRID	3.6	3.4	2.9	8.2	36.9	18.0	14.5
MURCIA	2.9	37.6	24.5	15.2	67.1	47.2	57.6
NAVARRA	7.3	16.6	13.6	10.6	26.6	13.8	19.6
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava		4.2	4.8	6.9	16.2	19.7	31.5
Guipúzcoa		3.6	5.2	3.4	6.7	18.5	7.7
Vizcaya		2.9	2.3	2.5	7.0	13.5	1.5
LA RIOJA	11.1	30.5	23.0	10.9	31.3	32.5	22.3

Table A III.5 New voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82
ANDALUCIA		
Almería	9.8	.3
Cádiz	13.3	.6
Córdoba	13.3	.5
Granada	22.1	1.3
Huelva	15.5	1.4
Jaén	24.0	2.9
Málaga	7.8	.4
Sevilla	9.9	.8
ARAGON		
Huesca	24.9	5.8
Teruel	37.3	3.6
Zaragoza	11.9	1.1
ASTURIAS	6.7	.9
BALEARES	15.8	7.6
CANARIAS		
Las Palmas	35.4	.7
Tenerife	20.0	3.7
CANTABRIA	9.9	2.3
CAST.-MANCHA		
Albacete	32.9	1.0
Ciudad Real	13.3	10.0
Cuenca	29.9	8.4
Guadalajara	23.3	3.4
Toledo	24.9	3.6
CAST.-LEON		
Avila	46.5	4.8
Burgos	44.1	4.8
León	26.9	7.5
Palencia	19.6	1.6
Salamanca	28.2	3.6
Segovia	50.2	6.2
Soria	32.4	6.8
Valladolid	20.5	2.1
Zamora	18.6	1.4
CATALUNYA		
Barcelona	7.3	.7
Girona	11.7	2.0
Lleida	11.4	1.9
Tarragona	5.8	1.7
C.VALENCIANA		
Alicante	16.9	2.0
Castellón	22.3	2.1
Valencia	18.9	1.9
EXTREMADURA		
Badajoz	27.0	2.2
Cáceres	29.8	3.7
GALICIA		
A Coruña	16.7	6.0
Lugo	17.0	8.1
Ourense	12.1	3.6
Pontevedra	10.2	.4
MADRID	18.2	2.4
MURCIA	21.9	1.3
NAVARRA	15.5	3.4
BASQUE COUNTRY		
Alava	17.0	
Guipúzcoa	9.9	
Vizcaya	8.2	
LA RIOJA	31.0	5.5

Table A III.6 New voters opting for CDS: Ecol percentages

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93
ANDALUCIA				
Almería	2.2	4.6	7.4	.8
Cádiz	1.4	2.1	1.0	.2
Córdoba	1.7	4.8	4.4	1.0
Granada	1.5	6.1	4.8	.6
Huelva	1.4	4.4	2.4	.7
Jaén	.6	7.0	6.5	.9
Málaga	1.1	4.5	6.4	.9
Sevilla	.3	2.6	2.0	.4
ARAGON				
Huesca	3.3	8.0	6.7	3.1
Teruel	4.1	9.3	8.4	1.6
Zaragoza	3.7	12.6	6.2	1.0
ASTURIAS	4.8	25.1	15.6	2.2
BALEARES	3.4	7.8	10.0	1.3
CANARIAS				
Las Palmas	1.3	35.0	33.2	.3
Tenerife	4.3	5.6	5.0	.7
CANTABRIA				
CAST.-MANCHA				
Albacete	1.9	10.5	8.4	2.8
Ciudad Real	1.4	11.6	10.1	2.3
Cuenca	1.7	7.3	10.0	2.4
Guadalajara	4.0	18.7	10.4	2.5
Toledo	1.9	12.5	6.8	1.6
CAST.-LEON				
Avila	7.0	33.5	7.8	3.8
Burgos	3.6	15.2	8.2	2.5
León	2.2	12.2	9.6	1.3
Palencia	4.2	11.4	7.6	2.8
Salamanca	4.1	19.1	7.3	2.8
Segovia	4.9	19.1	13.1	12.3
Soria	5.1	19.9	9.6	4.0
Valladolid	3.7	18.1	5.6	3.6
Zamora	3.8	15.6	6.7	2.8
CATALUNYA				
Barcelona	.8	2.5	1.2	.2
Girona	1.3	1.4	4.2	.3
Lleida	1.8	3.8	6.2	.7
Tarragona	1.8	2.9	2.8	.5
C. VALENCIANA				
Alicante	1.8	8.5	8.5	1.1
Castellón	2.2	3.8	9.6	1.8
Valencia	.9	7.3	3.5	.4
EXTREMADURA				
Badajoz	.9	8.7	13.3	2.8
Cáceres	1.7	8.8	7.4	2.8
GALICIA				
A Coruña	1.5	8.0	9.4	1.8
Lugo	.7	9.4	9.7	2.7
Ourense	.9	2.9	5.6	2.4
Pontevedra	2.2	6.9	4.2	1.2
MADRID				
MURCIA	1.8	4.8	13.1	.7
NAVARRA	3.6	7.1	8.4	1.6
BASQUE COUNTRY				
Alava	17.8	5.2	3.5	.6
Guipúzcoa	1.6	3.1	1.5	.1
Vizcaya	.5	3.8	1.4	.2
LA RIOJA	3.6	9.7	6.1	2.6

Table A III.7 Electoral abstainers opting for abstention: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	62.8	42.2	50.0	51.8	50.2	60.6	67.2
Cádiz	63.9	37.6	67.6	68.6	57.8	61.5	69.6
Córdoba	55.5	32.0	45.3	56.9	50.0	60.2	69.4
Granada	65.8	50.0	71.3	59.2	52.5	63.9	69.5
Huelva	71.8	40.7	68.5	66.4	55.7	67.6	76.5
Jaén	54.5	36.9	57.5	52.8	49.4	58.3	69.4
Málaga	65.0	31.6	42.3	50.6	52.5	66.0	71.4
Sevilla	67.4	22.9	36.3	66.6	51.1	61.0	73.1
ARAGON							
Huesca	64.9	32.6	45.1	43.8	41.0	58.6	49.9
Teruel	53.6	39.6	54.8	51.9	41.0	47.6	54.7
Zaragoza	59.8	27.9	45.1	56.9	38.2	57.3	66.8
ASTURIAS	82.2	47.7	86.1	68.4	58.2	71.3	73.4
BALEARES	57.4	28.2	66.2	68.4	59.6	76.1	80.5
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	63.1	44.3	69.2	72.5	55.2	73.6	80.0
Tenerife	77.4	27.3	38.2	68.3	60.9	74.8	77.2
CANTABRIA	66.5	27.0	63.2	59.4	51.0	59.4	76.7
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	62.9	40.1	49.9	51.0	49.6	61.6	72.0
Ciudad Real	64.8	36.8	41.4	55.8	51.5	63.1	75.2
Cuenca	55.3	25.8	45.9	53.5	42.5	54.3	61.1
Guadalajara	62.9	26.7	51.7	49.0	43.3	51.9	55.8
Toledo	51.2	28.0	46.6	55.3	46.7	60.1	69.6
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	69.9	34.4	57.2	49.7	43.4	50.4	28.6
Burgos	43.2	38.3	60.6	50.4	50.4	62.2	59.0
León	67.1	42.3	69.0	67.6	52.8	68.0	70.2
Palencia	65.0	32.2	45.7	43.5	46.6	56.5	56.8
Salamanca	56.5	31.0	60.5	50.9	46.9	53.4	60.7
Segovia	43.2	26.7	42.6	44.2	38.3	45.3	51.4
Soria	58.8	32.5	49.2	49.3	48.0	57.0	57.1
Valladolid	50.1	18.1	33.5	47.5	45.4	56.8	61.6
Zamora	65.2	42.4	64.2	59.8	56.0	66.0	67.3
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	61.2	27.7	63.9	63.4	55.0	63.4	72.2
Girona	56.6	32.3	52.0	59.9	49.1	58.2	71.9
Lleida	62.0	43.1	57.9	62.7	49.5	59.9	70.2
Tarragona	62.2	34.5	59.7	59.7	48.1	56.9	71.5
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	60.2	29.5	56.5	56.0	49.9	71.7	80.1
Castellón	55.6	33.7	52.3	60.6	48.1	58.1	72.3
Valencia	53.1	24.6	44.5	46.0	35.9	66.5	73.8
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	54.8	36.9	64.4	51.5	50.3	49.9	53.8
Cáceres	68.6	38.7	59.8	52.5	49.1	56.2	55.9
GALICIA							
A Coruña	81.6	55.7	68.3	68.1	45.5	69.7	61.4
Lugo	77.5	51.5	68.9	59.8	41.9	61.6	56.0
Ourense	83.9	63.5	71.1	62.5	29.9	56.5	50.5
Pontevedra	82.5	47.8	66.2	64.2	45.2	70.7	67.2
MADRID	30.8	17.0	37.9	49.5	44.8	61.0	65.4
MURCIA	53.8	32.1	59.4	58.1	51.0	69.3	83.1
NAVARRA	54.0	37.6	64.2	62.2	55.7	64.8	66.4
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	54.5	19.6	48.4	60.7	58.9	65.3	58.1
Guipúzcoa	51.4	41.3	68.6	68.1	68.4	72.6	67.6
Vizcaya	52.6	36.1	68.8	71.1	62.1	73.2	61.1
LA RIOJA	56.5	24.1	47.0	54.3	43.2	53.8	56.1

Table A III.8 Electoral abstainers opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	.9	1.4	1.3	2.2	3.9	2.9	1.1
Cádiz	2.5	1.2	3.0	4.0	4.9	5.6	1.4
Córdoba	1.7	1.0	.8	4.1	4.2	4.3	1.7
Granada	3.4	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.8	1.3	.8
Huelva	1.6	1.3	1.0	2.6	4.3	3.8	1.4
Jaén	3.3	2.1	1.1	2.0	<i>1.1</i>	3.8	.6
Málaga	2.8	1.7	3.4	5.8	3.6	4.2	1.1
Sevilla	3.5	1.5	3.4	5.1	5.8	3.4	1.2
ARAGON							
Huesca	2.4	1.7	1.2	4.1	2.8	5.1	2.7
Teruel	2.3	1.0	1.4	3.5	2.6	5.6	2.1
Zaragoza	2.9	2.0	.9	5.4	2.4	6.2	1.9
ASTURIAS	1.5	1.9	.7	1.3	<i>1.0</i>	.7	.7
BALEARES	3.0	1.6	1.1	2.8	3.5	4.2	2.2
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	2.7		4.8	6.8	4.9	2.2	.8
Tenerife	1.8		1.5	3.5	2.7	3.8	.9
CANTABRIA							
CAST.-MANCHA	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.9	4.0	1.2
Albacete	3.4	1.1	1.0	3.2	3.5	2.3	1.5
Ciudad Real	2.6	1.3	1.4	3.3	3.5	2.8	.9
Cuenca	3.1	1.5	1.7	2.6	3.5	3.8	2.8
Guadalajara	2.2	1.9	1.1	2.6	3.9	4.3	2.5
Toledo	3.7	1.1	2.6	6.3	4.2	5.0	1.8
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	2.0	1.4	.9	2.0	2.1	5.1	4.4
Burgos	3.2	1.2	1.1	3.0	3.6	2.9	2.1
León	2.0	1.5	1.3	2.2	2.4	2.9	1.2
Palencia	2.0	2.1	1.7	2.8	5.0	5.6	2.4
Salamanca	1.8	1.1	1.4	2.9	3.2	4.1	2.0
Segovia	2.3	1.3	1.2	4.5	4.5	5.2	2.7
Soria	1.4	.9	1.1	2.7	4.0	5.5	3.4
Valladolid	6.8	2.7	1.2	11.8	8.2	9.1	3.0
Zamora	1.0	.8	1.3	1.7	2.2	2.9	1.4
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	3.1	2.6	1.8	6.2	5.2	3.5	1.0
Girona	2.8	1.4	1.6	3.0	2.7	2.9	1.1
Lleida	2.0	1.7	1.1	2.1	1.8	2.9	.9
Tarragona	4.3	2.5	2.1	3.5	3.1	3.9	1.0
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	2.8	1.5	1.5	6.0	7.4	4.7	1.6
Castellón	1.9	1.2	.7	2.7	3.8	5.0	2.1
Valencia	5.0	2.3	2.1	6.7	7.1	7.0	2.4
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	3.3	1.6	2.4	3.7	3.3	3.6	2.0
Cáceres	3.1	1.2	1.2	2.6	2.5	3.1	1.9
GALICIA							
A Coruña	.5	.9	.3	.6	<i>1.2</i>	.6	.3
Lugo	.3	.5	.3	.4	<i>1.0</i>	.9	.6
Ourense	.7	.4	.3	.5	.3	<i>1.7</i>	.4
Pontevedra	.7	.7	.3	<i>1.0</i>	<i>1.1</i>	.5	.4
MADRID	7.7	3.2	3.2	12.0	6.4	5.9	4.2
MURCIA	2.4	2.7	1.3	4.1	4.9	5.3	1.2
NAVARRA	1.0	.6	.8	2.6	5.6	5.8	3.1
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	.8	.6	.1	1.1	2.5	5.0	2.2
Guipúzcoa	1.9	1.2	.6	1.1	3.0	2.7	1.8
Vizcaya	.9	.8	.5	1.6	4.0	4.2	2.0
LA RIOJA	2.7	1.3	1.1	4.4	3.5	7.2	3.1

Table A III.9 Abstainers opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	7.1	22.8	22.4	21.6	5.6	11.3	1.7
Cádiz	7.6	37.1	8.5	2.9	5.6	2.3	1.8
Córdoba	12.2	38.4	31.7	13.7	6.2	4.6	1.5
Granada	9.6	18.7	13.9	20.9	14.1	12.6	5.5
Huelva	8.7	34.0	17.0	10.6	10.6	5.7	1.8
Jaén	24.9	35.1	21.8	27.3	18.3	14.6	6.7
Málaga	9.0	40.2	30.4	22.7	13.5	.9	1.7
Sevilla	9.9	46.9	36.4	5.3	14.4	4.9	3.1
ARAGON							
Huesca	6.5	21.0	20.1	20.6	12.0	14.0	13.0
Teruel	15.5	23.4	13.5	13.9	11.0	15.2	5.2
Zaragoza	10.1	34.9	25.2	9.0	4.3	9.3	2.7
ASTURIAS							
BALEARES	7.9	24.0	9.5	8.3	11.4	11.2	4.3
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	6.8	15.4	7.4	3.7	2.5	4.1	2.0
Tenerife	4.5	32.4	23.4	6.1	2.9	1.3	2.2
CANTABRIA							
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	12.2	24.2	19.9	23.2	15.8	14.2	5.6
Ciudad Real	14.1	30.7	25.4	13.7	12.4	8.8	4.9
Cuenca	9.9	23.1	17.9	16.2	13.1	13.6	8.7
Guadalajara	6.6	21.5	11.9	15.0	15.1	11.2	9.1
Toledo	13.6	28.0	17.9	11.2	9.0	8.7	5.7
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	6.0	13.3	6.0	11.0	10.9	10.5	16.6
Burgos	14.6	16.5	10.1	15.5	12.8	10.6	8.7
León	6.8	20.6	12.3	10.7	22.8	9.2	5.2
Palencia	5.0	24.5	13.2	18.2	13.7	9.3	7.0
Salamanca	9.6	29.3	12.9	15.0	15.3	12.8	7.1
Segovia	8.9	21.2	9.4	7.3	10.7	11.9	5.9
Soria	7.6	21.1	8.5	7.9	13.5	8.2	5.1
Valladolid	11.9	43.0	23.8	3.8	11.6	7.7	8.7
Zamora	4.0	12.0	4.9	6.6	7.4	5.3	3.7
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	4.2	21.8	7.8	4.3	11.6	18.0	6.4
Girona	6.7	9.9	4.8	5.4	8.5	17.8	4.3
Lleida	3.8	8.9	2.0	2.9	5.6	13.1	5.1
Tarragona	8.9	22.1	6.8	9.4	9.2	18.7	5.7
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	13.7	38.4	15.2	11.2	12.4	7.5	3.0
Castellón	6.4	22.3	13.7	10.4	12.1	12.2	3.1
Valencia	14.6	28.4	21.8	12.9	15.4	5.3	2.3
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	21.5	32.8	18.8	24.9	11.8	21.5	13.7
Cáceres	13.7	27.0	14.6	19.9	18.7	14.0	10.2
GALICIA							
A Coruña	1.4	4.8	4.6	8.6	13.3	1.4	3.1
Lugo	2.1	9.7	2.9	12.6	11.7	2.6	6.8
Ourense	1.9	5.9	4.1	10.4	18.1	3.3	2.4
Pontevedra	1.0	9.7	2.9	9.0	15.8	1.1	2.6
MADRID							
MURCIA	10.8	26.0	13.2	12.3	5.3	7.6	1.7
NAVARRA							
BASQUE COUNTRY	3.0	10.4	3.4	2.3	7.5	2.0	3.0
Alava	2.3	26.6	2.1	4.5	3.5	4.8	6.2
Guipúzcoa	1.4	7.6	3.3	1.9	5.8	4.2	3.2
Vizcaya	2.7	14.1	2.9	2.2	10.8	5.1	4.8
LA RIOJA	9.1	30.5	15.8	11.2	13.6	10.1	9.3

Table A III.10 Abstainers opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	2.7	19.4	8.7	7.7	27.6	15.5	19.4
Cádiz	1.3	12.7	9.3	5.1	17.7	15.6	15.2
Córdoba	3.2	14.0	8.4	7.4	25.7	18.2	19.4
Granada	2.2	10.4	5.1	5.8	18.2	11.5	13.3
Huelva	2.0	10.3	2.7	3.6	17.5	8.8	8.7
Jaén	1.3	9.8	11.6	5.5	19.6	11.1	11.1
Málaga	2.0	13.8	10.0	7.1	17.6	16.3	15.4
Sevilla	2.0	16.0	11.2	3.5	16.5	15.8	8.3
ARAGON							
Huesca	4.1	20.2	10.8	9.6	14.3	14.1	18.0
Teruel	3.8	15.3	7.3	9.0	11.5	22.7	15.4
Zaragoza	3.8	19.5	10.8	9.3	10.9	15.3	12.2
ASTURIAS	1.4	11.8	2.3	3.2	15.0	8.9	9.8
BALEARES	11.3	28.0	12.2	10.7	11.3	3.4	4.3
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	2.5	14.6	8.0	5.0	21.6	11.6	3.8
Tenerife	1.4	16.6	10.0	4.6	14.3	10.8	7.8
CANTABRIA	4.1	24.7	13.9	22.6	20.1	19.9	11.9
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	1.7	13.4	22.3	8.7	19.0	14.2	13.3
Ciudad Real	2.7	13.9	18.7	11.4	19.1	16.7	9.9
Cuenca	2.7	27.3	19.9	12.6	27.0	20.4	16.1
Guadalajara	5.7	24.7	21.8	19.9	24.3	23.9	22.0
Toledo	6.0	25.1	17.6	11.8	27.0	17.1	11.9
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	3.5	16.5	10.5	13.6	24.8	25.9	42.8
Burgos	5.1	18.3	12.8	14.7	18.8	17.1	21.6
León	3.4	12.8	5.0	5.8	10.5	11.0	11.3
Palencia	3.4	20.8	19.3	19.4	17.9	18.7	22.3
Salamanca	2.9	15.8	11.3	14.6	18.4	22.0	19.9
Segovia	3.6	25.1	21.6	24.2	26.0	29.3	28.1
Soria	5.0	21.1	18.5	24.3	18.3	21.2	23.5
Valladolid	8.4	20.1	24.8	15.6	16.8	17.3	12.3
Zamora	4.1	16.9	12.9	15.2	18.6	17.0	18.5
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	3.8	15.5	2.8	4.0	11.9	6.7	7.1
Girona	2.5	9.9	4.3	3.6	11.4	4.9	6.9
Lleida	2.1	9.2	3.3	2.5	9.0	4.9	5.6
Tarragona	2.7	12.0	8.1	4.4	14.0	7.0	7.4
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	3.6	17.0	9.9	11.1	15.1	7.6	6.4
Castellón	2.5	24.7	19.0	9.4	20.2	16.2	9.9
Valencia	2.8	24.9	10.2	11.3	28.2	13.2	9.7
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	1.9	12.5	4.7	6.5	21.9	19.2	22.9
Cáceres	2.3	11.0	9.9	8.2	17.8	18.1	19.8
GALICIA							
A Coruña	2.7	19.2	14.3	8.2	16.4	18.5	19.9
Lugo	3.0	19.0	13.3	14.4	20.6	23.4	17.4
Ourense	3.4	7.5	9.7	13.1	25.3	17.9	30.8
Pontevedra	1.7	20.3	21.6	13.7	17.0	21.6	20.6
MADRID	1.4	22.7	12.5	9.2	17.4	16.9	9.7
MURCIA	5.6	26.1	11.6	6.8	23.2	8.0	6.6
NAVARRA	9.2	12.6	7.3	7.7	9.7	5.4	11.8
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava		9.1	4.4	2.1	8.1	5.8	18.0
Guipúzcoa		2.8	1.5	2.0	5.7	3.3	4.8
Vizcaya		4.6	1.8	1.6	8.5	4.9	13.1
LA RIOJA	8.6	27.2	22.5	18.4	24.0	21.9	21.3

Table A III.11 Abstainers opting for UCD: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82
ANDALUCIA		
Almería	21.2	3.4
Cádiz	16.4	2.2
Córdoba	15.8	4.3
Granada	11.8	7.9
Huelva	5.2	3.1
Jaén	10.9	6.9
Málaga	8.1	1.2
Sevilla	3.5	1.0
ARAGON		
Huesca	17.1	7.8
Teruel	16.4	6.4
Zaragoza	9.4	1.7
ASTURIAS	8.7	4.4
BALEARES	14.5	3.4
CANARIAS		
Las Palmas	15.9	1.0
Tenerife	9.3	8.0
CANTABRIA	12.5	4.1
CAST.-MANCHA		
Albacete	14.1	11.2
Ciudad Real	9.9	6.0
Cuenca	24.8	9.5
Guadalajara	15.0	11.2
Toledo	15.8	4.0
CAST.-LEON		
Avila	13.5	9.0
Burgos	20.3	10.3
León	16.2	10.8
Palencia	16.7	5.6
Salamanca	22.6	8.4
Segovia	35.2	7.4
Soria	21.6	10.8
Valladolid	13.4	2.5
Zamora	20.7	11.9
CATALUNYA		
Barcelona	13.1	1.5
Girona	13.6	2.1
Lleida	13.6	3.5
Tarragona	8.2	1.4
C.VALENCIANA		
Alicante	9.8	1.8
Castellón	24.2	4.4
Valencia	14.1	2.8
EXTREMADURA		
Badajoz	13.6	3.6
Cáceres	6.7	9.5
GALICIA		
A Coruña	9.6	9.3
Lugo	11.3	8.6
Ourense	5.9	13.5
Pontevedra	10.3	11.6
MADRID	13.6	1.1
MURCIA	22.3	2.5
NAVARRA	11.9	7.9
BASQUE COUNTRY		
Alava	4.8	
Guipúzcoa	1.5	
Vizcaya	1.9	
LA RIOJA	18.2	3.4

Table A III.12 Abstainers opting for CDS: Ecol percentages

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93
ANDALUCIA				
Almería	1.7	6.2	8.0	1.9
Cádiz	1.2	7.0	3.3	.8
Córdoba	1.2	2.3	4.4	1.4
Granada	1.3	2.5	4.2	1.3
Huelva	1.5	2.9	3.8	.9
Jaén	.8	1.6	3.1	1.0
Málaga	1.0	3.7	3.3	1.0
Sevilla	.7	3.1	2.3	.9
ARAGON				
Huesca	4.3	6.1	5.2	1.8
Teruel	3.5	7.1	4.8	1.6
Zaragoza	3.8	3.1	5.1	1.0
ASTURIAS	3.1	1.4	4.2	2.4
BALEARES	2.8	3.2	2.5	2.5
CANARIAS				
Las Palmas	7.2	3.3	4.8	1.3
Tenerife	2.2	9.1	4.6	1.5
CANTABRIA	3.7	6.0	5.4	1.4
CAST.-MANCHA				
Albacete	1.8	1.5	5.6	1.9
Ciudad Real	2.1	4.2	5.9	2.5
Cuenca	1.9	4.5	5.6	2.7
Guadalajara	2.6	3.1	4.2	2.7
Toledo	2.4	6.0	5.1	2.5
CAST.-LEON				
Avila	15.1	18.4	13.6	5.4
Burgos	4.5	4.7	6.5	2.9
León	1.8	5.6	5.1	2.1
Palencia	4.4	9.5	8.0	3.5
Salamanca	2.8	6.7	7.6	3.9
Segovia	6.1	12.9	9.9	6.8
Soria	3.9	9.2	5.9	3.7
Valladolid	4.7	7.1	8.9	4.5
Zamora	3.4	8.2	7.6	3.3
CATALUNYA				
Barcelona	2.5	3.5	4.0	.9
Girona	2.1	1.5	2.2	.6
Lleida	3.1	.9	2.7	.6
Tarragona	2.0	1.9	3.1	.7
C.VALENCIANA				
Alicante	3.2	4.5	6.4	3.2
Castellón	4.1	3.9	6.7	2.2
Valencia	3.0	6.9	4.6	1.9
EXTREMADURA				
Badajoz	1.4	3.0	4.9	2.2
Cáceres	1.5	3.3	7.1	1.9
GALICIA				
A Coruña	1.5	2.5	6.6	1.1
Lugo	1.1	1.4	2.7	.5
Ourense	1.1	1.5	2.0	.3
Pontevedra	1.6	2.1	3.9	.9
MADRID	3.9	9.9	5.4	2.6
MURCIA	2.6	5.1	7.1	2.9
NAVARRA	4.3	5.8	4.4	1.8
BASQUE COUNTRY				
Alava	3.3	1.0	1.9	.8
Guipúzcoa	1.2	1.2	1.0	.6
Vizcaya	.9	2.2	1.7	.7
LA RIOJA	3.4	4.4	3.5	1.8

Table A III.13 Loyal to PCE/IU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	48.9	12.1	37.5	56.3	75.8	76.0	30.4
Cádiz	52.3	30.1	48.5	75.0	84.5	82.5	35.3
Córdoba	83.6	45.8	77.8	91.1	87.5	91.3	54.9
Granada	75.2	46.9	41.3	62.6	79.8	89.0	47.8
Huelva	63.5	35.4	46.6	70.5	75.7	82.4	44.0
Jaén	71.4	39.1	61.2	76.7	84.1	87.4	52.4
Málaga	59.0	24.5	46.4	69.4	83.4	91.6	41.1
Sevilla	69.8	38.0	55.0	80.3	78.3	86.0	45.7
ARAGON							
Huesca	41.2	17.7	13.0	37.5	49.3	54.3	12.8
Teruel	30.3	12.5	10.3	18.8	35.7	50.2	18.1
Zaragoza	39.2	22.7	14.1	60.0	64.8	68.6	25.0
ASTURIAS	55.5	47.6	54.6	85.7	90.8	92.0	52.0
BALEARES	5.8	4.1	9.6	48.7	80.2	86.1	25.5
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	16.9			60.9	21.5	42.0	26.7
Tenerife	31.3			65.0	38.6	61.0	27.4
CANTABRIA	28.5	17.1	17.2	45.1	67.3	81.0	30.9
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	67.0	30.8	26.5	66.6	75.7	85.9	38.8
Ciudad Real	62.5	20.1	27.8	66.8	79.4	87.5	36.5
Cuenca	57.0	24.7	11.5	41.2	51.5	61.9	26.1
Guadalajara	48.9	20.8	23.6	57.4	60.3	69.7	32.4
Toledo	72.8	36.8	50.4	67.9	74.3	84.9	41.5
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	39.8	17.4	18.8	25.4	51.1	56.9	15.0
Burgos	19.9	7.1	10.3	36.0	59.6	73.7	24.7
León	29.7	7.8	18.6	43.8	50.0	72.6	30.9
Palencia	26.6	18.8	14.5	33.2	46.2	62.0	27.6
Salamanca	26.5	4.3	7.8	36.9	48.4	63.9	22.9
Segovia	31.0	9.1	11.4	33.4	41.6	46.4	28.2
Soria	16.6	6.1	8.6	19.3	34.5	52.1	15.7
Valladolid	35.6	19.2	12.0	61.2	71.9	80.9	36.4
Zamora	15.6	8.0	8.1	23.8	39.9	63.6	19.9
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	45.6	10.8	32.7	53.1	67.3	63.4	13.2
Girona	41.2	13.2	13.3	29.2	31.3	30.5	9.1
Lleida	38.0	9.0	9.7	23.1	20.3	30.5	3.5
Tarragona	48.1	20.4	28.2	39.4	51.2	43.9	6.6
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	49.3	22.4	45.9	64.6	78.5	86.3	37.8
Castellón	51.6	21.4	16.7	50.7	54.1	63.6	30.0
Valencia	71.6	26.0	30.2	66.5	73.3	82.2	40.1
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	60.7	33.1	50.1	62.4	81.0	83.7	36.4
Cáceres	34.2	12.0	11.7	29.8	49.1	71.5	26.0
GALICIA							
A Coruña	36.0	12.8	13.3	41.3	49.3	74.2	21.6
Lugo	3.2	1.8	2.1	6.9	16.2	36.0	9.0
Ourense	10.6	4.9	1.2	7.1	12.9	27.7	6.6
Pontevedra	28.0	18.6	12.6	23.9	43.4	51.0	21.7
MADRID	41.2	18.0	22.5	69.0	69.2	75.2	33.2
MURCIA	41.4	25.6	41.1	86.7	84.7	84.2	46.2
NAVARRA	26.4	8.5	7.1	30.0	60.4	70.6	32.1
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	12.7	4.2	1.2	5.4	37.9	63.2	27.0
Guipúzcoa	8.2	5.4	5.2	11.9	43.4	55.5	15.7
Vizcaya	26.1	24.4	23.5	29.4	52.8	74.8	30.9
LA RIOJA	27.6	11.6	6.0	31.9	57.5	76.1	23.7

Table A III.14 PCE/IU voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	17.0	8.0	18.4	21.7	5.5	10.5	39.7
Cádiz	21.4	7.9	30.0	17.3	7.3	10.4	41.1
Córdoba	3.9	2.2	3.8	3.6	3.3	3.5	22.9
Granada	6.5	4.3	11.3	16.3	4.5	3.7	23.7
Huelva	12.4	4.9	17.2	14.7	7.0	8.0	26.4
Jaén	6.5	5.2	9.3	6.3	4.3	3.7	22.0
Málaga	17.8	16.4	24.6	10.2	5.4	3.3	21.7
Sevilla	14.8	12.3	17.3	10.5	6.0	7.6	33.8
ARAGON							
Huesca	17.7	7.4	23.0	20.3	14.7	18.6	39.7
Teruel	26.2	18.8	39.7	39.4	25.4	18.8	41.2
Zaragoza	22.6	5.3	33.6	22.5	12.6	11.7	40.1
ASTURIAS							
ASTURIAS	10.5	2.3	15.9	5.6	2.7	3.4	25.8
BALEARES							
BALEARES	30.5	35.2	45.6	36.9	11.5	10.6	59.3
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	22.9	26.7		16.7	10.8	20.4	34.4
Tenerife	42.4	17.7		21.5	30.4	22.9	45.4
CANTABRIA							
CANTABRIA	19.6	5.5	18.3	23.7	9.7	6.2	26.2
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	7.2	5.1	12.6	11.6	8.1	6.3	37.3
Ciudad Real	13.9	11.0	23.4	15.6	7.1	7.7	44.3
Cuenca	15.0	7.3	19.8	24.5	16.3	18.0	40.1
Guadalajara	15.1	5.2	20.9	18.2	11.1	11.3	39.4
Toledo	7.6	8.6	16.0	17.2	11.9	8.3	39.5
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	21.7	9.0	28.1	28.1	12.7	11.6	21.8
Burgos	11.1	11.9	31.2	28.8	10.3	11.0	30.0
León	22.9	9.9	31.3	31.6	17.1	13.3	39.7
Palencia	30.0	6.7	25.6	31.2	18.2	17.8	39.3
Salamanca	24.6	9.4	39.7	28.3	16.3	15.0	46.9
Segovia	20.6	8.7	28.7	26.8	14.3	16.7	34.4
Soria	30.1	11.0	33.5	37.8	23.4	17.7	46.5
Valladolid	26.9	5.6	40.7	24.3	17.0	13.6	38.0
Zamora	35.9	15.0	39.8	34.6	22.0	16.6	49.5
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	9.1	7.7	28.7	28.3	9.5	11.2	24.5
Girona	11.4	5.8	29.0	36.6	22.3	19.1	47.9
Lleida	13.6	7.6	37.5	42.8	28.9	25.6	49.2
Tarragona	23.9	11.3	31.6	31.0	19.7	26.0	49.7
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	10.5	6.7	9.9	14.5	7.2	6.4	36.9
Castellón	6.7	3.0	10.5	20.2	18.3	21.4	47.3
Valencia	12.1	6.5	22.5	14.4	8.2	11.0	42.5
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	14.4	9.6	20.0	15.2	7.3	6.2	32.2
Cáceres	29.7	12.5	31.7	29.0	13.8	9.8	30.3
GALICIA							
A Coruña	19.0	6.9	41.0	32.9	10.3	11.2	42.7
Lugo	66.0	24.1	48.0	45.9	13.8	25.5	31.5
Ourense	48.5	21.4	40.7	37.6	30.8	14.7	44.2
Pontevedra	23.3	4.8	35.1	33.7	8.2	12.8	27.1
MADRID							
MADRID	20.1	5.8	30.2	14.7	11.6	9.7	26.2
MURCIA							
MURCIA	26.3	7.6	21.5	6.7	4.8	8.5	26.0
NAVARRA							
NAVARRA	22.5	11.9	35.7	35.4	9.5	13.2	20.4
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	16.2	2.1	34.8	40.0	17.6	14.3	8.7
Guipúzcoa	27.1	25.4	43.1	53.4	16.8	10.5	10.7
Vizcaya	24.7	4.3	18.3	32.6	9.3	6.7	6.0
LA RIOJA	33.7	11.6	27.4	34.5	18.3	12.8	52.2

Table A III.15 PCE/IU voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	19.2	49.0	16.3	3.7	.9	1.3	5.3
Cádiz	2.2	54.6	13.2	3.4	3.1	.9	2.1
Córdoba	4.7	38.6	8.8	1.6	.5	.2	.5
Granada	6.7	38.4	25.8	9.0	3.2	1.3	4.2
Huelva	13.4	49.0	23.2	7.0	7.2	1.5	2.6
Jaén	12.0	40.0	17.8	8.8	4.2	1.7	5.0
Málaga	7.7	34.1	13.0	9.4	3.7	.1	4.4
Sevilla	3.8	36.5	16.0	4.1	11.1	2.1	11.3
ARAGON							
Huesca	28.4	48.7	38.5	16.0	6.2	4.7	13.6
Teruel	29.3	52.6	26.1	16.9	21.1	15.8	12.5
Zaragoza	19.2	56.9	19.7	1.4	.8	.5	1.1
ASTURIAS							
ASTURIAS	28.4	45.3	13.1	2.9	2.5	1.9	10.8
BALEARES							
BALEARES	43.0	35.2	34.4	8.6	5.2	2.5	7.8
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	19.2	41.1		1.3	1.0	1.7	2.3
Tenerife	7.6	32.9		1.4	1.0	.2	2.1
CANTABRIA							
CANTABRIA	24.5	52.9	43.4	13.0	14.7	5.3	9.7
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	10.0	36.0	32.4	8.1	2.3	2.1	3.2
Ciudad Real	16.7	55.8	24.0	6.0	3.4	1.0	5.8
Cuenca	13.1	44.2	29.0	19.3	12.6	7.9	15.8
Guadalajara	20.6	55.1	35.6	7.7	8.6	7.3	9.1
Toledo	7.1	32.7	15.9	4.8	3.1	1.7	5.1
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	21.3	43.1	19.8	17.0	7.1	7.5	23.5
Burgos	31.9	56.9	38.3	20.1	13.8	6.9	22.4
León	30.6	61.4	31.6	10.3	16.1	6.6	10.9
Palencia	30.7	64.2	46.0	19.4	21.3	14.7	21.8
Salamanca	23.8	51.7	14.7	5.5	4.9	2.1	7.7
Segovia	25.5	60.2	25.1	12.3	13.6	16.1	17.9
Soria	22.0	49.5	20.0	18.0	22.6	15.4	20.9
Valladolid	25.7	62.9	19.8	1.1	1.9	1.9	8.6
Zamora	22.3	44.4	18.0	16.6	16.2	6.3	11.1
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	33.5	69.6	23.8	6.1	10.0	14.5	39.5
Girona	28.0	62.4	26.2	9.6	18.7	42.7	19.7
Lleida	30.2	60.6	26.3	10.8	22.3	30.4	20.4
Tarragona	10.6	41.6	12.6	7.4	10.6	17.2	11.1
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	32.2	56.9	34.1	12.6	5.5	3.7	7.4
Castellón	26.0	54.7	30.4	7.1	8.5	7.1	6.1
Valencia	7.1	45.5	22.5	7.7	6.5	1.4	3.5
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	17.9	43.4	20.1	14.1	3.2	3.7	11.8
Cáceres	24.2	52.6	32.1	16.5	6.1	3.3	4.9
GALICIA							
A Coruña	22.4	54.9	10.2	5.2	11.4	1.1	7.0
Lugo	8.9	27.4	12.2	19.0	17.1	3.0	13.6
Ourense	16.9	42.7	20.2	16.6	17.1	6.1	12.4
Pontevedra	8.4	32.6	13.4	10.8	5.8	.5	3.0
MADRID							
MADRID	27.7	69.4	35.9	10.2	11.1	10.0	31.3
MURCIA							
MURCIA	11.4	40.6	11.4	2.0	.7	1.3	1.1
NAVARRA							
NAVARRA	24.7	51.0	24.6	8.8	13.8	5.5	17.0
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	49.9	50.1	36.2	19.1	15.6	13.4	32.6
Guipúzcoa	24.7	16.2	23.8	12.9	24.0	22.5	43.9
Vizcaya	32.2	62.8	41.4	16.7	27.9	13.4	39.0
LA RIOJA	19.1	51.2	36.7	6.6	5.1	2.6	6.7

Table A III.16 PCE/IU voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	3.7	22.0	15.0	6.6	13.8	10.0	13.5
Cádiz	2.9	3.8	3.0	1.1	2.7	2.9	13.2
Córdoba	1.2	10.0	3.5	1.0	5.0	3.5	13.8
Granada	1.0	5.8	4.9	4.0	7.9	3.9	13.5
Huelva	.7	4.5	2.1	2.3	3.9	2.2	9.8
Jaén	.9	8.5	3.9	.8	3.0	3.9	7.7
Málaga	2.4	19.1	8.3	4.1	5.0	3.6	24.1
Sevilla	1.2	7.1	4.2	.4	1.4	1.9	2.1
ARAGON							
Huesca	2.7	15.7	8.6	7.4	6.7	7.4	17.1
Teruel	2.3	6.5	3.4	6.6	6.5	6.8	8.6
Zaragoza	3.1	6.5	4.8	2.8	5.3	1.6	6.6
ASTURIAS							
ASTURIAS	1.1	1.4	.4	.2	.8	.6	1.8
BALEARES							
BALEARES	2.9	9.8	2.1	1.7	.6	.1	1.3
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	3.6	12.2		12.8	33.8	23.7	16.7
Tenerife	6.4	27.3		6.8	22.5	12.1	11.1
CANTABRIA							
CANTABRIA	4.7	13.4	5.0	3.9	4.4	1.8	2.9
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	.8	19.6	15.1	2.9	7.5	3.2	9.2
Ciudad Real	1.6	5.1	6.9	1.1	2.5	2.1	3.2
Cuenca	1.7	12.3	17.3	6.0	11.0	7.4	6.8
Guadalajara	2.6	10.7	5.2	2.3	5.3	5.4	4.3
Toledo	1.1	10.3	7.3	3.1	5.3	2.7	4.2
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	3.5	19.3	11.1	11.2	22.1	19.4	30.7
Burgos	4.8	11.8	4.9	3.0	4.7	4.3	6.9
León	3.5	9.9	2.9	2.5	5.1	3.3	3.8
Palencia	4.1	4.6	3.0	3.1	1.5	1.1	2.0
Salamanca	5.9	25.6	12.2	12.8	19.5	12.3	5.5
Segovia	2.0	8.5	13.8	9.3	4.3	7.8	5.0
Soria	11.4	15.3	13.6	12.0	6.5	8.7	7.1
Valladolid	5.1	5.4	3.5	2.0	1.0	.8	.9
Zamora	9.9	17.3	9.8	8.3	8.4	7.4	5.5
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	.2	.8	.6	1.5	3.5	6.0	6.7
Girona	.6	4.5	4.4	2.4	5.4	3.4	11.9
Lleida	1.1	9.0	3.6	3.1	11.2	8.5	12.5
Tarragona	1.4	6.0	5.0	2.6	8.2	7.1	10.6
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	2.2	6.8	3.3	3.1	4.0	.9	6.5
Castellón	1.2	10.3	8.4	2.9	7.3	3.9	3.4
Valencia	.8	10.9	3.9	2.7	6.5	3.0	3.2
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	.9	8.4	2.6	2.1	5.3	4.9	11.8
Cáceres	1.9	11.8	8.4	7.1	19.7	12.0	27.7
GALICIA							
A Coruña	4.5	12.3	8.5	5.0	4.4	4.3	2.7
Lugo	2.7	27.1	10.4	9.2	3.5	6.7	7.2
Ourense	7.1	16.7	15.4	17.5	8.8	12.6	5.3
Pontevedra	13.6	16.3	10.6	7.3	5.1	2.6	1.6
MADRID							
MADRID	.6	3.5	1.9	1.0	1.2	.9	.4
MURCIA							
MURCIA	3.5	19.8	5.8	1.0	8.2	2.9	17.5
NAVARRA							
NAVARRA	3.0	6.7	7.2	6.4	5.3	4.4	13.0
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava		5.7	3.3	4.3	7.7	5.7	18.0
Guipúzcoa		3.9	1.5	1.7	5.5	5.9	19.9
Vizcaya		1.0	.5	.6	3.1	2.4	12.4
LA RIOJA	5.7	15.5	12.6	7.6	6.3	4.8	4.2

Table A III.17 PCE/IU voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82
ANDALUCIA		
Almería	2.0	.1
Cádiz	2.7	.1
Córdoba	1.6	.2
Granada	3.2	.5
Huelva	.9	.4
Jaén	4.7	.8
Málaga	3.3	.4
Sevilla	.8	.3
ARAGON		
Huesca	6.1	1.2
Teruel	4.5	1.3
Zaragoza	1.0	.1
ASTURIAS	.3	.0
BALEARES	3.2	3.9
CANARIAS		
Las Palmas	1.6	.1
Tenerife	1.4	1.6
CANTABRIA	3.0	1.4
CAST.-MANCHA		
Albacete	10.5	.7
Ciudad Real	2.5	.5
Cuenca	10.2	3.4
Guadalajara	3.6	1.2
Toledo	4.9	1.4
CAST.-LEON		
Avila	7.3	1.3
Burgos	14.2	3.1
León	9.9	.9
Palencia	.9	.3
Salamanca	13.7	1.0
Segovia	17.2	1.2
Soria	10.8	3.2
Valladolid	2.0	.3
Zamora	8.6	1.6
CATALUNYA		
Barcelona	1.1	.1
Girona	10.0	.5
Lleida	5.5	.9
Tarragona	3.3	.6
C.VALENCIANA		
Alicante	.9	.2
Castellón	7.3	.2
Valencia	2.1	.8
EXTREMADURA		
Badajoz	3.2	.4
Cáceres	3.9	1.6
GALICIA		
A Coruña	2.8	.4
Lugo	6.8	5.4
Ourense	8.6	4.2
Pontevedra	1.4	.3
MADRID	1.7	.1
MURCIA	5.4	.3
NAVARRA	6.7	2.5
BASQUE COUNTRY		
Alava	1.8	
Guipúzcoa	12.9	
Vizcaya	4.5	
LA RIOJA	7.2	1.5

Table A III.18 PCE/IU voters opting for CDS: Ecol percentages

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93
ANDALUCIA				
Almería	2.8	5.0	2.3	.2
Cádiz	.2	1.3	.5	.0
Córdoba	.6	3.0	1.1	.3
Granada	.3	1.2	1.4	.4
Huelva	.4	1.7	.9	.1
Jaén	.7	2.7	2.0	.2
Málaga	.8	1.9	1.1	.1
Sevilla	.2	.5	.7	.1
ARAGON				
Huesca	.9	4.5	5.7	2.1
Teruel	2.4	5.4	3.9	1.2
Zaragoza	3.2	10.9	4.7	.9
ASTURIAS				
	.3	4.6	3.2	.4
BALEARES				
	2.4	3.8	.9	1.2
CANARIAS				
Las Palmas	1.6		.2	.2
Tenerife	2.8		1.3	.6
CANTABRIA				
	1.8	5.3	2.4	1.6
CAST.-MANCHA				
Albacete	2.0	2.5	2.5	.9
Ciudad Real	1.5	9.4	6.3	1.1
Cuenca	1.0	6.3	3.4	1.6
Guadalajara	2.4	7.2	7.3	2.8
Toledo	1.3	3.8	1.9	.9
CAST.-LEON				
Avila	4.4	12.7	5.3	1.7
Burgos	3.3	8.1	5.6	2.2
León	1.9	8.9	4.6	1.2
Palencia	2.2	4.9	5.7	2.3
Salamanca	4.5	13.4	6.0	2.0
Segovia	3.8	9.0	7.0	10.0
Soria	8.4	17.3	6.5	3.2
Valladolid	3.0	15.1	4.8	2.2
Zamora	4.2	10.7	4.8	2.4
CATALUNYA				
Barcelona	.5	9.0	5.0	1.1
Girona	.7	2.3	2.5	.5
Lleida	2.2	3.9	4.4	.9
Tarragona	1.5	1.6	2.2	.4
C.VALENCIANA				
Alicante	.8	1.2	1.1	.3
Castellón	2.0	7.9	5.8	1.9
Valencia	1.3	6.5	2.8	.7
EXTREMADURA				
Badajoz	.6	2.9	1.7	.6
Cáceres	1.3	4.6	6.8	2.7
GALICIA				
A Coruña	3.8	10.6	3.4	3.3
Lugo	1.4	8.1	3.6	2.7
Ourense	2.0	9.8	5.3	2.4
Pontevedra	2.8	6.6	4.2	1.6
MADRID				
	.8	5.7	1.4	1.2
MURCIA				
	1.6	6.9	1.4	.2
NAVARRA				
	4.9	10.2	8.1	1.8
BASQUE COUNTRY				
Alava	.8	7.0	6.5	1.6
Guipúzcoa	1.8	4.4	4.5	1.3
Vizcaya	.3	3.7	4.8	.8
LA RIOJA				
	2.8	5.9	4.2	2.5

Table A III.19 Loyal to PSOE: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	74.4	81.0	51.6	72.9	91.0	89.5	74.4
Cádiz	62.2	90.5	72.8	74.9	91.5	84.8	68.4
Córdoba	62.1	79.8	57.2	79.8	92.1	89.0	81.5
Granada	72.0	80.9	62.6	73.3	90.4	88.9	78.7
Huelva	67.9	79.9	65.2	80.4	91.4	89.1	76.2
Jaén	65.4	74.4	66.2	76.8	85.6	86.9	85.7
Málaga	54.1	<i>60.4</i>	<i>48.2</i>	63.0	89.4	85.9	77.2
Sevilla	51.9	71.9	57.1	82.0	90.9	81.1	73.0
ARAGON							
Huesca	62.3	74.9	43.7	<i>49.9</i>	69.6	86.2	<i>57.8</i>
Teruel	69.5	82.1	64.1	70.2	72.5	84.1	65.1
Zaragoza	49.0	75.5	45.3	72.0	76.6	84.7	73.3
ASTURIAS	69.5	82.1	62.1	64.3	84.9	91.5	68.0
BALEARES	58.9	72.1	64.4	65.8	86.1	86.8	62.5
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	<i>30.0</i>	81.8	71.5	69.7	73.4	89.3	<i>57.9</i>
Tenerife	60.3	<i>61.7</i>	<i>32.6</i>	78.4	88.1	91.9	59.0
CANTABRIA	59.2	73.2	59.7	74.2	72.3	72.3	76.6
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	65.2	74.2	54.4	76.0	87.6	89.4	79.5
Ciudad Real	72.7	78.0	58.0	81.9	88.0	89.2	76.9
Cuenca	70.8	68.9	57.0	75.1	78.0	80.8	72.0
Guadalajara	53.1	67.1	57.2	64.7	75.4	76.3	70.3
Toledo	64.3	79.6	64.2	80.2	84.2	83.9	76.1
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	74.5	77.0	52.6	76.3	80.2	83.7	<i>38.4</i>
Burgos	54.6	73.5	59.5	<i>61.4</i>	81.5	78.4	69.6
León	58.5	70.3	66.2	68.0	71.5	87.3	69.0
Palencia	65.7	88.2	58.9	63.2	81.1	84.6	72.1
Salamanca	65.2	71.2	<i>50.9</i>	70.9	79.2	78.9	68.1
Segovia	58.4	76.0	56.8	64.9	72.7	76.0	70.8
Soria	67.1	75.8	62.5	67.7	81.5	78.3	70.1
Valladolid	62.8	76.9	<i>44.0</i>	72.8	82.4	84.4	71.3
Zamora	56.1	72.7	67.4	72.5	82.1	82.5	64.0
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	<i>46.1</i>	77.1	65.0	78.3	90.1	85.7	59.7
Girona	51.9	<i>60.2</i>	62.4	72.0	81.1	89.3	58.5
Lleida	50.0	71.4	59.4	73.6	78.6	88.4	60.6
Tarragona	64.8	74.3	61.7	69.4	82.9	82.0	62.8
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	57.6	75.6	60.8	66.7	77.0	85.2	64.2
Castellón	74.6	75.9	54.6	65.3	74.5	<i>66.8</i>	66.0
Valencia	59.0	<i>65.3</i>	58.1	<i>62.3</i>	68.0	84.7	65.7
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	53.1	62.7	68.3	77.4	87.3	83.0	70.2
Cáceres	81.0	79.6	69.6	78.7	84.7	87.8	77.5
GALICIA							
A Coruña	51.7	82.4	70.9	67.4	<i>47.7</i>	<i>57.0</i>	<i>56.6</i>
Lugo	<i>34.0</i>	<i>64.9</i>	65.3	54.0	<i>44.0</i>	<i>63.6</i>	<i>53.0</i>
Ourense	<i>42.9</i>	71.9	72.4	<i>61.3</i>	<i>38.3</i>	<i>56.8</i>	<i>53.2</i>
Pontevedra	54.9	65.0	57.4	54.2	<i>46.4</i>	78.1	58.1
MADRID	52.1	69.9	47.1	<i>61.2</i>	79.7	77.7	70.2
MURCIA	55.2	72.6	65.6	75.7	83.8	91.8	72.4
NAVARRA	63.4	83.6	61.3	73.5	83.6	76.3	57.9
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	<i>41.6</i>	<i>49.8</i>	<i>49.4</i>	<i>54.4</i>	82.4	82.1	<i>54.2</i>
Guipúzcoa	<i>45.3</i>	82.5	60.2	76.5	85.7	81.8	<i>56.9</i>
Vizcaya	<i>40.0</i>	86.6	69.0	70.6	84.4	86.2	65.2
LA RIOJA	71.1	73.0	57.0	70.2	80.0	83.3	70.4

Table A III.20 PSOE voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	10.9	4.5	19.2	10.4	2.8	1.5	5.6
Cádiz	17.0	4.8	14.8	13.7	3.2	6.2	15.6
Córdoba	14.9	6.3	15.4	8.4	2.4	2.6	5.3
Granada	9.3	6.9	13.3	15.1	6.1	5.8	14.9
Huelva	16.7	8.2	14.4	8.5	2.6	3.5	12.0
Jaén	14.4	8.9	13.3	10.8	6.2	4.5	5.6
Málaga	23.4	18.6	29.8	21.0	3.5	5.5	9.0
Sevilla	20.0	16.3	25.6	8.7	2.8	7.5	15.5
ARAGON							
Huesca	13.4	5.9	21.4	20.5	3.9	5.9	13.8
Teruel	15.2	7.9	17.9	14.1	8.0	5.2	13.3
Zaragoza	18.6	7.8	24.0	12.9	4.9	3.1	8.0
ASTURIAS							
ASTURIAS	8.0	1.3	6.2	9.9	5.0	4.0	18.3
BALEARES							
BALEARES	24.5	7.3	17.3	20.7	6.9	9.3	26.5
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	13.2	10.2	15.3	15.1	5.6	4.0	20.5
Tenerife	21.6	9.1	29.5	10.2	1.5	2.5	13.7
CANTABRIA							
CANTABRIA	10.6	4.1	10.9	6.8	4.9	6.9	6.6
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	9.7	5.1	19.6	11.1	2.7	2.3	4.1
Ciudad Real	16.7	8.9	20.3	7.5	2.8	3.0	8.1
Cuenca	12.7	7.8	16.4	9.1	6.0	4.6	6.3
Guadalajara	17.0	5.9	13.5	13.6	7.4	8.4	12.0
Toledo	13.8	5.9	15.2	7.2	2.6	3.1	5.1
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	9.4	3.9	10.4	8.9	5.3	5.6	23.6
Burgos	12.7	7.3	20.0	16.8	9.3	10.7	17.3
León	12.9	7.0	9.8	12.3	8.8	7.9	19.9
Palencia	13.6	2.3	18.8	16.0	6.2	6.5	13.8
Salamanca	12.5	5.5	11.7	11.4	6.0	7.3	6.6
Segovia	13.6	3.5	11.1	12.7	7.5	7.2	12.3
Soria	12.2	5.4	17.8	17.2	7.2	8.8	14.6
Valladolid	19.4	7.9	29.0	12.0	2.2	3.0	10.6
Zamora	16.2	4.5	5.2	7.0	3.3	3.8	9.2
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	23.8	9.2	22.8	14.8	5.5	6.5	30.1
Girona	11.6	8.3	16.7	16.1	8.9	5.8	26.8
Lleida	15.5	5.1	17.1	13.3	7.9	5.1	24.7
Tarragona	17.5	7.3	20.7	15.7	7.4	9.7	22.4
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	19.9	7.1	18.8	13.5	2.6	3.0	8.9
Castellón	5.4	2.4	13.5	10.9	2.6	19.1	9.2
Valencia	17.5	17.0	14.2	14.7	9.4	4.1	13.6
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	21.3	15.7	11.1	7.7	4.3	5.7	5.4
Cáceres	9.8	6.4	9.9	7.9	4.7	4.6	9.9
GALICIA							
A Coruña	4.7	3.8	4.9	14.1	1.7	19.2	18.7
Lugo	39.6	6.6	11.1	16.2	2.6	16.5	21.0
Ourense	22.1	9.3	7.7	13.0	10.1	15.3	21.1
Pontevedra	7.1	3.9	16.4	13.4	1.4	8.2	17.0
MADRID							
MADRID	22.6	11.7	28.0	21.2	11.7	10.0	21.5
MURCIA							
MURCIA	20.2	6.1	12.6	8.3	2.7	2.0	10.3
NAVARRA							
NAVARRA	8.6	1.9	11.0	7.3	2.0	4.3	7.7
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	20.6	1.6	24.3	18.9	5.2	5.1	11.3
Guipúzcoa	15.7	4.3	17.3	10.9	4.5	3.8	10.8
Vizcaya	23.7	2.6	13.9	13.0	4.5	2.7	9.3
LA RIOJA							
LA RIOJA	13.9	8.0	18.9	14.0	5.7	5.5	7.5

Table A III.21 PSOE voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	5.0	1.5	3.4	3.0	.1	.4	.2
Cádiz	3.3	.3	1.7	2.7	.8	1.7	1.0
Córdoba	5.5	1.4	5.3	1.7	.1	.4	.3
Granada	5.5	1.5	3.3	3.8	.3	.6	.4
Huelva	3.3	1.8	3.6	2.1	.4	1.3	1.1
Jaén	7.8	3.6	3.7	2.7	.3	.8	.2
Málaga	4.4	2.0	4.4	3.6	.5	1.6	1.0
Sevilla	9.1	1.9	3.0	2.3	1.0	2.9	1.6
ARAGON							
Huesca	5.8	1.5	2.6	4.4	.5	.6	.5
Teruel	3.1	.7	1.0	3.0	1.4	3.1	1.2
Zaragoza	8.4	1.4	3.7	2.7	.2	.3	.1
ASTURIAS	13.1	4.4	6.5	8.1	.4	.3	.5
BALEARES	1.3	1.9	2.4	4.5	1.1	1.7	1.3
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	4.2		3.4	2.5	.7	.2	.3
Tenerife	2.1		1.8	.3	.0	.2	.1
CANTABRIA	6.0	3.0	2.9	5.0	2.4	7.8	.9
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	5.1	.9	3.2	1.7	.2	.1	.3
Ciudad Real	3.3	1.0	3.4	1.6	.2	.3	.1
Cuenca	4.6	.9	2.0	2.3	1.0	1.2	.7
Guadalajara	10.0	3.4	5.2	5.2	1.5	2.4	1.1
Toledo	4.6	.6	2.1	1.9	.3	.4	.2
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	3.8	1.0	1.9	2.4	.7	1.7	2.1
Burgos	4.8	1.9	3.9	8.3	1.6	2.6	2.0
León	7.9	1.6	2.4	4.4	2.4	1.4	.9
Palencia	7.8	1.9	3.3	6.6	2.5	2.8	2.0
Salamanca	4.2	.8	1.5	1.9	.5	.9	.2
Segovia	7.4	.9	3.1	6.9	2.3	3.8	2.4
Soria	2.8	.8	2.7	5.2	1.7	3.2	2.0
Valladolid	7.1	2.9	2.9	1.8	.3	.5	.4
Zamora	4.6	.5	1.6	3.6	.9	1.2	.9
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	15.7	5.2	2.4	4.0	2.3	5.1	1.4
Girona	4.1	2.6	2.0	2.6	2.2	2.3	1.3
Lleida	10.9	1.9	2.3	3.1	2.8	1.9	.8
Tarragona	3.0	.8	1.7	2.8	1.3	2.3	.8
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	9.2	2.8	3.4	5.6	1.4	1.5	.9
Castellón	5.6	1.1	1.9	2.6	.7	.6	.6
Valencia	6.8	1.8	3.4	3.5	2.3	1.5	.6
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	6.1	1.6	2.6	3.2	.5	1.2	.8
Cáceres	3.7	.8	1.4	2.1	.6	.5	.7
GALICIA							
A Coruña	6.0	1.0	.8	2.1	.2	1.1	.2
Lugo	1.6	.4	.5	3.0	.3	1.1	.6
Ourense	4.1	.4	.5	2.2	1.1	.7	.5
Pontevedra	9.0	1.1	.6	3.2	.3	.2	.2
MADRID	15.0	4.6	5.9	10.9	5.4	9.7	4.3
MURCIA	3.8	1.0	2.9	2.4	.5	.5	.2
NAVARRA	1.7	.6	1.9	4.9	2.3	4.7	2.4
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	5.3	2.4	1.0	4.7	3.1	7.4	3.8
Guipúzcoa	2.3	1.3	1.1	2.8	5.0	9.5	5.5
Vizcaya	9.4	3.7	1.7	5.6	7.1	8.4	5.8
LA RIOJA	2.9	1.4	1.9	2.2	.4	.8	.6

Table A III.22 PSOE voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	1.9	9.9	13.4	5.2	2.0	3.3	13.8
Cádiz	.4	.5	1.5	.3	.6	1.2	2.6
Córdoba	1.9	5.6	8.8	.8	.6	.9	1.8
Granada	1.1	6.3	6.9	1.2	.6	.8	1.3
Huelva	.8	2.7	4.9	3.8	1.2	1.4	2.1
Jaén	1.4	5.7	7.1	2.8	3.7	4.0	3.5
Málaga	2.4	12.2	7.2	2.3	1.1	1.4	3.9
Sevilla	1.0	2.8	4.1	.2	.5	2.2	1.8
ARAGON							
Huesca	1.7	7.9	10.7	8.3	3.8	3.7	14.9
Teruel	1.3	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.0	7.2
Zaragoza	3.0	6.6	5.8	4.2	3.5	8.1	8.4
ASTURIAS	2.2	6.8	2.9	5.2	4.0	1.2	5.0
BALEARES	.6	6.0	1.3	1.5	2.7	.8	4.8
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	2.7	3.3	1.7	1.8	9.1	2.5	7.0
Tenerife	2.8	11.0	5.6	.6	2.5	1.0	12.7
CANTABRIA	2.8	9.8	5.6	3.6	7.8	9.3	10.6
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	2.2	12.5	8.2	4.0	4.5	4.3	10.8
Ciudad Real	1.3	5.3	4.1	1.8	3.5	3.2	7.7
Cuenca	2.0	14.4	10.7	5.9	8.9	9.3	15.0
Guadalajara	3.2	13.8	5.5	6.1	9.6	9.5	12.2
Toledo	1.3	7.7	5.9	3.1	7.3	8.5	12.1
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	3.3	12.4	17.6	7.8	8.1	5.0	28.6
Burgos	2.8	8.9	3.2	3.8	2.8	4.2	5.4
León	4.5	11.9	5.4	4.7	9.6	1.5	5.0
Palencia	4.2	4.3	3.8	3.8	4.1	3.1	5.8
Salamanca	4.8	16.4	12.6	7.3	7.6	9.1	19.9
Segovia	2.8	10.3	8.6	4.6	5.0	8.4	7.9
Soria	4.8	10.1	4.1	2.6	2.9	5.9	8.3
Valladolid	3.9	5.4	3.3	8.6	10.0	10.3	14.5
Zamora	9.8	13.0	10.5	10.0	7.8	8.5	18.6
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	.4	.8	.2	.1	.3	.9	2.2
Girona	.8	6.5	4.0	1.8	2.6	1.4	4.3
Lleida	1.8	9.0	6.9	2.9	5.3	2.4	4.3
Tarragona	1.1	5.5	2.2	1.4	2.1	2.6	3.0
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	2.7	6.3	3.0	3.6	14.8	8.2	19.2
Castellón	1.1	13.3	9.7	8.8	11.9	12.1	15.3
Valencia	.7	7.0	6.4	6.5	12.7	5.7	12.3
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	1.2	10.3	6.4	1.7	2.1	4.4	15.1
Cáceres	.9	6.2	6.2	3.4	3.4	2.5	4.6
GALICIA							
A Coruña	2.4	6.2	3.6	4.4	1.0	10.5	11.2
Lugo	2.7	17.6	5.5	11.7	1.5	8.5	10.2
Ourense	9.9	12.9	9.2	12.4	3.2	18.3	14.8
Pontevedra	5.1	17.1	5.2	3.3	.5	9.2	17.0
MADRID	.3	7.4	1.3	.4	.8	.9	.5
MURCIA	1.2	13.8	7.0	1.7	7.2	3.1	12.3
NAVARRA	2.1	5.6	6.7	7.4	7.7	11.4	26.5
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava		9.0	4.2	3.2	3.9	2.6	19.9
Guipúzcoa		2.0	2.0	1.2	1.6	1.9	16.5
Vizcaya		1.1	.8	.3	1.2	.7	10.4
LA RIOJA	1.9	8.0	6.3	5.8	5.8	6.2	14.3

Table A III.24 PSOE voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82
ANDALUCIA		
Almería	2.4	.2
Cádiz	8.4	.3
Córdoba	6.3	2.0
Granada	4.8	1.1
Huelva	1.3	2.0
Jaén	5.5	2.0
Málaga	3.0	.8
Sevilla	3.6	1.2
ARAGON		
Huesca	10.8	2.4
Teruel	4.3	.7
Zaragoza	1.9	.4
ASTURIAS	1.3	.0
BALEARES	8.4	1.0
CANARIAS		
Las Palmas	2.2	.3
Tenerife	.7	.9
CANTABRIA	4.1	1.4
CAST.-MANCHA		
Albacete	13.1	1.3
Ciudad Real	2.4	.5
Cuenca	7.6	1.8
Guadalajara	8.0	1.3
Toledo	8.6	.9
CAST.-LEON		
Avila	4.1	1.1
Burgos	12.7	1.2
León	11.3	1.1
Palencia	.8	.1
Salamanca	9.2	.7
Segovia	13.6	.8
Soria	7.5	1.3
Valladolid	2.7	.4
Zamora	5.9	.7
CATALUNYA		
Barcelona	2.5	.1
Girona	7.5	.8
Lleida	7.0	.5
Tarragona	2.7	.3
C.VALENCIANA		
Alicante	1.7	.7
Castellón	6.8	.2
Valencia	7.8	2.2
EXTREMADURA		
Badajoz	11.7	2.2
Cáceres	1.4	1.4
GALICIA		
A Coruña	2.8	.5
Lugo	11.0	3.5
Ourense	10.7	1.5
Pontevedra	1.2	.3
MADRID	3.4	.4
MURCIA	12.5	2.1
NAVARRA	11.9	1.5
BASQUE COUNTRY		
Alava	7.2	
Guipúzcoa	14.3	
Vizcaya	9.7	
LA RIOJA	5.1	.8

Table A III.25 PSOE voters opting CDS: Ecol percentages

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93
ANDALUCIA				
Almería	.6	4.9	2.5	.1
Cádiz	.0	.9	.6	.0
Córdoba	.4	4.2	1.8	.1
Granada	.4	3.9	1.2	.1
Huelva	.2	3.1	.3	.0
Jaén	.5	3.2	1.7	.1
Málaga	1.1	3.2	3.0	.0
Sevilla	.1	1.6	1.0	.0
ARAGON				
Huesca	1.2	8.6	3.9	.2
Teruel	1.5	4.9	1.8	.2
Zaragoza	2.3	9.5	1.7	.1
ASTURIAS	1.6	12.1	5.4	.2
BALEARES	2.2	5.2	2.1	.5
CANARIAS				
Las Palmas	.6	3.2	8.1	.3
Tenerife	1.3	2.1	3.4	.1
CANTABRIA	1.4	10.1	2.5	.9
CAST.-MANCHA				
Albacete	.7	6.8	3.0	.1
Ciudad Real	.6	6.5	1.7	.1
Cuenca	1.1	6.8	2.8	1.0
Guadalajara	2.2	10.9	4.4	.6
Toledo	.5	5.8	2.0	.2
CAST.-LEON				
Avila	1.4	9.5	.7	.6
Burgos	2.0	7.6	4.2	.8
León	1.5	8.8	5.3	.8
Palencia	1.2	7.8	4.3	.6
Salamanca	2.3	13.9	4.0	.9
Segovia	3.4	11.5	5.5	3.7
Soria	2.2	8.7	4.1	.9
Valladolid	2.3	12.6	1.5	.3
Zamora	1.9	7.1	2.0	.6
CATALUNYA				
Barcelona	.5	3.5	1.3	.1
Girona	.7	2.5	1.8	.2
Lleida	1.4	3.5	2.3	.2
Tarragona	.9	3.4	2.2	.3
C.VALENCIANA				
Alicante	.6	5.2	2.9	.3
Castellón	1.0	7.0	3.1	.4
Valencia	.7	5.1	2.1	.4
EXTREMADURA				
Badajoz	.9	4.4	4.2	.2
Cáceres	.4	4.3	2.3	.3
GALICIA				
A Coruña	1.5	9.8	2.9	.1
Lugo	1.0	8.6	3.3	.1
Ourense	1.2	3.5	3.4	.4
Pontevedra	2.4	7.0	3.7	.1
MADRID	1.0	11.1	3.8	.3
MURCIA	.3	6.7	8.2	.6
NAVARRA	1.3	7.0	2.4	.3
BASQUE COUNTRY				
Alava	.8	9.6	5.1	.3
Guipúzcoa	1.4	5.3	2.6	.3
Vizcaya	.3	4.6	2.4	.3
LA RIOJA	1.9	6.1	1.4	.2

Table A III.26 Loyal to AP/PP: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	9.0	58.3	39.1	57.4	76.7	82.3	70.2
Cádiz	7.3	57.0	62.3	64.8	90.1	91.1	76.2
Córdoba	12.2	47.5	49.3	65.0	87.6	93.3	86.4
Granada	16.7	39.6	67.2	74.3	89.8	93.1	82.8
Huelva	7.1	46.3	59.4	61.4	76.8	95.0	86.3
Jaén	12.4	43.7	58.7	74.1	87.8	92.0	81.6
Málaga	6.9	48.9	43.5	56.2	78.1	94.8	69.8
Sevilla	32.5	61.2	55.5	80.1	92.2	94.7	88.0
ARAGON							
Huesca	3.6	37.8	32.5	48.7	71.8	79.8	54.6
Teruel	16.7	66.0	55.4	73.9	79.0	85.1	69.2
Zaragoza	9.8	37.4	43.2	75.2	77.8	79.0	73.0
ASTURIAS							
	22.0	56.6	73.4	78.6	91.7	95.0	83.1
BALEARES							
	34.4	51.0	55.7	85.8	89.0	89.4	87.9
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	9.3	22.8	62.8	58.9	81.1	88.2	90.5
Tenerife	5.7	29.9	30.7	71.9	73.2	83.4	67.3
CANTABRIA							
	26.1	56.1	54.1	76.6	62.3	78.0	84.8
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	6.9	52.5	47.9	80.9	87.6	89.8	78.9
Ciudad Real	3.2	44.6	53.0	74.4	91.9	93.8	86.9
Cuenca	17.3	44.1	47.4	74.2	79.9	83.1	76.1
Guadalajara	16.3	52.7	59.9	75.1	82.8	82.6	76.2
Toledo	9.7	53.9	58.1	77.8	85.1	86.5	81.5
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	28.1	42.9	42.0	75.5	78.2	84.3	61.4
Burgos	11.5	63.3	60.0	79.0	87.4	89.4	81.6
León	16.8	56.1	68.0	82.4	87.2	93.8	77.5
Palencia	14.3	47.3	59.8	80.4	85.7	90.1	85.1
Salamanca	13.3	45.2	53.4	76.8	81.9	83.7	72.3
Segovia	19.5	33.4	54.5	53.8	74.4	82.7	78.6
Soria	30.9	55.3	56.3	73.7	79.8	83.8	75.4
Valladolid	10.7	43.9	54.3	82.7	85.3	86.8	81.3
Zamora	20.1	54.0	52.2	72.4	83.6	87.8	75.0
CALUNYA							
Barcelona	15.7	53.8	50.0	75.6	88.5	84.1	85.2
Girona	12.6	28.7	37.8	43.8	65.3	71.3	72.8
Lleida	8.3	45.3	52.1	51.6	75.8	75.8	75.5
Tarragona	12.7	49.5	46.9	60.9	77.2	80.6	79.6
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	15.6	41.1	59.6	73.4	91.0	91.7	81.2
Castellón	7.6	52.3	26.9	73.7	84.6	76.5	82.2
Valencia	18.3	55.9	53.3	51.9	72.6	94.0	86.2
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	12.6	51.1	59.5	71.2	84.9	81.7	66.0
Cáceres	12.1	44.8	55.7	73.8	82.5	89.1	78.8
GALICIA							
A Coruña	36.1	71.9	54.9	73.1	77.9	94.3	72.5
Lugo	45.9	71.8	61.8	67.3	67.7	94.1	79.2
Ourense	22.4	50.9	48.1	60.4	53.7	83.5	76.1
Pontevedra	17.1	57.4	41.7	70.3	76.4	91.1	76.7
MADRID							
	23.9	68.5	64.9	89.2	94.1	98.2	92.5
MURCIA							
	21.2	60.0	60.0	75.1	92.7	94.5	80.6
NAVARRA							
		51.5	64.8	84.3	84.3	83.8	80.5
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava			51.4	67.9	83.9	89.9	76.2
Guipúzcoa			61.2	60.6	78.4	85.2	75.9
Vizcaya			69.5	78.1	88.4	92.9	81.7
LA RIOJA	38.6	61.5	53.1	73.7	82.8	83.4	74.8

Table A III.27 AP/PP voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	47.5	9.7	24.9	19.0	8.2	9.9	20.0
Cádiz	41.9	14.2	23.6	17.3	4.6	4.4	16.8
Córdoba	34.7	14.7	24.1	18.1	5.7	4.1	10.6
Granada	29.8	17.7	13.5	14.3	4.8	4.1	9.7
Huelva	39.7	13.1	19.1	21.8	7.1	3.0	10.1
Jaén	18.5	10.8	12.9	11.2	3.0	3.6	10.6
Málaga	48.9	19.3	22.2	22.9	11.7	3.6	23.5
Sevilla	31.2	11.1	21.5	11.1	3.7	2.8	7.5
ARAGON							
Huesca	36.5	16.5	24.3	22.5	7.6	8.6	20.6
Teruel	24.5	11.9	20.5	11.8	7.2	7.5	12.6
Zaragoza	36.3	10.1	20.5	10.8	4.6	9.8	10.6
ASTURIAS							
BALEARES							
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	55.2	32.3	12.1	18.1	2.1	5.0	5.2
Tenerife	52.7	17.1	35.2	14.1	15.5	9.6	20.9
CANTABRIA							
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	38.9	7.0	16.2	5.1	3.0	4.1	12.1
Ciudad Real	24.0	18.6	22.1	7.6	2.6	2.5	6.7
Cuenca	31.0	12.1	23.1	9.8	5.6	6.1	9.4
Guadalajara	32.0	13.2	15.7	10.6	6.8	8.1	9.0
Toledo	21.2	17.9	17.3	7.6	3.7	4.4	7.4
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	19.9	9.3	16.2	8.9	7.5	6.5	19.8
Burgos	26.7	10.2	13.8	9.1	4.6	5.7	8.7
León	40.8	7.5	8.7	5.8	3.6	2.6	5.2
Palencia	20.9	7.4	16.3	6.9	4.2	4.8	6.2
Salamanca	28.4	8.2	11.7	9.8	6.7	6.8	14.1
Segovia	21.7	16.6	15.1	14.4	9.4	11.3	10.0
Soria	26.9	10.5	21.6	13.0	10.4	11.0	13.0
Valladolid	20.4	8.9	14.4	3.3	3.6	4.6	7.6
Zamora	33.1	10.2	14.7	10.4	4.7	5.4	11.2
CALUNYA							
Barcelona	45.0	8.4	20.3	7.4	2.0	7.9	6.9
Girona	36.7	22.6	28.8	33.6	18.3	16.7	20.2
Lleida	44.8	16.5	22.0	24.5	9.5	9.3	13.8
Tarragona	28.3	17.1	24.5	26.0	12.2	11.1	13.5
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	28.9	9.6	14.3	3.0	1.6	1.8	6.7
Castellón	36.2	8.5	25.6	5.8	1.9	10.7	5.6
Valencia	30.5	12.1	15.1	17.4	7.9	3.1	6.4
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	31.6	13.0	16.3	11.7	7.1	9.9	22.5
Cáceres	37.0	15.9	16.1	11.1	7.4	5.8	12.5
GALICIA							
A Coruña	36.7	8.5	19.6	16.6	6.1	3.1	15.4
Lugo	32.1	14.2	19.1	19.4	10.4	3.7	9.7
Ourense	43.4	17.4	17.0	23.1	18.7	12.7	13.4
Pontevedra	50.0	6.3	22.8	18.9	12.0	6.6	12.5
MADRID							
MURCIA							
NAVARRA							
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	36.2		11.9	16.5	4.6	4.0	3.3
Guipúzcoa			20.5	22.4	8.7	5.5	3.7
Vizcaya	35.2		14.0	12.9	4.4	2.7	2.2
LA RIOJA	27.2	11.3	20.8	12.9	5.2	7.6	11.9

Table A III.28 AP/PP voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	.8	1.2	4.2	4.8	2.3	2.1	.9
Cádiz	1.1	.6	1.1	1.6	.9	.7	.2
Córdoba	2.1	1.0	2.8	4.3	1.4	1.1	.4
Granada	2.7	.9	2.3	2.4	.7	.5	.4
Huelva	3.5	.5	.9	1.7	1.6	.4	.3
Jaén	6.0	1.1	1.5	1.2	.2	.4	.2
Málaga	5.2	1.1	4.9	7.2	3.9	.8	.6
Sevilla	1.9	.5	1.4	.8	.4	.1	.1
ARAGON							
Huesca	1.5	1.3	2.3	2.6	.9	1.4	.8
Teruel	1.2	.4	.7	.6	.4	.9	.3
Zaragoza	1.4	1.5	.7	.9	.3	1.6	.2
ASTURIAS	1.5	.9	.1	.3	.1	.0	.1
BALEARES	2.6	.8	.4	.1	.1	.2	.1
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	3.2		3.5	7.0	3.8	1.5	.4
Tenerife	4.4		2.7	3.8	2.7	.9	.6
CANTABRIA	.7	1.2	.7	.5	.1	1.8	.2
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	4.9	.6	1.5	.5	.3	.5	.4
Ciudad Real	.8	.9	.6	.2	.1	.1	.1
Cuenca	2.6	.7	1.0	.6	.5	.7	.3
Guadalajara	1.5	1.1	.9	.4	.2	.5	.3
Toledo	1.6	.6	.9	.6	.3	.4	.2
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	3.8	1.1	1.0	1.5	1.4	2.6	2.0
Burgos	.8	.6	.5	.7	.2	.5	.3
León	1.9	.5	.4	.6	.3	.2	.1
Palencia	.4	1.0	.5	.2	.1	.1	.1
Salamanca	1.6	.6	1.2	1.4	.9	1.6	.8
Segovia	2.4	1.0	.7	1.2	.7	.6	.2
Soria	1.6	.8	1.4	.7	.4	.6	.7
Valladolid	1.0	1.7	.4	.1	.1	.1	.1
Zamora	.6	.5	.9	.5	.3	.3	.4
CALUNYA							
Barcelona	.7	.7	.6	.6	.3	.3	.2
Girona	3.9	1.0	1.2	1.6	1.1	1.3	.6
Lleida	2.0	1.2	1.4	1.9	1.4	1.2	.4
Tarragona	2.8	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.6	.9	.4
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	3.7	.8	.8	.5	.2	.2	.2
Castellón	2.4	1.1	1.2	.3	.2	.4	.3
Valencia	4.3	1.1	1.1	2.0	1.8	.3	.3
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	3.4	.9	1.2	1.5	.8	1.4	.8
Cáceres	2.8	.6	.9	1.9	1.1	1.2	.9
GALICIA							
A Coruña	1.0	.7	.5	.4	.5	.0	.1
Lugo	.3	.2	.3	.2	.3	.1	.1
Ourense	1.1	.3	.5	.7	.8	.2	.1
Pontevedra	1.5	1.3	.5	.3	.3	.1	.1
MADRID	.5	.3	.6	.2	.0	.0	.2
MURCIA	3.5	1.6	1.6	2.4	.4	.9	.9
NAVARRA		.2	.4	.6	.9	1.1	.9
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	1.3		.3	.5	.7	1.7	1.4
Guipúzcoa			.2	1.0	1.7	2.3	2.3
Vizcaya	.4		.2	.6	.6	.5	1.0
LA RIOJA	1.2	.7	.9	.7	.2	.6	.5

Table A III.29 AP/PP voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
ANDALUCIA							
Almería	9.3	24.2	15.1	10.2	5.1	2.4	4.1
Cádiz	.9	13.8	1.2	.3	.2	.1	.6
Córdoba	10.9	26.7	7.0	2.4	.6	.2	.3
Granada	7.9	24.6	4.9	1.9	.7	.3	.6
Huelva	13.5	26.8	9.2	7.1	9.2	.6	.5
Jaén	16.8	32.1	13.2	8.0	4.6	2.2	2.5
Málaga	10.3	25.1	15.7	3.0	1.8	.1	.9
Sevilla	1.4	16.2	8.1	.7	.9	.1	.6
ARAGON							
Huesca	11.3	26.8	18.0	10.5	3.8	6.2	7.2
Teruel	7.8	9.7	5.1	3.5	2.9	3.4	1.6
Zaragoza	8.3	39.2	10.4	3.6	2.3	4.3	3.3
ASTURIAS							
	11.0	24.7	11.9	6.8	2.2	.9	3.1
BALEARES							
	3.4	6.3	2.2	1.0	.7	1.2	.3
CANARIAS							
Las Palmas	7.8	15.7	3.4	3.2	.3	1.4	.5
Tenerife	2.8	31.8	8.0	1.4	.7	.9	1.8
CANTABRIA							
	2.6	22.3	8.6	2.4	3.5	5.6	.6
CAST.-MANCHA							
Albacete	14.2	32.2	21.5	9.5	5.7	3.5	4.6
Ciudad Real	7.3	26.2	12.8	13.4	3.0	2.1	2.8
Cuenca	13.7	26.5	15.3	7.9	7.0	6.6	8.0
Guadalajara	4.9	15.7	9.7	6.7	4.5	4.6	7.2
Toledo	3.7	13.3	9.8	8.5	6.1	5.8	5.8
CAST.-LEON							
Avila	22.2	31.7	9.4	8.6	5.6	2.8	8.9
Burgos	3.8	11.9	8.4	2.0	1.5	.7	1.1
León	9.1	21.4	7.9	3.0	1.1	.4	.5
Palencia	3.4	30.9	7.8	2.7	1.5	1.1	1.0
Salamanca	9.0	35.2	12.5	4.5	4.0	3.6	4.8
Segovia	13.8	26.7	6.2	5.8	2.6	1.9	2.1
Soria	9.7	20.8	6.9	1.6	1.5	.8	1.3
Valladolid	4.0	34.5	14.0	7.4	5.2	5.0	4.4
Zamora	3.1	21.9	14.6	9.1	5.7	3.1	4.8
CALUNYA							
Barcelona	1.0	3.2	.4	.1	.2	.4	.9
Girona	7.7	7.8	10.2	3.8	4.9	6.7	2.8
Lleida	5.9	14.8	9.0	4.5	5.7	5.6	4.0
Tarragona	4.7	9.1	7.3	2.3	2.9	2.6	2.2
C.VALENCIANA							
Alicante	10.6	34.7	8.2	11.1	3.3	4.6	7.2
Castellón	10.4	25.9	26.6	12.6	10.0	10.4	6.5
Valencia	6.1	12.9	10.1	10.7	8.4	1.0	2.0
EXTREMADURA							
Badajoz	18.7	21.1	8.4	7.3	2.4	4.5	5.7
Cáceres	13.7	23.7	12.4	6.5	5.1	1.7	2.4
GALICIA							
A Coruña	3.1	10.9	6.1	3.0	4.5	.2	2.9
Lugo	4.2	4.9	7.5	5.1	7.4	.1	.7
Ourense	4.4	18.7	15.9	8.0	9.9	1.1	1.7
Pontevedra	2.9	23.6	14.7	3.3	3.5	.3	1.6
MADRID							
	1.5	3.7	1.3	.3	.1	.0	.2
MURCIA							
	6.3	9.5	3.8	5.9	1.8	1.0	1.7
NAVARRA							
		9.8	9.8	3.4	7.6	4.6	7.2
BASQUE COUNTRY							
Alava	8.6		17.0	3.6	1.5	2.2	11.4
Guipúzcoa			5.8	2.0	3.0	2.7	6.2
Vizcaya	2.0		1.9	.7	1.0	.4	1.9
LA RIOJA							
	3.8	15.5	11.3	4.9	5.5	4.1	4.4

Table A III.30 AP/PP voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82
ANDALUCIA		
Almería	26.0	.3
Cádiz	29.3	.2
Córdoba	26.2	.6
Granada	22.0	2.6
Huelva	6.7	.8
Jaén	28.2	.6
Málaga	7.8	.1
Sevilla	9.1	.3
ARAGON		
Huesca	35.6	4.7
Teruel	40.9	2.5
Zaragoza	25.9	.5
ASTURIAS	23.4	.8
BALEARES	23.2	4.9
CANARIAS		
Las Palmas	4.2	.2
Tenerife	26.8	1.3
CANTABRIA	22.7	2.8
CAST.-MANCHA		
Albacete	28.2	.5
Ciudad Real	46.9	2.2
Cuenca	32.0	4.4
Guadalajara	32.4	6.6
Toledo	48.9	3.1
CAST.-LEON		
Avila	15.6	3.8
Burgos	49.4	4.0
León	24.5	6.2
Palencia	44.4	2.4
Salamanca	41.6	3.1
Segovia	34.4	7.7
Soria	21.7	2.9
Valladolid	46.6	1.3
Zamora	36.3	2.1
CALUNYA		
Barcelona	17.8	1.7
Girona	19.0	1.9
Lleida	19.7	.9
Tarragona	34.3	1.3
C.VALENCIANA		
Alicante	28.3	.6
Castellón	30.6	.3
Valencia	17.6	1.2
EXTREMADURA		
Badajoz	24.6	1.8
Cáceres	21.3	4.2
GALICIA		
A Coruña	11.9	1.0
Lugo	9.5	2.1
Ourense	17.7	6.2
Pontevedra	19.1	.4
MADRID	44.1	3.6
MURCIA	15.7	1.5
NAVARRA		3.8
BASQUE COUNTRY		
Alava	26.5	
Guipúzcoa		
Vizcaya	9.0	
LA RIOJA	23.6	3.2

Table A III.31 AP/PP voters opting for CDS: Ecol percentages

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93
ANDALUCIA				
Almería	1.8	7.6	1.7	.4
Cádiz	2.8	2.7	1.0	.2
Córdoba	1.9	10.0	4.4	.3
Granada	5.4	6.0	3.3	.4
Huelva	2.3	4.4	1.7	.2
Jaén	1.3	5.4	1.7	.2
Málaga	1.0	5.7	1.6	.4
Sevilla	2.7	4.5	.7	.3
ARAGON				
Huesca	4.3	7.3	3.2	.7
Teruel	3.8	5.9	2.9	.5
Zaragoza	3.7	3.3	1.1	.2
ASTURIAS	4.7	2.6	2.2	.4
BALEARES	.5	4.8	2.0	.1
CANARIAS				
Las Palmas	3.2	1.6	1.4	.0
Tenerife	3.1	4.7	1.0	.5
CANTABRIA	2.2	7.1	2.3	.2
CAST.-MANCHA				
Albacete	2.5	6.7	.8	.2
Ciudad Real	2.2	5.3	1.5	.2
Cuenca	1.9	5.2	2.2	.8
Guadalajara	2.9	5.3	1.4	.5
Toledo	3.5	8.2	1.9	.4
CAST.-LEON				
Avila	4.9	22.6	1.6	1.0
Burgos	2.6	9.2	3.0	.5
León	2.3	5.6	1.6	.6
Palencia	3.2	7.3	3.2	.7
Salamanca	3.5	12.3	3.2	.8
Segovia	8.4	14.6	17.7	3.1
Soria	5.7	4.7	3.5	1.1
Valladolid	3.6	8.9	1.6	.9
Zamora	2.3	8.3	3.3	.4
CALUNYA				
Barcelona	2.5	1.6	.9	.1
Girona	2.5	2.9	3.7	.6
Lleida	2.3	2.9	2.9	.3
Tarragona	1.4	3.6	1.6	.3
C.VALENCIANA				
Alicante	5.4	8.4	6.0	.3
Castellón	4.3	8.5	2.9	.2
Valencia	3.1	4.5	2.5	.7
EXTREMADURA				
Badajoz	1.4	7.3	4.7	.7
Cáceres	2.2	4.6	2.5	.4
GALICIA				
A Coruña	1.6	4.6	2.0	.4
Lugo	.6	2.1	2.6	.2
Ourense	.7	5.2	2.9	.6
Pontevedra	3.4	6.2	2.6	.4
MADRID	14.1	8.2	1.3	.4
MURCIA	1.6	5.1	3.5	.1
NAVARRA	2.3	3.5	1.2	.3
BASQUE COUNTRY				
Alava		7.0	1.4	.3
Guipúzcoa		3.6	1.4	.3
Vizcaya		7.6	1.4	.3
LA RIOJA	2.7	6.8	1.9	.3

Table A III.32 Loyal to UCD: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82
ANDALUCIA		
Almería	63.6	26.4
Cádiz	49.7	14.8
Córdoba	59.6	18.8
Granada	55.8	10.1
Huelva	62.0	18.2
Jaén	55.3	19.4
Málaga	74.7	12.3
Sevilla	67.0	12.8
ARAGON		
Huesca	63.0	24.1
Teruel	61.1	28.0
Zaragoza	68.3	19.3
ASTURIAS	66.4	9.6
BALEARES	55.9	17.6
CANARIAS		
Las Palmas	73.2	25.5
Tenerife	72.2	31.6
CANTABRIA		
CAST.-MANCHA	67.6	7.6
Albacete	49.7	13.2
Ciudad Real	67.4	20.8
Cuenca	63.6	23.0
Guadalajara	59.0	21.4
Toledo	58.1	21.1
CAST.-LEON		
Avila	68.3	11.0
Burgos	55.5	9.6
León	55.2	21.0
Palencia	69.0	19.9
Salamanca	60.8	20.9
Segovia	57.8	12.7
Soria	57.7	26.7
Valladolid	54.0	15.6
Zamora	59.1	28.6
CATALUNYA		
Barcelona	24.7	2.6
Girona	47.6	3.7
Lleida	53.9	12.8
Tarragona	65.2	14.3
C.VALENCIANA		
Alicante	78.2	19.1
Castellón	64.9	26.2
Valencia	59.0	8.2
EXTREMADURA		
Badajoz	64.0	15.8
Cáceres	65.0	19.8
GALICIA		
A Coruña	63.0	15.5
Lugo	53.7	21.5
Ourense	52.7	32.1
Pontevedra	59.4	28.1
MADRID	52.5	8.3
MURCIA	54.4	14.5
NAVARRA	64.1	19.7
BASQUE COUNTRY		
Alava	48.8	
Guipúzcoa		
Vizcaya	49.0	
LA RIOJA	67.8	12.2

Table A III.33 UCD voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86
ANDALUCIA			
Almería	25.9	27.0	26.0
Cádiz	32.2	39.2	47.2
Córdoba	23.9	19.0	13.8
Granada	28.0	17.7	51.2
Huelva	22.1	17.1	24.5
Jaén	26.8	14.3	31.5
Málaga	12.8	27.1	35.0
Sevilla	13.8	16.1	15.1
ARAGON			
Huesca	21.3	16.4	25.8
Teruel	24.5	11.0	19.8
Zaragoza	19.1	18.6	23.5
ASTURIAS	24.3	14.4	77.1
BALEARES	23.4	15.2	10.9
CANARIAS			
Las Palmas	15.2	9.7	6.5
Tenerife	20.8	34.9	18.4
CANTABRIA	20.8	15.2	37.4
CAST.-MANCHA			
Albacete	30.2	17.2	35.9
Ciudad Real	19.0	18.1	28.9
Cuenca	23.5	14.9	23.8
Guadalajara	22.0	17.1	25.4
Toledo	17.4	8.7	12.6
CAST.-LEON			
Avila	22.1	11.8	38.5
Burgos	28.7	13.8	26.1
León	26.7	14.6	44.0
Palencia	20.4	13.1	14.6
Salamanca	23.0	16.4	34.8
Segovia	25.5	14.0	18.1
Soria	23.2	17.9	20.6
Valladolid	23.0	16.3	4.8
Zamora	21.7	16.2	39.5
CATALUNYA			
Barcelona	48.0	19.7	37.4
Girona	28.1	18.8	41.3
Lleida	26.0	20.6	45.3
Tarragona	18.8	23.5	28.9
C.VALENCIANA			
Alicante	11.6	12.3	7.8
Castellón	14.8	13.2	11.8
Valencia	19.4	11.8	19.6
EXTREMADURA			
Badajoz	18.2	9.2	20.9
Cáceres	19.9	15.6	42.1
GALICIA			
A Coruña	26.7	25.2	56.1
Lugo	27.1	31.7	50.3
Ourense	32.6	18.2	50.3
Pontevedra	29.7	29.3	57.2
MADRID	24.8	9.9	10.1
MURCIA	22.0	15.2	19.2
NAVARRA	18.5	9.6	33.8
BASQUE COUNTRY			
Alava	24.8	9.1	
Guipúzcoa		10.3	
Vizcaya	17.6	10.3	
LA RIOJA	17.4	13.7	14.5

Table A III.34 UCD voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86
ANDALUCIA			
Almería	.5	.5	.2
Cádiz	.9	1.1	1.5
Córdoba	.5	.7	.3
Granada	1.3	.9	.8
Huelva	.5	.6	.3
Jaén	1.4	1.9	.8
Málaga	.9	2.6	2.5
Sevilla	1.0	1.3	2.6
ARAGON			
Huesca	1.0	.6	.5
Teruel	.6	.1	.3
Zaragoza	.3	.3	.1
ASTURIAS	.3	.1	.1
BALEARES	1.4	.3	.1
CANARIAS			
Las Palmas	.2		.1
Tenerife	.3		.4
CANTABRIA	.5	.5	.8
CAST.-MANCHA			
Albacete	2.8	1.5	.7
Ciudad Real	.6	.5	.2
Cuenca	1.6	1.0	1.0
Guadalajara	.9	.8	.4
Toledo	2.4	.4	.4
CAST.-LEON			
Avila	.7	.5	.5
Burgos	.9	.6	.8
León	1.1	.5	.3
Palencia	.2	.2	.2
Salamanca	.8	.7	.4
Segovia	.7	.7	.4
Soria	1.0	.6	.4
Valladolid	1.1	.4	.1
Zamora	.8	.3	.3
CATALUNYA			
Barcelona	2.8	1.3	.6
Girona	2.1	1.6	1.3
Lleida	1.9	.8	1.0
Tarragona	1.7	1.6	1.2
C.VALENCIANA			
Alicante	.4	.5	.1
Castellón	1.7	1.4	.2
Valencia	1.9	.8	1.4
EXTREMADURA			
Badajoz	.8	.3	.3
Cáceres	.8	.4	.8
GALICIA			
A Coruña	.4	.5	.1
Lugo	.6	.3	.3
Ourense	.7	.2	.3
Pontevedra	.6	.3	.1
MADRID	1.1	.6	.3
MURCIA	.8	.9	.2
NAVARRA	.3	.3	.8
BASQUE COUNTRY			
Alava	.6	.3	
Guipúzcoa		.7	
Vizcaya	1.1	.6	
LA RIOJA	.5	.5	.6

Table A III.35 UCD voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86
ANDALUCIA			
Almería	5.6	25.6	44.5
Cádiz	2.4	25.8	15.2
Córdoba	5.5	33.6	69.5
Granada	6.4	30.8	26.2
Huelva	5.4	32.9	54.5
Jaén	9.3	25.7	33.4
Málaga	7.4	35.4	44.0
Sevilla	5.4	33.9	56.2
ARAGON			
Huesca	6.9	19.1	19.8
Teruel	4.0	8.6	7.3
Zaragoza	2.9	8.3	23.7
ASTURIAS	1.8	17.4	5.4
BALEARES	9.2	11.9	3.3
CANARIAS			
Las Palmas	5.6	15.5	18.4
Tenerife	1.7	7.5	45.5
CANTABRIA	1.9	13.9	16.1
CAST.-MANCHA			
Albacete	8.9	28.3	23.6
Ciudad Real	4.3	14.0	18.0
Cuenca	5.3	20.7	15.1
Guadalajara	5.0	12.9	7.9
Toledo	9.8	15.9	17.2
CAST.-LEON			
Avila	2.5	9.2	4.2
Burgos	2.8	12.5	7.7
León	5.7	19.5	6.0
Palencia	1.2	2.9	2.6
Salamanca	3.7	20.4	11.4
Segovia	3.7	13.7	5.7
Soria	6.8	6.2	4.0
Valladolid	4.3	13.3	19.2
Zamora	6.2	11.3	3.2
CATALUNYA			
Barcelona	6.1	9.1	1.7
Girona	6.6	18.3	10.8
Lleida	5.0	8.8	3.9
Tarragona	3.3	10.0	3.6
C.VALENCIANA			
Alicante	4.8	5.4	8.2
Castellón	9.6	20.3	6.2
Valencia	8.1	32.6	24.5
EXTREMADURA			
Badajoz	11.3	35.0	39.7
Cáceres	7.2	19.1	16.9
GALICIA			
A Coruña	2.5	24.4	4.5
Lugo	6.9	14.0	5.1
Ourense	4.0	13.0	2.6
Pontevedra	1.5	8.4	2.2
MADRID	5.3	12.5	2.8
MURCIA	17.3	28.7	41.5
NAVARRA	3.8	21.1	10.8
BASQUE COUNTRY			
Alava	4.0	24.0	
Guipúzcoa		26.5	
Vizcaya	7.6	25.2	
LA RIOJA	2.7	16.1	20.5

Table A III.36 UCD voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86
ANDALUCIA			
Almería	.7	11.0	15.6
Cádiz	1.7	11.1	6.4
Córdoba	2.5	18.3	7.5
Granada	2.4	33.4	10.5
Huelva	1.7	24.8	13.0
Jaén	1.4	31.4	26.2
Málaga	.5	12.1	4.9
Sevilla	2.2	27.4	13.9
ARAGON			
Huesca	2.8	24.4	21.6
Teruel	4.4	38.9	29.9
Zaragoza	1.2	42.9	21.6
ASTURIAS	3.0	48.9	12.2
BALEARES	2.6	40.5	39.5
CANARIAS			
Las Palmas	.4	28.4	2.7
Tenerife	.8	16.7	5.2
CANTABRIA	2.4	49.5	30.3
CAST.-MANCHA			
Albacete	2.1	28.7	33.0
Ciudad Real	2.9	37.5	46.3
Cuenca	2.5	29.0	40.2
Guadalajara	6.6	38.1	53.9
Toledo	4.1	43.4	44.6
CAST.-LEON			
Avila	2.1	33.1	32.8
Burgos	5.8	52.0	28.7
León	6.9	32.7	28.6
Palencia	3.9	54.0	60.0
Salamanca	3.3	26.9	37.4
Segovia	4.0	41.4	30.6
Soria	4.3	32.8	47.7
Valladolid	3.6	43.5	62.8
Zamora	6.1	28.4	39.5
CATALUNYA			
Barcelona	3.8	24.1	8.5
Girona	3.8	17.1	13.5
Lleida	2.0	16.1	7.6
Tarragona	3.7	26.3	30.7
C.VALENCIANA			
Alicante	1.7	51.5	64.3
Castellón	1.5	24.4	75.5
Valencia	2.6	34.7	36.3
EXTREMADURA			
Badajoz	1.6	25.4	24.5
Cáceres	1.4	28.2	25.9
GALICIA			
A Coruña	2.4	22.8	30.8
Lugo	3.0	23.8	9.2
Ourense	5.4	31.9	14.9
Pontevedra	1.6	25.6	33.4
MADRID	8.8	56.2	70.2
MURCIA	2.0	33.9	26.4
NAVARRA	5.3	39.0	33.5
BASQUE COUNTRY			
Alava		43.9	
Guipúzcoa		40.8	
Vizcaya		42.7	
LA RIOJA	7.7	46.4	48.2

Table A III.37 UCD voters opting for CDS: Ecol percentages

	79-82	82-86
ANDALUCIA		
Almería	.5	2.1
Cádiz	2.1	23.1
Córdoba	1.0	1.2
Granada	1.4	4.2
Huelva	.4	.7
Jaén	.9	1.1
Málaga	1.3	2.0
Sevilla	.3	3.7
ARAGON		
Huesca	5.3	9.8
Teruel	4.3	7.1
Zaragoza	2.0	1.8
ASTURIAS	5.3	2.0
BALEARES	7.0	4.7
CANARIAS		
Las Palmas	3.8	68.7
Tenerife	3.4	24.7
CANTABRIA	6.6	7.9
CAST.-MANCHA		
Albacete	1.5	1.1
Ciudad Real	1.4	3.2
Cuenca	1.1	7.3
Guadalajara	2.2	2.8
Toledo	1.2	14.4
CAST.-LEON		
Avila	28.3	17.2
Burgos	3.8	13.4
León	2.2	8.4
Palencia	2.5	9.9
Salamanca	3.1	8.5
Segovia	6.6	32.7
Soria	2.9	10.9
Valladolid	2.6	2.1
Zamora	3.3	10.2
CATALUNYA		
Barcelona	2.0	1.4
Girona	2.3	5.3
Lleida	2.3	1.4
Tarragona	3.4	1.1
C.VALENCIANA		
Alicante	2.1	6.3
Castellón	1.4	1.5
Valencia	2.1	9.3
EXTREMADURA		
Badajoz	1.2	6.6
Cáceres	1.9	4.4
GALICIA		
A Coruña	1.4	1.9
Lugo	1.6	1.7
Ourense	.7	.6
Pontevedra	1.1	2.2
MADRID	4.9	5.0
MURCIA	.4	2.0
NAVARRA	3.6	9.4
BASQUE COUNTRY		
Alava	4.5	
Guipúzcoa	3.6	
Vizcaya	5.1	
LA RIOJA	3.1	8.5

Table A III.38 Loyal to CDS: Ecol Percentages

	82-86	86-89	89-93
ANDALUCIA			
Almería	28.3	17.6	4.0
Cádiz	10.4	33.4	6.8
Córdoba	18.5	18.6	6.1
Granada	29.5	29.3	5.3
Huelva	28.3	22.5	3.3
Jaén	9.3	23.6	6.0
Málaga	14.1	13.2	2.7
Sevilla	10.2	9.1	2.1
ARAGON			
Huesca	25.7	16.7	5.3
Teruel	27.3	37.0	6.3
Zaragoza	26.1	23.6	2.8
ASTURIAS	28.0	42.3	18.7
BALEARES	52.5	23.0	2.3
CANARIAS			
Las Palmas	32.8	63.3	.6
Tenerife	15.4	40.7	3.9
CANTABRIA	30.9	40.3	3.0
CAST.-MANCHA			
Albacete	17.8	30.9	11.6
Ciudad Real	22.2	30.0	10.9
Cuenca	11.7	22.2	8.7
Guadalajara	14.8	22.8	8.3
Toledo	25.8	38.8	7.4
CAST.-LEON			
Avila	81.4	64.0	28.2
Burgos	27.6	30.1	9.8
León	20.7	30.0	8.3
Palencia	24.5	16.3	13.3
Salamanca	33.9	33.7	13.3
Segovia	44.7	15.8	12.7
Soria	20.8	20.1	7.7
Valladolid	45.2	37.7	9.7
Zamora	35.0	34.6	12.7
CATALUNYA			
Barcelona	15.1	38.2	7.3
Girona	5.4	14.3	1.9
Lleida	7.4	14.8	2.9
Tarragona	12.5	20.5	3.2
C.VALENCIANA			
Alicante	42.6	30.4	4.7
Castellón	14.8	24.6	8.5
Valencia	19.7	30.6	5.5
EXTREMADURA			
Badajoz	16.6	40.0	6.1
Cáceres	15.3	36.8	10.5
GALICIA			
A Coruña	16.9	15.1	2.0
Lugo	12.5	18.2	3.2
Ourense	11.6	14.9	2.4
Pontevedra	20.0	10.0	2.5
MADRID	19.8	41.9	11.0
MURCIA	17.5	15.4	10.0
NAVARRA	26.7	25.4	5.2
BASQUE COUNTRY			
Alava	13.5	35.6	5.9
Guipúzcoa	22.4	17.6	2.6
Vizcaya	36.3	29.0	6.4
LA RIOJA	27.9	34.7	10.3

Table A III.39 CDS voters opting for abstention: Ecol Percentages

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
ANDALUCIA				
Almería	34.5	47.1	33.0	56.5
Cádiz	40.3	46.4	34.9	39.1
Córdoba	38.9	33.3	24.1	46.7
Granada	37.9	32.2	27.3	47.4
Huelva	43.2	40.2	38.1	58.4
Jaén	38.1	30.4	22.7	39.0
Málaga	36.1	40.8	30.0	47.8
Sevilla	36.4	48.9	28.2	35.2
ARAGON				
Huesca	35.7	17.5	20.2	45.1
Teruel	31.0	28.2	27.6	41.0
Zaragoza	31.9	30.6	26.1	45.8
ASTURIAS	27.1	22.1	14.9	53.6
BALEARES	11.3	32.3	13.0	63.1
CANARIAS				
Las Palmas	47.6	14.5	18.5	73.3
Tenerife	35.5	29.2	19.3	65.8
CANTABRIA	28.1	13.4	17.2	25.0
CAST.-MANCHA				
Albacete	30.2	27.4	27.7	45.2
Ciudad Real	31.1	35.6	22.2	44.6
Cuenca	37.4	26.3	21.2	36.0
Guadalajara	29.4	25.4	20.5	33.7
Toledo	39.5	21.3	15.2	31.2
CAST.-LEON				
Avila	13.3	17.1	11.2	25.6
Burgos	29.0	26.6	21.3	34.7
León	26.9	24.0	21.3	43.7
Palencia	25.4	29.1	21.2	34.7
Salamanca	26.4	20.0	18.5	35.7
Segovia	22.1	23.3	21.2	21.7
Soria	26.2	33.4	29.5	34.6
Valladolid	27.3	27.9	26.2	39.1
Zamora	24.7	23.1	21.5	39.2
CATALUNYA				
Barcelona	48.9	26.2	20.2	35.7
Girona	44.0	49.8	30.8	44.5
Lleida	53.7	45.7	35.7	49.8
Tarragona	39.2	36.7	35.8	46.5
C.VALENCIANA				
Alicante	32.3	28.3	14.1	40.2
Castellón	36.6	31.3	19.0	23.3
Valencia	33.6	25.9	18.4	58.1
EXTREMADURA				
Badajoz	43.6	24.3	16.3	30.0
Cáceres	36.3	23.9	24.3	35.2
GALICIA				
A Coruña	35.6	38.6	33.2	44.0
Lugo	44.8	34.2	27.3	35.3
Ourense	44.7	29.6	24.6	25.2
Pontevedra	32.2	28.3	16.9	46.7
MADRID	19.4	20.2	23.1	30.8
MURCIA	48.6	41.0	9.3	50.3
NAVARRA	38.2	40.8	27.9	41.5
BASQUE COUNTRY				
Alava	40.8	25.0	21.1	31.4
Guipúzcoa	40.8	36.9	20.9	32.9
Vizcaya	33.6	30.9	19.5	31.1
LA RIOJA	27.3	24.1	17.3	32.7

Table A III.40 CDS voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol Percentages

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
ANDALUCIA				
Almería	5.6	6.2	2.3	2.4
Cádiz	1.2	2.2	3.1	2.8
Córdoba	4.2	18.3	3.5	9.2
Granada	2.8	5.6	2.3	3.0
Huelva	1.2	3.5	5.7	3.8
Jaén	4.0	10.9	3.2	5.8
Málaga	2.8	6.1	3.3	4.5
Sevilla	1.0	1.4	3.4	1.1
ARAGON				
Huesca	1.3	8.0	4.6	12.8
Teruel	.9	2.0	2.3	4.8
Zaragoza	2.8	18.0	6.2	15.0
ASTURIAS				
	.3	10.2	5.5	2.5
BALEARES				
	.2	1.8	.5	9.1
CANARIAS				
Las Palmas	1.6	.2	.3	4.4
Tenerife	1.7	1.0	.5	3.3
CANTABRIA				
	1.1	2.9	1.2	21.0
CAST.-MANCHA				
Albacete	3.5	10.9	5.7	6.0
Ciudad Real	1.7	10.8	9.9	6.4
Cuenca	2.7	4.5	4.3	3.8
Guadalajara	3.2	13.3	10.9	10.2
Toledo	3.1	3.3	2.2	5.0
CAST.-LEON				
Avila	.3	2.3	.7	3.2
Burgos	1.2	7.0	5.3	11.1
León	1.4	5.6	4.1	3.7
Palencia	2.4	3.7	3.2	8.1
Salamanca	2.2	6.7	2.1	5.4
Segovia	1.5	4.0	3.4	11.6
Soria	2.8	3.7	6.2	10.3
Valladolid	2.2	13.5	6.6	8.7
Zamora	1.9	2.5	1.2	3.8
CATALUNYA				
Barcelona	2.8	23.7	19.5	12.3
Girona	1.8	3.4	4.4	4.8
Lleida	2.0	6.0	5.2	9.4
Tarragona	2.2	5.9	6.7	7.3
C.VALENCIANA				
Alicante	.8	3.0	1.3	3.7
Castellón	2.4	7.8	4.5	9.1
Valencia	3.0	11.4	8.8	11.9
EXTREMADURA				
Badajoz	1.7	4.5	2.3	4.4
Cáceres	2.1	8.7	5.0	13.5
GALICIA				
A Coruña	3.7	8.9	1.1	6.3
Lugo	.7	6.4	3.4	14.4
Ourense	1.0	5.2	3.5	12.3
Pontevedra	.8	4.3	2.4	3.4
MADRID				
	1.4	7.9	4.2	5.4
MURCIA				
	3.5	10.5	1.7	6.2
NAVARRA				
	1.1	5.0	14.0	16.9
BASQUE COUNTRY				
Alava	1.4	4.7	10.0	26.3
Guipúzcoa	1.5	6.9	19.5	19.3
Vizcaya	.6	5.4	17.4	15.3
LA RIOJA				
	1.9	8.7	7.8	17.6

Table A III.41 CDS voters opting for PSOE: Ecol Percentages

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
ANDALUCIA				
Almería	8.5	8.0	12.9	7.9
Cádiz	1.8	2.4	8.0	.9
Córdoba	12.7	3.0	15.7	6.8
Granada	7.9	3.0	3.8	3.3
Huelva	5.2	3.3	4.4	2.0
Jaén	20.5	9.6	23.0	6.9
Málaga	29.0	5.5	15.1	.4
Sevilla	12.6	3.6	35.9	1.5
ARAGON				
Huesca	12.1	16.5	12.3	9.1
Teruel	13.7	9.7	9.7	9.4
Zaragoza	16.9	4.0	2.6	5.9
ASTURIAS	24.4	6.5	6.2	10.8
BALEARES	8.2	5.2	3.1	14.0
CANARIAS				
Las Palmas	8.7	18.8	14.1	11.0
Tenerife	12.5	19.1	23.3	3.3
CANTABRIA	15.2	20.4	12.0	19.4
CAST.-MANCHA				
Albacete	21.6	12.1	10.8	8.3
Ciudad Real	18.5	5.9	8.0	7.2
Cuenca	20.2	20.2	16.1	15.9
Guadalajara	27.9	14.8	15.0	12.2
Toledo	10.6	17.8	15.2	7.0
CAST.-LEON				
Avila	.8	3.0	1.4	10.6
Burgos	21.3	9.7	10.5	10.5
León	19.5	12.5	25.3	9.5
Palencia	19.8	11.6	9.2	12.8
Salamanca	13.3	11.7	12.5	15.9
Segovia	15.1	9.0	10.6	17.6
Soria	24.8	15.2	13.1	9.3
Valladolid	9.3	1.7	5.5	5.7
Zamora	14.2	16.3	9.2	10.4
CATALUNYA				
Barcelona	3.9	4.5	11.5	14.4
Girona	9.2	12.2	17.3	25.3
Lleida	10.6	16.7	15.2	18.2
Tarragona	11.0	19.6	16.0	25.4
C.VALENCIANA				
Alicante	7.2	9.8	10.3	17.3
Castellón	22.0	13.1	15.5	27.4
Valencia	8.1	6.4	15.8	4.0
EXTREMADURA				
Badajoz	17.8	13.3	16.1	16.4
Cáceres	15.7	10.5	11.9	10.1
GALICIA				
A Coruña	20.8	13.0	15.5	2.2
Lugo	12.8	19.1	10.2	3.9
Ourense	16.2	19.7	19.5	6.2
Pontevedra	17.4	35.1	18.6	1.7
MADRID	3.2	8.3	9.8	2.5
MURCIA	7.0	14.2	18.4	21.3
NAVARRA	11.8	6.2	15.5	6.0
BASQUE COUNTRY				
Alava	15.7	15.0	10.6	9.8
Guipúzcoa	18.5	11.5	34.6	23.8
Vizcaya	5.7	6.6	22.5	10.2
LA RIOJA	18.5	5.5	7.0	7.7

Table A III.42 CDS voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol Percentages

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
ANDALUCIA				
Almería	13.4	8.5	34.4	24.7
Cádiz	37.8	5.4	30.5	44.6
Córdoba	17.0	14.5	30.4	27.6
Granada	13.2	16.2	46.4	32.5
Huelva	2.9	3.9	25.5	14.5
Jaén	17.8	5.5	27.8	33.7
Málaga	9.3	15.5	32.2	37.6
Sevilla	25.8	11.3	18.9	46.0
ARAGON				
Huesca	11.4	16.7	17.4	16.6
Teruel	14.1	12.9	22.9	33.2
Zaragoza	6.8	5.9	15.1	17.9
ASTURIAS	8.6	5.2	18.1	22.8
BALEARES	3.5	8.2	33.1	3.9
CANARIAS				
Las Palmas	1.6	.3	6.8	4.5
Tenerife	12.4	3.7	16.3	12.8
CANTABRIA	14.3	13.2	22.7	18.2
CAST.-MANCHA				
Albacete	16.8	7.3	27.4	28.8
Ciudad Real	16.4	6.0	20.5	28.7
Cuenca	17.8	18.7	29.5	27.9
Guadalajara	17.4	10.4	21.3	29.6
Toledo	13.0	9.1	40.4	39.2
CAST.-LEON				
Avila	1.3	6.6	22.9	47.4
Burgos	11.5	16.2	30.8	29.9
León	15.9	15.2	23.2	29.4
Palencia	16.6	28.2	25.3	29.2
Salamanca	13.7	18.1	25.6	34.6
Segovia	7.9	38.5	33.1	37.5
Soria	15.5	19.5	23.1	32.5
Valladolid	6.8	10.7	32.5	30.8
Zamora	12.2	14.6	27.6	26.9
CATALUNYA				
Barcelona	14.5	3.3	18.2	28.6
Girona	8.1	8.6	24.5	17.4
Lleida	5.1	7.2	21.1	13.4
Tarragona	13.6	6.3	17.9	10.1
C.VALENCIANA				
Alicante	10.2	16.9	56.4	14.4
Castellón	8.8	4.5	34.1	28.4
Valencia	19.9	12.2	34.9	19.8
EXTREMADURA				
Badajoz	11.1	9.2	43.4	34.8
Cáceres	14.7	8.3	27.7	31.9
GALICIA				
A Coruña	10.2	7.8	16.4	18.4
Lugo	15.2	8.2	20.6	15.1
Ourense	14.1	21.0	19.0	14.2
Pontevedra	13.1	7.0	18.9	24.3
MADRID	39.7	9.5	30.0	43.3
MURCIA	8.4	3.8	36.1	10.7
NAVARRA	9.1	9.1	15.9	14.6
BASQUE COUNTRY				
Alava	8.4	4.6	13.7	24.5
Guipúzcoa	4.2	7.6	10.0	13.2
Vizcaya	12.3	5.6	17.2	28.2
LA RIOJA	13.0	14.3	30.6	26.8

Appendix IV

Ecol Loyalty Rates and Selected Transition Matrixes for CiU, PNV and HB (only tables with transition rates above 10 percent included).

Table A IV.1 Loyal to CiU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Barcelona	49.5	56.0	77.9	83.7	82.6	87.0	75.3
Girona	39.5	57.3	76.5	77.5	79.9	84.7	72.8
Lleida	22.9	66.2	78.9	76.2	75.3	83.4	72.1
Tarragona	50.5	60.0	83.9	77.7	76.3	84.4	72.5

Table A IV.2 Loyal to PNV: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Alava	3.3	52.3	48.1	75.6	90.0	94.2	79.6
Guipúzcoa	61.3	83.7	65.5	47.0	87.0	90.7	69.7
Vizcaya	51.5	74.0	66.2	73.4	87.1	89.6	68.7

Table A IV.3 Loyal to HB: Ecol percentages

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
Alava	25.0	38.3	61.9	73.8	71.7
Guipúzcoa	68.3	69.3	77.4	84.8	84.8
Vizcaya	56.5	70.1	71.5	79.4	77.7

Table A IV.4 New voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
CATALUNYA							
Barcelona	5.8	6.1	19.1	21.2	36.3	7.8	8.0
Girona	17.6	17.7	33.8	11.3	28.4	20.9	21.8
Lleida	10.4	10.9	11.2	8.2	10.3	21.9	17.3
Tarragona	8.3	19.7	24.5	22.4	24.8	15.7	16.6

Table A IV.5 New voters opting for PNV: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Alava	5.1	8.5	5.9	.5	1.3	17.8	13.6
Guipúzcoa	9.7	23.2	9.3	9.4	12.1	14.8	23.1
Vizcaya	10.8	28.6	7.5	28.7	30.8	24.4	45.9

Table A IV.6 New voters opting for HB: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
Alava	5.3	6.6	13.2	.9	2.1	1.0
Guipúzcoa	6.9	5.9	6.6	6.8	7.7	3.8
Vizcaya	7.3	14.2	5.6	8.3	5.6	4.2

Table A IV.7 Abstainers opting for CiU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Barcelona	5.4	17.4	9.0	4.8	3.0	1.7	.7
Girona	10.2	29.3	27.0	14.8	12.5	9.0	4.6
Lleida	7.6	17.7	26.0	14.7	18.7	11.3	5.9
Tarragona	3.5	11.5	13.1	9.7	10.8	5.1	2.9

Table A IV.8 CiU voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Barcelona	20.8	10.9	9.6	3.1	1.3	5.0	10.7
Girona	24.6	12.7	13.3	11.9	5.4	6.0	10.6
Lleida	30.0	16.4	13.3	14.6	8.2	7.8	13.2
Tarragona	21.0	9.6	6.9	11.4	5.5	4.9	12.5

Table A IV.9 Abstainers opting for PNV: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Alava	18.1	16.7	24.6	3.2	4.5	6.8	3.0
Guipúzcoa	9.2	19.3	6.2	3.4	2.6	5.6	7.8
Vizcaya	19.5	22.4	5.7	4.8	1.9	1.3	7.6

Table A IV.10 PNV Voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Alava	34.8	23.4	25.6	8.8	3.5	2.2	14.7
Guipúzcoa	23.6	6.7	19.9	6.1	4.7	3.9	23.1
Vizcaya	27.4	11.3	16.7	2.4	4.4	6.3	24.1

Table A IV.11 Abstainers opting for HB: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
Alava	9.9	8.3	9.4	5.6	1.8	2.0
Guipúzcoa	26.6	13.9	10.7	4.6	2.6	3.2
Vizcaya	14.0	6.0	5.3	2.3	.5	.3

Table A IV.12 HB Voters opting for Abstention: Ecol percentages

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Alava	8.2	40.3	11.8	11.1	11.3	67.6
Guipúzcoa	12.0	18.0	10.5	8.0	8.6	85.5
Vizcaya	13.2	12.3	5.9	6.0	9.4	60.4

Table A IV.13 PCE/IU voters opting for HB: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
Alava	8.2	9.3	3.9	1.1	.2	.2
Guipúzcoa	9.2	16.8	3.9	2.0	.3	.1
Vizcaya	1.8	.5	.5	.3	.0	.0

Table A IV. 14 PSOE voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Barcelona	.6	.8	.2	.1	.0	.0	.1
Girona	15.8	9.6	1.5	.8	.8	.2	1.2
Lleida	3.2	2.1	2.6	.9	.8	.3	1.2
Tarragona	4.0	4.9	4.4	3.1	1.3	.7	2.4

Table A IV.15 CiU voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Barcelona	1.7	2.7	.2	.0	.0	.3	.1
Girona	11.3	8.8	1.5	.4	.2	1.9	.2
Lleida	14.3	5.1	.5	.3	.3	1.2	.3
Tarragona	11.2	13.7	1.6	1.4	1.5	4.3	1.1

Table A IV.16 PNV Voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Alava	22.5	4.7	1.0	.1	.0	.1	.1
Guipúzcoa	.4	.4	.4	.1	.1	.1	.3
Vizcaya	.5	.4	.1	.0	.1	.1	.1

Table A IV.17 HB Voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages

	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Alava	29.8	6.0	.5	.4	.6	1.0
Guipúzcoa	2.6	.7	.2	.2	.1	.4
Vizcaya	1.4	.4	.1	.2	.1	.2

Table A IV.18 AP/PP voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Barcelona	11.7	20.1	21.2	7.8	1.8	2.1	.2
Girona	7.4	22.7	10.0	5.8	2.5	1.6	.5
Lleida	10.3	8.7	5.6	5.9	2.3	3.4	.9
Tarragona	3.6	9.7	7.8	4.2	1.7	2.2	.7

Table A IV.19 CiU voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Barcelona	2.2	13.8	3.5	1.2	3.6	2.0	1.4
Girona	1.9	6.1	1.2	.6	.8	.2	.2
Lleida	.9	3.2	1.3	.4	2.5	.4	.7
Tarragona	1.0	4.1	1.1	.8	2.8	.7	.7

Table A IV.20 AP/PP voters opting for PNV: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96	96-00
Alava	4.6		4.6	2.4	1.2	.7	.4
Guipúzcoa			.9	1.0	.4	.3	.7
Vizcaya	17.6		.4	1.0	.2	.0	.5

Table A IV.21 UCD voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82	82-86
Barcelona	6.1	30.1	41.3
Girona	5.7	28.7	18.6
Lleida	5.5	29.4	29.8
Tarragona	.9	14.1	11.5

Table A IV.22 CiU voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages

	77-79	79-82
Barcelona	17.4	2.2
Girona	9.8	.6
Lleida	13.3	1.2
Tarragona	3.8	.3

Table A IV.23 CDS voters opting for CiU: Ecol Percentages

	82-86	86-89	89-93	93-96
Barcelona	7.6	.5	.5	.3
Girona	20.4	3.8	4.6	2.7
Lleida	11.7	2.3	5.9	2.9
Tarragona	10.6	2.6	4.8	2.4