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Sources of violence

Analyzing the literature on the Rwandan tragedy in the 1990s

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Preface

The thesis you are holding in your hands (or reading on your screen) is the result of many years of reflection on the literature on Rwanda. In my reading on Rwanda, I have been intrigued by the scornful disagreements between certain authors, and by what it means to be objective in the face of a tragedy of such massive proportions. My fear is that the acrimony in the literature feeds conflict in the Great Lakes region. My hope is that this thesis could strengthen the more nuanced positions of scholars, and contribute to a history both Hutus and Tutsis can relate to.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Christine Smith-Simonsen, for her invaluable suggestions and encouragement. For the many helpful comments on earlier versions of the thesis, I thank Katharina Bökenbrink and Karen Therese Ugelvik. I would also like to thank my family and friends, without whom I would be lost, as well as the people I met during my stay in Rwanda.

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Abstract

This is a historiographical thesis that analyzes the literature written about the massive human rights violations perpetrated in Rwanda in the 1990s. This violence includes the genocide against Tutsis in 1994, in which the majority of Tutsis within Rwanda were killed, as well as crimes against Hutus perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the scale and nature of which are difficult to establish. The RPF occupied the country during the genocide and has remained in power since.

There are two contending versions of history written about Rwanda, one favourable to the RPF, and one hostile to it. I call these camps Friends and Enemies of Rwanda, respectively. In between these contending camps lies the scholarly literature, which is more nuanced. The main focus of this thesis is not the scholarly literature, but rather the two antagonistic camps.

The thesis has both a qualitative and a quantitative part. In the qualitative part, I analyze the literature to show what characterizes these two camps by discussing some of the main controversies in Rwandan history; I also show where scholars stand with respect to both camps. In the quantitative part I analyze the patterns of references between the most important authors on Rwanda, and attempt to categorize the literature with citation network analysis.

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Map of Rwanda in 1994



Figure 1: Detailed map of the administrative divisions of Rwanda in 1994, made by the author.

The map is available in svg format at

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Administrative_divisions_of_Rwanda_in_1994.svg.

Introduction

Looking out the window of the minibus, I saw the moon hanging horizontally, something that can only be seen close to the equator. I was travelling in Eastern Rwanda in Africa in the dry season of 2022, taking the last bus from the border town Rusumu in the south to the transport hub Kayonza further north. As usual, the bus was completely full, and the Rwandans who took it were engaged in lively conversations. It all began when the bus driver and his helper started arguing among themselves. It turned out that they had been pilfering money from their bus agency by undercounting the passengers, and now they were fighting over how to divide the pickings. The passengers unanimously ridiculed the bus driver; the bus driver replied by mounting a defence so impassioned that certain commuters began doubting their safety. The conversation soon turned to gender relations, particularly on the question of whether women should participate in the labour market. Three young men in the front of the bus were adamantly opposed, arguing—perhaps in jest—that working women would be too tired for sex. Although the men were outnumbered, only a few older women bothered to contradict them, explaining that one salary is not enough to sustain a family. The men countered by suggesting that the women find new men if their husbands cannot provide for them.

I was trying to learn the local language, Kinyarwanda, but my level was still too basic to follow the discussion. I can recount it now because I had it translated to me by a friend I met along the way, who we may call Esperance.* Like most Rwandans, Esperance is too young to remember the genocide of 1994, in which the Tutsi minority was systematically killed. Even those who fled to the churches were not spared by the Hutu militias who called themselves *interahamwe* ('those who work together').

I had been studying the history of this genocide for years. In fact, I knew a bit too much. I knew that the current regime, which prides itself in having stopped the genocide, was guilty of massive human rights violations in the 1990s. The road we were driving on was a reminder of the complexity of Rwandan history. In late April 1994, when the world was learning about the extent of the genocide taking place against Tutsis, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled to Tanzania through the Rusumu border post—the place I was coming from. In the words of an UNHCR employee, 'The Rusumo road was just one compact mass of people, like a flow of lava descending inexorably toward the Tanzanian border.'¹ Confusingly, the fleeing Rwandans were Hutu, and they were fleeing

* For security reasons, I do not divulge the identity of people I met in Rwanda.

1 UNHCR, 'Cooperation Crucial in Rwanda Crisis'.

from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a predominantly Tutsi rebel group that is still in power in Rwanda today.

While studying the history of Rwanda, I had made what I believe is the most detailed map of Rwanda's administrative divisions in 1994 available (Figure 1). Such a map is necessary because the administrative system was completely changed in the early 2000s. Proud of my accomplishment, I showed Esperance what I had made in the bus, only to be told that such a thing should not be shown with so many people around. I was puzzled, isn't it just a map? 'Trust me, if the wrong person sees it, it's not "just a map"', she replied. I later understood that by 'wrong person', she meant certain Tutsis, although she never used the term Tutsi. Instead, she used long-winded euphemisms that put Tutsis squarely and unequivocally in the victim category. I suspected that this manner of speaking was not meant for me; it was meant to protect her against anyone who might be listening. Rwanda is a dictatorship, and for Rwandans like Esperance it is second nature to talk in favour of the authorities and the dictator, Paul Kagame. If Rwandans want to criticize the ruling class, they do it by speaking in codes that provide plausible deniability. I was not used to communicating in this way, and often struggled to discern the intended meaning. Sometimes it took months before it dawned on me why things were said in a particular way.

More forthright about ethnicity was a middle-aged man of Burundian origin, who we might call Joseph. In the civil war leading up to the genocide in the early nineties, Joseph had gone to Uganda to fight for the RPF. Joseph was still traumatized by what he had done for the RPF—although I never found out what that was. Given what I knew about recent Rwandan history, and certain things he said, I suspected that he had many lives on his conscience. Joseph seemed to harbor contempt for Hutus, and claimed that he could do 'anything' because he was Tutsi. It was clear that for Joseph, the Tutsis were in power in Rwanda, and it was imperative that Hutus never regain the presidency. Yet Joseph was also a victim of the dictatorship. He was poor, sick, and he could not speak freely. He told me in French that although Rwandans might smile to foreign visitors, they are in fact 'dying inside [*on meurt à l'interieur*]'. This is reflected in the UN World Happiness Report, where Rwanda consistently ranks very low.²

Joseph and Esperance overstepped the line in what they told me, but they were still holding back much of what they actually thought—things that were too sensitive or dangerous to say. The situation is well captured by the Kinyarwandan proverb *mu nda ni kure* (it is far to the gut).

2 The results of the World Happiness Report are available at <https://worldhappiness.report/data/> (Accessed May 2023).

Despite the authoritarian nature of RPF rule, post-genocide Rwanda has typically had a good reputation, also among Western democracies. At the time of my visit, Kigali, which was never a British colony, hosted the biannual Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). When a journalist from the BBC dared to question President Kagame about his commitment to upholding the values of human rights and democracy at the concluding press conference, she was met with a 30-minute rebuttal from an agitated Kagame. It is instructive to read an excerpt:

You take time, you broadcast and... from morning to evening you... this is literally just abusing people! You're abusing Rwandans, you're abusing Africans, you're... values, values, values... what values do you know my dear sister? On behalf of BBC? So I want to assure you, there is nobody, in the BBC, or anywhere else thereabout, who [is] beholding values better than we do here in Rwanda. Except if you just want to cover up the mistakes of the same people [from the North] who want to define these values for us. Or really tragic mistakes of things they have caused. [...] Democracy, or people in prison you are talking about... there is nobody in Rwanda who is in prison that should not be there, [...] actually there are people who are not in prison who should be there!³

Paul Kagame has usurped all power in Rwanda, and it is Kagame who decides who should or should not be in prison. He was helped on his way by a well-intentioned donor community that has focused on Rwanda's technocratic governance and development, while ignoring the political dimension.⁴ During CHOGM, the British government was hard at work trying to send a symbolic number of 'inadmissible' asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda in a shady arrangement called The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership. Ironically, Rwanda was at the same time intervening in the North Kivu province of neighbouring Congo through a predominantly Tutsi rebel group called the M23. More than 450,000 people are estimated to have been displaced in 2022 by the M23 offensive.⁵

Research questions

A persistent trait in the literature on Rwanda is that many authors choose sides, either for or against Paul Kagame's dictatorship. Which side is chosen also determines—and is determined by—which story one tells about the Rwandan Patriotic Front's (RPF) rise to power in the 1990s, post-genocide reconciliation and developmental success. Did the RPF rescue Rwanda from genocide, or did it exacerbate tensions, thereby provoking it? Is the RPF innocent of systematic massacres, or has it

3 CHOGM 2022, 'Concluding Press Conference', at 48:15.

4 Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 258–60.

5 Rolley, 'U.N. Internal Report Flags East Congo Rebels Flouting Ceasefire and Withdrawal Deal'.

killed hundreds of thousands of people in Rwanda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Which answer you get will depend on which book you pick up. This great divergence of views is not promising in terms of reconciliation between Rwandans, particularly between Hutus and Tutsis. It amounts to a great challenge for anyone who tries to understand the history of the Rwandan genocide, perhaps the most tragic event in recent world history. That is why this thesis attempts to take a step back, and to analyze the two sides to the conflict as it is expressed in the literature. I will base my analysis on three categories of authors, which will be explained in greater detail in the next section: *Friends*, *Enemies*, and *scholars*. Friends and Enemies refers to authors that are positively or negatively inclined towards the RPF government, respectively. Scholars refers to academics that generally are more detached from the political dichotomy, and typically have fewer axes to grind. These categories are not absolute, but they are very useful in making sense of the literature on Rwanda. Most authors on Rwandan violence are quite easy to categorize.

This thesis is historiographical, in that the subject of study is not Rwandan history itself, but rather the literature produced on Rwanda's history of violence in the 1990s by Enemies, Friends, and scholars. Most of this literature deals with the Rwandan genocide of 1994, but I also include in my analysis the literature on RPF human rights abuse in the 1990s. The reason I restrict the analysis to books dealing with Rwanda's violence in the 1990s is that this is a period of massive violations of human rights, which includes both the genocide of 1994, as well as major massacres by the RPF (principally in the years 1993–1997). The title of the thesis, *Sources of violence*, is a play on words which refers both to the subject matter of this literature—violence—and to the potential the literature has to fuel further violence, in view of the bipolar political landscape and the enormous disagreements on major aspects of history between Friends and Enemies.

The thesis has both a quantitative and a qualitative side, and each part has its own research questions. In the qualitative part, which is in the chapter called Rwanda's Friends and Enemies, I will analyze how Friends and Enemies differ in their interpretations of Rwanda's history of violence, as well as how the scholarly consensus has evolved over time. The research questions for the qualitative part are the following:

What are the major disagreements between Friends and Enemies, and how can they be used to distinguish between the two categories of authors?

Where do scholars stand in relation to Friends and Enemies on the major disagreements, and how has the scholarly consensus evolved over time?

To answer these questions I will discuss some of the major controversies in turn, and illustrate the anatomy of the disagreements with examples of what Friends and Enemies write on the topic, as well as scholars.

In the quantitative part, located in the chapter called Quantifying the literature, I will analyze the references in the major books written on the topic of Rwandan violence in the 1990s—mostly on the Rwandan genocide. In particular, I have been interested in finding out which people are referencing which other people, and with what frequency. The reason for focusing on *people* rather than books is that I wanted to find out if the identity of the people cited could say something about the biases—i.e, their friendliness or hostility to the RPF—of the author in question. In the quantitative part I attempt to classify the literature based on a network of authors I created with a standard algorithm in network science to detect communities, called the Girvan-Newman algorithm. The research question for the quantitative part is the following:

Is it possible to categorize the literature on Rwanda's history of violence in the 1990s into the groups Friend, Enemy and scholars with quantitative methods that look only at which people authors are citing?

I will go in greater detail on the methods I used in trying to answer this question in the quantitative part of the thesis.

The quantitative and qualitative part of the thesis is similar in that both parts essentially attempt to answer the same question, albeit in different ways. In the qualitative part, I will show how the literature can be categorized based on *what authors write*; in the quantitative part, I will attempt to categorize the literature based on *who they cite*.

A divided literature

The focus of this thesis is not Rwanda's history of violence in the 1990s as such, but rather the extensive literature produced to explain it. More particularly, the focus is on the highly polarized nature of this literature: authors seem inevitably to position themselves for or against Paul Kagame's dictatorship. It is simply not possible to understand the Rwandan genocide—or RPF atrocities, for that matter—without first understanding the polarization of the literature, which provides ample pitfalls for unsuspecting newcomers. It is only through an awareness and critical reflection of this polarization that credible accounts can be produced.

To make sense of this polarization, I employ two terms to categorize the most obviously biased accounts: Friends of Rwanda and Enemies of Rwanda. For brevity, I will refer to these categories

simply as (capitalized) Friends or Enemies. The first term, Friend of Rwanda, is an official term used by the Rwandan government, and by some Friends themselves. For example, the Rwandan government has bestowed an ‘Order of Outstanding Friendship’ to its most fervent supporters. This includes a well-known author on the genocide, Linda Melvern, who used the term Friends of Rwanda solemnly in her acceptance speech for this prize.⁶ In my thesis, the term Friend of Rwanda will be used for anyone who displays a systematic pro-RPF bias, regardless of whether or not they would agree to be labelled as such. The second term, Enemy of Rwanda, is not a term anyone would use about themselves, but it is used in this thesis because it stands in neat opposition to the term Friends of Rwanda, and is therefore intuitive and easy to understand. The Enemies are not really enemies of ‘Rwanda’, but rather enemies of the RPF dictatorship and Paul Kagame.

As stated earlier, these categories are not absolute. The polarization of the literature is more accurately thought of as a spectrum; authors vary substantially in how far they are willing to go to criticize or defend the RPF. The terms defined above are therefore simplifications, whose usage is justified by the analytical clarity it provides. As we will see, the two camps have their own interpretations of virtually any episode in Rwanda’s violent history. How ‘friendly’ or ‘hostile’ an author is determines how often they follow the party line proscribed by their camp, and how big or small the number of victims of any violent episode will be.

The polarization of the literature is merely one reflection of the polarization of Rwandan politics in general. It is a continuation of the split among the Rwandan political parties in 1993 into pro- and anti-RPF camps. Today, real opposition is not tolerated within Rwanda, and the split is one between a dictatorship and a political diaspora opposed to it. The danger of this polarization for how the history of the genocide is written was clear from the first moment by seasoned observers of Rwanda, such as the historian Jan Vansina.

Writing in 1998, Vansina argued that the widespread media coverage of the Great Lakes crisis in the 1990s provided a massive quantity of information, which was nevertheless problematic. In the excerpt below, Vansina was writing specifically about the wars in the Congo and the killing of Hutu refugees, but his words apply to the Rwandan civil war as well:

[...] most of the accessible sources (especially those generated by the media) are not reliable, in part because of individual bias or even incompetence, but mainly because the sources are all part of an intense propaganda war. This campaign is intended to generate support for one side or the other, [...]. Furthermore, atrocities and the violent emotions they

6 Government of Rwanda, ‘Order of Outstanding Friendship – Igihango Conferment Ceremony’, 57:10-1:03:50.

generate make it nearly impossible for any observer to retain a "neutral" stance or to avoid "demonizing" one side or the other. Precisely because of this, genuine and imagined atrocities are the usual handmaidens of war propaganda.⁷

Vansina pointed out that any work produced on the crisis—such as the works of ‘immediate history’ published in the 1990s—would inevitably be drawn into the conflict and used as ammunition by the conflicting parties. These works are therefore not purely descriptive, existing in a void to themselves, but may in fact become sources of violence in the future: ‘despite the intentions of their authors, such works may well fan the flames of conflict—a major reason why other historians of the area have remained silent’.⁸ The unfortunate side effect is that the ‘responsible’ scholars were relatively silent compared to authors more prone to choosing a side, and therefore less concerned about the effects of the propaganda war.⁹ Compounding this problem was the long-term effect these works—which Vansina called ‘preemptive histories’—could be expected to have on historiography:

such books are [...] likely to exert strong long-term effects because they define what is relevant and thus preempt the agenda for future discussion. Indeed, since the dramatic character of their contents generates such strong emotions, one can, on the basis of similar situations in the past, expect that the fields of interpretation they define will not be queried for a long time to come.¹⁰

In my thesis I make a distinction between Friends and Enemies—who are often journalists (like Linda Melvern and Judy Rever)—and scholarly authors (such as Gérard Prunier, Alison Des Forges and Lee Ann Fujii). This does not mean that scholars are not affected by the polarization.

‘Preemptive histories’ such as Gérard Prunier’s 1994 book on the genocide (*The Rwanda Crisis*), was problematic in its pro-RPF bias and has had a lasting effect on scholarship. The reason for treating scholarly works differently is that the *intention* of scholars is typically to be objective rather than to choose a side, and the quality of scholarly works on the genocide has only increased in the decades since. This is quite unlike the journalistic accounts of Friends and Enemies, which seem to become more polarized with time.

Two caveats are warranted in terms of the categorization of the literature. The first caveat is that authors do evolve over time, and sometimes they ‘switch sides’, or become more nuanced in their understanding. My impression is that this is quite rare, however. This kind of change in an author’s stance generally seems to happen early in their authorship in Rwanda. A long-time Friend or Enemy

7 Vansina, ‘The Politics of History and the Crisis in the Great Lakes’, 38.

8 Vansina, 41.

9 Reydams, ‘NGO Justice’, 582–83.

10 Vansina, ‘The Politics of History and the Crisis in the Great Lakes’, 41.

is quite unlikely to change their position on the RPF. A second caveat is that not all authors are easy to categorize. Some scholars are quite biased, and might belong better in the category of Friends and Enemies than with other scholars; and some authors are quite balanced in what they write about Rwanda, without being scholars.

Readers unfamiliar to Rwanda might be surprised that the position of authors *vis-à-vis* the merits of the RPF, the governing party of Rwanda, has so much influence over what they write about Rwandan history. In the qualitative part of the thesis, I will discuss in detail why authors choose sides along this axis.

I should emphasize that there is no reason to suspect bad faith among Friends, Enemies nor scholars. Even the most extreme positions have a seemingly empirical basis, accompanied by a comprehensive world view in which their perspective makes sense. It should be assumed that all authors attempt to the best of their ability to understand what happened.

I myself strive to be a scholar rather than a Friend or Enemy, although on the spectrum from Friends to Enemies, I may lean slightly more towards Enemies than Friends compared to most other scholars. Although Friends and Enemies are more biased than scholars, that does not mean they are always wrong. In my extensive reading on Rwandan history I have tried to keep an open mind, and my own positions are occasionally more in line with Enemies or Friends than with scholars.

Structure of thesis

The thesis is composed of three chapters. The first chapter (Overview of Rwanda) is an introduction to Rwanda's geography, language, ethnicity and history of violence. The chapter is intended to give a basis for understanding the quantitative and qualitative discussion to follow. The historical overview in that chapter is an attempt to synthesize Rwandan history in a way that includes the major historical grievances from both a Tutsi and a Hutu perspective.

In the second chapter (Rwanda's Friends and Enemies) I start with a discussion of knowledge and authority, and binary thinking—which is relevant to understand the binary opposition of Friends and Enemies—before answering the qualitative research questions by discussing the major controversies in Rwanda's history of violence in the 1990s.

In the third and final chapter (Quantifying the literature) I will explain how I registered the data on references between authors, and how it can be accessed with the Python programming language. I will then use this data to find out which authors are cited the most; which books have the most 'diverse' references in terms of people cited; and finally, I will create a network based on the data

and classify the network with the Girvan-Newman algorithm, in an attempt to answer the qualitative research question.

Overview of Rwanda

Introduction

This chapter is an overview of Rwanda, meant to provide a necessary basis for understanding the literature on Rwandan violence in the 1990s. I will start by writing about Rwanda's geography, language and ethnicities. The last part of this chapter is a synthesis of Rwandan history with a particular focus on ethnicity and historical grievances that are relevant to understand the violence Rwandans succumbed to in the 1990s.

Geography, language and ethnicity

Rwanda is a landlocked country located to the east of the Congo basin, on the volcanic highlands of the East African Rift System. With an average elevation of 1600 meters above sea level, Rwanda is the second-highest country in Africa, beaten only by Lesotho. Rwanda is known as 'the land of a thousand hills', due to its mountainous terrain.

The elevation yields a climate that is comfortable for humans and inhospitable for tsetse flies, which in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa spreads disease that impede livestock. It has been shown that areas inhospitable to tsetse flies are associated with high population density, political centralization, and intensive agriculture in precolonial times,¹¹ something that may explain why Rwanda is such a densely populated country today.

With 13.46 million inhabitants in 2021 and a population density of 511/km², Rwanda is among the most densely populated countries in the world. Rwanda, which is about ¼th the size of Iceland, is 35% more densely populated than



Figure 2: A view of Rwanda's hills. Both the valley and the hills are intensively cultivated; houses are generally built on top of hills. This picture is taken by the author in Byumba, a particularly mountainous area in the north of the country.

¹¹ Alsan, 'The Effect of the TseTse Fly on African Development', 391, 395.

its former colonial power, Belgium. A major difference is that most people in Rwanda live on the countryside. Whereas Belgium is almost entirely urban, Rwanda is 82% rural.¹² The upshot is that there are people everywhere in Rwanda; there is little privacy, and peer pressure is difficult to avoid. As Omar McDoom has pointed out, Rwanda's population density encourages *vertical* control by the state, and *horizontal* control by dense social networks.¹³ These are important factors both in explaining the genocide, and in explaining why the state is so powerful. Rwanda's high population, which has exploded since around 1950, has encouraged Malthusian arguments in explaining the genocide.¹⁴ This argument is cast into doubt by the observation that Rwanda's population growth was only temporarily disturbed by the genocide and change of power. Rwanda's population was 7.7 million on the eve of the genocide, far lower than today.

Rwanda has a sister country to its south called Burundi which is similar in many respects: ethnic composition, size, population density and language, to name a few. A notable difference is that from decolonization in 1962 to today, the politically dominant ethnic group has most of the time been different for Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda it changed from Hutu to Tutsi as a result of the Rwandan civil war (1990–1994); in Burundi it changed in the *other* direction as a result of the Burundian civil war (1993–2005). Another difference is that Burundi is a much poorer country than Rwanda, particularly because Burundi's economy has stagnated over the last two decades.

Almost all Rwandans speak Kinyarwanda, a Bantu language that is virtually identical to Kirundi, the language spoken in Burundi. Languages of various degrees of mutual intelligibility are spoken in the area surrounding Rwanda and Burundi. Prior to the genocide, Kinyarwanda was the medium of instruction for the first years of primary school, while further education was done in French, the language of Rwanda's former colonial power, Belgium. After the genocide, both French and Kinyarwanda have been replaced by English as the language used in schools.¹⁵ This is because the RPF leadership emanates from Uganda, a former British colony.¹⁶

Kinyarwanda is a tonal language written in the Latin script.¹⁷ Below are some example sentences to get a sense of the language:

12 Data on demographics are taken from the World Bank Open Data website (data.worldbank.org).

13 McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*, 64.

14 For a discussion, see Willame, *Aux sources de l'hécatombe rwandaise*, chap. 4.

15 Pearson, 'Policy without a Plan'; Williams, 'For the Third Time in 11 Years, Rwanda Changed the Language Used in Primary Schools'.

16 Hintjens, 'Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda', 13; Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 2009, 4.

17 To my knowledge, the best book for learning Kinyarwanda is Overdulse and Jacob, *Initiation au kinyarwanda*.

Umugorê arahìnga	The (or a) woman cultivates
Abagorê barahìnga	The women cultivate
Abagorê bazāhìnga ejô	The women will cultivate tomorrow
Umugorê	: Woman
Guhìnga	: To cultivate (infinitive verb)
Umu-, Aba-	: 2 of 16 noun classes, here used to distinguish between singular and plural
-ra-, -zā-	: Verb tenses
Ejô	: Tomorrow / yesterday

The tones and length of vowels are lost in written form; in the sentences above they are indicated with diacritics. For example, the ‘i’ in *arahìnga* is a long, falling tone. Like other Bantu languages, Kinyarwanda is structured around noun classes, usually counted as 16 in the case of Kinyarwanda. New words can be formed by changing the noun classes; for example, the verb stem of **Guhìnga** (to cultivate) can be used with **umu-** to form **umuhìnzi**, which means ‘cultivator’. Interestingly, words related to time are often ambiguous and can refer both to the future and the past. In the last example sentence above, it is only clear that *ejô* means tomorrow because the verb is conjugated in the future tense. Likewise, the word *kéra* means both ‘long ago’ and ‘far in the future’. There are very few adjectives in Kinyarwanda, something that is made up for in part by verbs such as *gukònja* (to be cold) and *gutukura* (to be red). Rwandan times of day is borrowed from Swahili, where the day begins when the sun rises, so 7:00 is *saa moja* in Swahili, meaning ‘one hour’. There are many recent loan words in Kinyarwanda from French and English, like *umushoferi* (from *chauffeur*) and *imôdokâ* (from motorcar).¹⁸

There are three ethnicities in Rwanda: Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Twa is a Pygmy people accounting for less than 1% of the population. Tutsi is a minority, traditionally associated with the ruling aristocracy, which accounted for around 11% of the population on the eve of the genocide, while about 88% were Hutu.¹⁹ Ethnicity is no longer a part of Rwandan censuses, but the percentage of Tutsis may be higher today.²⁰ The RPF has since its earliest days rejected ethnicity in favour of a nationalist ideology, emphasizing that the RPF are ‘not Hutu, Tutsi nor Twa’.²¹ Yet it has been argued that this was an ‘essential element of the hegemonic strategies of a small Tutsi elite’ which

18 Lwaboshi Jacques and Mutasa, ‘Allocation of Loanwords into Kinyarwanda’.

19 The percentage of Rwandan Tutsi prior to the genocide is controversial, because it can be used to estimate the number of Tutsi victims. For 11%, see McDoom, ‘Contested Counting’, 88–89.

20 The ethnic balance was relatively undisturbed due to an influx of up to a million ‘old caseload returnees’—mainly Tutsi exiles—immediately after the genocide and in the succeeding years. For the ‘old caseload returnees’, see Hilhorst and Leeuwen, ‘Emergency and Development’, 266.

21 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 693–97.

‘allowed the concealment of domination by Tutsi.’²² This argument is strengthened when looking at ethnic relations in the region through the lens of the *longue durée*. Ethnic amnesia has been used to conceal Tutsi dominance previously in Burundi. In Rwanda, the academic Meghan C. Laws has found striking similarities between RPF’s nationalistic rhetoric and that used by the Tutsi ruling elite in the late 1950s—before the Hutu revolution. According to Laws,

Both then and now, rhetorical calls to remove ethnic labels from public discourse in the name of national unity are key resilience strategies designed to shape regime relations with domestic and international audiences in ways that reinforce power concentration by a small (largely Tutsi) elite.²³

It should be emphasized that Hutus and Tutsis speak the same language and share the same culture. There are no inherent obstacles to the RPF’s project of de-ethnicization.

Historical overview

In this section I will give an overview of Rwandan history, with a particular focus on ethnicity and on the causes of the genocide of 1994. It should be noted that history in Rwanda, both ancient and contemporary, is a very sensitive topic. The post-genocide regime has sought out to rewrite a Rwandan history in accord with the RPF’s ideology. The new history is not more correct than the old, and it is difficult to square with historical facts. As Timothy Longman has written,

Those who endeavored to write history entered a political minefield in which their analysis was constrained by the government’s expectations of a “correct” version of history. Yet even those historians who shared the government’s vision of the past were confronted by the sheer magnitude of the task of developing a new narrative entirely at odds with ideas previously accepted as fact by the majority of Rwanda’s people.²⁴

This historical overview is a synthesis and does not contain anything new about Rwandan history. If anything is unusual about this introduction to Rwandan history it might be my attempt to include the major historical grievances from both a Tutsi and Hutu perspective. I believe many authors write only from one of these perspectives because it is psychologically difficult to include both. I have tried to avoid this trap. My characterization of earlier episodes of violence against both Tutsis and Hutus as genocidal is also somewhat unusual in the literature. I do this in part because I believe these episodes would qualify as genocide as defined by the U.N Genocide Convention, but also

22 Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World’, 30.

23 Laws, ‘Recycled Rhetoric’.

24 Longman, *Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 34.

because I would argue that the nature of the violence in 1994 in Rwanda was unprecedented in the region only in scope, not in its nature.

Pre-colonial Rwanda and Belgian colonialism

Much ink has been spilled over the supposed historical origins of the social categories Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. The narrative written during colonial times (in the 1920s and 1930s) was based on the racist Hamitic hypothesis, according to which ‘everything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race’—in the disapproving words of Edith R. Sanders.²⁵ As adopted to Rwanda, the story went as follows.²⁶ Rwanda was originally inhabited by Twa, a hunter-gathering people. They were then displaced by the Hutu, a Bantu people that practised agriculture and cleared the forest. At last the Tutsi invaded from the north, a Hamitic, pastoral people that had supposedly ‘lost’ their language. The story implied a racial hierarchy in which Tutsis were ‘better’ than Hutus, and Twa were the most primitive. During the genocide, this story was turned on its head, and was used as a justification for killing Tutsis, who were said to be foreigners.²⁷

A major problem with the Hamitic hypothesis—apart from the questionable empirical basis—is how the categories Tutsi and Hutu are fixed in time, as if cattle herders and farmers several hundred years ago thought of themselves in the same terms as when Rwanda was colonized. A more nuanced explanation is offered by the late Jan Vansina, a pioneering Africanist historian who has authored a seminal book on the history of pre-colonial Rwanda, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda*.

According to Vansina, the term Tutsi was a self-designation used by a political elite of herders, and its use and prestige spread together with the growth of the Nyiginya kingdom, the pre-colonial kingdom of Rwanda. Hutu was a demeaning term used by the Tutsi elite to designate servants (even Tutsi servants), which eventually evolved to designate all farmers. The Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy was institutionalized in the mid-19th century, and it was exacerbated by the introduction of a particularly exploitative clientship relationship called *uburetwa*, which was forced exclusively upon farmers. The farmers not only had to hand over a substantial portion of their produce to their chief, they also had to spend half their time working for him.²⁸

While the Tutsi was an ethnonym that had been used for centuries to designate a subset of herders, in the latter half of the 19th century its meaning was broadened to refer to *all* herders, in opposition

25 Sanders, ‘The Hamitic Hypothesis; Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective’.

26 The following draws on Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 36–37.

27 Longman, *Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 37–38.

28 Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda*, 36–38, chap. 5.

to farmers. The exploitative practice of *uburetwa* led farmers to armed revolt in the period from 1885 to 1900, not only against the Nyiginya kingdom, but more specifically against Tutsis. Significantly, Vansina emphasizes that farmers at the time (around the year 1900) ‘absolutely did not think of themselves as members of a single ethnic group, and they all rejected the insulting epithet that was bestowed on them’:

They distinguished themselves as the “people” of Bugoyi, Kinyaga, Nduga, [...], not as “Hutu.” An awareness of their common quality was to arise only as the result of their common experience as Hutu subjects of the same colony and by its registration in all manner of census and identity papers of an awareness that then was openly appropriated and further refined during the political struggles of the 1950s.²⁹

Rwanda was first colonized as part of German East Africa (roughly corresponding to present-day Tanzania), but the German presence was very light and did not modify Rwandan society in depth. Rwanda was conquered by the Belgians in 1916 from the neighbouring Belgian Congo during World War I, and it was administered by Belgium as one of two kingdoms of the Ruanda-Urundi colony until both kingdoms were decolonized in 1962 as two different states (Rwanda and Burundi).

Given the weak German presence in Rwanda, it was natural for the Germans to ally with what seemed to be the superior race and govern Rwanda indirectly through the kingdom in place, something that strengthened the power of the Tutsi king (*umwámi*) and therefore exacerbated the Tutsi/Hutu tension³⁰—which, as we have seen, was a recent phenomenon. Belgium further exacerbated the tension by continuing to solidify the Tutsi/Hutu dichotomy, particularly through sweeping administrative reforms in the period 1927–1936. For example, *uburetwa* was (inadvertently) harshened and introduced to areas where it had not existed before,³¹ and identity ‘booklets’ were issued to men (not to women) where their ‘race’ was set in stone as either *Mututsi*, *Muhutu* or *Mutwa*.³² Post-colonial Rwanda continued to issue identity documents where people’s ‘ethnicity’ was recorded. Such documents were used to identify Tutsis not only in the genocide in 1994, but also in the ethnic violence which accompanied the 1959 Hutu revolution.³³

29 Vansina, 136–39.

30 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 23–26.

31 Prunier, 27; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 97–98.

32 Vervust, ‘The Relative Importance of Ethnicity, Class and Race in Colonial Rwanda’, 103–6.

33 Vervust, 106.

From the Hutu revolution to Habyarimana's Rwanda

Belgium changed tack in the 1950s by providing opportunities to Hutus within education and administration, which led to the formation of a Hutu counter-elite. This counter-elite feared the consequences of decolonisation without first addressing the Tutsi monopoly of power. In 1957, nine Hutu intellectuals authored a document which came to be called the Bahutu Manifesto, which sought to further the Hutu cause vis-à-vis a UN trusteeship mission.³⁴ Thanks to Belgian colonialism, the Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy was now perceived as one between different races, Bantu vs. Hamitic. The Bahutu Manifesto strongly advised against removing the 'race' labels from identity documents, 'at least for the time being', because these could be used to 'monitor [the] race monopoly'. Removing them might risk furthering 'the selection [of Tutsis] by hiding it'.³⁵ This logic would lead to the introduction of 'quotas' in post-colonial Rwanda, meant as a kind of affirmative action favouring the politically dominant, but historically marginalized majority.³⁶

With the help of Belgium, this Hutu elite succeeded in capturing power in the period 1959 to 1961, in what is known as the Hutu revolution. Elections were held, the monarchy was abolished, and Rwanda soon became a *de facto* one-party state under Grégoire Kayibanda after decolonization in 1962. Kayibanda was a signatory of the Hutu Manifesto, and he had funded a political party called MDR-Parmehutu. The name of the party left little doubt as to its exclusionary nature. Kayibanda had made his views clear in a speech in 1959 on who the country belonged to:

Our movement aims at the Hutu group. It has been offended, humiliated and despised by the Tutsi invader. We must illuminate the mass. We are here to return the country to its owners. It is the country of the Bahutus. The small Mututsi came with the big.³⁷

By stating that the small (i.e. poor) Tutsis came with the big, Kayinbanda underscored that *all* Tutsis are foreign to Rwanda, not only the ruling aristocracy.

The Hutu revolution of 1959 was accompanied by anti-Tutsi violence, particularly directed at the Tutsi elite, which was more prevalent in areas where Tutsi rule had been introduced in the colonial period.³⁸ This resulted in an exodus of Tutsis to all the surrounding countries.

34 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 45–46.

35 Translations are mine. The full text of the Bahutu Manifesto, whose actual title was '*Note sur l'aspect social du problème racial indigène au Ruanda*', can be found in Nkundabagenzi, *Le Rwanda politique (1958-1960)*.

36 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 46.

37 Buckley-zistel, 'Dividing and Uniting', 105.

38 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 39.

In the years 1961 to 1967, a destructive dialectic developed whereby some of the Tutsi refugees, calling themselves *inyenzi* (cockroaches),³⁹ attacked Rwanda with the goal of restoring the *status quo ante*, and Hutus responded by arbitrarily killing Tutsis within Rwanda. After a particularly successful *inyenzi* invasion in December 1963, the violence reached genocidal proportions. Over the course of a few weeks, more than 10,000 Tutsis were killed. René Lemarchand described it in these terms in a book from 1970:

Never before—not even during the worst period of the revolution—had the killings reached such frightening proportions. Never before had racial hatred led to such bestial cruelty.⁴⁰

By 1964, somewhere between 150,000-250,000 Tutsis had fled the country, perhaps 50% of all Rwandan Tutsis.⁴¹ Many Tutsis had also fled within Rwanda, resettling in less desirable areas such as the swampy Bugesera south of Kigali.⁴²

Then, in 1972, an event of an often underestimated importance took place in neighbouring Burundi, where there had been no Hutu revolution. After a deadly Hutu insurrection, the Tutsi government responded with what Lemarchand has called a genocide of all educated Hutus within Burundi. The purpose of the killings seems to have been both to consolidate Tutsi support for the government, and to eliminate any future ‘threats’ to the regime.⁴³ Killing all educated Hutus was a way to prevent the growth of a Hutu counter-elite, which might lead to another Hutu revolution modelled on the one in Rwanda. During this genocide, the Burundian government issued a white paper where it denied the genocide, and claimed—probably falsely—that the Hutu insurrectionists ‘had a meticulously prepared plan, namely the systematic extermination of an entire ethnic group: the Tutsis.’⁴⁴ Although the number of victims cannot be accurately established, it is believed that somewhere between 100,000 to 300,000 Hutus were killed by the Burundian government in the span of four months in 1972.⁴⁵

Genocidal violence had now taken place both in Rwanda and Burundi. In each case it was perpetrated by members of the politically dominant ethnicity against the politically marginalized

39 It may seem surprising that the rebels used the term *inyenzi* for themselves. But that is what many sources say, and there seems to be no alternative term to describe these attackers.

40 Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 216.

41 Watson, *Exile from Rwanda*, 5. The estimates of Tutsis who fled Rwanda at this time differ wildly. The figure of more than 300,000 cited by both Des Forges and Prunier is likely too high. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 61–62; Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 40. See the discussion in Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 160–61.

42 For the story of one of those who moved, see Hatzfeld, *Dans le nu de la vie. Récits des marais rwandais*, 65–75.

43 Lemarchand, ‘Burundi 1972’, 41–42.

44 Ministère de l’Information, *Livre Blanc sur les événements survenus aux mois avril et mai 1972*, 36.

45 Lemarchand, ‘Burundi 1972’, 41.

ethnicity. In each case, it was the specter of a change in the dominant ethnicity that provoked the slaughter. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 would be no different in that regard, only worse.

The violence in Burundi spilled over to Rwanda in 1973, where Hutu students organized themselves into ‘public safety committees’ that expelled Tutsis from schools and other organizations.⁴⁶ The chaos caused by this anti-Tutsi agitation created the opportunity for a military *coup d’état*, which was carried out by the young General Juvénal Habyarimana (Hutu)—whose future assassination would be the immediate cause of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Habyarimana created a one-party dictatorship, where all Rwandans automatically became members of his political party, *Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement* (MRND).⁴⁷ This changed the political balance within Rwanda from the south to the north—both Grégoire Kayibanda and Habyarimana favoured their home regions, spawning regional tensions.

For Tutsis within Rwanda, Habyarimana was an improvement over Kayibanda. There were no *inyenzi* attacks during this period, and there were no anti-Tutsi massacres until the civil war started in October 1990.⁴⁸ Whereas Tutsis had earlier been perceived as an alien race, under Habyarimana they became an ‘ethnicity’, native to Rwanda.⁴⁹ Similarly to the current government, Habyarimana expertly positioned Rwanda as an apolitical ‘development opportunity’, attracting substantial aid from the international development community. This community developed an idyllic image of Rwanda, which Peter Uvin summarized in these terms:

In brief, it was the image of a country of subsistence farmers faced with daunting economic and demographic challenges but endowed with a government that followed the right policies, the fruits of which the hardworking population enjoyed. It was the image of a country in which things were good for all those in the business of development.⁵⁰

Political liberalization and civil war

In the late 1980s, Rwanda’s idyllic image began to disintegrate. Among other issues was the price of coffee—Rwanda’s most important export—which kept falling throughout the 1980s.⁵¹ However, most important for explaining the genocide was what happened in the four years prior to it: political liberalization and civil war. Crucially—and exceptionally—these both happened at the same time.⁵²

46 McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*, 60.

47 McDoom, 60.

48 McDoom, 60.

49 Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, chap. 5.

50 Uvin, *Aiding Violence*, 42.

51 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 350; McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*, 78.

52 This is among the main findings of Omar McDoom, who has authored an excellent book on the causes of the Rwandan genocide. McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*.

By 1990, the Cold War had ended, and there was a renewed focus on democracy. Whereas it had been sufficient to be a 'developing' country in the 1980s, now there was an expectation on the part of Western donor nations that African countries should also move in the direction of democracy. Important in this regard was a speech held by the French President François Mitterand on 20 June 1990 in an annual summit of leaders of (mostly Francophone) African countries under the aegis of France. The speech, called *discours de La Baule*, has been summarized as follows: 'there is no development without democracy and there is no democracy without development.'⁵³ Juvénal Habyarimana, who was in attendance, took the hint, and within a year other political parties were allowed to organize. Habyarimana's own party changed name from *Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement* (MRND) to *Mouvement **républicain** national pour **la démocratie et le développement*** (MRNDD).⁵⁴ 'Republican' sounds more democratic than 'revolutionary', and his party was now working towards both democracy and development, just as Mitterand had requested. This political liberalization went ahead in spite of the invasion from Uganda of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) on 1 October 1990, marking the start of the four-year Rwandan civil war (1990–1994). The Tutsi refugees who fled in the wake of the Hutu revolution had been living a precarious existence in neighboring countries for decades. In the case of Uganda, the Tutsi refugees had settled in camps (later better described as settlements) where they became rather well off compared to Ugandans generally, which earned them the envy of many locals. They received assistance from the United Nations in the form of food handouts and scholarships earmarked for refugees.⁵⁵ Yet their citizenship was ambiguous at best, and they were repeatedly persecuted by successive regimes. In 1982 and 1983, during the Ugandan Bush War (1980–1986), there had been hateful campaigns against Banyarwanda,⁵⁶ and especially against Tutsi cattle herders. The destruction was considerable. Tens of thousands of cattle were killed; thousands of houses were destroyed; 40,000 people fled to Rwanda, where the vast majority were rejected citizenship and languished in border camps for months.⁵⁷ It was hard for the Tutsi refugees to consider Uganda their homeland in view of such persecution, even when times were good, because the carpet could be pulled out from under their feet at any moment.⁵⁸

53 Lugan, *François Mitterand, l'armée française et le Rwanda*, 45–46.

54 Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise*, 107.

55 Wrong, *Do Not Disturb*, 127.

56 Banyarwanda means Kinyarwanda speakers. There were a substantial amount of Banyarwanda in Uganda, most of them Hutu. Some had lived there since before colonial times, others had moved there as economic migrants during the colonial period. The refugees who came after the Hutu revolution represented less than 15% of all Banyarwanda in Uganda. Watson, *Exile from Rwanda*, 5.

57 Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 169.

58 Watson, *Exile from Rwanda*, 9.

It is in this context that many Tutsi refugees—both in Uganda and in the (global) diaspora—began to dream of a return to Rwanda. Gérard Prunier described their state of mind in these terms:

As the years passed and memories of the real Rwanda began to recede, Rwanda slowly became a mythical country in the refugees' minds. The trend was even clearer for the young who had left as babies or been born in exile. Contrasting an idealised past life with the difficulties they were experiencing, their image of Rwanda became that of a land of milk and honey.⁵⁹

Whereas Hutu/Tutsi relations had developed for the better within Rwanda, the last memory of the Tutsi refugees were that Hutus had been killing them and chasing them away in the years after the Hutu revolution. When a Tutsi refugee in Uganda was asked about Hutus around the time of the RPF invasion, this was the reply: 'I have never been with Hutu. [...] I just hear the stories about what they did to us. How they killed our grandparents and elder brothers with knives.'⁶⁰

In no small part due to the persecution of Banyarwanda in 1982–3 in Uganda, the Tutsi refugees had been driven into the ranks of the rebellious National Resistance Army (NRA), which went on to win the Ugandan Bush War (1980–1986). About a quarter of the NRA were Banyarwanda at the time it won the war in 1986.⁶¹ It is within the NRA that Tutsi refugees began to organize in the late 1980s for a military return to Rwanda. A group was formed for this purpose in late 1987 called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was technically a renaming of an older organization formed in 1979, namely the Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU).⁶²

Although Tutsis held privileged positions within the Ugandan military, the strong Banyarwanda presence in the NRA became a political liability for the NRA and Yoweri Museveni—NRA's leader, who is still Uganda's President today. A Ugandan scholar, Mahmood Mamdani, called the criticism of the Banyarwanda presence within the NRA 'the first crisis of the NRA in power.'⁶³ This meant that the NRA and the RPF both had something to gain from a successful invasion. For the NRA, a successful RPF invasion would be a resolution to its crisis. Although Museveni might not have been consulted on the exact date of the invasion of Rwanda, Uganda went on to covertly support the RPF militarily during the Rwandan civil war.⁶⁴ This aid reportedly included the SA-16 surface-to-air missiles used in the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994.⁶⁵

59 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 66.

60 Watson, *Exile from Rwanda*, 9.

61 Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 170.

62 Kuperman, 'Provoking Genocide', 66–67.

63 Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 184.

64 McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*, 78.

65 Reyntjens, 'The RPF Did It'.

The initial invasion in October 1990 did not succeed in capturing Kigali, and the RPF soon changed tactics to a more protracted warfare. Starting in June 1992, the RPF began to occupy an increasingly larger territory in the northern prefectures of Ruhengeri and Byumba—an area inhabited almost exclusively by Hutus, who fled the RPF in droves. This created an internal refugee problem of enormous proportions; at the apex of the crisis, following a major RPF offensive in February 1993, a million people were said to be displaced within Rwanda. This meant that about 1 out of 7 Rwandans had fled their homes due to the war waged by the RPF. Some of them had fled repeatedly.⁶⁶ Of those fleeing, 350,000 did not have any place to go, and were forced to settle in makeshift camps. Jean-Hervé Bradol and Marc Le Pape described the situation as follows, in a book on *Médecins Sans Frontières's* (MSF) involvement in Rwanda:

Conditions were appalling. Epidemics, particularly malaria and dysentery, were decimating a population living in makeshift shelters and weakened by malnutrition, with insufficient access to drinking water and a lack of latrines. [...] Despite [the MSF's] best efforts, the teams were unable to bring the number of deaths below the disaster threshold for many months. [...] Sever acute malnutrition was rampant [...].⁶⁷

The RPF 'cause' was supported by a global Tutsi diaspora which provided funding (particularly from those living in richer countries such as Canada and the United States), as well as recruits from neighbouring countries like Burundi and Zaire—and also from within Rwanda. The RPF grew tenfold from an estimated 2,500 in the initial invasion to 25,000 in April 1994.⁶⁸

The RPF war put ethnic relations in Rwanda to a test it immediately failed. After the invasion on 1 October 1990, hundreds of Tutsis were killed in the commune of Kibilira in Gisenyi (nowhere near the fighting) on the instigation of local authorities.⁶⁹ When the RPF's October offensive was pushed back in the north east, the Rwandan military, *Forces armées rwandaises* (FAR), killed up to a thousand Hima (an ethnicity associated with Tutsi) civilians, accused of having aided the RPF.⁷⁰ More massacres would follow in other locations, particularly after RPF offensives, or after the RPF gained concessions in peace negotiations.⁷¹ In the days after the invasion, thousands of alleged 'accomplices' (*ibytso*) were arrested, the vast majority of them Tutsis. Many of those arrested remained imprisoned for months.⁷² The Minister of Justice explained that 'to prepare an attack of

66 Bradol and Pape, *Humanitarian Aid, Genocide and Mass Killings*, 17.

67 Bradol and Pape, 17.

68 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 93, 117.

69 Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise*, 94–95.

70 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 50.

71 Kuperman, 'Provoking Genocide'.

72 Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise*, 94.

that scale required trusted people [on the inside]. Rwandans of the same ethnic group offered that possibility better than did others.⁷³ Hate media flourished, such as the magazine *Kangura*, which in December 1990 published a list of ‘10 Hutu commandments’ where one could read, among many other disturbing things, that ‘Every Muhutu must know that every Mututsi is dishonest in business. He only aims for the supremacy of his ethnicity.’⁷⁴ *Kangura* continued to be published throughout the war. In an issue from December 1993, at a time when tensions were at a tipping point, *Kangura* clearly advocated genocide, when it suggested that the machete could be used to defeat the *inyenzi* ‘once and for all’.⁷⁵ The word *inyenzi* conflated the Tutsi invasions of the 1960s with the RPF, which in turn was conflated with all Tutsis, who were then also dehumanized by being called ‘cockroaches’ (the literal meaning of *inyenzi*).

During the civil war, Tutsis were increasingly seen as a fifth column, and ethnicity became ever more a concern for Rwandans. According to Omar McDoom, ‘the war ethnicized Rwandan politics and society: the stronger the threat, the greater this ethnicization became.’⁷⁶ Unfortunately, the threat became stronger as the war dragged on; as the RPF occupied a bigger share of territory; as the internal refugee crisis swelled; and as the RPF gained concessions in negotiations.

Although the period 1990–1994 is called a war, most of the fighting occurred during the RPF offensives. The most significant offensives were in October 1990, January 1991, June 1992 (the first offensive in which the RPF managed to occupy a part of Rwanda), February 1993, and then during the genocide itself, from April to July 1994. In between the offensives, the RPF and the government were mostly in ceasefires (which the RPF repeatedly broke with its offensives), and peace negotiations were held in Arusha, Tanzania. The war was officially ended on 4 August 1993, when the comprehensive ‘Arusha Accords’ were signed. Although the Accords entailed considerable concessions on the part of the Rwandan government, Habyarimana was compelled to sign them due to international pressure.⁷⁷ Significantly, Rwanda’s army was to be replaced with an integrated one, in which the RPF would hold 50% of officer positions and 40% of enlisted ranks. Such an army might facilitate a military *coup d’état* by the RPF. According to Alan J. Kuperman, ‘In light of the superiority of the rebels on a man-for-man basis by this time, the military integration protocol was tantamount to a negotiated surrender of the Hutu army to the Tutsi rebels.’⁷⁸

73 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 50.

74 Chrétien, *Rwanda*, 141.

75 Chrétien, 114.

76 McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*, 74.

77 Kuperman, ‘Provoking Genocide’, 75.

78 Kuperman, 75.

It is essential to understand that there were not two parties competing for power during the Rwandan civil war, but rather three (which is still a simplification):

- Juvénal Habyarimana and his party, the MRNDD, were trying to conserve his power by presenting himself and the MRNDD as a bulwark against the existential threat of the RPF. Habyarimana employed populist rhetoric in view of winning a future general election, which was not an unrealistic prospect, especially towards the end of the war.⁷⁹
- The RPF wanted to capture power in Rwanda.⁸⁰ In this vein the RPF used military force, negotiations, and also destabilization through irregular warfare in which the RPF's responsibility could be denied or was entirely unclear. For example, the RPF perpetrated terrorism and political assassinations within Rwanda in times of ceasefire.⁸¹
- A political opposition emerged in the south of Rwanda (far from the frontline) as a result of the political liberalisation. The many new parties organized themselves in their opposition to Habyarimana in a 'block' called *Forces démocratiques du changement* (FDC);⁸² the most important of these parties was the *Mouvement démocratique républicain* (MDR), which was a successor party to Kayibanda's MDR-Parmehutu.

The opposition parties organized huge demonstrations, and in April 1992, Habyarimana made a major concession by agreeing to create a multiparty government where MRNDD was not a majority, and where the prime minister was from the MDR.⁸³ It was this multiparty government that engaged with negotiations with the RPF. Yet for the political opposition, whose constituency did not bear the brunt of the war, the RPF could be used to weaken the MRNDD. By playing the MRNDD and the RPF against each other, the opposition could hope to come out on top at the conclusion of the peace process. As André Guichaoua has written, 'With a surprising political naïveté, [the opposition parties] gave themselves over to the RPF in order to weaken the Habyarimana regime and to enlarge their own political domain.'⁸⁴

The tactic of allying with the RPF backfired in 1993, particularly after the February offensive which displaced a million people. The political landscape—including the opposition parties—now cleaved into two factions: pro-RPF (often called 'Hutu moderates') and anti-RPF (most often referred to as

79 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 76–77.

80 Kuperman, 'Provoking Genocide'.

81 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 67–68.

82 Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise*, 120–21.

83 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 56–57.

84 Guichaoua, 60.

Hutu Power). For example, MDR was split into one tiny, pro-RPF faction under Faustin Twagiramungu; and an MDR-Power faction (which represented the popular base of the old MDR).⁸⁵

Although most Rwandan political parties (and there were many) had the word ‘democratic’ in their names, there is no reason to suppose, *a priori*, that any of the main three contestants for power were genuinely animated by democratic ideals. In the case of the first two factions, the case is clear: Habyarimana was a proven dictator whose fall from power was brought about by external pressure, and the RPF went on to establish a dictatorship. The opposition parties are often given the benefit of the doubt, and are sometimes even referred to as the ‘democratic’ opposition; especially the pro-RPF factions.

Yet the conduct of the MDR during the war was hardly in the spirit of democracy. One of the MDR’s main tactics was *kubwoza*, which literally meant ‘to help liberate’, but which actually meant to convince people—including mayors of local communes—to change political parties through violence.⁸⁶ Partly through such methods, as well as non-transparent local elections in March 1993,⁸⁷ the MDR took control over the local administration in the prefecture of Gitarama—its regional stronghold. According to one account, the MDR ruled Gitarama essentially as a one-party state, intolerant to anyone (including farmers) who did not rally behind ‘our party’.⁸⁸ The national government of April 1992, where both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister was from the MDR,⁸⁹ was not elected, but chosen in agreement with Habyarimana. In July 1993, at the time the MDR was splitting in two and Twagiramungu was losing his popular base, he nevertheless managed to have his own name inscribed in the Arusha Accords as the future (non-elected) prime minister in the Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) envisaged by the Arusha Accords. In exchange for having his name inscribed, the RPF was allowed to install a battalion in Kigali (a serious military miscalculation).⁹⁰ The MRNDD was happy to support Twagiramungu’s reckless ambitions, well knowing that it would paralyse the MDR—its main contender come election day.⁹¹

The Arusha Accords were deeply problematic in many respects, and it was never implemented in practice due to opportunistic stalling by both sides in the now bipolar political landscape. Among the problems, there were disagreements about which part of the cleaved opposition parties was the ‘real’ party; such an agreement was necessary to decide which politicians should participate in the

85 Guichaoua, 88–91.

86 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 54–57.

87 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 97.

88 Umutesi, *Fuir ou Mourir au Zaïre*, 39.

89 For the composition of the various governments during the war, see Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, Annex 22.

90 Guichaoua, 94, 89.

91 Guichaoua, 88–90. It went without saying that RPF could not compete in national elections due to its ethnic composition.

BBTG and the transitional legislature.⁹² In order to oversee this ill-fated transition, the signatories requested and received a United Nations peace-keeping force (UNAMIR), which arrived in Rwanda starting from November 1993.⁹³ The Blue Helmets would become first-hand witnesses of the genocide which erupted a few months later. Preventing genocide was in no way part of their mandate.

UNAMIR arrived at a time of extraordinary tensions. In neighbouring Burundi there had also been a democratization drive, and Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, had been elected President in June 1993. On 21 October, Ndadaye was assassinated by putschists in the Tutsi-dominated army, marking the start of the Burundian civil war (1993–2005). For many Hutus within Rwanda, this was ‘proof’ that the RPF, and even Tutsis in general, could not be trusted. By this point, the leaders of the anti-RPF faction of the MDR turned to ethnic mobilization, to the point of eviscerating the distinction between the various parties pledged to the Hutu cause. In a protest in October 1993, one of its leaders, Froduald Karamira, chanted these slogans to the crowd (the acronyms are political parties): ‘MDR Power! CDR Power! PL Power! Hutu united! Power!’. The crowd responded enthusiastically after each exclamation with ‘Power! Power! Power!’.⁹⁴ The events in Burundi caused an influx of more than 200,000 Hutu refugees into southern Rwanda, who were easily recruited into militias hostile to the RPF.⁹⁵

The main currents of the ‘opposition’ parties now rallied behind Juvénal Habyarimana, who had regained his popularity lost earlier in the war.⁹⁶ In an increasingly securitized atmosphere, Habyarimana could count on the support of his party’s youth wing, which in the course of the war transformed into a militia, called the *Interahamwe* (those who work together). All the political parties had their respective militias, who were often fighting against each other. In late 1993, the *Interahamwe* began receiving secret military training and received weapons. This seems to have been motivated by the idea that ‘The only way to stop [the RPF] is the participation by all of the people.’⁹⁷ Whether intentional or not, ‘the people’ would soon perpetrate genocide with such weapons. The RPF, meanwhile, had sent a battalion of soldiers to Kigali on 28 December 1993 in accordance with the Arusha Accords, escorted by UNAMIR.⁹⁸ Of all places, the battalion was placed in the Rwandan parliamentary building, *Conseil national de développement* (CND), in the vicinity of the capitol’s airport. This battalion of 600 men was supposed to protect RPF politicians

92 Guichaoua, 99–101.

93 For a chronology of UNAMIR, see Marchal, *Rwanda*, 320–26.

94 Chrétien, *Rwanda*, 209.

95 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 132.

96 Guichaoua, 116.

97 Guichaoua, 140.

98 Marchal, *Rwanda*, 81–95.

during the implementation of the Accords. In fact, in the first months of 1994, the RPF withdrew its top politicians from Kigali and covertly sent 200 additional soldiers to the capital. This was part of a risky plan for the RPF's final offensive, in which the Kigali battalion would pin down the FAR in Kigali while the rest of the RPF would sweep across the country, starting in the north-east.⁹⁹

Rwandan genocide

On the evening of 6 April 1994, Juvénal Habyarimana's airplane was shot down as it approached for landing in Kigali. With him on the plane were important military leaders, whose death created difficulties in the leadership of the FAR, as well as the Burundian President, Cyprien Ntaryamira (Hutu).¹⁰⁰ In other words, in less than the span of 6 months, three Hutu heads of state had been assassinated in Rwanda and Burundi. Although the responsibility for this attack is hotly debated, there is little doubt that the assassination was a part of the RPF's plan to take power in Rwanda.¹⁰¹ The RPF had shot down aircraft on several occasions earlier in the war,¹⁰² and the French pilots who perished in the attack had been 'almost certain' that the RPF had brought surface-to-air missiles to Kigali and saw it as a serious threat in the months prior to Habyarimana's assassination.¹⁰³ Perhaps more importantly, for most of the now radicalized political elite in Rwanda, the RPF was clearly responsible, and many of them believed that the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR had been helping the RPF.

While massacres of Tutsis began immediately in many locations, the policy of genocide seems not to have been fully endorsed by the Rwandan state until 12 April, after extremist elements within the MRNDD and close to the defunct president had captured power through widespread political assassinations of pro-RPF politicians, and the instauration of an 'Interim Government' composed of the MRNDD and the Power wings of the political parties.¹⁰⁴ Among the first victims was the acting Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was in the tiny pro-RPF wing of the MDR. Uwilingiyimana was planning to address the Rwandan public early the next morning, and sought the help of UNAMIR to escort her to Radio Rwanda, before it became clear that she was under attack by the Presidential Guard. Ten Belgian soldiers were sent to protect her, but these were disarmed and brought to a military camp, where they were lynched by a group of Rwandan soldiers

99 Kuperman, 'Provoking Genocide', 78.

100 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 143, 156–57.

101 See for example Reyntjens, 'The RPF Did It'; Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, chap. 7.

102 Collins, *Rwanda 1994*, 25–26.

103 Lukan, *Rwanda*, 225–26 (letter written by copilot Jean-Pierre Minaberry on 28 February 1994).

104 The days from 6 to 12 April is covered in great detail by Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*.

who apparently believed that the Belgian soldiers had helped the RPF shoot down Habyarimana's airplane.¹⁰⁵

Over the course of three months, Tutsis were systematically killed by Hutus in the areas not yet occupied by the RPF. The majority of the perpetrators were civilians, although soldiers and other armed personnel were also involved. Scholarly estimates of participants range from 200,000 to 400,000 males, which means that as many as one in four Hutu males may have directly participated in the genocide—this is without counting those who looted the property of dead Tutsis.¹⁰⁶ The best estimates of victims range from 500,000 to 700,000, which means that about 75% of all Tutsis residing in Rwanda prior to the genocide were killed.¹⁰⁷ All Tutsis were targeted, including women and children, and the speed with which the genocide got underway is extraordinary. In the case of Kibuye prefecture in Western Rwanda, 75% of all murders happened in just nine days, from 10 April to 18 April.¹⁰⁸ The most common weapon used was the machete, an agricultural tool owned by most Rwandan households.¹⁰⁹ The killers and victims were often neighbours who knew each other personally, and whose relationship might have been good before the war—or even before Habyarimana's assassination.¹¹⁰ Tutsis sought strength in numbers, notably by gathering in churches in the thousands—a safe hiding spot during the *inyenzi* attacks of the 1960s. This time the churches were surrounded and desecrated as Tutsis were killed in enormous numbers.¹¹¹ The killers were not acting alone, but rather in groups where culpability was shared. These groups often called themselves *igitero* ('attack group'), a term with associations to hunting and communal self-defence.¹¹² Both for these groups and for the victims, killing Tutsis became a daily ritual, an act which was captured by the euphemism *gukora* ('to work').¹¹³

It is hard to imagine the terror the survivors lived through, after hiding wherever they could for weeks or even months from such groups of attackers—in a country with very few hiding places. The best way to understand it is from accounts by the victims themselves. The following is a testimony from Claudine, a teenaged survivor from the Bugesera region, who survived one month of killings by hiding in a swamp:

105 Reyntjens, *Rwanda, trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire*, 65–80.

106 McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*, 284–28.

107 McDoom, 'Contested Counting'; Verpoorten, 'How Many Died in Rwanda?'; Reydam, "More than a Million".

108 Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, 55–60.

109 Verwimp, 'Machetes and Firearms'.

110 Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, 2–3.

111 Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, 5.

112 Mironko, 'Igitero', 51–53.

113 Mironko, 51.

Our schedule for survival was established. At dawn, we went down into the swamp and made our way through the papyrus. To avoid all dying together, we divided into small teams. We'd place three children here, two children farther along, two more somewhere else. We increased our chances, took our positions lying in the mud, surrounding ourselves with foliage. Before the attackers arrived, we shared ideas for dodging fear; afterward, we couldn't even whisper anymore. We drank the muddy marsh water. It was enriched, pardon my bluntness, with the blood of the dead.

It wasn't hard to hear the *interahamwe* from a long way off. They whistled and sang, shooting their guns into the air, but oh, they were careful not to waste bullets killing people outright. In the beginning, they would crouch down and murmur gently to lure us out: "Little one," or "Mama, come on out, we see you..." Well, even those so scared they couldn't help [but obey], they weren't rewarded with a quick gunshot. Reason why, later on, neither the sick, nor the infants, nor anyone ever moved at all until the whistle blew for the killers' departure.¹¹⁴

In large part due to the killing of the ten Belgian soldiers, UNAMIR was reduced in size from 2,500 to 270 soldiers at the height of the genocide.¹¹⁵ Almost all Westerners had already been evacuated by French, Belgian and Italian forces in the days 9 to 13 April,¹¹⁶ and the foreign embassies had closed down.¹¹⁷ It should be pointed out that in the first two weeks, it was poorly understood by outside observers that a genocide against Tutsis was taking place. In the beginning the violence was rather understood as a reignited civil war which the RPF was winning.¹¹⁸

The fact that the world 'abandoned' Rwanda at this time cleared the way both for extremists to commit genocide out of view of the prying eyes of foreigners, and for the RPF to take over Rwanda without the intervention of foreign troops. On 12 April, at a time when the RPF seemed to be winning the war, the RPF declared that the foreign evacuation troops had 60 hours to get out of the country, lest they be treated as hostile forces.¹¹⁹ The RPF were especially hostile to the French forces, which had intervened on the side of the Rwandan government earlier in the war, spoiling the RPF's victory. When discussions were underway in late April to send more UNAMIR soldiers with a mandate to protect civilians with force, RPF was categorically opposed, arguing that 'The time for

114 Hatzfeld, *Life Laid Bare*, 193–207.

115 Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, 40–42. In reality, the number of UNAMIR soldiers was always above 450.

116 Kuperman, 40–42.

117 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 222.

118 Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, chap. 4.

119 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 608.

U.N. intervention is long past. The genocide is almost completed.’¹²⁰ The mentality of the RPF was laid out plainly during the genocide by Paul Kagame to the force commander of UNAMIR, Roméo Dallaire (who admired the former):

There will be many sacrifices in this war. If the refugees [at the Hôtel des Mille Collines] have to be killed for the cause, they will be considered as having been part of the sacrifice.¹²¹

It should be remembered that the leaders of the RPF had been exiled for decades, and the ‘sacrifice’ did not touch them very personally. In fact, some RPF members viewed the Tutsis in Rwanda with disdain, because they had not fled after the Hutu revolution.¹²² While the RPF expected genocidal retaliation against Tutsis as a consequence of their offensive, it is unlikely that they expected a full-blown genocide.¹²³ There is some indication that the RPF may have had second thoughts about its uncompromising stance when the scale of the violence had become clear on 23 April, when it offered a ceasefire to the FAR.¹²⁴ Such an offer might have worked ten days earlier, but by this time the extremists were firmly in control over the Rwandan army.¹²⁵

There are reports that the RPF perpetrated massacres in northern Rwanda in the years prior to the genocide, presumably as a means to depopulate the area under its control and destabilize the Rwandan government.¹²⁶ The evidence is scant, partly because the RPF retained full control over the areas it occupied and placed restrictions on the movements of human rights investigators during the war (this also holds true during and after the genocide).¹²⁷ These early reports are not implausible when one takes into consideration the later human rights record of the RPF, which is dismal.¹²⁸ It is during and after the genocide itself that convincing evidence of RPF massacres emerges. An early example was the massacre at Byumba Stadium in the north of the country on 23 April, where the RPF had gathered unarmed civilians, who were then massacred.¹²⁹

Characteristically of the large uncertainty over the scope of RPF violence, the number of killed in Byumba Stadium ranges from ‘300 or more’¹³⁰ to ‘between one and two thousand’.¹³¹ This massacre was part of a larger pattern whereby the RPF would organize meetings in newly occupied areas,

120 Des Forges, 699–701.

121 Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 358, see also 515.

122 Prunier, *Africa’s World War*, 2009, 19.

123 Kuperman, ‘Provoking Genocide’.

124 Kuperman, 79.

125 Kuperman, 79; Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 210.

126 For example, see the testimony in Umutesi, *Fuir ou Mourir au Zaïre*, 26–27.

127 Straus, ‘The Limits of a Genocide Lens’, 510–11.

128 Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, chap. 4.

129 For a detailed, but controversial, account, see Rever, *In Praise of Blood*, 72–80.

130 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 705.

131 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 313.

then kill those who turned up.¹³² According to Alison Des Forges, this practice ‘gave rise to the bitter joke that *kwitaba Imana*, meaning to die, had come to mean the same as *kwitaba inama*, to attend a meeting.’¹³³ Such massacres was grist to the mill for Rwanda’s hate media which during the genocide included the radio station *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM). RTLM alleged that it was Hutus, not Tutsis, that were in risk of extermination. In an emission on 14 May 1994, an RTLM host implied that almost all killed during the genocide were Hutu:

After the 200,000 [killed, the journalists] claim that the number has risen to 500,000. [...] These additional 300,000 are without a doubt Hutus; the Hutus are dying in Byumba prefecture, the Hutus are dying in Kibungu prefecture especially; all those are dying because it is the objective of the *inkotanyi* [another name for the RPF] since 1990.¹³⁴

Scholarly estimates of Hutus killed by the RPF are far more moderate, although not insignificant. Omar McDoom writes that 25,000–45,000 Hutus killed in the period April to August 1994 is a ‘low estimate’, and he is not convinced by allegations that these killings constituted genocide.¹³⁵ The basic problem of establishing the extent of RPF massacres has been well put by Alison Des Forges:

Although the subject of substantial speculation, the RPF slaughter of civilians has been poorly documented. Even during the months when the RPF was just establishing its control, it was remarkably successful in restricting access by foreigners to certain parts of the country. Such limitations fed the speculation about RPF abuses but, at the same time made it extremely difficult to prove wrongdoing.¹³⁶

As the war was nearing an end, in late June, France belatedly intervened with an operation called *Turquoise* by establishing a ‘safe humanitarian zone’ in Rwanda’s south-west, furthest away from the frontlines possible. The RPF was of course violently opposed to this intervention, fearing that the French might get in their way of victory. This fear was warranted. While the criticism of France’s role has taken a life of its own, and should be taken with a grain of salt, it is true that France wanted to ‘preserve a situation in which the conditions would still exist for the negotiation of a ceasefire and then a political negotiation.’¹³⁷ In other words, France did not want the RPF to win the war, and since there were no alternatives to the Interim Government for such ‘negotiations’, the policy arguably endowed a genocidal government with legitimacy.¹³⁸

132 Prunier, *Africa’s World War*, 2009, 15–16.

133 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 706.

134 Chrétien, *Rwanda*, 337.

135 McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*, 296. The ‘double genocide’ argument has been most forcefully advanced in Rever, *In Praise of Blood*.

136 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 692.

137 Assemblée Nationale, ‘Mission d’information Sur Le Rwanda. Tome I’, 324–26.

138 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 669.

Refugee crisis and the Congo wars

About half of Rwanda's Hutu population fled the RPF as it took over the country.¹³⁹ Many of those fled outside the country. The first exodus happened from late April into Tanzania in Rwanda's east (where the RPF began its military offensive). By 1995, 600,000 Rwandan refugees had ended up in Tanzania.¹⁴⁰ Another exodus of Rwandans follows into neighbouring Zaire, which happened in two main waves: the first (and biggest one) into Goma in mid-July as the RPF captured Gisenyi in Rwanda's north-west, the second was a month later into Bukavu, when the French withdrew from their 'safe humanitarian zone'.¹⁴¹ In total, around 1 million Rwandans had sought refuge in Zaire. It must be emphasized that accounts vary significantly in how this exodus is explained. For some, like Gérard Prunier in 1994, 'The exodus had been masterminded by the ideologues of the genocide [who] kept almost total control of their subjects.'¹⁴² For others, like Gérard Prunier in 2009, 'Most of the Hutu who had stayed in the country were there because they had not managed to run away in time.'¹⁴³ If these statements seem contradictory, it is because Prunier in 1994 had not realized that there were good reasons to flee the RPF. Suffice it to say that both are true: Hutus were fleeing because they genuinely feared the RPF, *and* because the Hutu authorities told them to. The exodus is also commonly framed as Hutus fleeing because they feared 'revenge killings' by the RPF. This ignores the fact that Rwandans had been fleeing the RPF from long before the genocide in northern Rwanda. The exodus in 1994 was merely the continuation of a refugee problem which had begun in 1992 within Rwanda itself.

The refugees were in dire need of humanitarian assistance, which they promptly received by international actors with an urge to 'do something', after having done little during the genocide.¹⁴⁴ Controversially, the refugees settled in camps just outside of Rwanda under the leadership of their now-genocidal authorities, who inflated the refugee numbers and diverted international aid for their own purposes, which included plans to invade Rwanda and oust the RPF from power.¹⁴⁵ The enthusiasm for aiding these refugees was therefore short-lived, and pressure was mounting for a repatriation. This happened from late 1996, when the majority of the new Rwandan refugees were forcibly repatriated. In Tanzania this was done in December 1996 by Tanzania and the UNHCR; almost all refugees were returned.¹⁴⁶ In Zaire this was done in the context of the First Congo War, in

139 Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 2009, 5.

140 Whitaker, 'Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection'.

141 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, Chronology.

142 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 314.

143 Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 2009, 4.

144 Bradol and Pape, *Humanitarian Aid, Genocide and Mass Killings*, 47–49.

145 Bradol and Pape, 48, 62–63.

146 Whitaker, 'Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection'.

which Rwanda covertly invaded Zaire, and with the aid of other African countries toppled the Zairian government and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).¹⁴⁷ Rwanda would invade once more in 1998 with less success in the Second Congo War. Rwanda continues to intervene in the DRC to this day. On two occasions it has intervened in the DRC's North Kivu province through the Tutsi rebel group M23, both in 2012–3 and from 2022—the latest M23 offensive is still ongoing at the time of writing (February 2023).¹⁴⁸ These interventions also had an economic element, in that Rwanda (along with other countries) illegally re-exported the DRC's natural resources, such as diamonds and gold, but most importantly the highly profitable ore coltan, used in the production of computers and mobile phones. For Rwanda in 1999 and 2000, its illegal venture in the DRC is estimated to have amounted to 8% of its GNP.¹⁴⁹

More problematic than resource exploitation and aggression is the well-documented massacres perpetrated by the RPF in the DRC, particularly during the First Congo War. Roughly half of the Hutu refugees were repatriated to Rwanda in November 1996 after the RPF had attacked the refugee camps. The other half fled in the other direction, and in the course of the war they would be relentlessly pursued and massacred from October 1996 to September 1997—out of view of the international community.¹⁵⁰ Estimates of people killed range from the 'tens of thousands' to more than 200,000.¹⁵¹ Like the other instances of RPF human rights abuse, there has been no real accountability for these crimes. While the scale of this violence is not comparable to the genocide—both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the two ethnic groups—the cruelty of the perpetrators and suffering of the victims is. This is clear from the so-called UN Mapping Report, published in 2010, which recorded atrocities by all parties to the wars in the Congo from 1993 to 2003. The following is only one of countless examples of massacres of Hutu refugees documented by the report:

Around 9 December [1996], AFDL/APR soldiers intercepted and executed several hundred Rwandan refugees in the vicinity of the village of Chambucha, four kilometres from Hombo. The victims, who included a large number of women and children, were shot dead or killed by blows of hammers and hoes to the head near a bridge over the Lowa River. Before killing them, the AFDL/APR soldiers had promised the refugees that they would

147 Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 2009, 113–25.

148 For Rwanda's support of M23 in 2012, see Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 156–58.

149 Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 2009, 244–45.

150 Emizet, 'The Massacre of Refugees in Congo'; Gowing, 'New Challenges and Problems for Information Management in Complex Emergencies: Ominous Lessons from the Great Lakes and Eastern Zaire in Late 1996 and Early 1997'.

151 For tens of thousands, see Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 138. For more than 200,000, see Emizet, 'The Massacre of Refugees in Congo'.

repatriate them to Rwanda with the aid of UNHCR. Most of the bodies were then dumped in the Lova River.¹⁵²

Remarkably, tens of thousands of Rwandans were indeed repatriated more or less at the same time through the UNHCR. In the period May to June 1997, over 70,000 of these fleeing refugees were repatriated to Rwanda, essentially turned over to their erstwhile killers by the UNHCR. As the UNHCR diplomatically put it in a 1998 report, 'Their return by air and by land to Rwanda was more often an evacuation as a last-resort solution, rather than voluntary repatriation.'¹⁵³ According to the account of one refugee, the UNHCR actively searched for Rwandan refugees and threatened to bring the 'soldiers of Kabila' (which included the RPF) to force them to repatriate. According to the same account, the UNHCR even went so far as to put a price of 10 dollars on the head of each refugee, thereby enticing the local population to turn in the Rwandan refugees who had settled in their villages.¹⁵⁴

RPF's consolidation of power

On July 19, after capturing most of the country, the RPF inaugurated a new Rwandan government inspired by the Arusha Accords, with most ministers being Hutus. Such Hutus came to be known as 'Hutu faces', in view of their illusionary authority, meant to convey an image of political inclusivity.¹⁵⁵ The new arrangement was in fact designed to hide RPF hegemony. Real power was to be found in the authority of 'vice-president' Paul Kagame (Tutsi).¹⁵⁶ Immediately after the genocide, as many as 600,000 (mainly Tutsi) refugees from neighboring countries (and some from far-flung places) followed the RPF in its footsteps and settled in Rwanda's cities and towns. More would follow in the coming years.¹⁵⁷ With the exception of the cabinet, most positions of authority in the state came to be occupied by Tutsis, and/or members of the RPF. Such discrimination was hard to perceive for outside observers, such as donors, because officially there were 'no longer Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, but only Rwandans'.¹⁵⁸ Since 2003, Rwanda has been organizing multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections which has only served to consolidate the dictatorship.¹⁵⁹ Foreign

152 UNHCR, 'Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003', 100.

153 UNHCR, 'Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees', 13.

154 Umutesi, *Fuir ou Mourir au Zaïre*, 249–53.

155 Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 18.

156 Reyntjens, 1–2.

157 Reyntjens, 20; Hilhorst and Leeuwen, 'Emergency and Development', 266.

158 Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 18–21.

159 Reyntjens, chap. 2.

observers with a superficial understanding of Rwanda tend to get misled by these elections. Suffice it to say that Paul Kagame won an impressive 98.8% of the votes in the 2017 presidential election.

The RPF has been successful in promoting significant economic growth within Rwanda, particularly after the year 2000, and the country is both clean and safe for foreigners.¹⁶⁰ For some RPF sympathizers, these improvements, and particularly the effects of development on Rwandans, outweigh the other failings of the RPF, such as human rights abuse and foreign aggression. In fact, these failings are often ignored or even denied. An exemption is the academic Phil Clark, who has explained this perspective candidly:

Having conducted research in rural Rwanda every year since 2003, I have seen the sustained improvement in people's socioeconomic circumstances and in communal relations. Many of the Hutus I have interviewed remain suspicious of the RPF but continue to express surprise that unlike previous Rwandan regimes, it has pursued welfare and development equally across the ethnic divide. When numerous foreign donors temporarily froze their aid programs in Rwanda in 2013—in protest over Rwanda's military and logistical support for [the M23] rebellion in eastern Congo—development projects suffered markedly, especially in rural Rwanda. Once they saw this impact up close, those same donors reinstated all their aid provision within a year.¹⁶¹

Conclusion

Although the genocide of 1994 was unprecedented in its scale, it was not fundamentally different in nature from earlier episodes of ethnic violence in the Great Lakes region. Both Tutsis and Hutus were victims of killings that this author would not hesitate to call genocide, namely the massacres of Tutsis in December 1963 and the killing of Hutu intellectuals in Burundi in 1972. These episodes of violence also has another thing in common with the Rwandan genocide: they both were a response to a perceived danger of a change in the politically dominant ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi.

We now move on to the qualitative part of the thesis, where the differences between Friends, Enemies, and scholars will be discussed.

160 Reyntjens, xvi.

161 Clark, 'The Two Rwandas'.

Rwanda's Friends and Enemies

Introduction

In this chapter I will discuss the difference between the literature produced by Friends and Enemies by focusing on some of their most important disagreements, many of which revolve around the fateful date of 6 April 1994. I will discuss where the scholarly literature stands on these important questions, and how the scholarly consensus has evolved over time.

I will start by making some theoretical reflections. I will discuss the fundamental relationship between knowledge and authority, which has guided many of the decisions taken in this thesis. After that I will discuss the propensity of humans to think in terms of binary categories of 'Good' and 'Bad', or 'Us' versus 'Them'. Such thinking is essential for understanding both the logic of genocide and for understanding the opposition between Friends and Enemies of Rwanda in the literature. These reflections on binary thinking and on knowledge and authority explain why it is warranted to think of the literature in terms of the three, distinct categories of Friends, Enemies and scholars.

Knowledge and authority

An assumption underlying many of the choices made in this thesis (especially the quantitative part) is that all knowledge ultimately rests on authority. I will therefore elaborate in this section on why that is. Some might object to that assertion, seeing as it seems to subject knowledge to power. That is not the intention (although knowledge often *is* subject to power); rather, the assertion is an acknowledgment of how knowledge works—indeed, how knowledge *must* work.

The reason knowledge must rest on authority is mathematical in nature. No matter how much a person or a community 'knows', there will always be a frontier of new, unanswered questions. This is common sense in science; as the scientific 'horizon' expands, as new discoveries are made, so are more questions in need of answers. In physics, the frontier of knowledge of the world's building blocks has gotten ever more detailed; first we were made of atoms, believed to be 'elemental particles'; then atoms came to be composed of the sub-atomic particles protons, neutrons and electrons; and then even protons and neutrons were discovered to be composed of quarks. But what is a 'quark', really? At this small scale there are limits to what we can measure, and the question of what a quark is must be answered by theories based on the measurements we can make. The point is

that knowledge is a fractal structure, and there is no limit to the increasingly detailed questions one might ask. It is impossible to reason without at some point stopping the fractal structure of knowledge in its tracks and taking something for granted. For physicists, this includes ‘elemental particles’ like quarks; for all of us, this includes beliefs we hold, or things we have heard or read. Mathematicians recognize the inevitability of doing this; they call such end-points ‘axioms’, which means unproven statements assumed to be true, which can be used to build complicated theorems. In other words, all mathematical theorems rest on unproven axioms. This is simply inevitable.

It is rarely necessary to go as far to the frontiers of knowledge as quarks; usually we stop the fractal structure very early, in the form the abstractions like belief or hearsay, or a scholarly consensus. When writing non-fiction literature it is sometimes necessary to substantiate such abstractions by citing other authors. What such citations mean is essentially ‘such-and-such is true because so-and-so says so’. It is not possible nor desirable to describe everything in its most minute detail when we write, so we compensate by invoking the *authority* of some holder of knowledge. Because humans are social creatures, I believe that in general, the ‘holder of knowledge’ is predominantly the author of a given book or publication, rather than other entities involved in the production of a cited text (such as a publishing house).

When knowledge is understood in this way, it becomes clear that our world-view is to a large extent dependent upon which people or institutions we invest with the authority to ‘know’. We might invest authority to an organized religion, or to a political cause; in either case, it would fundamentally shape our understanding of reality. One might—and many do—invest authority to the scientific community, to the peer-review process, journals and accomplished scholars. The major difference is that due to the scientific ethos prevailing in academia—quite unlike in religion and politics—this authority is to a greater degree warranted, and the impressive results of scientific thought are now evidenced all around us. For those motivated by this ethos, like the pioneering scientist Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), science is ‘above’ national interests.¹⁶² Or, as the botanist Joseph Bank—one of Humboldt’s contemporaries—put it, ‘The science of two Nations may be at Peace, while their Politics are at war.’¹⁶³ I believe that most scholars writing about Rwanda are motivated by such ideals, which is why I avoid lumping the scholars into the categories Friends or Enemies—unless they veer too far from the scholarly consensus.

The link between knowledge and authority has important implications; for example, it may help explain the rise of Trumpism in the United States. When Donald Trump declared, without any

¹⁶² Wulf, *The Invention of Nature*, 103.

¹⁶³ Wulf, 76.

evidence, that the 2020 Presidential election was ‘stolen’, he did something that previously would have been unthinkable, and he seemed to get away with it. The rise of the Internet was likely crucial in explaining how democracy in the United States came under threat.¹⁶⁴ While the Internet has provided a democratization of knowledge production, it has also undermined traditional sources of authority by giving everyone the opportunity to speak authoritatively about issues which they might know little about. It has engendered a crisis of information in which many Internet users choose poorly which authorities they consider holders of knowledge. The media, a traditional holder of knowledge, could now simply be declared ‘fake news’ if it contradicted Trump in any way.

We can expect the crisis to become worse in the years to come. With the recent advances in Artificial Intelligence, it has become possible to produce fake information on command, even audiovisual information indistinguishable from the real thing. People will be misled by such information, and it will be used uncritically by political actors to further their cause.

In a dictatorship like Rwanda, the holder of knowledge is the powers that be, namely the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Paul Kagame. This is particularly true in the field of history, given its political sensitivity.¹⁶⁵ Yet, like all dictatorships, the RPF is highly polarizing, and its claim to authority over knowledge is challenged by its opponents, which includes many in the Rwandan diaspora, some investigative journalists, and others aware of the history of its massive violations of human rights in the 1990s. These opponents form a community of knowledge producers united in their opposition to the RPF. While scholars also challenge the RPF’s claim to authority over knowledge, Enemies are different in that opposition to the RPF is their defining feature. Before moving on to a discussion of the differences between Friends and Enemies of Rwanda, I will discuss the notion of binary thinking, and its impact on social organization. Why do humans seem so prone to organize themselves in binary ways, of Us/Them; Hutu/Tutsi; Republicans/Democrats (in the United States); or left or right on the political spectrum?

Binary thinking

Our tendency to think in terms of binary categories is evidenced all around us, and with the Internet we can see it in the data, if we know where to look. One place it can be seen is in the ratings for movies and TV series on IMDb (Internet Movie Database), where users rate series and movies in a scale from 1 to 10. If these users were to rate a show objectively, one would expect the user ratings to form something resembling a normal distribution around the ‘right’ answer, for example around 6

¹⁶⁴ Persily, ‘The 2016 U.S. Election’.

¹⁶⁵ Longman, *Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 34.

(for a mediocre series). Yet what often happens, particularly when a series is controversial, is that a substantial amount of votes are either 1 or 10. An example of this is the Amazon TV series *The Lord of the Rings: The Rings of Power*, the so-called ‘most expensive TV series of all time’, which upon its release on 1 September 2022 provoked a controversy due to its inclusive casting. As an article in *Reader’s Digest* reported,

Thousands of so-called Tolkien fans have bombarded the internet with racist and misogynistic complaints. On the other side of the spectrum are the fans embracing it—25 million viewers tuned in to the series premiere, and many are calling it one of the best TV shows on air right now.

By 2 September, the day after its release, thousands of votes had been cast, and a large majority of the votes (65%) were either a 1 (26%) or a 10 (38%). The more reasonable votes in the middle, from 4 to 7, received a mere 10% in total, and there was no hint of a normal distribution. The vote for *The Rings of Power* has gotten progressively less binary over time, and today a normal distribution has formed around 8—a reasonable rating, given the enormous production value of the series. Yet even today, almost 50% of the votes are either a 1 or a 10.¹⁶⁶ What these ratings indicate is that while humans are capable of producing a reasonably objective rating (like 7); our ability to do so sometimes breaks down and we start thinking in terms of binary categories of good vs. bad. Any nuance seems to get lost when we think in terms of binary categories, and *The Rings of Power* is suddenly either so good that it cannot possibly be better, or so bad that it cannot get worse.

To explain why nuance breaks down in this way, it is fruitful to consider the perspective of the cognitive psychologist Daniel Kahneman, who in his 2011 book, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, distinguished between two kinds of thinking: one intuitive, fast and effortless; another one slow, analytical and effortful.¹⁶⁷ Kahneman points that most of the time, our brains engage in ‘fast’ thinking, which involves quick, intuitive judgments. We sometimes ‘slow down’ our thinking, and think analytically, but this is the exception rather than the rule, because thinking ‘slow’ is effortful. Kahneman uses the abstraction of two ‘systems’ to write about these two modes of thinking: when we are thinking ‘fast’, we are using System 1, and when we are thinking ‘slow’ we are using System 2. It should be noted that the vast majority of ratings are probably produced through System 1, including sensible ones. It is entirely possible to produce a reasonable rating such as 7 without any analytical reasoning; a TV series might simply ‘feel’ like a 7. Thinking with System 1 is very

166 The ratings are available on this URL: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt7631058/ratings?demo=imdb_users&ref_=ttrt_fltr_imdb_users (accessed 24 March 2023). This status of this URL on 2 September and 7 September 2022 are available through the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine (<https://web.archive.org/>).

167 Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*.

efficient, but it also makes us susceptible to biases. One of the more interesting biases for our purposes described in Kahneman's book is what is called the 'halo effect'.

The halo effect is our tendency to see certain people (or more abstract concepts, like organizations) entirely in a positive or a negative light, even though we might know next to nothing about them. The first impression is particularly important, according to Kahneman. If we stumble upon negative information about someone we already believe to be good, we are likely to disregard it, because it does not fit our conception of this person. Kahneman points out that this is a way to reduce ambiguity, and can help us think more coherently—although not necessarily more correctly.¹⁶⁸ In the case of Rwanda, we might relate this to Gérard Prunier's observation that which 'side' is chosen in Rwanda depends to a large extent on when one first encounters Rwanda. For example, many people who first discovered Rwanda in 1994 certainly thought that the 'Hutus' (i.e. the Rwandan government) were the bad guys and the 'Tutsis'¹⁶⁹ (i.e. the RPF) were the good guys. This first impression made it hard to swallow subsequent evidence of RPF mass killings, because it disturbed the moral clarity of the first impression.¹⁷⁰

A possible explanation for the halo effect is the recent discovery by neuroscientists that neurons used to store positive and negative information in the brain are physically distinct, and in many areas of the brain, like the amygdala and the hippocampus, the positive and negative neurons are even clustered together, and could therefore be said to have their own real estate in the brain.¹⁷¹ Interestingly, one of the areas where positive and negative neurons were mixed rather than separated is the prefrontal cortex, the area responsible for analytical thinking (or System 2).¹⁷² These and other findings indicate that the binary categories of 'good' and 'bad' are fundamental to how we think. One function of thinking in such categories is simply to survive. Like other animals, we are hardwired to detect potential dangers in our environment, such as snakes. As Joseph LeDoux, a specialist in the neuroscience of emotions, has written, it is even 'possible for your brain [specifically the amygdala] to know that something is good or bad before it knows exactly what it is.'¹⁷³

168 Kahneman, 82–83.

169 I put parentheses around the ethnic terms here because it is incorrect to conflate Hutus with the Interim Government which oversaw the genocide, and Tutsis with the RPF. It reproduces the very same logic which led to the genocide (the logic is this: all Tutsis are RPF, ergo killing Tutsis is an acceptable way to fight the RPF). Yet it is through this binary ethnic categorization that many foreigners and Rwandans understood the conflict. It is not uncommon to find these political and ethnic terms conflated in the literature—often implicitly rather than explicitly.

170 Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 2009, 357.

171 Rogers, 'Good and Bad Memories Have Their Own Real Estate in the Brain, Raising the Possibility of Memory Manipulation'.

172 Rogers.

173 LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain*, 69.

Another function of binary thinking is likely its implication for social organization. Researchers of morality in media narratives have found that if people are exposed to morally clear narratives—that is, narrative in which the ‘good guy’ and the ‘bad guy’ are clearly defined, and where the ‘good guy’ does not suddenly start acting in a bad way and vice versa—they are subsequently more prone to cooperate with others.¹⁷⁴ This makes sense. Binary thinking enables complex social cooperation to form spontaneously as humans group together for or against something. We saw an example earlier in the case of *The Rings of Power*, where thousands of people unknown to each other acted in unison, either for or against the TV series. We might consider a thought experiment in which humans did not think in terms of binary categories, and someone on the Internet felt very strongly that *The Rings of Power* deserved a rating of 3. It would be hard to rally people behind such a banner. Another person who felt it deserved a 2 would not cooperate, because 2 and 3 are different. Yet if the nuance between these positions is sacrificed, and both of them are rounded down to 1, they would realize they are on the same team. Voting 1 is a silly thing to do, of course, but that is beside the point.

What is taking place among the IMDb voters is a spontaneous organization into two opposing groups, each of whom consider themselves (‘Us’) to be the good guys, and the others (‘Them’) to be the bad guys. Such a polarization has happened repeatedly throughout history, both internally in societies and in international relations between states. This seems to occur very often in cases of conflict. A typical case within societies is where a revolutionary agenda overthrows a dictatorship only for the revolution to go sour immediately afterward. The French revolution of 1789 and the Iranian revolution of 1979 are examples of this. Revolutionaries define themselves in opposition to a regime, and once the revolution has been accomplished it can become unclear what the revolutionaries are *for*, rather than against. With the disappearance of a common enemy, the unity may disappear as previously ignored differences come to light. On the level of international relations, both world wars were characterized by a binary opposition of two alliances of states. Whereas World War I pitted the Allied Powers against the Central Powers, World War II saw the opposition of Allies against the Axis. World War II was immediately followed by the Cold War, a binary opposition of Communism against Capitalism which touched every corner of the planet, despite the fact that it was mostly a conflict between Russia and the United States. Should China decide to invade Taiwan today, this may lead to a third world war pitting Russia and China against the United States, the European Union and other democracies, in which all countries would be hard pressed not to pick a side. Our propensity to organize against a common enemy can be both

¹⁷⁴ Lewis et al., ‘Moral Clarity in Narratives Elicits Greater Cooperation than Moral Ambiguity’.

detrimental (when the conflict is unnecessary) or beneficial, in cases where the threat necessitates a response (such as German aggression during World War II), or where the common enemy unifies a society and leads to greater trust among a populace. The enemy does not have to be other groups of people, it can also be natural disasters that affect an entire society.¹⁷⁵

Certain polities seem to be deadlocked into a bipolar political system. An example of this is the United States' political polarization into Republicans and Democrats, a polarization that in the last decade has become so tense that it has come to pose a threat to the democratic system. Political polarization undermines the trust within a society, and this erosion of trust makes it harder for the society to face challenges like climate change, and it may promote egotistical behaviour.¹⁷⁶

Why does political polarization happen so often, and why does it always seem to be binary in nature, as opposed to ternary? The reason may be mathematical in nature. In a network where several actors are either friends or enemies, many configurations of relationships will be unstable. The mathematician Steven Strogatz has explained it with an example many of us will be familiar with, namely that of a bad breakup. The friends of the couple are inevitably obliged to choose a side in the dispute, or to engage in an uncomfortable balancing act where care must be taken to keep the erstwhile lovers apart. In a network with more actors, where everyone knows everyone, it turns out there are only two possible kinds of stable configurations of relationships: one where all actors are friends, and a polarized state where two camps (of any size) are fiercely opposed. A ternary split into three factions is not possible without causing a certain degree of imbalance in the network.¹⁷⁷ In the real world, everyone does not know everyone, but this mathematical property of networks of relationships may provide an explanation for why binary polarization occurs in so many societies, particularly in cases of conflict. The logic of bipolar social organization has an unnerving tendency to overwhelm and threaten other social organizations—even the one we cherish the most, namely the family. U.S. citizens have in recent years learnt to avoid discussions of politics during Thanksgiving, a national holiday in which American families are united over a festive meal.¹⁷⁸ This is because they know a political discussion might split the family along the Democrat/Republican divide.

In the case of Rwanda, what occurred during the Rwandan civil war was a political polarization, which gradually evolved to become a polarization of those for and those against the RPF. Many

175 Toya and Skidmore, 'Do Natural Disasters Enhance Societal Trust?'

176 Lee, 'Social Trust in Polarized Times'.

177 Strogatz, *The Joy of X*, 18–21. For a proof, see Easley and Kleinberg, *Networks, Crowds, and Markets*, 107–12.

This proof does make one questionable assumption, namely that a triangle of three nodes all hostile to each other is unbalanced.

178 Johnson, Bostwick, and Cionea, 'Talking Turkey'.

Rwandans also saw this polarization in ethnic terms, one of Tutsis (the RPF) against Hutus. It would be hard for any Rwandan to view this emerging polarization with indifference, especially the minority Tutsis within Rwanda, who now found themselves the object of hatred for many Hutus. The RPF takeover of Rwanda perpetuated the polarization. When foreigners new to Rwanda began to write about its recent history, after the genocide of 1994 catapulted the country to international infamy, they too tended to position themselves (mostly) for or (sometimes) against the RPF. Almost thirty years later, the literature on Rwanda remains polarized along these lines.

Although a scholarly literature has emerged which tries to understand the violence without falling victim to the political polarization, this does not mean this literature exists in a vacuum. Any scholarly conclusion, no matter how objective and impartial the process which led to the conclusion, can be used by the two sides to attack each other, and scholars are painfully aware of this. In addition, scholars may be tempted to measure their words when writing about sensitive issues like RPF human rights abuse, because being too critical would make it more difficult or impossible to conduct research within Rwanda. In fact, the five most cited people (see Table 2) by the 27 authors I have registered, namely Alison Des Forges, Filip Reyntjens, Gérard Prunier, André Guichaoua and René Lemarchand, have all been declared *persona non grata* in Rwanda.¹⁷⁹ Among the books I have registered, nearly 20% of *all* references to people are to one of these five scholars.¹⁸⁰ This pervasive exclusion of the most reputable authors on Rwanda is a good illustration of the RPF's insensitivity to accounts that contradict its own version of history.

Typology of the literature

In this part of the thesis I will explore the qualitative differences between the literature produced by Friends and Enemies of Rwanda. The best way to do this is to look at some of the most controversial topics in Rwanda's history of violence, like RPF human rights abuse. The reason for this is that these are the issues the Friends and Enemies disagree most about. They essentially function as a litmus test for the literature. For example, if an author firmly states that Hutu extremists shot down Juvénal Habyarimana's airplane on 6 April 1994, it is almost certain that this author is not an Enemy (because such a conclusion would exonerate the RPF), and it is likely that the author is a Friend (for the same reason). One may subject authors to more litmus tests; if authors unflinchingly accept the arguments of either Friends or Enemies, respectively, it strongly suggests

179 Reyntjens and Lemarchand in 1995, Prunier in 1997, Guichaoua sometime prior to 2008 and Des Forges in 2008.

Reyntjens, 'Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World', 4–5; Reyntjens, *Les risques du métier*, 114–15; Hirondelle News Agency, 'Rwanda/HRW - Alison Des Forges Is Prohibited from Entering Rwanda'.

180 See the section Most cited people below.

where they stand. On some of the controversies there is also an issue of scale. For example, the numbers of Hutus killed by the RPF in the 1990s varies wildly in the literature, and how big this number is for any given author is an indication of their hostility to the RPF.

There are many controversies in the literature that can be used to distinguish Friends and Enemies. Below I have chosen four controversies which are particularly useful for distinguishing Friends from Enemies. For each of them, I will discuss where Friends and Enemies stand. I will also discuss where the scholars stand, and how the scholarly consensus has evolved over time. I will end this chapter by discussing the difference in the thematic focus of Friends and Enemies.

The question of planning

In the context of the Rwandan genocide, and in the trials conducted by the special UN trial set up in Tanzania after the genocide to persecute the culprits (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR]), the question of planning refers to whether the violence that occurred against Tutsis and the political opposition after 6 April 1994 was planned prior to that date. Thierry Cruvellier, an excellent writer and one of the rare journalists who avoids the pitfall of ‘choosing a side’ when writing about Rwanda, has put the controversy in these terms:

On one side of the debate were the fierce gatekeepers concerned about official history, who think, in short, that the genocide in Rwanda must be a tropical version of Hitlerism and cringe at the slightest hint of doubt as to the meticulous, chronologically well-organized, central planning of the Tutsi extermination. They fear that questioning whether the genocide was planned would mean the crime itself could be questioned. On the other side were those who actually silently dream of renaming this crime in order to further trivialize or deny it, and who never miss an opportunity to fan the fire by pointing out how proof of a plan continues to elude the guardians of dogma.¹⁸¹

The controversy has implications for how the change of power in 1994 is seen. If the genocide was planned prior to 6 April, this means that its occurrence was inevitable, and it puts the RPF offensive during the genocide in a positive light. If, on the other hand, it was not planned, then it is more natural to see it as a *consequence* of the RPF offensive. If the genocide was planned, this would serve to underline the illegitimacy of the pre-genocide government of Rwanda, and the MRND(D) in particular—and to underline the legitimacy of RPF, which then would seem to have acted to stop this Machiavellian plan.

181 Cruvellier, *Court of Remorse*, 140.

The allegation that the genocide was planned in advance of 6 April 1994 was advanced during the genocide itself by Human Rights Watch (HRW)—whose Africa branch was called Africa Watch prior to the genocide—in a report published in May 1994,¹⁸² and it was further substantiated in an extremely detailed book on the genocide published by African Rights (not to be confused with Africa Watch) in September 1994, called *Rwanda: Death, despair and defiance*.¹⁸³ Unlike HRW, African Rights was a tiny human rights organization (composed of Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal) with questionable ties to the RPF.¹⁸⁴ The book by African Rights claimed there was ‘overwhelming evidence’ that the genocide had been planned well in advance of 7 April 1994, a claim which was echoed in the same terms a few months later in an official UN report.¹⁸⁵ In the next decade, this allegation was standard orthodoxy of what happened in Rwanda, not only among Friends, but also among the most important scholarly books on the genocide. What distinguishes Friends from scholars, is the tenacity of the belief in a genocide conspiracy. A prominent example is the British investigative journalist Linda Melvern, who discovered Rwanda during the genocide and subsequently wrote three books dedicated to Rwanda. Her authorship persistently deflects responsibility from the RPF, something which is done in three ways:

- Insisting on the existence of a genocide conspiracy, and implying that anyone who is not convinced by the evidence of such a conspiracy are genocide deniers (including reputable scholars).¹⁸⁶
- Ignoring or denying evidence of massive human rights violations by the RPF.
- Berating the ‘international community’ and ‘the West’ for its ‘betrayal’ of Rwanda.¹⁸⁷ Intentional or not, focusing on what ‘the West’ did not do during the genocide deflects attention from what Rwandan actors actually did, particularly the RPF.

From Melvern’s point of view, the changing scholarly consensus is actually the result of the ‘pernicious influence’ of what she calls the ‘Hutu Power movement’, whose purpose is ‘to destroy truth and memory – the final stage of the genocide process.’¹⁸⁸ It is clear from such emotionally laden rhetoric why Melvern cannot accept alternative points of view on the genocide. She is doing battle with ‘Hutu Power’, and will not be misled by ‘fake news’ and ‘phoney science’.¹⁸⁹

182 Human Rights Watch, ‘Genocide in Rwanda, April - May 1994’.

183 African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, chap. 4.

184 Reydams, ‘NGO Justice’.

185 United Nations, ‘Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994)’, para. 58.

186 This is implied in her 2020 book, Melvern, *Intent to Deceive*.

187 Melvern, *A People Betrayed*.

188 Melvern, *Intent to Deceive*, 1–4.

189 Melvern, 1.

Technically there is no question that the killings of Tutsis were organized and planned; the question is *when* it was planned (before or after 6 April) and how decentralized its planning and execution was. Soon after the genocide started, the new authorities (Interim Government) characterized the genocide as a spontaneous outburst of violence which was impossible to control.¹⁹⁰ It is psychologically difficult for many to accept a lack of meticulous planning, because it seems to let the Rwandan government at least partially off the hook. The lower the echelon of responsibility for the killings, the more anonymous the perpetrators become, and the strategy of the *génocidaires* of killing in groups so as to dilute responsibility seems somehow to have paid off, as it makes it seem as if everyone and no one in particular are responsible for it. It just happened.

Among the Enemies one finds Barrie Collins, who has been particularly determined to argue against the idea of a genocide conspiracy. In 2014 he published a book on the subject entitled *Rwanda 1994: The Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and its Consequences*—a book prefaced by a former defence lawyer at the ICTR.¹⁹¹ Although based on meticulous research—it is an adaption of his PhD thesis from 2009—Collins has clearly chosen a side in the conflict, and his particular focus on Rwandan history seems designed to exempt the former Rwandan authorities from blame. The reason for choosing the ‘Hutu’ side is ideological. Like Melvern, Collins is furious at ‘the West’ for things it allegedly did or did not do in Rwanda. Writing in the British magazine *LM* (Living Marxism) in 1997, a magazine with roots in the radical far-left, Collins was particularly concerned with how Rwanda had been ‘singled out for a genocide tribunal’ by powerful nations, particularly the United States. Like Melvern, Collins writes in conspiratorial prose: ‘The tribunal is clearly not what it claims to be. Something else is going [sic] here. It is a showtrial, staged by the powers who run the UN.’¹⁹² Collins wrote indignantly about ‘the hysteria over an alleged genocide [which has] obscured the real causes of the conflict [i.e., the West]’ and of ‘alleged genocidal acts’.¹⁹³ It is hard not to characterize such rhetoric as genocide denial.

Views of scholars

The scholarly consensus has gradually shifted from the viewpoint of Friends to that of the Enemies on the question of planning. The most important scholarly works published on the genocide in the 1990s, like Prunier 1995, Chrétien 1995, and Des Forges 1999, all took the genocide conspiracy for granted, and tried to prove it. Like other conspiracy theories, it was a collection of a wide range of seemingly convincing facts all pointing in the same direction, with little reflection on how these

190 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 252.

191 Collins, *Rwanda 1994*.

192 Collins, ‘Showtrial, UN-Style’. Collins was writing under the name Barry Crawford, presumably a pen name.

193 Collins.

indices might contradict each other, or even itself. An example of such evidence is the case of the machete imports to Rwanda prior the genocide. Based on questionable data, Des Forges argued that the Rwandan businessman Félicien Kabuga had imported an ‘extraordinary quantity’ of machetes prior to the genocide, as part of the genocide conspiracy.¹⁹⁴ This was among the charges when Kabuga was indicted by the ICTR in 1998. Kabuga remained at large for more than 20 years, before being arrested in France in 2020. Only after his arrest was the accusation of importing machetes for the purpose of genocide removed from Kabuga’s renewed indictment, in view of the poverty of the evidence.¹⁹⁵

As late as 2004, the academic Nigel Eltringham wrote that the ‘lack of a transparent, judicial investigation into the attack [against Juvénal Habyarimana’s airplane] serves the cause of those who seek to deny *the indisputable reality* of a premeditated genocide against Tutsi in 1994.’¹⁹⁶ The genocide conspiracy was seemingly confirmed at the ICTR in the period 1998–2001 when two judgments were handed down, and confirmed on appeal, in which the defendants were sentenced for having planned the genocide. Yet the claim that the genocide conspiracy was ‘indisputable’ turned out to be premature, as the prosecutors at the ICTR were struggling to prove this conspiracy in its most important cases, particularly against Théoneste Bagosora, allegedly the mastermind behind the genocidal plan. André Guichaoua, an expert witness for the ICTR prosecution for many years, wrote that with the exception of the two early cases, ‘the Trial Chambers have uniformly found the prosecution’s proof of a conspiracy wanting, regardless of the case.’¹⁹⁷ Notably, for those with strong feelings on the subject it is possible to pick and choose which judgements are considered authoritative with respect to genocide planning, as Eltringham has pointed out in a later work.¹⁹⁸ For example, Linda Melvern ignored the failure of the prosecution in its later cases when she wrote in 2019 that ‘It seems extraordinary that after convictions at the ICTR for conspiracy to commit genocide, trials in which the arguments of a lack of planning failed to persuade the judges, some academics have continued to argue the opposite.’¹⁹⁹

Yet for those at the ICTR, the failure to prove a genocidal plan against Bagosora was nothing short of embarrassing. This is how Thierry Cruvellier describes the opening of the case against Bagosora in 2002:

194 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 127–28.

195 Rugiririza and Ruvugiro, ‘Why Kabuga Is No Longer Accused of Importing Machetes for Genocide’. See also Guichaoua, ‘Did Machete Imports to Rwanda Prove That the Genocide against the Tutsi Was Planned?’

196 Eltringham, *Accounting For Horror*, 118. Eltringham’s emphasis.

197 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 303.

198 Eltringham, *Genocide Never Sleeps*, 176.

199 Melvern, *Intent to Deceive*, 159. Note how the burden of proof seems to fall on the defence rather than on the prosecution in Melvern’s formulation.

Prosecutor Chile Eboue-Osuji created a sensation when he opened this long-awaited trial. He started by showing an explanatory diagram of the genocidal plan, the “tangled web of conspiracy.” The drawing resembled a map of the sky where the deadly Hutu Power constellations and the isolated stars of criminal conspiracy became entangled and intertwined under the spell of RTLM’s airwaves. The author of the sketch had proudly signed his work, just as one might patent the discovery of parthenogenesis. [...]. The sketch quickly became a prime target for mockery or condemnation.²⁰⁰

Although there is some evidence of a genocidal plan, most scholars seems to have abandoned this notion, particularly after Bagosora’s detailed judgment in 2008, in which he was convicted for genocide, but in which the evidence for a genocide plan prior to 6 April 1994 was thoroughly rejected.²⁰¹ Scott Straus, in a book from 2006, emphasized the importance of the war (combined with state power and the ethnic classifications) in bringing about the genocide: ‘War was critical in legitimizing violence and causing the fear and uncertainty that led some to kill.’²⁰² The evidence for a genocide plan was now deemed ‘inconclusive’ by Straus, who argued that ‘the genocide need not have been planned in advance for it to have occurred.’²⁰³ André Guichaoua’s influential book from 2010 (translated from French to English in 2015), *From War to Genocide*, provided a more nuanced account of how Hutu extremists took over the state in the days following the assassination and used this power to fan the flames of genocide.²⁰⁴ In his 2021 book on the causes of the genocide, Omar McDoom cites the results of the ICTR on this question and argues that ‘the evidence does not clearly point to a conspiracy to commit genocide before 7 April 1994.’²⁰⁵

In retrospect, the evidence for a genocidal conspiracy prior to 6 April 1994 seems to have been based to a large extent on moral indignation. As the years passed by, and with the help of the ICTR, scholars could evaluate the evidence with greater emotional detachment and nuanced their understanding on the causes of the genocide. It is also likely that the scholars with a greater sense of moral clarity (which the theory of a genocidal conspiracy provides) were quicker to publish book-length accounts on the genocide, while those who doubted the theory took longer to publish explanations for the violence. With the absence of a conspiracy, the violence also becomes more difficult to explain.

200 Cruvellier, *Court of Remorse*, 140–42.

201 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 322–27.

202 Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, 226.

203 Straus, 226.

204 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*.

205 McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*, 176–77.

Juvénal Habyarimana's assassination

Perhaps the most controversial subject in the literature on the Rwandan genocide, and one which neatly distinguishes Friends from Enemies, is the question of who was responsible for shooting down the airplane of Juvénal Habyarimana as it approached the Kigali airport on 6 April 1994. There are two contending explanations for what happened:

1. The RPF shot down the airplane as part of its plan to take power in Rwanda.
2. Hutu extremists shot down the airplane of their own president as part of a genocidal plan.

The stakes are incredibly high because the assassination was the immediate cause of the Rwandan genocide. As Omar McDoom writes, 'Habyarimana's assassination – and the belief [among Rwandans] that the RPF were responsible – were causally necessary for the extremists to capture the state and thereby carry out the genocide.'²⁰⁶ Among the two explanations, the first one is the most straightforward, because it posits that the RPF killed its avowed enemy. The second explanation is more counter-intuitive because it argues that extremists around the President—including the President's wife, Agathe Habyarimana—killed their own leader (and with him important military leaders), in the belief that this assassination would make it possible to commit genocide against Tutsis.

Investigative journalist Michela Wrong put it well when she pointed out that the second explanation violates the principle of Occam's razor, 'which states that the simplest answer is likely to be the correct one.'²⁰⁷ It is difficult to apply such principles when the stakes are so high. It is therefore very difficult for Friends to believe that the RPF shot down the airplane. It is instructive how the self-described Friend Gerald Caplan framed the issue in an article from 2012 on the Rwandan genocide. For him, it is the second explanation that is intuitive:

Many experts believe the finger most plausibly points to Habyarimana's extremist allies, adamantly opposed to sharing power and spoils with the RPF as agreed at Arusha and openly threatening the President's life. Some, like British authority Linda Melvern, suspect the French might have cooperated with the plotters (Melvern, 2009). Others, including several historians, a French judge, and various genocide deniers, have insisted the RPF leadership was responsible, though without persuasive evidence for this counter-intuitive charge. A 2010 report by a Rwandan "Committee of Experts," followed by a 2012 report by a second French judge, together make a compelling case that the RPF could not have been

²⁰⁶ McDoom, 179.

²⁰⁷ Wrong, *Do Not Disturb*, 366.

responsible and that Hutu insiders alone could have fired the deadly rockets. This sensible conclusion will never satisfy genocide deniers; whether it will be accepted by reputable doubters is too early to know.²⁰⁸

Caplan's lumping together of 'reputable doubters' with 'various genocide deniers' is revealing, as is his willingness to believe the conclusion of a Rwandan government report from 2010—a problematic report by an actor with a vested interest in absolving itself from blame.²⁰⁹ As Caplan wrote in 2018—even as he distanced himself from the RPF due to concern over its human rights record—'for those who have always believed that Hutu Power was the obvious perpetrator of the plane crash, [...], an abundance of evidence has always existed in plain view.'²¹⁰ 'Obvious' is the operative word. Like Melvern, Caplan is doing battle with Hutu Power and genocide denial, and this makes it very hard to believe that the RPF could be responsible. The firmness of his conviction leads Caplan—who has a PhD in African history—to misrepresent the scholarly consensus when he wrote in 2010 that 'It has always seemed most plausible to a majority of those studying the genocide that Hutu extremists and not the RPF shot down the President's plane',²¹¹ or when he wrote in 2018 that 'a generation of scholars' had concluded that Hutu extremists were responsible.²¹² Caplan does not seem to be aware that he is at the fringe of scholarship on this issue.

Caplan is correct that his ideological opponents take advantage of the evidence pointing to the RPF. The opinionated French investigative journalist and *Enemy* Pierre Péan characteristically started his book from 2005 on Rwanda (*Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs*) by writing 'Who killed Juvénal Habyarimana, the ex-President of Rwanda, and why is he dead?'.²¹³ This is the lever with which Péan could upend conventional wisdom and write an account in which the RPF is maximally responsible for the violence. Enemies have an advantage over Friends when writing about Habyarimana's assassination, because there are many different strands of evidence pointing to the RPF. Péan's text is interspersed with minute details like the name of the missile (incorrectly referred to as SAM 16), its origin (Soviet Union → Uganda → RPF), the name of the group organizing the shoot down ('Network Commando') and even the identity of the alleged shooter (Jack Nziza).²¹⁴ The investigative journalist Judi Rever (*Enemy*) followed in Péan's footsteps in 2018, adding more detail such as the inside stories of alleged witnesses to the assassination who were killed or

208 Caplan, 'The 1994 Genocide of the Tutsi of Rwanda', 457. Caplan has later distanced himself from the RPF. See Caplan, 'Rethinking the Rwandan Narrative for the 25th Anniversary'.

209 For a deconstruction of the 2010 'Mutsinzi report', see Reyntjens, 'A Fake Inquiry on a Major Event'. See also Caplan, 'Who Killed the President of Rwanda?'

210 Caplan, 'Rethinking the Rwandan Narrative for the 25th Anniversary', 177.

211 Caplan, 'Pambazuka - The Politics of Denialism'.

212 Caplan, 'Rethinking the Rwandan Narrative for the 25th Anniversary', 178.

213 Péan, *Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs*, 7.

214 Péan, 7–23.

disappeared from neighbouring countries by the RPF.²¹⁵ In this context Enemies like to tell the conspiratorial story of how an investigation into the assassination by the ICTR prosecution was shut down in 1997, supposedly after U.S. interference made the ICTR Prosecutor Louise Arbour change her mind.²¹⁶ Although Arbour did change her mind, there is little substance to the allegation of U.S. interference.²¹⁷

Views of scholars

Early scholarly works were inconclusive as to the perpetrator of the attack, and they consisted of discussions of various theories and their relative probabilities of being correct. Gérard Prunier, who at the time he published his seminal book on the genocide in 1995 (*Rwanda Crisis*) was enamored by the RPF, argued that it was not in the RPF's interest to kill Juvénal Habyarimana and believed that those who had planned the genocide, namely 'some of [Habyarimana's] close associates', were also likely to be the perpetrators of the assassination.²¹⁸ Filip Reyntjens, who was far more critical of the RPF and believed the extent of RPF massacres were underestimated, discussed the competing theories in his 1995 book on the first days of the genocide (*Rwanda, trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire*) and argued that the evidence pointed to the RPF as the perpetrator of the attack, possibly in collaboration with Habyarimana's political opponents in Rwanda.²¹⁹

Des Forges in *Leave None to Tell the Story* (1999) discussed both theories, but was inconclusive. Des Forges emphasized that genocide planning and the assassination of Habyarimana should be kept separate: 'We know little about who assassinated Habyarimana. We know more about who used the assassination as the pretext to begin a slaughter that had been planned for months.'²²⁰ In the next few years evidence began to accumulate that the RPF was responsible, and many scholars were swayed by this explanation, although they generally avoided premature conclusions. An exception is Nigel Eltringham, who wrote in 2004, similarly to Prunier a decade earlier, that 'The weight of available evidence [...] suggests that those who planned and perpetrated the genocide of Tutsi also shot the plane down.'²²¹ Scott Straus wrote in 2006 that 'the current balance of evidence suggests that the RPF was responsible.'²²² Likewise, the late Lee Ann Fujii wrote in 2009 that she believed 'the evidence points more strongly toward the RPF.'²²³ André Guichaoua went further in 2010 when

215 Rever, *In Praise of Blood*, 185–90.

216 Rever, 177–79.

217 Reyndams, 'Politics or Pragmatism?'

218 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 213–29 (quote on p. 225).

219 Reyntjens, *Rwanda, trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire*, 20–49, 116.

220 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 185.

221 Eltringham, *Accounting For Horror*, 112.

222 Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, 44.

223 Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, 55.

he concluded that the RPF was responsible. In the book (*From War to Genocide*) Guichaoua explained that he had been certain of RPF responsibility since 2002, after stumbling upon incriminating evidence against the RPF in his capacity as expert witness for the ICTR prosecution.²²⁴ Filip Reyntjens, the scholar who has written most on the assassination officially concluded that the RPF was responsible in 2020, although he had always suspected the RPF, and he had likely made up his mind long before that date.²²⁵

Although Des Forges was inconclusive in *Leave None to Tell the Story*, we know from other sources that she suspected the RPF, and that she was convinced that the RPF was responsible around the same time as Guichaoua, although she never aired her suspicions before her untimely death in 2009.²²⁶ Prunier, who in 1995 suspected that the assassination was part of the genocide plan, seems also to have been won over to the theory of RPF culpability.²²⁷

Writing in 2021, Omar McDoom is less conclusive than Reyntjens and Guichaoua, writing that ‘My personal assessment is that it is improbable that the assassination was the result of a coup from within.’²²⁸

In general, the scholarly consensus among the authors who have written books on the genocide, at least in the English-language literature, leans towards the RPF as the author of the attack. Some have definitely concluded that the RPF did it, while many others suspect the RPF. A few suspect (or previously suspected) Hutu extremists, but none have concluded that Hutu extremists perpetrated the attack. It is noteworthy that the 5 most cited authors from the books I have registered (Des Forges, Reyntjens, Prunier, Guichaoua and Lemarchand) all believe that the RPF was responsible. Most of them (Reyntjens, Guichaoua and Lemarchand) have stated their conviction clearly in writing.²²⁹ It should be mentioned that the 6th most cited author is Jean-Pierre Chrétien, who is much more ‘friendly’ toward the RPF than the other most cited authors. Chrétien has voiced strong opposition to prematurely concluding that the RPF is responsible.²³⁰

Like in the case of genocide planning, the consensus among scholars have shifted from the position of Friends to that of Enemies on the question of who assassinated Juvénal Habyarimana.

224 Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide*, 144–45.

225 Reyntjens, ‘The RPF Did It’.

226 Wrong, *Do Not Disturb*, 370.

227 Wrong, 370.

228 McDoom, *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda*, 201.

229 For René Lemarchand’s view, see Lemarchand, *Remembering Genocides in Central Africa*, 103ff.

230 Chrétien, ‘Dix ans après le génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda’.

RPF human rights abuse

Another controversial issue is the RPF human rights record, particularly in the 1990s when the RPF perpetrated massive killings of Hutu within Rwanda and in neighbouring Zaire (later the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Given the political sensitivity of the issue, and the impunity the RPF has enjoyed for its crimes, there is a great uncertainty about the extent of these killings, an uncertainty that both Friends and Enemies can take advantage of to minimize or to exaggerate the extent of the abuse. Mirroring the debate about genocide planning, discussed above, there is the question of where responsibility for these killings lies. For Friends, the killings—to the extent that they are acknowledged—were perpetrated by lower echelons of RPF soldiers, for example because they sought revenge. For Enemies, the killings were perpetrated by orders from the highest authority, Paul Kagame, who is demonized for his brutality. Both in this case and the question of genocide planning, to single out upper echelons is more political than to single out the lower echelons, because it serves to underline the need for political change or accountability. This might explain why both Friends and Enemies generally insist on the responsibility of the upper echelons of their respective *bête noire*.

It is important to understand that the RPF has remained in power in Rwanda since the genocide, and has therefore been able to suppress evidence evidence of its own killings. For example, André Guichaoua reports that the ICTR prosecution was only allowed to exhume victims in mass graves in Rwanda in two locations in 1996, before the exhumations were permanently suspended. The problem was this:

According to the prosecutor's office, the suspension resulted from the discovery of "two layers" of bodies in several mass graves, one connected to the genocide of Tutsi civilian populations and the other to post-genocide crimes of "revenge" committed by the RPA against Hutu civilians.²³¹

Enemies are sometimes reluctant to isolate in time and place the killings perpetrated by the RPF, perhaps because it might make it seem like the RPF's massacres were something ephemeral. From the perspective of Enemies, the killings by the RPF reveal the true nature of the organization, and the fact that the RPF seems to have stopped perpetrating massacres on a massive scale since the turn of the millennium does not change this eternal truth. An example of such a sentiment is expressed by the investigative journalist Judi Rever, an Enemy who has authored a detailed book dedicated to the RPF's human rights record, called *In Praise of Blood*:

231 Guichaoua, 'Counting the Rwandan Victims of War and Genocide', 132.

The truth, no matter what aid donors seem to believe, is that the RPF has never stopped the violence. Kagame killed before the genocide. He killed during the genocide. And he killed after the genocide.²³²

While technically true, Rever's perspective entails a loss of nuance which is probably more helpful for the purpose of overthrowing Kagame's dictatorship than to understand the massacres perpetrated by the RPF. The most important instances of RPF violence might be classified as follows. The list is far from conclusive, but it includes the cases where the death toll is presumed to be the highest. The number of Hutus killed are in all instances conservative, and they might be gross underestimates:

- April 1994–1995: Tens of thousands of Hutus were killed by the RPF behind the front line as the RPF advanced during the genocide. The massacres continued for some time after the genocide. Thousands more were killed when the RPF closed down the internal refugee camp of Kibeho in April 1995 in Rwanda's south-west.²³³
- October 1996–September 1997: Tens of thousands of Hutu refugees were pursued over enormous distances and massacred by the RPF in neighbouring Zaire the context of the First Congo War.²³⁴
- 1997–1998: In the context of a counter-insurgency campaign by the RPF in Rwanda's north-western prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, RPF killed thousands of civilians. The insurgents, called the *Armée de libération du Rwanda* (ALIR), also killed civilians.²³⁵

In addition to this comes more targeted political abuse, such as the harassment, disappearances and assassinations of people who might threaten the RPF's hold on power, such as political figures or journalists.²³⁶ This includes the assassinations of Rwandan political exiles in other countries, like Kenya and South Africa—particularly high-level RPF deserters.²³⁷

While the evidence for RPF killings is often thin, thanks in large part to its own concealment and impunity, there is no question that the RPF has killed civilians on a massive scale in the 1990s. This is most evident in the case of the First Congo War, where the killings have been well documented in a UN report from 2010.²³⁸

232 Rever, *In Praise of Blood*, 220.

233 Straus, 'The Limits of a Genocide Lens', 510–13.

234 Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, chap. 9.

235 Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 115–19.

236 Straus, 'The Limits of a Genocide Lens', 515. For the persecution of journalists, see Sundaram, *Bad News*.

237 The assassinations of Rwandan political exiles is documented in detail in Wrong, *Do Not Disturb*.

238 UNHCR, 'Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003'.

Friends and Enemies differ wildly in how this violence is understood, both in terms of the scale of the violence and in how it is framed. For the Enemy Judi Rever, the RPF killed somewhere between five hundred thousand and a million Hutus in the 1990s.²³⁹ For Rever, and many other Enemies, the RPF violence is best understood as a genocide perpetrated against Hutus, an argument often encapsulated with the term ‘double genocide’:

[T]he darkest secret that the RPF has kept from the wider international community is that its troops continued to commit genocide against Hutus in 1994 and in the following years. The policy of ethnic murder came from the highest level of government and military.²⁴⁰

Friends, in contrast, are disposed to uncritically accept the RPF’s explanations for the evidence of RPF massacres. An example is the journalist Stephen Kinzer, who in his book from 2008 quotes his interviews with Paul Kagame extensively, also when discussing RPF massacres. This is how Kinzer frames the violence, echoing the RPF’s own explanations:

As the new regime confronted this growing threat from the army it had just defeated [in Zaire], it also had to deal with an angry and resentful population. It did not always do so gently. Some RPF soldiers who returned to their hills and found their families massacred sought out and killed those whom they believed were responsible. Others attacked anyone they thought had supported the genocide in any way.

During the last three months of the war, as the genocide raged, nearly ten thousand recruits had joined the RPF. In the weeks after the war ended, another ten thousand enlisted. Most were quite unlike the tightly disciplined *inkotanyi* [= the RPF]. Many were teenagers whose families had just been killed and who were burning with homicidal rage.²⁴¹

In Kinzer’s account, the violence becomes an understandable overreaction of undisciplined recruits, acting on their own accord. Having interviewed Kagame at length, it might have been difficult for Kinzer to accept that his interlocutor was a mass murderer.

Much of the controversy revolves around the so-called ‘Gersony report’, referring to the findings of a small team led by the consultant Robert Gersony, a man of considerable experience, sent by the UNHCR to Rwanda from August to September 1994 to assess the prospect of an early repatriation of the Hutu refugees who had fled during the genocide. Well-disposed to the RPF on their arrival, they began to find evidence of systematic killings by the RPF. Making the most out of a *laissez-passer* issued by the Rwandan government, which thanks to Gersony’s foresight mentioned the

239 Rever, *In Praise of Blood*, 266.

240 Rever, 232.

241 Kinzer, *A Thousand Hills*, 189.

name of Paul Kagame, the three-person team ventured into areas not even UNAMIR was allowed to go, such as the south-eastern Kibungo prefecture. They collected hundreds of interviews inside and outside of Rwanda, and stumbled upon fresh corpses that could only have been killed by the RPF. Gersony concluded that the RPF had killed tens of thousands of people in a systematic fashion from April to August 1994. Dismayed, Gersony feared for his safety, and believed his inconvenient findings might spell the end of his career.²⁴² It is interesting that in the course of his research in Rwanda, Gersony made the transition from the position of Friends, for whom RPF atrocities were understandable ‘revenge killings’, to that of Enemies, for whom the killings were systematic and widespread.²⁴³

As a result of Gersony’s findings, the UN temporarily halted the return refugees, put pressure on the Rwandan government to stop the killings, and buried Gersony’s findings under the rug due to its political inconvenience.²⁴⁴ The essence of the findings was nevertheless leaked to the press, together with Gersony’s identity,²⁴⁵ and to this day the mythical Gersony report remains a fighting ground between Friends and Enemies.

For Friends, the Gersony report can be dismissed due to its suppression by the UN, and the existence of subsequent investigations which failed to verify Gersony’s conclusions. It becomes a case of one man’s mistaken ‘claims’ against the ‘forensic examination’ of the entire world, embodied in the UN.²⁴⁶ For Enemies, the findings of Gersony can be used bolster the argument of a ‘double genocide’, and the suppression of his findings feeds into the conspiratorial thinking prevalent among Enemies (as well as among Friends, it should be said).²⁴⁷ Enemies and Friends seem to live in alternative realities, and both the positions of Friends and Enemies seem at the face of it to be empirically well-grounded. This makes it possible for anyone to believe what is most psychologically comfortable for them, and to be misled by the halo effect, believing that the RPF must be either entirely good or entirely bad. The great dissonance between the two viewpoints is highly uncomfortable for anyone who is not sure what to believe about the RPF’s human rights record. And for good reason: if one believes what Friends say, one is at risk of becoming an apologist for a major human rights offender; if one believes what Enemies say, one runs the risk of being misled by a genocidal ideology seeking to minimize the Rwandan genocide. And what if both Friends and Enemies are wrong?

242 Kaplan, *The Good American*, chap. 11.

243 Kaplan, chap. 11.

244 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 726–31.

245 Bonner, ‘U.N. Stops Returning Rwandan Refugees’.

246 Melvern, *Intent to Deceive*, 180–85.

247 Rever, *In Praise of Blood*, 96–98.

Views of scholars

Scholars are not immune to psychological distortions, particularly not on this emotionally charged issue, but their understanding is more nuanced than Friends and Enemies. Unlike Friends, scholars do not doubt the essence of Robert Gersony's findings, although some were sceptical of it in the beginning. A good example is Gérard Prunier, who was enamoured by the RPF when he wrote *The Rwanda Crisis* in late 1994 and did not want to believe that the allegations of massive RPF massacres were true. Similarly to the tendency of Friends to invoke the conspiratorial spectre of French involvement to explain anything inexplicable about Rwanda, Prunier immediately suspected that the Gersony report was somehow misinformation by the French army. Only after meeting Gersony personally and listening to him present his findings (which Gersony was not allowed to present in public) did Prunier realize that 'the good guys were really quite bad guys'. As Prunier later recounted, the fact that he and most other observers up to that point had gotten the RPF wrong provoked in him a 'horrible, nauseous feeling'.²⁴⁸ Prunier wrote an additional chapter to *The Rwanda Crisis* in a 1997 edition of the book. This chapter was highly critical of the RPF and was titled 'Living in a broken world'.²⁴⁹

The allegations of RPF human rights abuse was confirmed in Des Forges' *Leave None to Tell the Story*, written for the human rights organizations Human Rights Watch and FIDH, which dedicated a chapter to the RPF. This book, which was based on years of research, concluded that the RPF's killings 'were wide-spread, systematic, and involved large numbers of participants and victims. They were too many and too much alike to have been unconnected crimes executed by individual soldiers or low-ranking officers.'²⁵⁰

Unlike Friends, scholars like Des Forges are attuned to the political context and the reasons for suppressing evidence of RPF massacres. As Johan Pottier has written, it turned out that 'international guilt could be converted into strong support for the RPF'.²⁵¹ This support enabled the RPF to get away with the most absurd distortions over its human rights record. An example is the Kibeho massacre of April 1995, when RPF soldiers killed thousands of internal refugees while closing a refugee camp, in clear view of UNAMIR soldiers who were powerless to stop the massacre. The RPF then buried victims in the cover of night, and a few days later the Rwandan government proudly conducted a body count in front of foreign diplomats and NGO representatives.

248 The information on Prunier meeting Gersony comes from the recent biography of Robert Gersony. Kaplan, *The Good American*, chap. 11.

249 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, chap. 10.

250 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 734.

251 Pottier, *Re-Imagining Rwanda*, 157.

When the result came in, the Rwandan President proclaimed: ‘It is 338 corpses. If you pretend there are more, tell me where they are, show them to me!’²⁵²

Unlike *Enemies*, scholars are generally hostile to the idea of a ‘double genocide’, believing that there is a moral and quantitative difference between the two cases of violence. Claudine Vidal, a French sociologist who knew Rwanda very well before the genocide, spoke for many scholars when she wrote the following about those who advance the ‘double genocide’ theory:

Their aim is clear: to reinforce the accusation of genocide, now seemingly the only way of gaining recognition of a mass crime and eliciting public outcry. But this approach would put the Tutsi genocide, as adjudicated by the ICTR, on a par with FPR massacres of Hutus between 1990 and 1997.²⁵³

Scholars are often quite concerned that calling RPF massacres a genocide would create a moral equivalence between those crimes and the genocide against Tutsis. On the other hand, the crimes perpetrated against Hutus by the RPF are also at risk of being minimized since they don’t quite compare to the genocide. Anything seems insignificant compared to the ‘ultimate crime’ (borrowing from the title of one of Melvern’s books), and Friends have no issue ignoring the RPF’s human rights record altogether. Scott Straus recognized this in an reflection article from 2019 called ‘The Limits of a Genocide Lens’.²⁵⁴ Straus is very critical against the exaggerations of *Enemies*, but argues that the exclusive focus on genocidal crimes have a tendency to distort the context of the genocide—both regional and temporal—and to make other crimes seem insignificant:

Genocide’s special status, [...], implies incomparability and untouchability, which in turn renders marginal or even invisible other forms of mass violence. It’s as if one cannot say in a single breath, ‘There was a state-led genocide of Tutsis and extensive RPF crimes against humanity against Hutus.’ Doing so invites the charge of making ‘equivalences,’ relativizing or even denying the genocide, and insulting the memory of the genocide victims. If genocide is so absolute then to speak of related non-genocide crimes becomes tantamount to denialism, and, even worse, if genocide is so absolute then other crimes become justifiable in the name of stopping genocide or preventing new ones.

We are left then with a polarized and polarizing history, one that [at] a minimum does not serve Rwanda well: on the one hand, a hugely lop-sided and Manichean account of the past that marginalizes non-genocide experiences or, on the other hand, a sensationalist rendering

252 Pottier, 160–61.

253 Vidal, ‘Debate’.

254 Straus, ‘The Limits of a Genocide Lens’.

that implies all we have known is wrong as a way to gain recognition to the marginalized crimes.²⁵⁵

The two versions of history evoked by Straus is, of course, the histories of Friends and Enemies, respectively. Both these histories are problematic and should be challenged.

Genocide death toll

Another effective litmus test, particularly for identifying Friends, is which death toll is used for the genocide. This is because the Rwandan government has proclaimed a scientifically untenable, but politically acceptable figure of more than a million genocide victims. The basis for this number is a Rwandan government census from 2000 which claimed, with questionable accuracy, that there were 1,074,017 genocide victims. This figure seems to have included some Hutu, although the census has subsequently been misrepresented by some Rwandan government entities to mean that all the victims were Tutsi.²⁵⁶ In the final report of the census from 2002, 93.67% of the victims were said to have been killed because they identified as Tutsi, which would amount to slightly more than a million Tutsi victims.²⁵⁷ The problem is that there were not that many Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, even if one counts those that survived the genocide. The census is therefore not taken seriously by scholars. As Jens Meierhenrich has written, ‘the RPF’s inflated body count – which still has a powerful hold on the humanitarian imagination – can be assigned to the dustbin of methodology. By all accounts, it is a “bad number” that has masqueraded as science for too long.’²⁵⁸ For scholars, the RPF’s manipulation of numbers is glaring, and it can also be perceived on the level of local genocide memorials. Timothy Longman—who was a researcher for Des Forges’ *Leave None to Tell the Story*—reports how the figure for the massacre at Murambi in southern Rwanda has gradually increased from a realistic 5,000–6,000 to figures like 50,000, which is clearly an exaggeration.²⁵⁹ If the death toll listed at various memorials in Rwanda are summed up, one ends up with untenable figures like 1,744,000 Tutsis killed.²⁶⁰

The Rwandan government figure of ‘more than a million’ killed could only be accurate if includes hundreds of thousands of Hutus, which it does not. The figure is nevertheless immortalized in Rwanda’s 2003 constitution,²⁶¹ and the Rwandan government has succeeded in including it in a

255 Straus, 522.

256 Reydam, “More than a Million”, 245.

257 Government of Rwanda, ‘Dénombrement des victimes du génocide. Rapport final.’, 30.

258 Meierhenrich, ‘How Many Victims Were There in the Rwandan Genocide?’, 82.

259 Longman, *Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 8–9.

260 Guichaoua, ‘Counting the Rwandan Victims of War and Genocide’, 130.

261 Reydam, “More than a Million”, 236.

General Assembly resolution.²⁶² The important thing is that Friends are generally oblivious to Rwanda's manipulation of numbers, and for them the figure of 1,074,017 victims is solid proof. This is because Friends trust the Rwandan government—something neither Enemies nor scholars do.

When Enemies manipulate numbers it is mostly to blow RPF massacres out of proportion, but they also sometimes minimize the death toll of the genocide against Tutsis. Pierre Péan in his revisionist *Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs* cited as authoritative the claim of a Rwandan political exile who claimed that 280,000 Tutsis were killed in the genocide, as compared to 'more than a million Hutus killed since 1990.'²⁶³ These figures seem designed to minimize the genocide and underscore that the Hutus are the real victims. This is also the case with the careless estimate proffered by the Enemies Edward S. Herman and David Peterson in their book called *Enduring lies*, where the authors claimed more Hutus than Tutsis died during the genocide—a term the authors insist on putting in quotation marks. Herman and Peterson use a methodology similar to scholars in coming to their conclusion, but uses questionable baseline figures which favours their desired outcome. But only favours it; the authors compounded the distortion with a basic mistake in arithmetic, without which they would have to abandon their revisionist claim.²⁶⁴ Herman and Peterson then conclude their discussion of numbers by pinning all the blame on the RPF:

If the word *genocide* is to be applied to Rwanda 1994, should it not be applied to the principal organized perpetrators of the events of April–July—Paul Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front? Should it not be recognized that the primary victims of his triumph were Hutu, whose earlier social revolution once led to the flight of many Tutsi, now triumphantly returned to minority power by the RPF and its U.S. and U.K. sponsors?²⁶⁵

Views of scholars

Scholars typically estimate the number of Tutsi victims by establishing the pre-1994 Tutsi population within Rwanda and subtracting the number of survivors. There are many variables which make scholarly estimates different, such as the growth-rate used when extrapolating population

262 United Nations, 'General Assembly Designates 7 April International Day of Reflection on 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda, Amending Title of Annual Observance'. The resolution specified that the figure included 'Hutu and others who opposed [the genocide]'. Victims of RPF massacres are not included.

263 Péan, *Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs*, 277.

264 Herman and Peterson, *Enduring Lies*, 32–35. The mistake is that the authors claim that between 100,000 and 200,000 Tutsis died. In fact, based on the distorted figures they use, it should have been between 100,000 and 300,000. This mistake then reverberate in their figure of Hutus killed, which is derived from the first figure.

265 Herman and Peterson, 35.

censuses, or the question of whether Tutsis were undercounted in the census of 1991 (the last census prior to the genocide).

An early attempt was made by Gérard Prunier in 1995, who estimated that 800,000 Tutsis were killed during the genocide.²⁶⁶ This estimate lives on today as the go-to figure used by the international media when reporting about Rwanda. Alison Des Forges made a more conservative estimate in 1999 of at least 500,000 Tutsis killed. Des Forges's estimate is lower mainly because she questioned Prunier's claim that Tutsis were undercounted in the 1991 census.²⁶⁷ In an article from 1997, Filip Reyntjens used a somewhat different methodology of counting missing people in the region, and arrived at a global death toll (from all causes) of 1,100,000 Rwandans in 1994. Of those he estimated that 600,000 were Tutsi and 500,000 were Hutu.²⁶⁸ Reyntjens' attempt at estimating a death toll for Hutus is unusual. This is because it is considered methodologically complicated to calculate Hutu casualties.²⁶⁹

The *Journal of Genocide Research* organized a forum in 2020 called 'Calculating Mortality in the Rwandan Genocide', with several contributors and estimates. It is clear from this forum that the scholarly consensus is narrowing around a figure of 500,000–650,000 Tutsis killed. I believe the best estimates from the forum is that of Marijke Verpoorten (562,000–662,000) and Omar McDoom (491,000–522,000).²⁷⁰ Verpoorten and McDoom agreed on a pre-genocide Tutsi population of around 800,000, but differed somewhat on the number of Tutsi survivors, which accounts for the difference in their estimates. Two points should be made in how estimates have changed. Although McDoom's estimate is similar to that of Des Forges in 1995, the baseline figures are substantially different. McDoom operates with both a higher pre-genocide Tutsi population and a greater number of Tutsi survivors. It is also noteworthy that if Verpoorten's and McDoom's estimates of 800,000 Tutsis within Rwanda prior to the genocide are accurate, then Prunier's estimate of 800,000 Tutsis killed must be too high. With a methodology similar to her colleague at the University of Antwerpen, Filip Reyntjens, Verpoorten also tried to estimate the number of Hutu deaths in the 1990s. Verpoorten arrived at a guestimate (her term) of 540,000 Hutu deaths from all causes, with a very large uncertainty interval ranging from 212,000 to 1,300,000. This estimate illustrates the huge uncertainty over the extent of RPF massacres, something which can be exploited by both Friends and Enemies to deny or exaggerate these crimes, respectively.

266 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 263–65.

267 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 15–16.

268 Reyntjens, 'Estimation du nombre de personnes tuées au Rwanda en 1994'.

269 Meierhenrich, 'How Many Victims Were There in the Rwandan Genocide?', 79.

270 Verpoorten, 'How Many Died in Rwanda?'; McDoom, 'Contested Counting'.

Thematic focus

A banal, but significant difference is the focus of the literature among Friends and Enemies. This is particularly relevant for identifying Enemies. Whereas most books on Rwanda are dedicated to the genocide in one way or another, books by Enemies are very often dedicated to explaining why the RPF is bad. In such books the genocide, while often acknowledged, becomes more of a footnote. This tendency can be seen even in more balanced authors who I would not categorize as Enemies, such as Michela Wrong who in 2021 published the book *Do Not Disturb: The Story of a Political Murder and an African Regime Gone Bad*.²⁷¹ To Wrong's defence, she explains that choosing a side is pretty much inevitable for the kind of book she wanted to write, because it would not be possible to interview both RPF leaders within Rwanda and RPF exiles outside of Rwanda. As she put it, 'On this story, crossing the battlefield was not going to be possible.'²⁷² Yet there is also a psychological element to it. Wrong wrote about her disillusionment of the RPF in the years after the genocide:

There came a day when, with a near-audible mental *ping*, I realized I no longer believed most of the key "truths" upon which the RPF had built its account [of Rwandan history], and hadn't for ages. It felt like a relief. Shibboleths can weigh heavy on the soul.²⁷³

This change in her perception of the RPF seems to be reflected in the subtitle of her book. In order for something to 'go bad', it must have been good in the first place. Yet from what we know of the RPF's human rights record, its most serious crimes were committed in the first four years after coming to power.

It seems to be psychologically difficult to tell the story of both the genocide and negative aspects of the RPF at the same time. Books tend to be either about the genocide, or about how bad the RPF is. In standard scholarly works of the genocide, such as Des Forges' *Leave None to Tell the Story* or the second edition of Prunier's *Rwanda Crisis*, negative aspects of the RPF are tacked on as the last chapter, rather than integrated into the story of the genocide.²⁷⁴ In Prunier's case this was literally an afterthought, as the chapter critical of the RPF was added in the second edition of the book.

The focus of Enemies is often clear from the title of their books. Examples include Judi Rever's *In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front*, and Gaspard Musabyimana's *La vraie nature du FPR/APR d'Ouganda en Rwanda [The true nature of the RPF/RPA from Uganda in Rwanda]*.²⁷⁵

271 Wrong, *Do Not Disturb*.

272 Wrong, 8.

273 Wrong, 7.

274 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 692–735; Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, chap. 10.

275 Rever, *In Praise of Blood*; Musabyimana, *La vraie nature du FPR/APR d'Ouganda en Rwanda*.

A major disagreement between Friends and Enemies is the nature of France's involvement in Rwanda during the Rwandan civil war—when France intervened to prevent the RPF from taking over Rwanda—and at the end of the genocide, when France intervened in a humanitarian operation (Operation Turquoise) and took control of Rwanda's south-east, the area not yet captured by the RPF. For Friends, France was an accomplice to genocide, despite its professed humanitarian aims. For Enemies, who have written books in response to those of Friends, France did nothing wrong. Much of this literature is in French, and the claim of French involvement in the genocide by Friends is related to the more general opposition to *Françafrique*—a pejorative term coined by the influential French intellectual François-Xavier Verschave, referring to France's sphere of influence over Francophone states in Africa. Verschave has written extensively about France's supposed complicity in genocide, also in the book from 1998 where he coined the term *Françafrique*.²⁷⁶ Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, a journalist who covered the Rwandan genocide for *Le Figaro* in 1994, was particularly impassioned in his book published ten years later, *L'inavouable : La France au Rwanda [The Unspeakable: France in Rwanda]*.²⁷⁷ These books are only the tip of the iceberg; one might also mention Jacques Morel's (continually updated) book of 1600 pages called *La France au cœur du génocide des Tutsi [France at the heart of the genocide of the Tutsi]*, a book accompanied by its own website with a database of documents related to the Rwandan genocide,²⁷⁸ or the journal and website *La Nuit rwandaise [The Rwandan Night]* dedicated solely to France's alleged complicity in the genocide.²⁷⁹ An example of a counter-book by an Enemy is Charles Onana's book *Rwanda, la vérité sur l'opération Turquoise [Rwanda, the truth about Operation Turquoise]*, based on his PhD thesis.²⁸⁰ The question of France's role, the subject of so much attention in France, is emotionally charged, and the literature seeking to implicate France is entirely one-sided. France's complicity is taken for granted by Friends, all that remains is to 'shine a light' on France's role, which means to find evidence for a foregone conclusion. It seems that many of the authors writing about France's role in Rwanda—particularly Friends—are primarily writing to show how good or bad France is, and are therefore only Friends or Enemies by implication. It might be more accurate to think of them as 'Enemies/Friends of France'. This means that Rwandan history is only incidental to the point they are making, something which I believe makes these authors more prone to choose a side in the literature on Rwanda. This is also the case with many Enemies, who are primarily 'Enemies of the United States', which leads them to become Enemies of Rwanda, because

276 Verschave, *Complicité de génocide?*; Verschave, *Françafrique*.

277 Saint-Exupéry, *L'inavouable*.

278 Morel, *La France au cœur du génocide des Tutsi*. The accompanying website is at <https://francegenocidetutsi.org/>.

279 Available at <https://www.lanuitrwandaise.org/>.

280 Onana, *Rwanda, la vérité sur l'opération Turquoise*.

of the United States' support of the RPF in the years following the genocide.²⁸¹ Herman and Peterson, who were discussed above, are examples of such Enemies.

Conclusion

We have seen that Friends and Enemies disagree about whether or not the genocide against Tutsis in 1994 was planned; about who assassinated Juvénal Habyarimana; about the extent and nature of RPF human rights abuse; and about the death toll of the genocide. The disagreements fundamentally hinge on whether or not the RPF government is a trusted source of information or not. These disagreements can be used in combination as litmus tests to find out whether an author is a Friend or an Enemy.

Scholars generally fall somewhere in between the position of Friends and Enemies. In many cases, like the question of planning, the assassination of Habyarimana and RPF human rights abuse, scholars have gradually shifted towards the positions of Enemies.

We now move on to the quantitative part of the thesis, where I will answer the question of whether or not authors can be categorized into the three groups scholars, Friends and Enemies, simply on the basis of who they are citing, rather than what they are writing.

²⁸¹ For more on the RPF—U.S. relationship, see Reydams, 'Let's Be Friends'.

Quantifying the literature

Introduction

In this chapter I will explain how I tried to answer the qualitative research question of whether or not the literature on Rwandan violence in the 1990s can be categorized by quantitative methods. I will start by showing how the data has been registered, and how it can be accessed. I will then illustrate the potential for how this data can be used with two examples. First, I will find out which authors are cited the most. Second, I will rank the books on Rwanda according to how ‘diverse’ its references are, with something I call the ‘myopic index’.

In the last part of this chapter I will attempt to categorize the literature using network citation analysis.

Registering and accessing the data

An assumption I made when I registered the data is that the identity of the author is more salient for the purpose of categorizing the literature than the identity of the publication or the book cited. As I argued in the previous chapter, most knowledge ultimately rests on authority; be that the authority of any particular author, a particular university, scientific publication or publishing house, or journalistic outlets, to name a few. Books may also have authority invested in them—a good example for our purposes would be the book *Leave None to Tell the Story*, the highly influential book on the genocide published by Human Rights Watch in 1999 after considerable research by many collaborators, whose principal author was the late Alison Des Forges. Yet overall, I believe, what matter most is the identity of the author, and if an author changes his or her point of view, the latter viewpoint will generally be perceived to have invalidated the former—unless the change goes against the ideological conviction of whoever is doing the citing. Citing someone is to acknowledge that the cited author’s point of view matters, and is worth paying attention to, even if that means denouncing that view.

In total I have registered the references in 30 books pertaining to Rwandan violence in the 1990s. Among these are 6 books by 7 unique authors which I would characterise as Enemies of Rwanda, and 7 books by 4 unique authors which I would characterize as Friends of Rwanda. Of the 30 books, 19 are written by 18 unique authors which I would characterize as scholars—meaning that the authors are associated with academia, and their contributions are generally viewed as serious by

others in academia. In many cases, these scholarly books are PhD theses adopted to book form. A couple of these scholars are so opinionated that I would characterize them as a Friend or an Enemy, but for the vast majority of them, this is not the case. A list of all the registered books is provided in Annex 1. In the discussion that follows, I will refer to the registered books by the ID listed in Annex 1; for example, the book by Des Forges discussed above will be referred to as Des Forges 1999. Both the data I have registered and the accompanying Python code is included as an appendix file to this thesis, called ‘Citation_analysis.zip’.

Although my reason for registering the references of these books is to see if biases can be revealed through who is referencing who, I have mostly registered scholarly works. There are several reasons for this. The first is that there are not that many book-length, published, academic accounts of the genocide. The 19 scholarly books are close to exhaustive, particularly in the English language, which makes the data more interesting than it would have been if it was only a small subset. The second reason is that scholarly works lend themselves more to be registered as I have done, because they have many references in a consistent style. Books by Friends and Enemies are often journalistic accounts, some of which have no, or very few, references. It is possible that such an overweight of academic accounts (as opposed to a 50%/50% split of books by Friends and Enemies) makes it harder to reveal hostility or friendliness to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) based on the references. But I reasoned that if such a thing is possible, the method used should be sufficiently robust to not be thrown off the scent by this over-representation of academic books.

Each book has its own OpenDocument spreadsheet (.ods) document where each and every footnote and/or parenthesized reference in the text is registered. The image in Figure 3 shows an example of such a book.

Each row has three columns. Column A (‘Reference location’) is where in the book each citation was made. The value if this field depends on the reference style of the book. For most books it has

	A	B	C	D
1	Re - ID		Comments	
2	p.5	Berkeley 2001, Hyman 2005, Anonymous		
3	p.8	Rucagu		
4	p.11	Semujanga 2003, Guillebaud 2002		
5	p.14	Rutagambwa, Ndahiro		
6	p.17	Prunier 1995		
7	p.22	Kamukama 1993, Maquet 1961, Richards 1959, Meeren, Vansina 2004, Prunier 1995		
8	p.23	Dorsey 1994		
9	p.24	Bale 2002, Prunier 1995		
10	p.25	Mamdani 2001, Prunier 1995		
11	p.26	Prunier 1995		
12	p.27	Prunier 1995, Dorsey 1994, Semujanga 2003, Prunier 1995		
13	p.28	Prunier 1995, Dorsey 1994, Prunier 1995*3		
14	p.30	Watson, Mamdani 2001, Rittner et al. 2004, Semujanga 2003		
15	p.31	US		
16	p.32	Dorsey 1994, Mamdani 2001, Barnett 2002		
17	p.33	Watson, Mamdani 2001, Semujanga 2003, Auzias 1997		

Figure 3: The first rows of ‘Kinzer 2008.ods’ (A Thousand Hills)

the structure ‘<chapter>.<footnote>’. For example, a reference location of ‘3.54’ means ‘chapter 3, footnote 54’. The next field, ‘ID’, is a comma separated list of *reference identifiers*.

I will explain this in greater detail below, but in short it refers to the identity of the sources referenced in that particular footnote or on that particular page. Sometimes a multiplier is used to save some keystrokes—in row 13 of Figure 3, ‘Prunier 1995*3’ simply means that the same book was cited three times in a row. The third field, ‘Comments’, is used to register comments to explain why a reference was registered in a particular way. It is very rarely used.

In cases where non-book sources with multiple authors are cited, the authors of the source are separated by one (or more) ampersand (&) symbols. Ampersands may also be present in the reference identifiers for books to indicate multiple authorship, but this reference identifier is simply looked up against the ‘ID’ field of the ‘Books’ sheet of ‘Sources.ods’ (explained below), and does not need to contain ampersand. For example, ‘Imbs & Bart F. & Bart A.’ refers to an article with three authors, while ‘Adelman & Suhrke 1996’ refers to a book with two authors. The reason for taking note of multiple ownership is to make it possible to factor that into the quantitative analysis. If a reference is made to the ‘Imbs ...’ article above, then that could be counted as 1/3 of a reference to Imbs and to each of the Barts. The idea is that this avoids giving too much importance to co-authors when building a citation network, which will be done in the last part of this chapter.

While registering the data, I quickly discovered the need to decide on how detailed the information should be in order to be useful, and for the data to be consistent. These are the decisions I made:

- Any news article, or any source which has the appearance of news, have been registered by the name of the publication. For consistency, the author is always ignored, even when the author is well-known authority on Rwanda, or when the author is a journalist who would later go on to write books on Rwanda. For example, news articles written by Patrick de Saint-Exupéry in 1994 for *Le Figaro* is always registered with the reference identifier ‘Le Figaro’—even though this is a very opinionated journalist, and later author of several books on Rwanda, and the act of citing him could potentially be revealing an ideological stance of the citer. The reason for ignoring the author is that news articles are often cited without reference to an author. It would be too tedious and sometimes impossible to find the author. In another spreadsheet (described below) I will register the fact that the reference identifier ‘Le Figaro’ is of type ‘News’, in order to separate it from the other kinds of sources. The other types of sources are ‘Doc’, ‘Journal’, and most importantly ‘Person’.

- In some rare cases, academic journals are cited without an author. In that case the reference identifier is the name of the publication, and it is typed as 'Journal'. It is likely that some such publications have been typed as 'News' instead, and I cannot vouch for the consistency of the distinction between those two types—it was not a priority when registering the data.
- Any source which bears the resemblance of a document has been given a reference identifier typed 'Doc'. In most cases, this reference identifier is simply the country from where the document originates, such as 'Uganda'. This likely means a document produced by the state; but not necessarily. Publications by human rights organizations are categorized as 'Doc' with the name of the organization as the reference identifier. The same is true of other organizations like the ICRC, IMF, although many documents by non-human rights organizations have been registered simply with the reference identity of the country from which the organization originates. Whenever an interview is cited where the full name of the interviewee is unknown, it has been registered with the reference identifier 'Anonymous', which is of type 'Doc' (for lack of a better alternative). In some cases the source is registered as 'Anonymous' even though the identity of the interviewee would be possible to infer from context.
- A special reference identifier 'UNKNOWN' of type 'UNKNOWN' is used as a catch-all in the rare cases where it was not possible to understand the reference.
- The vast majority of reference identifiers are of type 'Person'. The previous types of reference identifiers are mostly intended to capture any source which cannot be tied to the authority of an author; this is why the reference identifiers above captures so widely (such as 'Rwanda' of type 'Doc' for all Rwandan documents). Whenever a 'Person' is cited, this means that the information ultimately originates from the person in question. This could be from a book they wrote, a scientific article, an interview made by the author in which their full name was provided (this means that a 'Person' can be a witness; it is not necessarily an author), or simply a reference to a name in a footnote where it is clear that the citer has been in personal contact with a particular person.

	A	B	C
1	ID	Type	Full name (optional)
2	ABC	News	
3	Abuom	Person	Agnes C. Abuom
4	Achebe	Person	Chinua Achebe
5	ACORD	Doc	
6	Adalian	Person	Rouben Paul Adalian
7	Adelman	Person	Howard Adelman
8	ADL	Doc	Association Rwandaise pour la Défer
9	Adler	Person	Reva Adler
10	AFP	News	Agence France Presse
11	Africa Analysis	News	

Figure 4: The first rows of the sheet ‘Names’ in the spreadsheet ‘Sources.ods’

In my thesis, I am interested not only in which people are cited, but also which books are cited. I have therefore registered *all* books cited with a special identifier, typically of the format ‘<Person><year>’, where Person is the last name of the author of a book, and the year is the publishing year. The metadata needed to make sense of these reference identifiers is included in a spreadsheet file called ‘Sources.ods’. This spreadsheet has two sheets which will be explained in turn.

The first sheet is called ‘Names’, and is shown in Figure 4. Column A and the optional column C provide the name of the source in question. Both of these names can be used interchangeably as a reference identifier, but the column A (‘ID’) is more practical, since it is shorter. It is also possible to add alternative names for a reference identifier in another row;

so long as one of the name columns are shared between the two rows, the program I wrote will recognize the various names as identifying the same source. For an example (in fact the only example) of this, both the ID ‘Collins’ and ‘Crawford’ refer to the full name ‘Barrie Collins’, and all these three names will be recognized as the same person (which it is). While registering the data, I had to make sure that all sources have their own unique names. If mistakes have been made in this regard, I believe they are very rare, and would not affect the most popular sources.

Type	Number
Person	1902
News	319
Doc	130
Journal	9
Total	2360

Table 1: Number of unique reference identifiers registered in ‘Sources.ods’, according to type.

In all the references of all 30 books, I have registered 2360 unique reference identifiers, most of them of type ‘Person’ (as shown in Table 1).

The ‘Names’ sheet of ‘Sources.ods’ lists all the regular reference identifiers used; to account for references to *books* in particular, a second sheet was created called ‘Books’. The structure is shown in Figure 5.

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1	ID	Type	Author(s)	Date	Title	
2	Achebe 1989	Book	Chinua Achebe	1989	Hopes and Impediments: Selected Essays	
3	Achebe 2000	Book	Chinua Achebe	2000	Home and Exile	
4	Adamantidis 1956	Book	D. Adamantidis	1956	Monographie pastorale du Ruanda et de l'Urundi	
5	Adelman & Suhrke 1996	Book	Howard Adelman & Astr	1996	The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Less	
6	Adelman & Suhrke 2000	Edited	Howard Adelman & Astr	2000	The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to	
7	Africa South of the Sahara 1994	Book	Africa South of the Sah	1994	Africa South of the Sahara 1994	
8	Africa South of the Sahara 2004	Book	Africa South of the Sah	2004	Africa South of the Sahara 2003	
9	African Rights 1994	Book	African Rights	1994	Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance	
10	African Rights 1995	Book	African Rights	1995	Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance. Revised 1995 Editio	
11	African Rights 2002	Book	African Rights	2002	Tribute to Courage	
12	Akçam 1996	Book	Taner Akçam	1996	Armenian und der Völkermord. Die Istantuler Prozesse unc	
13	Albright 2003	Book	Madeleine Albright	2003	Madam Secretary. A Memoir	
14	Allison 1971	Book	Graham T. Allison	1971	Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis	
15	Allport 1954	Book	Gordon Allport	1954	The Nature of Prejudice	
16	Allport 1958	Book	Gordon Allport	1958	The Nature of Prejudice: Abridged	
17	Alvarez 2001	Book	Alex Alvarez	2001	Governments, Citizens, and Genocide: A Comparative and I	
18	Ambrosetti 2001	Book	David Ambrosetti	2001	La France au Rwanda: un discours de légitimation morale	
19	Amin 1974	Book	Samir Amin	1974	Accumulation on a World Scale	
20	Amnesty International 1992	Report	Amnesty International	May	Rwanda: Persecution of Tutsi minority and repression of go	

Figure 5: The first rows of the sheet 'Books' in the spreadsheet 'Sources.ods'.

Column A ('ID') is a special reference identifier for the book in question. Almost all follow the format '<author> <year>', but it could be any unique string of text. This ID is used in the books I have registered to refer to a specific book. The spreadsheet files for all the 30 registered books bear the name of their book ID, so that my software can automatically know not only what a particular book is citing, but also which other books are citing the book in return. The rest of the columns provide relevant metadata, such as title, date and author. There is also a 'Type' column; almost all are simply of type 'Book'; some are 'Edited Book'; and a few are typed as 'Report'. 'Report' means that the source is a report by a human rights organization published around the time of the Rwandan civil war (such as the oft-cited report from 1993 by a group of foreign human rights observers visiting Rwanda), or an important government publication on Rwanda, such as the reports published by the Belgian and French parliaments on Rwanda in 1997 and 1998, respectively. The reason for including these sources in the 'Books' sheet is that these documents are particularly interesting, and by including them it is possible to know exactly who cites them, and where.

Column C ('Author') is an ampersand-separated list of authors of the book in question. These authors are all reference identifiers; if the reference identifier is not found in the 'Names' sheet, then my software will treat it as a reference identifier of type 'Person'. It is important that this column contains no typos, because a reference identifier to a book is simultaneously a reference to an author. In other words, when registering books, 'Prunier 1995' is simply a roundabout way of saying 'Prunier', with the advantage of adding more granularity to the data by identifying the book

as well as the author. In this way it will be possible to ignore the books and focus solely on which authors are cited in the quantitative analysis.

It should be mentioned that when registering the data, it was sometimes unclear if sources should be seen as a book. For example, is a PhD thesis a book? I chose not to consider it a book, and registered PhD theses only by the name of the author. Unless, of course, the PhD thesis was adapted to book form. Des Forges 1999 is considered a book, even though it could also be seen as a very long human rights report.

In total, the 30 books registered have cited 1013 unique books.²⁸² Figure 6 Shows the temporal distribution of these books. There are a substantial amount of books cited from the years 1994–1996, with one odd spike in the year 2001. This temporal distribution is at once a reflection of when the 30 books I registered are published, the temporal focus of these books, and of when books on Rwanda were actually published. A similar figure could easily be made for any one of the 30 books registered, which might be an indication which period of the author believes is important to understand to explain the genocide.

Figure 7 shows the same information as Figure 6, but is restricted to those 288 books written specifically about Rwanda, meaning that the title of the book contains either ‘Rwanda’, ‘Ruanda’ or ‘Kigali’. Here the weight of the temporal distribution is shifted forward in time, and the change from 1993 to 1994 becomes particularly pronounced.




Figure 6: Temporal distribution of all books cited in the 30 books registered.

282 Revised/updated and translated editions of books are counted as ‘new’ books; but not books that have been republished unchanged in the same language.




Figure 7: Temporal distribution of books pertaining to Rwanda.

Figure 6 and 7 are only basic examples of what is possible to do with the data I have registered. Having the data registered in this way opens up a whole host of possible ways to look at the literature which would not ordinarily be possible.

In order to explain how to use the data I have collected, it is necessary to get somewhat technical. I hope to explain it in a way that readers unfamiliar to programming can follow.

All computers are designed to interpret certain sequences of 1's and 0's as instructions, and all computer programs ultimately boil down to such binary instructions. It is difficult, however, to write complicated programs directly in binary code, so computer scientists have designed abstract languages—called programming languages—which look more like natural languages and makes it easier for humans to instruct computers to do complicated things. One of the most popular programming languages is called Python 3, which is the language I have used to process the data. I have also used multiple Python 3 modules; a module (often called a 'library' in other programming languages) is essentially is a bunch of code written by other programmers to help to do certain things, like reading an OpenDocument spreadsheet or making a graph. The modules used in my program, which can be installed with the Python package manager (pip), are the following: pyexcel_ods3, networkx, dash, dash_cytoscape, tabulate, numpy and matplotlib.

The program I wrote is in a text file called 'citation_analysis.py', and is a few hundred lines of code in length. This program is instructed to read and process the file called 'Sources.ods', before it moves on to read and process all the files of the 30 registered books (which are all in the same

directory/folder, called 'Books'). After all the files have been read, the program will have created a large amount of abstract objects of two kinds: Names and Books. A Name is any person or organization registered in 'Sources.ods'; a Book is any of the books (or the occasional report) registered in the 'Books' sheet of 'Sources.ods'. The important thing is that all the Book objects and all the Name objects knows exactly how many times, by whom, and even where they have been cited. This also goes in the other direction: all Name objects and Book objects knows who they have cited and where. That is, if the Book is among the 30 books registered, or if the Name object represents the identity of one of the authors of those 30 books. The easiest way to interact with this data is to import 'citation_analysis.py' as a module from the interactive Python interpreter. The Book and Name objects can then be accessed by querying the 'index' dictionary, which maps all *reference identifiers* to their respective Name or Book object. All the registered books can also be accessed through the list 'registered_books'.

As an example, lets say that we want to know how many times the book Willame 1995 has been cited. This is what it would look like in the Python interpreter (the text after hashtags are comments meant for the reader):

```
>>> import citation_analysis import CA
>>> CA.index['Willame'] # Returns a 'Name' object
Jean-Claude Willame
>>> CA.index['Willame 1995'] # Returns a 'Book' object
Book(Book, Jean-Claude Willame, "Aux sources de l'hécatombe rwandaise"
[1995])
>>> CA.index['Willame 1995'].cited_by
defaultdict(<class 'list'>, {Book(Book, Scott Straus, "The Order of
Genocide" [2006]): ['1.46', '7.20', '7.22', '7.24', '7.26', '7.27',
'7.37', '7.42', '7.48', '7.50', '7.51', '7.54', '7.55', '7.58', '7.63',
'7.70', '7.74', '7.75', '7.80', '7.82', '8.49'], Book(Book, Gérard
Prunier, "The Rwanda Crisis" [1997]): ['10.24'], Book(Book, Jean-Paul
Kimonyo, "Rwanda" [2008]): ['2.80', '2.82', '2.83', '2.91', '2.93',
'3.124', '4.116', '6.1', '6.48', '7.1', '10.7', '10.19'], Book(Book, Peter
Uvin, "Aiding Violence" [1998]): ['1.4', '6.9', 'p.4', 'p.13', 'p.16',
'p.46', 'p.57', 'p.112', 'p.117', 'p.129', 'p.129', 'p.131', 'p.135',
'p.137', 'p.177', 'p.183', 'p.186', 'p.188', 'p.188', 'p.193', 'p.222'],
Book(Book, James K. Gasana, "Rwanda" [2002]): ['n.99']})
>>>
```

Both Book and Name objects have a 'cited_by' attribute which shows exactly in which book, and where in that book, the Book or Name was cited. In the example above, we can observe that Uvin 1998 has cited Willame 1995 21 times, for example in the 4th note of chapter one, or on page 13 as an in-text citation. Given the flexibility of Python, it is easy to ask more detailed questions. For

example, how many times has Jean-Claude Willame been cited in total, not just the book Willame 1995? It only takes a couple of lines of code to find out:

```
>>> sum(map(len, CA.index['Willame 1995'].cited_by.values()))
56
>>> sum(map(len, CA.index['Willame'].cited_by.values()))
65
>>>
```

The code above shows that the book Willame 1995 has been cited 56 times in total, while Willame the person has been cited 65 times. In other words, there are 9 citations to Willame which are *not* citations to Willame 1995; this could for example be to another book. Since Willame 1995 is one of the 30 registered books, it is also possible to see outgoing citations made to other people in this book.²⁸³ This is how it is done:

```
>>> CA.index['Willame 1995'].people_cited
defaultdict(<function Book.register_data.<locals>.<lambda> at
0x7f5646296d40>, {Colette Braeckman: {'n_refs': 1.0, 'citations':
['0.2']}, Emmanuel Terray: {'n_refs': 4.0, 'citations': ['0.7', '0.8',
'0.9', '0.10']}, Jean Leca: {'n_refs': 2.0, 'citations': ['1.1', '1.2']},
Philippe Braud: {'n_refs': 2.0, 'citations': ['1.3', '1.9']}, Carl
Schmitt: {'n_refs': 1.0, 'citations': ['1.4']}, Michel Maffesoli:
{'n_refs': 4.0, 'citations': ['1.5', '1.6', '1.7', '1.8']},
...
})
>>> CA.index['Willame 1995'].people_cited[CA.index['Prunier']]
{'n_refs': 6.0, 'citations': ['3.129', '3.130', '3.131', '3.132', '3.133',
'3.140']}
```

The ‘people_cited’ dictionary above is not shown in full, because it is quite long; it contains all the citations to people made in the book Willame 1995. The second command above shows all of the citations made to Gérard Prunier in Willame 1995; it turns out that there are 6 such citations in the book (‘n_refs’), and they are all in chapter 3.

It is not difficult to add helper functions/methods to Books and Names, such as the following method (‘most_cited_people’):

```
>>> CA.index['Melvern'].most_cited_people(5)
Most cited people by Linda Melvern
Person                n_refs  Percentage
-----
Roméo Dallaire        79      10%
Alison Des Forges     44       6%
G rard Prunier        37       5%
```

²⁸³ It is also possible to see *all* citations with the use of the ‘citations’ attribute, which has the same structure as ‘people_cited’, but also includes citations to other types of sources, like ‘Doc’ and ‘News’.

Linda Melvern	35	5%
Boutros Boutros-Ghali	21	3%

>>>

The method was instructed to show the 5 people the author Linda Melvern cites the most. There are three books registered by Melvern in the data set; the numbers above refer to all of Melvern’s references in all three books, which are added together. It shows that 10% of all of Melvern’s references are made to Roméo Dallaire, the Force Commander of UNAMIR during the Rwandan genocide. Alison Des Forges, Gérard Prunier and herself are all cited about 5% of the time. What these authors have in common is that they support Melvern’s view that the Rwandan genocide was planned in advance of Juvénal Habyarimana’s assassination. It is interesting to note that the author Andrew Wallis, with a similar ideological conviction as Melvern, also cite Des Forges, Prunier and Dallaire the most; yet the two authors rarely cite each other. Melvern has not cited Willis once in her 3 registered books, and Wallis has cited Melvern 4 times in his 2 registered books.

Information like this is clearly interesting, but rarely available. It provides a birds-eye view of the literature which can indicate biases on the part of authors. In Annex 3 I have tabulated the result of ‘most_cited_people’ for all 27 registered authors.

In the following I will use this data to find out two things: First, what are the most influential books and authors on the Rwandan genocide, judged by how often they are cited? Second, is the ‘diversity’ of a book’s citations a good indication of quality?

Most cited people

There are many possible ways to calculate the popularity of authors. One way, which is used here, is to see how often a person A is cited by all the 27 other authors registered (or 26, if person A happens to be a registered author); then finding the median or the mean of those numbers. The median is the most ‘impressive’ number, because it avoids giving too much weight to statistical outliers. If the median is high, this means that most authors cite author A, and we can therefore assume that author A is highly influential. In order to account for authors who are not among the 27 who were registered, the

Author	median (%)	mean (%)
Alison Des Forges	4.10	5.38
Filip Reyntjens	3.77	4.67
Gérard Prunier	3.71	3.63
André Guichaoua	1.99	2.29
René Lemarchand	1.30	2.82
Jean-Pierre Chrétien	0.98	2.54
Roméo Dallaire	0.89	2.45
Catharine Newbury	0.68	1.62
Philip Gourevitch	0.19	0.67
Colette Braeckman	0.14	0.73

Table 2: Most cited people by the 27 registered authors, sorted by median.

calculation above is done for all 1902 unique people mentioned in all the 30 books. There is no fundamental difference between authors and non-authors in the data, but the most cited people are all authors. The 10 most cited people are shown in Table 2. A fuller version with the 70 most cited names is provided in Annex 2.

The table demonstrates a substantial ‘inequality’ in the amount of citations an author receives. Three authors in particular stand out: Alison Des Forges, Filip Reyntjens and Gérard Prunier. The vast majority of authors on Rwandan violence in the 1990s cite these authors, and these authors are cited more than 3.7% of the time by the majority of other authors. Why are these authors so commonly cited? The most obvious reason is that the most cited authors (from Des Forges to Chrétien) were all considered experts on Rwanda *before* the genocide—with the exception of Prunier, who was a relative newcomer to Rwanda. Another, related, reason is that Des Forges, Reyntjens and Prunier all published books on Rwanda around the time of the

genocide. Reyntjens (1994 and 1995) and Prunier (1995) came first; Des Forges came later (1999), although with a book that was unusual in its detail of the genocide. It should be emphasized that the method used for Table 2 underestimates the influence of more recent works, for the simple reason that it is not possible to cite future works. For example, in my data set there are no references to Omar McDoom (apart from himself), even though the book he has published on the genocide in (McDoom 2021) represents the cutting edge of scholarship on the Rwandan genocide. This book is the youngest one among the 30 registered books, and there are therefore no references to this book. There could have been references to McDoom however, as he has authored many papers on Rwanda, the first one in 2005.

The result of the calculation above can be taken further. The sixth most cited authors (Des Forges—Chrétien) are all among the 27 registered authors. If we take their unmatched popularity as an endorsement of their knowledge (which, in general, it is), it would

Author	median (%)	mean (%)
Jean-Pierre Chrétien	4.93 (+3.90)	6.62 (+4.10)
Filip Reyntjens	4.58 (+0.81)	5.65 (+0.98)
André Guichaoua	3.70 (+1.70)	4.80 (+2.50)
Alison Des Forges	2.24 (-1.90)	3.36 (-2.00)
Claudine Vidal	1.98 (+1.98)	2.25 (+1.30)
René Lemarchand	1.49 (+0.19)	1.68 (-1.10)
James K. Gasana	0.84 (+0.84)	2.81 (+1.20)
François-Xavier Verschave	0.70 (+0.70)	1.00 (+0.64)
Roméo Dallaire	0.55 (-0.34)	0.75 (-1.70)
Catharine Newbury	0.51 (-0.17)	0.96 (-0.66)
Jean Shyirambere Barahinyura	0.49 (+0.49)	0.87 (+0.57)
Jacques J. Maquet	0.49 (+0.49)	0.75 (+0.43)
Catharine Watson	0.47 (+0.36)	0.83 (+0.33)
Colette Braeckman	0.35 (+0.21)	1.89 (+1.20)
Stephen Smith	0.09 (+0.09)	0.33 (+0.21)
Gérard Prunier	0.00 (-3.71)	2.07 (-1.60)
Balthazar Ndengeyinka	0.00 (=)	2.04 (+1.60)
Mathieu Ngirumpatse	0.00 (=)	1.73 (+1.30)
Helen Fein	0.00 (=)	1.29 (+0.76)
Augustin Cyiza	0.00 (=)	1.26 (+0.97)

Table 3: The 20 most cited people by the experts (Des Forges, Reyntjens, Prunier, Guichaoua, Lemarchand and Chrétien).

be interesting to see which authors *they* cite, as opposed to the non-influential authors. Perhaps this could suggest which authors are particularly noteworthy, since the ‘experts’ seem to agree that these authors are interesting. The result is shown in Table 3, along with the difference from Table 2, shown in parentheses. The numbers are calculated in the same way in both tables, the only difference is that only the citations by the 6 ‘experts’ are considered in Table 3. From the table it is clear that Jean-Pierre Chrétien is substantially more popular among the ‘experts’. Both Prunier and Des Forges are significantly less popular, while Gourevitch is now completely out of sight (with a median of 0% and a mean of 0.16%). A couple of Rwandan historical actors also enter the list (Ndengeyinka and Ngirumpatse) exclusively because Guichaoua cites them extensively in his 2010 book. Francophone authors in general seem to rank higher, which is likely because all the experts speak French, and also because these authors are well acquainted with the pre-1994 literature on Rwanda, which was mostly in French.

It should be pointed out that a fair share of the difference between Table 2 and 3 may amount to pure chance, especially since the data for some of the experts used in Table 3 is somewhat limited (notably Lemarchand, Chrétien and Guichaoua).

Myopic index

Another way to use the data is to see how ‘diverse’ the references of the various books are, by measuring what I call the myopic index of books. The myopic index of a book is calculated by making a sorted list of the most cited people of a Book (or a Name), then counting the number of the most cited names until the total percentage of references to those people surpass 50%. For example, if the myopic index of book B is 4, this means that more than 50% of the references to other people in book B are to 4 people exclusively. In other words, the references to people are not very diverse in book B.

One might assume that a high myopic index is an indication of quality in a non-fiction work. It means that the author has consulted a variety of sources and is not too reliant on the authority of a handful of authors. This, at least, was my initial assumption. The result of this calculation for all of the 30 registered books is shown in Table 4. A more detailed version of the table is provided in Annex 4, with an additional column showing exactly which authors are in the top 50% for each book.

At the very first glance, the myopic index seems like it could be an indication of quality. The top two books, Uvin 1998 (34) and McDoom 2021 (29) are impressive scholarly works. The next three books, however, are authored by Friends (Melvern and Wallis) and an Enemy (Philpot). Meanwhile, some of the best books written on Rwandan violence, notably Des Forges 1999 and Guichaoua 2010, are towards the bottom of the list. To a certain extent this might be explained by the fact that Des Forges 1999 relies heavily on anonymous sources—one in three of Des Forges 1999’s roughly 3000 citations are anonymous, while Guichaoua’s system of extensive ‘Annexes’ and ‘Boxes’ doesn’t lend itself well to being registered in a system where the sources are assumed to be contained in references.

The table shows a substantial difference not only between the books themselves, but also between different books by the same authors. For example, Wallis 2006 has a myopic index of only 3, while his later book from 2019 has a myopic index of 24. The same is true of Melvern, with a myopic index ranging from 5 (Melvern 2005) to 27 (Melvern 2020). For the three authors who have more than one book registered (Reyntjens, Melvern and Wallis), there seems to be a general trend that their later books have a higher myopic index. There is one exception to this rule: Melvern 2000 has a myopic index of 14, while Melvern 2004 has 5. It makes sense that the myopic index would tend to increase with time; there are both more sources available to cite at a later date, and it can be assumed that authors are more knowledgeable later in their life, and are therefore able to cite a greater variety of sources. It could also simply be a coincidence, given the scarcity of the data.

If one accepts that the books authored by Friends and Enemy are biased, then a high myopic index is not a good indication of a quality book. There seems to be no correlation between quality and myopic index. The myopic index does say something about how diverse the references of a book are, which could be interesting information in itself.

Myopic index	Book
34	Uvin 1998
29	McDoom 2021
27	Melvern 2020
24	Wallis 2019
22	Philpot 2013
21	Prunier 1997
18	Collins 2014
18	Onana 2019
15	Eltringham 2004
15	Longman 2010
14	Melvern 2000
14	Rever 2018
14	Willame 1995
14	Straus 2006
13	Mamdani 2001
12	Lemarchand 2009
11	Kimonyo 2008
10	Fujii 2009
9	Gasana 2002
7	Herman & Peterson 2014
7	Chrétien et al. 1995
7	Reyntjens 2018
6	Lugan 2014
6	Kinzer 2008
5	Kuperman 2001
5	Des Forges 1999
5	Melvern 2004
4	Guichaoua 2010
3	Reyntjens 1995
3	Wallis 2006

Table 4: The 30 registered books, sorted by their myopic index.

Categorizing the literature with citation network analysis

A more interesting application of the data—and the main purpose of registering it—is to use it to create a network representing who is citing each other, and how often. Before doing so I will discuss the theoretical underpinnings of my method.

The analysis of networks in science rests on the more abstract mathematical theory of graphs, which refers to the analysis of logical structures of *nodes* connected to each other by *edges* (or simply lines). The edges may convey a sense of direction, in which case it is called a *directed graph*, rather than an *undirected graph*. The edges can also carry a numerical value called a *weight* which symbolizes how closely the two nodes are connected; in this case it is called a *weighted graph*.

Graph theory becomes network theory once the nodes and edges start representing concrete networks found in the real world. When those networks represent relationships between living organisms, the term of choice becomes Social network analysis (SNA). The analysis of networks has now become ubiquitous in science. As the mycologist Merlin Sheldrake wrote in 2020:

Today, network science is inescapable. Pick any field of study – from neuroscience to biochemistry, to economic systems, disease epidemics, web search engines, machine learning algorithms that underpin much of ‘AI’, to astronomy and the very structure of the universe itself, [...] – the chances are that it makes sense of the phenomenon using a network model.²⁸⁴

Likewise, SNA has a lot of potential for the study of history. There is now an organization dedicated to the application of SNA to history called Historical Network Research Community (HNR), which has published several issues of its own journal called the *Journal of Historical Network Research*. An example of what can be done is to create a network based on the metadata of historical letters, which might give an indication of which people are particularly influential. Such methods may reveal that certain, well-connected historical people (often women) have been overlooked by scholarship.²⁸⁵

When SNA is applied more specifically to references between documents or people, one might refer to it as citation network analysis. Such methods, and the analysis of references more generally, are widely used on the scientific literature to judge the influence of people, articles, and journals.

What I wanted to do when I registered my data was to create a network based on who is referencing who in the 30 books I have registered, and then to apply a standard algorithm in network science,

²⁸⁴ Sheldrake, *Entangled Life*, 170–71.

²⁸⁵ For an example of this, see Ahnert and Ahnert, ‘Protestant Letter Networks in the Reign of Mary I’.

called the Girvan-Newman algorithm, to categorize the authors. This algorithm works by successively removing the most ‘central’ edge in the network (more technically, the edge with the highest betweenness centrality), because these edges are assumed to straddle communities in the network.²⁸⁶

My hypothesis was that doing so could reveal an author’s stance as either Friend or Enemy, simply based on who they cite, how often they cite them, and equally important, who cites them in return. This seemed plausible because in a complex citation network, what matters is not simply the edges between individual authors, but also all their other citations, and the structure of the network as a whole. For example, if two authors like to cite the same people, this will increase their likelihood of being grouped together by the Girvan-Newman algorithm. If certain people don’t cite each other, that is also information which will influence the algorithm. Given my knowledge of the literature on Rwandan violence, it is possible for me to determine at a glance whether Friends and Enemies are grouped together by the algorithm.

The plan was to simply create an undirected graph between all the people cited in all 30 books registered, where the edges would be weighed according to how often they cite each other, and how mutual it is. The graph was built using the Python module networkx, which also contains the implementation of the Girvan-Newman algorithm I used. I then used the Python modules dash and dash_cytoscape to visualize the network interactively in the browser. A small portion of the resulting network can be seen in Figure 8.

²⁸⁶ The way the Girvan-Newman works is explained in the documentation for the Python package networkx, which I what I have used. See <https://networkx.guide/algorithms/community-detection/girvan-newman/> (accessed April 2023).




Figure 8: A network containing all names cited by all authors. The nodes shaped as stars means people for whom a book has not been registered. The people with round nodes are registered authors. I have interactively dragged some of the registered authors outside the network to illustrate the sheer quantity of edges.

I quickly discovered that I would have to simplify this network, for two reasons. First of all, the Girvan-Newman algorithm runs extremely slowly on such a large network. More fundamentally, however, is that when the initial results came back, the algorithm, instead of categorizing large portions of the network, would simply pop off individual authors, particularly ones with a large number of citations to many people, like Omar McDoom. I realized that this is due to how the algorithm worked, namely by successively removing the most central edges. If a node is surrounded by a large quantity of nodes with no other links to the rest of the network, this will increase the centrality of the edges connecting this node to the rest of the network, making it more likely that it will be categorized by itself.

Another issue is that there is a crucial difference between having an edge and not having an edge. If I have more data on author A than on author B, this will unfairly make author A more central in the network. In my simplified network, I should therefore strive to give authors a similar amount of edges.

Network with top 7 cited names

I decided to simplify the network in two ways: first, each registered author would be accorded a limited amount of edges. After experimentation, I decided that each author will get an edge to their seven most cited people. It should be said that the number of edges makes a big difference for the result of Girvan-Newman, and I settled on 7 after observing that it seemed to be a sweet spot. Too few or too many edges seemed to make Girvan-Newman less willing to categorize. Secondly, after all registered authors have received their seven edges, I would remove the stray nodes with only a single edge. This is to avoid the problem mentioned above, where a node surrounded by stray nodes become unduly central.

Another important decision is how the resulting network should be weighted. A simple approach would be to define the weight of an edge between nodes n and m as the average of how often they cite each other:

$$\frac{n_p + m_p}{2}$$

In the equation above, n_p and refers to how many percent of n 's references are to to m , and vice versa for m_p . Due to the way Girvan-Newman works, where a lower weight means that the nodes are closer, n_p and m_p are both inverted percentages. For example, if m_p is 0.95, this means that 5% of m 's references to people are to n .

The problem with making the weight a simple average is that it does take into account the significance of mutual references. If n and m both cite each other frequently, this is significant, and they should therefore be 'rewarded' with a lower weight value (meaning that they are closer together). In my network, I therefore use the following function which serves that purpose:

$$weight(n, m) = \frac{n_p + m_p}{2} \max(n_p, m_p)^{10}$$

The result of the formula above is identical to a simple average if the citations go only in one direction, but if the references are mutual, then the weight becomes smaller as a function of how mutual it is. The exponent at the end of the function (10) determines how much mutual references should be 'rewarded', and can be adjusted accordingly. With the simplified network I tried to use both a simple average and the *weight* function above with Girvan-Newman, and found that the difference in the result was marginal, but the *weight* function seemed to be a slight improvement.




Figure 9: Simplified network of edges to top 7 cited people. The size of nodes indicates their centrality in the network (technically, their closeness centrality). As might have been expected, the most cited authors are also the most central authors in the network. The width of the edges indicate how often authors cite each other, and how mutual the citing is. Some authors have less than 7 edges because stray nodes have been removed. Some have more than 7 because they are cited by others.

The resulting network can be seen in Figure 9.²⁸⁷ The smaller size of the network makes it far easier to visualize the relationships between authors. The cases of significant amounts of mutual references are easily identifiable, because the edges connecting the authors are very thick.

I then ran the Girvan-Newman algorithm with the simplified network as input. The result of the algorithm can be visualized as a dendrogram. I did not find an easy way to represent dendrograms in Python, so I converted the data to JSON and used the JavaScript data-visualization library D3.js, which could visualize the result as an SVG.

²⁸⁷ The code for creating this network is located in the Python function `make_graph_first_n` in the file `'graphs.py'`.




Figure 10: Dendrogram visualizing the result of the Girvan-Newman algorithm on the simplified network with 7 edges per author. The 3 resulting groups have been labelled by me for the purpose of discussion. Here I stopped the algorithm after it had made 3 categories; it is possible to run the algorithm at greater ‘depth’, where the groups A, B and C would be further sub-categorized.

The result took me by surprise. What struck me first was that the algorithm could hardly have been better at separating scholars on the one hand, and Friends and Enemies on the other. One may question the placement of Barrie Collins in scholars, or of Bernard Lugan with the Enemies, but these authors are both scholars and Enemies and are therefore hard to categorize.

The second thing that struck me was the algorithm’s tendency of grouping Friends and Enemies together. I had expected the algorithm to categorize Friends and Enemies separately. The categorization of Friends together with Enemies indicated to me that these authors have something in common. When I looked at the network, I could see that both Friends and Enemies liked to cite Roméo Dallaire and Luc Marchal, both of them top commanders of UNAMIR who has authored books on their experience. These officers incidentally have very different views on the RPF; Dallaire is a Friend and Marchal is an Enemy. Scholars cited these people far less than Friends and Enemies did. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also made it as a node, and was connected to a Friend and an Enemy—but no scholars.

A third thing that struck me was that it seemed to be easier for the algorithm to classify Enemies than Friends. Although enemies were spread across the categories B and C, the last category, C, was exclusively composed of Enemies. When I looked at the network, I could see that several nodes

were connected exclusively to Enemies, including Peter Erlinder (an ICTR defense lawyer), Amadou Deme (who worked under Dallaire in UNAMIR), Pierre Péan (an Enemy, but not a registered author) and somewhat oddly, the well-known Friend Philip Gourevitch. The reason Enemies cite Gourevitch is to criticize him, of course, but since Gourevitch ended up with edges only to Enemies, it would be impossible to categorize him correctly as a Friend. I should be pointed out that having Peter Erlinder among the top 7 cited people is very unusual—it’s something only an Enemy could have. A better methodology might be able to detect how unusual citations like this one are and give them greater weight to classify the network.

When I experimented with the variables and increased the number of edges for each author from 7 to 10, I found that the Enemies were the first to be categorized (most would end up in C, two ended up in B, and Collins remained in A), while Friends would end up comfortably in the same category as scholars. To me this indicated that Enemies are more marginal than Friends in terms of who they cite. In addition, the fact that Friends were jumping from B to A in this way suggests that it should be possible to categorize Friends from Enemies with a more refined methodology. It indicates that there is something unique about Friends, something that distinguishes them from both Enemies and Scholars.

Reference fingerprint

When I found out that I had to simplify the network, I realized that there are many possible ways to create a network between authors based on the data I have. The network above is quite straightforward in that the weight between nodes is simply how often the two authors in question cite each other directly. A more indirect way to build the network is to base the weight of the edges on how often two authors cite the same people. I think of this as comparing the ‘reference fingerprint’ of two authors. In this case, the weight is defined as the sum of all the references that two authors have in common. More precisely, the following weight function is used:

$$weight(n, m) = \sum_{c \in P} \min(c_n, c_m)$$

P refers to the set of all authors cited by the nodes n and m ; c_n and c_m refers to how many percent of n and m ’s references to people are made to c , respectively. The percentages in the formula above are not inverted yet, since it would make the formula more complicated. The weights are inverted before the network is passed on to Girvan-Newman. If both n and m both cite an author c at least 2% of the time, this will slightly increase the weight of the edge between those nodes (by 0.02). The same goes for all the other authors that they both cite.




Figure 11: A network where edge weights are made by comparing the ‘reference fingerprint’ of authors. As can be seen from the node sizes, Scott Straus is the most central node in the network (closeness centrality). This means that Straus’s reference fingerprint is the most representative, or typical, of all the authors.




Figure 12: The first categorization made by Girvan-Newman on the network based on reference fingerprints.

Girvan-Newman did not produce interesting results with the resulting network because there were too many edges. I therefore removed the weakest edges in the following way: all authors get to keep their 7 edges with the highest value; all other edges are removed. As with the first simplified network, the Girvan-Newman algorithm is very sensitive to the number of edges, and 7 was chosen

because it yielded an interesting result. Changing the number of edges slightly yields comparable results with Girvan-Newman. The network after removing the weakest edges is shown in Figure 11. The result of Girvan-Newman is shown in Figure 12. Similar to the result shown in Figure 10, Girvan-Newman was good at distinguishing scholars on the one hand, from Enemies and Friends on the other. The only exception is André Guichaoua, who does not belong among Friends and Enemies.²⁸⁸ One again, Friends and Enemies were grouped together, rather than separately. It is interesting that the results in Figure 10 and 12 are so similar, because the way these networks were created are completely different. The method based on reference fingerprints does seem to be somewhat less reliable, both because Guichaoua was incorrectly categorized, and for the reason explained in Annex 5.

Still trying to separate Friends from Enemies, I tried to make a similar network based on reference fingerprints, but one that would take into account unusual citations (like to Peter Erlinder). The following *weight* function was used:

$$weight(n, m) = \sum_{c \in P} \frac{\min(c_n, c_m)^2}{c_p}$$

The main difference from the version above is c_p , which refers to the mean percentage c is referred to by *all* authors (as explained above under Most cited people), not just n and m . In other words, if authors n and m both cite c at least 2% of the time, while other authors generally cite c only 0.5% of the time, the weight of the edge will increase by 0.08 (rather than just 0.02), because n and m are citing c unusually often. Like in the first attempt, only the top 7 edges for each node were kept in the network, to reduce the amount of edges. The result of the function above can be above 1, so I normalized the values to be below 1 before inverting them.

My assumption was that by taking into account the presence of unusual citations, it would be easier to separate Friends from Enemies. It turns out that this did not work (at least not with the function above), and the results of Girvan-Newman on this network was hard to interpret. The result is shown in Figure 13; I show the result in greater depth than earlier to illustrate to the reader what that looks like.

²⁸⁸ The data for Guichaoua is not particularly good, and he might have been categorized differently if his book from 2005 was also registered (*Rwanda 1994. Les politiques du génocide à Butare*).




Figure 13: The result of Girvan-Newman on a network based on reference fingerprints, where the unusualness of citations have been factored in. The result is shown in greater depth for illustration.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored various ways to analyze quantitatively the references between authors on a controversial topic. A mundane, but nevertheless useful way to use the data I have registered is to see which authors are cited the most in the literature. It turns out that a handful of authors are cited far more than anyone else. These are authors who knew Rwanda well before the genocide, and who published books on the genocide not long after it happened. It is also possible to see how diverse a book's references to people are with what I have called the myopic index.

To answer the quantitative research question, I turned the data into a network and used a standard algorithm to find communities in complex systems to categorize the literature. With two very different methodologies, I was not able to separate Friends from Enemies, although the result from the first methodology indicates that it might be possible to do so. The algorithm was far better at separating scholars on the one hand, from Enemies and Friends on the other. Both methodologies were able to separate scholars from the other authors, although the first method was more reliable. This suggests that Friends and Enemies have something in common. It is also possible that Friends and Enemies were categorized together simply because scholars have something in common. It is

clear from the thick edges in Figure 9 that many scholars are citing each other mutually. The edges between Enemies and Friends are far weaker in that figure. If Friends and Enemies really were echo chambers, as one might suspect, one would expect them to cite each other more often.

The result of the Girvan-Newman algorithm would have been different if I had registered more books by Enemies and Friends. It is possible that the algorithm would be more successful in separating Friends from Enemies in this case, particularly with the first methodology, which was the most promising.

It should be emphasized that in making these networks, many arbitrary decisions had to be made, such as the number of edges; the weight of the edges; whether to include non-registered authors in the network, and in that case, how many, etc. All of these decisions influence the result of the Girvan-Newman algorithm, and it is unlikely that all the decisions taken by me were the best ones for the purpose of separating Friends from Enemies. There are many things I could have done, which I didn't, such as factoring in the year a book was published. One might argue that a reference to a newer book should count for more than a reference to an old one, because old books have had more opportunities to be cited. I could also have used a different algorithm; Girvan-Newman is only one of many possible algorithms to categorize networks.

Conclusive remarks

In this thesis I have analyzed the literature on the Rwandan tragedy on the 1990s, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. In the qualitative part, I showed how Friends and Enemies could easily be distinguished by analyzing where the authors stand on certain controversial issues in recent Rwandan history. Their differences fundamentally hinges on whether or not the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is a reliable source of information. The positions of scholars are more nuanced, and it is therefore more difficult to discern scholars from Friends and Enemies using this qualitative method.

The results was opposite in the quantitative part of the thesis. It turned out to be hard to separate Friends from Enemies based on who they cited. The quantitative method, where the Girvan-Newman algorithm was applied to a citation network, was very effective in categorizing scholars on the one hand, and Friends and Enemies on the other.

When categorizing the citation networks in this thesis, I have intentionally avoided taking into account what a citation actually means; whether this citation amounts to an endorsement or criticism. It might be fruitful to combine the qualitative and quantitative approaches, by creating a network that takes into consideration the hostility between authors. When Friends and Enemies cite each other, this is almost exclusively to criticize each other, and it is probably possible to take this into account in a systematic way.

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Annex 1: List of registered books

ID	Author(s)	Date	Title
Chrétien et al. 1995	Jean-Pierre Chrétien	1995	Rwanda: les médias du génocide Rwanda 1994: The Myth of the Akazu Genocide
Collins 2014	Barrie Collins	2014	Conspiracy and Its Consequences
Des Forges 1999	Alison Des Forges	1999	Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda
Eltringham 2004	Nigel Eltringham	2004	Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda
Fujii 2009	Lee Ann Fujii	2009	Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda
Gasana 2002	James K. Gasana	2002	Rwanda : du parti-Etat à l'Etat-garnison Rwanda : De la guerre au génocide, Les politiques criminelles au Rwanda (1990-1994)
Guichaoua 2010	André Guichaoua	2010	
Herman & Peterson 2014	Edward S. Herman & David Peterson	2014	Enduring Lies: The Rwandan Genocide in the Propaganda System
Kimonyo 2008	Jean-Paul Kimonyo	2008	Rwanda. Un génocide populaire A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man who Dreamed it
Kinzer 2008	Stephen Kinzer	2008	The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda
Kuperman 2001	Alan Kuperman	2001	
Lemarchand 2009	René Lemarchand	2009	The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa
Longman 2010	Timothy Longman	2010	Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda
Lugan 2014	Bernard Lugan	2014	Rwanda : Un génocide en questions When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda
Mamdani 2001	Mahmood Mamdani Omar Shahabudin	2001	
McDoom 2021	McDoom	2021	The Path to Genocide in Rwanda: Security, Opportunity, and Authority in an Ethnocratic State A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide
Melvern 2000	Linda Melvern	2000	
Melvern 2004	Linda Melvern	2004	Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide
Melvern 2020	Linda Melvern	2020	Intent to Deceive: Denying the Genocide of the Tutsi Rwanda, La vérité sur l'opération Turquoise. Quand les archives parlent
Onana 2019	Charles Onana	2019	
Philpot 2013	Robin Philpot	2013	Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. Second edition.
Prunier 1997	Gérard Prunier	1997	In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
Rever 2018	Judi Rever	2018	
Reyntjens 1995	Filip Reyntjens	1995	Rwanda, trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire
Reyntjens 2018	Filip Reyntjens	2018	El genocidio de los tutsi en Ruanda
Straus 2006	Scott Straus	2006	The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda
Uvin 1998	Peter Uvin	1998	Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide
Wallis 2006	Andrew Wallis	2006	Stepp'd in Blood: Akazu and the Architects of the Rwandan Genocide Against the Tutsi
Wallis 2019	Andrew Wallis	2019	
Willame 1995	Jean-Claude Willame	1995	Aux sources de l'hécatombe rwandaise

Notes: Jean-Pierre Chrétien was registered as the sole author for Chrétien et al. 1995 for simplicity. There were three other authors involved in this book, but it was made under the direction of Chrétien. In Lemarchand 2009, only chapters 5-8 (pertaining to Rwanda) were registered. Reyntjens 2018 was registered instead of the original French because it was freely available.

Annex 2: Most cited names of 27 registered authors

The list is sorted first by median, then by mean, and contains the 70 most cited names.

Author	median (%)	mean (%)			
			Abdul Joshua Ruzibiza	0.00	0.36
Alison Des Forges	4.10	5.38	Bernard Lugan	0.00	0.33
Filip Reyntjens	3.77	4.67	Theogene Rudasingwa	0.00	0.33
G�rard Prunier	3.71	3.63	F. Nkundabagenzi	0.00	0.33
Andr� Guichaoua	1.99	2.29	Barrie Collins	0.00	0.32
Ren� Lemarchand	1.30	2.82	Henry Kwami	0.00	0.32
Jean-Pierre Chr�tien	0.98	2.54	Anyidoho	0.00	0.32
Rom�o Dallaire	0.89	2.45	Jacques J. Maquet	0.00	0.32
Catharine Newbury	0.68	1.62	Lee Ann Fujii	0.00	0.31
Philip Gourevitch	0.19	0.67	Louis de Lacger	0.00	0.31
Colette Braeckman	0.14	0.73	Linda Kirschke	0.00	0.31
Jan Vansina	0.12	0.52	Ntaribi Kamanzi	0.00	0.31
Catharine Watson	0.11	0.50	Luc de Heusch	0.00	0.30
James K. Gasana	0.00	1.63	Astri Suhrke	0.00	0.30
Claudine Vidal	0.00	0.94	Andrew Wallis	0.00	0.30
Scott Straus	0.00	0.85	Jean Shyirambere	0.00	0.30
Luc Marchal	0.00	0.76	Barahinyura	0.00	0.30
Linda Melvern	0.00	0.75	Nik Gowing	0.00	0.30
Amadou Deme	0.00	0.75	Howard Adelman	0.00	0.29
Ian Linden	0.00	0.72	Augustin Cyiza	0.00	0.29
Peter Erlinder	0.00	0.58	Christophe Mfizi	0.00	0.29
Mahmood Mamdani	0.00	0.55	Th�og�ne	0.00	0.29
Peter Uvin	0.00	0.55	Murwanashyaka	0.00	0.29
Pierre P�an	0.00	0.54	Johan Pottier	0.00	0.28
Helen Fein	0.00	0.53	Paul Rutayisire	0.00	0.27
Laurien Uwizeyimana	0.00	0.50	Carla Del Ponte	0.00	0.27
Balthazar Ndengeyinka	0.00	0.49	Colin M. Waugh	0.00	0.27
Jean-Claude Willame	0.00	0.43	Robert Melson	0.00	0.26
Bruce D. Jones	0.00	0.43	Alexandre Goffin	0.00	0.26
Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh	0.00	0.42	Hugh McCullum	0.00	0.25
Jean-Paul Harroy	0.00	0.42	Pierre Erny	0.00	0.25
Robin Philpot	0.00	0.41	Christopher Browing	0.00	0.25
Jordane Bertrand	0.00	0.40	Tharcisse Gatwa	0.00	0.25
Mathieu Ngirumpatse	0.00	0.40	Boutros Boutros-Ghali	0.00	0.24
David Newbury	0.00	0.40	Scott R. Feil	0.00	0.23
Fran�ois-Xavier Verschave	0.00	0.36	Marc Vaiter	0.00	0.23
			Baudouin Paternostre	0.00	0.23
			de la Mairieu	0.00	0.23
			Faustin Twagiramungu	0.00	0.22

Annex 3: 10 most cited people by the 27 registered authors

Most cited people by Barrie Collins, based on the book Collins 2014

Person	n_refs	Percentage
James K. Gasana	67	9%
G�rard Prunier	32	4%
Alison Des Forges	29	4%
Catharine Newbury	29	4%
Mahmood Mamdani	27	4%
Peter Erlinder	26	3%
Bruce D. Jones	25	3%
Pierre-Claver Kanyarushoki	20	3%
Rom�o Dallaire	17	2%
Joyce Leader	17	2%

Most cited people by Andr  Guichaoua, based on the book Guichaoua 2010

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Andr� Guichaoua	21.33	20%
Balthazar Ndengeyinka	13	12%
James K. Gasana	12	11%
Mathieu Ngirumpatse	11	10%
Augustin Cyiza	8	8%
Filip Reyntjens	4	4%
Alison Des Forges	4	4%
Abdul Joshua Ruzibiza	3	3%
Bernard Lugan	3	3%
Marcel Gatsinzi	2	2%

Most cited people by Jean-Claude Willame, based on the book Willame 1995

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Ren� Lemarchand	21	8%
Claudine Vidal	20	8%
Andr� Guichaoua	18	7%
Luc de Heusch	15	6%
Christian Thibon	7	3%
Catharine Newbury	6	2%
Aaron Segal	6	2%
Victor Silvestre	6	2%
G�rard Prunier	6	2%
Jacques Vanderlinden	6	2%

Most cited people by Jean-Pierre Chr tien, based on the book Chr tien et al. 1995

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Jean-Pierre Chr�tien	14.33	23%
Filip Reyntjens	4	6%
Claudine Vidal	4	6%
Nicolas Poincar�	3	5%

Andr� Guichaoua	2.33	4%
Colette Braeckman	2	3%
Christophe Mfizi	2	3%
Emile Mworoha	2	3%
Jean-Paul Harroy	2	3%
Guy Logiest	2	3%

Most cited people by Scott Straus, based on the book Straus 2006

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Filip Reyntjens	60	10%
Alison Des Forges	45.5	8%
Ren� Lemarchand	34	6%
Jean-Claude Willame	21	4%
Rom�o Dallaire	19	3%
Jean Hubert	16	3%
Aaron Segal	16	3%
James K. Gasana	15	3%
G�rard Prunier	15	3%
Catharine Newbury	14	2%

Most cited people by Mahmood Mamdani, based on the book Mamdani 2001

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Ren� Lemarchand	65	11%
Catharine Newbury	39.5	6%
G�rard Prunier	36	6%
Colin Legum	28.5	5%
Tharcisse Gatwa	24	4%
Filip Reyntjens	21	3%
Scott Grosse	17	3%
Catharine Watson	17	3%
David Newbury	16.5	3%
Tor Sellstrom	13	2%

Most cited people by Filip Reyntjens, based on the books Reyntjens 1995, Reyntjens 2018

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Andr� Guichaoua	17	13%
Filip Reyntjens	14	10%
Colette Braeckman	10	7%
Lee Ann Fujii	8	6%
Jean-Pierre Chr�tien	7	5%
Alexandre Goffin	6	4%
Scott Straus	6	4%
Fran�ois-Xavier Verschave	4	3%
Claudine Vidal	4	3%
Alison Des Forges	3	2%

Most cited people by Alan Kuperman, based on the book Kuperman 2001

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Alison Des Forges	80	28%
Filip Reyntjens	25	9%
Scott R. Feil	16	6%
Ntaribi Kamanzi	16	6%
Henry Kwami Anyidoho	14	5%
G�rard Prunier	12	4%
Jacques Lanxade	8	3%
Daniel R. Schroeder	8	3%
Bernard Lugan	7	2%
Holly J. Burkhalter	6	2%

Most cited people by James K. Gasana, based on the book Gasana 2002

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Laurien Uwizeyimana	8	11%
James K. Gasana	6.5	9%
Barrie Collins	4	6%
Marc Vaiter	4	6%
Ren� Lemarchand	3	4%
Baudouin Paternostre de la Mairieu	3	4%
Pierre Erny	3	4%
G�rard Prunier	3	4%
Andr� Guichaoua	3	4%
Cornelis Marinus Overdulve	3	4%

Most cited people by Judi Rever, based on the book Rever 2018

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Nik Gowing	7	7%
Th�og�ne Murwanashyaka	7	7%
Theogene Rudasingwa	5	5%
Filip Reyntjens	4	4%
Alison Des Forges	4	4%
Pierre P�an	3	3%
Alphonse F. Furuma	3	3%
Carla Del Ponte	3	3%
Philip Gourevitch	3	3%
Nicholas Stockton	2	2%

Most cited people by Charles Onana, based on the book Onana 2019

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Charles Onana	11	5%
Jean-Claude Lafourcade	11	5%
Rom�o Dallaire	9	4%
Pierre P�an	9	4%
Bernard Debr�	8	3%
Sophie Pontzeele	8	3%
Amadou Deme	7	3%
Jean-Pierre Chr�tien	6	3%
Eug�ne Shimamungu	6	3%
Filip Reyntjens	5.5	2%

Most cited people by Linda Melvern, based on the books Melvern 2020, Melvern 2000, Melvern 2004

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Rom�o Dallaire	79	10%
Alison Des Forges	44	6%
G�rard Prunier	37	5%
Linda Melvern	35	5%
Boutros Boutros-Ghali	21	3%
Luc Marchal	18	2%
Colin Keating	17	2%
V�nuste Nshimiyimana	15	2%
Filip Reyntjens	14	2%
Andr� Guichaoua	14	2%

Most cited people by Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, based on the book Herman & Peterson 2014

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Filip Reyntjens	18	13%
Peter Erlinder	14	10%
Alison Des Forges	12	9%
Rom�o Dallaire	10	7%
G�rard Prunier	8	6%
Robin Philpot	8	6%
Philip Gourevitch	7	5%
Catharine Newbury	6	4%
Michael Dobbs	3	2%
Christian Davenport	3	2%

Most cited people by Bernard Lugan, based on the book Lugan 2014

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Amadou Deme	18	14%
Bernard Lugan	11	8%
Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh	11	8%
Alison Des Forges	10	8%
Rom�o Dallaire	10	8%
Luc Marchal	8	6%
Michel Robardey	7	5%
Jean-Pierre Chr�tien	6	5%
Filip Reyntjens	4	3%
Herv� Deguine	4	3%

Most cited people by Peter Uvin, based on the book Uvin 1998

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Filip Reyntjens	27	4%
G�rard Prunier	26	4%
Jean-Claude Willame	26	4%
Scott Grosse	18.5	3%
Andr� Guichaoua	17	2%
Colette Braeckman	16	2%
Ren� Lemarchand	16	2%
Jean-Pierre Chr�tien	15	2%
Jean Nzisabira	14	2%
Robert E. Ford	13	2%

Most cited people by Nigel Eltringham, based on the book Eltringham 2004

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Jean-Pierre Chrétien	86	9%
Alison Des Forges	59	6%
René Lemarchand	51.5	6%
Gérard Prunier	40	4%
Filip Reyntjens	37	4%
Catharine Newbury	35.5	4%
Jordane Bertrand	32	3%
Ian Linden	21	2%
Helen Fein	15	2%
Richard Fardon	15	2%

Most cited people by Omar Shahabudin McDoom, based on the book McDoom 2021

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Scott Straus	62.5	9%
Alison Des Forges	27	4%
André Guichaoua	24	4%
Peter Uvin	19	3%
Gérard Prunier	18	3%
Stuart J. Kaufman	13.5	2%
Mahmood Mamdani	13	2%
Omar Shahabudin McDoom	11	2%
Lee Ann Fujii	11	2%
Benjamin Valentino	9.33333	1%

Most cited people by Andrew Wallis, based on the books Wallis 2019, Wallis 2006

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Alison Des Forges	77	10%
Gérard Prunier	73	10%
Roméo Dallaire	32	4%
Christophe Mfizi	27	4%
Jean Shyirambere Barahinyura	19	3%
Georges Kapler	16	2%
Christian Jennings	15	2%
André Guichaoua	15	2%
Philip Verwimp	13	2%
Agnès Callamard	11	1%

Most cited people by Lee Ann Fujii, based on the book Fujii 2009

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Alison Des Forges	37	9%
Filip Reyntjens	26	7%
Catharine Newbury	25.5	6%
René Lemarchand	25	6%
Gérard Prunier	21	5%
Jordane Bertrand	17	4%
Scott Straus	16	4%
David Newbury	15.5	4%
Stathis N. Kalyvas	11	3%
Ian Linden	11	3%

Most cited people by Timothy Longman, based on the book Longman 2010

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Alison Des Forges	49	8%
Ian Linden	46	7%
Filip Reyntjens	34	5%
Paul Rutayisire	32.33	5%
René Lemarchand	30.5	5%
Gérard Prunier	29	5%
Catharine Newbury	22.5	3%
Julien Kalibwami	21	3%
Helen Fein	10	2%
Michel Twagirayesu	9.5	1%

Most cited people by Gérard Prunier, based on the book Prunier 1997

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Jean-Pierre Chrétien	14	5%
Filip Reyntjens	13	5%
Louis de Lacger	10	4%
André Guichaoua	9	3%
Catharine Newbury	9	3%
Claudine Vidal	9	3%
Jean-Paul Harroy	8	3%
René Lemarchand	7.5	3%
Catharine Watson	7	2%
Jean-Népomucène Nkurikiyimfura	6	2%

Most cited people by Jean-Paul Kimonyo, based on the book Kimonyo 2008

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Filip Reyntjens	103	12%
Alison Des Forges	76	9%
René Lemarchand	56	7%
Joseph Habyarimana	29	3%
Jan Vansina	27	3%
Augustin Karara	27	3%
Gérard Prunier	25	3%
Sephorien Karekezi	24	3%
André Guichaoua	21.33	3%
Jean-Pierre Chrétien	18.33	2%

Most cited people by Robin Philpot, based on the book Philpot 2013

Person	n_refs	Percentage
James K. Gasana	10	6%
Philip Gourevitch	6	4%
Maximilian C. Forte	5	3%
Yoweri Museveni	4	3%
Carol Off	4	3%
Luc Marchal	4	3%
Boutros Boutros-Ghali	4	3%
John Philpot	3	2%
Pierre Péan	3	2%
Faustin Twagiramungu	3	2%

Most cited people by Alison Des Forges, based on the book Des Forges 1999

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Jean-Pierre Chrétien	75	21%
Filip Reyntjens	42	12%
Gérard Prunier	32	9%
André Guichaoua	16	4%
Sylvain Nsabimana	16	4%
Howard Adelman	9.5	3%
Astri Suhrke	9.5	3%
Faustin Kagame	9	2%
Linda Kirschke	9	2%
Théoneste Bagosora	7	2%

Most cited people by Stephen Kinzer, based on the book Kinzer 2008

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Roméo Dallaire	81	18%
Linda Melvern	46	10%
Gérard Prunier	38	8%
Andrew Wallis	34	7%
Colin M. Waugh	26	6%
Mahmood Mamdani	15	3%
Michael N. Barnett	15	3%
Henry Kwami Anyidoho	14	3%
Hugh McCullum	12	3%
Robert E. Gribbin	10	2%

Most cited people by René Lemarchand, based on chapters 5–8 of the book Lemarchand 2009

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Alison Des Forges	10	10%
Helen Fein	8	8%
René Lemarchand	6	6%
Eva Hoffman	5	5%
Robert Melson	4	4%
James K. Gasana	4	4%
Mark Levene	3	3%
Edouard Husson	3	3%
Christopher Browning	3	3%
William F. S. Miles	3	3%

Annex 4: Myopic index of 30 registered books

Book	Myopic index	People in top 50%
Uvin 1998	34	Reyntjens (4%), Prunier (4%), Willame (4%), Grosse (3%), Guichaoua (2%), Braeckman (2%), Lemarchand (2%), Chrétien (2%), Nzisabira (2%), Ford (2%), Kabirigi (2%), Cart (2%), Olson (2%), Uvin (1%), Fein (1%), Seruvumba (1%), Suhrke (1%), Erny (1%), Stavenhagen (1%), Adelman (1%), Voyame (1%), Friedli (1%), Gern (1%), Keller (1%), Brusten (1%), Bindariye (1%), Newbury C. (1%), Mamdani (1%), Longman (1%), Vidal (1%), Benedict Anderson (1%), Gurr (1%), Pabanel (1%), Ferguson (1%)
McDoom 2021	29	Straus (9%), Des Forges (4%), Guichaoua (4%), Uvin (3%), Prunier (3%), Kaufman (2%), Mamdani (2%), McDoom (2%), Fujii (2%), Valentino (1%), Longman (1%), Reyntjens (1%), Mann (1%), Ervin Staub (1%), Lemarchand (1%), Sémelin (1%), Harff (1%), Krain (1%), Verpoorten (1%), Kuperman (1%), Milgram (1%), Dallaire (1%), Kimonyo (1%), Snyder (1%), Waller (1%), Pierre Englebert (1%), Chrétien (1%), Rummel (1%), Newbury D. (1%)
Melvorn 2020	27	Chrétien (4%), Roland Moerland (3%), Nahimana (3%), Keating (3%), Prunier (2%), Morel (2%), Black (2%), Dupaquier (2%), Gordon (2%), Laurence Binet (2%), Dallaire (2%), Cruvellier (2%), Nsanzuwera (2%), Ndahiro (2%), Laure Coret (2%), Verschave (2%), Terry (1%), Carol Off (1%), Reyntjens (1%), Stec (1%), Philpot J. (1%), Hervé Deguine (1%), Straus (1%), Doyle (1%), Mulgrew (1%), Galand (1%), Paul J. Magnarella (1%)
Wallis 2019	24	Mfizi (6%), Jean Shyirambere Barahinyura (4%), Prunier (4%), Des Forges (3%), Guichaoua (3%), Verwimp (3%), Havugintore (2%), Gatwa (2%), Valens Kajeguhakwa (2%), Dallaire (2%), Shimamungu (2%), Rucagu (2%), Henrion (2%), Ndahiro T. (2%), Malagardis (2%), Nsanzimfura (2%), François-Xavier Munyarugerero (1%), Nicholas Gordon (1%), Mugesera (1%), Reyntjens (1%), Kamana (1%), Katarbarwa (1%), André Sibomana (1%), McCullum (1%)
Philpot 2013	22	Gasana (6%), Gourevitch (4%), Maximilian C. Forte (3%), Museveni (3%), Carol Off (3%), Marchal (3%), Boutros-Ghali (3%), Philpot J. (2%), Pierre Péan (2%), Twagiramungu (2%), Chrétien R. (2%), Marie Béatrice Umutesi (2%), Ferroggiaro (2%), Paciocco (2%), Achebe (2%), Gil Courtemanche (2%), Madsen (2%), Dorothy Hammond (2%), Alta Jablow (2%), Lemarchand (1%), Aimé Césaire (1%), Reed (1%)
Prunier 1997	21	Chrétien (5%), Reyntjens (5%), Lacger (4%), Guichaoua (3%), Newbury C. (3%), Vidal (3%), Harroy (3%), Lemarchand (3%), Watson (2%), Jean-Népomucène Nkurikiyimfura (2%), Nahimana (2%), Prunier (2%), Maquet (2%), Emile Mworoha (2%), Kagame F. (2%), Linden (2%), Twagiramungu (2%), Rumiya (1%), Logiest (1%), Gasana (1%), Verschave (1%)
Collins 2014	18	Gasana (9%), Prunier (4%), Des Forges (4%), Newbury C. (4%), Mamdani (4%), Erlinder (3%), Jones (3%), Kanyarushoki (3%), Dallaire (2%), Leader (2%), Philpot R. (2%), Vansina (2%), Bahunga (2%), Mugenzi (1%), Melvorn (1%), Pottier (1%), Robert E. Gribbin (1%), Adelman (1%)
Onana 2019	18	Onana (5%), Lafourcade (5%), Dallaire (4%), Pierre Péan (4%), Bernard Debrédrgg (3%), Pontzeele (3%), Deme (3%), Chrétien (3%), Shimamungu (3%), Reyntjens (2%), Guichaoua (2%), Booh-Booh (2%), Cameron (2%), Ruzibiza (2%), Didier Tazuin (2%), Carla Del Ponte (2%), Laure Coret (2%), Verschave (2%)
Eltringham 2004	15	Chrétien (9%), Des Forges (6%), Lemarchand (6%), Prunier (4%), Reyntjens (4%), Newbury C. (4%), Bertrand (3%), Linden (2%), Fein (2%), Fardon (2%), Pottier (2%), Linda Kirschke (2%), Bauer (1%), Guichaoua (1%), Taylor C. (1%)
Longman 2010	15	Des Forges (8%), Linden (7%), Reyntjens (5%), Rutayisire (5%), Lemarchand (5%), Prunier (5%), Newbury C. (3%), Julien Kalibwami (3%), Fein (2%), Twagirayesu (1%), Uvin (1%), Antonio Gramsci (1%), Fernand Bézy (1%), Karamaga (1%), Vansina (1%)

Book	Myopic index	People in top 50%
Melvern 2000	14	Des Forges (9%), Boutros-Ghali (6%), Prunier (6%), Dallaire (4%), Guichaoua (4%), Jacques Castonguay (4%), Kagame (3%), Linda Kirschke (3%), Keating (3%), Gaillard (3%), Jonathan Moore (2%), Suhrke (2%), Antoine Lema (2%), Lemarchand (2%)
Rever 2018	14	Gowing (7%), Murwanashyaka (7%), Rudasingwa (5%), Reyntjens (4%), Des Forges (4%), Pierre Péan (3%), Furuma (3%), Carla Del Ponte (3%), Gourevitch (3%), Stockton (2%), Stanton (2%), Marchal (2%), Guichaoua (2%), Matata (2%)
Willame 1995	14	Lemarchand (8%), Vidal (8%), Guichaoua (7%), Heusch (6%), Thibon (3%), Newbury C. (2%), Segal (2%), Silvestre (2%), Prunier (2%), Jacques Vanderlinden (2%), Jean Hubert (2%), Reyntjens (2%), Nzisabira (2%), Harroy (2%)
Straus 2006	14	Reyntjens (10%), Des Forges (8%), Lemarchand (6%), Willame (4%), Dallaire (3%), Jean Hubert (3%), Segal (3%), Gasana (3%), Prunier (3%), Newbury C. (2%), Harroy (2%), Melvern (2%), Christopher Browning (2%), Chrétien (2%)
Mamdani 2001	13	Lemarchand (11%), Newbury C. (6%), Prunier (6%), Colin Legum (5%), Gatwa (4%), Reyntjens (3%), Grosse (3%), Watson (3%), Newbury D. (3%), Tor Sellstrom (2%), Lennart Wohlgemuth (2%), Des Forges (2%), Maquet (2%)
Lemarchand 2009	12	Des Forges (10%), Fein (8%), Lemarchand (6%), Hoffman E. (5%), Melson (4%), Gasana (4%), Levene (3%), Edouard Husson (3%), Christopher Browning (3%), Miles (3%), Uvin (2%), Paul Ricoeur (2%)
Kimonyo 2008	11	Reyntjens (12%), Des Forges (9%), Lemarchand (7%), Habyarimana J. (3%), Vansina (3%), Karara (3%), Prunier (3%), Karekezi (3%), Guichaoua (3%), Chrétien (2%), Bertrand (2%)
Fujii 2009	10	Des Forges (9%), Reyntjens (7%), Newbury C. (6%), Lemarchand (6%), Prunier (5%), Bertrand (4%), Straus (4%), Newbury D. (4%), Kalyvas (3%), Linden (3%)
Gasana 2002	9	Uwizeyimana (11%), Gasana (9%), Collins (6%), Marc Vaiter (6%), Lemarchand (4%), Baudouin Paternostre de la Mairieu (4%), Erny (4%), Prunier (4%), Guichaoua (4%)
Herman & Peterson 2014	7	Reyntjens (13%), Erlinder (10%), Des Forges (9%), Dallaire (7%), Prunier (6%), Philpot R. (6%), Gourevitch (5%)
Chrétien et al. 1995	7	Chrétien (23%), Reyntjens (6%), Vidal (6%), Nicolas Poincaré (5%), Guichaoua (4%), Braeckman (3%), Mfizi (3%)
Reyntjens 2018	7	Guichaoua (14%), Reyntjens (9%), Fujii (8%), Chrétien (7%), Straus (6%), Vidal (4%), Des Forges (3%)
Lugan 2014	6	Deme (14%), Lugan (8%), Booh-Booh (8%), Des Forges (8%), Dallaire (8%), Marchal (6%)
Kinzer 2008	6	Dallaire (18%), Melvern (10%), Prunier (8%), Wallis (7%), Colin M. Waugh (6%), Mamdani (3%)
Kuperman 2001	5	Des Forges (28%), Reyntjens (9%), Feil (6%), Ntaribi Kamanzi (6%), Henry Kwami Anyidoho (5%)
Des Forges 1999	5	Chrétien (21%), Reyntjens (12%), Prunier (9%), Guichaoua (4%), Nsabimana (4%)
Melvern 2004	5	Dallaire (22%), Melvern (11%), Des Forges (6%), Prunier (6%), Vénuste Nshimiyimana (5%)
Guichaoua 2010	4	Guichaoua (20%), Ndengeyinka (12%), Gasana (11%), Ngirumpatse (10%)
Reyntjens 1995	3	Braeckman (29%), Alexandre Goffin (17%), Reyntjens (16%)
Wallis 2006	3	Des Forges (22%), Prunier (20%), Dallaire (8%)

Annex 5: Autoanalysis

It is only fair that the quantitative techniques used on others authors also be applied to the present thesis. I have therefore registered all the references in this thesis after it was completed, and I present the result in this annex.

The myopic index of this thesis is 9, which is slightly lower than average compared to the books on Rwanda I have registered.

My 10 most cited people are the following:

Most cited people by Mattias Ugelvik, based on Ugelvik 2023

Person	n_refs	Percentage
Guichaoua	28	10%
Reyntjens	24	9%
Prunier	21	7%
Des Forges	20	7%
McDoom	15	5%
Kuperman	12	4%
Straus	9	3%
Rever	9	3%
Michela Wrong	8	3%
Reydams	6	2%

When I categorized the literature with the simplified network of top 7 cited names I was categorized with the scholars. When I did the same with a network based on comparing reference fingerprints, I was categorized with the Enemies, Friends, and Guichaoua. However, I also dragged along with me several scholars into this category, such as Fujii and Straus. This probably has something to do with the fact that this thesis is historiographical and has many references to Friends and Enemies. This result suggests that separating scholars from Friends and Enemies with the network based on reference fingerprints is less reliable.

