No Work, No Peace: Livelihoods of Ex-Combatants in Monrovia, Liberia

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Abstract

Conflicts undermine state security, cause massive loss of lives, destroy livelihoods and undermine the general well-being of civilian populations. DDR has thus become the foremost policy tool for securing state security and establishing the framework for reconstructing conflict-affected societies.

Using Liberia as a case, the present study has explored the livelihoods of ex-combatants within the framework of the UN-led DDR Program. Re-integrating ex-combatants into civil, productive and institutional life is the expected end result of the DDR Program.

This led to the use of three main concepts; human security, human development and reconciliation. These three concepts provided the basis for assessing the success of the DDR Program in Liberia, with empirical focus on the ex-combatants’ livelihoods in Monrovia.

The study then found that most of the ex-combatants were unemployed; they had no stable sources of income and place to live. They were using illegal means such as armed robbery and criminal gang banditry to support themselves. The DDR failed to help prepare and reintegrate the ex-combatants into civilian life. The program also failed in making the ex-fighters responsible members of their communities despite the time and resources used for the program. Improving the human security of those directly involved in the conflict was an important way to bring development to the local communities, and to also reconcile perpetrators with their victims.

The DDR Program in Liberia appeared to have had its own administrative problems, including funding. These problems strongly may have affected its operations, especially in providing alternative and legitimate sources of income for the ex-combatants. This is because a mass of unemployed and disgruntled ex-fighters can seriously undermine post-conflict security, reconstruction and reconciliation.
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List of Acronyms

AFL: Armed Forces of Liberia
ATU: Anti-Terrorist Unit
AU: African Union
CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDRR: Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation
EC: European Commission
ECOMIL: ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
LURD: Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy
GOL: Government of Liberia
MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCDDRR: National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation
NPFL: National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NTGL: National Transitional Government of Liberia
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNIDIR: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
ULIMO: United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
USA: United States of America
VOA: Voice of America
Political Map of Liberia
Chapter 1: General Introduction

Section One

1.1.0 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community led by United Nations, has taken many steps in securing peace in many post-conflict nations through DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) programs. Providing sustainable post-war livelihoods for ex-combatants and their families is the key component of DDR programs (UN-DDR 2010).

1.1.1 Intra-States Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa

For the past decades and on, intra-state conflicts, like those in West Africa (Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia), and regional conflicts, like those of the Great Lakes Region in central Africa (countries bordering Lake Victoria and Tanganyika) have ruined Sub-Saharan Africa (Ross 2005). This has led to millions of deaths, displaced many people, created cross-border refugees, and led to gross human rights abuses (Akokpari 1999). Because of these conflicts, people living in these areas are faced with the lack of access to proper human security and social development.

Intra-state conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa constitutes nearly half of global conflicts that have occurred for the past three decades (Carment and Schnabel 2003). Examples include: the genocide of Rwanda’s ethnic cleansing in the mid 1990s; Sierra Leone’s indiscriminate killings and amputation of limbs of civilians in the early 1990s; the conflict in Cote D’Ivoire; the renowned killing fields in the DR Congo; Somalia’s political instability, and Uganda’s continual civil war (Akokpari 1999).

1.1.2 Securitizing Post-Conflict Society through DDR Programs

The introduction of DDR in post intra-state conflict is far more rewarding nowadays, but there are lots of challenges that lie in this corridor to security stabilization. DDR programs ensure
political stability, social economic development, security, sustainable development and rule of law. These are the expected outcomes when DDR is fully implemented.

Combatants are the central focus in order to ensure a stable secure environment for post-war peace building; therefore, by introducing DDR, and implementing every component of the program efficiently can provide the enabling environment for peace building. The most important thing about DDR is not just the collection of guns, or reintegration of ex-fighters into civilian lives, but mainly transforming them into law abiding citizens. That is preparing them as people who are able and capable of earning a living legitimately as expected of every member of society. There are some ex-combatants who may be eligible or qualified for police or the army job after completing the DDR, and if these ex-combatants are re-enlisted into these security apparatus, they may have not been re-settled or reintegrated as civilians, but as law abiding citizens and officers, which is also a boost to post-war recovery.

Dealing with ex-fighters in the aftermath of war is a difficult task in peace building process. To demilitarize fighting groups that have used guns as the major means of earning a living during war time is far challenging than easily thought (Muggah 2009). Ex-combatants in West Africa’s trouble spots (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast) during the war collected tens of thousands of dollars from looting, armed robbery and trade of illicit gem stones (Ross 2005). Those ex-combatants are now receiving little amount of money per month from DDR reinsertion package. The vast drop in such earnings usually creates serious problem to keep these ex-fighters in the DDR program for long period of time. Ex-combatants are used to extorting huge amounts of money through illegal means at the expense of others, which they would like to continue doing even during postwar era. During war time, just take any other conflict zone in Africa as an example; let say Sierra Leone. A fighter could just point an AK-47 at your head and take away all your life long earnings in minutes (Muggah 2009). Now it is the DDR responsibility to provide an alternative means through which these spoiled ex-combatants can earn a living legitimately. These alternative means are not just to provide means of earning a living, but mainly to prevent the ex-combatants from engaging in illegal activities that have the potential to undermine national security and the post war reconstruction.

Building a secure society, preventing recurrence of conflict, restoring rule of law and kick starting developmental initiatives in the aftermath of war are the leading objectives of UN
humanitarian intervention (UN 2010). The foundation upon which a success of peace building mission can be built in order to achieve peace during post-war reconstruction is the DDR. Evidence abound that wherever DDR had failed, there has not been sustainable peace. This is evident in the DR Congo, Afghanistan and even the 1994-1995 failed DDR in Liberia, which resulted in renewed fighting from 1998 to 2003 (Pietz 2004). The point here is that DDR is now the tool for international peace building in the aftermath of war. DDR is very relevant for peace building, but the cost that comes with it is practically high; that is why dedication and adequate funding are very important for the DDR programs in order to succeed in its goals.

Due to the underfunding problem to run the DDR program to the reintegration phase, most ex-combatants, who are the major subject, are not adequately catered for. Demand for quick fix from international community, and donors can put huge pressure on the DDR process (Muggah, 2009). Conflict of political interest can also put pressure on the program, making it more difficult to successfully reintegrate the ex-fighters into communities on time. It is important to understand that the reintegration of ex-combatants is relevant for sustainable peace and national security. This phase of DDR is a social-economic and developmental process that is carried out in communities at local level with an open time frame (Jennings 2008).

1.1.3 Re-Defining Security

The concept of security has been redefined. Security today does not only constitute the protection of state against state or external threat, but also internal threats (Lipschutz 1995). It is through employing this new meaning that peace building in the aftermath of war can be accomplished and conflict prevented. Previous research shows that securitizing postwar countries especially in an aftermath of civil conflict, should guarantee the security of every actor in order to reach a peace deal (Zeeuw 2008). It is against this backdrop that this research is conducted to prove that if major issues faced by actors in conflict like combatant’s personal security and well being are well tackled, further threats of violence recurrence can be reduced and even prevented.

Ex-combatants find themselves in a vulnerable position today in Liberia and other post-war countries. They can be easily lured by some power hungry or potential spoilers to return to warfare, and activities that can undermine public security as argued by Stephen Stedman in
his ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’. It is important to highlight measures and strategies that are relevant to prevent the manipulation of ex-fighters by some power hungry politicians and spoilers that await the slightest windows of opportunity during postwar reconstruction.

Ex-combatants are also sometimes the victims, who are taken advantage of by warlords and politicians to propel them to power as mentioned by one rebel General Butt Naked in a recent interview (Daily Mail, 2010). Therefore, the documented neglect and exclusion of ex-combatants from active participation in socio-economic life could undermine efforts at consolidating the postwar society. It is a mistake to ignore or act as if these ex-combatants have no serious issues that pose threat to the national security. Ronnie Lipschutz; for example, has argued that:

> On closer inspection, however, it is evident that most of the threats posited by those who have argued for a redefinition of security have primarily to do with human health and welfare, social problems internal source of instability, and the costs imposed upon societies by the disruption of customary ways of doing things. While such threats certainly could affect the safety, cohesion and stability of individuals, families, communities, societies, and even countries, it was and is by no means clear that these constitute “security threats” or problems of “national security”...(Lipschutz 1995,p.6).

Studies have shown today that intrastate conflicts have destabilized regions like the Middle East, Latin America and Africa for decades and on (Carment and Schnabel, 2003). The increase of intra-state conflicts, proxy interstate conflicts, and semi-conventional wars has drawn the attention of world and regional bodies such as UN, NATO, AU and ECOWAS. Through DDR initiatives, regional and world bodies are now able to create secure working environment for peace building. If governments of countries in these trouble spots can only act responsibly by caring for the well being of citizens, including ex-combatants that are living in destitute lives in these countries; national security will surely be improved.

Postwar reconstruction requires a secured working environment. But, to obtain enabling working environment, one has to look beyond the political and socio-economic spectrums. In other words, the agents of insecurity have to be identified, and strategies put in place to stabilize the existing threats of insecurity. In the case of Liberia, it is evident that the defunct warring factions and some civilian combatants are the primary agents of insecurity, who may take weapons to fight if the need arises. Therefore, the first objective of UN led peace building mission in Liberia was to constructively engage those agents (warring factions and
combatants) of insecurity in order to create a secure society and working environment. To reach this goal, the targeted individuals (combatants) will have to undergo securitizing process through program such as DDRR.

The DDRR program in Liberia was initiated by UN, and regional body to stabilize the security threat in the postwar reconstruction of Liberia. However, for the security situation in Liberia to become normal as compared to other postwar countries like Angola, Mozambique and Rwanda, those causes and factors that led to the insecurity in Liberia should be addressed and resolved mainly considering the combatants as high priority. This is usually done through both quick impact programs, and long term programs that are about to be disused in detail in this study.

The concepts used in this paper to further explain the theoretical theme word (Securitization) of this research are effective and efficient tools in measuring the impact that the DDRR program has had on the ex-combatants in post-war reconstruction areas around the world. The means by which ex-fighters earn their living, and support their families after DDR programs can give better clue as to whether DDR goal are reached. Exploring the livelihoods of these ex-combatants in Monrovia will actually uncover the causes of the high unemployment of the ex-combatants in the oldest African republic. Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation are the three concepts used in this study. I believe in any postwar reconstruction process, especially where civil conflict has occurred, security stabilization in that area can become a successful undertaking, if the three mentioned concepts are employed effectively and efficiently.

Though there are other concepts believed to also be vital in stabilizing security in an effective way; for example, Democratization, Human Rights and Justice. However, since the main focus here is on the DDRR, it would have overwhelmed the entire study if every concept in peace building is considered and included in this paper. Furthermore, Democracy, Justice, and the Rule of Law can be achieved in the aftermath of war only where DDR program is being successfully implemented (Zeeuw 2008). Therefore, Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation are the best conceptual tools that I prefer to use in this paper to support the ideal of securitization in post-conflict reconstruction since combatants are the major subjects under discussion.
For further clarification, this paper’s intention is to investigate how well the DDRR was conducted in Liberia with regards to the possibility of ex-fighters earning better incomes legitimately from stable jobs, but not to investigate the overall performance of UN mission in Liberia. Hence, within the DDRR initiative, the investigation focused specifically on the ex-combatants and their associates including their host communities. To put this in context, the ex-combatants are the primary subjects or focus group in this investigation.

1.2 Problem Statement

Ex-Combatants are finding it difficult to cope with life during post-conflict reconstruction due to their less qualification and untrustworthiness, which leads to high unemployment amongst them (Microcon 2010). Those of Liberia are no exception to this uphill battle for political and socio-economic balance during post-war reconstruction.

Ex-fighters are just like ordinary people with high hopes and determination for better lives for themselves and their families. They are desperate, using all means necessary including criminal means to survive in a society of neglect; where they are subjected to retribution and unemployment by locals. Without proper solution to their neglect, retribution and unemployment, peace will remain elusive in the postwar era, undermining the security of the entire country.

The question is how are the ex-combatants surviving in the absence of stable and better paying jobs? Are they employing their DDR training skills to earn a legitimate living? Are some involved in criminalities? If so, why? What are the strategies and policies put in place to reintegrate these ex-fighters in order for them to earn a better living, and prevent recurrence of violent conflict and crimes?

1.3 Hypothesis

That the failure of ex-combatants to obtain stable, and legitimate jobs could undermine their personal security and eventually the postwar security of Liberia.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The research problem questions and hypothesis will be better explored through the following questions:
1. What was the focus of the DDRR program in Liberia?
2. What was the plan for reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life with regards to jobs and accommodation?
3. How did the DDRR program envisage ex-combatants to support themselves economically in the post-war era?
4. Were the ex-combatants provided with useful vocational training to enable them to have access to jobs, accommodations, and participation in community development?
5. Did the DDRR program prepare the larger society to accommodate the ex-combatants?
6. What are the perceptions of ex-combatants about the DDRR program?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The importance of this research is that it makes the cause of present insecurity in Liberia explicit for practitioners to rethink and come up with new strategies and policies towards the preparation of ex-combatants for legitimate and stable livelihoods. The paramount importance is how these new strategies and policies can improve the lives of ex-fighters in the aftermath of war on a long term basis mainly during post-war reconstruction and beyond. The study further pinpoints innovative approaches to preparing former fighters for post-war civilian life through some recommendations that are mentioned at the conclusion of this piece of work. If those issues surrounding the sustainable livelihoods of ex-combatants are not well addressed, lasting peace will always be elusive, with a full scale violent conflict being inevitable.

From the findings of this paper, I strongly believe that the recommendations put forth will make DDR program more meaningful, making it to become an effective tool in post-war reconstruction more than before.

1.6 Operational Definition

For better comprehension of what the research is trying to portray, it is important to give clear definition of the appropriate jargons used in this paper.
**Combatant:** By definition of the Geneva Convention, a combatant is a person who takes a direct part in the hostilities of an armed conflict. There are two kinds of combatants, a lawful and an unlawful combatant. A lawful is a person who takes a direct part in the hostilities of an armed conflict, and who upon capture, does qualify for prisoner of war status. As for the unlawful combatants it is a bit complicated to identify or distinguish them from lawful combatants due to the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949 that calls for the protection of both lawful and unlawful combatants including civilians with regards to human rights. However, we can say an unlawful combatant is considered a civilian combatant who does not enjoy treatment as Prisoner Of War (POW) when captured. Modern warfare like guerilla, terrorist and rebel movements are excellent groups that often harbor unlawful combatant (Dormann 2003)

**Ex-combatant:** A combatant who by official affirmation disengages from direct participation in armed hostilities. All combative intentions should be relinquished and refrained from and civilian life must be the final status of said person.

**Livelihood:** A livelihood is the means by which people live, mainly their primary occupation that provides the basic for supporting life (Ellis 2000).

**Security:** Security by definition is the degree of protection against danger, loss or criminals (Lipschutz 1995). Security by concept is the protective separation of what is at threat (assets) from the threat itself. In peace studies, it is believed that security is a perfect breeder of peace; therefore, security is considered as a condition where people are encouraged to refrain from becoming threat to others or themselves. The term also refers to all elements of human security.

**1.7 Structure of the Thesis**

The thesis is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 is subdivided into two sections, section one and section two. Section one covers the introduction, research problem, hypothesis, research objectives, relevance of the study and some operational definitions of major concepts. Section two focuses on the methodology. It covers study area (Monrovia, Liberia), sampling procedures, and technique of data collection. It’s also comprised of interview, group discussion, observation, field experience, limitation and ethical issues.
Chapter 2 revisits the background issues, focusing on the Liberian civil war, the peace agreement and the DDR program.

Chapter 3 again highlights the background issues, but this time through the theoretical theme word of securitization; linking three core concepts, namely human security, human development and reconciliation to support the theory of securitization during post-war reconstruction.

Chapter 4 is where the data is presented and analyzed. This chapter has three sections. Section one is about personal information of the informants, section covers the livelihoods of the informants and section three is about their reintegration in post-war Liberia with regards to permanent employment and sustainable livelihoods.

The last chapter is chapter 5. It is about the conclusion with some final recommendations. This chapter tries to summarize why the present security situation in Liberia is still fragile with numerous threats that can undermine the stability of Liberia. After the summary of the entire research, the thesis then put forth recommendations that can improve those issues threatening the peace in Liberia and other post-war areas.

Section Two: Methodological Framework

1.8 Study Area-Monrovia, Liberia

The study was conducted in Monrovia, the Liberian capital city. My research was carried out from June to July of 2009. In a general view, Liberia is a secular state located on the west coast of Africa. It borders Sierra Leone on the west, Republic of Guinea at the north, Ivory Coast on the east and the Atlantic Ocean at the south. The country has a land area of 111,369 sq km with geographical coordinates of 6 30° N, 9 30° W. The population of Liberia is approximately 3.44 million people with a little over a million people living in its capital, Monrovia. Liberia is divided into 15 political subdivision (counties) and 16 local tribes or ethnic groups.

Liberia is officially considered as Africa’s oldest republic, gaining independence on July 26, 1847. Liberia is a founding member of the Mano River Union, ECOWAS, Organization of African United now African Union and United Nations. It is one of the few remaining
countries with vast reserve of tropical rain forest that is home to thousands of animal and plant species. Though considered poor, Liberia has a huge reserve of natural resources like iron ore, timber, gold and other agricultural related products that constitute about 77% of the total GDP of $1.626 billion (CIA Factbook 2009).

Monrovia was chosen as the study area because of its strategic importance to all warring factions during and after the civil war. Despite Monrovia being a social and economical attraction for ex-combatants, it is presently the home of most belligerents that participated in the war and the DDRR program. In Monrovia, every former warring faction is accounted for, giving me easy access to ex-combatants, headquarters of relevant agencies, institutions and individuals that vital information can be solicited from for the study.

Besides being the largest city, and the home to 1/3 of Liberia’s population, Monrovia is the leading industrial, commercial, social-economical and political capital of Liberia. Monrovia is Liberia’s most bustling city, making it the most important city in the country. It is a multi-cultural city that is represented by all religions, races and people from all walks of life. The busy streets and market places are very noisy with daily activities of real people. Monrovia’s Infrastructures comprised of modern mansions, middle class homes and mixed shape ghetto houses, which gives the city multiple views.

About 85% of Liberians are unemployed or do not have stable jobs. In recent years the GDP per capital income has increased to about $ 400-$500, but this only constitute the 15% of Liberians found in top and middle class jobs. Most of the country’s rural dwellers live mostly on subsistence farming. With new fiscal policies and salaries increment put in place recently, it is promising for these figures reflecting per capital income to increase in three digits in the following years to come (UNDP 2009).

Like any other Sub-Saharan Africa nation, Liberia has a very high illiteracy rate. Over half of the population has no formal education. Some statistics put it as high as 70% of the population being illiterate, that is those who have no formal education or cannot read and write. Majority of the ex-combatants are found within the categories of unemployment and illiteracy. They become vulnerable to politician and other potential spoilers because of their lack of proper education in making sound decisions (UNDP 2009).
1.9 Sampling

Generally, sampling is the selection of some cases to examine in detail, and use the outcome to understand a much larger set of cases (Neuman 2011). The sampling size of this research is relatively small as compared to the overall number of ex-combatants reportedly to have gone through the DDRR program in Liberia. However, this small number of 30 principal informants did serve the purpose of the study.

My selected group of informants was 30 male ex-combatants. The 30 men were from Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and Militia soldiers comprising of Charles Taylor’s Anti-Terrorist Unite (ATU).

The 30 male informants were selected from amongst those that were willing to participate in the study at a short notice and within the limited timeframe during the research. Since I was using multiple research methods such as Mixed and Purposive methods, it was expedient to talk to people with in-depth knowledge of issues relating to the research especially ex-combatants that had completed the DDR program. They were visited at their homes and other places that we agreed to meet. Those informants that were selected presented their ex-combatant DDR participation ID cards and certificates obtained from vocational training to prove their authenticity for being the right informants.

Besides the primary subjects, information was also gathered from DDR officials, locals and former generals of the various warring parties.

In the Liberian society, male has been the predominant gender, making them the decision makers and leaders in every sub-cultural group despite women being the president today. History shows that every civil unrest and military hostility that occurred in Liberia from the 1980s has been orchestrated and led by men (Youboty 2004). However, this study is not concentrated on gender equality, but rather on real life context of ex-combatants well being that if not properly addressed could probably lead to the recurrence of violent conflict. It is often noted that the agents of present day insecurity in most post-war countries are presumably the ex-combatants and those associated with the conflict. Those posing security threat to the postwar reconstruction of Liberia are mostly the men (Youboty 2004). The armed robbers taking rubber plantations, mineral mines and constantly raiding communities with
terror are not women but men. Even if females were to be considered in the study, the one month research period was not enough to find willing female ex-combatant.

I was told by some interviewees that most of the registered female ex-combatants were just family members or associates to combatants that had access to weapons to undergo the DDR just for incentives. Most of them were not actual combatants; they were wives, daughters or sisters to the male fighters. Females who are raped victims and sex slaves may technically fit the definition of the DDR program target group. But the post traumatic stress associated with victims from the Liberian civil war especially amongst female has an embarrassing stigma that they will have to live with for the rest of their lives. Most of the female ex-fighters preferred not to talk about their past ordeal during the Liberian conflict, and convincing them to participate in case study like this is very difficult.

There were some females who took advantage of DDRR offers as a temporary means to improve their social-economic circumstances. Previous studies show that most of these females were only pushing for the economic benefits and often refrain from being interviewed or even classify as ex-combatant afterwards (Muggah 2009). This complicates the finding of female ex-combatants in the scope of one month. Those females who actually fought during the Liberian civil-war, and also went through the DDR program; believed it is embarrassing, and also has a negative ramification on their chances of becoming wives or respected stakeholders in the post-war society of Liberia if interviewed or referred to as former fighter. Being so conscious of public reactions, they often shy away and take their war experiences as personal issues. It is very important to make these points clear as the reasons for not including female informants in the sampling. Female informants could have been included, but getting them requires a considerable amount of time and resources, which I never had.

1.10 Data Collecting Techniques

The method used in collecting data for this study is the Mixed Methods through purposive selection. This research was revolved around primary data gathering to give a solid basis for credible findings. I am conscious of gatekeepers, planted agents and access restriction to information, and know that they all can threaten the authenticity and reliability of what is understudy. However, this section intends to depict the method used in the research.
Mixed Methods or triangulation method allows one to analyze both quantitative and qualitative data (Maanen 1983). The Mixed Method will give me the advantage of handling archival data such as statistical data obtained from secondary sources and those primary data collected from my fieldwork (Yin 2009, p. 174). The combine used of both quantitative method in the form of statistical data handling and qualitative method through the purposive sampling sequence will definitely strengthen the data quality in this study.

Archival data from NCDDRR /UNDP, data collected from interviews, group discussions and observation during this research are the core data sources of the entire study. Data from each source is interpreted in different measures; therefore, using the Mixed Method will create a compatible cohesion through which those data can be presented and analyzed within one accord.

The primary data collected during this study was done through purposive sampling procedure. Purposive sampling is a kind of case study research strategy that single out a small size of a given population or group as the subject because of their in-depth knowledge and expertise of the case understudy (Neuman 2011).

To further grasp how I collected my primary data, I should first clarify some doubts on case study method. Case study is a research strategy used to conduct an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context (Mason 2002). Exploring the livelihoods of Liberian ex-combatants is a particular case drawn out of many cases in Liberia. The livelihood of ex-combatant is the phenomenon that is being focused on within the research; therefore, the entire investigation will concentrate on the livelihoods of Liberian ex-combatants in general. Let me make a point clear, case study is not restricted to just qualitative research alone (Yin 2009). Though case study is often used in qualitative research, but it can also be used in quantitative research too.

1.11 Interviewing

Normally interview is a conversation between two or more people where questions are asked to obtain information (Neuman 2011). During research interview, information is gathered from subjects to test hypothesis and/or highlight a research problem. There are many formal and informal channels to go about getting interview done. In this study, the semi-structure
interview, focus group discussions and observation were all key methods used to obtain relevant information. No matter what pattern one chooses, the objective of getting knowledge or information should be the key goal.

From the days of old, it is believed that ‘Knowledge is power’. “But those who leak ‘knowledge’ that others wish to remain silenced are in the position of great vulnerability” (Somekh and Lewin 2005:41). Today social researchers will press against all odds to obtain information from informants while doing fieldwork; in return, those researchers gain knowledge and information that are unknown. Interviewing of informants is the most important aspect of creditable information gathering and also crucial point on the field. Therefore it is important to conduct interviews with caution of not to cause harm and not be harmed.

1.11 Semi-Structure Interview

One of the patterns used to collect data during the study was through semi-structure interview. Semi-structure interview in context is an interview during research where interviewees freely participate without fixed questions (Mason 2002). This kind of interviewing is relevant to my research because it gives room for fresh questions, ideas and exploration for the topic under discussion. With this pattern, I was able to get down to major points that the informants were interested in at the same time putting some specific questions of relevance through. The semi-structure interview usually creates the avenue for openness and in-depth discussion bringing forth expected and unexpected questions and answers.

The important advantage I had was being an insider (former soldier of AFL). This puts me in a better position of discussing in-depth issues at the same pace and level with the informants. With this background I had more knowledge on the issues under discussion already, which narrows the room for my informants altering stories and providing false information.

My questions were not standardized like formal questionnaire used in large survey data collection because my interview technique was not a formal structure interview. This was mostly like a guide to questions that were relevant to the topic and giving opportunity to my informants to contribute from freely during the entire interviewing process. The questions were straightly formulated for the 30 primary informants, meanly designed for gathering
answers at the same time exploring their individual stories. They were asked about personal information, background and their benefits acquired from the DDRR program.

Being a former Liberian soldier myself, coupled with my ethnic background (Krahn) apparently reduced the possibilities of coming across gatekeepers, planted informants, and less informed individuals who usually give misleading and bias information. With my 14 years of military experience as AFL soldier I was in a better prepared, physically and mentally, for the research than other previous researchers; especially when it comes to dealing with those hard to reach ex-combatants, and establishing rapport with them.

1.11.2 Focus Group Discussion

Focus group discussion is a group discussion often guided by a facilitator, during which participants talk freely and spontaneously across the board about a certain topic (Mason 2002). The focus group discussion method is relevant to my study because it helps to obtain in-depth information about concepts, perceptions and ideas surrounding the ex-combatants.

Group discussions with ex-combatants from defunct Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and Charles Taylor’s integrated rebels-turned-AFL known as Anti-Terrorists Unite (ATU) were held on a daily basis. The working relationship was fascinating and they were delighted to talk to me about their disappointment in the reintegration phase of the DDRR initiative in Liberia. Four of the interviewees explained in tears while telling their frustration in the Program. “No work for us, the people fooled us and lie to us big time”, one middle age informants explained.

I conducted four group discussions with the ex-combatants and each of these discussions was conducted under a peaceful atmosphere. The focus group discussions were held in groups of 6 and 8 informants at a time. The small size was meant to enable every informant to be active participants during the discussion. From their voices and body language, one could sense the anger and frustration they were communicating.
1.11.3 Observation

Observation is a method in research work where researcher uses his/her sense such as seeing and hearing to obtain information about the subject (Silverman 2006). Sometimes the used of scientific instruments to record data during fieldwork can be considered as observation as well. The observation method was important to my study because it gives me the opportunity to get to know my subjects, brings me closer to them and makes me to understand things from their perspective. It was more like being part of social world of the informants.

One of the most important tools in social research is observation. Observing the informants is very crucial to knowing the reliability of the information they are passing on. As a researcher, observation is a primary tool in gathering information during research. Therefore, using senses of observation thoroughly will give a better edge in making decision based on what have been observed.

The expression, the gesture, the language tone and choice of words of informants during the research were opted for observation. Throughout my study, I used keen observation to capture information that the interviewees were not willing to share with me. All the informants communicated through the Liberian Pidgin English and local dialect with lots of slangs that are difficult to understand. However, I needed no translator because I understand and speak their colloquial perfectly including three local dialects (Krahn, Gio and Bassa).

1.12 Field Experience

Getting connected to various contacts was not easy, despite my background as an ex-soldier and a native of my study area. Building up a good rapport with the interviewees was important. However, being an insider gave me an upper advantage over other researchers that have visited Liberia to document cases of such. Where and how to find the right people was important. Being familiarized with the study area made it easy for me to move around. There was no need for second party interpreter. Most importantly, I was not perceived as a paid agent or an undercover outside agent of the West sent to track down war criminals. I was wholeheartedly received by the informants, and they were glad for the documentation of their stories, which they expected would be published for the rest of the world to view.
Most of the informants were found in ghettos, slums and casual work places in Monrovia. Former generals and other influential people were very cooperative after knowing the purpose of my research. Some of those contacted are parliament members, NCDDRR officials, rebel turned politicians and officials of government. They provided colossal assistance in finding the relevant informants for the research which was really rewarding. Through their cooperation, I was able to identify, track and trace information rich informants.

I visited some of ex-combatants at their homes and work places; went for football practice with them on some occasions and even ate with them. All these were done to build better bond, trust and confidence with them.

1.15 Limitation of the Study

The major limitations of this study were the short time used for the data collection on the field and my background as former AFL soldier. I spent about a month collecting data, which was very inadequate. Giving the nature of the research, three months would have been adequate for the undertaking. It was difficult in gathering the informants at a short notice. Reaching an agreeable meeting arrangement with respondents was time consuming. It took days for the first batch of informants to sign in for our first meeting after being in Monrovia for over a week.

As an insider conducting research with respondents that were once enemies and/or friends, I feel this puts me in an awkward position in refraining from being bias and not paying better attention to my former enemy combatants. To the redundant AFL, I was like a friend and comrade with the good intention of making their voices heard. On the contrary, I had the fear of being seen as former enemy by ex-combatants from the other defunct warring factions. Even if I am not perceived as former enemy by these respondents, producing an honest and credible report was always going to be a serious challenge for me.

Others hindrances were the unwillingness of NCDDRR officers to cooperate, limited funds and not including female as primary informants in the study. After knowing that my research was more about depicting the weaknesses of the Liberian DDRR, officials from NCDDRR began to question the legality of my study and wanting to know which organization I am representing. The secretariat of NCDDRR, out of a sudden told me that the meeting was
postponed to two weeks. With limited time left for my stay in Liberia, I pressed on hard to get some information from their final report but to no avail. After the two weeks of postponement, I was able to meet two officers from NCDDRR and they were really resourceful to my research.

The lack of enough funds to cover the research was a very serious issue. Traveling between my temporary residence and the field was very demanding. Commuters were literally engaged in fist fight with each other on a daily basis just to get on public transportation such as bus and taxi cab. Renting a vehicle would have cost me up $ 200.00 a day, which was far beyond my budget. With little money to rent car, I was compelled to join the commuters under these testing conditions just to get from one point to another for data gathering. The delays caused by getting on public transportation from one point to another resulted to the cancellation of some appointments making it impossible for me to get some important information from other ends.

Just as I have given my justification for not including female in previous lines, I remain. However, no matter how best the reasons in my opinion for not including female as primary informants may be, I am absolutely aware of the gender imbalance in my study and the consequential critique that this action may prompt in some quarters. I hope my reasons for excluding female as informants from this study should be seen as facts faced on the field and not an act of anti-gender equality.

1.16 Ethical Considerations

It is of paramount importance to consider the relationship between you the researcher and the informants with regards to sensitive issues of ethical behavior while doing a research (Walliman 2006). The safety, privacy and consent of my respondents went in line with the ethical approach in doing social research. Every ethical value was highly considered and well held to during the study.

Participation was open to willing respondents with no act of direct or indirect coercion and false promises in order to obtain information. The informants knew that I was a student from a Norwegian university doing a research on ex-combatants and not a philanthropist whom
they could benefit from financially. One thing they were sure of was their stories will be published and at least heard by few people in the outside world.

Building a cordial working relationship with the informants was important. From this rapport, confidence and trust were built. Playing soccer with the community youth in my temporary resident stopping place, visiting homes of some informants and dinning with some of them was a way of conveying a strong friendly relationship. Throughout the study, the informants were convinced that I was doing more good than harm and that I was worthy of their trust.

Respect and confidentiality agreement of respondents was taken into high consideration as well. Respect for what and who they are was never taken advantage of. Every conversation carried out was confidential, taking into consideration cultural norms, values and traditions. I did not draw line between the respondents and myself; we ate the same food together during lunch time. Some of them even spoke the same local dialect that I speak (Krahn), which really helped to build that unique bond that was necessary for good working relationship on the field.
Chapter Two: Liberia; From Conflict to Peace Agreement

2.1 Brief History of the Liberian Civil Conflict

The Liberian civil conflict started as the result of resentment, grievance, greed, power struggle, poverty, socio-economic inequality, suppression, ethnicity, corruptions among others (Collier & Hoeffler 2009). Since the coming of the ex-slaves from America in the 1820s, resentment has been built up between the resettled ex-slaves and the natives (Indigenous tribal people). The ex-slaves or the elites ruled Liberia for more than 133 years from the day of independence in 1847 to 1980. They ruled Liberia with iron hands and suppressed the indigenous people while the wealth of the country was shared among members of their inner circle (Youboty 2004).

Though there were some revolts staged by the indigenous people in the early days of the elite dynasty, but they were neutralized in short time. The defeat of the natives helped the elite regimes to keep ruling until 1980, when the reign of the Americo-Liberians, as they (ex-slaves/elites) are sometimes called, came to an end through Samuel K. Doe led military coup (Youboty 2004). In that coup, the then President, William R. Tolbert was killed, bringing to power a native indigenous person for the first time in the Liberian history since the 1820s. Samuel Doe, who was a native son, came with retribution and resentment against descendants of the ex-slaves. During Doe’s regime many government officials from Tolbert’s government were executed and imprisoned including the present President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Even natives that had connections with the elite rulers (ex-slaves) were persecuted.

It is evidence that unemployment, illiteracy and poverty are some of the contributing factors for civil unrest and military hostilities (Youboty 2004). Politicians usually take advantage of this caliber of people to launch operations and programs of self-interest at the expense of the poor masses without considering the ramification that their actions may lead to. Struggle for balance of power, social justice, socio-economic equality and respect for human rights were fair enough reasons to revolt against dictatorial and corrupt regimes in Liberia. The moment power is seized, the ordinary people are then perceived as potential threats to the ruling party. Instead of following those democratic principles to the letter, they then deviate from the democratic norms and values by transforming into dictators. Names like the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy in Liberia
(LURD) among others came with the platform of liberation and freedom fighter. Instead of standing for their cause and manifestos, they themselves became the mayhem.

In December 1989, Taylor started his revolt against Doe as a pure revenge for the mistreatment of the Americo-Liberian and the Gio and Mano by Doe in Liberia. After nine months of intensive guerrilla rebel style of military campaign by Charles G. Taylor and Prince Y. Johnson against Doe, Samuel Kanyan Doe was toppled. By September 1990, Samuel Doe was captured at the Free Port of Monrovia by Prince Y. Johnson, who was an ally to Taylor. Doe was mutilated alive and decapitated by Johnson and his men. Prince Johnson was a native indigenous man from the Gio/Mano ethnic group. The Gio and Mano were politically and physically victimized during Doe’s reign with torture, imprisonment, arbitrary arrest, unlawful detention and secret killings. The Gio and Mano on the other hand made numerous attempts to topple Doe from power but failed. Taylor, who is a descendant of the ex-slaves, cleverly recruited members of the Gio and Mano ethnic tribes, who already had resentment against Doe, to join him in the fight against Doe dictatorial rule. However, the fight was not only taken to Doe, but to all members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic tribes. In respond to this collective attack, the Krahn and Mandingo teamed up to fight back. This is how the four ethnic tribes became the major characters of the Liberian civil conflict. Doe was a Krahn and the Mandingos were Doe sympathizers (Youboty 2004).

After the death of Doe, the conflict did not end there as most ordinary Liberians thought. Many other warring factions emerged; few peace agreements were signed and broken. Five different transitional power sharing governments were established. In 1997, Taylor was elected president, but three years later, conflict erupted again in Liberia. Taylor was attacked from two fronts by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) fighting from the north-west of Liberia and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) fighting from the south-east of Liberia. The conflict took the lives of about 300,000 people and ruins all basic functions of the state (Pajibo 2005). Charles Taylor who is presently facing charges for war crime and crimes against humanity at The Hague was in 2003, forced into exile in Nigeria as the warring parties converged on Accra for peace talk.
2.2 The Accra Peace Agreement

Peace agreement was reached in Accra, Ghana in 2003. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by LURD, MODEL, GOL (Government of Liberia) and the Civil Society of Liberia. The Accra Peace Agreement was brokered by West Africa regional body ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) supported by the United Nations. The CPA calls for the cessation of hostilities, formation of a power sharing transitional government, employment of DDRR, democratic elections and formation of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Pajibo 2005). Since 2003, the CPA has been implemented with one phase after another. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was democratically elected in 2005 general elections, becoming the first female president in African political history. This study is mainly about the DDRR program; therefore, the study focused on the objectives of the DDRR program vis-a-vis the livelihoods of the ex-combatants. Implicit in this consideration is that improvement in the lives of ex-combatants will translate into security in postwar Liberia.

2.3 Keeping the Peace in Liberia

By the last quarter of 2003, the Accra Peace Agreement was already having a positive impact on the Liberia conflict. Cease fire was holding as the first boots of ECOWAS soldiers were deployed in collaboration with the United States Army. The joint multi military forces of United Nations and ECOWAS called ECOMIL were deployed through the logistical support of the US Army. People were celebrating in every street of Monrovia welcoming the peace keeping soldiers marking the beginning to the end of 14 years of human suffering. Thousands of Liberian came out on the first day of deployment to see the military show up of the US Army and modern weaponry. This was a relief from the constant fear under which Liberians lived for 14 years.

The peace keeping mission in Liberia was under the auspices of the United Nations. By 2004, there were about 15,000 UN peace keepers serving in the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The role of UNMIL was to spearhead the peace process by encouraging the implementation of the Accra Peace Agreement reached by all parties into the Liberia civil crisis. The UN troops were first deployed in Monrovia and then to the rest of the country. Buffer zones and checkpoints were set up at major highways separating warring factions. The multinational UN
A national transitional government was established to work in collaboration with the UNMIL to smoothly carry out the Liberia peace process. This new transitional government was headed by a Liberian businessman, Charles Gyude Bryant. It was the goal of the transitional government, through the help of UNMIL, to conduct DDRR initiative, to be followed by general elections. The DDRR process in Liberia was meant for a strong security guarantee for every Liberian both combatants and non-combatants. At the end of the DDRR program in Liberia, it was expected that combatants would have regained civilian status and weapons be removed from the society. However, as this study focuses on the impact of DDRR on the lives of ex-combatants, it is important to understand that the study will strongly examine factors that are leading to present days’ security problems in Liberia. Completing the DDRR program does not necessarily mean one has been reintegrated in the society. The reintegration of ex-combatants has been a hitch of DDRR program worldwide, including that of Liberia (Muggah 2009). Reintegration does not only entail changing ex-combatants into civilians, but also their reconciliatory acceptance by the communities that they once ravaged, and how best they (combatants) can become assets to their communities through stable employment.

2.4 Securitizing through Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRR) conceptualizes the security of the state’s population and the capacity building of combatants’ well-being during post-war reconstruction (Castillo 2008). The major aim is to build the capacity of combatants in a meaningful way so that they can find peaceful and legitimate means of coping with life in the civilian world instead of by violence means (Muggah 2009). To fulfill this task, there are two things that one must concentrate on, the combatants and their communities or locals.

The following are brief objectives of DDRR given by the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan:

- Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunitions, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also
civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management program to prevent the recirculation and proliferation of collected arms.

- Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose. This includes the disbandment of command and control facilities and relocation of combatants into cantonment site, encampment site or barracks, where basic incentives and other packages are provided to them.

- Reinsertion is when the combatants and their families are given basic needs. This phase last from disbarment until reintegration begins. Reinsertion is a short term living support while in this transitional period. Basic life support in the form of allowance, food, clothes, shelter, medical services. This phase is where combatants are educated formally, trained in vocational schools and given basic working tools upon completion to enable them cope with the reintegration.

- Reintegration is a long term, continuous social and economic process of development. Reintegration is where ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and legitimate income. Reintegration is often a socio-economic process with an open time table, primarily taking place in communities at local level. (UN-SG A/C.5/59/31)

The DDRR in Liberia was launched in December 2003, but was interrupted by some backlashes from combatants due to missteps and inadequate preparation for the launching of the program. The disruption caused the death of about nine persons, which sent a strong signal of the tough future challenges that lie ahead of the DDRR practitioners. It was then suspended and resumed in early 2004 at which time better plan was put in place to smoothly carry out the DDRR process. Although, the program was poorly planned and fused with mismanagement, interruption and flaws, but this did not prevent the employment of DDRR initiative from kick-starting. The National Commission for DDRR (NCDDRR) was established to provide the overall supervision and policy guidance to the Program (Activity Report- Trust Fund-UNDP 2009). The NCDDRR was comprised of representatives from the warring factions, the UN, the ECOWAS, EC, USA and the NTGL respectively. However, the
program was a multi-lateral joint effort by numerous parties and stakeholders. Parties included were the UN, the NTGL, international community, non-governmental organizations and implementing partners.

The entire process ran from December 2003 to July 2009 with some breaking laps in-between due to lack of funding and previous reasons just mentioned. The program was divided into phases just as seen in the acronym meaning. Disarmament is the first phase; followed by demobilization, and rehabilitation and then reintegration as the last but continue phase.

The program was characterized by the collection of weapons, encampment of registered combatants, education (vocational training/formal education), resettlement, medical care and $300 for allowance. The $300 was given in two installments; first $150 is given after registration, which covers (disarmament and demobilization) and the balance $150 is given before entering the reintegration preparation programs (Paes 2005). There were five known cantonment sites built to temporarily host the ex-combatants. The first was built at Camp Scheiffelin Military Barracks in Margibi County, just a few kilometers from Monrovia. Additional four were built in Gbarnga, Buchanan, Tubmanburg and VOA, in order to reinforce the preparedness of program. Additional cantonment sites were erected in leeward cities such as Zwedru, Ganta, Kakata, Tappita and Voinjama respectively.

Though the program was marked by some flaws and quick fix errors that overwhelmed it with financially desperate civilians and individuals who took advantage of those loopholes, but the DD portion was considered successful in military term. After the disarmament and demobilization phases, about 103,000 ex-combatants, over 28,314 weapons, about 6,500,000 small arms ammunition and 33,604 other projectiles and explosive were reported collected (NCDDRR/UNDP 2008).

The reinsertion and reintegration phases have been strongly criticized by researchers and freethinkers due to the present security problems in the country. About 90,000 ex-combatants were recruited for the reintegration phase and just about 78,000 of them completed vocational training and formal education offered to them. Additional 9,000 leftover ex-combatants entered and completed the RR phase between 2008 and 2009 (NCDDRR/UNDP-Report 2008). Investigation conducted by this paper reviles that thousands of combatants were left out including about 8,000 officers of the AFL. These left over combatants were only disarmed and partially demobilized but did not undergo rehabilitation and reintegration training
program. It was further uncovered that nearly 50% of the total ex-combatant that participated in the DDRR program were not bonafide combatants but rather economic disadvantage Liberians. These flaws were overlooked at the kickoff of DDRR program, creating avenue to overwhelm the program that should have had a lot fewer registered ex-combatants.
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will use three core concepts to theoretically explain how DDR can become a stabilizing tool in postwar securitization and development. Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation are the three main concepts chosen to discuss the interplay between securitization and development in post-conflict areas. The lead argument within this study is about the insecurity in Liberia due to DDR failed programs. This has caused dissatisfaction amongst some ex-combatants who are presumably causing problems now because of unemployment and lack of sustainable livelihoods. Therefore, to test this theory of postwar securitization, it is important to use these three concepts as measuring tools in the work conducted by the Liberian DDRR initiative.

They are important for successfully implementing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration during post-war reconstruction, using Liberia as my case study. The chapter is going to show how these approaches, if implemented to the letter, can stabilize security threats that otherwise may have likely escalated into violent conflict in a nation or region. These three approaches are expressed through the normative school of thought in post-war securitization. These concepts have become very instrumental within the United Nations Peacekeeping operations worldwide. And have also become an innovative way of building sustainable peace and a durable security system even in stable nations (Muggah 2009). As the argument unfolds in this paper, the strength and weaknesses of the DDRR program in Liberia will be made clear to the public, showing why Liberia is still considered volatile with a fragile and unreliable security system after the DDRR has ended with a so called ‘success story’.

Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation can highlight issues underlying Liberia’s DDRR program. The three concepts deal with the well-being of people and how they can live a secure and peaceful life.

When it comes to reducing violence and securing the entire society of Liberia from the recurrence of large scale violence conflict (intra-state conflict), we must consider the ex-combatants as first priority. They are the ones posing threats in the society of Liberia. DDRR program involve certain tools that can single out individuals from a whole population in post-conflict areas and cater for their basic needs. These individuals are combatants, their families
and most often relatives and associates. From this selection, the concept of freedom from fear and freedom from wants come into play. However, bringing all these issues smoothly together can be challenging for DDR program.

3.2 Human Security

DDR is a people centre program that focuses on a particular group of individuals, who are the combatants, their families and sometimes relatives. Human Security is a non-military approach to assure human survival in a devastating society especially in postwar era and natural disaster (UNIDIR 2011). However, Human Security concept is also used by wealthy nations to stabilize their countries and avoid unrest. This approach can in many instances be related to the Copenhagen School of Thought that strongly considered non-military issues as security threats (Hough 2008).

The Copenhagen School in many ways agrees with the concept of Human Security by accepting the individual as the main referent object instead of the Realist view that prioritize the security of the state and sub-state groups (Hough 2008). The Copenhagen School concept will not be the rightful choice in the support to DDR concept, but yet still, we cannot rule out the relevant of the Copenhagen School or Traditional Security approach, which can also be used to securitize post-war nation. The Copenhagen School Theory is considered to be a Neo-Realist and is another version of the Traditional Security. It supports the state being the securitizing agent; in this case, the state will play a central role and may secure its interest first before the individual people. Barry Buzan, who is one of the leading theorists of the Copenhagen School, further clarified that well structured states that execute the norms and values of democracy, human rights and social order can be better examples of a state serving as a securitizing agent (Buzan 1998).

Western Europe; for example, is evidential to Buzan’s argument, but logically, that cannot hold in intra-state conflict especially in Liberia, where the state government lacks of many democratic values. Buzan’s view on Human Security is made clear in his 2009 publication “The Evolution of International Security Studies”. Buzan’s argument was Human Security through the implementation of UNDP mainly reduces conflict between the West and South (Sub-Saharan Africa), and between regimes and citizens, which is relevant for conflict prevention. It is like Human Security provides a win-win situation for both the people and
state. Human Security is straightly about the guarantee of the people welfare; this is why Norway, Canada and Japan are ranked high amongst countries that provide better Human Security for their citizens. In a conflict nation like Liberia, where democracy is at a halt; as dictatorship and mismanagement are reigning, trust then becomes a serious problem. This puts the eligibility of the state government for being the securitizing agent to question. One cannot be a player at the same time a referee, if so, circumvention and bending of rules will be a common practice. It is expedient to use the Human Security concept because it is often conducted by a third party (humanitarian intervention) in an aftermath of war, and has no double standers like the Copenhagen School or Traditional Security.

Human Security on the contrary to Traditional Security argues that the main referent for security should be the individuals rather than the state. Traditional Security approach has no better footing in this study because this is not about inter-state conflict but rather intra-state. In intra-state conflict, it is always people against people or state’s leadership, making it difficult for the state to be the securitizing agent as argued by Buzan (2009). Some academics argued as to whether the state should be considered as a person(s) or thing because only another person can provide security for another person that is in need (Buzan 2009). Buzan’s main point of argument here is that no matter what, the state will always have a role to play in providing security for its people making the state a securitizing actor and the people referents. There are ongoing debates amongst academics and theorists about redefining security and its concepts, but since security is interpreted based on school of thoughts, one can say the evolution of security is yet to unfold.

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain (Cold War), UN has embodied Human Security approach to boast security and development programs in post-conflict zones. In Liberia, the DDRR program is no exception to Human Security approach. The conventional focus group of DDRR is combatants, but in recent time, this target group is broadening to accommodate others whose survival may be at risk, such as war affected people, non-combatants and the civilian population.

The Human Security approach has seven main agendas (Economic, Food, Health, Environmental, Personal, Community and Political securities) and these seven elements are the content of freedom from fear and freedom from wants. Freedom from fear is better explained by protecting individuals from violent conflict through recognizing those violent
threats, while freedom from wants is by protecting individuals from natural threats like hunger, disease, flood and other natural disasters (UNIDIR 2011). Once the threats causing fear are removed and material needs are provided, the subjects themselves will assist in securitizing because they do not want to lose what they already have.

The origin of these threats is often motivated by poverty, lack of opportunities and other forms of suffering including natural hazards (UN2011). Failure to properly address these issues often prompts violent conflicts in many developing nations (Collier, Anke and Dominic 2009). Therefore, Human Security seeks to address these problems by selecting those referents that are at risk or in harm’s way. I relate this concept to DDRR because it is the combatants and victims of violent conflict that are singled out of a population for their Human Security elements to be improved in order to have better livelihoods.

If the seven elements of UN Human Security approach are fully addressed, ex-combatants will have access to better life and the risk of violent conflict recurrence can be prevented or managed. Moreover, there will be no need to use violence conflict as the last resort, when future of the people is secure in a society. For example, the possibility for Norway to fight a civil war from now onwards is very low due to the high rated Human Security provided to its people.

Let see how the seven elements of Human Security are connected to the concept of DDRR in securitizing post-war state which reflects the livelihoods of ex-fighters. They are explained as follow:

- **Economic Security** _Economic Security is the assurance of basic income for individual (Jolly and Deepayan 2006). If Economic Security is considered to be a condition of having stable income or resources to support living standard for now and the future, then it is arguable that combatants will need such a security in order to disengage from violent conflict that may cost lives’. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the moment the combatants realized the short term economic benefit that they (Ex-combatants) were about to get by participating in the DDRR program, the Program was overwhelmed on a short notice by combatants seeking economic safety including some civilian imposters. Although this was a short term measure but very relevant to the DDRR initiative. For the long term solution, DDRR provided education and vocational training for combatants. Agriculture, small business training and macro-
loan are some of the basic and easy ventures of Liberian ex-combatants which were
given high priority. Some ex-combatants in Liberia utilized the DDRR educational
offer, which makes them competitive for employment amidst the high unemployment
in Liberia. However, majority of them did not bother to take advantage of these offers
due to illiteracy or lack of the will, making them vulnerable for easy recruitment by
potential spoilers. Economic Security plays a vital role in stabilizing postwar
reconstruction. When there are stable jobs from which the ex-combatants can get
stable income, they will surely avoid everything that will threaten that job. When there
is no income base resource, they feel that there is nothing to lose and will pursue
illegitimate means to get money to support themselves.

- **Food Security**. Food Security is the assurance of adequate food supply or the
availability of food and the access to it (McClain-Nhlapo 2004). Money and food
production are two ways of having access to food. The program tries to address this
issue in a limited way. The point here is that DDRR went as far as increasing and
building up the purchasing power of ex-combatants by given them money. They even
distributed food rations to them. Although many academics and other practitioners do
not welcome the ideal of rewarding of ex-combatants for doing wrong, but in a
nutshell, they are not rewarded for doing wrong, but rather for them to desist from
doing wrong through violent means (Muggah 2009). Again, this is just a short term
solution, but the long term solution is the economic empowerment gained from
vocational training and other forms of education or career building for future
reference. Once there are jobs and stable incomes for the ex-combatants, food may
likely be accessible. This is modern time where ‘money is the key medium of
exchange of goods and services’. Even those ex-combatants that choose to do
agriculture, which will enable them to produce their own food, are complaining of
inadequate finance. They will need other financial sources in order to kick-start or
revive their farm projects before becoming self-reliance.

- **Health Security**. Health Security is the assurance of health services to protect
individuals from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles (Hough 2008). Medical services
were provided to ex-combatants during the DDR program in Liberia in order to make
sure that ex-combatants enjoy healthy lives. Post-traumatic stress disorder,
psychological effects and HIV/AIDS are the most common among ex-combatants,
which reportedly left unattended due to the short time table (Pajibo 2005). Again since
DDRR program does not last longer, ex-combatants are charged with the responsibility to make use of the economic empowerment programs, which will in the long run provide jobs and income that will enable them tackle their health issues.

- **Environment Security**. Environmental Security is the assurance of the protection of individuals from ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the natural environment (Hough 2008). This may not have a clear link to DDRR but it does in some instances. The natural resources were spared from further degradation and exploitation when the combatants were recruited for the DDRR program. The widespread illicit mining that fueled the Liberian conflict came to a halt as those combatants carrying on these illegal trade and transactions became participants of DDRR program. Logging companies operating illegally left the forest, sparing the habitat of wildlife and trees that are important in the reduction of CO2 (Time Magazine 2011). On the other hand, clean drinking water was provided to ex-combatants during the program. They had access to safe drinking water instead of unsafe water from streams, rivers and water holes unsafe for human consumption.

- **Personal Security**. Personal Security is the assurance of the protection of individuals against violent crimes, from physical violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, or from predatory adults (Jolly and Deepayan 2006). Combatants during DDRR process were well protected from physical violence and also the entire society was protected from the combatants when they were place in cantonment sites. This shows the importance of Personal Security. Ex-combatants are people too, and need protection just as the rest of the population. The locals that were terrorized during the conflict will like to revenge, which places the personal security of ex-combatants at risk. Mob justice is quite common in Liberia. In fact, many criminals, who are presumably to be ex-combatants, are reported murdered by locals without state intervention or legal action taken. Ex-combatants encamped in cantonment sites had maximum security guarantee, but most of them considered it as a semi-prison and prefer going out. Female and child soldiers were given special care due to their vulnerability to male and commanding officers of their groups. Former sex-slave female soldiers and conscripted child soldiers’ personal security was improved by separating them from their former commanders and their rapists. Personal Security for ex-combatants has been an issue of debate in Monrovia. Are ex-combatants victims or perpetrators? There is no clear
answer to this question because most of the interviewees said they were forcefully recruited or cleverly led to take arms. Considering such ex-combatant as a perpetrator will be a disservice and an unjust judgment. It will be wise to protect every ex-combatant for the sake of restoring justice in an aftermath of gross human rights violation like the case of Liberia.

- **Community Security**. Community Security is the protection of individuals from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence. The Krahns fighting for retaining power and Gios fighting a revenge proxy war for the Americo-Liberian to come back to power. The two tribes violently destroyed each other’s traditional relationships and values during the 14 years of the Liberian conflict. Those perpetrators were the combatants from both ethnicities. DDRR was used as an intervention measure to stop this community violence. When the DDRR program was rolled out in Liberia by early 2004, the destruction and killings were stopped (Pajibo 2005). Ethnic tension is one of the major causes of violent conflict in the Liberia history. Respect for tradition came to a standstill during the war. Traditional sites of historical values were destroyed and desecrated.

- **Political Security**. Political Security is the assurance of the protection of individuals from basic human rights violations (Jolly and Deepayan 2006). Gross violations of basic human rights are often carried out during civil conflicts. Most dictatorial African governments and regimes believe that their protection lies with the political repression, systematic torture, disappearance or arbitrary arrest of oppositions (Carment and Schnabel, 2003). This has been the leading cause of the Liberia civil war. DDRR program created the foundation for peaceful settlement between rival groups. The 2003 National Transitional Government and the 2005 general elections would not have been held without the ground work that was carried out by DDRR through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. Rebel leaders with political interest were encouraged to take the democratic trend by taking part in the National Transitional Government and the 2005 general elections. Their participation brought Political Security to them and their former fighters including the entire country. Studies show that whenever people are politically disfranchised, violent becomes an option for political participation (Youboty 2004).
Human Security is not the only remedy in reducing the periodic violence in the Liberian society. What we can say is that this approach to a wider extent helps the DDRR process to meet most of its objectives by providing most of the basic needs of the ex-combatants and their communities.

**3.3 Human Development**

Human Development is another normative approach to maintaining sustainable peace during the securitization of post-war state. There is no absolute security without development and there is no development without security (Collier, in Whitehall Report, 4-06). Human Security and Human Development are interdependent; therefore, the failure in one will lead to the failure of the other. This has been the most difficult part in teaming the two approaches. Human Development is a shared responsibility among DDRR, UNDP and other collaborating partners. The confusion of, ‘who to do what and when to do what’, only undermines the DDRR program. Yet still, amidst this tug of war, DDRR has managed one way another to perform some of its task.

Human Development is the building of individual’s capabilities by choice to enable self-support (Welzel et al., 2003). It is a people-centre innovation to securitization. Human Development has four basic pillars; sustainability, production, equity and empowerment (UNDP 2011). To prove the relevance of Human Development to DDRR, we see these four components as basic link in securitizing post-conflict nations. DDRR strives toward the improvement of ex-combatants well being at both long and short term perspectives. Let us look at the overall concept of Human Development which is capacity building. The ex-combatants and war affected people’s capabilities to support their own lives through legitimate means is of paramount importance to DDRR. They should be the ones to decide what to do in life. DDRR gives varieties of choices, though not so convenient, but a bit meaningful to produce, sustain and empower the ex-fighters. The formal education and vocational schools offered during DDRR process are meant to increase chances of ex-fighters survival in postwar era in the long term. Education is a vital tool to Human Development, that is why the program really prioritized the education of ex-combatants, but majority of them did not take advantage of those offers to the end. Not that they do not want to, but it is because they do not have the will to go to school.
Politics has taken hold of the intended good will of DDRR in Liberia. For instance, there are about 8000 men and women of the disbanded Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) that were completely marginalized. They were excluded from the DDR program. These soldiers were only disarmed, but not demobilized neither participated in the reintegration exercise. They were instead given some cash money for their services rendered to Liberia.

The confusion here is Charles Taylor’s had his own army alongside AFL. During the DDRR process, Taylor’s elite forces and the other two main rebel group took part while the AFL soldiers were left out, thinking that they are constituted army and should be retained or hugely compensated. However, they were only disarmed and layout from active military duties. The redundant soldiers were left in the cold not knowing what their future will be. This did not go down well with the AFL soldiers. Although, they were given about $540-3,000 each with certificates for serving their country, yet still they are requesting for more money and reinstatement to the newly formed AFL.

The money given to the redundant soldiers has long been spent and they now have no means of earning to support themselves and their families. The capacity of these soldiers is yet to be built to increase their chances of survival. Human Development does not call for only cash donation but rather the combination of cash, education, and sustainable assistance that will lead to socio-economic empowerment. At the end result, Human Development growth brings smile to the faces of not only the ex-fighters but also the locals and that can help in stabilizing the security of the people and state.

To further buttress my view of Human Development as a supporting concept to DDRR which can lead to perfect securitization of a post-war state or region, I would like to reflect back to the 1995-96 DDR program in Liberia. Due to the lack of adequate ingredients in improving Human Security and Human Development in the 1995 DDR program in Liberia the conflict further degenerated. Because the physical and mental disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of fighters were not prioritized, Liberia again was soon caught in the midst of another bloody civil war from 1999 to 2003.
3.4 Reconciliation

Reconciliation is the most effective and acceptable mechanism in conflict resolution and conflict transformation (Beyond Intractability 2011). Where there is no true reconciliation, peace becomes elusive with a propensity to erupt into a violent conflict. This happened in 1999; just two years after Charles Taylor won the 1997 general elections in Liberia and became president, fighting broke up again and lasted for four more years. Reconciliation has become a hitch in the struggle for lasting peace in Liberia. Reconciliation is the forgiveness and acceptance of perpetrator by the victim and vice versa (Aertsen et al. 2008). This approach really takes time, determination, courage and pure heart to be reached. Just little misstep, the entire conflict can start at fresh.

Reconciliation amongst ex-combatants in Liberia has been relatively successful in the lower rink and file. Most of the low ranking ex-combatants were encamped alongside their former enemies during the DDRR program, which broke the divide and built confidence in accepting and forgiving each other. The leaders on the other hand are still justifying their role played in the conflict, making it much harder for true reconciliation between them to hold. Leaders of defunct warring factions, ex-combatants and locals are still confronting each other with resentments, threatening remakes and calling for retribution. Local communities are skeptical of ex-combatants, as ex-combatants feel discriminated against by the society.

Education on reconciliation was not fully put to play during the DDRR process. Reconciliation is never archived with resentment and unforgiving (Potter 2006), but rather the human resilience to accept all pain for healing and reparation. This is now posing a serious security risk in Liberia. Reconciliation is a very complex issue in Liberia. The people are not sincere in reconciling their differences. Bitter pill has to be swallowed to change the already existing “negative peace” into durable “positive peace” that may otherwise soon turn into full scale violent conflict like in 1999.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (TRC) was charged with the responsibility of conducting thorough investigation in the Liberian civil conflict from 1980 to 2003. This Commission was given legitimacy to come out with findings and recommendations in ensuring justice in the aftermath of the Liberia civil war that was characterized by gross human rights violation. The first draft of the Commission’s final report was released in July 2009 which increased the buildup of political tension once again in
Liberia. The citizens were divided, some calling for absolute amnesty to be granted to everybody no matter what the role may have been during the Liberian crisis while others saying justice must be served through retributive justice (punishment for wrong doings). Even the current president, Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has not allowed the Commission’s recommendation to come to effect. With these differences, reconciliation in Liberia has a long way to go.

3.5 Summary

Improvement of Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation are very relevant for the securitization of post-war nations during post-conflict reconstruction. The fear and possibility of slipping back into violent civil conflict is never ruled out during post-conflict reconstruction especially where the three concepts mentioned previously are not improved to acceptable standard. There is an increasing risk of insecurity in every Liberian community. The ex-combatants are in the constant habit of invading company’s plant and private homes; stealing properties, extorting cash and armed robbing civilians, which even sometimes cause human fatality (Time Magazine 2011).

The livelihoods of ex-combatant can be improved in a meaningful way through these concepts mainly for the stabilization of security in post-war areas that may threaten state or regional security. The motive of DDRR is to build the potentials of ex-combatants by changing them from armed bandits, soldiers and militias to lawful civilians. In achieving this, DDRR mainly builds and improves the capabilities of the ex-combatants in order to survive just as ordinary civilian. Options of returning to violence conflict are then reduced to the minimum through the employment of Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation approaches. These approaches to securitization are costly and difficult to undertake, but once they are collectively and effectively undertaken, a vibrant and stable security can be achieved.
Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Analysis

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will present and analyze data collected from 30 male former combatants that participated in the DDRR program in Liberia between 2003 and 2009. There are three sections in this chapter. Section one will cover the personal data of the 30 ex-combatants, section two will deal with their post-war lives mainly their (livelihoods), and section three will cover the reintegration issues. The living conditions of the ex-fighters and the way they sustain themselves economically as civilians will give a clue to the present insecurity in Liberia. It is important to note that the study is not seeking out the demerits of the Liberian DDR program, but rather to examine the cause of the huge unemployment and the lack of stable jobs amongst the ex-combatants, which has the propensity of undermining the national security of Liberia.

Section One

4.2 Background of Respondents

Table 1

Age Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19-24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43-48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49-64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork 2009

Table 1 above shows the age range of the primary interviewees. From the table it is evident that over half of the ex-combatant interviewed was between the ages of 24 and 42, which
indicates that there are more working age men amongst them. If the 14 years of conflict is subtracted from each age in this table you will find out that most of the ex-combatants were children and young men prior to the war.

Out of the total of the 30 men who were interviewed, 40% (12) formed the modal age group between the ages of 31 and 36. Second to the modal age group are ages from 25 to 30, constituted 23% of the respondents. Ages of 19 to 25 constituted 17%, while 10% of the respondents were between the ages of 37 and 42. This table shows that as the age increases all other variables decrease. Between ages 43 and 48, there is just 7%, and 3% for ages between 49 and 64.

Putting this data trend into context with regards to the research problems, it is proven that most of the ex-combatants are economically active. Most of the ex-combatants were young men with the energy and ambition to work, but lack of experience because age comes with experience and experience is one of the major factors of qualification in terms of employment in the Liberian society. With all their vocational training skills, it was difficult for them to get employed because most of them were young men with little or no working experience in the Liberian setting.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Background</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary/Junior high Sch.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (Senior high Sch.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training School</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork 2009

Table 2 shows above the education level of the respondents. The table shows that there is a relatively high illiteracy rate and nearly half of them have had some kind of skill training but this does not reflect the reality on the ground in terms of getting jobs from what they have learned. A very low number of them have reached upper high school and college while about
7% with lower education. The high illiteracy rate and low education level amongst the respondents is one of the leading factors to their unemployment.

The table shows 47% of the 30 respondents completed DDR skill training, 40% have no formal educated, while 7% with primary education, 3% with secondary and 3% with college education.

The table conveys low formal educational level amongst the respondents, but very high vocational training skill. On the contrary, the high rate of vocational training skills amongst the respondents does not reflect their employment. Even with these new skills, the ex-fighters are unfortunately the highest unemployed group of people in Monrovia. Therefore, one can say that their qualification for employment is not evaluated just on their skills alone, but from amongst other factors discussed below.

Table 3
Marital Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single/never Married/cohabit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devoiced</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widower</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork 2009

Table 3 above shows the pattern of marital status. This table shows marital status of the ex-combatants, with most having dependents and household members. The table shows that about 70% of the respondent has family, which means there is obligation for them to economically provide for their dependents. However, the remaining 30% may have not being in the category of married men, but have some extended family members living with them as dependents according to the below table 4.
The data trend shows 40% of the respondent were living together with women but not legally married. 30% were married either by civil or traditional marriage, 13% were separated from their spouses while 7% were single, 7% devoiced and 3% widower.

From this table one can see that 70% of the respondent had one or more family member to provide for in terms of food, clothes, shelter and other basic human needs. These responsibilities are what driving the ex-fighters beyond the legal limit in search for daily bread. With these responsibilities, but no stable or permanent means of livelihood, one can say that they have little chance of upholding to the law.

### Table 4

#### 4.3 Respondents’ Dependents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant by ID#</th>
<th>Number of children &amp; spouse</th>
<th>Number of other dependent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 above shows the family size of the respondents from zero to seven, which comprised of children, spouse, and extended family members. Although there were just 30 respondents that participated in the study, but their income is shared by dependents within their household. That alone puts extra economic responsibility on the ex-fighters who are mainly unstable income earners.

Unlike the nuclear family structure mostly found in the Western countries, most Liberian households are considered to be extended. It is culturally acceptable for cousins, nephews, uncles, aunties, brothers, sisters, parents and, grandparents to be member of a household as dependents (Liberiansown). Some of the respondents even have foster children living with them under these struggling conditions. As respondent #28 puts it, “it makes sense to live as a large family because we all put together our little daily earnings to cook a big evening dish for all of us to eat together as family”. Living together in an extended family structure builds strong and lasting connection amongst members of the family, and most importantly helps to overcome economic and social hardships, which otherwise an individual could not have done alone especially in post war affected nation like Liberia.

| #20 | 2 | 4 |
| #21 | 2 | 1 |
| #22 | 0 | 2 |
| #23 | 2 | 3 |
| #24 | 3 | 2 |
| #25 | 0 | 0 |
| #26 | 3 | 4 |
| #27 | 4 | 2 |
| #28 | 3 | 4 |
| #29 | 5 | 1 |
| #30 | 2 | 3 |
| **Total** | **59** | **45** |

Source: Fieldwork 2009
Respondent #14 is just 20 years and his father was killed by some militias in 2002. He now lives along with his mother, two sisters and a brother. He said “although I am an adult but living with my mother makes me happy and stronger because I have someone as a role model and who will stand for me always”. In Liberia, a 20 year old is formally considered as adult, but traditionally 20 years old is like a child who still heavily depends on the parents for nearly everything.

4.4 Living Arrangements

It was recorded that ex-combatants and their families were given temporary accommodation during the disarmament period at cantonment sites according to UNDP, but accommodation was not included in the resettlement package. The ex-combatants thus had to find their own accommodation. It was easy for those that took rural communities to settle in because building or renting hunts was relatively affordable those areas. However, those that choose to live in Monrovia faced exorbitant rent and the general high cost of living.

As explained by respondent #25, “We are sleeping in the streets of Monrovia. Some of us sleep in old cars, abandon buildings, unfinished houses and under market tables and bridges. Let the people help us for God’s sake”. He further asked me whether $150 could build a house in this modern time.

According to respondent #25, who is involved in building construction, “ex-fighters that were resettled in the rural areas had advantage in getting good accommodation from their host communities because those communities in the interior needed people to live in their deserted towns and villages in order to bring back human presence”. That was not in the case of most of my informants in Monrovia. Their point of argument was that not every ex-fighter will live in rural Liberia just for better housing, what they really need is stable job and better income. They can find better house to rent when they have stable and better pay jobs. In fact, the rural areas have no social-economic and developmental activities going on in those rural settlements and communities. “There is no life in the interior; no job is there, commercial goods are very expensive, no good car roads, going to live there is like going back to primitive life. This is why you are seeing most of us taking the chance of surviving the hard way here in Monrovia,” respondent #25 said.
I visited respondent #13 and his family in Dwazohn, Robert’s Field Highway. As for him, he owns a half plot of land that he bought for himself after receiving his AFL demobilization package. He also built a house with 3 bedrooms. He said, “I am not a former rebel but rather former soldier of the regular national army (AFL). We were redundant from the AFL and given a token for our service which I have used wisely for me and my family to have a place to call our own home”.

Respondents #4, #8, #9, #11, #12, #19 are all unskilled worker and live in a zinc house with two rooms cut by partition inside at ELWA Junction in Monrovia. The men pay a monthly rent of 500 Liberian dollars which is equivalent to about $8 per month. “I think we are doing ok here despite the over crowdedness of the house and lack of privacy. We do not have permanent jobs to rent apartments like other people, though we do not like how we live here, but we just have to cope with living this way for now. Some of our friends have nowhere to sleep.” those were words of respondent #19.

The DDR program did not actually provide permanent homes for the ex-combatants which resulted into a great setback in reintegrating them in their chosen communities. Most communities in rural Liberia are not easily accessible because of the bad road networks, making lives there unattractive. Rural life style in Liberia mainly involves farming, which most ex-combatants consider unattractive and thereby explaining eagerness to settle in urban areas.

Roads leading from Monrovia to Lofa, Maryland, Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru, Gbapolu, and River Cess counties are in deplorable conditions for vehicles to travel on. “Sometimes for months, cars don’t travel on these roads especially during rainy season that is why everybody wants to live in Monrovia where things are quite better,” according to respondent #3, who is resident of Red Light in Monrovia and a taxi driver.

Crowded up ghettos, large market places, and deserted buildings are affordable homes for some of the respondents interviewed. Respondent #29 who is a middle age man and a block layer told me “we don’t have choice; we just want some where to sleep instead of wondering up and down in the streets of Monrovia. The money they give us cannot buy land and build a house at the same time”. Actually a piece of land (an acre) in Liberia cost about $100-$3,000
depending on the location. Building house with 2 to 3 bed rooms is about $1,000-$20,000 depending also on the type of house. Mixed shape mat, earth-bricks and all-round-zinc houses can cost you about $3000-$7,000 while modern cement concrete bricks house will cost about $8,000-$20,000, according to respondent #27, who is also a DDR trained mason.

Section Two

4.5 DDR Vocational Training Programs

The DDR program was overwhelmed the day the first part payment of the $300 incentive allowance was given to each disarmed and demobilized fighter. From that moment the reintegration face of the DDR program began. Besides the cash money offered to the combatants there were series of other educational and vocational training programs that were available according to NCDDRR. Those programs were as follows:

1. Normal school (primary, secondary and college)
2. Bakery
3. Carpentry
4. Electrician
5. Hair dressing
6. Building construction (small homes)
7. Masonry
8. Plumbing
9. Mechanic
10. Small farming

Only seven (23%) of the 30 respondents were able to earn some income from jobs that they were trained. While 23 (77%) found themselves doing something quite different from what they were trained for and were compelled to combine jobs just to earn enough money. Respondent #30 said he was trained as a mechanic, but now he is a commercial taxi driver and is very happy with that.
There were lots of programs conducted by other NGOs in collaboration with DDR during the skills training section of the DDR program. Agricultural skills like food crops farming, small businesses and other creative skills training were introduced to boost the capacity of ex-combatants. However, some of the ex-fighters took advantage of these programs and today utilizing their skills to earn their living while most of them have no means of putting their training skills to use.

4.6 Income Generating Activities

United Nations and international donors spent millions of dollars on the DDR program in Liberia to assure genuine security upon which development, political and social-economic planning can take the stage (Pajibo 2005). In this venture, education and vocational training opportunities were offered to ex-combatants in order for them to be qualified for future jobs. The data shows that getting education or Job training was one thing and getting a place on the job market was another. There is a huge negative mindset surrounding ex-combatants in Liberia up to present where locals and employers do not trust the ex-combatants for employing them. Findings from the research as shown in table 4 proves that DDR skill trainings really backfired because of the lack of actual job placement, and career guidance for ex-fighters causing more problems for the reintegration of ex-combatants in general.

Trained as mechanic but turned Taxi driver:
Trained as mechanic but now a taxi driver; according to respondent #30, he was trained as mechanic, but at the end he found himself being a taxi driver. This was one of his statements during the interview:

“That is life; I just have to join the struggle with my friends and hope for better future but my story can prove that the people (DDR) wasted our time and money. They cannot negotiate for jobs that we were trained for but rather dashing without real jobs to support our families. How can you blame those carrying on armed robberies when there is no other alternative for them? Not everybody can withstand hardship, especially this humiliating situation we find ourselves in”.

The hundreds of dollars spent for his mechanic training could have been used to send ten ex-fighters through a driving school and get a driver license and even second hand car (sedan) to run as taxi. The respondent further said, “some of our friends are three drivers to one taxi or
two to one motorbike and they change shift which allow them to do other jobs on the side to enable them earn more money.”

In order to build the human security and human resource of the ex-combatants more options should have been considered to avoid the ex-fighters from getting back in the streets with violence or crossing over to Ivory Coast to fight in hope of benefitting from the spoils of war as report by local Liberian news papers.

If these extra activities were immediately adopted into the action plan of DDR it would have been hugely impacted the lives of ex-combatants on a positive note, saved lot of money and improved the overall security of the state.

Student but turned motorbike-taxi man:
Respondent #16 told me that he was sent to high school, but decided to sell his school coupon and find something else to do. According to him “I am getting old, there are lots of things going on in my life now so I just want to start earning money to help my children go to school instead of me”. When I asked him why he sold his school coupon, he then responded like this: I sold the coupon to buy motorbike to run as commercial transportation in order to support my children. They give us about $30 per month and pay tuition and fees which is pretty close to about $600 per year. So when I am offered about $800 for the coupon that is valid for three school years, it is enough to buy me one motorbike that will give me a daily income of about $30, which is thirty times more than the monthly allowance given me for the back to school program. You are the book man so just do the simple math”.

The jobs of most of the respondents are not stable or permanent; they range from casual daily laborer jobs (unskilled part-time jobs) to professional driver and block layers. Most of the jobs are not stable; today one ex-fighter may find himself brushing roadside and the next week selling cold water or farming. “Most employers are afraid to hire ex-combatants as carpenter, plumber or house constructor because equipments and material get missing when they are employed,” that was a respond from one DDR official.

Trained for general building construction but turned block molder:
Respondent #1 who was trained for general building construction is now a block molder. When asked about the dramatic change of career plan this was his response:

“Well, it is disappointing to see myself molding blocks for a living when trained to build house and things like that. I am just tire complaining because it is like a losing battle, nobody is willing to listen or help us. When they hear the word ‘Ex-combatant’ it sounds like Satan to them. So we just have to keep out of trouble and accept what God has for us”.

These changes between job trained for and jobs occupied presently is very common amongst the ex-combatants. Some were trained as small farmers but they sold their tools and seeds to other farmers just to end up mining sand or loading public transport at Red Light, Water Side, ELWA Junction, Johnson Street, Broad Street and Duala Market. This job has no stable income so the day an ex-combatant finds no contract as car conductor; he is possibly tempted to steal or engage in criminal activities in order to provide food for his family. Though none of the respondents admitted of being involved in armed robbery or criminal activities, but with the present socio-economic situation couple with high unemployment in Monrovia it becomes a wonder how some of these ex-combatants provide food for they and their families.

4.7 Informants by Income Generating Activities

Table 5 below summarizes the income generating activities of the ex-combatants, and the occupational definitions.

**Block molding** comprise of the molding and selling of concrete blocks used in building construction.

**Taxi driver** is one who drives a taxi cab for commercial purpose.

**Motorbike taxi** is to move commuters from point A to point B on motorbike for a fee.

**Conductor at parking** is an individual who finds passengers for taxi/buses for a commission.

**Sand wining** is the wining, selling and transportation of sand for building construction.

**Casual laborer** is one who can do any kind of odd job that requires no formal training.

**Building construction** comprise of the building of small homes, houses, carpentry work, block laying and masonry work. It also includes working as assistant at building sites.

**O** comprise of seasonal contractors.
Table 5: Income Generating Activities

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<th>Block molding</th>
<th>Taxi driver</th>
<th>Motorbike taxi driver</th>
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Source: Fieldwork 2009

Table 5 above also shows dramatic changes in skill training courses offered by DDR vocational training schools with regards to the current jobs being occupied by the ex-fighters. Most of the respondents took on livelihoods (jobs) that were not part of the DDR training
program just to fill in the unemployment gap and most of these jobs are seasonal or unstable. When some were asked about these changes respondent #16 responded by saying, “we do not have to know book to drive motorbike or taxi, it only takes determination and willing heart to do what we do”. Some combined jobs in order to increase their income that will be enough to sustain them and their families.

Just like the unstable jobs, incomes of some respondents are also unstable and not fixed. Even the taxi and motorbike (Pem-Pem) drivers are not certain about their income, but at the end of their daily work, they expect something lucrative as compared to most unskilled ex-combatants. Despite the little economic boom being experienced today in Liberia, over half of its population lives on less than a dollar a day. The economic growth is in no way reflecting the livelihoods of the common people in Liberia among whom you find large portion of the ex-combatants population.

UNDP index on income reveals that each Liberian earns about $500 per year with regards to the country GDP and per capital income, but in reality it is one out of every 100 that earn such income per year.

Below is data from the field showing details explanation of table 5 which shows jobs and earnings of respondents. The then exchange rate was $1=70 Liberian dollars:

- Taxi driver………………………………….earns about 1,000 Liberian dollars per day ($15)
- Mini Motorbike (Pem-Pem)……………earns about 2,000 Liberian dollars per day ($30)
- Daily unskilled laborer…………….earnings range from 50 to 300 Liberian dollars per day ($0.70 to $4)
- Skilled laborer (carpenter, mechanic ect)…….earnings range from 2,000 to 10,000 Liberian dollars per month ($30 to 143)

From the incomes shown above, we now know why DDR prioritized vocational skill training for the ex-combatants. The DDR strategists felt by training ex-fighters in these areas they (ex-combatants) would have found permanent employment with lucrative wages, but that was not the case. It became difficult to have the ex-combatants employed despite their vocational training qualifications and certificates. The mini motorbike drivers have become one of the
leading income earners amongst the respondents and this was not part of the DDR training program.

The social-economic and cultural settings of the ex-combatants were not examined thoroughly before DDR could consider the kind of programs for the ex-fighters. It seems like these programs were directly or indirectly imposed on the ex-fighters without considering other options and alternatives like mini motorbike, public transport conductor for taxi/buses and driver license for ex-combatants to operate taxi and motorbike taxi.

Section Three

4.8 Acceptance and Forgiveness

The rate of acceptance and forgiveness is very low between the ex-combatants and the local communities in Liberia, which poses threat to the employment of the ex-fighters by local employers. Acceptance and forgiveness are the core ingredients for absolute reconciliation and ex-combatants cannot be reintegrated in any community without resolving these issues (Skaar 2005).

Because of the lack of acceptance and forgiveness, the ex-fighters are finding it difficult to be hired or employed by local employers and without jobs the means to support their livelihoods is at stake. The bitterness and resentment are so high to the extent that the ex-fighters are being dehumanized in many communities by locals. The rage for retribution against ex-combatants is so high to the extent that most landlords and employers are not willing to accept them in some quarters, which has also contributed towards their unemployment and lack of sustainable livelihoods. Communities and locals are extending little forgiveness to ex-combatants rather than to forgive sincerely.

This is how a 19 year old respondent #5 puts it:

_We are human too despite what may have happened in the past years. Are we now the bad guys? No, we are not. We considered ourselves to be victims too, they used us to fight. I was forcibly conscripted into Charles Taylor’s militias at the age of 8, drugged on a daily bases and indoctrinated into African Vulu. Would you considered me as the bad guy here? I don’t think you can because you know better. There are many Liberians who just think that once_
you are a former combatant you deserve not to live. If every ex-combatant is imprisoned or executed today in Liberia will that bring peace? I don’t think so. Some of my friends were murdered in cold blood by angry mobs because they were accused of being armed robbers. Of all the school and vocational training we went to, they don’t want to give us their jobs. No body to stand and speak for us so we are just living by the grace of God.

In the aftermath of violent conflict were gross human rights abuse and other forms of war related maltreatment were carried out, true reconciliation becomes difficult, but not impossible. In reality, it is hard to forgive anybody who killed your parents for no justifiable reason, but for the sake of peace and putting to an end circular violence it is a noble thing to forgive your perpetrator. Due to vengeance, Liberia was slowly dragged into 14 years of civil conflict and today it is realized now that payback (retribution) has been the greatest mistake ever in the history of Liberia. Issues that should have been dealt with peacefully with amicable solution were degenerated into large civil crisis that destroyed the entire country. I don’t think diplomacy is cowardice but rather a nexus between the peaceful coexistence and national solidarity of the suppressed and suppresser.

4.9 Political reintegration

Political reintegration is important for the personal security of ex-fighters. The participation of ex-fighters in political activities can pave the way for reintegration and gives ex-fighters a sense of belongingness and goal fulfillment (Zeeuw 2008). The conflict was driven by political and social-economic injustices; therefore, political reintegration of ex-fighters gives room for more employment opportunities and a new start for peace.

Most of the respondents are affiliated with political parties in Liberia. From newly formed Congress for Democratic Change to National Patriotic Party of Liberia and the ruling party Unity Party, there are ex-combatants making up the grass root members of those parties. Some ex-general from warring parties are senators, representatives, ministers and directors in the present government who have become personal contacts for recommending qualified ex-combatants for employment in both the private and public sectors.
I talked to one former general from one of the warring factions about the political connection between the ex-fighters and political parties. For political reason he told me not to mention his name. He then explained like this:

*The former combatants see us who are in government as their representatives. Majority of them are registered members of political parties in Liberia. They are the foot soldiers (campaigner) for most of the political parties in Liberia.*

*I am always reminding them when they come to my office that the revolution (war) is over and they should find better things to do with their lives. At first I never wanted to encourage them by giving them money, but they are like brothers now so it is like an obligation to me. I give them food and small pocket-change (small cash money) at least for them to take home to their families too.*

*Not all of them were lucky to find job after their vocational training so you cannot blame them for everything you see or hear about them today. I think democracy is about the rich helping the poor to become rich too so since they have nothing doing now, let us that have the means help them to get on their feet. I think when we help them the security problem nowadays will improve.*

The political reintegration is by far the most successful type of reintegration in Liberia. It gives back to the ex-combatants political security, which protects individuals from basic human rights violations (Jolly and Deepayan 2006). Former warlords are given the authority to express their political franchise through the ballot box. Ex-soldiers are free to register to cast their vote for whosoever they want. If this freedom was extended beyond every line of security indicators, the Liberian security today would have been better than what it is.

### 4.10 Socio-economic reintegration

Socio-economic reintegration refers to all factors surrounding the social and economic status of ex-combatants in postwar Liberia. The lack of work makes it harder for socio-economic reintegration to hold because it undermines the active participation of ex-fighters into societal development. It was discovered by this study that key factors that curve socio-economic upwards are lacking making the lives of most of the respondents to be difficult. It is important for the ex-fighters to be active member of society through stable work and participation in
community activities (Castillo 2008). This will give them a sense of responsibility, trust and confidence in becoming good citizens once again, which will promote stable peace.

Because of stereotyping, the ex-fighters are even finding it hard to interact with people in their local communities, and in so doing, making them to live in their own self-created world. Most residents are stereotyping the ex-fighters and avoiding them in many ways. Soft spoken respondent #27 explains:

“I and three of my colleagues completed our training in masonry. Everybody is afraid of us to give us contract, thinking that we will not do their work well or we will steal the materials. We are now making bricks and it is paying off a little which is better than nothing. Not every one of us can bear this hardship that is why you see armed robbers all over the place hustling their way out of this suffering”.

The economy of Liberia is though recovering but at a relatively low pace. Postwar may be a good alibi for the slow pace in recovery coupled with global financial crisis. Whatever excuses the DDR authority and the Liberian government may have, there are yet more questions to be asked surrounding the poor impact the DDR program have had on ex-combatant’s lives. There were lots of policy alternatives and other options but they were not considered. Not to say there was no money for the program; millions of dollars was pumped into the DDR program in Liberia that could have pulled out better results (Pajibo 2005). But until the ex-combatants can have better livelihoods, there is no doubt for one to say that the DDR program has failed the ex-fighters, Liberian society and donors.

4.11 Summary

As I summarize issues in this chapter, let me once again point out the relevant of the three concepts used to support the theory of securitization in postwar reconstruction and how their absence or limited usage has caused huge problems, which may undermine the security of Liberia. The huge unemployment of the ex-combatants is giving raise to the persistence violence in Liberia and beyond its borders. The human security and human development of most of the respondents was never improved sending them back to square one of the hard struggle of survival. The decline in donor support has resulted in the abrupt end of many DDR programs (Liberia DRRR).
Communities and locals are reluctant to accept and forgive the ex-fighters due to lack of trust, while true reconciliation between the locals and ex-fighters has not yet improved. Due to the little or no education of the ex-combatants, human development indicators such as capacity building and skill training offered by the DDR didn’t change their living conditions neither improve their lives because most of them have no stable jobs. Most of them do not have the educational foundation to continue vocational schools training.

With the limited implementations of the three concepts during the postwar reconstruction of Liberia, a return to circular violence is imminent as thousands of ex-combatants hoping that their days of ruling with guns will return again soon. The unemployment has driven some ex-combatants across the borders to the Ivory Coast to join the fighting there in hope of getting money and spoils of war to support their lives.
Chapter 5: Summary and Concluding Remarks

5.1 Summary

This chapter presents a summary of the study, especially the background issues, problems and main findings. It also offers a set of ideas towards enhancing livelihoods of ex-fighters and develop DDR program.

The study puts forth three relevant concepts (Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation) that when injected into DDR initiative fully to the letter, the problems of criminal violence, risk of recurrence of war and insecurity in the aftermath of war could be prevented or minimized to a relatively low. After exploring the livelihoods of the Liberian ex-combatants, it was discovered that these concepts were although delivered by the Liberian DDRR initiative, but not effectively and efficiently. This has led to the unemployment of many ex-fighters, which poses threats in undermining the national security of Liberia. To prove right my findings, ex-combatants are now taking on to the streets and communities of Liberia wagging havoc on peaceful citizens to find their daily bread. Some of them are being recruited as mercenaries in nearing Ivory Coast currently.

Majority of the respondents said they never had stable job since their completion of DDRR training programs. These are just some of the few loopholes found in the DDR program. Why should the Liberian DDRR be considered a success story in the first place, when the reintegration of the primary subjects (ex-combatants) now finding it difficult to fully reintegrate into the Liberian society? Though some of the ex-fighters are enjoying the fruit of the DDRR and are said to be reintegrated in communities, but there are considerable number of them who say they are being discriminated by locals. The direct and indirect denial of the ex-fighters for equal job opportunity; short timeframe for the reintegration process, lack of active and long term institutions to run the affairs of ex-combatants including the lack of sincerity in the forgiveness of the ex-fighters, couple with donor fatigue and lack of political will are all major causes of the failure of the reintegration of the Liberian ex-combatants.

Reintegration is a complicated concept that can be interpreted based on different perspectives. For example, from a layman point of view, reintegration will be considered as one returning back to their normal livelihood after an interruption by crisis like war and disaster. From DDR
perspective, reintegration is about transforming fighters into law abiding people who will once again live normal lives just like the ordinary people in their communities (Muggah 2009). DDR’s reintegration goes beyond just the return of ex-fighters to their past normal lives; it mainly focuses on the stability of state security by providing the means through which basic needs and services can be easily accessed by ex-fighters, which as the result will discourage ex-fighters from going back to unlawful and subversive acts.

The process through which “ex-combatants are reintegrated into the society and helped to develop legitimate alternative income-generating activities so they can provide for themselves and their family is the key indicator upon which the success of the DDR can be measure (De Zeeuw 2008). DDR will not be considered successful if war starts again few months after completing DDR program in a country or if ex-combatants resurface on war front in other country or elsewhere.

I think reintegration is practically a continue undertaking as buttressed by De Zeeuw in his argument saying “the reintegration part of the DDR process takes a long time and generally receives little attention” (De Zeeuw 2008:13). The effort and strategy needed to reintegrate an eighteen year old former combatant will not be the same as reintegrating a thirty year old returnee refugee. Most of if not all of the Liberian ex-fighters may have experienced violence directly or indirectly. The exposure to such gruesome violence has psychological impact on their future behavior, and that need special attention. This makes reintegration through the DDR perspective the best remedy for stabilizing post-war countries.

The livelihoods of the ex-fighters in Liberia such as access to stable jobs and housing facility are not amicably addressed; putting them (ex-combatants) to square one of the human suffering that was one of the major causes of the Liberian civil war. Though it is unacceptable in modern society to use violence as the means to react to political and socio-economic injustices, but in Sub-Saharan countries where these injustices perpetuate by unbreakable and well structured ruling elites, there will always be people to rise against these kinds of structural violence even if violence means is the only option (Collier, Anke & Dominic 2009).

Findings from the study were documented from answers during the research footwork. The first question was asked about the main focus of the DDR program in Liberian. Why the DDR
was heavily focused on short term goals of security (disarmament and demobilization) and not on the long term sustainable livelihoods of the program main subject (ex-combatants). From the study, it was discovered that long term reintegration plans for the ex-combatants were not properly tackled.

The DDR program was implemented in a hurry, without any long term plan. After providing the ex-combatants with skills training, they were immediately discharged into communities to start life without any re-insertion guideline. The reintegration phase which is the most important part of sustainable security and development was abandoned leaving thousands of fighter’s lives in bleak. Did the DDR program provide vocational training for the ex-combatants? Yes, but most of the skills obtained from the training programs were not put to use by the ex-combatants. As a result, many ex-combatants were driven into unemployment, which undermines the postwar security in Liberia.

The socio-economic dynamic of the ex-combatants was never considered. DDR officials randomly draw out projects that were not compatible with the previous or future earning capacity of ex-fighters as a result most ex-combatants did not find jobs for what they were trained for. For the question of reconciliation, it has not been an easy road for the ex-combatants. They are still faced with retributions from many locals and communities in Monrovia. Most of them have become victims of mob justice, resulting in injuries and death without any proper redress or investigation by the government.

When the ex-combatants were asked about their views on the DDR program, most of them responded negatively. Respondent 14 puts it this way, “they failed us, fooled us with lies and false promises, but let them pray for nothing bad to happen here again because as for me I won’t listen to anybody this time if war comes again”. If the DDR officials are mainly concern about collecting weapons from the fighter without concentrating on the factors that led to the people taking those weapons in the first place, they get it wrong because the possibility of rearming and causing chaos still exist. The DDR program main subject (ex-fighters) has no security guarantee, putting them in a vulnerable position to do whatever it might take to be secured in Liberia.
Most respondents concluded by saying they are waiting to see the outcome of the coming 2011 general elections in Liberia. Their point was there is high possibility for renew fighting after the elections if the wrong presidential candidate wins and United Nations troops are withdrawn. Their argument is based on the fact that Liberia has a violent history where previous dissatisfaction in elections results has led to civil crisis. Samuel Doe’s controversial victory in 1985 presidential elections and Charles Taylor’s 1997 landslide victory are all good examples. This is why the UN still has troops in Liberia up to date in order to prevent such circular violence. The Liberian DDR program that should have level the playing field for security boom has failed, leaving UN with no other choice but to keep thousands of military and paramilitary officers on the ground indefinitely.

5.2 Concluding Remarks

As I compile the findings of this research, it is very important to put forth some recommendations that will enhance the livelihoods of ex-combatants during post-war reconstruction. I am not trying to suggest that these are the best recommendations to affect DDR initiative during peace building in post-war society, but they may have some significant contribution in reducing post-war violence, circular conflict and threat of insecurity. This is just an opportunity to give my view on how best the DDR program can improve the well being of ex-combatant’s livelihood, and give them meaningful lives in order to narrow down criminality and insecurity in the aftermath of war in the future.

This study puts forth the following recommendations:

1. Adequate fund to run DDR is a major aspect of making the program successful. Let every donor, UN and government pledging financial support to DDR programs live up to their promises. DDR objectives cannot be fulfilled without enough money and support. The indefinite operational time couple with some unforeseen events down the line has made the undertaking of DDR initiatives very costly and lengthy, therefore, those giving their financial commitment should think well enough before making pledges and be able to deliver on their promises.
2. Stable and permanent jobs for ex-combatants. Unemployment itself is a crisis; therefore, the state should give tax reduction to companies that will give permanent employment to ex-combatants. This will be an encouraging factor for huge employment opportunity for ex-soldiers since most employers believe that employing ex-fighters is risk to their businesses and line of work.

3. Financial institutions should prioritize giving grant and loan with low interest rate and long repayment term to potential entrepreneurs with agreement of employing ex-number of former fighters. Small businesses and companies are the leading employers in growing economy today, therefore donor countries should prioritize the giving of loans and grants to private owned Liberian companies with the potential of low capital flight and that envisioned sustainable development aiming at employing both skilled and unskilled workers. We can see today the likes of Rwanda and Angola as excellent examples.

4. Permanent institution should be established to run the affairs of ex-combatants during post-war reconstruction. DDR strategists and the state should constitute national institution that will provide long term personal assistant for every ex-combatant until he/she is fully reintegrated into society. Graduating ex-fighters from DDR vocational schools alone cannot guarantee their reintegration and permanent employment.

They will need guidance throughout until they are fully reintegrated since reintegration itself is a continuous long term process. For instance, about 100 ex-combatants to one specialized consultant will be a good start. The consultant will be the contact person serving as character guarantor, career path finder and negotiator (agent). The assistant will send progress report for each ex-combatant quarterly and assist them in finding job as well. Just the how refugees and asylum seekers are integrated into the Norwegian society with personal assistant, who serves as a guide until a refugee is fully integrated.

5. True reconciliation amongst ex-combatants and locals should be of paramount importance. Again, the state in collaboration with UN and other donors should offer compensation to communities that will willingly accommodate ex-combatants. Some
kind of settlement or compensation should be given to direct war victims that will encourage forgiveness and acceptance. The media should be used as a vital too through which community educational awareness on true reconciliation can be thought.

6. Sustainable entrepreneurship should be a key priority for the ex-combatants training and job placement initiative. The establishments of companies like (taxi, motorbike-taxi, sand wining, block molding, agriculture and other small and medium size businesses are ideal for job allocation for many ex-combatants. These small start-up companies can provide thousands of new jobs not only for ex-combatants, but also to other unemployed citizens.

7. A permanent small size UN or ECOWAS deterrent force should be deployed with a robust mandate to prevent war and protect civilians by intervening at a short notice and enforcing the peace when necessary. This deterrent force can also continue the training of the new national army and other security apparatus.

The presence of such a deterrent force will send a strong signal to future would be trouble makers that there is a bigger and stronger military force to reckon with. This will also help to discourage the repeated formation of rebels and armed groups in Liberia and West Africa at large. Because they will know that victory through ballot instead of bullet is the only acceptable way of coming to power in this time of modern democracy.

When all these points are carefully evaluated and adopted by UN, state governments, donors and other implementing partners that are engaged in post-war reconstruction work; lasting peace and sustainable security could be possible.


**Internet Reference Materials**


Liberia’s general Butt Naked “The most evil man in the world” (2010, November 28) [online]-URL: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1333465/Liberias-General-Butt-Naked-The-evil-man-world.html


Time Magazine “Harvesting Trees Sustainably in Liberia” (2011, September 6) [Online]-URL: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2090399,00.html


Appendix I: The interviews and the interviewees

The interviews

All the interviews in this paper were conducted under confidentiality agreement between me and the interviewees for security, political and personal reasons. All the interviews were done in Monrovia, Liberia. My primary informants were from MODEL, LURD and AFL/government militias. Some information rich individuals were also interviewed as secondary informants.

The interviewees

Due to the confidentiality agreement between me and the respondents, I was unable to mention the direct names of the respondents. However, a list showing their names, factions and ranks has been given to the evaluation committee separately since this paper will be published for public view in the near future. Revealing their names could make them targets of retribution and stereotyping by locals, governments and organizations.
Appendix II: Interview Guide for Ex-combatants

The interview guide was used to solicit views of the principal respondents and facility focus groups discussion.

A. Background/Personal Information

1. What is your name?
2. How old are you?
3. What is your marital status?
4. What is your level of education?
5. What is your current occupation?
6. What is your parental status?
7. How many dependants do you have?
8. How many close family members do you have alive?
9. In terms of rural and urban dweller, who are you?
10. Which former belligerent group you were member of?
11. What was your rank/position in the belligerent group?
12. How long did you fight for your belligerent group(s)?

B. The DDR Program

13. Did you participate in the DDR program?
14. Which programs did you participate in?
15. Is your training from the DDR program beneficial to your reintegration?
16. Have you found job from what you were trained for?
17. What was/is your expectation from the DDR program with respect to sustainable livelihood?

18. Are you satisfied with the training options offered by the DDR?

19. What are you doing for a living presently?

20. What are the sources of your income/living?

21. If you were asked to grade the DDR program, what percentage would you award the Program?

22. Did the DDR program help in giving you a meaningful life today in Liberia? Explain!

23. From your personal point of view, how your life would have been without DDR intervention through its training programs?

24. Did the DDR meet your expectation?

25. What are your views on the DDR program?

C. Social-Economic Reintegration

26. Are you living in the same community as you were before the war? If yes why?

27. Do you face problem in gaining acceptance/forgiveness from your neighbors/community? If yes why?

28. Who do you spend most of your free time with? Why?

29. In your opinion, what is the perception of the ordinary Liberian towards you as ex-combatants?

D. Security and Peacekeeping

30. Are you satisfied with the present security situation in Liberia?

31. Does the presence of UN peacekeepers gives strong security guarantee?
32. Can the Liberian people depend on the national police and army for security?

33. What the security condition will be like if the UN peacekeepers leave Liberia?

34. Why crime is on the increase in Liberia nowadays?

35. Would you accept the results of the coming 2011 general elections? Why?

36. If there should be war in Liberia again, will you join a militia group again? If yes, why?

37. If the present Liberia government wants to recruit you for any of the security agency (i.e. army and police), will you accept the offer?

**E. Personal Views, Comments and Suggestions on Human Security, Development and Reconciliation in Liberia**

38. Four hours of open group discussion as respondents present comments, views and suggestions on the human security, development and reconciliation of ex-combatants in Liberia. Remarks of how to improve job opportunities that can provide better sustainable livelihoods for the ex-fighters finalized our discussion.