



Uit

THE ARCTIC
UNIVERSITY
OF NORWAY

Centre for Peace Studies

Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education

Hot tensions in a cold region: territory and peace in the European Arctic

Alexey Adikov

Master's thesis in Peace and Conflict Transformation – SVF-3901
June 2014



ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on relations between territorial issues and peace in the European Arctic. The objective of this research is to examine region's political decision makers' views and reflections on state of peace in the European Arctic and how it is influenced by territorial disputes. It utilizes a conceptual framework based on theory of zones of peace. The results of qualitative research indicate that territorial factor is no longer a serious threat for peace in contemporary European Arctic. Moreover, it finds that states in the region prioritize international cooperation to their geopolitical ambitions, as its' benefits surpass possible consequences of confrontation for territories. The study results emphasize the role international institutions in the study area both for international and cross border cooperation and peace. The findings also suggest that European Arctic can be described as zone of stable peace with certain expectations for evolving into pluralistic security community of states.

Key words: European Arctic, zones of peace, territory, state of peace, international cooperation, territorial claims, negative peace, stable peace, pluralistic security community of states, international organizations

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank The Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund (Lånekassen) for giving me an opportunity to study Master in Peace and Conflict Transformation program.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the academic and administrative staff of Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Tromsø, especially to Percy Oware and Elisabeth Giæver, you are wonderful people!

I want to thank my classmates and fellow students for sharing with me this wonderful education experience.

I would like to express huge thanks to my supervisor Ingrid Kvalvik for her patience, support and kind advice.

Thanks to my informants and to all the people who assisted me in my research.

Furthermore, I want to express my enormous gratitude to my family and especially my mother Evgenia Adikova for being my constant source of inspiration and encouragement.

And finally, my huge thanks to all the friends I met in Tromsø: Regina, Anna, Charlie, Pierre, Diana, Sediq, Alexander, Olga, Daniel (both German and French), Vika, Fillippo, Tanya (both small and tall), Emilio, tata LouLou, Lia, Agata, JB-ma poule, Thomas, Yuri and others. I'm quite sure I forgot someone, don't be angry with me, I love you all! Thank you, guys, for everything, you're awesome! ØLC 4 Life!

Всем спасибо! Все свободны!

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| Chapter 1. Introduction..... | 1 |
| 1.1 Arctic region: problem of definition..... | 1 |
| 1.2 European Arctic: factors and issues that make the region special | 2 |
| 1.3 Problem statement..... | 5 |
| 1.4 Research questions..... | 5 |
| 1.5 Finding my thesis..... | 6 |
| 1.6 Structure of the thesis | 8 |
| Chapter 2. European Arctic in Geopolitical Context | 9 |
| 2.1 Arctic territorial disputes over borders and jurisdiction | 9 |
| 2.1.1 Russia – Norway’s dispute upon delimitation in the Barents Sea..... | 10 |
| 2.1.2 Legal status of the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area around Svalbard | 14 |
| 2.1.3 Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles | 16 |
| 2.1.4. Other territorial disputes | 18 |
| 2.2 Changing Arctic: conflict or cooperation? | 20 |
| 2.3 Summary..... | 22 |
| Chapter 3. Conceptual framework | 23 |
| 3.1 Concept of zones of peace | 23 |
| 3.2 European Arctic as a zone of peace | 31 |
| 3.3 Summary..... | 35 |
| Chapter 4. Methodology..... | 37 |
| 4.1 Study area..... | 37 |
| 4.2 Data collection technique: Fieldwork..... | 39 |
| 4.3 Sampling: size and selection..... | 40 |
| 4.4 Interviewing..... | 41 |
| 4.5 Challenges and reflections | 43 |
| 4.5.1 Gaining and negotiating access | 44 |
| 4.5.2 Researcher’s identity..... | 47 |
| 4.6 Summary..... | 51 |
| Chapter 5. Data presentation and analysis | 53 |
| 5.1 Informant presentation | 53 |
| 5.1.1 A note on informant anonymity..... | 53 |
| 5.1.2 Background of informants..... | 54 |

| | |
|--|----|
| 5.2 Territorial factor | 56 |
| 5.2.1 Territory as a peace-influencing factor in the European Arctic | 56 |
| 5.2.2 Territorial ambitions VS Cooperation..... | 61 |
| 5.3 Perceptions of peace in the area..... | 62 |
| 5.3.1 Negative peace and violent conflict potential..... | 62 |
| 5.3.2 Zone of stable peace | 66 |
| 5.3.3. Pluralistic community of states | 67 |
| 5.4 Role of international cooperation | 71 |
| 5.4.1 The Arctic Council..... | 71 |
| 5.4.2 Barents Regional Cooperation..... | 72 |
| 5.4.3 Other aspects of international cooperation..... | 74 |
| 5.5 Summary..... | 75 |
| Chapter 6. Summary and concluding remarks | 77 |
| Literature..... | 81 |

Chapter 1. Introduction

In the conditions of rising interest to the Arctic space and regions of the European North, the description and the analysis of geopolitical processes occurring there becomes extremely important from the scientific point of view. The subject is very extensive and represents itself a wide field for scientific activity.

As Arctic region and its treasures are now getting more and more attention from the leading world powers, issues of peace and stability in the area become of greater concern. Enormous resource potential of the Arctic as well as its geopolitical and transportation perceptiveness stimulates global powers to join the race for ensuring their national interests in the area.

Territory is one of the key factors determining international relations in the Arctic. However, territorial disputes in the region are quite different from the ones social researchers are used to. Territorial claims in the Arctic are usually concerning sea-territories rather than land-territories¹, which makes this region rather specific and complicated. As long as territorial issues in the region are of great concern, they are one of the elements which are most likely to influence the processes connected with peace and stability.

1.1 Arctic region: problem of definition

The Arctic region cannot be simply defined. Relevant criteria for the delimitation of the region include geographic, climatic or biological factors, as well as political or demographical borders.²

The official definition on what is Arctic or where its boundaries lie does not exist. Instead, there are few ways of defining the Arctic.

The Arctic consists of ocean surrounded by continental land masses and islands. The central Arctic Ocean is ice-covered year-round, and snow and ice are present on land for most of the year.

¹ Territorial issues in the region will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2

² Wegge N. *The political order in the Arctic: power structures, regimes and influence*. In: Polar record 47(241) (2010) p. 165. <http://byers.typepad.com/files/wegge-on-ir-theory-and-arctic-1.pdf> [Visited 8 October 2012]

The southern limit of the Arctic region is commonly placed at the Arctic Circle (latitude 66 degrees, 32 minutes North). The Arctic Circle is an imaginary line that marks the latitude above which the sun does not set on the day of the summer solstice (usually 21 June) and does not rise on the day of the winter solstice (usually 21 December)³.

According to Rosemary Rayfuse (2007: 197) the Arctic is usually referred to as comprising all areas lying north of the Arctic Circle, or 66°33' north latitude. Ecologically speaking, a more accurate defining criterion for the Arctic region may be the northern limit of the tree line, the existence of which is based on temperature. Alternately, the Arctic is also sometimes defined as a northern region where the average July temperature is under 10°C. Both of these ecological descriptions encompass an area considerably larger than that enveloped by the Arctic Circle. For political purposes, too, the definition of the Arctic varies depending on the subject matter under discussion and on the interests of the discussants. Definitions include all areas north of 60° north, or all areas north of the Arctic Circle but with an exception to include all of Iceland, or simply all areas north of the Arctic Circle.⁴

However, this scope of definitions does not fully describe the region of interest in relation to this research paper. As long as it is quite hard to give a full overview of peace related issues in the whole Arctic region, the scope of research limits the geographical boundaries to the European part of the Arctic. Due to this, a definition by Geir Hønneland (2003: 141) will be taken as a basis. It describes European Arctic as “the parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and European Russia that are located north of the Arctic Circle, plus the Barents Sea, the Svalbard Archipelago and the Russian archipelagos of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land”.⁵ At the same time for some purposes, it may also be fruitful to include the western and northern parts of the European Arctic, including the European part of the Arctic Ocean as well as Iceland (located south of the Arctic Circle) and Greenland (located on the North American continent) can also be included as “borderline cases”.

1.2 European Arctic: factors and issues that make the region special

Defining some characteristic features of the European Arctic is useful for its further analysis in terms of “peacefulness” of the region. According to Åtland (2007: 8), European Arctic

³ Definitions of the Arctic <http://portlets.arcticportal.org/definitions-of-the-arctic> [Visited 10 October 2012]

⁴ Rayfuse, Rosemary. 2007. 'Melting Moments: The Future Of Polar Oceans Governance In A Warming World'. *Review Of European Community & International Environmental Law* 16 (2), p. 197.

⁵ Hønneland, Geir. 2003. *Russia And The West*. 1st ed. London: Routledge, p. 141

shares basic five characteristic features. It is a region: 1) of peripheries; 2) rich in natural resources; 3) with unresolved legal issues; 4) of strategic significance; 5) of transnational cooperation.

Speaking about European Arctic as a *region of peripheries*, first thing that needs to be said is that “it cuts through the borders of four states: Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Rather than being a region of *states*, it is a *transnational region* consisting of *sub-state entities* (Nordic counties and Russian Federation subjects) whose main common denominator is that of being located in the northern periphery of the European continent”⁶. However, these are states, but not sub-state entities which run their international politics in the area. Thus, conducting international politics and promoting their national interests through their particular northern territories, European Arctic countries make the region a very special area from international relations point of view.

Secondly, the region is *rich in natural resources*, both hydrocarbons and marine resources. An overview of the global oil resources by the US Geological Survey suggests that the circumpolar Arctic could conceal as much as 25 percent of the world’s total remaining petroleum resources. As far as Norway is concerned, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate has calculated that the northern-most part of Norway’s continental shelf might hold a third of the country’s undiscovered oil and gas resources. Both Russia and Norway have signaled a desire to intensify offshore exploration in the European Arctic. Among the areas specified for such expansion are north-western Russia and the continental shelf in the Barents and Kara Seas. The region’s living marine resources are also seen as being of great value, not only to Norway and Russia, but also to third country fishers.⁷

Further Åtland stresses the *existence of legal problems* as another characteristic feature of the area. This relates to recent Russian-Norwegian issue of delimitation of continental shelves and economic zones in the Barents Sea which emerges from different interpretations of the legal basis of the delimitation and has been affecting relations between two countries over the past 30 years. This issue, however, has been successfully solved and is no longer of great concern in the region. This also comes to the issue of Svalbard and Norwegian sovereignty over the

⁶ Åtland, K. (2007) “The European Arctic after the Cold War: how can we analyze it in terms of security?” Rapport for Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2 February 2007 p. 9

⁷ *ibid.* p.9

island, as well as fisheries protection zone around it.

The fourth remarkable feature of the European Arctic is its *strategic significance*:

“For Russia, the strategic importance of the European Arctic has historically been related to the Northern Fleet’s bases and port facilities on the Kola Peninsula. The concentration of sea-, land- and air defense forces in the northwestern corner of the Soviet Union during the Cold War was not primarily related to military or other threats in the region itself. Security challenges in the country’s southern and eastern regions have traditionally been far greater than challenges in the north and west. The historical reason why one of the world’s largest fleets was based on the remote Kola Peninsula was rather the favorable ice conditions in the southern Barents Sea, the easy access to the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and the geographical proximity to potential targets on other continents. These conditions made - and still make - the area well suited for naval operations.”⁸

And finally, after the end of Cold War, European Arctic is more and more becoming an *area of transnational and regional cooperation*. In the last 10-15 years, the Arctic has become the focal point for a wide range of initiatives involving transnational cooperation. Some, like the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996, involve straightforward intergovernmental agreements, while others feature leagues of subnational actors drawn together in pursuit of common interests. The establishment of the Barents Euro-Arctic Regional cooperation in 1993 was a significant development that opened a new phase of East–West interaction in the region. The Barents Council serves as an important meeting place for representatives of Norway, Russia, Finland, Sweden, and the European Union. It has contributed to promoting cooperation and stability in one of the world’s most heavily militarized regions.

These characteristics make region special in economical, strategic, political and international respect. They have become a reason for European Arctic nowadays to become a matter of serious international concern. They have stimulated interests of the leading world powers moving towards the North. However, in current research I would mainly focus on three main characteristics. First is presence of unresolved legal issues as it is forming the context of territorial disputes in the European Arctic. In relation to this, transnational cooperation will be discussed as an alternative to territorial confrontation. And finally, issues of territory and cooperation will be examined through the prism of periphery, emphasizing the transnational nature of the European Arctic, thus bringing regional perspective to the surface. Two other characteristics (regions strategic significance and its resource potential), however, will not be left behind and will be taken into consideration as they define the specifics of political and geopolitical processes happening in the region and shaping international relations there.

⁸ *ibid.* p.10

1.3 Problem statement

The study seeks to bring focus on the perspectives of perceptions of territory in relation peace at the European Arctic and on viewpoints of the politicians currently involved into the Arctic issues at the region. In this way referring to politicians' reflections hopes to create better and fuller understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. The study's standpoint is that, in order to understand the state of peace in the European Arctic, it is necessary to clarify the opinions upon the issue at the individual local politicians' level through obtaining first-hand knowledge. The study seeks to achieve this by giving priority to 1st person accounts by vocalizing the actors which previously mostly remained silent.

By finding regional actors representing countries, who are involved into both territorial issues and trans-border cooperation, research seeks to vocalize perspectives of persons who cannot directly influence the national politics in these areas, but are, however, involved into them and find them as a matter of concern.

Moreover, research seeks to provide insights on the processes of transformation of peace in the European Arctic in relation to both territory and other factors throughout the history. This transformation process is strongly connected to transition from the Soviet Union to Russian Federation. Thus, the time period chosen for the research has been chosen to be from the break of Soviet Union and active start of regional Arctic cooperation in 1993 until nowadays. However, study seeks to find the other factors that happened to influence these processes. Furthermore, through personal and individual-level reflections, this study seeks to be a tool for wider understanding of processes of change and continuity in contemporary European Arctic.

1.4 Research questions

According to this context, the main question this thesis aims to answer is: What is the state of peace in today's European Arctic?

In order to answer the research question, the following supplementary questions have been formulated:

- What kind of “zone of peace”⁹ is the European Arctic?
- What are the local politicians’ views upon peace in the area?
- What is the role of territory in relation to peace in the area?
- How other processes, such as international and cross-border cooperation influence peace in the European Arctic?

1.5 Finding my thesis

“I’d like to put my 2 cents into this geopolitical slalom”¹⁰

The starting point of this thesis project was simple curiosity. In the year of 2008 I was a third year student in Russia studying International Relations. I got an assignment of writing a term paper titled “Arctic Geopolitics in global context”. While reading the literature about the issue, talking to the scientists, involved into the Arctic research, and discussing the case with my fellow students, I became more and more curious about the subject. Apparently, for me the assignment happened to become not just another boring term paper, but a subject of scientific interest. Since I have always been interested in geopolitics, I found it extremely exciting to research on the geopolitical interests of the world’s leading countries around the strategically and economically important area. So, after submitting the term paper successfully, I decided that I might be interested in writing my final graduation diploma paper on the same topic.

Another factor which made Arctic a field of my research area was actually my Northern mentality. I am coming from Arkhangelsk – a city on the North-West of Russia which has deep historical connection with the Arctic. So the Arctic issues have always been of significant importance in my city. Arctic has always been considered as one of the most perspective directions for the city development and this caused my interest in researching the role of the Arkhangelsk region in the global context of the Arctic geopolitical processes. Arkhangelsk ambitions of becoming the gateway to the Russian Arctic were of great concern for me as for a city inhabitant.

⁹ Concept of “zones of peace” will be discussed in Chapter 3.

¹⁰ Dyadya Zhenya – Russian Hip-Hop singer

At the same time, coming from the North was an obvious interest determining my interest in Northern issues. Conducting a research which is relevant for my home area seemed to me to be both challenging and valuable at the same time. It is also important for my self-satisfaction, as it is giving me a feeling that I am doing something which is good and useful for my home. Being an International Relations student determined my interests in the Northern issues moving to the international arena. Obviously it made me curious about the international processes happening in the area, thus making me enthusiastic about the further research on the topic. Studying International Relations encouraged me to research not only about the Russian politics in the area, but to study the positions of the other actors represented in the region as well. While investigating on the other countries politics, I was comparing them to the Russian ones, trying to identify the similarities and differences, weak and strong points in countries positions, thus diving deeper into the Arctic geopolitical issues. That was the beginning of my thesis.

In the first place, my plan was to write about territorial impact on peace in the Arctic from the Geopolitical point of view. However, being a peace student I started to have an impression that Geopolitical perspective does not seem to be absolutely relevant for the perspective of my research. I planned to make my research from peaceful perspective, examining peace in the region and factors which affect or influence it. Geopolitical concepts, however, failed to provide full and profound understanding of peace in the Arctic, tending to describe the nature of conflict rather than peace in the area, thus affecting the peaceful perspective of my research. Aimed at describing national supremacy and strategic struggle, Geopolitical concepts, in my view, not only fail to contribute to the peaceful regional research, but also affect the peaceful nature of my research.

And secondly, after my fieldwork in Russia in 2012 I started to feel that my preliminary choice of theory was drawing attention away from what my informants were actually saying. Instead of geopolitical issues the interviewees were talking about the local, regional and cross-border processes, thus leaving geopolitics behind. So original approach did not seem to resonate with the reflections and experiences the interviewees had shared with me, thus making geopolitical concepts irrelevant for this research perspective.

Thus I came to idea that a new theoretical concept was needed. After some research I came to a conclusion that the concept of “Zones of peace” by Kakowicz happened to be the most

relevant concept for the perspective of my research.¹¹ After trying to implement it to the existing Arctic realities, I got an impression that it opens new horizons and opportunities for the Arctic peace research.

Thus the research perspective and framework was set, making me confident about the future research and giving an opportunity of finding my thesis.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is divided into six chapters. In the next chapter the context of the study is further detailed with focus on the history of the territorial issues in the European Arctic. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework of the thesis. Chapter 4 discusses and reflects on the methodological issues of the study. Chapter 5 focuses on informant presentation, data presentation and analysis. Finally, summary and concluding remarks will be offered in chapter 6.

¹¹ The concept of “zones of peace” and its relevance to my research will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 2. European Arctic in Geopolitical Context

In this Chapter geopolitical processes taking place in the target region will be discussed. This relates both to territorial issues and processes of Arctic cooperation, since they simultaneously form geopolitics in the area.

2.1 Arctic territorial disputes over borders and jurisdiction

*“As a result of these developments, the Arctic is emerging as a region of major geopolitical significance to the five Arctic coastal states – Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway – as well as to other Arctic and non-Arctic states. Previously non-pressing disputes over access to natural resources and strategic shipping lanes are gradually coming to the surface, raising concerns about a possible “remilitarization” of the region”.*¹²

Kristian Åtland (2010) defines 8 basic territorial disputes and disagreements that are most likely to rise the conflict potential in the Arctic, thus affecting the state of peace in the area. They are: “(1) the delimitation of Norway’s and Russia’s economic zones and continental shelves in the Barents Sea, (2) the legal status of the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area around Svalbard (Norway and Russia, primarily), (3) the delimitation of the Bering Sea (U.S. and Russia), (4) the delimitation of Beaufort Sea (U.S. and Canada), (5) the disputed status of Hans Island in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and Greenland (Canada and Denmark), (6) the legal status of the Northwest Passage (Canada and the U.S.), (7) the legal status of the Northern Sea Route (Russia and the U.S., primarily), and (8) the delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (Russia, Canada, and Denmark, primarily).”¹³

As European Arctic is the primary region of current research, issues numbered (4) and (6) are of less interest as the territories which constitute the subject of concern in these disputes, happen to be outside the geographical area of research. Disagreements numbered (3), (5), and (7) can be described as issues of medium concern in relation to current research as they involve at least one actor state from the European Arctic. While territorial issues number (1), (2) and (7) happen to be of greatest concern and the most sensitive ones when it comes to state of peace in the targeted region of research and how it is influenced by territorial factor. This is

¹² Åtland K. 2010. *Security implications of climate change in the Arctic*. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), p. 3

¹³ *ibid.* p. 19

simply because these disagreements directly involve countries from the European Arctic, thus making them most valuable for current research. However, territorial disputes that have been defined of less importance should never be left behind or underestimated as they happen to be a part of the bigger picture of territorial disagreements in the Arctic which constitutes the context for the current research.

This is why every territorial disagreement will be described in the following parts of the paragraph to an extent they are valuable for European Arctic as the target region of current research.

2.1.1 Russia – Norway’s dispute upon delimitation in the Barents Sea

The history of the delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea dates back at least to the 1957 Varangerfjord Agreement, which established the boundary between the territorial seas of mainland Norway and the Soviet Union. Since this time the issue was gradually developing along with the development of international law of the sea. After UN Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted both Norway (in 1963) and Soviet Union (in 1967) claimed sovereign rights to the seabed and the subsoil adjacent to its coasts.¹⁴ Norway has argued that the boundary should follow the “median line”, whereas Russia has claimed the so-called “sector line”, as did the Soviet Union.¹⁵ The discrepancy between the two claims gave a disputed area (see Figure 2.1) of some 155,000 square kilometers, or roughly 11 % of the Barents Sea, including shelf areas containing potentially significant petroleum resources.

¹⁴ Henriksen, Tore, and Geir Ulfstein. 2011. 'Maritime Delimitation In The Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty'. *Ocean Development & International Law* 42 (1-2), p. 2

¹⁵ Timtchenko, Leonid. 1997. 'The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past And Present'. *Arctic* 50 (1). 29




Figure 2.1. The Norwegian-Russian delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea. The disputed area was located between the “sector line” and the “median line”.¹⁶

Thus the formal agreement on border delimitation between two countries was needed and negotiations started in 1974. They were expedited by the fact that in 1977 both countries established their 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's) in the Barents Sea. Thus, besides delimitation of the boundary, both states needed to deal with overlapping EEZ claims. This stimulated the negotiation process, because EEZ waters were very valuable for both countries in terms of fishing, which pushed parties to the first agreement:

“Because fishing was the most pressing issue, they agreed on a temporary arrangement to regulate fishing in the disputed area, the so-called Grey Zone Agreement, which was signed in January 1978.12 The Grey Zone Agreement covered a large part of the southern area of the disputed waters as well as including undisputed Norwegian and Soviet EEZs.13 Under the agreement, each party was to

¹⁶ Åtland K. 2010. *Security implications of climate change in the Arctic*. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) p. 19

*exercise jurisdiction solely over fishing vessels flying its own flag and over vessels flying the flag of third states that had access to the area under license. The agreement has been subsequently extended for 1-year periods.*¹⁷

Later negotiations on the continental shelf continued on the basis of Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention to which both states were parties, which stipulated that the boundary is the median line unless another boundary is justified by “special circumstances.”¹⁸ However, at this point both parties had serious disagreements:

*“Norway’s position was that there were no special circumstances in the overlapping claimed area and that the boundary should be the median line between the mainland coasts and of Svalbard and the islands of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Island. The Soviet Union (and its successor the Russian Federation) has maintained that there are special circumstances and that the maritime boundary should follow the so-called sector line from the Varangerfjord toward the North Pole only adjusted eastward in the Svalbard area to avoid infringing on the area defined in Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty.”*¹⁹

The other special circumstances argued by USSR included the greater population, geological conditions, economic interests, special environmental risks, and security interests.

Henriksen and Ulfstein (2011: 2) state that “over the years there was seemingly slow, if any, progress in the negotiations. A proposal in 1988 by the Soviet Union for cooperation on petroleum resources in a joint development zone was rejected by Norway. Progress was made in 2007 when the parties agreed to revise the 1957 Varangerfjord Agreement to extend the maritime boundary to a point approximately 30 kilometers from the terminus of the Varangerfjord, where the median line and sector line cross and the southern part of the disputed area began.” Finally, after 40 years of negotiation, in 2010 parties managed to reach the agreement. The agreed-upon delimitation line, known as “the compromise line” was established. It divides the overall disputed area in “two parts of approximately the same size”, as illustrated in Figure 2.2

¹⁷ Henriksen, Tore, and Geir Ulfstein. 2011. 'Maritime Delimitation In The Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty'. *Ocean Development & International Law* 42 (1-2), p. 2

¹⁸ UN Convention on the Continental Shelf, article 6

¹⁹ Henriksen, Tore, and Geir Ulfstein. 2011. 'Maritime Delimitation In The Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty'. *Ocean Development & International Law* 42 (1-2), p. 2



Figure 2.2. The “compromise line” divides the disputed area into two parts almost the same size.²⁰

Thus, the issue is now officially solved; however, the past tensions are still likely to influence the relations between two countries. Since the Barents Sea delimitation has been a big problem for Russia and Norway, one should keep it in mind when analyzing peace in the European Arctic simply because it serves an example of territorial dispute on one hand and dialogue and cooperation on the other.

²⁰ Aftenposten (12.10.2011) Her går delelinjen http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article3625442.ece#_U3TUcygkR2A [Visited 21 November 2012]

2.1.2 Legal status of the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area around Svalbard

In addition to the delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea, Norway and Russia have differing interpretations of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty.

“During the peace settlement in the aftermath of World War I, Norway’s main aim was to obtain sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago”²¹. After ensuring support from the greatest powers who won the WWI, Norway reached the goal, and in 1920 Norway signed the Svalbard Treaty, proclaiming Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago. Russia, was, however, absent at the peace conference in Paris, but protested against the Svalbard Treaty.²² However, in 1924 USSR joined the treaty for the purpose of conducting economic activities on the island.

Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty grants Norway “full and absolute sovereignty” over Svalbard, but at the same time, under articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, the nationals of all parties to the Treaty ‘enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting’ and may engage in ‘all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality’²³. However as noted by Pedersen, “the *Svalbard Treaty*, crafted prior to the modern law of the sea, is inconclusive as to which maritime areas its stipulations apply, referring only to the “waters [...] of the territories,” a dimness that has given rise to international controversy.”²⁴ Norwegian regulatory measures on and around Svalbard have often been perceived in Russia as infringements on the latter articles:

*As far as the maritime areas around Svalbard are concerned, Norway maintains that the Svalbard Treaty’s provisions apply only to the land and sea territory of the archipelago. Russia (and other parties to the Treaty) contest Norway’s claim to exclusive rights in areas beyond the territorial waters of the archipelago.*²⁵

²¹ Riste, O. 2003. *Norway’s Foreign Relations: A History*. / Russian translation by Korobochkina M. Moscow: Ves Mir. p.153

²² *ibid.* p.153-155

²³ Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th February 1920. <http://www.lovdato.no/traktater/texte/tre-19200209-001.html>

²⁴ Pedersen, Torbjorn. 2008. 'The Dynamics Of Svalbard Diplomacy'. *Diplomacy And Statecraft* 19 (2), p. 237

²⁵ Åtland K. 2010. *Security implications of climate change in the Arctic*. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), p.20

Pedersen (2010: 237) states that major concerns about Norwegian sovereign rights today primarily relate to the continental shelf and the 200-mile zone adjacent to Svalbard, Norway's jurisdiction on Svalbard territory has also been challenged.

A climax was reached in 1944 when the Soviet foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, suggested that the Svalbard Treaty should be "thrown in the trashcan," that sovereignty over the southernmost Bear Island should be transferred to the Soviet Union, and the rest of the archipelago become a Russo–Norwegian condominium.²⁶

Further international tensions, according to Pedersen, also rose in 1951 when Norway included the archipelago in the NATO command system. The reaction of the Soviet Union was sending a note to Norway, calling this act “unfriendly”, stating that the Soviet State was “unable to recognize as legal”; later followed by the incident in the late 1950s when Norway sought to establish an airfield on Svalbard amid Soviet protests (ibid.).

In 1976–77 Norway added to its position an obligation to manage the living resources off Svalbard. It established the 200-mile fisheries protection zone by Royal Decree on 3 June 1977, a provisional measure to “preserve the living resources in the sea.” (ibid.) Even though the *Svalbard Treaty*, as noted by Pedersen (2010: 237) did apply beyond the territorial limits, Norway argued, Article 2 of the Treaty prescribed it to “maintain, take or decree suitable measures to ensure the preservation and, if necessary, the re-constitution of the fauna and flora” in Svalbard waters. Soviet Union, therefore, called this decision unfair and illegal:

“...the Norwegian decision assumes the opportunity to prohibit other contracting parties from conducting fishing in this area and even presupposes punitive measures against their nationals. ... The Soviet government views the decision taken 3 June 1977 as a new step by Norway toward the illegal expansion of Norwegian rights in the Spitsbergen area, in defiance of the articles in the Treaty of 1920, which moves beyond the fisheries problem.”²⁷

Thus the situation resulted into a long-running dispute, primarily between Norway and the Soviet Union (and now Russia) over fishing rights in the region.²⁸

A Barents Sea treaty might seem to be a solution for the ongoing dispute between two countries, but, unfortunately, “neither the joint statement nor the treaty include references to

²⁶ Pedersen, Torbjorn. 2008. 'The Dynamics Of Svalbard Diplomacy'. *Diplomacy And Statecraft* 19 (2), p. 237

²⁷ Soviet Union diplomatic note handed to Norway on 15 June 1977. Translated from Russian.

²⁸ Willy Østreng. 1986. "Norway in Northern Waters". In Clive Archer & David Scrivener. *Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues*. Routledge. pp. 165–167.

the Svalbard archipelago or any of its islands.”²⁹ Never the less, some researchers (Henriksen, Ulfstein 2011: 9) claim that by drawing the delimitation line east of its previously asserted adjusted sector Russia can be read as recognizing that current Norwegian policies over Svalbard are not breaking the treaty of 1920. Anyhow, since the official change of Russian position has never been announced, such statements should be treated critically and not taken for granted, since recent arrests of Russian fisheries vessels by Norwegian coast-guard, even after the Barents Sea treaty was ratified,³⁰ illustrate, that Russia is still not recognizing the 200-mile fisheries protection zone.

So, to a certain extent, the dispute still exists, thus being able to influence not only Russian-Norwegian relations in the European Arctic, but peace and stability in the region as a whole. This issue, without any doubt, should be kept in mind when analyzing the state of peace in the region.

2.1.3 Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles

Article 76 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) permits a coastal state whose continental margin extends beyond its 200-nautical-mile EEZ to establish the outer edge of its continental margin up to, but no further than, 350 nautical miles beyond the baselines used to delimit the territorial sea or not more than 100 nautical miles (n.m.) from the 2,500-meter isobath. Specifically, the coastal State intending to claim a continental shelf beyond 200 n.m. is required to submit information (a certain number of geological and other data) on the limits of the shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereafter CLCS or the Commission). Thus, according to this, a number of Arctic states have submitted their claims to extend their territories:

“In the Arctic region, the Russian Federation made a submission on 20 December 2001. On 27 June 2002, the Commission adopted its recommendation on the submission and recommended that the Russian Federation make a revised submission. On 27 November 2006, Norway submitted relevant information with regard to the North East Atlantic and the Arctic to the Commission. The recommendation on Norway’s submission was adopted by the Commission on 13 March 2009. On 29 April 2009, Iceland submitted data concerning the Aegir Basin area and the western and southern parts of Reykjanes Ridge to the Commission. On the same day, Denmark submitted data with respect

²⁹ Henriksen, Tore, and Geir Ulfstein. 2011. 'Maritime Delimitation In The Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty'. *Ocean Development & International Law* 42 (1-2), p. 9

³⁰ Vzgljad (10.10.2011) *Nebyvaloe chislo arestov*. <http://vz.ru/economy/2011/10/10/529145.html> [Visited 21 November 2012]

to the area north of the Faroe Islands to the Commission. As at 2010, the recommendations of the Commission involving these submissions remain to be seen.”³¹

Kristian Åtland (2010: 18) notes that these claims may turn out to be partially overlapping, particularly in the cases of Russia, Canada, and Denmark. All of the three countries argue that the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural continuation of their respective continental shelves. This and other underwater structures are in other words likely to figure centrally in the deliberations.




Figure 2.3. Arctic territorial claims³²

Figure 2.3 shows the possible overlap of territorial claims from Russia, Canada and Denmark in relation to the Lomonosov Ridge. Since CLCS process provides no mechanisms for resolving simultaneously submitted conflicting claims, these three countries might face a territorial dispute in nearest future.³³

³¹ Tanaka, Yoshifumi. 2011. 'Reflections On Arctic Maritime Delimitations: A Comparative Analysis Between The Case Law And State Practice'. *Nordic Journal Of International Law* 80 (4), p. 466-467

³² BBC News World (22.09.2010) *The struggle for Arctic riches*. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11381773> [Visited 10 December 2011]

³³ Traner, Helena. 2011. 'Resolving Arctic Sovereignty From A Scandinavian Perspective'. *Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.*, p. 508

As noted by Traner (2011: 508), Canada and Denmark, have been cooperating in data collection process, however, at the same time these states still send their own national scientists and maintain their own national programs. Russia does not take part in this research and has its own data collection team. “Thus, even if Canada and Denmark submit a joint claim, it is still likely to directly conflict with Russia’s.”³⁴

Thus, in relation to the European Arctic, process of delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles certainly holds some conflict potential. However, it is hard to imagine an opened violent conflict in relation to this issue, but at the same time, an unsolved dispute creates a certain level of stress in the area, therefore being able to influence on state of peace, security and stability in the region.

2.1.4. Other territorial disputes

The scope of other territorial issues in the Arctic region, according to Åtland (2010: 21--22), includes: delimitation of the Bering Sea, delimitation of Beaufort Sea, disputed status of Hans Island in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, legal status of the Northwest Passage, legal status of the Northern Sea Route.

³⁴ ibid p. 509

Unresolved Arctic maritime boundaries and territorial claims

| Nations | Boundary/claim area | Summary | Status |
|--------------------------|--|---|--|
| U.S./Russian Federation | Maritime boundary runs from the NW Pacific through the Arctic Ocean. | The maritime boundary was described in the 1990 USA/USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement. The U.S. Senate gave advice and consent in 1991, but the USSR collapsed prior to signing the treaty. | The Russian Federation has not signed the treaty, and it is not evident when, or if, they will. However, in practice they abide by the treaty terms. |
| U.S./Canada | Beaufort Sea | Canada maintains that the boundary is an extension of the land boundary between Alaska and the Yukon that runs along 141°N. The United States maintains that the boundary is perpendicular and equidistant to the low water line of both coasts. | This is a managed dispute with no evidence of pending resolution. There is a moratorium on oil and gas development in the disputed region as well as a U.S. moratorium on fisheries. |
| U.S. + others/ Canada | Northwest Passage | Canada maintains that the passage is a part of its internal waters, the U.S. and others hold that it is an international strait. | Unresolved. |
| U.S. + others/ Russia | Northern Sea Route | U.S. protests to Russia's claims that the straits along the Northern Sea Route are to be regarded as Russian internal waters. The U.S. argues that the straits in question are international, and that they can be used for international navigation. | Today, all commercial ships transiting the route must adhere to a restrictive Russian regime and pay substantial fees. |
| Canada/ Denmark | Hans Island | Canada claims the island on the basis of its discovery by Britain (whose rights Canada inherited) and determination of the island's exact location by the Topographical Survey of Canada. Denmark's claim may be based on the proximity of the island to Greenland. | The dispute remains unresolved; the two nations issued a joint statement after a 2005 meeting affirming a "long-standing and excellent relationship" between them and noted that, although they had failed to resolve the dispute, both remain dedicated to its peaceful resolution. |

Figure 2.4 Other territorial disputes in the European Arctic³⁵

Figure 2.4 shows a brief overview of these disputes. Some of them might not be that crucial for the European Arctic, however, they form the context and background for geopolitical

³⁵ Brosnan, Ian G, Thomas M Leschine, and Edward L Miles. 2011. 'Cooperation Or Conflict In A Changing Arctic?'. *Ocean Development & International Law* 42 (1-2), p. 179

processes in the area. While being able to affect the state of peace in the other parts of the Arctic, these issues, definitely, can indirectly influence stability and security in the European part of the region. Thus, when analyzing state of peace in European Arctic, these processes, happening in the Arctic as a whole, should also be taken into consideration and should never be left behind. Combined together with disputes in the European arctic, they constitute the whole picture of peace and security in the Arctic Region.

However, since the European Arctic is the target region of research, the above issues will be paid less attention and will be addressed only as a part of contextual framework in relation to the target area.

2.2 Changing Arctic: conflict or cooperation?

All the above mentioned disputes constitute a certain level of tenseness in the European Arctic. However, the region is not only about conflict. International and cross-border cooperation is a big part of region's development and should never be left behind when discussing peace in the area.

When it comes to the European Arctic as a target region of research, Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) is the key player for cooperation in the area. BEAR is the "largest region for interregional cooperation, which includes the northernmost parts of Sweden, Norway, Finland and Northwest Russia. The Region is characterized by "strong cultural identity, stability, prosperity and fast progress".³⁶ The Barents cooperation was formally established on 11 January 1993, when the Kirkenes declaration was signed. The Barents cooperation is organized on two level. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) operates at government level and the Regional Council operates at regional level.

The purpose of the Barents Cooperation is to strengthen east-west infrastructure, establish people-to-people contacts and thereby contribute to the economic, cultural and social development of the Region. The Barents Cooperation promotes people-to-people contacts and economic development and creates good conditions for interregional exchange in many different fields; e.g., culture, indigenous peoples, youth, education, security, trade,

³⁶ The Barents Euro-Arctic Region. Cooperation and visions of the North.
<http://www.founorrbotten.se/download/18.54d7ab81114cbc561f98000223/Barents+Euro-Arctic+Region.pdf>
[Visited 21 November 2012]

environment, transportation and health. The primary goal of BEAC is to promote sustainable economic and social development in the Barents Region and thus contribute to peaceful development in the northernmost part of Europe.³⁷

Since its creation, BEAR has been the key institution for international, regional and cross-border cooperation in the European Arctic, thus influencing the state of peace in the region in a positive way.

When it comes to Arctic as a whole, the Arctic Council is a remarkable organization for international cooperation in the region. Established in 1996 under Ottawa Declaration, Arctic Council serves as a high level forum to:

- provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.
- oversee and coordinate the programs established under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy – international initiative preceding Arctic Council - on the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program; conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna; Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment; and Emergency Preparedness and Response.
- adopt terms of reference for and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development program.
- disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues.³⁸

The Council consists of eight Arctic states; Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and the U.S and six permanent participants; Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North and Saami Council. Since its establishment it

³⁷ Cooperation in the Barents region <http://www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region/Cooperation> [Visited 21 November 2012]

³⁸ Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Canada, 1996)

has served as an important meeting platform for the Arctic states to discuss the above mentioned issues and to coordinate cooperation on them.

So, together with unresolved issues, European Arctic holds a certain level of well-developed cooperation, as well as avenues for future potential cooperation. As stated by Brosnan (2011: 203) the criteria by which the Arctic states make their policy decisions will play a key role in determining whether states pursue avenues for cooperation or whether conflict will arise.

2.3 Summary

As stated by Åtland (2010: 22), despite the presence of unresolved issues, “the Arctic is generally a stable and peaceful region, and the long-term conflict potential should not be exaggerated.”

“There seems to be consensus among Arctic and non-Arctic nations that UNCLOS applies also to the Arctic Ocean, and that there is no need for a region-specific legal regime à la the Antarctic Treaty. The five Arctic coastal states’ commitment to finding peaceful solutions to outstanding issues through diplomacy and negotiations, in accordance with the existing Law of the Sea framework, has been reiterated on a number of occasions, for instance in the joint declaration signed at the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland, in May 2008.”³⁹

However, at the same time, Åtland warns that one should not underestimate the potential for interstate disputes and conflicts over the access to the land and shelf areas inside the Arctic Circle[23].

As can be concluded from the points, discussed above, European Arctic has a double-faced nature. On one hand we have a certain conflict possibility, but on the other – a history of ongoing international cooperation and potential for its enlargement. Thus, for a peace researcher, calling European Arctic merely “*generally a stable and peaceful region*”, without defining the condition of peace in the area is not just enough. This is why, from a scientific point of view, it becomes really interesting to investigate the state of peace in such a controversial region.

In further chapters of my research, I will study how territorial issues influence peace in the European Arctic.

³⁹ Åtland K. 2010. *Security implications of climate change in the Arctic*. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), p.23

Chapter 3. Conceptual framework

This chapter brings the conceptual framework to the study of territory and its influence on the state of peace in the European Arctic. It introduces the concept of zones of peace by Kacowicz as an attempt to describe relation between peace and territory in the study region. With this concept I seek to explain how territorial issues in the European Arctic influence the state of peace there.

Relations between territorial claims and their influence on peace in the European Arctic have been clear for me since the start of research project. Reason has been simple: one can never speak about perfect peace in the certain area while territorial disputes still exist there. Thus, my desire to examine the state of peace in relation to territory as one of the most sensitive topics in the European Arctic has determined my choice of theory. Moreover, field findings have also proven that current concept was a relevant choice. As my informants always failed to describe European Arctic as a “fully peaceful region”, it became more obvious for me that a certain gradation of ‘peacefulness’ is necessary. Therefore I consider current concept to be the most relevant in helping to provide objective answers to my research questions.

3.1 Concept of zones of peace

The world consists of regions which are made up from states. These states as a rule have something in common in order to be united into one region. This might be various factors from sharing common geographic area to culture, religion, identity, traditions, common history, etc. In some regions tensions between states arise and disappear with permanent frequency, while some of them, due to some special features, managed to secure the sustainable state of peace throughout the centuries. In respect to regional approach Kacowicz defines zone of peace as “a discrete geographical region of the world, in which the vast majority of a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for at least thirty years (a generation), even though civil wars and domestic unrest and violence might still occur within their borders, and even though they might be involved in broader international conflicts”.⁴⁰

In other words, first of all, the countries in the zone of peace should share some common geographical location thus forming a region. The geographical closeness constitutes the key

⁴⁰ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1995. 'Explaining Zones Of Peace: Democracies As Satisfied Powers?'. *Journal Of Peace Research* 32 (3), p.266

basement for the regional approach and makes it possible to unite countries to the zones of peace.

Further Kacowicz notices that states should have maintained peaceful relations for at least thirty years. This, however, arises some questions. First of all it is necessary to identify the term “peaceful relations”. Relying on Galtung’s concept of negative and positive peace, “peaceful relations” can only understood as an absence of open violent conflict between countries in the region, but this does not necessarily mean that the area is peaceful. People can, for example, experience a high rate of structural (indirect) violence in forms of exploitation, segmentation and marginalization as well as cultural violence which relates to “aspects of symbolic sphere of life that can be used to legitimize direct or structural violence”.⁴¹ Secondly, it is doubtful that one generation is enough for the country to be regarded as peaceful: this generation might simply be the “children of war” who have seen the horrors of violent conflict and have no willingness to experience it again. But their grandchildren, however might think in an opposite way, this is why, it might be reasonable to say that there should be a certain peaceful mentality formed throughout the generations in order to constitute the zone of peace. However, for modern history 30 years is a big period and this is why it might be reasonable to set it as a time criteria.

Moreover, Kacowicz stresses that being involved into internal domestic and even broader international conflicts which do not directly affect the neighbors is still acceptable for the country in order to remain the member of the zone of peace. This statement, however, is also doubtful: both internal and international conflicts participation can have long-going consequences beginning from sanctions up to intervention and terrorism. All this measures are likely to affect not only the country taking part in a conflict, but the other actors in the region as well. This is why we can say that being involved either in the conflict outside the zone of peace or into domestic civil war brings a certain threat to the region and affects the positive understanding of the zone of peace.

Kacowicz, however, has the same doubts and this is why he does not see all the zones of peace to be the same, dividing them into three types in respect with Galtung’s peace understanding theory.

⁴¹ Galtung, J. 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: SAGE Publication Ltd., p. 196-197

At first he relates his theory to negative peace, identifying the first type of zones of peace as

“... zones of negative or precarious peace (the mere absence of war), in which peace is maintained only tentatively by threats, deterrence, or an unwillingness or incapacity to pursue violent conflict at a particular time. In a region of negative peace, the vast majority of states support their territorial status quo. In this sub-system, civil wars, domestic and international conflicts, and even limited military interventions (below the level of international war) are still possible”⁴²

He understands the second gradation of zones of peace as zone of stable peace which consists of a “community or society of nation-states satisfied with status quo, in which domestic and international conflicts might occur, but remain non-violent”⁴³. In such zones “peace occurs on a reciprocal, consensual basis and the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of the leaders involved”⁴⁴.

And finally Kacowicz defines the third type of zone of peace as

“... zones comprised of a pluralistic security community of nation-states, with stable expectations of peaceful change, in which the member states share common norms, values, and political institutions, sustain an identifiable common identity, and are deeply interdependent. A pluralistic security community results from integration, which occurs when regional states stop preparing for war against one another. More subjectively, integration reflects a prevalence of mutually compatible self-images of the states participating, to the point of developing a common identity and mutual expectations of shared economic gains”⁴⁵.

As can be seen from the definitions, negative peace is fundamental for establishing any of the three kinds of zones. Speaking more precisely, territorial satisfaction and absence of territorial claims are essential for region to be called a zone of peace; however Kacowicz notes that “it is not a necessary factor” – regional peace is not explained by a single factor rather than by combination of numerous conditions in the region.⁴⁶

The theory can also be criticized to be “one-sided”, focused on describing only peace in its different understandings. It fails to describe the nature of possible conflict which might occur within the zone of peace, and even more, does not attempt to describe the nature of conflicts which happen outside the zone but involve states from the zone. It can, however, be argued that if the conflict occurs within one of the three types of zone of peace, its nature lays in

⁴² Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p. 170

⁴³ Kacowicz, M. 1995. “Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 268

⁴⁴ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p. 170

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ *ibid.* p. 175

changing the conditions of sustaining peace in the region. In relation to zones of negative peace this might mean one of the states being able to go into war. In respect to stable peace this relates to one of the parties dissatisfaction on territorial status quo and/or certain value of indirect violence. And in relation to pluralistic community of states it means start of disintegration processes and loose of common identity. At the same time with a certain level of interdependence and interconnection violent conflict seems to be hardly possible in this third kind of zone of peace.

In further parts of my research I will give a brief overview of three types of zones of peace and will try to define European Arctic as one of them (if any).

Zones of negative peace

As stated above, zones of negative peace are mainly characterized by the absence of war. This principle lies in the basis of all the three types; however, in relation to zones of negative peace, it is extremely important to understand why states in certain regions do not clash into the open violent conflict with each other. Kacowicz believes that democracies "...do not war with each other since they are usually satisfied with the status quo, within their own sovereign territories and across their borders".⁴⁷ This satisfaction can take different forms depending on various characteristics of the countries represented, beginning from **a**) "lack of revintionist intentions and territorial claims towards neighboring states"; to **b**) satisfaction "in relation to the existing regional and international orders" and respect to international law; up to **c**) satisfaction because of being the dominant power of in the region.⁴⁸ Of course different countries in the region have different kinds of territorial satisfaction. Satisfactions **a** and **b** seem to be of no danger and even contributing to the regional negative peace establishment, but satisfaction of type **c** is rather controversial and can contribute to peace establishment as well as can be regarded as a threat by other member states thus affecting the regional peace.

The basic conditions needed for establishing the zone of negative peace are obvious and follow from the definition of negative peace. However, war can be present in the regions of negative peace; this is why it is necessary to clarify its elements. As Archer and Joenniemi note, the two main conditions for establishing the negative peace zone are: 1) absence or very

⁴⁷ Kacowicz, M. 1995. "Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 267

⁴⁸ *ibid.* p. 267-268

little inter-state war in the region; 2) states should not be involved into war with other actors outside the region, and even if they are, this must not be initiated by the zone of peace member state.⁴⁹

The first condition is quite obvious but, however, still leaves the understanding of zone of negative peace quite unclear through allowing low-scale wars to appear. This however threatens the definition of negative peace thus deleting it away from the region; this is why it might be reasonable to exclude the possibility of little inter-state war inside the region from this condition. At the same time, the second condition and its part concerning the possibility of involvements into wars which were not initiated by the member-states of zone of peace appears to be rather reasonable relying on the natural right of the state to protect its interests. If the state was attacked by the other state it does not necessarily mean it is not peaceful and does not mean it affects peace in the region.

Illustrating the zones of negative peace Western Africa is a very good example. Kacowicz marks that in spite of regions disputes, high rate of domestic violence and civil war...

“... West Africa stands out as Africa's only zone of peace since the decolonization process began after World War II. Except for the brief Mali-Burkina Faso war of December 1985, and the border skirmishes between Dahomey and Niger in 1963-1964, and between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989-1990, no international wars have occurred among the 16 member-states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).”⁵⁰

Negative peace in this zone can be explained by the fact that most of the states in the region have been satisfied with the territories they obtained after the break of the colonial world order and that they had to concentrate on dealing with their internal security issues rather than on expanding their territorial assets.⁵¹ This internal security concerns prevented member-states from being involved into clashing with each other as well as from the conflicts outside the region, thus ensuring both basic conditions for establishment of the negative peace zone. The other factor which contributed to the peace establishment in the region is that at least some of the countries (Sierra Leone and Gambia) have experience democracy while the others were the authoritarian regimes or were looking forward for democratic way of development.⁵²

⁴⁹ Archer, Clive, and Pertti Joenniemi. 2003. *The Nordic Peace*. 1st ed. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, p.4

⁵⁰ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p.173

⁵¹ *ibid.* p.174

⁵² Kacowicz, M. 1995. "Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 271

This fact proves that even though democracy is crucial for the zone of negative peace establishment, it “might also emerge among strong (but undemocratic) states ... but the quality of the peace may be influenced by the type of political regime”.⁵³ Negative peace was also supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which “managed to coordinate the regional political decisions of the West African Heads of State, and even helped to establish a common security policy towards the Liberian domestic crisis of 1989-1990—which produced the unique, peace-enforcing West African multinational force (ECOMOG) in 1990-1995”.⁵⁴ This once again stresses the importance of the importance of local international organizations in the process of regional peace building. ECOWAS was a big step forward towards West-African cooperation and had a huge potential of transforming the already established negative peace to stable peace zone and in future perspective even moving towards the security community of states.

However it did not and there is a number of reasons which did not let the West-African zone of negative peace evolve into something more favorable. First of all, this was the high rate of internal conflicts which were not only threatening the peace in the region but also made the member-states authorities fully concentrate on the internal violence rather than paying attention to issues of democratization, regional development and interstate cooperation. Secondly, that were the authorities themselves, most of them were authoritarian, greedy for powers and might have seen stable peace zone establishment as a threat to their unlimited powers and interests. And finally that was “economic stagnation and marginalization, which slow the interdependence that follows from economic and political integration”⁵⁵. In order to overcome these challenges it might be reasonable for West-African states to step on the democratic way of development as soon as possible in order to obtain authorities which would be able to stop the internal conflicts and ensure regional interaction in order to move forward to more desirable types of zones of peace.

Zones of stable peace

Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 4) state the two important characteristics of zones of stable peace. First there should be no or little armed conflict in form of civil wars or other uprisings, and second, the countries in the region should not take part in military interventions in other

⁵³ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p. 175

⁵⁴ *ibid.* p. 174

⁵⁵ *ibid.* p. 175

parts of the world.⁵⁶ These factors are crucial for the region to be called zone of stable peace and contribute to further peace evolution in the area.

Kacowicz describes South America as zone of stable peace:

“Since the Pacific War's end in 1883, the South American region has been a zone of peace, except for two international wars: the 1932-1935 Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, and the 1941 border war between Ecuador and Peru (with two brief sequels in 1981 and 1995).”⁵⁷

He states that mainly all the countries were satisfied with the territorial status quo left after the colonial regime break, but even when territorial disputes occurred, they were as a rule resolved peacefully. This satisfaction was the basis for negative peace in the area which later evolved to stable peace. This satisfaction is the essential condition for stable peace establishment and helped to avoid violent conflicts in the region. The other necessary condition for stable peace, as noted by Kacowicz is a normative consensus on peaceful change⁵⁸ which is defined by Miall as “mutual development, mutual trust and co-operative behavior”.⁵⁹ However, those were not only these two conditions which contributed into stable peace establishment in South America. The other contributing conditions can also be found. Such things as contentious process of democratization taking place in the region are also believed to contribute to negative peace evolving to stable one. This showed the desire of the member states to improve the existing situation and to preserve peace in the area. This might have brought them to closer cooperation and interaction, thus making stable peace more possible. This brought the region to “economic integration, interdependence, and even transnational linkages that (re)create a common identity”.⁶⁰ This shows that stable peace cannot be achieved without inter-state cooperation in the region and states desire for closer harmonization.

This is remarkable, that just like in West African case, South America have the international organization for cooperation – MERCOSUR – and we can say that such kinds of institutions are crucial for establishing regional peace, because the not only provide international cooperation, but also contribute to building regional identity and coordinate region's policies.

⁵⁶ Archer, Clive, and Pertti Joenniemi. 2003. *The Nordic Peace*. 1st ed. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, p. 4

⁵⁷ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p. 171

⁵⁸ *ibid.* p. 173

⁵⁹ Miall, Hugh, 2007. *Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 66

⁶⁰ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p. 173

Unlike Western Africa, South American countries had less internal problems and a strong desire for democratization – the countries did not have to think about the internal conflicts and did not have to fight for the regime and this brought them to stronger regional interaction and dedicated peace building. These processes formed the basis for possible South American evolution into the region with pluralistic community of states.

Pluralistic community of states

And finally the third type of zone of peace is a “pluralistic security community of nation-states, with stable expectations of peaceful change, in which the member states share common norms, values, and political institutions, sustain an identifiable common identity, and are deeply interdependent”.⁶¹ This is the most desirable state of the regional peace. As can be seen from the definition, pluralistic community is a product of regional cooperation, integration and interconnection. These processes, however, do not crop up by themselves; they are a natural result of sharing common history, culture and traditions, thus forming a special kind of common regional identity which then stopped countries from fighting each other and thus contributed to process of regional peace building.

Following Archer and Joenniemi the necessary conditions for pluralistic community of states are: 1) full absence of any kind of violent conflict as well as its little possibility 2) political institutions of the member-states are closely interconnected or are even common.⁶² The first condition can easily be explained by long historical ties, atmosphere of respect and certain value of common identity, as well as by a number of factors which are of benefit for all the states like economic, political and other types of cooperation. While political institutions interconnection is a deliberate step towards new level of regional interaction which would benefit for all the member-states. Peaceful coexistence in such areas is natural and is taken for granted. Kacowicz stresses that historical overview shows that pluralistic communities involve only democracies⁶³ and this is why democracy is desirable for regional peace building as well as for evolving from negative and stable peace to pluralistic community of states.

⁶¹ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p.170

⁶² Archer, Clive, and Pertti Joenniemi. 2003. *The Nordic Peace*. 1st ed. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, p. 5

⁶³ Kacowicz, M. (1995) “Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 272

The pluralistic community can be illustrated with Nordic example. Countries in this region share common history, mentality, language propinquity as well as certain value of common identity. These factors formed the basis for Nordic region to become relatively peaceful experiencing no war since 1815.⁶⁴ The other conditions for Nordic region to become a pluralistic community, as identified by Archer and Joenniemi, are: lack of ethnic and cultural differences, common political culture, high level of interdependence between member-states, geographical location of the area, long historical traditions of peaceful dispute settlement.⁶⁵

These factors, supported by strong people desire for peaceful interaction contributed for process of Nordic states evolution into pluralistic community. Such peace seems to be fragile because it is extremely hard to achieve, however is it actually fragile and easy to break? The incident in Oslo on 22nd of July was obviously a challenge for whole Europe and Nordic peace in particular. No doubts that situation destabilization and a threat to peaceful coexistence were one of the main aims of this terrorist attack. However time showed that this terrible incident did not manage to affect Nordic's peacefulness and maybe even made Nordic states more interconnected in terms of friendship and solidarity. This shows that even though pluralistic community of states is hard to establish and maybe even harder to maintain, it is not easy to break and the system supports itself from the inside.

3.2 European Arctic as a zone of peace

In relation to the European Arctic as a target region of research, it might seem unclear if it can or cannot be defined as zone of peace. This is mostly because of the impression that the concept basically defines states as the main actors in the zone of peace, while the European Arctic, as mentioned above, is consists of sub-state entities. However, first of all, even though European Arctic is a region of peripheries, there can be no doubts that these are not sub-state entities on their own, but *states* who conduct international politics in the area. Even if represented through the territorial units (counties or federal subjects) the national interests remain *national*, which means a part of the state's politics. At the same time the definition of the zone of peace does not limit its borders to the borders of the states, thus giving a possibility to limit it to the other kind of boarders. At the same time the European Arctic obviously fits the criteria "a discrete geographical region of the world, in which the vast

⁶⁴ Archer, Clive, and Pertti Joenniemi. 2003. *The Nordic Peace*. 1st ed. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, p.5

⁶⁵ *ibid.* p. 8

majority of a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for at least thirty years (a generation)". This means that the region itself can be defined as a zone of peace, however a very special one, since it does not consist of entire states.

So, looking at the European Arctic as at the zone of negative peace, one can define some important features. First of all, as a zone of negative peace, European Arctic can be characterized by absence of inter-state war. Moreover, open violent conflicts never happened to have place in the region. This can be explained by the fact that the European North and the Barents region has historically been the area of cooperation and interaction not only between Nordic countries but included Russia as well. For example, the so-called "pomor trade" in 19th century was a period which gave its birth to the Barents regional cooperation, formed its basis by establishing unique common identity and contributed to the common history much more than any other era.⁶⁶ The second condition is also satisfied since none of the states represented in the area happened to be a violent aggressor during the last generation. It can be argued that Nordic countries and Russia happened to be involved into a number of military actions outside the region, however none of the states happened to be the initiator of such kind of aggression, and the consequences of such involvement never penetrated into the region, thus sustaining its "negative peacefulness".

Further, the states in the region are satisfied with the existing territorial status quo. It is, however, necessary to identify the nature of this satisfaction. If we talk about satisfaction due to "lack of revisionist intentions and territorial claims towards neighboring states" – this can be partly true. But lack of revisionist intentions simply originates from the fact that the region has never experienced a violent conflict, thus making such intentions impossible to appear. At the same time one can hardly say there are no territorial claims in the area, since the process of the Arctic delimitation is still ongoing. If talking about satisfaction originating just in existing international law, this seems to be the most relevant explanation of the existing satisfaction, but this does not necessarily mean that the territorial situation might not change in case the international law permits. And it seems to be completely irrelevant to describe this satisfaction due to being the dominant power in the region. First of all, because it is hard to identify the dominant power, since a lot of geopolitical actors take part in the "Arctic game".

⁶⁶ Nielsen, J.P. 1994. "The Barents region in Historical Perspective", in Stokke, O. and Tunander, O. (eds.) *The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe*. London: Sage Publications, p.89

And second, due to region's strategic importance, it is hardly possible that the emergence of the dominant power will lead to another parties satisfaction.

So these factors make it possible to define European Arctic as at least a zone of negative peace, but what happens when it comes to more "advanced" forms of peace?

There are several characteristics that European Arctic shares as a zone of stable peace. First of all, "... domestic and international conflicts might occur, but remain non-violent"⁶⁷. Territorial disputes, as mentioned above, are resolved peacefully, however, at the same time, their existence without any doubt affects the peacefulness of the region. According to Young there are three categories of concerns that are most likely to raise non-violent tensions in the region's future: first, those requiring the resolution of jurisdictional issues among the Arctic states; second, those centering on relationships between the Arctic states and non-Arctic states interested in the region; and third, those raising questions about the protection of Arctic ecosystems and cultures; and none of them, however, is likely to end up as "brutal, bitter and bloody confrontation waged between rival international powers that are desperate to acquire the world's diminishing supply of natural resources"⁶⁸. Secondly, there is a normative consensus peaceful change and certain willingness for European Arctic cooperation. This is proven by the recent Russian-Norwegian treaty concerning maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents sea and the Arctic ocean as well as by rising level of the Arctic states cooperation and interaction. And finally, region experiences no civil war or other uprisings which this proves its relative peacefulness.

However, it is hard to say that the probability of war in the Arctic "is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of the leaders involved"⁶⁹. Since the region is enormously rich in its potential, many researches still have a lot of doubts about its security and peacefulness. At the same time the statement that the states of the European Arctic are not involved into interventions in other parts of the world is also not a true one, and this affects the region's peacefulness. Recent growth of the military powers in the region is also not likely to contribute to the European Arctic being regarded as a zone of stable peace.

⁶⁷ Kacowicz, M. 1995 "Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 268

⁶⁸ Young, Oran R. 2011 "The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?" *International Affairs* Vol.87(1), p. 189

⁶⁹ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p. 170

So, it is quite hard to say whether the region can be fully described as a zone of stable peace or it is on its way.

Even though the Nordic region is described as a pluralistic community of states due to its lack of ethnic and cultural differences, common political culture, high level of interdependence between member-states, geographical location of the area, long historical traditions of peaceful dispute settlement,⁷⁰ the European Arctic generally cannot be characterized as one, basically because it is a bigger region and it fails to share all the criteria mentioned above. It does not show a desired level of multi-level integration and political interconnection; however it has its potential to evolve into such kind of zone of peace.

Even though it is hardly possible to characterize an area as a pluralistic security community, it might be reasonable to define the premises it has to become such a region in the future. Firstly, it refers to rich history of cultural exchange and certain level of common Northern mentality as well as shared values and “we-feeling” the region used to experience in the past. Secondly, because certain expectations of peaceful change and ongoing growing processes of cooperation in the area. A crucial characteristic that the region lack to become a pluralistic community of states is sharing political institutions, however the Arctic council has its potential of evolving from the urgent issues discussion body to an organization providing political interconnection, interdependence and integration of the political institutions in the Arctic, thus encouraging sovereignty pooling. These factors are likely not only to ensure the peacefulness of the region, but also to bring the area to a completely new level of cooperation.

So after examining three types of zones of peace, the European Arctic was found to fail to be characterized as a pluralistic community of states, however performing certain potential for future transformation. As a zone of negative peace it is characterized by the absence of war and satisfaction with territorial status quo due to existing international laws. As a zone of stable peace it is basically characterized by territorial disputes being resolved peacefully, absence of civil war and other uprisings and normative consensus on peaceful change. But at the same time region’s militarization and member-states involvement into the interventions outside the region affect the understanding of the area as a zone of stable peace.

⁷⁰ Archer, Clive, and Pertti Joenniemi. 2003. *The Nordic Peace*. 1st ed. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, p. 8

3.3 Summary

This chapter was intended to outline conceptual framework of the thesis. Concept of zones of peace has been introduced in order to understand the issue of state of peace and how it is influenced by territorial concerns in the European Arctic. This concept seeks to explain the nature of peaceful relations between states in different parts of the world. Thus it makes it relevant for investigating the state of peace in the study area.

Three types of zones of peace were discussed in relation to ground concept: zones of negative peace, zones of stable peace and pluralistic community of states. Zone *negative peace* refers to a sub-group of states within a region that are satisfied with status quo. It is also characterized by absence of war and civil war between and within the states. Incidents of violent clashes, however, may occur. Zones of *stable peace* are characterized by states and non-state actors in the region generally preferring status quo to violent conflict escalation as well as international (inter-)state and domestic conflicts remaining non-violent. And finally pluralistic security community is characterized by dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population and interdependence between democratic states / major political actors.

Further I tried to make a brief analysis of European Arctic in relation to zones of peace theory. Analysis has shown that study region fails to fit the criteria of pluralistic community, but at the same time can be described as a zone of negative peace; however it is difficult to say whether it can be called a zone of stable peace. Analysis results are represented in Table 3.1

Table 3.1. European Arctic as a zone of peace

| Zone of peace | Characteristic | Met or not |
|-------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| Zone of negative peace | Absence of war | Yes |
| | Actors satisfied with territorial status-quo | Yes |
| Zone of stable peace | Territorial disputes resolved peacefully | Yes |

| | | |
|---|--|---------|
| | No civil war or other uprisings | Yes |
| | Consensus on peaceful change | Yes |
| | States not taking part in military interventions in other parts of the world | No |
| | Probability of war | Unclear |
| Pluralistic security community of states | Stable expectations for peaceful change | Unclear |
| | Consists of democratic states | Yes |
| | Political integration | No |

Thus the state of peace in the European Arctic still remains unclear. It is quite hard to say whether the region managed to evolve to the state of stable peace or is still a zone of negative peace. It is also not clear how territorial issues influence the state of peace in the study area. This questions will be further examined in the next chapters, as I move on to the dialogue between the theory and the empirical material in data presentation and analysis.

Chapter 4. Methodology

In this chapter I will focus on methodological issues, such as choice of study area, informants and data collection technique. Chapter also reflects on data-collection technique and its strengths and weaknesses in relation to research context. And I also reflect upon my role as a researcher and how such attributes as language, nationality, being local/non-local influenced it.

4.1 Study area

As described in Chapter 1, European Arctic is a rather big area; this might create an impression that data collection in this region a rather complicated task. However, defining local actors representing countries and involved into trans-border relations did not happen to be hard for me, as I decided to collect my data in the cities, which have proven to be active on the international Arctic arena.

The city of Arkhangelsk was founded in 1584. It has a population of about 330 thousand people and is the administrative center of the region.⁷¹ In the period of 1814 – 1917, Arkhangelsk was the center of so-called Pomor trade (“originating from Russian *Pomorje*”) which from the early 18th century developed “in a wide variety of forms”, including common language, used mainly for trade, exchanging Norwegian fish to Russian grain, furs and wooden products, cultural exchange and long-going perspectives.⁷² At the age of Arctic polar exploration Arkhangelsk was as a starting point of numerous Arctic expeditions.⁷³

In relation to nowadays European Arctic, Arkhangelsk is often called the Russian “gateway to the Arctic”. It serves the base for a fishing fleet and the western terminus of the Northern Sea Route. The city and the Region is an active participant in Barents Cooperation and Norwegian Barents Secretariat has an office there. After the opening of Northern (Arctic) Federal University in 2010, Arkhangelsk became the main scientific center in the Russian Arctic Politics with ambitions of becoming an institution that accumulates best Russian Arctic

⁷¹ “Region” refers to Arkhangelsk Oblast - a federal subject of Russia (an oblast). It includes the Arctic archipelagos of Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya, as well as the Solovetsky Islands in the White Sea.. It has an area of 587,400 km².and opulation of 1,227,626 people.

⁷² Nielsen, J.P. 1994. “The Barents region in Historical Perspective”, in Stokke, O. and Tunander, O. (eds.) *The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe*. London: Sage Publications. p.87

⁷³ Арктические экспедиции на русском севере <http://www.paulsen.ru/onlinepro/polar/rupolar> [Visited 18 December 2012]

scientists in various disciplines.⁷⁴ And last, but not least, Arkhangelsk is an important Russian Arctic politics center. Offices of numerous politicians, decision makers, advisers and other people involved into the Arctic issues are situated here, which makes the city a relevant area for data collection.

The city of Tromsø is the second area of data collection. Troms County in Northern Norway founded in 1794 with a population of approximately 68 thousand people.⁷⁵

Just like Arkhangelsk, back in the days, Tromsø served as Norwegian “gateway to the Arctic”, being a starting point of numerous Arctic expeditions of Nansen and Amundsen. It has also been a big economic center of Northern Norway due to its extensive trade connections with Northern Russia.

Nowadays Tromsø is still an important city in the European Arctic. The Secretariat of the Arctic Council (a high-level intergovernmental forum that addresses issues faced by the Arctic governments and the indigenous people of the Arctic) is located there. It is also a huge scientific hub in the Northern Norway, including the university with around 12000 students and 2700 staff⁷⁶ and research center consisting of about 500 scientists from 21 institutions involved in interdisciplinary research in the fields of natural science, technology and social sciences.⁷⁷ This makes Tromsø an important point for access to data concerning the issues about the European Arctic.

And, finally, Kirkenes – a city in Northern Norway, close to the Russian and Finnish border with around 9800 inhabitants. What makes this city special in terms of adding it into the study area is that the Barents Secretariat is located there, thus making this city a centre of cross-border cultural, educational and business relations in the Barents Region.

That were the three primary cities included into my study area. However, keeping in mind that European Arctic consists of plurality of realities, I have also partly conducted my research in

⁷⁴ Russia beyond the headlines (13.05.2013) *Arkhangelsk – Science’s gateway to the North*. http://rbth.co.uk/travel/2013/05/12/arkhangelsk_sciences_gateway_to_the_north_25889.html [Visited 28 November 2013]

⁷⁵ Fakta om Tromsø <http://www.visitnorway.com/en/Where-to-go/North/Tromso/Key-facts/> [Visited 18 December 2012]

⁷⁶ UiT The Arctic University of Norway http://en.uit.no/om/art?p_document_id=343547&dim=179040 [Visited 28 November 2013]

⁷⁷ The Fram Centre <http://www.framsenteret.no/english.150370.no.html> [Visited 18 December 2012]

Copenhagen, Kiruna and Rovaniemi. However, for this research a different method was used.⁷⁸ Thus, my study is based on the premise that “the only way to find a larger vision is to be somewhere in particular.” And further in my research I will try to combine these particular pieces of information into the full picture of the study area.

4.2 Data collection technique: Fieldwork

Emphasizing the human dimension

Most of the studies on the issues of peace and security in the European Arctic rely on the official facts and documents, such as international agreements, conventions and strategies, thus leaving the personal attitudes of policy-makers behind. Some of them, however, take human dimension into account by bringing quotations of the stakeholders’ representatives. Nevertheless, these studies can easily be criticized for representing the limited perspective by reproducing the official points of view, rather than the personal perception of the situation.

The choice of this perspective, social researcher wants to prioritize and highlight, defines the choice of data collection method and technique used. From the stage of project design I was aware about the official points of view over the issues in the European Arctic. At the same time, the aim of the study was to emphasize how the European Arctic policy makers themselves understand and reflect on the issue of peace in the region, leaving the official position behind.⁷⁹ In other words, I wanted to investigate their personal attitude towards this phenomenon, thus emphasizing a personal or human dimension in understanding peace in the European Arctic.

Thus, when choosing a data collection technique I decided to stay away from mere document analysis and content analysis of written sources as they seemed to represent no or very little personal reflection. I needed a technique that could make it possible to make personal attitudes visible, thus putting human dimension on the foreground. Thus, leaving behind the official viewpoints represented in the previous research and mediated in the media, I have chosen fieldwork as a prior data-collection technique in order to get direct access to informants, their first-hand experience, personal reflections and attitudes towards the issue. I

⁷⁸ Methods used for my study will be discussed in further parts of this chapter.

⁷⁹ Leaving it behind as far as possible. However, it is hardly possible to completely run away from the official position and it should always be taken into consideration as a part of the context.

suppose it to be the best and easiest way to emphasize the human dimension and bring attention to personal perspective in my research.

4.3 Sampling: size and selection

Informant Selection

As Rubin & Rubin state, informants should have “relevant first-hand experience” and must be “experienced and knowledgeable in the area”.⁸⁰ In the context of the European Arctic and issues of peace in the area, not a big number of people can be said to be able to have direct experience with the issues, described in previous chapter. Due to this, and to the intention of gathering as variable data as possible, I decided to keep my sample selection criteria pretty simple: an interviewee should be a person anyhow involved into the political processes in the European Arctic. By political processes I meant not only issues territorial delimitation, but also coordinating cooperation in the area and establishing dialogue in the region. Thus I was hoping to get in touch with informants with various backgrounds, points of view and attitudes. Such choice of informants has also been determined by regional focus of current research: studying attitudes of local actors who cannot influence national politics in the study are, but at the same time are involved into trans-border relations and cooperation. Therefore I wanted to emphasize the regional dimension by looking at the European Arctic through the prism of region of peripheries and voices of actors who have their own perspective of living in the area.

Sample size

At the beginning of my fieldwork I was hoping to conduct around 8-10 interviews, however, by the end of it I was happy I managed to have six.⁸¹ Nevertheless, later in 2013, I managed to two more interviews in Norway and three outside, thus making a total number of my informants ten.

This might seem to be a rather small sample lacking representativeness, but the big number of participants is not the main issue when it comes to qualitative research. Kvale (1996:103) suggests two reasons for obtaining significant knowledge from a few subjects: 1)

⁸⁰ Rubin, Herbert J, and Irene Rubin. 2005. *Qualitative Interviewing*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, pp.64-65

⁸¹ Challenges in gaining access to informants will be discussed later in this chapter.

quantitatively, *each case contains an immense number of observations* of single individuals; while 2) qualitatively, the *focus on single cases* makes it possible to *investigate in detail* the relationship of a specific behavior to its context, to work out the logic of relationship between the individual and the situation. In other words, the main advantage of a limited number of informants is the ability of deeper data-analysis and paying more attention to detail.

Taking this as basic premises for my research, I was happy with a number of 10 interviewees as a quite common number in current interview studies.⁸² This made me feel that the main goal of my data collection – obtaining deep and good-quality data – has been fulfilled. Furthermore, during the process of data collection I started to realize that a bigger sample was simply useless, since certain themes, opinions and reactions seemed to be pretty much similar. As one of my informants said at the very beginning of the interview: *“I’m afraid I am not able to surprise you and tell anything different from what they [other informants] already said. We will all say the same even if we do not actually think so”*.

4.4 Interviewing

Qualitative interview as a method of data collection

As mentioned above, the scope of present study focuses on persons anyhow involved into the political processes in the European Arctic and their perceptions and interpretations of peace in the area. As noted by Bryman (2008: 466) these issues are “resistant to observation”. In other words, these kinds of aspects seem to be hard to get from simple observation or ethnography. This is why I decided a qualitative interview to be the best data collection method for current research:

“Researchers often choose qualitative interviews over ethnographic methods when their topics of interest do not center on particular settings but their concern is with establishing common patterns or themes between particular types of respondents.”⁸³

As a research method, qualitative interview is based on “guided conversation” and *“attempts to understand the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations”*.⁸⁴ As Warren (2002:83) writes, the purpose of the method is *“to derive interpretations, not facts or laws,*

⁸² Kvale, Steinar. 1996. *Interviews*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, p.103

⁸³ Carol A.B. Warren Qualitative interviewing in Gubrium, Jaber F, and James A Holstein. 2002. *Handbook Of Interview Research*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. p.86

⁸⁴ Kvale, Steinar. 1996. *Interviews*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, p.1

from respondent talk". In other words, researcher carefully listens "so as to *hear the meaning*" of what is being conveyed.⁸⁵

So, as long as the main aim of research was not to shed light on the facts that are easily accessible through media and scientific sources, but rather to investigate, how the first-hand actors reflect upon these issues, qualitative interviewing has been chosen as a primary method for the present study, being able to represent certain perceptions of a particular social group.

Conducting Interviews

Two interviews were conducted in Tromsø and four in Arkhangelsk during the fieldwork period in September and October 2012. One interview was conducted in Kirkiness and three more in Copenhagen, Kiruna and Rovaniemi after the actual fieldwork in April 2013. All the informants were interviewed only once with an average interview length of forty five minutes. The shortest interview lasted for about half an hour and the longest took about one hour and twenty minutes. All the interviews were tape-reordered and the interviewees were aware of that. Six interviews were conducted at the informants' workplaces in their offices. All of them were conducted during the working hours of the interviewees, however, my informants have been really helpful and managed to put all their current work aside in order to pay me as much attention as possible. At the same time the office personnel moving around and a couple of unexpected phone calls might have been a stressful factor and are likely to have affected the quality of data. One interview was held at the quiet room at the university in Arkhangelsk during the lunch break at the conference which both I and my informant were visiting. This was the only possibility due to informant's busy schedule and the limited duration of the lunch break in this case might have also influenced the data quality. As long as it is not always possible to have face-to-face conversation during your data collection, I had to choose a compromise and conduct three interviews (the ones in Copenhagen, Kiruna and Rovaniemi) via telephone.

As qualitative interview has been chosen as a research method, I decided to use its semi-structured model, in which the scholar to a certain extent follows an interview guide (the script) – a list of topics and guidelines to frame the conversation, however the format is flexible and the informants are free to bring on the issues they consider to be relevant about

⁸⁵ Rubin, Herbert J, and Irene Rubin. 2005. *Qualitative Interviewing*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, p. 7

the topic.⁸⁶ Following this principle, I was encouraging my interviewees to talk about the issues they considered to be important. Due to this, I asked many questions that were not included into my interview guide at the beginning, as I picked them from the things my informants said, and after each interview I was improving and correcting my script. Thus each conversation turned out to be unique, which, I believe, helped me to collect data of the better quality.

Generally, the informants showed a lot of interest to the topic and were very willing to participate in the research. Some misunderstandings occurred only during negotiating access⁸⁷, while during the interview itself they were easily resolved by deeper explanations. During the interviews atmosphere was relaxing and friendly and afterwards many interviewees stated they were pleased to provide their perceptions and opinions on the topic. Some of the informants even offered further help with research and gaining access to more data. One of them even wondered if it was possible to mention him as a co-author of the study.

Usually, after conducting an interview I ended up with an off-topic discussion about my research and studies. All the informants showed curious interest in my research, its motivation, findings and progress. Many of them were interested about my study program and its contents. Informants from Russia also showed a keen interest on the system of education in Norway and how different it was from the Russian system I was previously used to.⁸⁸ Quite often I was told that I have chosen a relevant topic to study and it could be good to continue further research on it. Even though these off-topic conversations are not completely relevant to the scope of quality data collected, I consider them to be one of the elements forming the context of data collection and from time to time I will refer to them in further parts of my research.

4.5 Challenges and reflections

⁸⁶ Bryman, Alan. 2008. *Social Research Methods*. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.438-439

⁸⁷ Challenges in gaining access to informants will be discussed later in this chapter.

⁸⁸ All of them asked the same question: whether it's harder to study in Norway than in Russia.

4.5.1 Gaining and negotiating access

“Problems of gaining access often come as a rude surprise to the researcher who has developed a research design and is eager to get down to the important task of finding some answers”.⁸⁹ I happened to be the one who faced this problem as well. As my potential informants had a rather high social status and position, there were certain difficulties I had to deal with during my research design and data collection.

Establishing contact

According to Odendahl and Shaw (2001: 307), gaining permission to interview an elite subject typically requires extensive preparation, homework and creativity on the part of researcher. My first steps when establishing contacts with potential informants was simply getting their contact details from the public sources. However, as noticed by Feldman et. al. (2003: 23), it often happens that even after finding the right people, making initial contact still requires much work. So, as long as “initial contacts often takes place through a letter”⁹⁰, my next step was writing e-mails to my potential respondents. During this first contact I tried not to bore the potential informant with loads of information, just stating I was a student conducting the research and why I was interested in “interviewing this particular person”, in order to help them see “why they would want to spend their time finding out about the research” (ibid.: 25, 23).

Nevertheless, using this method for gaining access appeared to be rather challenging. Many potential participants did not even respond the mails, many of them replied it was impossible to find time in their tight schedule and one even replied he doubted his experience and knowledge being relevant for this kind of research. One can only guess if that were the real reasons of refuse or they were simply unwilling to talk to me. Glesne (2006: 45) emphasizes that “[i]t is easy to overreact and become paranoid when faced with negative responses to requests to interviews”. Keeping this in mind I was satisfied with a number of positive responses I got. Nevertheless, even though “rejection may be unrelated to anything you have done or could have done” I took into consideration Glesne’s statement that it could be “a signal to reflect on what you are doing and perhaps experiment with your approaches”.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Feldman, Martha S, Jeannine Bell, and Michele Tracy Berger. 2003. *Gaining Access*. 1st ed. Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press, p. vii

⁹⁰ ibid. p. 23

⁹¹ Glesne, Corrine. 2006. *Becoming Qualitative Researchers*. 1st ed. Boston: Pearson/Allyn & Bacon, p.45

Role of gatekeepers

During my preliminary research design I was completely relying on establishing initial contacts completely by myself. However, after getting numerous rejections, I started doubting effectiveness of this access strategy. Thus, I began to think it could be good to acquire one or two “insiders” who are “familiar with the individuals and politics involved”⁹² and with whom I could “establish considerable rapport and trust and who are willing to spend time familiarizing [me] with the elite under consideration”.⁹³ In other words, since study involved certain kinds of organizations and agencies, I found it useful to make contacts with gatekeepers with whom I could “negotiate the conditions of access”.⁹⁴

As noted by Feldman et.al. (2003: 31) if the researcher fails to acquire a gatekeeper, then every individual is the person who can grant access, which means with every potential informant I had to start from the scratch again. In order to avoid this, I started thinking of a person, who could become a gatekeeper for me. As noticed by Rubin & Rubin (2005: 89), researchers often make use of their social networks in order to find and gain access to informants and gatekeepers, so, however, quite surprisingly for me; I managed to find my gatekeepers pretty quickly. As long as I still had good relationships with my ex-department at my previous university in Arkhangelsk, one of the professors, who had an extensive network of contacts with local European Arctic policy-makers agreed to introduce me to some informants and to ask them for assistance with my research. The second gatekeeper was my old friend working at Arkhangelsk region administration, who managed to persuade two of his bosses to become the participants of my study.

Thus, obtaining the gatekeepers made my research much easier through their grant of my initial access to informants. Feldman et.al. (2003: 31) explains this phenomenon by the assumption that a gatekeeper as this person in a sense actually vouches for the legitimacy of the researcher to all the other people to whom one gains access. When it comes to my gatekeepers, I can also mention that they helped me not only with resolving legitimacy issues, but also with some practical matters, such as accommodation, transportation and physical access to restricted administration buildings, thus being extremely valuable contributors to current research.

⁹² *ibid.*

⁹³ Carol A.B. Warren Qualitative interviewing in Gubrium, Jaber F, and James A Holstein. 2002. *Handbook Of Interview Research*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. p.307

⁹⁴ Glesne, Corrine. 2006. *Becoming Qualitative Researchers*. 1st ed. Boston: Pearson/Allyn & Bacon, p. 44

Developing contacts

Thus, establishing initial contact (myself or through the gatekeepers) was the hardest part for me in terms of gaining access. But, even though, “gaining access is an initial undertaking, maintaining access is another matter; it may be occasioned by the changes that occur in the expectations and needs of both researcher and researched at any time in the course of the research process”.⁹⁵ This happened to me as well. After arriving to one of my fieldwork destinations in Arkhangelsk I found out that three research participants cancelled the interviews saying they were busy or simply saw no purpose of meeting me.

Thus, in order to maintain and develop my established contacts, I decided to follow Feldman (2003: 35) advise and concentrate on developing rapport with people who could provide information. Rapport in this context refers to “a harmonious relationship between researcher and informant”.⁹⁶ In other words, my task was to develop a certain level of trust with my potential informants. During the initial contact phase I got an impression that some of the informants had certain level of mistrust about me, my research and interviewing. As explained by Odensdahl and Shaw (2002: 299), this mistrust is understandable as “they [elites] tend to protect themselves from outsiders”. Therefore, my task for the next step was to overcome this mistrust. In other words, I needed “to allay the initial fears that they [my interviewees and informants] might have had about the research”.⁹⁷ Thus, since the initial contact has already been established, I did not hesitate to contact them again, this time, via telephone. This time, together with arranging tentative interview dates, I provided them with full details about myself, my program of study, my research, its purpose, methods, and their ability to benefit. I also especially pointed the issues of anonymity and assured potential informants the no personal data will be revealed. After doing this, when meeting my informants in person, they did not seem to be suspicious about me and my research, which makes me believe that “a basic sense of trust has developed [and] that allowed the free flow of information”,⁹⁸ thus making better quality data available.

⁹⁵ Glesne, Corrine. 2006. *Becoming Qualitative Researchers*. 1st ed. Boston: Pearson/Allyn & Bacon., p. 45

⁹⁶ Spradley quoted in Feldman, Martha S, Jeannine Bell, and Michele Tracy Berger. 2003. *Gaining Access*. 1st ed. Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press, p. 35

⁹⁷ Feldman, Martha S, Jeannine Bell, and Michele Tracy Berger. 2003. *Gaining Access*. 1st ed. Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press, p.23

⁹⁸ *ibid.* p. 35

At the same time, developing rapport not only influenced the quality of data, but also helped me to get more informants, thus making the primary data body more diverse. One of the informants in Kirkiness, after a long and thoughtful conversation about my research, decided to help me. She not only provided me with contact details of potential interviewees in Sweden and Finland, but also contacted them herself and encouraged to participate in my study, thus becoming an informant and a gatekeeper at the same time. Furthermore, an informant from Sweden also contributed to my study by helping me to establish connection with informant from Denmark. In this respect I managed to establish my small research network, based on the social networks of the other research participants. In other words, I experienced the phenomenon of so-called snowball sampling: in which participants or informants “with whom contact has already been made, use their social networks to refer the researcher to other people who could potentially participate in or contribute to the study.”⁹⁹ This networking not only helped me to get a bigger number of informants, but also gave me access to data which was inaccessible for me before, thus, making my research more representative.

4.5.2 Researcher’s identity

The concept of identity is not simple to describe, since it accumulates several dimensions from psychology, social anthropology and philosophy, however, it plays a significant role in social research. Since defining and explaining the concept of identity is not the purpose of current research, the definition by Brossard will be taken as ground. It explains identity as “properties based on the uniqueness and individuality which makes a person distinct from others.”¹⁰⁰

In this part of the chapter I will focus and reflect on such elements of my identity as language and nationality, since they were the most remarkable ones influencing my research.

Language

As described by Hennik (2008: 22), “language and communication are the basis of qualitative research”:

⁹⁹ Heckathorn, Douglas D. 2002. 'Respondent-Driven Sampling II: Deriving Valid Population Estimates From Chain-Referral Samples Of Hidden Populations'. *Social Problems* 49 (1), p.12

¹⁰⁰ Erikson, Erik H. 1968. *Identity, Youth, And Crisis*. 1st ed. New York: W. W. Norton., p.18

“Language is a fundamental tool through which the qualitative researcher can understand human behavior, social processes and the cultural meanings surrounding human behavior. Language represents data in qualitative research and communication is the process through which data is generated between a researcher and a study participant. In cross-cultural research, the researcher is often at a distance with the study participants from another culture both culturally and linguistically. To improve accurate methodology in cross-cultural qualitative research, a researcher has to pay attention to language and communication issues throughout the entire research process. It is important to understand how data that originates in another language is produced and interpreted”¹⁰¹

In my case, while conducting a cross-cultural research, language was a big advantage and challenge at the same time. Being a native Russian speaker has certainly contributed to the quality of my data, since there was no language barrier between me and my Russian informants. Hennik (2008: 24) argues that “research participants provide their “best” accounts to researchers who share social and cultural characteristics”. Thus, speaking Russian as a mother tongue can be considered as an important element of developing the rapport. There were several reasons of deciding to conduct interviews with my Russian informants in their native language. First, I believed that giving them an opportunity to express themselves in their mother tongue is likely to make them feel more comfortable, thus establishing a better feeling of trust between the researcher and the participant. Second, I thought that interviewing in Russian will help me to obtain the deeper and richer data. Third, it made it easier for me to follow the interview process, react and ask the follow-up questions. And last, but not least, very few of my Russian informants had a level of English appropriate to give a full and deep interview.

On the other hand, since my informants were not only from Russia, I had to use English as a primary language of interviewing. Even though I consider myself fluent in English, I found it sometimes challenging to conduct interviews and consider using it had some disadvantages. First comes the problem of language competence – my English is obviously not as fluent as my Russian – it has affected my confidence as an interviewer. I could not show the same level of reaction, asking follow-up questions, asking for explanations and clarifications, as I could when interviewing in Russian. Even though I am very satisfied with the quality of English data obtained, while transcribing interviews of my informants I noticed that sometimes I could be more “attuned and responsive”.¹⁰² In other words, I could make a semi-structured interview more deep and rich.

¹⁰¹ Hennink, M. M. ”Language and Communication in Cross-Cultural Qualitative Research” in Liamputtong, Pranee. 2008. *Doing Cross-Cultural Research*. 1st ed. [Dordrecht]: Springer p.24

¹⁰² Bryman, Alan. 2008. *Social Research Methods*. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 447

At the same time, my informants were also limited in their means of expression as none of them spoke English as a mother tongue. Thus the data provided by them was limited with their English skills. Even though all of them had a very good level of English, it was not always possible to hear their attitudes towards certain issues, since they were not always able to express their thoughts “*in corpore*”. English was also a stress factor in terms of comfort for both interviewees and the researcher. In my case, after the first interview in English I made some analysis and no longer found interviewing in English uncomfortable, but I could see that my informants felt a certain discomfort because of English when starting an interview. At the same time using English involved a problem of oral misunderstanding when participants sometimes just did not understand my questions or I did not understand their answers, which resulted in long paraphrasing and clarifying, hence making interviews longer and more exhausting.

Thus, my inability (or limited ability in case with Norwegian) to speak my research participants’ native language had a small impact on the quality of core data body, however, did not affect it dramatically. Moreover, when it comes to my Norwegian interviewees, I even made some use of my limited Norwegian language skills. When interviewing them, I always started and finished our conversation in Norwegian by thanking them for their research participation, explaining about myself and my study and talking about some unrelated matters like weather, how I liked their town, etc. These conversations have no value in terms of obtaining any important data, but I consider them valuable in terms of establishing the connection and developing the rapport between the researcher and participant.

Role of my nationality

Just like speaking Russian, being a Russian citizen was both an advantage and disadvantage in my research. Nationality was a factor that I could not hide; hence both I and my informants had to deal with it.

“Because the interviewer contributes actively to the conversation, he or she must be aware of his or her own opinions, experiences, cultural definitions, and even prejudices.”¹⁰³ Having grown up in Russia, I, of course, shared some political values of the state, which were always at the background of my mind. Moreover, growing up under state propaganda, I, without any

¹⁰³ Rubin, Herbert J, and Irene Rubin. 2005. *Qualitative Interviewing*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications p. 36

doubt, was influenced by its willingness to re-establish Russia as a great world power, defending its national interests and holding firm position on the international arena. As a Russian citizen I want a better life for my country, thus I, of course have my own perception and a viewpoint on the research topic. Moreover, I grew up in Arkhangelsk – the birthplace of the Russian fleet, the first port of the country and the city with great Arctic exploration history, which is now considered to be “the Russian gateway to the Arctic”. Thus, throughout my life I have been always quite close to the Arctic issues, which, has, probably made me more sensitive about the topic than an ordinary non-northern Russian.

So, from the point of view of having a strong personal perception and opinion, my “Russianness” was certainly a disadvantage for me as a researcher. Keeping this in mind, I tried to be a neutral scholar, leaving my personal attitudes as far behind as I could. One of the factors that actually helped me doing this was the fact that I was a student of a foreign university, which motivated me to position myself as an independent researcher, not affected by the issue of his nationality. However, at the same time, I strongly kept in mind that my foreign degree should by no means result into mere criticism of the Russian Arctic politics. Thus, by overcoming my “Russianness” and turning into a neutral independent researcher I believe I managed to obtain a certain level of scientific objectivity.

Another disadvantage of being Russian was my non-Russian respondents’ attitude towards my patriotic feelings and their unwillingness to hurt them. This often resulted in interviewees carefully selecting words, and being afraid to say something improper during the conversation. When they were criticizing Russian politics, they were careful in their expressions, always trying to bring something positive right after criticism. Sometimes I had a feeling they did not want to criticize too much in order not to hurt my above-mentioned “Russianness”. This could be simple politeness, or their desire to avoid conflict, however, explaining this phenomenon is behind the scope of current research. Anyway, despite this, the data obtained from my non-Russian informants was quite deep and interesting and of high value for my research.

However, at the same time, my nationality was also an advantage. First and foremost, it greatly contributed to my access to the informants. Speaking about Russian informants, it made the search and negotiating access easier. As attitudes of the Russians towards their co-nationals are, obviously, different from attitudes towards foreigners, I was able to establish

initial contact and develop the rapport more simply and effectively. Generally, “access to the informants is tied up with issues of identity, language and culture”.¹⁰⁴ As mentioned above, informants tend to have more trust to people with whom they share cultural and social characteristics; hence my nationality was an important contributing factor in developing good interviewer-interviewee relationships. However, being a Russian studying in a foreign university was sometimes challenging, as it caused certain level of mistrust and suspicion from my research participants. As one of the interviewees said after the conversation: “*I thought, Russians who study abroad only write about bad things in their country*”. At the same time my nationality also contributed to my access to the non-Russian informants. They found it really interesting and uncommon that a Russian student was making a research on the areas of their expertise. As one of them mentioned: “*before I was only interviewed by Russian journalists, but never by Russian researchers*”.

4.6 Summary

At this chapter I focused on methodological issues of my research. Due to complicity of the study area, data collection was carried in the cities of Tromsø, Kirkenes, Copenhagen, Kiruna, Rovaniemi, Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. This helped me to obtain diverse and full data. In order to emphasize the human perspective which refers to European Arctic policy makers’ *personal* perceptions of issues of peace, I chose qualitative interviewing as a primary method of data collection. All together 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted within the study area in October 2012 and April 2013. Negotiating and gaining access to the informants happened to be a challenging task, since establishing initial contacts was quite hard. However, use of the gatekeepers contributed to rapport establishment as well as development of initial contact. Moreover, developing contacts resulted into snowball sampling, which provided access to new informants and thus ensured data diversity. I found my identity both advantageous and challenging. Obviously, since the sample was rather diverse in their identities, my nationality and language had a certain impact on access and data quality. Nevertheless, I believe that for this research my identity was rather advantageous than disadvantageous.

¹⁰⁴ Denzin, Norman K, and Michael D Giardina. 2009. *Qualitative Inquiry And Social Justice*. 1st ed. Walnut Creek, Calif.: Left Coast Press, p. 281

Chapter 5. Data presentation and analysis

This chapter presents and discusses the field data. It starts with presenting the participants' backgrounds, especially focusing on issues of their citizenship and occupational background, followed by the issues of age, education and time of being involved into the international issues in the European Arctic. Further the chapter proceeds with informants' reflections on the issues of peace in the study area and role of the territorial factor in the Arctic peace through the theoretical concepts discussed in Chapter 3. Ending with some thoughts and conclusions about the future of international Arctic cooperation and development.

5.1 Informant presentation

5.1.1 A note on informant anonymity

Even though peace in the European Arctic might seem to be not a sensitive topic, I have decided to ensure anonymity of my informants. This was mainly done for two reasons. First, as stated above, by stating to the interviewee that all the information provided will be anonymous I was hoping to develop a better feeling of trust and rapport. If the informants know that their words will not be directly associated with them individually, they are more likely to trust the interviewer. Hence, the informants are also more likely to provide more deep and quality data, since the level of feeling trust and security is likely to be higher during this kind of interviews. Security of my informants was the second reason I decided to cover their identities. Since I was expecting to have a sincere conversation, I did not want any thoughts provided by my informants to affect their lives or careers in any way. Even though it was quite unlikely for them, I did not want my research to put anyone into any kind of uncomfortable situation.

Thus I decided to assure confidentiality and anonymity of my informants in the best way I could. Firstly, I have chosen to give all the interviewees fake names to assure the information provided by them is not associated with their personality. And secondly, I decided not to provide all the personal details of my interviewees to make it even harder to identify them. This might make my research less representative, since it reduces the possibility to look deeper into the context. However, I have chosen to compromise between the desire for more profound research, on the one hand, and the desire to minimize any kind of possible consequences to my informants.

5.1.2 Background of informants

Citizenship and occupation

Total of 10 people were interviewed for the study. Figure 5.1 illustrates their nationality and occupational backgrounds. Four of the informants had Russian citizenship; three of them were Norwegian, one Swedish, one Danish and one Finnish. Three of the informants were from Arkhangelsk, which, as mentioned above, is referred as Russian gateway to the Arctic, one was originally from Arkhangelsk, but his work required regular “*roaming between Arkhangelsk, St. Petersburg Murmansk and Moscow*”¹⁰⁵. Two of the participants were from Tromsø – a big Norwegian Arctic city and one from Kirkenes – the center of Norwegian Barents cooperation. One participant lived and worked in Copenhagen – capital of Denmark, one – in Kiruna and one in Rovaniemi.

Interviewees’ occupation included the following fields: national (Russian, Finnish, Danish) Arctic politics, Russian-Norwegian relations, Russian Arctic shipping politics, International Arctic cooperation and Barents cooperation. Therefore, all the research participants were involved into Arctic development issues on the regional level, thus emphasizing regional, rather than national perspective. Some of them, however, were representing national politics in the European Arctic, being unable to influence it directly, but implementing it through cross-border relations in the area. Others were representing regional perspective through their work in different international institutions and organizations specific for the European Arctic. Five of the informants were employed by governmental institutions while five were working for different international organizations. Interviewing a government employee can have both advantageous and disadvantageous. On the one hand, such an informant possesses first-hand relevant data. However, on the other hand, such an informant always has an employer at the back of the mind. In other words, an interviewee employed by the government, compared to the one which is not, during the interviews is more likely to announce the official state position, rather than personal perceptions, as they are likely to be shaped by the employer. Thus ensuring a 50/50 governmental/non-governmental informants’ participation can be regarded as a compromise for current study.

¹⁰⁵ From the interview with Egor

| Pseudonym | Place of Residence | Occupation | Working for Government |
|------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Andrey | Arkhangelsk (Russia) | Russian-Norwegian relations | |
| Sergey | Arkhangelsk (Russia) | Russian Arctic politics | X |
| Egor | Arkhangelsk (Russia) | Russian Arctic politics | X |
| Anton | Arkhangelsk (Russia) | Russian Arctic shipping politics | X |
| Henrik | Tromsø (Norway) | International Arctic cooperation | |
| Jonas | Tromsø (Norway) | International Arctic cooperation | |
| Helga | Kirkenes (Norway) | Barents cooperation | |
| Simone | Copenhagen (Denmark) | Danish Arctic politics | X |
| Alfred | Kiruna (Sweden) | International Arctic cooperation | |
| Hanna | Rovaniemi (Finland) | Finish Arctic politics | X |

Figure 5.1 Informants citizenship and occupational background¹⁰⁶

Age, education, time of being involved into the Arctic issues

All the informants were aged between 35 and 60 years old. All of them had higher education. Three of them had educational background in history, four – in international relations, one – in linguistics, one – in community development and one in sociology. Thus, all of them had humanities educational background.

One of the participants claimed to have been involved into the Arctic issues for longer than 20 years. Two were involved into international processes in the area for around fifteen years. Four worked on these matters for around ten years. One interviewee was involved into Arctic issues for nine years and one was claimed to be “*relatively new to this field*” working with this issues for five years. Thus all the participants were quite experienced with the issues in the European Arctic.

Summing up, the present interviewees' educational and occupational choices determine them as relevant participants of current research. Further, more than half of the informants have been involved into international issues in the European Arctic for more than ten years, which makes their experience valuable and their data of extreme importance.

¹⁰⁶ Source: Fieldwork 2012, 2013

5.2 Territorial factor

5.2.1 Territory as a peace-influencing factor in the European Arctic

Land delimitation concerns, previously described in Chapter 2, were one of the most discussed topics during the interviews. All the informants agreed that territorial factor “*is a matter of great importance and concern in the region*”¹⁰⁷, thus, in respect to peace studies it makes it crucial to investigate how territory influences peace in the European Arctic.

Speaking about the importance of the territorial factor, interviewees explained it as “*...a rather sensitive topic for the Arctic states*”¹⁰⁸. However, they described rather different reasons making territorial factor that important. Some of the informants claimed that territory is important “*... in respect to countries geopolitical ambitions*”¹⁰⁹ and their aspiration for “*... strengthening their positions in the region and international arena*”¹¹⁰, thus recalling the geopolitical value of the Arctic territories. Others, however, stressed the economic value of the territories, pointing out that “*Territorial claims are obvious in order to gain the legal control over the fossil fuel resources*”¹¹¹ and that “*The Arctic rush [for territories] is nothing more than countries desire to gain economic profit from resources development and shipping routes*”¹¹². These were the main two points of view over the importance of territory in the European Arctic. At the same time most of the informants agreed that those are both geopolitical and economic reasons making territory an important issue in the area.

In further discussions I was talking with my research participants about territorial disputes in the region in respect to their importance pointed out earlier in Chapter 2 in order to find out their influence on state of peace in the European Arctic.

Russia – Norway’s dispute upon delimitation in the Barents Sea

When describing Russia – Norway’s tensions about delimitation of the Barents sea, many of the informants mentioned it could become the most dangerous case for peace in the European Arctic:

¹⁰⁷ From the interview with Simone

¹⁰⁸ From the interview with Hanna

¹⁰⁹ From the interview with Sergey

¹¹⁰ From the interview with Egor

¹¹¹ From the interview with Helga

¹¹² From the interview with Anton

*“This was, definitely, the case that was mostly affecting the peaceful relations between two countries and their kind neighborhood relations. [...] Moreover, this uncertainty in border delimitation was not only concerning Russia and Norway, but was creating some tensions in the whole Arctic as there was no distinctness in how everything will be divided”*¹¹³

*“I can not say it was directly affecting peace in the European Arctic, but it was definitely the most stressful factor in this region since it was the reason for a lot of tensions and misunderstandings”*¹¹⁴

At the same time, since the dispute was solved in a peaceful way, research participants no longer considered it as a peace-affecting factor in the European Arctic. As concluded by Sergey *“Both parties managed to find the solution and overcome the misunderstandings, so, in relation to your research, I assume, this case is out of question”*, followed by Andrey, expressing that *“...this is a solved case, so I see no means how it can influence peaceful co-existence in the Arctic”*.

Moreover, many informants stressed that *“... finding a solution to this case, actually improved Russian-Norwegian relations and was a big step-forward in peaceful cooperation for these countries.”*¹¹⁵ As Helga mentioned *“Solving this border case has actually contributed to peace, as it removed the “grey zone” tensions between Russia and Norway and created the platform for future peaceful Arctic delimitation and deeper political interconnection in the area”*.

Thus, research findings show that the territorial dispute between Russia and Norway used to be an important factor affecting peace in the European Arctic in the past, but since it has been solved, it is no longer a big threat. Moreover, research participants have pointed out one of the characteristics of zone of stable peace, where territorial disputes are solved peacefully and have even regarded it as a premise for political integration as one of the elements of pluralistic community of states.

Legal status of the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area around Svalbard

¹¹³ From the interview with Sergey

¹¹⁴ From the interview with Jonas

¹¹⁵ From the interview with Henrik

When talking about the situation around Svalbard, most of research participants agreed that it is hardly likely to affect peace in the European Arctic. Hanna, for example, thinks that *“It might be a case for Russian and Norwegian fisheries policies, but it is definitely not big enough to influence their peaceful relations”*. She is followed by Sergey, stating that *“...Svalbard now, is, actually, not a big deal”*:

*“Looks like Russia has actually lost its interest in Svalbard and its presence at the archipelago is just formal for the reasons of international prestige and standing up for some geopolitical ambitions. Territorial claims and matters of recognition of Norwegian authority, however, do not come to the surface, thus making this area a matter of concern just for Russian fishers”*¹¹⁶

Thus, research findings show that, according to the informants, Svalbard case *“... does not represent a big threat for peace in the European Arctic, at least now”*¹¹⁷. Research participants agree that it is still creating certain tensions and misunderstandings between Russia and Norway, but these tensions, as characterized by Jonas *“...are not really crucial for relations between two countries”* hence are not likely to affect peace in the study area.

Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles

Research findings show that delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, described as one of the territorial issues in Chapter 2, is perceived as a matter of economic, rather than political interest. As Egor mentions *“I see no geopolitical value in this issue, so I consider it to be just the desire for obtaining natural resources”*.

Remarkably, a respondent from Denmark, a country directly involved into this issue, does not think it affects peace in the European Arctic:

*“I don’t see a big threat for peace in this issue. For me it is obvious that the case will be solved in a peaceful way according to the international law. When all the geological surveys will be done, it will be Russia, Canada or Denmark obtaining the right to use these territories. It can also be possible that geologists will find out that the Lomonosov Ridge is a part of two countries’ or even three countries’ continental shelf – in this case there is no other choice as joint cooperation and exploration. Who knows? It might even be the best option.”*¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ From the interview with Sergey

¹¹⁷ From the interview with Anton

¹¹⁸ From the interview with Simone

However, most of research participants agree, that in terms of peace in the European Arctic nowadays this dispute might be the most vital. As mentioned by Alfred “*This is a real race for resources and in this case countries are doing their best to own them*”. He is followed by Helga, characterizing the nature of this “race”: “*Russian flag-planting¹¹⁹ at the bottom was not actually a peaceful act and made it clear that Russia has really serious ambitions in this area*”. Moreover, Helga considers this case to be a “... *proof of Putin’s plans to secure Russia’s strategic, economic, scientific and defense interests¹²⁰ in the Arctic*”. At the same time Canadian Arctic strategy, in relation and foreign policy in relation to this case is also regarded as “... *too ambitious and kind of aggressive*”¹²¹, according to my informants: “*Canada’s claims and region’s militarization certainly do not contribute to peace there.*”¹²² Thus, most of research participants agree about the extreme importance of this issue for peace in the European Arctic.

However, when answering a question if this delimitation dispute is a threat for peace in the area, all the interviewees agreed with the Danish representative, concluding that, even though some tensions exist, they are most likely to be solved within existing international law and do not really affect peace in a dramatic way:

“We should understand that there is actually an existing mechanism of solving this problem, so we don’t have to invent anything new. [...] I think, countries will just follow the international law as soon as geological research will be finished”¹²³

“It is clearly stated in United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea how to deal with this kind of situations. So for me there is no doubt that countries will follow this procedure and the case will be solved peacefully. This is just the ongoing process – nothing more.”¹²⁴

Remarkably that research participants from both Sweden and Finland – countries which are not directly involved into Arctic shelf delimitation processes and do not have direct access to it, look at this issue have a similar point of view with their colleagues from the other countries. Therefore they de-emphasize the importance of territorial ambitions in the

¹¹⁹ In August 2007 Russian expedition have planted country's flag on the seabed 4,200m below the North Pole. It has found massive critique from the international community, regarding this as a Russian claim for the Arctic.

¹²⁰ Here Helga refers to Russian “Arctic Strategy”, Russian version can be found at

<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>

¹²¹ From the interview with Sergey

¹²² From the interview with Egor

¹²³ From the interview with Andrey

¹²⁴ From the interview with Hanna

European Arctic and introduce other issues which are of greater importance for peace in the region.

Thus, despite the fact that interviewees describe delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles as a most urgent territorial issue in the European Arctic, research findings show that it is hardly likely to dramatically affect peace in the region, since the dispute is now being dealt according to the norms of international law.

Other territorial disputes

Research findings show that other territorial issues, mentioned in Chapter 2, as perceived by most of the informants do not constitute a huge threat to peace in the study area:

“Most of these disputes are outside the region that you have defined [European Arctic], so they are not influencing its peacefulness directly. They might have some indirect effect, but for me it is quite miserable and should not be taken into account seriously”¹²⁵

However, one of the informants have pointed out one of the disputes mentioned, which, in his view, has a certain effect on peace in the region. Anton, being a person involved into Russian shipping politics, claimed the Northern Sea Route issue to be of a certain importance for peace in the European Arctic. As he has pointed out *“We cannot speak about peaceful cooperation in terms of Arctic navigation when countries do not have common agreement about the legal status of the basic and most perspective sea route in the Arctic”*. However, at the same time, he agreed that *“in relation to the region as a whole, this misunderstanding is not likely to be a serious peace-affecting factor [...] moreover, I do not consider it to be insoluble”*, explaining his special concern by this dispute by his professional occupation: *“I might be just too much concerned about it, because it is a direct part of my job”*.

Thus research shows that, besides some concerns due to professional occupation, other territorial disputes in the area do not constitute a serious threat to state of peace in the European Arctic. Moreover, speaking about all the territorial issues in the area of research, informants basically agreed that most of them do not affect peace in the area, and even one which is likely to do so, cannot be considered as a real threat, because it is in the process of resolution.

¹²⁵ From the interview with Egor

5.2.2 Territorial ambitions VS Cooperation

One of the main findings of the research, mentioned in the previous paragraph is that territorial factor, unlike traditional perspectives suggest, is not actually the key issue determining and affecting peace in the study area. Thus, for me, as for researcher it is important to investigate, what are territorial ambitions in the European Arctic replaced by and why did countries but them put them aside?

Research findings show that all the informants actually prioritize international, trans-border and cross-border cooperation to land claims and confrontation because of the territories. As it is described by Sergey: “... countries now begin to understand the value of international cooperation in the area, this is why they would rather give up their territorial claims in order to profit from mutual collaboration”. Furthermore, Andrey assumes that it is hardly possible for one country to manage Arctic development on its own; therefore compromise and cooperation are not only vital, but unavoidable:

“One country cannot simply manage Arctic development alone. Russia, for example, unlike Norway, does not possess technologies for drilling in these weather conditions, but at the same time has a number of other. Thus, countries are forced to cooperate in order to make the process faster and more effective. In my view, this was one of the reasons for the Barents Sea treaty to be signed – why should we argue about territories when we can develop them together?”

Therefore, research findings indicate a certain change in the way of thinking and a turn towards cooperation and region co-development instead of its delimitation. As perceived by the interviewees, this change has begun on the regional level and later influenced national politics of the Arctic States.

Other research participants also stress the importance of international cooperation and its priority over territorial confrontation. As mentioned by Henrik “...countries would benefit more from joint cooperation rather than from land possession” followed by Helga, saying that “Now [...] economic, cultural, scientific benefits [from cooperation] overcome territorial misunderstandings. In other words, it’s better now to cooperate than to be in confrontation”. According to Jonas: “Cold war is over and countries are seeking for partnership, rather than confrontation. International connections have now developed into deep form of cooperation,

making it possible to forget about territorial misunderstandings. This is why they put their territorial claims aside and together search for compromise solutions they can all benefit from.” He is supported by Hanna, according to her: *“peaceful coexistence and experience exchange is likely to be more effective than aggressive land policy”*. Moreover *“Cross-border cooperation, rather than international¹²⁶ one is becoming more and more effective, more and more visible and, maybe even more and more important.”¹²⁷* Therefore informants stress the importance of cooperation between certain parts of the countries in the European Arctic, rather than between the governments, thus emphasizing regional perspective and its importance as a peace-contributing factor in the European Arctic.

Thus, research findings show that territorial confrontation and land-claim ambitions in the recent years have been replaced by international cooperation and countries’ desire to benefit from it. In further paragraphs I will investigate what is the relation between different forms of international cooperation and integration within the institutions in the European Arctic their effects on peace in the area.

5.3 Perceptions of peace in the area

5.3.1 Negative peace and violent conflict potential

As mentioned above, the main characteristic of zone of negative peace is “mere absence of war”. Due to this, all the informants, obviously, agreed that European Arctic can be described as a zone of negative peace: *“there is, obviously no armed confrontation in the area; even though tensions still exist”¹²⁸*. Followed by Helga, stressing that *“...maybe it is hard to call Arctic a perfectly peaceful area, but it is definitely formed by peaceful countries. And that gives us hope”*. Thus, according to Segrey and Helga, European Arctic experiences two main conditions for establishing zone of negative peace, earlier suggested by Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 4), which are: 1) absence or very little inter-state war in the region; 2) states should not be involved into war with other actors outside the region, and even if they are, this must not be initiated by the zone of peace member state. At the same time, Sergey’s inability (or

¹²⁶ Here ‘international cooperation’ is used in relation to cooperation between countries and governments, while ‘cross-border cooperation’ refers to cooperation between Northern parts of countries in the European Arctic, i.e. Barents Cooperation.

¹²⁷ From the interview with Helga

¹²⁸ From the interview with Sergey

unwillingness) to describe the region as peaceful makes it important and interesting to define the nature of peace in the area.

Talking about the reason, why European Arctic states do not go into war with each other, all the informants agree that this must originate in their simple unwillingness to do so:

*“Why should they [go into war]? They are all developed countries and can find another way out”*¹²⁹

*“...actors simply do not want to waste their money, time and other resources for engaging into violent conflict. Moreover, nobody can predict how such a conflict can end up”*¹³⁰

Thus findings show that in the European Arctic, as in the zone of negative peace, peace is maintained due to actors' unwillingness to go into war, rather than by threats, incapacity or deterrence. This is proven by Henrik failing to recall any examples of threats or deterrence: *“no cases of international threats come to my mind”* and Simone saying that incapacity is out of question since *“... there is a number of great military powers concentrated in the Arctic”*.

Moreover, according to Kacowicz (1995: 267), democracies in the zone of negative peace *“...do not war with each other since they are usually satisfied with the status quo, within their own sovereign territories and across their borders”*. Most of the informants supported this statement, agreeing that in the European Arctic states are basically satisfied with their territorial status quo: *“I believe countries are fine with the territories they possess now”*¹³¹. Three of the informants, however had a different point of view on this issue. Two of them (Anton and Simone) noted that even though states in the European Arctic are *“quite satisfied with their territorial resources, they will not give up an idea of gaining more”*¹³². Moreover, Sergey expressed an idea that at least some countries are not quite satisfied with territorial possessions:

“If we [Russia] were satisfied, we would not have sent this expedition in 2007 and search for geological proof in order to extend the borders of our continental shelf. I can tell you even more,

¹²⁹ From the interview with Hanna

¹³⁰ From the interview with Andrey

¹³¹ From the interview with Jonas

¹³² From the interview with Anton

*Danish and Canadian claims for Lomonosov Ridge and North Pole show quite the opposite. We cannot talk about satisfaction in this case*¹³³

Thus not all of the informants agreed that the states in the European Arctic are satisfied with their territorial status quo. However, since the majority of informants supported this statement, it should be interesting to find out about the nature of this satisfaction. According to Kakowicz, this satisfaction can take different forms depending on various characteristics of the countries represented, beginning from **a)** “lack of revintionist intentions and territorial claims towards neighboring states”; to **b)** satisfaction “in relation to the existing regional and international orders” and respect to international law; up to **c)** satisfaction because of being the dominant power of in the region.¹³⁴ When talking about the form of satisfaction, informants stated that it originates basically “in relation to the existing regional and international orders” and respect to international law:

*“Arctic States respect the UN Convention on Law of the Sea and other norms of international law, therefore they limit their territorial borders in respect with them”*¹³⁵

*“Since Norway and Russia have delimitedated their border, territories in the European Arctic are legally defined and states are relying on these international regulations”*¹³⁶

At the same time, as stated above, two of the informants mentioned that “*even though there is the certain satisfaction, according to international law, Arctic Countries will definitely try to do their best to extend their territories if such a legal opportunity appears*”¹³⁷ In other words, they mean that countries obey the order established by the international law, but, in case situation changes, or there will appear a legal opportunity to extend their territories, they will try to do it as long as it corresponds to the international law. Therefore, this satisfaction can, according to Simone and Anton, be regarded as temporary.

When talking about satisfaction due to being the dominant power of in the region, taking the existing geopolitical realities into account, it is quite obvious; none of the interviewees mentioned it as the dominating form of satisfaction: “*I think, in the emerging multi-polar*

¹³³ From the interview with Sergey

¹³⁴ Kakowicz, Arie M. 1995. 'Explaining Zones Of Peace: Democracies As Satisfied Powers?'. *Journal Of Peace Research* 32 (3), pp. 267-268

¹³⁵ From the interview with Andrey

¹³⁶ From the interview with Jonas

¹³⁷ From the interview with Simone

world it is hardly possible to talk about the dominant powers or obvious leaders in such a “hot” area”¹³⁸. At the same time, for me, as for researcher, it was quite surprising none of the informants mentioned territorial satisfaction taking place due to lack of revintionist intentions and territorial claims towards neighboring states. However, when looking deeper, it can be easily explained by two facts. First of all, states in the European Arctic simply do not have any territorial revintionist intensions; and secondly, as claimed by Henrik: “*territorial disputes exist and cannot be ignored*”.

Comparing research findings concerning nature of negative peace in the European Arctic, one can say that it is slightly different from the West-African example, described in Chapter 3. Like West-African states, states in the European Arctic are satisfied with their territorial status quo. However, while in West-Africa they were “... satisfied with the territories they obtained after the break of the colonial world order”¹³⁹, states at the research area are satisfied due to existing international law. Moreover, in Western-Africa states did not get involved into any kind of conflicts due to their internal security concerns, which can be described as their inability and incapacity of going into the conflict, while in the European Arctic, as described by Simone and Jonas they do not do this because of their unwillingness and, again, respect to the international law:

*“... they [states] simply don’t want to, they see no point in this [open conflict]”*¹⁴⁰

*“...this [open conflict] is against the international law, Arctic states are smart enough to follow it”*¹⁴¹

However, not all of them agreed or even managed to describe the level of conflict potential in the area:

“...looking at it [European Arctic] from the point of view of international conflict – there is no open one, however, I would not dare to describe the conflict potential in the region”

“...situation is changing rapidly and, when it comes to me, from time to time I, actually, change my mind about the level of probability of conflict here [in the Arctic]”

¹³⁸ From the interview with Sergey

¹³⁹ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p.174

¹⁴⁰ From the interview with Simone

¹⁴¹ From the interview with Jonas

Most of the informants, however, were quite certain about the possibility of violent conflict in the area. They expressed an opinion that an open conflict in the Arctic (no matter its European part or the whole region) is extremely unlikely to happen. As stressed by Andrey: “[I] *do not think that open conflicts are ever going to happen, since the actors understand that its consequences can be disastrous*”. Followed by Egor, emphasizing that “*..the price [of the violent conflict] is too high so I suppose it is extremely unlikely to happen, since the states now put more value on collaboration rather than open confrontation*”.

Thus, according to my informants’ perceptions of negative peace in the European Arctic, countries in the area do not go into war with each other due to their satisfaction with their territorial status quo, which originates in them following and respecting the existing international law. Moreover, the probability of open violent conflict in the region is quite miserable and should not be taken into serious account.

5.3.2 Zone of stable peace

As mentioned before in Chapter 3, in order to be regarded a zone of stable peace, region, besides characteristics of zone of negative peace, should experience no or little armed conflict in form of civil wars or other uprisings, as well as, countries in the region should not take part in military interventions in other parts of the world (except in the forms of internationally sanctioned actions).¹⁴² Both characteristics found support among research participants. None of them managed to recall any serious internal conflicts within the European Arctic and also mentioned that territorial disputes are resolved peacefully according to norms of international law, thus stressing countries’ desire for peaceful change as another important condition for stable peace.¹⁴³ Furthermore all of them agreed that “*Arctic countries do not conduct any military interventions which are breaking the international law.*”¹⁴⁴

Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 4), at the same time, add two more characteristics of this zone of peace: “stable peace also means that all conflicts within the region fall short of violent resolution, let alone war. The relationship of the states is seen as being societal, suggesting closer and more trusting”. Research findings, presented above; show that informants consider violent conflict quite unlikely to happen. Characterizing relationships between countries in the

¹⁴² Kacowicz, Arie M. 1995. 'Explaining Zones Of Peace: Democracies As Satisfied Powers?'. *Journal Of Peace Research* 32 (3), p. 268

¹⁴³ Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2), p. 17

¹⁴⁴ From the interview with Henrik

European Arctic, interviewees tend to speak about cooperation¹⁴⁵ as a driving force for countries getting closer together. Andrey, for example, states that “*International cooperation is bringing countries and people closer...*” Moreover, Helga mentions “*...increased level of mutual trust after the break of the Soviet Union*”.

Comparing nature of stable peace in the European Arctic to South-American example, explained in Chapter 3, research findings show simple similarities between two examples. First of all, nature of negative peace as a basis for further peace evolution was quite the same. Moreover, respondents stressed the importance of “*democracy-building processes in Russia after the Soviet Union break*” which have “*...definitely contributed to region becoming a zone of lower tensions*”.¹⁴⁶ However, unlike South-American example Russia was the only country in the region experiencing democratization. Moreover, just like in South America, informants point out importance of international cooperation, however unlike American example, research participants do not dare to point out the leading international organization for cooperation in the European Arctic. One unique feature for the European Arctic as a zone of stable peace, which differentiates it from South American example is the cross-border cooperation in the area, which was leaving relations between states behind and bringing attention to the regional-level relations in the North, which, according to Andrey, “*...can be considered as the main peace-driving force...*” in the area.

Thus research findings indicate that European Arctic actually follows both the conditions described by Kacowicz and Archer & Joenniemi, therefore it can be called a zone of stable peace. Therefore it makes it important to investigate whether the region shares some characteristics of the most advanced zone of peace which is pluralistic security community of states.

5.3.3. Pluralistic community of states

According to Kakowicz (1997: 170), third type of zones of peace (pluralistic community of states) is characterized by: 1) stable expectations of peaceful change; 2) states sharing common norms, values, identity; followed by Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 5), stating that 3) political institutions should be deeply interdependent or even common.

¹⁴⁵ Aspects of international cooperation and its importance for peace in the European Arctic will be discussed later in this chapter.

¹⁴⁶ From the interview with Anton

However, informants were uncertain about these characteristics when talking about the European Arctic as a third type of zone of peace. When talking about expectations of peaceful change most of the interviewees agreed it exists in the area. As said by Helga: “*For me future of the region is, definitely, peaceful*”, followed by Andrey, believing that “*all the disagreements and future potential disputes should be and will be resolved peacefully*”. However, at the same time, not all of them were so optimistic about it. Sergey expressed a different opinion: “*...the only alternative to cooperation in the Arctic is war. Which alternative will we get in the future? It will depend on countries’ international politics and global geopolitical realities.*” Thus most of the research participants, even though, not all of them, characterized European Arctic as a region with certain expectations for peaceful change. Therefore, European Arctic can be described as partly sharing this characteristic of pluralistic community of states, as certain expectations for peaceful change exist, however it is hard to say if they are stable or not.

Discussing common norms, values and identity, the informants agreed the European Arctic, unfortunately, cannot be characterized by sharing the common ones: “*...in the way you described the target region of research [...] I cannot say we can talk about common identity in this particular case*”.¹⁴⁷ Remarkably, most of the informants noticed that, even though one can talk about common Nordic identity, it is not possible to connect it to any kind of common identity in the European Arctic:

*“There is, certainly, common Nordic identity between the Nordic countries. Here people have been connected culturally, politically and even through the language throughout the centuries. However, it is not the same in the whole European Arctic. You know, Russians, they are a bit different...”*¹⁴⁸

*“Nordic identity is due to their ethnical, linguistic, historical and cultural connections. But not the whole region is that homogenous. Russians, for example; due to obvious reasons, such as different language and culture, as well as Soviet period of history; greatly differ from the Scandinavians. Therefore it is hardly possible to talk about it [common identity in the European Arctic]”*¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ From the interview with Egor

¹⁴⁸ From the interview with Alfred

¹⁴⁹ From the interview with Sergey

Nevertheless, not all the informants were so critical about distancing Russian identity from Nordic identity. Some of them recalled the times of 19th century and Pomor trade, which is considered to be the zenith of cooperation between Northern Russia and Northern Norway:

*“Common norms and values kind of existed at this time [Pomor trade]. People were in constant contact and even a common language was developed. So we can say there was some kind of common Russian-Norwegian identity in the North.”*¹⁵⁰

*“Russian-Norwegian contacts back in the days were really close. There was Pomor trade, they were fishing and hunting seals together. Besides that, both us [Russians] and them [Norwegians] were from the North, facing the same challenges and, maybe, values...”*¹⁵¹

Thus, two informants mentioned the possibility of sharing common norms between the North of Russia and North of Norway, however, both of them later mentioned that this identity was something different from Nordic one: *“...that were mainly hunters and traders, not common people, in touch with each other, so, there was no common identity between people, rather, between these merchants and hunters”*¹⁵²; followed by Anton doubting that *“...this common Northern identity was different from common Nordic one”*. Moreover, most of the informants did not even want to call it common Russian-Norwegian identity, describing it as *“a long history of Northern cooperation”*, which, however had a positive impact on modern history and *“resulted into the initiative of Barents cooperation”*.¹⁵³ Thus, according to research findings, it is possible to say there are common values, norms and identity in certain parts of the European Arctic, but hardly possible to say such thing as European Arctic identity exists.

Interviewees have also noticed that political integration (third and most crucial, according to Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 4), condition for evolving into pluralistic community of states) in the area is still on a very poor level. As noted by Alfred: *“We still have very low level of political interaction in the Arctic”*; followed by Egor, supporting that *“common political institutions in the Arctic are still not developed”*.

Lack of political integration is described by research participants in several different ways. Sergey, for example, believes that countries in the Arctic avoid active political integration,

¹⁵⁰ From the interview with Jonas

¹⁵¹ From the interview with Anton

¹⁵² From the interview with Jonas

¹⁵³ From the interview with Helga

due to their special political interests in the area: “Actors do not want to sacrifice their mysterious sovereignty in the region. Joint political governance in the Arctic for them might mean they can acquire smaller territories in the end”. Alfred, at the same, supports the idea of Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 8), who argue that lack of political integration is rooted in ethnic and cultural differences: “The region is too diverse. [...] You know, Russians, they are a bit different...”. He is followed by Hanna, also supporting Archer and Joenniemi’s (2003: 8) thought that common political culture is necessary for close political integration: “I can’t imagine close political integration between two different regimes: Soviet Union and Western countries in the region back in the days [...] thus, it was impossible to develop deep political integration”. This statement also partly proves Kakowicz’s idea that pluralistic community of states is only possible within democratic states.

Among other reasons for European Arctic failing to be regarded as a pluralistic community of states, research participants mention lack of high level of interdependence between the states: “Countries now begin to understand they depend on each other, but the level of this dependence is still small”¹⁵⁴. Possible reasons of this lack of dependence are expressed by Sergey when developing his thought about sovereignty:

“Unfortunately, the processes of sharing, exchanging and networking in the European Arctic are rather slow. They could be way more effective and extensive. Again, I think that states in this case, first and foremost, do not want to share their sovereignty in the Arctic, thus limiting the extent they depend on the other countries. Otherwise we could have already built a productive international network in the Arctic”.¹⁵⁵

Thus research participants distance European Arctic from the Nordic example explained in Chapter 3. First and foremost because this region cannot be described as pluralistic community of states due to certain ethnic and cultural differences, lack of common political culture and integration, inadequate level of interdependence between member-states. Informants, however, have indicated some premises for future evolution into such kind of zone of peace, which are emerging common mentality, certain expectations for peaceful change and developing cooperation which can bring to future closer political integration.

¹⁵⁴ From the interview with Simone

¹⁵⁵ From the interview with Sergey

5.4 Role of international cooperation

Is international cooperation appeared to be such crucial factor influencing the state of peace in the European Arctic it was important to find out the mechanisms it is fostered by. Research results have shown that informants prioritize role of international organizations and institutions for international integration in the process of peaceful cooperation, thus emphasizing their role for peace in the European Arctic.

5.4.1 The Arctic Council

Remarkably, all the research participants agreed that the Arctic Council nowadays is the leading institution for ensuring peace and security not only in the European Arctic, but in the whole Arctic region:

*“For me the Arctic Council is the only body which is somehow capable to serve as guarantor of peace in the region. [...] Without this international forum peaceful development of the Arctic could be a really hard job”*¹⁵⁶

*“Among the international organizations Arctic Council is the most important for the Arctic peace”*¹⁵⁷

*“It’s hard to overestimate its’ [Arctic Council’s] role. It is one of the few international platforms where the political representatives of the Arctic member-states meet to discuss a large variety of questions: not only about peace...”*¹⁵⁸

However, while stressing the importance of this international organization, most of the informants were uncertain about its’ efficiency. Thus, Sergey, for example, states that, even though Arctic Council is an important for peace, *“its’ efficiency, nowadays, unfortunately is pretty small”*, followed by Hanna, saying that it *“...is not a real body for sustaining peace in the Arctic”*. Moreover, Helga mentioned that *“... questions, discussed at the Arctic Council meetings are usually quite general and are sometimes very far from urgent realities”*. She is followed by Andrey, thinking that the Arctic Council *“... should be dealing with more important issues”*.

Thus, most of research participants agree that at the certain moment the Arctic Council is not efficient enough. However, at the same time, they suggest the ways of increasing its

¹⁵⁶ From the interview with Sergey

¹⁵⁷ From the interview with Henrik

¹⁵⁸ From the interview with Egor

effectiveness by introducing a number of reforms and changes to the organization. Most of them suggest providing Arctic Council with more authority: “...*first and foremost decision-making authority obligatory for all the member-states*”.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, some of the informants suggest transforming the organization into a completely new international institution, serving as a governance body for the whole Arctic area:

*“It should become a governance institution for the whole Arctic space with its legislative, decision-making and executive powers. Therefore it can become an effective body to manage the Arctic”*¹⁶⁰

*“It has a potential of becoming an organization like European Union – a full governance body for a certain region. Maybe an Arctic Union or something like this”*¹⁶¹

Thus informants suggest the Arctic Council becoming a common governance body for the Arctic region, therefore expressing their expectations of the area making one step forward towards future evolution into Pluralistic Community of States by tending to have “political institutions of the member-states closely interconnected or are even common” which is, according to Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 5), one of the most crucial characteristics of such kind of zone of peace. Accordingly, research participants consider the Arctic Council as a potential institution which is likely to contribute for European Arctic and Arctic as a whole evolving to qualitatively new level of peace and becoming a Pluralistic Community of States.

5.4.2 Barents Regional Cooperation

According to research findings, not only Arctic Council is an important international organization in terms of peace. All the informants also stressed the role of Barents Regional cooperation in the process of establishing and sustaining peace in the European Arctic.

Remarkably, most of research participants were speaking about Barents Region in relation to international and cross-border cooperation in the area, thus, again, stressing its importance for peaceful Arctic development. As noted by Andrey, “*Barents Regional Cooperation represents the strongest type of international connections in the European Arctic [...] thus creating positive environment for developing peaceful co-existence in the region*”. He is followed by Helga, saying that “*...most effective international cooperation now is taking place within the*

¹⁵⁹ From the interview with Andrey

¹⁶⁰ From the interview with Alfred

¹⁶¹ From the interview with Sergey

Barents Region project” and Jonas, adding that “*Establishment of Barents cooperation has definitely had a huge impact peace in the European part of Arctic*”.

While describing the way Barents Euro-Arctic Region contributes to peace in the study region, research participants, again, stress the importance of international cooperation:

*“Governments understand that cooperation, such as Barents Regional cooperation, for example, is a better alternative to open conflict. Moreover, it’s quite obvious that countries can benefit more from cooperation, rather than from war. This is why confrontation is now replaced with cooperation.”*¹⁶²

*“Barents project shows that member-states prioritize cooperation to political confrontation. [...] This can even mean giving up their territory-extension ambitions in favor of effective political, economic, scientific, cultural and other types of cooperation.”*¹⁶³

Thus, research findings show that it is mainly cooperation “*in political, economic, cultural and human dimensions*”¹⁶⁴ that makes Barents Region initiative so important for peace in the European Arctic. Remarkably, this cooperation takes place on cross-border level, which emphasizes regional perspective’s contribution to peace by keeping all international conflicts and misunderstandings out of the area. However, cooperation is not the only peace-contributing factor about Barents project, which was mentioned by my informants. Henrik, for example, brings it to human perspective, claiming that “*Barents connections simply bring people together*”, followed by Helga developing his statement: “*It [Barents cooperation] provides contacts in many different spheres of life, ensuring better understanding between people, friendship and professional collaboration*”. She even relates it to old history, emphasizing that Barents initiative “*...arose historical connections in the North, reminded people of their common Northerners identity and opened the door for bringing this old historical cooperation to the new modern level*”. Among other factors making Barents Regional Cooperation valuable for peace in the European Arctic, informants named “*emerging political integration*”¹⁶⁵ opportunities provided by this initiative; and “*upcoming new prospects*”¹⁶⁶.

¹⁶² From the interview with Sergey

¹⁶³ From the interview with Anton

¹⁶⁴ From the interview with Jonas

¹⁶⁵ From the interview with Andrey

¹⁶⁶ From the interview with Hanna

When explaining the reasons of Barents Regional Cooperation initiatives becoming such an important platform for developing peace in the area interviewees go into history of its establishment. As noted by Egor “*Northern area needed an organization like that in order to fill up the vacuum which appeared after the break of Soviet Union*” Most of them recall long history of relations between Northern parts of Norway and Russia: “*Since it was a Norwegian initiative, I suppose, Norway was trying to bring back the old good days when cooperation with Russia was strong and effective. This history model could become the basis for establishing modern cooperation.*”¹⁶⁷ Some, however, argue that Barents initiative appeared because of fear and threat: “*Norway was afraid and did not know what to expect from the new neighbor from the East after the Soviet Union collapsed. For me this Norwegian initiative looks like an attempt to pacify newly-established Russia, and, apparently, it worked.*”¹⁶⁸ This, however, was just a single opinion; all the other informants agreed that Barents cooperation became so important for peaceful region development because of long historical connections and new promising opportunities.

Talking about the perspectives of Barents Cooperation, all the informants found it quite effective and promising: “*It is now working very good, I think, it has good future*”.¹⁶⁹ Remarkably, unlike Arctic Council example, no one of research participants suggested any changes in Barents Regional Cooperation structure or the way it functions, thus expressing their satisfaction with present functionality. Furthermore, interviewees expressed their hope for better future for the project: “*This is a wonderful initiative and I hope it will continue. It contributes not only to development of peace, but to development of the whole geographical area in all respects*”.¹⁷⁰

5.4.3 Other aspects of international cooperation

Among other aspects of international cooperation contributing to peace-building in the Arctic research participants mentioned The Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR)¹⁷¹ as an “*...important institution for having meetings at the parliamentary level [...] and discussing issues of cooperation and Arctic Council functionality.*”¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ From the interview with Jonas

¹⁶⁸ From the interview with Sergey

¹⁶⁹ From the interview with Helga

¹⁷⁰ From the interview with Henrik

¹⁷¹ CPAR is a parliamentary body comprising delegations appointed by the national parliaments of the Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, U.S.A.) and the European Parliament. The

The Northern Dimension¹⁷³ initiative also found a lot of support between the respondents. Jonas mentioned that it “...*not only promotes peaceful cooperation in the European part of the Arctic, but also brings European Union to the Arctic space and allows it to get involved into Arctic politics*”. Moreover Hanna expressed a big hope that “...*cooperation within the Northern Dimension policy will become stronger and make its contribution to peace there*”.

Simone also mentioned Nordic Council¹⁷⁴ as an “...*important arena for cooperation and meeting point for Nordic countries*”. She also mentioned that even though officially this institution is aimed at cooperation between Nordic countries “...*it also has a number of offices in Russia, thus including it into cooperation framework*”. Therefore Simone considers Nordic Council to “... *provide great opportunities for future cooperation in the European Arctic*”.

Thus these international initiatives, according to research participants, considerably contribute to peaceful international cooperation in the European Arctic. As concluded by Egor: “*There is a number of small and medium-scale international projects which actually also greatly contribute to cooperation in the region and its peaceful development*”.

5.5 Summary

In this Chapter I have focused on presenting and analyzing my fieldwork results. Research results indicate that informants consider territory to be no longer the main factor affecting peace in the European Arctic. Despite the fact, that territorial dispute between Russia and Norway upon delimitation of the Barents Sea previously could become a crucial issue for peace in the region, since it has been resolved upon the mutual agreement; research participants no longer consider it to be a peace-affecting issue. Moreover, they believe that its legal settlement has actually contributed to peace in the target region. Legal status of the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area around Svalbard is also perceived to be an issue which is hardly likely to affect peace in the European Arctic. Even though

conference also includes Permanent Participants representing Indigenous peoples, as well as observers. Source: <http://www.arcticparl.org/>

¹⁷² From the interview with Hanna

¹⁷³ The Northern Dimension refers to joint policy between EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. The ND Policy was initiated in 1999 and renewed in 2006. Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/north_dim/

¹⁷⁴ The Nordic Council is a geo-political inter-parliamentary forum for co-operation between the Nordic countries that was established after World War II. Its first concrete result was the introduction in 1952 of a common labour market and free movement across borders without passports for the countries' citizens. Source: <http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council>

delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is considered as a rather crucial one, informants believe that it will find its solution within the norms of existing international law and will not influence the state of peace in nearest future.

Research findings show that countries' territorial ambitions are actually now replaced by different kinds of cooperation in the European Arctic. Interviewees expressed the opinion that states today actually prioritize the benefits of international, cross-border and trans-border cooperation to their territory-expanding desires. Informants especially emphasize the role of such international initiatives as the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Region for peaceful cooperation in the target region. Arctic Council is referred as an organization of greatest importance for political integration and peace in the European Arctic. Moreover, informants relate their hopes for future common Arctic governance institution with this organization. Barents Euro-Arctic Region is called to be the ground institution for cooperation which contributed to ensuring peace in the target area.

In relation to zones of peace theory, research results indicate that European Arctic has made its way towards evolution from the zone of negative peace with countries' satisfaction with their territorial status quo due to existing international law to a zone of stable peace with countries staying away from violent conflict resolution with closer and more trustful relationships between them. At the same time informants consider the probability of violent conflict quite miserable and do not recognize it as a threat. However, interviewees agree that European Arctic nowadays cannot be regarded as pluralistic community of states. At the same time informants see some premises for the region to evolve to this new kind of zone of peace. They relate their hopes to developing political integration and some re-emerging common mentality.

Chapter 6. Summary and concluding remarks

Introduction

This thesis has focused on issues of territory and its influence on peace in the European Arctic. It was an attempt to provide individual reflections of people involved into processes of policy-making and cooperation in the region upon territorial disputes' influence on state of peace. Research has been based on ten qualitative semi-structured interviews. Concept of 'zones of peace' has been chosen to explain the connection between territorial issues and peaceful co-existence in the region. Three types of zones of peace have been used as theoretical framework to analyze reflections upon territory and peace in the European Arctic.

Summary of empirical research findings

The analysis of field narratives has shown that informants do not consider territorial factor as a key element determining peace in the European Arctic. Even though territorial disputes in the region are still considered to be of great importance, they are not perceived as ones affecting peace greatly. None of territorial issues existing in contemporary European Arctic has been referred to be a serious threat for peace in the study area. Territorial dispute over Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area around Svalbard has been described as a matter of economic interest and "geopolitical ambitions" rather than a serious threat to peace in the region. Problem of delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, even though being a rather sensitive one, have also been considered to be rather unlikely to affect peace in the study area as informants agreed it will be solved according to the international law within the time being. Thus, research participants expressed their expectations for peaceful dispute settlement in respect to international law, therefore agreeing that territorial issues are quite unlikely to affect peace in the European Arctic. Moreover, successful border dispute settlement between Russia and Norway has been found to be actually a case contributing not only to relations between two countries, but also to peace and stability in the European Arctic.

Research findings have also shown that the actual reason why countries put their territorial ambitions aside is their desire to benefit from mutual international cooperation. Cooperation has been referred to be the main peace-contributing factor in the European Arctic which managed to replace territorial confrontation. Moreover different kinds of international cooperation have been recognized as driving force for peace-building process in the region

and its benefits have been referred to be of extreme value. States' aspiration to seek for cooperation instead of confrontation on the regional level in the European Arctic is one of the main research findings of this thesis.

Analysis of field narratives has also shown that in terms of international and cross-border cooperation research participants prioritize institutions of the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Region. BEAR has been referred as one of the most effective body for cross-border collaboration between Northern countries in the European Arctic. Its projects have been described as effective, long-going and peace-contributing. Arctic Council, at the same time, has been recognized as an important governance body not only for the European Arctic, but for the whole Arctic area. However, it has been agreed that the Arctic Council could become a more effective institution in terms of peace and governance in contemporary Arctic. Informants suggested it should obtain bigger authority in relation to Arctic governance and decision-making. Moreover, interviewees suggested Arctic Council transforming into a qualitatively new kind of organization comprising functions of common Arctic governance, thus making political institutions of Arctic member-states closely interconnected.

Research findings also demonstrate that state of peace in the European Arctic is quite an interesting phenomenon. Region has successfully managed to transform from the zone of negative peace it used to be in times of Cold War, when relations in the area were characterized by mere absence of war due to respect to existing international law, to the zone of stable peace characterized by countries staying away from violent conflict resolution with closer and more trustful relationships between them. In this case international cooperation, once again, served as a driving force for peace-evolution and even territorial misunderstandings did not affect the process. Possibility of violent conflict in the region, at the same time, has been proven to be miserably small and suggested not to be taken into serious account. However, research has proven that due to certain amount of reasons, such as lack of political integration and interdependence, and absence of clear common identity; European Arctic unfortunately fails to be regarded as pluralistic community of states. However, research has identified some premises for regions' possible evolution to this kind of zone of peace, which are: some kind of historically-shared common mentality, emerging desire for deeper political integration and stable expectations for peaceful change.

Analytical contributions

This research has sought to bring better understanding the state of peace in the European Arctic. It is my hope that this study has contributed to this research area. I have tried to give an insight into perceptions of peace in the European Arctic and how peace is influenced by territorial issues. My hope is that this study provides a more detailed picture of international relations in the area, explains nature of peace there and suggests ways of ensuring region's peaceful future. My findings demonstrate that territorial ambitions are now replaced by aspiration for effective cooperation which contributes to peace and stability in the region. Therefore these issues can become the subject of further research.

Suggestions for further research

As research findings indicate, territory is actually not a key factor determining peace in contemporary European Arctic. International connections in the region are more deep and complex and territorial ambitions today are replaced by countries' desire for cooperation and joint Arctic development. Therefore, in my view, further research should be directed towards studying different aspects of cooperation and its influence towards peace in the European Arctic. Moreover, as current research has emphasized the role of international organizations in relation to peace, I recommend studying these issues deeper by taking them as separate units of analysis.

Furthermore, study results have shown a certain tendency for European Arctic's possible future evolution from zone of stable peace to pluralistic community of states. Thus further research can also focus on deeper investigation of this process and describing how and why region managed/failed to evolve into a qualitatively new state of zone of peace in future.

Literature

- Archer, Clive, and David Scrivener. 1986. *Northern Waters*. 1st ed. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble.
- Archer, Clive, and Pertti Joenniemi. 2003. *The Nordic Peace*. 1st ed. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate.
- Brosnan, Ian G, Thomas M Leschine, and Edward L Miles. 2011. 'Cooperation Or Conflict In A Changing Arctic?'. *Ocean Development & International Law* 42 (1-2): 173--210.
- Bryman, Alan. 2008. *Social Research Methods*. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Denzin, Norman K, and Michael D Giardina. 2009. *Qualitative Inquiry And Social Justice*. 1st ed. Walnut Creek, Calif.: Left Coast Press.
- Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Canada, 1996)
- Einarsson, N'iels, Nym, Joan Larsen, Annika Nilsson, and Oran R Young. 2004. 'Arctic Human Development Report'. *Stefansson Arctic Institute*.
- Erikson, Erik H. 1968. *Identity, Youth, And Crisis*. 1st ed. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Feldman, Martha S, Jeannine Bell, and Michele Tracy Berger. 2003. *Gaining Access*. 1st ed. Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press.
- Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: SAGE Publication Ltd.
- Glesne, Corrine. 2006. *Becoming Qualitative Researchers*. 1st ed. Boston: Pearson/Allyn & Bacon.
- Gubrium, Jaber F, and James A Holstein. 2002. *Handbook Of Interview Research*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Harsem, Oistein, Arne Eide, and Knut Heen. 2011. 'Factors Influencing Future Oil And Gas Prospects In The Arctic'. *Energy Policy* 39 (12): 8037--8045.
- Heckathorn, Douglas D. 2002. 'Respondent-Driven Sampling II: Deriving Valid Population Estimates From Chain-Referral Samples Of Hidden Populations'. *Social Problems* 49 (1): 11--34.
- Henriksen, Tore, and Geir Ulfstein. 2011. 'Maritime Delimitation In The Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty'. *Ocean Development & International Law* 42 (1-2): 1--21.
- Hønneland, Geir. 2003. *Russia And The West*. 1st ed. London: Routledge.
- Kacowicz, Arie M. 1995. 'Explaining Zones Of Peace: Democracies As Satisfied Powers?'. *Journal Of Peace Research* 32 (3): 265--276.
- Kacowicz, Arie M. 1997. 'Third World Zones Of Peace'. *Peace Review* 9 (2): 169--176.

- Kvale, Steinar. 1996. *Interviews*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Liamputtong, Pranee. 2008. *Doing Cross-Cultural Research*. 1st ed. [Dordrecht]: Springer.
- Miall, Hugh, 2007. *Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mikkelsen, Aslaug, and Oluf Langhelle. 2008. *Arctic Oil And Gas*. 1st ed. London: Routledge.
- Odendahl, Teresa, and Aileen M. Shaw. "15. Interviewing Elites." *Handbook of Interview Research*. Ed. Jaber F. Gubrium, and James A. Holstein. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2001.
- Pedersen, Torbjorn. 2008. 'The Dynamics Of Svalbard Diplomacy'. *Diplomacy And Statecraft* 19 (2): 236--262.
- Rayfuse, Rosemary. 2007. 'Melting Moments: The Future Of Polar Oceans Governance In A Warming World'. *Review Of European Community & International Environmental Law* 16 (2): 196--216.
- Riste, O. 2003. *Norway's Foreign Relations: A History*. / Russian translation by Korobochkina M. Moscow: Ves Mir.
- Rubin, Herbert J, and Irene Rubin. 2005. *Qualitative Interviewing*. 1st ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Stokke, Olav Schram, and Ola Tunander. 1994. *The Barents Region*. 1st ed. London: SAGE.
- Tanaka, Yoshifumi. 2011. 'Reflections On Arctic Maritime Delimitations: A Comparative Analysis Between The Case Law And State Practice'. *Nordic Journal Of International Law* 80 (4): 459--484.
- Timtchenko, Leonid. 1997. 'The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past And Present'. *Arctic* 50 (1): 29--35.
- Traner, Helena. 2011. 'Resolving Arctic Sovereignty From A Scandinavian Perspective'. *Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.* 44: 497--525
- Wegge, Njord. 2011. 'The Political Order In The Arctic: Power Structures, Regimes And Influence'. *Polar Record* 47 (02): 165--176.
- Young, Oran R. 2011. 'The Future Of The Arctic: Cauldron Of Conflict Or Zone Of Peace?'. *International Affairs* 87 (1): 185--193.
- Young, Oran R. 2004. 'Review Of Negotiating The Arctic: The Construction Of An International Region, By ECH Keskitalo'. *Polar Research* 23 (2): 211--213.
- Åtland, K. 2007. "The European Arctic after the Cold War: how can we analyze it in terms of security?" Rapport for Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2 February 2007.
- Åtland K. 2010. *Security implications of climate change in the Arctic*. FFI-Rapport 2010,

1097, 15.

Internet news sources and websites

Afterposten (12.10.2011) *Her går delelinjen*

<http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article3625442.ece#.U3TUcygkR2A> [Visited 21 November 2012]

Arkticheskie ekspedicii na russkom severe <http://www.paulsen.ru/onlinepro/polar/rupolar> [Visited 18 December 2012]

BBC News World (22.09.2010) *The struggle for Arctic riches.*

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11381773> [Visited 10 December 2011]

Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians <http://www.arcticparl.org/> [Visited 05 January 2014]

Cooperation in the Barents region <http://www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region/Cooperation> [Visited 21 November 2012]

Definitions of the Arctic <http://portlets.arcticportal.org/definitions-of-the-arctic> [Visited 10 October 2012]

Fakta om Tromsø <http://www.visitnorway.com/en/Where-to-go/North/Tromso/Key-facts/> [Visited 18 December 2012]

Russia beyond the headlines (13.05.2013) *Arkhangelsk – Science’s gateway to the North.*

http://rbth.co.uk/travel/2013/05/12/arkhangelsk_sciences_gateway_to_the_north_25889.html [Visited 28 November 2013]

The Barents Euro-Arctic Region. Cooperation and visions of the North.

<http://www.founorrboten.se/download/18.54d7ab81114cbc561f98000223/Barents+Euro-Arctic+Region.pdf> [Visited 21 November 2012]

The Fram Centre <http://www.framsenteret.no/english.150370.no.html> [Visited 18 December 2012]

The Nordic Council – Nordic Cooperation <http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council> [Visited 05 January 2014]

UiT The Arctic University of Norway

http://en.uit.no/om/art?p_document_id=343547&dim=179040 [Visited 28 November 2013]

Vzglyad (10 October 2011) *Nebyvaloe chislo arestov.*

<http://vz.ru/economy/2011/10/10/529145.html> [Visited 21 November 2012]

What is the Northern Dimension? http://eeas.europa.eu/north_dim/ [Visited 05 January 2014]