“Two Schools Under One Roof”
The divided education in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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1. Introduction

The Balkans has long been known as one of the conflict-ridden areas of Europe. Even today, in the wake of all tragic events of the previous century and in spite of the tangible progress of building civil societies, the region is still very much pervaded by tensions and nationalistic sentiments. Bosnia, being the country without a pronounced ethnic majority and ethnically and politically divided is thereby a potential hotbed for new conflicts. The aim of this thesis is to establish the connection of the current school system in Bosnia and its possible implications on the relations between the three constituent peoples.

Given the history of tensions between the three peoples in Bosnia and the current political system, primarily devised to bring peace to the country, which divides the country along the ethnic and political lines, one has to wonder whether future conflicts are possible and what circumstances might lead to them. The peace in Bosnia was reached through the Dayton agreement in 1995, following the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the end of World War II. The country was effectively split into two entities, one belonging to Bosnian Serbs and another one for Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks and Croats. The entity called The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is further split into numerous cantons in order to preserve the autonomy of the ethnic groups. Even though the war drastically changed the composition of what had previously been a much more mixed population in many towns and regions of the country, there are still numerous pockets of mixed population. The state also depends on the joint decisions of the representatives of all three peoples. In that kind of climate with the ethnic principle being at the core of the entire system, the question that naturally poses itself is what type of messages, young people get through the educational system in relation to Bosnian statehood, history of three of its biggest ethnic groups, the overall history of The Balkans and both Yugoslav states, as well as the perception of the two other respective peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The phenomenon that I took a particular interest in, is known in the Bosnian media as “two schools under one roof”, where students of different ethnicities go to separate schools that happen to be symbolically located in the same building. The same could be said about the entire state where students of different ethnicities attend school in accordance with different curricula for the so called, “national group of subjects” including subjects such as history,
language, geography and religion. When it comes to the subject of history, the students are presented with different versions of the same historical event depending on their ethnicity. Hence, the division is not just physical but it also manifests itself within the study content. The question is whether this school division can have a negative impact on the ethnic relations in the future as well as the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is nearly impossible to provide an answer to this question but an insight into the study content of history textbooks intended for children of different ethnic and religious background in Bosnia and Herzegovina can provide us with an idea of just how severe and deep the existing divisions are and lead us to some assumptions in relation to the future of the Bosnian society. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis I looked into the history textbooks used by the three constituent peoples in Bosnia (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs). I also conducted fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to conduct interviews with people linked with schools and this particular issue.

The main principle on which this division of schools is based is the linguistic difference with each of the three peoples adhering to their own linguistic standard of what was previously known as Serbo-Croatian in Yugoslavia (more about the linguistic issues and how they related to numerous changes of political systems on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be addressed later). Given that the parents and grandparents of these students went to schools together without any kind of ethnically based segregation in place, one has to wonder whether the current split is necessary and how it affects the overall ethnic relations between young people. While the physical phenomenon of “two schools under the same roof” exists in several towns in Bosnia, it could also be said, that speaking proverbially, Bosnia and Herzegovina itself has three “schools” under the same “roof” that the statehood represents.

1.1. Research Questions

These are the research questions, the answers of which I will try to reach through the analysis of history textbooks and interviews and personal observations from my fieldwork:

How integrative are the schools?

How are other ethnic groups portrayed in the history textbooks?
Are historical events portrayed in irreconcilable ways?

How are new collective narratives constructed through history textbooks?

How are the relations between one’s own and other nations presented in the text book?

How accepting are the students of possible teachers of different ethnic backgrounds and whether the teachers of different ethnic background can be hired?

What are the conditions under which, the contact between students of different ethnic groups occurs?

1.2 Personal background

I feel that it is of great importance to spare a few words about myself, my own sense of identity and the reasons why I decided to tackle this topic. I was born in Socialist Yugoslavia in 1984, in a small town of Jagodina, situated in central Serbia, only 120 kilometres south of Belgrade. When the war broke out in Yugoslavia, I was only 7 years old and I feel that these events came to shape a lot of my future attitudes towards the issues related to politics, conflicts and human rights. The war in 1991 and 1992 broke out in Croatia and Bosnia (with a couple of days of hostilities in Slovenia as well) which means that I grew up with the war as seen on television rather than actually experiencing it myself. However, one particular event during the war left a very indelible mark on me, even if it was very minor in the grand scope of things. When the war broke out in Croatia, Yugoslav National Army sent its troops to the Croatian border town of Vukovar. This event also triggered a state-forced mobilization of citizens. My father was among those who were recruited and he was dispatched to the border between Serbia and Croatia. Fortunately, he did not take part in any immediate clashes with the Croatian forces and spent only two months at the border due to a large number of newly-mobilized soldiers’ wives (my mother among them) demanding that their husbands be brought home. I remember that this particular episode left a very profound emotional scar on me. The fact that I had to worry for my father’s life and the fact that he was forcefully taken to the war-zone by the state made me ardently opposed to the militarization of the society. During this period I also realised that there were different nations living in Yugoslavia and that some of these, or more precisely put, parts of these nations were engaged
in a very brutal conflict. While I was subjected to the merciless propaganda depicting the others as vile, I still managed to question it, I assume, mainly due to the fact that my own parents were never overly nationalistic, not even in those turbulent times when a great majority of people were only given partial information to base their views on. My ethnicity is Serbian but given all the negative sentiments that are being linked with one’s nationality in the Balkans, I do not exhibit a particular interest in identifying as a Serb. It is simply something that accidently occurred and which is in that regard, much in the same vein as my own name and surname. However, I understand the importance of the ethnic identity for many people, especially those whose very existence was jeopardized solely because of their ethnicity. Still, I find ethnic divisions and antagonisms in The Balkans very futile and deeply tragic, particularly in the context of the unnecessary horrors that took place in the region. I find the national identity to be a very efficient tool of manipulation in The Balkans and that’s my prime motivation for this particular thesis. I understand that some of my own assumptions might amount to nothing but my own personal bias but I still deem it worthy to look into the issue and come out with a deeper understanding of the ethnic relations in Bosnia. In spite of the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina shares a lot of common heritage with Serbia and the rest of former Yugoslavia, I am not familiar with the country outside what I could learn from the media and talking to Bosnians living in Serbia. I think this distance can help me look at the issue more objectively but I am also fully aware that my anti-nationalistic stance may prove to be problematic.

2. Historical and political Background

2.1 The first Slavic states in the Balkans

In order to contextualize the circumstances of the Bosnian educational system and society today, one has to get a better grasp of the historical background behind them. The Balkans region has been a subject to a couple of highly intense and atrocious conflicts in the 20th century. The ethnic composition was such that it often had various nationalisms at odds with each other in their aspirations to create greater national states. The Slavic population originally settled on the peninsula in the 7th century. Soon enough the first Slavic states were established, Croatia in 910 at Biograd when Byzantine recognized its ruler Tomislav as an attempt to diminish Venice’s political influence, and Serbia in 1180 when Serbs’ ruler, župan Nemanja, managed to found an independent Serbian state after a serious humiliation inflicted
by Byzantine (Lampe 1996:14,16). Bosnian medieval state was originally set between these two states (Lampe 1996:18). These medieval states did not last long. While Croatia succumbed to the Hungarian rule as early as 1102, Serbian state went through the stage of great expansion under tsar Dusan in the 14th century only to fall completely under the Ottoman rule in 1459. (Lampe 1996:15,18) Bosnian state outlasted these two just to be conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1489 (Lampe 1996:19). For centuries these territories were effectively split between The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. These states arguably set the template for the first Yugoslav states as they introduced the medieval model for political integration in South-Eastern Europe as “a loosely structured, multi-ethnic empire, rather than a centralized state based on national identity.” (Lampe 1996:14)

2.2. The legacy of The Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, and the Yugoslav idea

In the 18th and 19th century the Habsburg monarchy was growing in power, while The Ottoman Empire was going through the period of turmoil and instability (Rogel 1998:3). The independent Serbian state eventually emerged from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire while the western parts of what would become Yugoslavia (Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina) stayed within Austro-Hungary until the end of World War I (Rogel 1998:3). Having endured sizable losses in World War I, Serbia emerged triumphant and the Yugoslav idea finally came to fruition (Rogel 1998:7,8). As I pointed out one could easily see the whole Yugoslav project as a response to two vast multicultural empires that ruled the region, Austro-Hungary in particular. Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of the Ottoman territories for the most part of the previous centuries. However, it was given to Austro-Hungary to administer following the congress of Berlin in 1878 which eventually lead to more tense relations between Austro-Hungary and Serbia that culminated with the assassination of the archduke Franz Ferdinand triggering World War I, with Austro-Hungary proclaiming war against Serbia.

Obviously, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a major importance for the region, not solely because of its geographical characteristics but also due to its political significance in relation to the awakening of the national movements of South Slavs in the wake of similar nationalist movements emerging throughout the continent. The question of Bosnian identity and what Bosnia historically meant to Serbia and Croatia alike is rather elaborate. Basically, both Serbian and Croatian collective narratives saw Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of their larger states. The Ottoman presence also lead to the massive conversion to Islam, hence making the
question of Bosnian identity even more complex with three different confessions having a considerable presence in the region. Given these complexities, and a mixed composition of the population that was initially split on the confessional basis only for each of the three major groups to start identifying with a separate national identity, Bosnia remained undefined for a long time. In regards to this issue, it is the question of one group’s identity that added the significant amount of confusion to it. The Muslim population in Bosnia had a rather interesting position compared to two other main confessional and ethnic groups. Namely, it was very tightly connected to the Ottoman Empire which set it apart in historical sense, especially in relation to defining its own national and ethnic identity (Glenny 1992:120).

*The Slav Moslems of Bosnia are the only nation, certainly in Europe and possibly the world, who are nominally identified by their religion and not language or ethnicity. Most are Slavs, Croats and Serbs, who are converted during the five centuries of Ottoman rule in Bosnia, although doubtless there is a rich mix if Turkish, Albanian, Jewish and Egyptian blood as well, given the ethnic fluidity of Ottoman Empire structures. Before the collapse of the Porte’s rule, the Moslems were identifiable as land-owning aristocracy, that is they were associated with class and religion rather than nationhood. For many centuries, Bosnia’s rulers, local and regional, came from this class, while other Balkan nations were very busy creating and the nurturing a modern national identity in the nineteenth century, The Bosnian Moslems had no need to—they were already established as the privileged of the region. It was not until the inter-war period that the Moslems began to transcend their religious and class origins and instead to assume their national identity(Glenny 1992:140)*

At the time when Glenny wrote this Bosnians Muslims started to identify themselves as Bosniaks (Bošnjak), hence assuming a particular name for their ethnicity rather than being solely identified by religion as was the case in Yugoslavia. Bearing this three-fold identity of Bosnians, with the ever-present claim that Bosnian Muslims originally come from both Serbian and Croatian ancestry, it can be argued that Yugoslav idea worked particularly in favour of Bosnia and Herzegovina reconciling various ethnic and religious aspirations.

The Austrian annexation 1909 also shed light on many conflicting political and national agendas that revolved around Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia clearly expressed its discontent with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria which was met with hostility on part of Croatian Peasant Party Leader, Stjepan Radić (Lampe 1996:86) He accused Serbian politicians of “megalomania” and its government for “trying to incite a war
between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire” (Lampe 1996:86). He also saw Serbia as the primary obstacle towards having the third South-Slavic unit within the monarchy (Lampe 1996:86). The struggles for self-determination under the Austro-Hungarian rule united South Slavs in the region and gave momentum to the Yugoslav idea. Under the political circumstances of the time, the most Slavs could do was “...to press for cultural advances and limited political autonomy within Austria-Hungary”(Rogel 1998:6) This incited a concerted effort on part of Serbian and Croatian Slavs as they felt that the Yugoslav idea, or the idea of another South-Slavic unit within the monarchy would get them a greater political leverage (Rogel 1998:6) The students of Zagreb and Sarajevo soon turned to violent measures in order to express their discontent (Lampe 1996:88). The Croat-Serbian Progressive Youth movement was founded in Zagreb, “and struck out on their own after 1910” (Lampe 1996:88) This movement organized several strikes and attempted to assassinate the Ban and other Austro-Hungarian officials. (Lampe 1996:88). “Beyond a commitment to individual terrorism, their romantic revolutionary notion of Yugoslavism set them apart” (Lampe 1996:88). This was favourably looked upon in Belgrade, even though Belgrade’s heightened interest in Yugoslavism only emerged later following The Balkans war as its prime goal at the time was expending Serbian territories southward toward Ottoman Macedonia in which it had several other contestants (Lampe 1996:88). Bosnia and Herzegovina proved to be the stronghold of the Yugoslav movement(Lampe 1996:88). The most prominent and influential Yugoslav movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina was Young Bosnia, initially derived from “…literary or patriotic organizations that the Narodna Odbrana from Belgrade and the Croatian Catholic Church from Zagreb had encouraged as exclusivist Serb or Croat organizations” (Lampe 1996:88). This organization organized and carried out the assassination of the arch-duke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 after which Austro-Hungary declared war against Serbia. And while it is still heavily discussed what kind of connections Young Bosnia had with Serbia and the Union and Death agents in Serbia, historian, Wayne Vuchinich “...credits the Young Bosnians with converting some Union and Death agents members from the idea of Great Serbia to Yugoslavism” (Lampe 1996:89) All these events show what the idea of Yugoslavia meant in political terms and how it transformed Serbian and Croatian nationalism into an idea that could appease both sides, and provide them with more leverage against major powers in the region. Bosnian Yugoslavism was the only idea that the three religious and ethnic group could agree on, “vaguely defined as the only possible solution to the nationality problem in that province, a solution that both of the two Yugoslavias failed to find” (Lampe 1996:89)
2.3. World War I and the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

One month following the assassination of arch-duke, Franz Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Very soon this war escalated into a European war for reasons unrelated to The Balkans alone (Rogel 1998:7) “European great rivalries had been building for decades, Among the most important was the Austrian-Russian one over control of the Balkans, where the Ottoman state was dying”. As the tides started to turn in favour of the Allied forces, so did the support in favour of the Yugoslav idea gained more support in South-Slavic parts of the Habsburg monarchy (Lampe 1996:106).

As for Bosnia, under the leadership of General Sarkotic, who was of Croatian descent, the Austro-Hungarian army carried arrests and deportations against Bosnian citizens of Serbian descent who they would accuse of aiding and supporting Serbia mobilizing Bosnian Croats and Muslim to persecute Serbian civilians (Lampe 1996:106) There were approximately 5,000 Serbs incarcerated in camps and some were executed under the charges of aiding Serbia (Lampe 1998:106). These draconian measures eventually only gave rise to Yugoslavism as the war was drawing closer to its end (Lampe 1996:106).

As Serbia emerged triumphant from World War I, the Yugoslav idea finally materialized as the map of Europe was decided on in Paris in 1919. The principle of self-determination guided the decisions and the representatives of South Slavs opted for a single state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Rogel 1998:8). The single state of South Slavs was eventually established in December 1918, named Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with the Serbian king at its helm (Rogel 1998:8). However, the new state was fraught with difficulties in its very infancy. Namely, Serbia emerged as part of the winning side, having suffered tremendous losses in the war (Rogel 1998:8). Therefore, a great number of Serbs felt that the new state was an enlargement of Serbia, “…a fortuitous fulfilment fulfillment of the Greater Serbia idea” (Rogel 1998:8).

There were also numerous divisions in the newly-founded state, mainly between the parts that used to belong to the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia due to the fact that many of former Austro-Hungarian citizens fought for Austro-Hungary, even if some of them eventually defected to the other side (Roger 1998:8,9). The state had a very poor infrastructure and much of its roads and railroads were now all but useless as they were
connected to the states that had become hostile neighbours such as Italy, Austria and Hungary (Rogel 1998:9). A lot of the political tensions surfaced as a result of Serbia establishing Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a centralist state rather than a federation of its peoples (Rogel 1998:8,9). It was extremely difficult to establish a single functional economy due to the devastation of resources and the underdeveloped industry with the much of the industry located in former Austro-Hungarian parts which were now detached from its previous markets (Rogel 1998:9). Due to these factors, the existence of the state was marked with disputes between two main ethnic groups, Serbs and Croats (Lampe 1996). Several violent and tragic events occurred amidst these tensions. One of the most prominent Croatian politicians, Stjepan Radic, was shot in the parliament by a Serbian radical which led to king instating royal dictatorship (Rogel 1998:10). The parliament was dismissed and only “Yugoslav” parties were allowed in the political life of the country. These events led to the assassination of King Alexander in France in 1934 as there were booming illegal political activities working together against the King’s regime (Lampe 1998).

There were also serious religion-related issues around this time mainly concerning Bosnian Muslims who protested against 1929 laws “that abolished their religious community’s hard-won Autonomous Statute of 1909 in favor of the single Islamic community for the country.” Effectively, they were deprived of the right to elect their own administrative bodies and were grouped together with Macedonian Turks and Kosovo Albanians with whom they had no historical and ethnic ties. (Lampe 1996:165). As the Kingdom was a centralized state, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not exist as a single unit and it was eventually split by Serbs and Croats when, in 1939, the prime minister Cvetkovic struck a deal on territorial reorganization with Croatian political leader Vladko Macek seeking to finally find the solution that would appease Croats and respond to their interest in the state (Lampe 1996). A single Croatian administrative and territorial unit was founded encompassing a great part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Lampe 1996:191). The deal was reached at the expense of Bosnian Muslims whose numbers were not even taken into consideration when deciding on the administrative borders as only the ratio of Serbs and Croats served as the criterium (Lampe 1996:1992). Bearing this in mind, we see how various ethnic interests collided in Bosnia, especially considering how the standing of each of the main three ethnic and religious group changed depending on political and historical events that took place. While Serbs and Croats were less privileged than Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) in the Ottoman Empire, Serbs and Croats were obviously favoured in the newly found state in which Muslims were not even regarded a separate nation. Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also heavily persecuted.
during World War I, only to assume the leading position in Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom of Yugoslavia). However World War II would bring another set of new circumstances that would yet again alter the relations between the ethnic groups.

2.4 World War II and the Bosnian question

“The Bosnian question was reformulated in 1941, when the Axis powers occupied Yugoslavia and created an entirely new political order across the whole country.” (Hoare 2007:199). Upon conquering Yugoslavia, Germany initially decided to leave the question of Bosnia to Italy. (Hoare 2007:199). However, eventually it ended up being part of the Croatian puppet state NDH (Independent state of Croatia) while Italy seized the coastal parts of Croatian territories such as Dalmatia (Hoare 2007:200). The Croatian Ustasha regime saw Bosnia as an integral and important part of the new Germany-sponsored new state and denied the existence of any other nation on its soil except its own (Hoare 2007:201). Thus, the Bosnian Muslims were proclaimed Croats of Islamic faith and NDH emphasized the significance of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the new states, particularly trying to appeal to Bosnian Muslim population, claiming it would solely remain free within the boundaries of the new state (Hoare 2007:201). The Ustasha regime went as far as planning to move the capitol from Zagreb to Banja Luka in Bosnia and Herzegovina but this was never carried out due to Serbian uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hoare 2007:201). Having conceded Dalmatia to Italy NDH tried its best to portray Bosnia and Herzegovina as its main gain calling it the heart of the country (Hoare 2007:201,202).

The existence of Serbian ethnicity was completely denied by the Ustasha regime (Hoare 2007:201). Serbs were openly persecuted and expelled across the border (Lampe 1996:206). According to German estimates from 1941, around 140 000 Serbs were banished to Serbia, while it is also assumed that there were at least 40 000 more unaccounted for. (Lampe 1996:206). Once the Ustasha regime (Independent State of Croatia) could not carry out any more expulsions due to Germany closing borders, it resorted to massive killings of Serbs and conversions into Catholic faith or the newly found Croatian Orthodox Church (Lampe 1996:207). This Ustasha genocide led to the Serbs fighting back in armed resistance and despite the deeply driven wedges between the three peoples of Bosnia, many Croats and Muslims fought alongside Serbs as there were many friendship and kinship bonds between the members of these three groups (Lampe 1996:207). “Croats and Muslims sheltered and protected Serbs from the Ustashas, Serbs would shelter and protect Muslims and Croats-first
from pogromist elements among the Serb rebels and later from the Chetniks, the Serb-nationalist guerillas who embarked upon a genocide of their own against non-Serbs” (Lampe 1996:207).

It has to be noted that the situation in Yugoslavia during World War II was highly complex involving numerous fractions fighting or collaborating with each other (Rogel 1998:11). The Partisans were organized by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and were the most prominent and the only viable resistance movement and the other two prominent movements were Serbian guerilla fighters led by General Dragoslav Mihailovic that were initially endorsed by the Yugoslav government in exile and the Allies but lost their support due to inactivity and collaboration with the Germans, and Croatian Ustashe who represented the nazi puppet state of Croatia, known as The Independent State of Croatia and who carried out a brutal genocide against Jews, Serbs and Gypsies (Lampe 1996). Germans also installed Serbian fascists in power in Serbia thus adding another fraction into equation (Rogel 1998:11) Effectively there was a civil war raging on between these various fractions representing different political views as well as different nationalistic movements.

2.5. The second Yugoslavia

Following the war and the victory of The Partisan under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito and backed by The Allies, Yugoslavia was established as a federal state of six republics, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro (Rogel 1998:12). This was the first times since its medieval state that Bosnia was given statehood, becoming one of the six republics within the federation.

The most intense struggle of the war had taken place there, and many Bosnians had fought committedly for a new kind of Yugoslavia. Tito needed this kind of commitment, for both Croats and Serbs had failed the first Yugoslavia (Croats supported separatism, while the Serbs’ regime fled and Mihailovic’s forces collaborated with the occupiers). The new government thus bet a great deal on this Bosnia-Herzegovinian republic and even made it the basis of its defense system and established the bulk of Yugoslavia’s munitions industry there (Rogel 1998:12)

With its multiculturalism and mixture of confessions and ethnicities, Bosnia represented the essence of the new state that was envisioned as a more balanced union of
South Slavs. Yet, despite the establishment of a federal state with each of its peoples enjoying a great degree of autonomy, the second socialist Yugoslavia was still marked with a great number of tensions between different constituents. One of the communist parties’ original goals was “…to erase all ethnic attachments, not only to the groups as currently defined—Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and so forth— but also to the South Slav conglomerate” (Ramet 1992:23). However, non-Serbs felt increasingly threatened by the Serbian influence, given that there was a feeling that Serbian elite took upon themselves the role of a “big brother” in the new state (Ramet 1992:23). Despite the efforts to suppress it, nationalism still persisted. There were numerous economic and social inequalities between the regions and republics of Yugoslavia (Ramet 1992:27). There seemed to be a particular rift between the developed North, the economy of which was reminiscent of Austria and the less developed south that bore similarities to southern Italy or Albania (Ramet 1992:27). Many interregional and inter-republic rivalries would stem from this rift and very often the politicians used ethnicity to mobilize people against the central power (Ramet 1992:26).
Following Tito’s death, the split between the republics became much deeper as “…there was no one strong enough to stand for the whole” (Rogel 1998:18). Slobodan Milosevic became the leader of the Serbian communists in 1987 and very soon upon seizing power, limited the autonomy of two Serbian autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo “..by pushing constitutional amendments through the provincial assemblies, which had been packed with Milosevic cronies”(Rogel 1998:20). This brought them a huge popularity and gave rise to Serbian nationalism which started to trouble the other republics (Rogel 1998:20). Slovenes were particularly concerned about Serbian nationalism and became its greatest opponent (Rogel 1998:20) The final split between the Slovenes and Croats on one side and Serbs led by Milovisic on the other, occurred at Yugoslav communist congress in Belgrade in January 1990 (Rogel 1998:20). Both Slovenian and Croatian delegations left the meeting. (Rogel 1998:20).

Shortly following this dramatic split, each of the republics held their first multi-party elections in 1990. The election results did not bode well for the country, as Milosevic and his newly found party of former communists won in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman, a well-known
nationalistic dissident and his CDU won the elections in Croatia following the campaign that “…recalled for some of the tone of the World War II Croat Ustasha excesses” and Bosnians voted predominantly for nationalistic parties of all three constituent peoples in Bosnia (Rogel 1998: 21, 22). Following a series of attempts to reform the union with Croats and Slovenes proposing the concept of loose confederation, these Northern Republics started working on their new constitutions (Rogel 1998:23). Encouraged by Milosevic, the vast Serbian population of Croatia decided to secede from Croatia in March 1991 and form their own autonomous province, hoping to join Serbia one day (Rogel 1998:24). With this development, things turned violent when Croat police tried to stop them and Yugoslav National Army intervened, at that point firmly controlled by Milosevic who used votes of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro in the federal presidency to hijack the power (Rogel 1998:24). With violence already breaking out in Croatia, Bosnia held its independence referendum in February 1992 with most of the Serbian population boycotting the referendum, 63 per cent of the electorate voting and 99.4 percent voting in favor of the independence (Hoare 2007:363). As a response to this, the SDS, the leading Serbian party in Bosnia at that time, set up barricades in Sarajevo, thus fanning the already-existing flames (Hoare 2007:363).

The war in Bosnia started in April 1992, five days before the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “…when the paramilitary ‘Tigers’ of the Serbian warlord Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan occupied the north-eastern town of Bijeljina.” (Hoare 2007:364). Shortly later, Yugoslav National Army, an effectively Serbian army at the time, got involved occupying Sarajevo airport and bombarding the town of Mostar (Hoare 2007:364). Initially the main opposing sides in the war were Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian government (Rogel 1998:32). Bosnian government had a very small armed force of only 50000 people while Bosnian Serbs had an army of 80 000 soldiers and Yugoslav National Army to back them up (Rogel 1998:32). The conflict was mainly characterized by the policy of Ethnic cleansing, which was first carried out in eastern Croatia in 1991 (Rogel 1998:33) The Bosnian Muslims were mostly affected by this policy. “The policy in Bosnia, implemented first in Muslim villages, began with harassing and terrorizing local inhabitants (civilians), many of whom, fearing for their lives, left voluntarily. The less fortunate were tortured, raped, mutilated, and murdered; their homes and other property were confiscated” (Rogel 1998:33).

This organized violence escalated to the cases of genocide, most notably by the end of the war, during the summer of 1995 when Bosnian Serb forces executed 6000 men in the town of Srebrenica. (Rogel 1995:33). Eventually, with NATO intervening against Bosnian Serbs in 1994, the conflicting sides were brought to peace negotiations in October, 1995 at the
military base located near Dayton, Ohio (Rogel 1995:39).” The Dayton accord was the product of an international policy in a state of flux, between the policy of the pre-Srebrenica period, which aimed to appease Milosevic’s Serbia and dismember Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the policy that would increasingly predominate in the years after Dayton which sought to reunite Bosnia-Hercegovina and to end Serbia’s and Croatia’s interference in its internal affairs” (Hoare 2007:402). The main goal of the Dayton agreement was to achieve peace and the idea of re-establishing a multiethnic, multireligious society was pushed to the background (Rogel 1998:68). Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to take a look into the ethnic relations in Bosnia today and see whether the legacy of conflict might lead to new tensions in the region.

As it is evident from this short historical review of the events that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other territories of former Yugoslavia, the historical legacy is quite complex with different ethnic groups finding themselves in various positions of power throughout the last two centuries. We can also see that the ethnic relations cannot be shown through black and white dichotomy as they have proven to be quite complex showing various fluctuations in terms of how majorities of respective peoples perceived each other. Knowing this, we have to wonder where Bosnia and Herzegovina is heading today.
The conflict in Bosnia was finally terminated in November, 1995 after three respective sides had reached the joint agreement under the auspices of the International community in Dayton, Ohio. The U.S. pressured all three parties into accepting the agreement that none of the parties was satisfied with (Hoare 2007:398) “The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was formally dissolved and replaced with a nominal state called ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’, which the Bosnian Serb rebels and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were compelled to recognize” (Hoare 2007:398). The war-time division was acknowledged by the constitution of two entities within the country: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, encompassing 51% of the territory and controlled by Bosnian Muslims and Croats and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) (not to be confused with the Republic of Serbia which is an independent country) encompassing 49% of the territory (Hoare 2007:398). The problem with the Dayton
Agreement is that it essentially served a single purpose of ending the conflict. “Based on the Contact Group plan that gave the Federation 51 per cent of territory and the RS 49 per cent, Dayton brought fighting to an end, in itself a considerable achievement. But as a model of reconciliation and for rebuilding a shattered society, it was and remains severely limited” (Glenny 1999:651). Glenny (1999:652) believes that the only thing that keeps the country together is the foreign military presence and that the country would inevitably dissolve if the international troops were to leave the country. The country is effectively split along the ethnic lines which manifests itself in nearly every aspect of the society. "While the agreement preserves the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia, it devolves exceptional autonomy to the two entities. Not only do they exercise authority over major aspects of state governance within their respective regions-including economic development, taxation, justice, education, communications, transportation and housing-but they are also permitted to maintain separate police and armed forces, subject to specified limitations” (Caplan 2000:219).

The entire state is set up in a manner that gives great autonomies to the ethnic groups, as well as ethnic elites. Moreover, the entity known as the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into ten separate cantons to ensure that both Croats and Bosniaks in each of these cantons also have the authority over education as well as other fields (Constitution of The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hoare (2007:399) claims that the Dayton agreement was also the international community’s legitimization of Serbian war-aims ensuring the separate entity for Serbs, the right that was not given to other two remaining ethnic groups that remain in the other federalized entity. “This discrepancy neatly symbolized the ambiguity of the international community’s policy: a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three entities could have marked its effective partition; the inclusion of the Serb within the Federation would have marked the country’s effective reunification; the two/entity policy seemed to do neither” (Hoare 2007:400). Another often voiced critic of the agreement revolves around the frailty of the new political construct that Bosnia and Herzegovina became in the wake of the Dayton agreement. “As successful as Dayton was at ending the violence, it also sowed the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system that undermined the state’s authority” (McMahon and Western 2009:70). In recent years, there has been a surge of ethnic nationalist rhetoric among the leaders of the three ethnic elites which had an adverse effect on the reforms (McMahon and Western 2009:70). The leaders are not capable to agree on the political structure of the country, with the leader of the Serb Republic openly advocating for secession (McMahon and Western 2009:70). Political representatives of the Croats also call for a broader autonomy of their people (McMahon and Western
It is this question of the political system and its viability and sustainability that leads to the part of the problems that are inherent in the Bosnian school system. The country was designed in such a way to keep parties separated and yet retain the full sovereignty without any of the parties having the right to legally leave the union. Initially the Dayton accord was widely seen as a success and Bosnia was “...the poster child for international reconstruction efforts” (McMahon and Western 2009:69). However, the Dayton agreement proved to have structural weaknesses which is why it can also be perceived as an obstacle to peace (Caplan 2000:222). Caplan (2000) lists four structural weaknesses.

First, although the accord ostensibly supports a unitary Bosnian state, its provisions constitute effective partition and make the task of reintegration more difficult to achieve. Second, the accord reaffirms ethnic, as opposed to civic, principles of political organization which in turn reinforce the very logic that has sustained the war. Third, the accord places greater emphasis on the military aspects of peace building, including the redress of violations of fundamental human rights. Finally the process of political, social and economic reconstruction which the accord envisages is so accelerated that it threatens to undermine its own objectives. (Caplan 2000:222,223)

All this clearly points to the difficulties of forging a common sense of nationhood and citizenship which in turn also reflects on organizing education as well as the curricula. The question that naturally poses itself is how much space there is left for tolerance and acceptance to be promoted in schools when there are still lingering animosities on the state level as well as very strong separatist tendencies. Is it in the interest of the current political elites to advocate for a school system that would forge the unity and the sense of common identity among three peoples of Bosnia?

2.8. The current political climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In order to address the issue of divided education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is significant to understand the current political context and how it relates to possible issues stemming from the current educational system. As previously stated, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very complex state due to the Dayton Agreement which sought to reconcile the
differences between the parties involved by offering a wide autonomy to each one of them with all the common political decisions hinging on consensus between the three parties. It seems that nowadays, almost twenty years after the end of the war, to some this agreement seems to be disputable and outdated, while the others see it as the sole way to retain their rights. There are also voices calling for the separation of two entities and the dissolution of the Bosnian state due to its lack of functionality. I will try to illustrate the current political relations between the entities through several newspaper interviews given by leading Bosnian politicians.

In the interview given on September 15th, 2011, Milorad Dodik, the president of the Serb Republic (one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to be confused with the Republic of Serbia) stated the following about centralization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the influence of the international community and Dayton agreement:

* Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state trying to obtain its authority by having various foreigners advocating its existence. Naturally, this is a problem as there is no basic internal consensus about what Bosnia and Herzegovina should be. We have never been particularly excited about the idea of being inside Bosnia and Herzegovina ("we" refers to Serb Republic, one of the entities comprising Bosnia), but we accepted the Dayton peace accord and wanted to live on the basis of how Dayton agreement defined Bosnia and Herzegovina as a con-federal state, comprising two entities and three peoples. In the meantime, many foreigners have tried to introduce some of their innovations in relation to the political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has led to fatigue. There is no way to refresh the political scene in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the grounds of old international community’s ideas- imposing the solution or building a centralized state, centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is an impossible and illusory operation that certainly will not succeed.

Dodik was further asked about the Dayton Agreement. “Given that you are talking about EU’s arrogance, can it be understood as arrogant that you firmly cling onto something that did not simply come from the sky, and that is the peace agreement, created during the war. Is it good for the Serb Republic to operate eternally under the Dayton agreement? Are circumstances not changing?”

1 * Interview with Milorad Dodik, http://tacno.net/interview/intervju-milorad-dodik-nema-zajednicke-
Dodik replied: “Hypothetically speaking, the best option for the Serb Republic would be to be an independent state and to have its own path towards EU. We would have been the regional leader in that respect a long time ago”. Further on, Dodik addressed the issue of the common state: “There is no common state if people do not perceive it that way. Here we have three political options divided, three political and national cultures… Neither Croats nor Serbs are happy to be within Bosnia, while Bosniaks are discontent for not having whole Bosnia (and Herzegovina). These are things that remain constant here, these are the existing relations, whether someone likes them or not”. Further on he states that 78 % of citizens in the Serb Republic endorse independence but he also states his commitment to the Dayton agreement as it is the Dayton agreement that grants special rights and autonomy to the Serb Republic.²

Another article that provides a good insight in the current situation in Bosnia is Slavoj Žižek’s analysis of recent social protests in Bosnia, published on February 10th, 2014 in The Guardian as “Anger in Bosnia, but this time, people can read their leader’s ethnic lies“. Žižek states the following about the ethnic leaders and protesters: “It is against this background that one should understand the latest events in Bosnia. In one of the photos from the protests, we see the demonstrators waving three flags side by side: Bosnian, Serb, Croat, expressing the will to ignore ethnic differences. In short, we are dealing with a rebellion against nationalist elites: the people of Bosnia have finally understood who their true enemy is: not other ethnic groups, but their own leaders who pretend to protect them from others. It is as if the old and much-abused Titoist motto of the "brotherhood and unity" of Yugoslav nations acquired new actuality“ (Žižek, The Guardian 10.02.2014).

As we can see from this statement, there is a belief that it suits the political elites to keep the country divided along the ethnic lines. The same conclusion can be drawn from Dodik’s interview where he as a president of one the entities talks about the dissolution of Bosnia as a step in the right direction despite showing awareness that such action is not possible and legal at the moment. He states it clearly that the people themselves do not see Bosnia as the common state of all peoples. One could argue that Dodik encourages separatism which is much in line in Zizek’s analysis according to which Bosnian leader use ethnic and nationalist sentiments to stay in power. The question is whether such political climate allows for the desegregation of schools and working towards a more unified curriculum in certain subjects.

In an editorial under the title „Lost in Dayton“ from the Serbian daily newspaper, Danas, published on November 21st, 2013, there is an analysis of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 years after the signing the Dayton accord. „Since the end of the war Bosnia and Herzegovina has been in permanent political crisis, which has been unsuccessfully dealt with, first with the imposition of the decisions of the high representatives of the international community (the high representative is a person appointed by the U.N. to monitor the implementation of the Dayton accord), and later with political leaders trying to agree on the future of their country on their own, which is facing difficulties due to polarized views and different interests. The economic and social crisis goes hand in hand with the political one.

Forbes made a claim in October that Bosnia and Herzegovina was an economic hell on Earth, reminding that this country had the highest unemployment rate in its region - 43.3%. The division along the ethnic and religious lines persists and the apex of the absurdity is the fact that the original document of the Dayton accord is lost” (Danas, 21.11.2013) ³

Stipe Mesic, former president of Croatia, recently proposed the reform of the Dayton accord, calling it Dayton 2. He proposed conceiving Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state of citizens fully divided into multi-ethnic cantons. “In the meantime, the concept of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be prepared, based on the premise that it will be a state of citizens, divided into several multiethnic-cantons, with the central government which will actually be what it name says it is and which will have secured equal representation of the three constituent peoples, without the exclusion of those citizens not belonging to them” ⁴

The current Serbian president Tomislav Nikolic stated in 2012 that Bosnia was a dysfunctional state that was slowly disappearing before our eyes.⁵ It is obvious that there is a vast discrepancy in the way Bosnia and Herzegovina is perceived by numerous political agents. The ethnic division is often pointed out as one of the main obstacles on Bosnia’s path towards economic recovery and the reason for its lack of functionality. We also see that some political agents such as Milorad Dodik, the president of the Serb Republic, and Tomislav Nikolic, the president of Serbia anticipate the dissolution of Bosnia due to its lack of functionality. On the other hand, there are proposals such as one made by Stipe Mesic to change the constitution and the political system so that it would not hinge on citizens’ ethnicity. It is interesting that both sides here agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is at the

³ http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/dijalog/izgubljeni_u_dejtonu.46.html?news_id=271614
⁴ Stipe Mesic in Mostar, 07.03.2013, Slobodna Evropa, ethttp://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/mesi%C4%87-iznio-svoj-prijedlog-preure%C4%91enja-bih-dejton-2/25289620.htmlmhnic division.
⁵ http://www.6yka.com/, 22.10.2012
moment, is not a functional state, yet there is an impression that some see it as a justification for dissolution of the country whereas some see the necessity to change the system through a series of reforms that would eradicate ethnic divisions and unite the people. Concluding from Dodik’s statement, there is not enough willingness on the top levels of the entity governments to carry out any reforms that would drastically change the post-Dayton situation and therefore the country is essentially stuck with status quo with ethnic divisions being the social and political norm. The question is whether the divisions in school could be removed in such climate that openly encourages ethnic and political division.

2.9. The issue of the language

One of the main reasons provided for the ethnically divided schools and curricula is the language. This is in many ways a controversial question due to the linguistic properties of said languages (Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian). Former Yugoslavia had a very liberal language policy. Even small minority groups such as Bulgarians for instance had significant media coverage in their mother tongue (Ramet 1992:55). Children of all nationalities were entitled to the education in their mother tongue (Ramet 1992:55).” Yugoslavia recognized three official languages: Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. Because of mutual sensitivity to differences of orthography, spelling, and vocabulary, the Serbian and Croatian variants of Serbo-Croatian were usually both given, that is to say, they were treated as distinct languages for legal purposes” (Ramet 1992:56). Basically Serbo-Croatian was considered a single language with two different standards, each properly acknowledged by the state. Bearing this in mind, there were no divisions in schools between the speakers of this language regardless of their ethnic background. Nowadays, the situation in Bosnia is such that these differences between the standards are an issue of national identification and hence deemed very important. It is also stated as one of the prime reason for divisions in schools despite the fact that there is nearly absolute mutual intelligibility. This is an extremely sensitive issue as any stance that might be taken can be construed as political (that these are in fact the same language due to its intelligibility, or that they are different as they are used slightly differently by members of different ethnicity).

Greenberg (2004:8) talks about the language as the marker of ethnic identity in former Yugoslavia which was characterized by ethnically mixed population that did not fully match the republic borders. He claims that “…the language component of ethnic identity in ex-Yugoslavia cannot be interpreted in terms of ‘an objective attachment’ (Greenberg 2004:8).
He further states that Yugoslavia’s rival ethnic groups could never fully agree on the name of the language they spoke (Greenberg 2004:8). He addresses the demise of the Serbo-Croatian language and the emergence of its four successor languages (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin) and the speakers’ attitude towards the language name:

In the 1990s, member of the four ethnic groups had to choose which successor languages they felt allegiance to. Some expatriates still subscribe to the notion that they are speakers of Serbo-Croatian, while Serbs who lived through the siege of Sarajevo may reject their own “ethnic” Serbian language and claim they speak Bosnian. In Montenegro, those individuals supporting an independent Montenegro assert that they speak Montenegrin, while pro-Serbian, self-identified Montenegrins say they speak Serbian. These language choices are subjective and politically motivated, and have little relation to whether or not the four ethnic groups truly have four separate languages or varieties of a single language. (Greenberg 2004: 9).

Greenberg also recounts the history of Serbo-Croatian starting with 1850 agreement in Vienna where several Serbian, Croatian intellectuals agreed on a single language for South Slavic people based on the principle of one language for one people (Greenberg 2004:9). Greenberg further claims that the problem arose when in the future Yugoslav states, these Southern Slavs were recognized as three of four peoples but “…were still supposed to speak a single language” (Greenberg 2004:10). According to Greenberg, the linguistic nationalism in Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia in the sixties and Serbia in the eighties, came as a result of this denial of each people having their separate language (Greenberg 2004:11).

This issue still seems relevant in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is clearly shown through school divisions. While the mutual intelligibility is nearly absolute, the political, ethnic and cultural implications of the language usage seem to be deemed extremely important. On the other hand, there are voices who consider dividing children in schools on the basis of speaking different languages unjustified as, according to them this is still a single language. One of such people is Croatian linguist, Snjezana Kordic. At the discussion named “The language that connects us and separates us” organized by Croatian PEN center in November, 2013, Kordic said: ” Today, here, we have speakers from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina but I don’t see any booths for simultaneous translation. I also don’t see any headphones on anyone’s ears. That is not normal given that children are being divided in schools, in separate classes, in Sandzak, in Vojvodina, in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and they are preparing to do the same in Montenegro on the grounds that these are foreign
languages, the languages that you have severe difficulties understanding” (“Pola ure culture”, 20.11.2013, broadcast by HRT, Croatian Radio Television”).

In her book, Language and nationalism, Snjezana Kordic claims that all these variants are the same language with polycentric standards, and she compares it to other such languages as German, Spanish and English (Kordic 2010). Kordic says that the number of differences between the standard languages in Bosnia and Herzegovna, Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro is significantly small compared to everything that is equal in the standard languages of these countries (Kordic 2010:80). She also mentions that the differences between the dialects of these respective languages are greater that the differences between the national standards (Kordic 2010:80). She cites another linguist, Raecke, who claims that all three names for the language (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian) denote the same thing and that the problems stem from the fact that different names suggest that they are different language (Raecke in Kordic 2010:125). She also cites Mieldig who concludes that people from the towns of former Yugoslavia whether it’s Zagreb, Belgrade or Sarajevo essentially speak the local version of their language regardless of their ethnicity and hence there might be different name for what is essentially the same local variant of this language (Mieldig in Kordic 2010:127).

The question that poses itself is whether these slight lingual differences are indeed a sufficient reason for introducing ethnic divisions. This is especially relevant due to the fact that there was not such thing for speakers of these languages before the war despite the well-acknowledged difference between the then two existing variants. Nowadays, due to the national and ethnic identification of the independent states that emerged from Yugoslavia, we have as many as four variants or languages (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian and Montenegrin), the first three of which are official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Judging by the linguists’ opinions stated here, we can only conclude that the differences primarily bear the political significance as there are not any real lingual barriers that would not allow for integrated classrooms. In that sense, we can see how the lingual differences are being used as an instrument of division.
3. Literature Overview

The topic of divided education in Bosnia has been relevant for almost two decades. There have been a solid number of articles written on the topic. In this literature overview, I will focus on several of these and provide a brief insight into their essence.

Gordana Bozic wrote an article in English, “Reeducating the Hearts of Bosnian Students: An Essay on Some Aspects of Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina” in 2006. The article is based on a case study of a multiethnic school in Popov Most in eastern Bosnia. It delves into the influence of politics in “…creation and maintenance of segregated schools” (Bozic 2006:319). Bozic concludes that during and following the war Bosnian children were reeducated “…through biased and ideologically driven interpretations of history, geography, language, and literature. (Bozic 2006: 341). However she points out her study case as a positive example in many ways with parents and teachers encouraging cooperation among children and trying to avoid politicizing the classroom (Bozic 2006:341).

One of the teachers also made sure that the controversial topics would not serve as the basis for children’s quarrels and thus gave assignment from two different text-books, Serbian and Bosniak (Bozic 2006:341). However, only Bosniak students were provided with two different perspectives (Bozic 2006:341). Bozic goes further pointing out the positive sides of the case she looked into:” It is the multiethnic character of the community in general, whereby both parents and children interact outside the school environment that facilitates intergroup contact among students” (Bozic 2006:341). She also suggests that the teachers should be encouraged to teach both “national subjects” (history, literature) and “general subjects” together for both groups included (Bozic 2006:341). She proposes a special teachers’ training that would help teachers introduce different perspectives to their students (Bozic 2006:342).

“Since the textbook revision is a long and painful political and educational issue, teachers dealing with multiethnic classes can make a difference, if trained to teach critically from a textbook printed by any constituent group. This will also facilitate the future transition from the notion of ‘national subjects’ to just ‘school subject’ (Bozic 2006:342)

Safia Swimelar published an article called, “Education in Post-War Bosnia: The Nexus of Societal Security, Identity and Nationalism” in 2012. She discusses the problem of divided education in Bosnia in terms of societal security. She sees the current divided educational system as a potential threat for the security of groups as well as the Bosnian state itself, “…understood in terms of national cohesiveness and territorial integrity” (Swimelar 2012:161). She also points out the problem of students learning exclusively about their own
ethnic group’s narrative, history, culture and religion (Swimelar 2012:162). She also touches upon “the two schools under the same roof” phenomenon mentioning that in such cases students of different ethnicities had a very minimal contact (Swimelar 2012:162). She further argues that the societal security dilemma “…appears when the attempts of one group to attain societal security and promote its identity through cultural and rhetorical means lead to perceptions of insecurity by another group, which then attempts to also support its identity and gain security through similar means.” She further states that education in Bosnia “…characterized by separate and often conflicting nationalisms of the three ethnonational groups or constituent people” (Swimelar 2012:167). According to Swimelar, “…nationalism is often manifested as a call for human rights, specifically invoked in their particular context as cultural or group rights, such as the right of a group to be educated in its own language, to have public support for its cultural preservation, and the right to cultural autonomy…” (Swimelar 2012:167). She sees the connection between the claim of these rights and an “…attempt to control the narratives of the past…” manifested in history books, street names and public symbols (Swimelar 2012:167). She also talks about the languages which are seen as the main reason for segregation with each group insisting on education in their own language. She points out that the have concluded that the difference between the three languages (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian) “…is even less than 5%, even closer than the difference between American English and British English” (Fischer in Swimelar 2012:167). Swimelar claims that insisting on these small differences and peculiarities lead to exclusion and show how collective rights in this case “…can work at cross purposes with universal human rights that strive for more civic ideals, non-discrimination and inclusion.”

In conclusion, Swimelar says: “While the granting of education and language group right to Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia could lead to protection of group identity (and dignity) and thus a sense of security among individual groups, the potential exists that these very measures have created insecurity for other groups (and their own attempts to gain security) and insecurity at the level of the Bosnian state” (Swimelar 2012:176). She also points out that the politicians in Bosnia use culture as an instrument for short-term political gain (Swimelar 2012:176) and that education is “…one of the last areas where politicians still have a strong grip and they don’t want to let go” (Clark in Swimelar 2012:176).

Lidija Kolouh-Westin addresses Bosnian curricula and textbooks and their relation to democratic values and human rights values in her article, “Education and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, published in 2004. She claims that the primary school curriculum does not emphasize democratic values and human rights (Koulouh-Westin 2004:505). She
also claims that teachers are not given enough freedom and that they do not “actively participate in influencing the contents” (Koulouh-Westin 2004:505). They are given a list of tasks that have to be fulfilled within a given time frame” (Koulouh-Westin 2004:505). She also emphasizes two contradictory dimensions in the curriculum text: the international vs national/ethnic orientation and the modern vs. traditional orientation (Koulouh-Westin 2004:505). “On one hand, modernity and new technologies are emphasized, but on the other hand, traditionalism, moral education, family values and an emphasis on the historical and religious past are stressed. The concept of ethnic nationalism in the contents of education is also visible, such as the focus on the national subjects, the differentiation of the three main national languages and the rebuilding of a national (and ‘ethnified’) identity. (Koulouh-Westin 2004:506)

Her final conclusion is that human rights and democracy are presented mostly in negative form, “…the student is given a negative model of these topics” (Koulouh Westin 2004:506). She also notices how “…personal traits of the individual related to patriotism, struggle for freedom and social justice are more valued than individual traits beneficial to the individual, i.e. personal autonomy, critical thinking, self-esteem, and individual initiative” (Koulouh Westin 2004:506). It is worth noting that the textbooks that Kolouh Westing analyzed were used before 2001.

An American of Bosnian descent, Azra Hromadzic writes about the case of integration of the Mostar Gymnasium, the same school where I failed to get access to the staff and students. In her article, “Discourse of Integration and Practices of reunification at the Mostar Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina”, she talks about the attempts to reintegrate the gymnasium and simultaneous segregation taking place within the community and its schools. She also touches upon lingual differences and peculiarities and the sensitivity of this issue. “This integrationist model could lead to a ‘mixing’ of languages, which is seen as a dangerous first step on the road of national destruction. Mixing of languages is especially forbidden in the context of ethnic segregation and national purity. For most Croats, the ‘mixed’ Serbo-Croat language symbolizes the legacy of the Serb hegemony in the former Yugoslavia.” (Hromadzic 2008:556).

Hromadzic points out two approaches “…for shaping post-conflict political and social design in B&H-the integrationist approach favored by the IC and the segregationist model supported by the local ethnonationalists…” (Hromadzic 2008:560). She points out the Mostar Gymnasium as the place where these two approaches clash (Hromadzic 2008:560). “The school embodies the paradoxical spirit of the Dayton Peace agreement, where simultaneous
segregation (in the name of ethnic group’s survival) and unification (in the name of democratization, reconciliation, and the common national identity) of citizens takes place” (Hromadzic 2008:560). She establishes that international community’s efforts to integrate school failed due to their lack of understanding of “…the social implications of integration for the local communities, especially theCroats” (Hromadzic 2008:560). Hromadzic mentions an IC officer who claims that the issue of integration was “…also perceived as a matter of the groups’ cultural and social survival” (Hromadzic 2008:560).

Still, she also mentions positive developments that happened in the school after she had already completed her research. Namely, an integrated computer science class, and the mixed international school that started to work within the Mostar Gymnasium (Hromadzic 2008:560, 561).

Wayne Nelles also looked into Bosnian education as a security issue in his article, “Bosnian education for security and peacebuilding?”. This study was done in 2006. Nelles concludes: “It may be too early to assess education reforms as a substantive contribution to preventing future violence or sustaining civil and regional peace. But many local community and national leaders working with international agencies appear to be nurturing valuable initiatives. “(Nelles 2006:236). Nelles expresses cautious optimism and he also states that there is not “…easily shared criteria to measure education’s contribution to local and school-based violence prevention specifically or to national and regional peacebuilding more broadly”(Nelles 2006:236). Nelles in the end calls for more collaboration and research on the part of international agencies and scholars working with local Bosnian universities and other educational institutions such as research centers and teacher-training institutes (Nelles 2006:238)

Apart from these articles a couple of comprehensive studies have been conducted by local NGOs in cooperation with their international partners. In 2007, Fond otvoreno drustvo BiH (Fund for open society Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Centar za policy studije (Center for policy studies), both based in Sarajevo conducted a research on the views of parents and students on the values contained in curricula and textbooks. The authors of this research paper are Dzenana Trbic and Snjezana Kojic Hasanagic. The goal of the research was to find out parents’ and students’ views on (1) essential principals that the education system promotes and (2) the application of these principals in the national group of subjects (history, literature, geography, native language and literature, religion) (Trbic and Kojic Hasanagic 2007:11). The research included 1 080 students and 1 056 parents.
Another notable research was conducted by Unicef. It was carried out by a group of authors (Dr. Vladimir Turjačanin, Dr. Jadranka Kolenović-Dapo, Dr. Sabina Čehajić-Clancy, Dr. Ervin Poljac, Mr. sci. Milenko Kordić, Meliha Alić, Branka Inić, Nadežda Radić) and published in 2009 under the title “Podijeljene skole u Bosni i Hercegovini” (Divided schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Besides the phenomenon of “two schools under the same roof”, this research cites other problems of the Bosnian education system such as the existence of several curricula, the lack of compliance with certain legal regulations and fear that the unified educational system for students of different ethnicities can lead to the loss of national and ethnic identity (Turjacanin et al. 2009:4). This research looks into different attitudes displayed by students, teachers, parents and other agents involved in the educational system, the content of the curricula and textbooks and the institutional and legal framework within which schools operate.

4. Theory

4.1 Collective narratives, ethnic identity and history textbooks

The history textbooks analyzed in this thesis mainly serve to showcase the current processes of constructing collective narratives in the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. These narratives are not of recent date as they are based on numerous historical events from the past. However, they did reemerge preceding and following the conflict and they are arguably constructed in a way to respond to particular nationalist political agendas. These narratives can be manipulated to deepen the rift between the ethnic groups or bolster cooperation. In that sense, they are of prime importance in providing young students with a wider frame of social relations. Backed by the educational institutions that bear a great amount of social and moral authority, the narratives constructed through history lectures cannot be neglected in terms of their impact on overall ethnic and social relations.

In his article on comparison of history schoolbooks in Cyprus, Cypriot Professor Yannis Papadakis (2008) addresses the difference between the new and old approaches of teaching history in Cyprus. The old, standard way of teaching sees nation as a homogenous primordial entity whereas “…the new approach significantly traces the emergence of national identity in Cyprus during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries according to a social-constructivist paradigm” (Papadakis 2008:129). According to Papadakis, the standard model of teaching history in Cyprus pursues “…‘identification stance’ that is,
‘stories of national origins and historic turning points [that] can create a sense of group membership and allegiance, and historic societal achievements [that] can be used to justify contemporary social arrangements or political actions” (Papadakis 2008:129). Contrary to that, the new approach that traces back the origin of the national identity provides a view that allows for “…the possibility of making choices regarding political allegiance in the present” (Papadakis 2008:129). Essentially, we have two approaches that differ in their implications on the students’ mindset, one that is based on facts and leaves room for interpretation and another one which is aimed at forging the sense of group membership serving to justify the current social and political status quo. Professor, Gavriel Salomon (2004), the peace researcher at the University of Haifa in Israel, touches upon the similar issues discussing the collective narratives in relation to peace education. “Collective narratives of groups in conflict—their perceived histories, beliefs, self-image, and those of their adversaries—play a central role in interpreting and fueling the conflict—and, thus, can play an equally central role in facilitating coexistence.” (Salomon 2004:273). Salomon gives the following definition of collective narratives relying on Bruner: “Collective narratives are the comprehensive collection of stories, beliefs, aspirations, histories, and current explanations that a group holds about itself and about its surroundings. Collective narratives are social constructions that coherently interrelate a sequence of historical and current events; they are accounts of a community’s collective experiences, embodied in its belief system and represent the collective’s symbolically constructed shared identity” (Bruner in Salomon, 2004:274). The problem arises when we have two or more conflicting collective narratives, with one delegitimizing the other, “…its pains, its sufferings, its history, and its aspirations” (Salomon 2004: 273). According to Salomon(2004:273), this delegitimization should be targeted for coexistence to be promoted through education. This is the reason, one of the main objectives of this thesis is to put history books to scrutiny and examine the way these different portrayals of the same historical events contradict or match each other, whether the representation is such that it delegitimizes the other’s narrative in a way that might be a potential basis for ethnic strife or social and political instability within the country.

The collective narratives of groups tend to contradict each other and provide “…interpretations of events that negate those on the other side” (Solomon 2004:277). “Thus, whereas a group’s collective narrative bolsters the group’s self-identity and justifies its role in the conflict, it, also, invalidates the other side’s” (Solomon 2004:277). A collective narrative “…gains its centrality in response to the political events while serving, among other functions, as a coping mechanism to strengthen a community’s resolve in the face of adverse
and traumatic events” (Rouhana & Bar-Tal in Salomon 2004:274). This can be applied to the Bosnian context as well with the trauma of war still pervading the society. This is why the messages that permeate the media, politics and education are central to the existing tensions in Bosnia, today.

In his book Culture, Identity, and Politics, Ernest Gellner cites Ernest Renan saying that nationalism brings people together on the basis of shared past and common memories (Gellner 1987:6). In addition, Renan makes a claim that “…a shared amnesia, a collective forgetfulness is as essential for the emergence of what we now consider to be a nation” (Gellner 1987:6). While Gellner and Renan mainly refer to the nation forming process and selective memories related to the time preceding the nation’s emergence, this concept can also be applied to modern day nationalism especially in those areas prone to border changes and dissolutions such as former Yugoslavia. In this respect, the selective and biased presentations of history play a major role in the forging of young people’s identities. As Papadakis (2008:129) points out in relation to history curricula in Cyprus, the traditional way of teaching history has the nation staged as the main hero of a long narrative and the students are called to identify with this hero. This is where forgetfulness plays an important role as facts get carefully dissected and cherry-picked so as to suit the desired outcome of the narrative and present the nation, as an almost infallible hero.

“A nation is a large collection of men such that its members identify with the collectivity without being acquainted with its other members, and without identifying in any important way with sub-groups of that collectivity” (Gellner 1987:6). This abstraction of the national identity allows for the simplification of the others as it relegates a group of people to particular identifying features while easily disregarding the others. In this sense, if teaching history portrays events through simple binary opposition and the personification of the nation, the others might be perceived and relegated to a simple role as attributed by the history textbooks or other sources of collective narratives. This leads to the questions of how the other ethnic groups are represented in the textbooks, and how divergent the perspectives covering the same historical events are.

4.2. Intergroup contact theory

I am focusing on The Intergroup contact theory because I believe that this theory addresses both the current situation in Bosnian schools as well as offering the possible solutions. One of my research questions deals with possible contacts that the students of
different ethnic groups in Bosnia engage in within the school environment as well as external environment. In this light, I find “the intergroup contact theory” pertinent to my research questions, as it addresses not just the fact that the absence of contact is a major hindrance in reducing prejudice and animosity, but it also prescribes the necessary conditions under which contacts produce positive outcomes. In a society that is fundamentally split along the ethnic lines in the aftermath of war such as the Bosnian one, the students of different ethnicities need much more than just a plain outlet to get together. Given that one of the main purposes of the education is to socialize children and integrate them into a wider society that goes beyond family units and encompasses the local community as well as the sense of citizenship, the educational system plays a crucial role in defining the social relations through the study content as well as the physical setting of schools.

Bearing these things in mind, I use the intergroup contact theory to shed light on the importance of intergroup contact itself, showing numerous positive effects of such initiatives. I also use “the intergroup contact theory” to showcase how the system itself relates to the factors prescribed as necessary prerequisites for the contact to be successful.

4.2.1 History of Intergroup contact theory and Allport’s hypothesis

Before Allport introduced his Contact Hypothesis in his book The Nature of Prejudice, there were other authors suggesting that intergroup contact could reduce prejudice (Dovidio et al. 2003:6). Zeligs and Henderickson looked into “…the relationship between several individual difference factors, including self-reported degree of acquaintance, and attitudes toward 39 different racial groups” (Dovidio et al. 2003:6). Another important work that contributed to the development of the intergroup contact theory was Robin Williams Jr.’s book, “The Reduction of intergroup tension” (Pettigrew 2011:5). “He stressed that many variables would influence contact’s effects on prejudice-such as the relative status of the participants, the social milieu, the level of prior prejudice, the duration of the contact, and the amount of the competition between the groups in the situation” (Pettigrew 2011:5). He pointed out four conditions that lead to the contact’s positive effects: “…(1) the two groups share similar status, interests, and tasks; (2) the situation fosters personal, intimate intergroup contact: (3) the participants do not fit the stereotyped conceptions of their groups; (4) and the activities cut across group lines.” (Pettigrew 2011:5).

Following World War II, there was a heightened interest in facilitating intergroup contact as a consequence of the horrors of the war which had been rooted in hatred and bigotry towards various groups with Holocaust being the most atrocious example of this (Pettigrew 2011:3). This resulted in the human relations movement in the United States,
which held a very firm belief in intergroup contact as the means to suppress prejudice and negative stereotypes (Pettigrew 2011:3) However they did not put any effort into introducing institutional changes that would “…enhance intergroup contact and combat discrimination in jobs, housing and education”(Pettigrew 2011:4). They idealistically thought that the contact with the other group as well as learning about it would suffice (Pettigrew 2011:4). However, contact alone is not sufficient to reduce prejudice and alter the existing perception. There are many factors besides sheer ignorance of another group, that perpetuate prejudice such as “…situational and institutional barriers” (Pettigrew 2011:4). Therefore, the conditions under which the contact occurs, play a very important role as well as we can see from Williams’ hypothesis as well. However, there were numerous studies that showed that contact could indeed be beneficial for eradicating prejudice and facilitating tolerance and understanding and these studies cited a variety of examples which all took place under particular conditions. For instance there were works delving into the relations between black and white soldiers during World War II, which showed that the white soldiers who fought alongside black soldiers had a significantly less prejudiced view of African-Americans (Singer and Stouffer in Dovidio et al. 2003:6). Another good example were black and white seamen who sailed “…under conditions of mutual interdependence” and with each voyage the interracial attitudes became more positive (Brophy in Dovidio et al. 2003:6 ). These examples indicate that in order for intergroup contact to yield positive results, there have to be certain conditions that will place members of both group on an equal footing and allow them to recognize a common interest. It is for this reason that The Human Relations movement was not entirely successful. In the first case, there was not enough understanding for the necessity of providing a certain framework that would ensure that each group felt the equal importance, whereas in the second case, the very fact that the soldiers were detached from their societies and placed in a situation where they were equally dependent on each other and thus held the same status helped them recognize each other as peers and equals.

This was also recognized by Allport, who defined intergroup contact theory in his book, The Nature of Prejudice(1954) . Allport’s Intergroup hypothesis states:

*Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e. by law, custom, or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to*
the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups. (Allport 1954:281)

All these issues are also pertinent to the case of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While there are fewer environments with mixed population compared to the pre-war times, there are still environments such as Mostar where children of different ethnic groups use the same premises. It is important to know whether these students are deprived of mutual contact and thus unable to have any kind of intergroup contact which might be essential to reducing bias. If contact exists, it is important to see the conditions under which it occurs and whether the members of different groups are brought together in a manner that allows them closer identification with each other and sets them on equal footing.

Allport also states that in order for contact and acquaintance programs to be fully effective, they should “…lead to a sense of equality in social status, should occur in ordinary purposeful pursuits, avoid artificiality, and if possible enjoy the sanction of the community in which they occur” (Allport 1958: 454). He states the importance of members of different groups to have a genuine and deep bond and feel they are part of the team (Allport 1958:454). Initially, the intergroup contact theorists found four factors to be crucial for the formulation of the contact hypothesis: cooperation, equal status among the participants, individualized contact, institutional support (Stephan et Stephan 1996:64). Allport cites four prerequisite features that influence reduction of the intergroup conflict: “(1) equal status; (2) intergroup cooperation; (3) common goals; and (4) support of authorities, law, or custom” (Dovidio et al 2003:7).

For cooperation to succeed, its outcome has to be positive; measures have to be taken to ensure that negative effects of different levels of task ability are avoided; both groups have a similar attitude; and that social categories are not made salient by assignments (Stephan et Stephan 1996:64). The problem with cooperation alone is that the change in the attitude toward some outgroup members brought about by successful cooperation might not translate to the overall attitude toward the outgroup (Stephan et Stephan 1996:64).

The different social status that majority and minority groups hold can have an immensely grave impact on intergroup contact. “From the perspective of members of the minority status groups, regular reminders of their group’s devalued status may become enduring features of the intergroup relationship, whereas members of majority status groups may deem these features less relevant to the intergroup relationship” (Tropp et Pettigrew 2005:952). The majority and minority status groups also tend to perceive the intergroup
contact differently due to their unequal status (Tropp et Pettigrew 2005:951).” Relative to members of minority status groups, members of majority status groups are generally less inclined to reflect on their group’s privileged status or to think themselves in terms of their group membership, unless there are demands to do so in the immediate social context” (Tropp et Pettigrew 2005:951). Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) conducted a meta-analytical study looking into relationships between intergroup contact and prejudice among minority and majority status group and reached the conclusion that even though intergroup contact proved to reduce the prejudice, the results “…indicate that contact-prejudice effects vary very significantly in relation to the societal status of the groups involved” (Tropp et Pettigrew 2005:956). Their results also showed that “…contact-prejudice relationships were generally weaker for the members of minority status groups than for members of majority status groups” (Tropp et Pettigrew 2005:956). Tropp and Pettigrew suspect that this is a consequence of a constant recognition of the minority status group’s devalued status (Tropp et Pettigrew 2005:956). This leads to the question of how the different groups relate to each other in those environments in Bosnia where one group is dominant either in numbers or economically as it is the case in Mostar where the Croatian part of the city looks significantly more developed. The question is whether the contact between the groups is organized in such a manner that these discrepancies are acknowledged and rendered less salient. This also takes us back to the way students are being taught to perceive the others, mainly through history lectures. If the textbooks enhance their sense of moral and social superiority compared to the other group, it will be more difficult to have them perceive each other as equals.

The institutional support can also be needed for the contact to be successful, as we saw in the case of the human relations movement the lack of success of which was ascribed to the lack of institutional support (Pettigrew 2011:3). However, it can also be counter-effective and partly mend the societal inequalities without altering the ingrained prejudices (Stephan et Stephan 1996:68). People also tend to react negatively as they disapprove of “…the loss of control over their freedom of association” (Stephan et Stephan 1996:68). Rothbart and John (1985:83) claim that there are two sources that changes in stereotypic beliefs come from: “…(a) direct contact with members, and (b) indirect ‘atmosphere’ effects.” “Atmosphere effects mean general, nonspecific changes in laws, social norms and expectancies, as well as images promulgated by parents, peers, gatekeepers, and the media” They are also “…changes produced by the application of social rewards and punishments.” (Rothbart and John 1985:83). This is why institutions play a major role in helping devalue prejudice and create the atmosphere with additional incentives to reconsider the ingrained stereotypes. In
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is also an important aspect to look into as it is the authorities and the institution that have it in their power to change the current educational framework if estimated that it does not help the integration and tolerance between the peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4.2.2 School desegregation

The school segregation is characterized by the absence of intergroup contact which is the reason this paper is focused on the intergroup contact theory. As we previously touched upon, for intergroup contact to yield a positive outcome, certain prerequisites have to be fulfilled. This makes the matter of school desegregation more elaborate than how it might initially be perceived. Stephan and Stephan(1996) give a review of the studies conducted in relation to the school desegregation in the United States. The results show that the intergroup contact that came as a result of school desegregation lead to the academic improvement of African-American students (Stephan and Stephan 1996:77). The increased school achievement was found in 25% of the cases and the decreased school achievement in only 5% of the cases( Stephan and Stephan 1996:77). On the other hand, the same studies showed that there was not any sizable increase in self-esteem among African-American students (it increased in only 4% of the cases). The results also showed that the low self-esteem was not the result of the segregation and that the African-American children did not have lower self-esteem than the white children (Stephan and Stephan 1996:77). The studies also showed that desegregation more commonly lead to the increase of the prejudice against African-Americans among white students, but had an opposite effect on the way African-Americans perceived their white peers (Stephan and Stephan 1996:78). "Desegregation increased prejudice toward African-Americans in three times as many cases (48%) as it decreased (16%)” (Stephan and Stephan 1996:78). However, these are short term effects of the desegregation (Stephen and Stephen 1996:79). The long term effects showed that African-Americans who went to disintegrated schools were more likely to work in the racially mixed environment and have cross-racial friendship (1996:80). Whites who attended desegregated schools were also more prone to work in racially integrated environments and both whites and African-Americans who attended desegregated school were more likely to live in integrated neighborhoods ( Stephan and Stephan 1996:80,81).

In sum, the studies of the long-term effects of desegregation suggest that it has led to some increases in educational and occupational attainment among African Americans, and greater integration in colleges and universities, in the workplace, and in housing. On the
negative side, desegregation has led to some short-term increases in white flight (white people leaving racially mixed neighborhoods) (Stephan and Stephan 1996:82). All this indicates how important it is to have more integrated schools and communities with initial mistrust and prejudice being overcome in the long run. One could argue that the same situation would positively reflect integration in Bosnia, at least in those environments with ethnically mixed population. In that regard, it is important to establish what efforts have been made so far to integrate students.

4.3. Conclusion

One of my research objectives is to establish the current state of affairs in relation to segregation in schools as well as to look into developments in terms of efforts to facilitate the contact between the students. In regard to that, I find that the intergroup contact theory points out the consequences of the absence of contact as well as the benefits that contact can yield. It also indicates how sensitive these interactions may be in relation to social circumstances which naturally vary from case to case. It implies that it is important to acknowledge the groups’ social statuses in order for the interaction to lead to a positive outcome. It shows the importance of majority-minority dynamics which is yet another important aspect for Bosnia. Another important research objective is to find out the manner in which history is taught to different ethnic groups and how it relates to the overall relations between ethnic groups. In that sense I find the notion of collective narratives very important, as they are essential to the sense of ethnic identity. My hypothesis is that these collective narratives can be constructed and reconstructed through formal education and used negatively or positively in relation to multi-ethnic relations.

5. Methodology

5.1. Content Analysis

The method that I decided to rely on the most while doing this research is content analysis. I decided to focus on analyzing the content of the history textbooks used in Bosnia and Herzegovina by students of different ethnic backgrounds. The goal of this practice is to establish the different perspectives offered in these books and how they relate to one another
as well as possible consequences of these discrepancies on the ethnic relations in Bosnia. I decided to focus on several important historical events and use them as themes for my analysis. The approach applied can be defined as qualitative content analysis as I compared the data and provided commentary for each theme with the general conclusion rounding up the analysis.

There are several definitions of qualitative content analysis. Zhang and Wildemuth offer three of these: a) “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon in Zhang and Wildemuth 2005:1), b) “an approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models, without rash quantification” (Mayring in Zhang and Wildemuth 2005:1), c) “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (Patton in Zhang and Wildemuth 2005:1). Qualitative content analysis also “…focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1287). In my case, qualitative content analysis focuses on comparison between the texts and finding discrepancies and consistencies between different textual data with a special focus on the language and its use as well as its contextual meaning.

The themes I singled out were the following: 1. The beginning of World War I and the assassination of the arch-duke Franz Ferdinand, 2. The Formation of first Yugoslavia 3. Yugoslavia between the late twenties and late thirties, 4. World War II and the formation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska), 5. World War II and the Chetnik movement, 6. The tensions within the second Yugoslavia and the Croatian political movement in the early seventies (MASPOK), 7. The dissolution of Yugoslavia. I found these particular themes to be of importance in relation to the currently existing tensions between different ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of these historical events have become part of the mythos fueling ethnic intolerance. It is the interpretations of these particular events as well as the events themselves that often used to justify intolerance and ethnic hatred. Hence I found it pertaining to my general topic to analyze the manner in which these were presented. In the process of analysis, I made sure to highlight the most drastic discrepancies between different presentations of the same historical event. I also provided my own interpretation of the language used and how its usage might be indicative of generalizations and stereotyping. This was a very demanding task as interpreting the language, the context and different
presentations of the same events also required me to pass my own subjective qualitative remarks. While doing so, I made sure I avoided my own personal opinions related to the events in question, focusing solely on the differences and their ramifications.

The books that I used for this analysis were all approved by the responsible institutions and they are selected in a very random fashion without me having any previous knowledge of the content within them. In that sense, the books are a good representation of the content which is being taught in Bosnian schools as they are validated by official institutions. Considering they were selected in a random manner, there is no intent to distort the reality and misrepresent the current state of affairs within history teaching in Bosnian schools. On the other hand, this analysis only partially sheds light on the way the history lectures are conducted within the school walls as a full insight would entail a much more extensive research. Yet this textbook analysis can provide answers as to whether Bosnian education today is helping the solidification of this war-torn country or only deepens the already existing rift that exists between three respective peoples and two entities.

I used three text books: “Istorija za 3. razred gimnazije prirodno-matematičkog i 4. Razred opšte i društveno-jezičkog smjera” by Dusan Zivkovic and Borislav Stanojlovic (History for the 3rd grade of the science-math department of the lyceum and 4th grade of the social sciences-language department) used by students in the Serb Republic, intended for the study program in Serbian, “Historija 4, Udzbenik za cetvrti razred gimnazija” by Indira Kucuk-Sorguc (History 4, the textbook for the fourth grade of the lyceum) intended for the study program in Bosnian and Povijest 4, udzbenik za cetvrti razred gimnazije) by Hrvoje Matkovic, Franko Mirosevic, Bozo Goluza and Ivica Sarac (History 4, the textbook for the fourth grade of the lyceum) intended for the study program in Croatian.

The main research question that guided this analysis was: How are historical events portrayed in textbooks and how do the presentations diverge from one another? The other important questions are: 1. Are historical events portrayed in irreconcilable ways? 2. How are collective narratives constructed through history textbooks? It was important to establish the relation between the history books and the prevailing public narratives and ethnic mythos as these might serve as the backbone for any future ethnic conflicts if at odds with one another. It was also important to see whether the history textbooks reinforce the irreconcilable views that co-exist in relation to the history of the region.
5.2. Interviews and fieldwork

Initially, I planned to collect much more data from interviewing. However this proved to be a very tough challenge due to the issues that will be dealt with in this chapter. However, I did manage to carry out two interviews that provide a good insight into the research topic. I decided to interview a Nansen Centre for Peace representative in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nansen Centre for Peace is a well-known, Norwegian-based NGO with numerous projects aiming at bridging the gap between divided communities in war-torn areas in The Balkans (parts of Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina). More about the organization is presented in the chapter dedicated to the interviews themselves. The main reason I decided to interview a Nansen Centre representative was the fact that they were directly involved with the issue I was trying to conduct a research on. A Nansen Centre representative could provide information on the initiatives that the organization took and the obstacles they were facing trying to help integrate students of different ethnic backgrounds. For this interview, I added questions that directly concerned the NGO activities but the rest of the questions were to a large extent fairly similar to the ones that I used to obtain data from a school principal.

My initial plan was to focus on schools in Mostar for my interviews. I was going to collect both qualitative and quantitative data using different types of questionnaires, one for teachers and school staff and another one for students which aimed at collecting more quantifiable data. However, due to the difficulties which will be addressed later in this chapter this proved too difficult to do.

The main obstacle I faced was gatekeeping and getting access to the interviewees due to numerous reasons some of which can only remain in the realm of speculation. I also assume that one of the reasons why I did not manage to fully succeed in obtaining data via interviews was my background which made the entire process exceedingly uncomfortable. I shall address these issues in the following section

The advantages and disadvantages of being a partial insider on the field and the issues of gatekeeping

I chose Mostar as the place where I would conduct my research. In retrospect this might not have been a very wise decision on my part, but it was this very city that I was intrigued by the most, due to its clear division along the ethnic lines. Most media in The Balkans would always report on Mostar in relation to the topic of divided education in Bosnia
in Herzegovina. I also felt it would be more appropriate for me as an ethnic Serb (an identity ascribed to me by the society and heritage rather than something that I find relevant in my everyday life) to look into the Croatian-Bosniak divide rather than any correlation that might include Serbs as one of the sides as I thought that would affect the perception of myself as an impartial researcher. However, this issue, as it turned out could not be entirely avoided. I was aware that my ethnicity could play a major role in my research and that it bore heavy risks considering that the wounds inflicted by war were still fresh in this area and that the ethnic structure of the town itself had changed a lot in the wake of the conflict (visible by ethnic markers and the street names as well as the absence of Serbian markers of identity). Still, knowing the overall atmosphere in The Balkans at the moment, I was very optimistic about being received appropriately by the locals. My assessment was in a large part vindicated as most people that I talked with treated me with respect, even if they were not necessarily pleased with what I was trying to accomplish. Still, this alone was not sufficient for me to conduct my research without any difficulties.

5.2.2. Mostar

The following text consists of my own observations of the town based on my knowledge and experience as a Serbian citizen and someone who is overly familiar with the culture and language due to my own cultural background.

Mostar is one of Bosnian major centers. In a way it is an official center for the Croatian population of Bosnia. This town was deeply divided by war and effectively split into two halves based on the ethnic principle. The eastern side is predominantly Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims) and the western side is Croatian (catholic). Prior to the conflict there were no sharply marked boundaries between parts of population of different ethnicity. People shared the same living space and utilized the same institutions to run their everyday affairs. Nowadays, the divide is exceptionally visible. As someone hailing from former Yugoslavia, I could easily spot the markers that indicated which part of the town, streets belonged to. The core of the Bosniak half was the main tourist attraction, the old town built in a very oriental Ottoman style, a reminder of the times when Bosnia was under the Ottoman rule which, it can be argued, left lingering consequences on its cultural and ethnic divisions. Outside the old town, the streets and buildings are noticeably more worn out than the ones that can be observed in the Croatian part of the town. The facades are more dilapidated and there seem to be more ruins from the war as a reminder of the unscrupulous bombing of the eastern part of
the town, during which the most famous landmark of the town, the old Bridge, was bombed and torn down. The eastern part of the town is also characterized by mosques some of which are quite old. However, the religious symbolism is not too salient, but still visible enough to indicate whose “territory” the streets belong to. As for the western part, or the Croatian part, it is not solely divided by the bridges as it is usually remarked in the media, but the boundary can be clearly identified just by walking the streets of the town. The street names in the Croatian part of the town are almost all invariably related to the Croatian history and some of them bear important ideological markings. For instance there is a street named in honor of the victims of the Bleiberg massacre which took place at the end of World War II. It happened in the wake of Yugoslav Partisans and the Red Army liberating Croatia and driving the Croatian Nazi collaborators and their families all the way to Austria where the thousands of them were executed by Partisans with the tacit approval of the British forces that were stationed in the region (Kolstø 2010). While the fact that most of the people executed were affiliated with the Nazis does not justify these hideous crimes that were never processed, it is also conspicuous that there are not any streets dedicated to the victims of Nazi and Ustashe (Croatian Nazi collaborators) crimes and this alone speaks volumes about the post-conflict situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the revived nationalisms that plague the society. The absence of important local figures of other ethnicities among the street names is also strikingly conspicuous. The only street I noticed bore a name of a famous Serbian local was the street of Aleksa Santic, a famous poet, one of the most celebrated people in Mostar’s history and that street also had another name added to it as if there had to be a Croatian alternative for it. Some of the streets name clearly recalled war (Vukovarska dedicated to the town of Vukovar which endured devastating bombing by the Yugoslav army (under Serbian control at that time) and Serbian paramilitary fractions. Another important feature is a large catholic cross looming over the city on a top of a mountain. Some of the walls bore graffiti such as Croatian coat of arms in the style of a short lived wartime Croatian republic, Herceg-Bosna. There were also numerous posters promoting a special event of celebrating the anniversary of the aforementioned wartime republic even though it ceased to exist following the Dayton Agreement in 1995. The Croatian part of the town is noticeably richer than the Bosniak part. There are more shops including a modern shopping center and the houses seem to be better preserved. It is also obvious that there have been more investments into restoring and rebuilding.
5.2.3. Schools

Prior to coming to the town I had not made a lot of contacts with the locals as some schools that I wrote to never replied. However I managed to get in touch with the Mostar branch of Norwegian Nansen Centre. I was received by a Nansen Centre representative who did his best to help me with my research, provided all the information he could and gave me a very comprehensive interview on the subject that his NGO had been looking into for years, organizing special activities to bridge the gaps between the students of different ethnicities in schools. My interlocutor and the Nansen Centre were immensely helpful and amicable and gave clear answers to any question regardless of how sensitive it might have seemed. Having met people from Nansen center prior to my fieldwork, my interlocutor fulfilled all of my positive expectations. He came across as a young, educated and open-minded man devoid of any biases related to the ethnic divisions in Bosnia. He never once questioned my intentions and I felt at ease at all times during my visit. He provided me with two telephone numbers belonging to the local school principals that I wanted to interview. Shortly after, I managed to arrange a meeting with one of them. I went to the school that was a perfect example of what is popularly called “two schools under one roof” phenomenon in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two schools sharing the same premises had two separate names, but were in fact providing the same type of specialized education, albeit in two officially different languages, Croatian and Bosnian (which were once all part of a single language called Serbo-Croatian). The Bosniak school principal received me in the company of the school pedagogist. They listened carefully to my presentation of the objectives of my research. However, the principal was clearly irritated by my intention to interview him, even if he agreed to it without too much deliberation. He kept insisting that his position as a principal was irrelevant regarding this particular subject matter, that there was nothing that he could do as everything was contingent on the government. I had two sets of questions with me, one for the principals and teacher and another one for students (I wanted to interview only those students who were 18 years old so as to avoid any complications of having to gain special parental approvals). Naturally, I showed the questions to my interlocutors. The school pedagogist found some of them too intrusive and inappropriate. Namely, the questions, the objective of which was to establish students’ attitude towards the students belonging to other ethnic groups were very straightforward (i.e. “Would you share the same desk with a Croat?”, “Would you marry a person of Serbian ethnicity”). The one she seemed to be most dissatisfied with was the question related to the students’ attitude towards the language, mainly, whether they felt the
language they spoke was the same or not. This is the issue that is usually stated as the main reason for separate school programs or separate schools existing on the same premises. Both, the principal and the pedagogist told me that there was another researcher coming there a couple of years before and that she could not elicit any meaningful responses from the students who made a mockery of her questions. They further claimed that handing out questionnaires to students or interviewing them would be useless and they did not want to help me ask students themselves whether they were interested in participating. When I asked whether they could help me get in touch with some of the teachers, they simply told me to wait for them outside without offering any help in establishing communication with them (I could not just stop random people in school and ask them whether they were teaching history or literature, the subjects that I was mainly interested in). I managed to get a single interview and left the school feeling quite uncomfortable over a very heated and somewhat rude reaction on the part of the pedagogist who seemed very displeased over my question and intentions. She was particularly irritated over my thesis working title which had the word “segregation” in it. I had the impression that both, the principal and her, felt as if they were in some ways intruded on or being patronized and held accountable. I got this impression mostly from the principal’s reactions who kept stating that he was not the right person to talk to, considering he had no leverage in relation to this issue. I did not feel comfortable staying longer at the school trying to find out on my own, who the teachers of history and literature were. I simply expected the principal to be more helpful in that regard and I expected him and other members of the school staff to help me as gatekeepers. Now, I realize that I mainly felt discomfort over the fear of being perceived differently due to my Serbian origins. My affiliation with the university in Norway definitely helped smooth the matters, yet I wonder whether my interlocutors would have been as straightforward and reacted as vehemently had I been seen as completely neutral. It is exceedingly difficult to answer this question without actually knowing what is going through the heads of people you are seeking collaboration and help from. It is also difficult to set the boundaries, not being fully aware of the ostensibly harmless things that might be seen as provocative and what these people themselves went through during the war.

I also hoped to get the most renowned school in town, The Mostar gymnasium, to collaborate with me, allow me to conduct interviews and provide all the necessary contacts with teachers and students. I finally managed to arrange a meeting with the principal after several days of waiting and asking when I could be received. Not so surprisingly after the first experience, the principal said that they had no interest to meet my needs. She was asking me
why I was not looking into similar issues in other European countries such as Belgium and Northern Ireland. She clearly stated that they did not want to be anyone’s guinea pigs and that she could not allow me to talk to the students, not even the adult ones as their parents would still be irritated just by the fact alone and they would eventually complain to school. She tried to be polite but still reacted very passionately about it. One of the most resounding sentiments was the one of feeling tired of people looking into this matter and talking about Mostar and its divide. According to most people working at schools that I talked to, there were not any divisive issues to talk about and they were immensely defensive about it as if bringing up the topic as part of research was somehow an affront to them and their town.

5.2.4 Gatekeepers

Prior to embarking on my fieldwork I underestimated the importance of securing as many gatekeepers as possible. I did manage to get in touch with the Nansen Center and thought that it would alone be sufficient for me to get into schools, as Nansen had many joint projects. While it proved to be a great starting point and of the utmost importance for me to get initial contacts, it did not grant me the degree of access that I desired. With hindsight, I should have put more effort into making sure that people would be cooperative before getting to meet them in person. Gatekeepers can be defined as “those whose permission is necessary in order to conduct a study, because they control access to resources, both documents and people” (Campbell et al. 2006:101). The gatekeepers are essential to your ability to access the desired informants and other sources of information. “These people can help or hinder research depending upon their personal thoughts on the validity of the research and its value, as well as their approach to the welfare of the people under their charge” (Reeves 2010:317). This is the reason why the people I saw as gatekeepers were difficult to negotiate access with. As school staff they felt protective of their students. This could be seen as the reason the pedagogist in the first school had so many objections to my questions as she saw them as too straightforward and not suitable for her students. It could also be argued that they were in a way shielding their communities from what they saw as a constant and unwarranted interest in their town. The other principal I met, clearly expressed her disapproval of my research by stating they did not want to be anyone’s guinea pigs and asking me why I was not looking into the cases in western Europe, which itself could be construed as implying that there was a sort of intrusion of privacy and condescending attitude on behalf of researchers who were interested in topics related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and its post-conflict issues. There was
an obvious lack of trust. This problem might have been avoided if I had had any friends on the field to help me gain more trust among crucial gatekeepers. Stevens(2001:70) says that the perception of the researcher and his work is of the utmost importance for earning research legitimacy.

_If people feel the research is worth their time and attention, its success comes to matter to them and they help rather than only tolerate you. Achieving legitimacy depends not only on your goals but also on how you inspire trust and enthusiasm. Living long-term in an area gives you an excellent chance to earn legitimacy. More and more people come to know you and your work as word spreads of your research, trustworthiness, and giving back to the community_ (Stevens 2001:70)

I think that I was in part not allowed a greater access because of people seeing my research as intrusive and condescending (as an outsider coming into their community asking questions about their community’s issues) rather than helpful and beneficial for the community. My status as a partial insider (a Serb from Serbia) probably did not help as I felt that it allowed my interlocutors to be much more straightforward and blunt when expressing what they thought of my research. I think it was partially due to expecting me to be more sensitive to their issues, the expectations which in all likelihood would not have been bestowed on a complete outsider which itself would entail more understanding for the researcher. On the other hand, my affiliation with a western European institution might have helped to talk to these people in the first place. All of this belongs to the realm of speculations as I can not exactly be sure what my interlocutors actually felt.

5.2.5. Insider/Outsider perception and its relevance

“The traditional methodological assumption that the researcher should remain distant from the research participants and site to maintain objectivity is increasingly being replaced by the recognition that the ethnographer’s self affects every aspect of the research process, from conception to final interpretation” (Coffey 1999:6). The question that naturally poses itself is how my own personality, background, way of speaking and all other markers of my identity affected my fieldwork, my interlocutors’ responses and my access to data. It is possible to believe that I was ascribed certain views and agenda due to my ethnicity or even due to the fact that I was affiliated with a western educational institution. Some researchers
claim that “partial insiders” are constrained “…in their research and analyses both by boundaries imposed through the anthropological discipline and by personal, gendered experiences in the field” (Sherif 2001:438). While there is an academic pressure to detach oneself from the locality and act as an outsider, Halstead (2001:101) says “…the informants were taking their own positions in situating my intrusion into their lives. For them, I became both insider and outsider. My positioning had very much to do with their perceptions of status. It rendered academic pressure on the need for the anthropologist to be outside the frame secondary”. While I had never visited Bosnia before, and the whole setting was only familiar to me to the extent that I was coming from a similar cultural background, it can be argued that there were different expectations bestowed on me due to my background.

Sheriff(2001) talks at great length about her own experience as a partial insider who nevertheless came from a different cultural background. She did her research in Egypt, the country of her parents and she was told by her doctoral committee that her being a partial insider would give her an advantage of sorts over other American students (Sheriff 2001:439). Still, Sheriff was not perceived as an outsider even if she was one. She did not have the same liberties that some other American researchers had as she was expected to act more in line with Egyptian values, whereas the other researchers were not expected to comply to the cultural code being excused by their perceived otherness (Sheriff 2001). Still, Sheriff acknowledges her advantages as a partial insider (Sheriff 2001:440). “I was in the unique position of having instant access to a very large, extended family and all of its acquaintances. Thus, I did not experience the anthropologist’s common dilemmas of isolation and the search for social acceptance and ties with the society…Indeed, I was not only accepted, but I as expected to know how to behave, and I thought that I did” (Sheriff 2011: 440). In some respects my own position was very much like Sheriff’s, especially in relation to being perceived as someone who’s familiar with the culture and the sensitivity of topics related to ethnic tensions in the region. However, I did not have her access as Mostar was just as new a place to me as any other town in the world even if I pretty much felt at home given the absence of the language barrier. I also had the luxury of being able to interpret my surroundings differently from someone whose knowledge of the Balkans and its peoples’ culture was more limited. I was able to spot important markers just by observing the streets of the town as described in the first part of this paper. I do not think I would have been able to come to the same conclusions without the pre-knowledge I had. I initially thought that this was a major advantage in my research and I never saw myself as being perceived as a total insider as I was vastly unfamiliar with Bosnia itself and I was also never partial to Serbian
nationalism and whatever Serbian nationalist agenda permeated Bosnia and Herzegovina. I was well aware of possible biases on part of people I would try to interview. Still, I also believed that this type of research should be done by someone familiar with the language, history and culture of the locality. Often when reading the outsiders’ accounts of The Balkans, I get the impression that things are being too simplified and that the subtleties of the issues escape the researchers’ attention. Zinn (1979:210) evokes the question of who should be doing the research of the racial minorities in The United States. He pinpoints a couple of different views. According to Moore, “…the distortions in past research reflect the biases and limitations of the 98 percent Anglo white composition of the profession, and it is now a common view point that the special insight of minority group scholars (insiders) renders them best qualified to conduct research in minority communities” (Moore in Zinn 1979:210).

Along that line of thinking, Zinn also cites Wilson who claims that “…whites are basically incapable of grasping black realities and because of the very nature of their experiences, black and whites will approach the subject of race with very different foci of interest” (Wilson in Zinn 1979:210). Then he goes on to offer a different view claiming that”… nonminority researchers are better qualified for such research because minority scholars may lack the objectivity required” (Zinn 1979:210). I thought myself detached enough from the common biases that were held in the Balkans and deemed myself able to look at things more objectively given that I never felt strong national sentiments. In that sense, I thought I was in a very unique position to conduct this research with more thorough understanding than any outsider might have. Being a Serb is an identity ascribed mainly by others and by the fact of my place of birth, family history and yet I was fully aware that I was also to be identified by others, strangers who were not familiar with my views and sentiments. I am also aware that I might be biased in some ways beyond a conscious recognition of my own bias. It is only when I reached the field that I realized the full scope of the problems I might be dealing as a partial insider. My own biases did emerge once I had negative experiences negotiating the access. I was gripped by fear knowing well enough how sensitive the issues I was inquiring about were and seeing that some people were not quite willing to oblige me. I was afraid that the fact that these questions are being asked by someone easily identified as a Serb might be construed in a wrong way. I cannot be sure whether the lack of success on the field could be ascribed to my ethnic identity or other factors such as fatigue and disinterest of those whose help I tried to gain.
5.2.6. Conclusion

Regardless of how we view ourselves as researchers and scholars, taking unorthodox and often lonely positions, others may still conclude things about us solely on the basis of our names and origins. While, the insider knowledge can be a great advantage in numerous ways such as the lack of language barriers, the heightened perception of our surroundings and understanding of the sub context, we are still constrained by the additional expectations on behalf of our research participants and a possible different interpretation of our intentions. Being seen as an insider can also mean that people would be much more straightforward and more inclined to deny you access if they feel uncomfortable with the subject matter of your research. Simply, you are in a more intimate circle just by the virtue of knowing the language and culture and belonging to one of the sides involved in the conflict on the basis of the ethnic principle. This can be seen as a proverbial double-edged sword as it can allow one a deeper understanding but it can also pose quite a hindrance in multiple ways such as allowing your own biases to taint your research, being perceived as someone different than who you think you are and not having the privilege of people being more patient with you due to your foreign background and unfamiliarity. My own predicament is difficult to define in terms of the main reasons that caused it and this chapter is merely speculative trying to present my situation from various angles and provide possible explanations to my failure to gain a better access to possible informants. I also believe that I managed to make valuable observations of the town itself that would have escaped me had I been an outsider. Just walking through the town and observing various markers of identity as well as division (for they were so thoroughly divided drawing an invisible line between two communities) helped me grasp the full scope of the problem. I also learned a lot from simple conversations with the people I was staying with who perfectly described the economic and social discrepancies existing between two halves of the town mention a person from the Bosniak side who was able to get employed in the Croatian side of the town and earn much more that what she would ordinarily gain in the Bosniak part.
6. Interviews analysis

Obtaining interviews was a somewhat difficult task as it was explained in greater detail in my theory chapter. However, the two interviews that I managed to obtain shed a lot of lights on the issues in question. They also offer to different perspectives as one of them is given by an NGO activist and another by a school principal. Both of these people are in different position in relation to this issue.

The first interview was given by a Bosnian representative of Norwegian NGO, the Nansen Centre which has numerous school integration activities all around former Yugoslavia and post-conflict areas in the region. The activities are mainly aimed at bridging the gap in divided and war-torn communities.

The Nansen Center for Peace and Dialogue (NCPD) was established as a separate center of the Nansen Academy Foundation in 2010, as a result of a merger of the Norwegian Peace Centre and Nansen Dialogue. The merge allows NCPD to draw experience from over 35 years of peace work conducted both nationally and internationally.

NCPD has its main office in Lillehammer and a branch office in Oslo, Norway. The center hosts an academic environment that provides experience-based knowledge of ongoing conflicts and practical dialogue and reconciliation work. The center's staff has, inter alia, several years of experience in working with peace education for diaspora groups and refugees in Norway and in dialogue work and reconciliation projects in deeply segregated societies in the Western Balkans. (http://www.peace.no/en/who-we-are/the-nansen-center-for-peace-and-dialogue)

Discussion

6.1. On the question of integration

As we can see from the responses, the problem of ethnic divisions in schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a rather complex one. The interlocutor confirms that this is very much the problem of a wider context of the post-conflict setting where according to him, the integration
of schools would also bridge gaps on the level of communities. From his perspective, for the integration to yield results there has to be a wider mobilization of different agents within the society (“the citizens, teachers, school administration, students and parents and the local authorities”). We can also see that from the perspective of this particular NGO, an extra effort has to be made in order to bring students of different ethnicities together. An interesting initiative is the student exchange with schools from Lillehammer in Norway which is supposed to facilitate a greater acceptance of differences with the immersion into another cultural environment as well as point out similarities and in a way assert the common identity with other Bosnian students of different ethnicities. I believe this also indicates how much the relations are affected by the social and political context that there is a need for students to be places in a different setting in order to get a better understanding of each other. According to the interlocutor, one of the important obstacles in building relations and bridging community gaps is the political level, over which, he feels NGOs do not have much influence. Similarly, the other interlocutor, a school principal, also shifts the accountability to the authorities and politicians. This seems to be a very common occurrence in the related research and interviews conducted by others. Unicef’s study, Divided schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, had another school principal providing similar answers:

“The interviewer: What are the greatest obstacles, at the moment, that prevent schools from unification?
The principal (Kiseljak 1): Well, you see this question is not directly connected to us.
The interviewer: Yes..
The Principal (Kiseljak 1): I mean, we cannot give the concrete answer. It is certainly on a higher level. The politicians are needed…” (Turjacanin et al 2009:189)

In the same research, one of the advisers working for the ministry of education said that the influence of the higher levels of politics on the educational system of lower levels, that is, schools, was exaggerated and not as significant as it was claimed to be (Turjacanin et al: 189).

There is still a feeling that either there is not a enough institutional support from the top, or that there is inertia of sorts where communities wait for the government to decide on the issues that directly concern them. Another answer in the principal’s interview that can be related to this is his attitude and opinion about the integration itself. His stance is very formal and reserved which is understood given his position. He does not want to delve into these issues and detaches himself from the whole discussion. This also reflects the understanding
that everything should come from the top, the political authorities, and that minor agents feel that they do not necessarily have their say in the matter. The principal whom I interviewed stated his view that the children should not go to schools separately. However, he also added that things would not be changed until there was a joint decision on the joint curriculum. This is yet another indicator that the solution is expected to come from the top.

According to the Unicef research, most of direct agents in the education system deny any possibility to influence the system a majority of them see politicians as the most powerful source of influence and introducing changes (Turjacanin et al 2009: 215)

The Unicef research makes a claim that in order to reduce prejudice and increase acceptance and tolerance among school children, there has to be a consensus in relation to the content of the knowledge that children acquire in schools (Turjacanin et al 2009:212). It is further claimed that such consensus is absent at the moment making the processes of integration a daunting task (Turjacanin et al 2009:212). It is proposed that there should be experimental classes, particularly in divided schools which would address the issues of divisions and intolerance (Turjacanin et al 2009:212). The institutional support is yet again cited as the most important for this to succeed (Turjacanin et al 2009:212)

6.2. Teachers of different ethnicity

In the interview with the school principal, we also see a very positive attitude towards the other school as well as teachers and students of different ethnicity. There seems to be the sense of content with the way things are at the moment, much in the opposition to the answers provided by the NGO representative. This seems to be in line with the current political climate in the country and the maintenance of status quo in relation to the political and state arrangement.

As far as having teachers of different ethnicities teaching, according to our interlocutors, this does not seem to be a public issue. However, according to the first interlocutor (NGO) this problem also exists due to the current system. It is also pointed out that such cases exist and this is also partly confirmed by the principal saying that all qualified teachers could apply for positions regardless of their ethnicity. We also see that these problems are factually non-existent on the level of higher education. Again, it can be argued that these issues come as a result of inertia and expectations that the entity and state authorities address and reshape the educational system.
6.3. The Content of history textbooks

When asked about history lectures, the principal interestingly enough relates it to the Hague tribunal for war crimes in Yugoslavia, citing how different ethnic groups see these processes very differently. This sweeping generalization is used to justify different historical perspectives provided to students of different ethnicity. This comparison with the Hague tribunal could be construed as legitimizing the existence of different “truths”. I found this answer particularly disturbing as the principal compared different perspective on convicted and indicted war criminals with different perspectives on historical events found in textbooks. Essentially, different perspectives on the Hague tribunal decisions imply justifying or denying war crimes and very often the perpetrators are perceived as heroes by some. It is also conspicuous that these perspectives were equated to the ones existing in the history books, some of which also address crimes in a rather different fashion. The question that poses itself is whether this ignoring and accepting of such radically different perspective will backfire in the future and have severe impact on the ethnic relations. This also brings up the question of accountability. If the accountability is not individualized in cases of war crimes, there is always a solid foundation for ethnic conflict as the blame would be places collectively. The same can be argued about history text-books. If the students are not given more diverse perspectives that do not favor any collective in particular, different understanding might result in a negative bias against other groups.

In the Unicef’s research on divided schools in Bosnia, it is stated that the main problem in relation to textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina are differences of interpretation of the events in the period between 1992 and 1995 (Turjacanin et al 2009:212). According to this report, a great number of history teachers who took part in this research proposed that the students should simply be given bare facts and allowed to come up with their own interpretation of the events (Turjacanin et al 2009:212). It is worth noting that these particular events were only partially covered in the textbooks that I had the opportunity to analyze for the purpose of this thesis. It shows that the educational authorities deemed these topics too sensitive for the current moment. Yet again, the question that poses itself is whether it is wise to simply ignore these events given that they are present in every day public and political discourse. They could instead be used to showcase the negative sides of multi-ethnic strife and intolerance.
6.4. What are the conditions under which the contact between students of different ethnic groups occurs?

In the interview with the school principal, it is affirmed that children of two different schools sharing the premises, do not meet each other within the school walls as they go to school in different time shifts. This can be seen as purely practical; nevertheless it does beg a question of eventual negative consequences. Still, much in line with the interview with an NGO representative, the principal confirms that there are external school activities involving students from both schools. According to the principal and other school staff, the ethnic composition in their schools is mixed rather than being Bosniak only. Basically every Bosnian is allowed to choose their school and in that sense there is not a strict ethnic segregation. Yet, we still have cases of two schools operating under the same roof under the auspices of offering education in different languages. The principal made an analogy in an informal conversation we had following the interview where he compared German and Italian mechanics being educated in their respective languages, with Bosniak students being educated in Bosnian and Croatian students in Croatian, stating that all of them could perform equally well as mechanics. I find that this analogy is missing the point altogether. The question is whether there is an actual practical need to separate students along the ethnic lines due to the language differences. Speakers of Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian used to attend schools together before the war where these respective languages were considered a single language with politically and socially acknowledged differences between the two standards at the time (Serbian and Croatian). As mentioned previously, Yugoslavia had a very good language policy allowing all ethnic minority students to have primary and secondary education conducted in their own language and yet there was no such distinction made for the speakers of Serbo-Croatian or Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian nowadays. My interviews were conducted in Serbian and the answers provided were in Bosnian. There was not any linguistic barrier to consider so the question is whether this is actually a good enough reason to keep students separated especially in the wake of the conflict where the entire society is still divided along the ethnic lines ultimately resulting in economic and social decline. Still, this is an extremely sensitive issue due to the existing differences and particularities that exist in these languages and their cultural significance. The Nansen Centre representative said that their ultimate goal was not to eradicate these differences or start any processes that might lead to assimilation but make sure that the students themselves have enough physical and social contact. This leads to the conclusion that the key is to find the way for students to be fully
integrated together with acknowledgement of cultural and lingual peculiarities. Having two schools in the same building that teach and train for the same profession such as the one of mechanic for instance might be seen as obsolete in that regard.

7. Textbook analysis

I decided to use a sample of three history text books, each one used for a different national curriculum in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is worth noting that there is a wide range of different textbooks approved by the educational institutions of both entities on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This implies that there could be important differences between different textbooks connected with the same national curriculum.

I will place focus on the way the same historic events were portrayed in these textbooks and reflect on the differences and similarities as well as the language used (whether it contains elements of hate speech, whether it meets particular academic standards etc.). All excerpts are translated into English from Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian language.

7.1. The beginning of World War I and the assassination of the arch-duke Franz Ferdinand

One of the crucial events in the history of the Balkans as well as European history was the assassination of the arch-duke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.

The Serbian textbook gives the following account of this event:” The motive for the start of World War I was the assassination in Sarajevo, on 28th June 1914. Gavrilo Princip, the member of the organization ‘Mlada Bosna’, killed the heir to the throne of the Monarchy, the arch-duke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. Even though the official Serbia did not take any part in the organization of the assassination (among other things, because of the great exhaustion from The Balkan Wars etc.), Vienna accused the Serbian government of organizing the assassination.

Austro-Hungary gave Serbia an ultimatum with humiliating conditions related to the investigation and the discovery of the culprits of the assassination of Ferdinand. It demanded that the investigation on the territory of Serbia be conducted by the representatives of Vienna. Naturally, Serbia as a sovereign country could not accept such a humiliating condition. One month following the assassination on the 28th of July 1914, Austro-Hungary declared war against Serbia which escalated into a war of global scale.” (Zivkovic and Stanojlovic 2012:7)
The Bosniak book gives the following account: “Following the maneuver at Tarchin on the 26th and 27th of July in which Sarajevo’s 15th corps and Dubrovnik’s 16th corps took part, the heir to the throne, arch-duke Franz Ferdinand made an official visit to Sarajevo. Apart from the officials, the assassins also anticipated him and the archduke’s security was not sufficient. The bomb thrown by Nedeljko Cabrinovic did not hit its goal, but Gavrilo Princip’s first bullet hit arch-duke Franz Ferdinand with deadly consequences, while the second bullet, intended for the head of the state, general Potoirek, killed his wife Sofia, the duchess of Hoenberg.

On the subsequently organized trial, the accused Gavrilo Princip, who left the lyceum in Tuzla four years prior, and attended the lyceum in Belgrade since, stated that he felt no remorse for his crime and that he was not a criminal as he just wanted to remove the evil. He became a proven Serbian nationalist in the circles he was part of. He hated Austria because he believed that it could only bring evil to the South Slavs. According to him, Serbia had the mission to detach Bosnia and Herzegovina from Austria and that was what every honorable person felt. That thought compelled him to commit the assassination.

For relevant military and political circles in Vienna and Berlin, the assassination in Sarajevo was an excuse to start a conflict with Serbia…The minister of foreign affairs, count Berthold called for the government session on the 7th of July, where everyone present agreed that the diplomatic success of Austro-Hungary would not have a great value even if it ended with Serbia being defeated. Hence, they concluded that Serbia should be given a demand in form of an ultimatum that presupposed rejection and thus cleared the way for a more radical solution… After the president of the of the Serbian government, Nikola Pasic had handed the note that Serbian government refused to have the investigation on the assassination conducted on its territory, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade announced shortly afterwards that the note’s content was dissatisfactory and that the embassy staff would leave Belgrade the same day. Following the expiry of the ultimatum, Serbia started the mobilization, as it was expected that the war would be declared within hours. Austro-Hungary declared war on Serbia on the 28th of July 1914.” (Sehic and Kucuk-Sorguc 2005:55)

The Croatian textbook states the following: “The initial blow that stirred the flames of World War I, took place in Sarajevo on the 28th of June 1914. That was the day when a member of the revolutionary-terrorist organization ‘Young Bosnia’, Gavrilo Princip, in a pre-mediated assassination attempt, killed the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne, arch-duke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sofia while they were in the official visit of Sarajevo. The motives of this assassination can be traced to the conflict of interests concerning Bosnia and
Herzegovina, involving The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and The Kingdom of Serbia, one already established major power and one reinforced local power (Serbia) on The Balkans. The heir to the throne’s aspirations to reorganize the monarchy whereby there would be the relief of tensions between Germanic-Hungarian and Slavic elements within the Monarchy, did not suit the plans of some political circles in Serbia regarding the expansion of the Kingdom of Serbia on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The revolutionary organization ‘Unity or death’, more well-known as ‘The Black Hand’, was behind the assassination. It was never fully cleared up whether the Serbian government at the time was involved in the assassination. The Austro-Hungary asked for the investigation in a form of an ultimatum (the request for a response within 48 hours). Among other things, it also asked for its investigators to conduct an investigation in Serbia, for Serbia to apologize and provide damages for the assassination. When Belgrade gave the negative answer, Austro-Hungary declared war on The Kingdom of Serbia on the 28th of July 1914.” (Matkovic et al 2006:34).

While we see that most of the facts here match, there are still some discrepancies in a way the books address Gavrilo Princip and the role of Serbia in these events. The Bosniak textbook mostly just states the facts with one snippet paraphrasing Gavriilo’s own words from the courtroom stating his motivation and beliefs. The text book does not openly condemn his actions but it does mention that he was a proven Serbian nationalist. The Serbian text-book provides a very similar account mentioning the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum much in the same manner as the Bosniak textbook albeit with more emotions involved (the ultimatum is characterized as humiliating). Much in the same way as the Serbian textbook, the Bosniak textbook claims that the demands were designed in a way to anticipate the negative answer. The Croatian text book slightly diverges from the other two. Unlike the Serbian textbook which claims that Serbia was not in any manner involved, the Croatian textbook states that it is still not fully resolved whether Serbia was directly involved or not. The Croatian textbook calls ‘Young Bosnia’ a terrorist organization. Unlike the other two textbooks it clearly characterizes the assassination as negative by bringing up the heir to the throne’s plans to solve the questions of Slavs within the Monarchy. In short, unlike the Serbian textbook that excludes any accountability on the part of the Serbian state at that time, the Croatian textbook sheds light on the Serbian government interests at the time and how they might have impacted the assassination. Unlike the other two textbooks, it does not describe the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum as devised to be rejected. We can argue that in this case Austro-Hungary is portrayed as the positive party as opposed to Serbia which is shown in a negative light (Franz Ferdinand is portrayed as the solution, and the Serbian organizations and Princip as terrorists).
On the other hand the Serbian textbook clearly depicts the Serbian state as unaccountable and as a victim by describing the ultimatum as humiliating. The use of the adjective “humiliating” goes beyond mere stating of the historical facts. It implies victimhood on the part of the Serbian state and by association, the Serbian people. Here, we can argue that the Bosniak textbook gives the account which is more factual and less emotional than the other two as it for the most part lists facts and lets the reader to make up their mind on the subject. The contrast between Serbian and Croatian portrayal of events shows a clear tendency to present things in a way that suits the pervading collective narratives of these respective peoples.

7.2. The Formation of the first Yugoslavia

The Formation of the first Yugoslav state, originally founded as The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was one of the most significant events in the context of the recent history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first Yugoslav state was also fraught with ethnic and political tensions which resulted in several decisive events which were all covered in these three text books.

The Bosnian Serb textbook gives the following account of the situation that ensued after the unification of the South Slavic territories:” The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the unification of which was embraced by the majority of Yugoslav peoples, faced many political, economic and cultural issues from its very start. Despite living under the influence of different cultures and religions they swiftly overcame certain differences thanks to the ethnic and historical closeness, interdependence and the similarity of the languages, believing that the joint state would secure a faster development and allow for an easier defense of the newly-acquired freedom. Unfortunately, from the very beginning of the life in the new union the feuds and even direct confrontations emerged between the members of Serbian, Croatian and Slovene bourgeois, which were striving to maintain their earlier status and privileges. In that struggle to achieve their own goals, many groups and individuals from Croatia and Slovenia, which were part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy until the end of the World War I, resorted to any means available to regain what they had previously lost” (Zivkovic and Stanojlovic 2012:61)

The Croatian text books gives a different account of the initial circumstances in the new state under the subtitle, ”A mistake from the start”:” The unification in 1918 brought
about the union of the lands with mostly different historical development, different social, economic and cultural circumstances, and what might have proven to be the greatest problem, mostly different concepts of the future common life in the newly-formed state. Nominally, only three peoples were recognized (‘the three clans of the same people’, as they were deemed by the supporters of the idea of the integral Yugoslavism): Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The main obstacle for the possibility of the political dialogue turned out to be the hegemony of the leading Serbian political circles. Soon the conflict between Serbs and Croats proved to be the essential and most difficult conflict in the country. The Croatian politicians’ aspirations for the decentralization of the country and their discontent with the status of the Croatian people came to be known as the Croatian question” (Matkovic et al. 2006:71).

The textbook intended for Bosniaks is more focused on the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the new state: “With the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1.12. 1918), Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself within the new state which considerably changed its position compared to the period of Austro-Hungarian administration. Even though it retained specific elements of its autonomy for a short period of time, it would lose its historical borders within the Kingdom. There were many factors that lead to this: centralized authority, unitaristic tendencies of the Serbian bourgeois and army, the discord among the Bosnian political elite, different political programs, tendencies and goals of Bosnian politicians, the dictatorship…” (Sehic and Kucuk-Sorguc 2005:92)

In the first excerpt from the Bosnian Serb textbook, we see that even though the Serbian bourgeois is mentioned within the same context as the Croatian and Slovenian bourgeois, in the continuation of the text we see unidentified groups and individuals from Croatia and Slovenia being singled out as the main culprits for the difficulties that the state had in its beginnings. We see these not precisely identified groups and individuals described as morally unscrupulous, willing to resort to any means available. The exemption of Serbs in the continuation and the vagueness when referring to those responsible with only their nationality being emphasized can be construed as ascribing guilt to the members of particular nations. Moreover, the new state is initially described as a great project, only to be marred by groups and individuals from Croatia and Slovenia. This arguably intensifies the negative sentiments towards those portrayed as the culprits.

In the Croatian excerpt however, we see a reverse situation. While the Serbian excerpt puts a lot of emphasis on the common goals of Yugoslav people and their similarities, in the Croatian excerpt we see the stress on various differences between the regions of the Kingdom. There is an insistence on the different concepts that the parties had. Following these general
statements that do not indicate the guilty side, we have it all narrowed down to a single culprit. Unlike the previous excerpt, it is the Serbian political circles. Again, just as in the previous chapter, the culprit is not specifically identified leaving the possibilities of broad interpretations. It is denoted as “Serbian political circles” not implying which particular Serbian political parties or fractions those are.

In the case of Bosniaks’ excerpt, we finally have the focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina and its own position within the new state. This is not the case in the other two textbooks even though they are also intended for Bosnian students. Furthermore, just as it is the case in the Croatian excerpt, the Serbs are singled out as culprits, the unitaristic tendencies of the Serbian bourgeois and army to be specific. A somewhat broad term is used again, but the chapter does not dwell much on it listing other reasons that mainly concern Bosnia and Herzegovina itself rather than any external factors.

Yet, what comes across most sharply is that, in essence, we have two completely opposing views of the same historical period. While there are numerous perspectives that a single historical event can be viewed from, here we have a vast discrepancy between how the event is viewed and interpreted. Even more problematic is the simplification of ascribing guilt to somewhat unspecified actors with their ethnicity being the most distinguishable attribute.

7.3. Yugoslavia between the late twenties and late thirties

The tensions between different ethnic and political fractions in The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes culminated in the assassination of some of the leading Croatian members of the parliament. They were shot inside the parliament itself by a Serbian MP.

The Serbian textbook says the following on this event:
“The leaders of particular political parties resorted to any means available in their interpersonal conflicts, and the parliament had become an arena for inciting partisan and nationalist passions. The atmosphere from the parliament influenced the public, causing uneasiness in the society. Half a year into 1928, the feuds and arguments between the representatives of the Serbian and Croatian bourgeoisie, that is between the radicals and the MPs of SDK (peasant-democratic coalition Radic-Pribicevic), reached the critical point and the assassination took place in a highly incendiary situation. On the June 20th in 1928, the MP of The Radical Party, Punisa Racic killed Pavle Radic and Djuro Basaricek and severely wounded Stjepan Radic who succumbed to injuries shortly afterwards. The assassination in the parliament definitively marked the end of the parliamentary democracy in The Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and made way for the King’s personal regime. Knowing the mutual relations and feuds between certain parties and the state of affairs within the country as well as the region, it is no surprising that the abolishment of the constitution did not stir protests among the people. On the contrary, many people even believed that it was the only way to save the country from its dissolution, which was not far from the truth taking into consideration everything that had preceded the introduction of the King’s personal regime: the assassination in the parliament, national and partisan intolerance, the international position of the country, the territorial aspirations towards some of its parts and the economic state in the country” (Zivkovic and Stanojlovic 2012:65)

The Bosniak text book gives the following account: “Following the enactment of the constitution, the political life in the Kingdom became more chaotic and reckless. Another factors that contributed to this were repressive measures as well as the terror carried out by the leading circles and the king at their helm. The King, Alexander Karadjordjevic often changed the governments, and treated politicians carelessly, not even sparing those supporting the great-Serbian idea and the king himself. The situation culminated with Punisa Racic assassinating Croatian MPs. He killed Djuro Basaricek and Pavle Radic with gunshots and deadly wounded Stjepan Radic (the president of the Croatian Peasant Party). This incident, which had been ordered by the King, served him as a justification to abolish the Vidovdan constitution, dismiss the parliament and introduce the dictatorship” (Sehic and Kucuk-Sorguc 2005:95)

The Croatian text book gives this account: “From the very start of its activities, SDK was characterized by incredible fighting spirit. It was particularly highlighted in all public initiatives, especially in in the speeches of two presidents at political gatherings where they always appeared together. Radic and Pribicevic ferociously attacked the government’s moves, the disregard for the law and corruption, and they also demanded the revision of the constitution. The overall political situation in the state was getting increasingly intense, and so the king and the government estimated that SDK and Stjepan Radic in particular, posed a threat to the government. The assaults on Radic were particularly intensified when he proposed the state division into four provinces that would be joined together in the confederation of sorts. The threat that Radic should be killed appeared in the government’s newspaper “The Unity”. Shortly afterwards, it turned out that it was not a mere verbal threat, but a well-thought design. On the 20th of June 1928, the assassination on the people’s representatives of HSS was carried out. The Radical, Punisa Racic shot at Croatian representatives and killed Pavle Radic and Djuru Basaricek on the spot, and severely
wounded Stejepan Radic. Ivan Grandja and Ivan Pernar were also wounded” (Matkovic et al. 2006:108)

Again, these three excerpts provide two radically different perspectives on the same events. In the case of the Serbian text, there is a negative emphasis on the politicians and their unscrupulousness. The King’s abolishment of the constitution and the ensuing dictatorship are justified in a way, claiming that the great number of people understood the king’s actions as the only means to save the country. The lack of protests is attributed to this reason, rather than any possible fear of oppression. We also see that rather than using the term “dictatorship”, the authors use a euphemism, “the king’s personal regime”.

Unlike the Serbian text book, the Bosniak text book directly accuses the king for orchestrating the events that took place in the parliament. The focus is also placed on the king and his government’s repression that had preceded the assassination. The king is the one that the blame is placed on rather than the politicians as it was the case in the previous excerpt (even though the chaotic political life is mentioned). However, the Bosniak textbook does not refer to any evidence behind the claim that the king orchestrated the assassination. However, unlike the Serbian text-book, the Bosniak text book claims that the assassination was carried out in order to serve as a justification for the dictatorship. On the other hand, the Serbian text book claims that the dictatorship came as a direct result of the assassination that was not in any way linked to the king, and that as such it was embraced by a large number of people as a justified means to deal with the political situation.

The Croatian text book provides a similar account to the one from the Bosniak text book. They link the assassination to the government by citing the newspaper “The Unity” which is mentioned as the government’s medium. It is claimed that the King felt threatened by the political fraction that subsequently was attacked in parliament.

7.4. World War II and the formation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska)

The Serbian textbook says the following on the Independent State of Croatia: ” As a puppet state, under the auspices of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy and supported (not publicly) by the Catholic Church, The Independent State of Croatia (NDH) fully executed the policies of its masters, and even surpassed them in crimes. As extreme nationalists, chauvinists and racists, with the intention to build their own state as soon as possible, modeled on Nazi Germany and integrate into the new “European order, the ustahas”, from
the very beginning, strived to remove all ‘alien’ peoples from their country.” (Zivkovic and Stanojlovic 2012:123). On the crimes and death camps in The Independent State of Croatia: “In NDH, unlike anywhere else in Europe, death camps were formed, the prisoners of which were children up to the age of 14. Besides, Stara Gradiska, the concentartion camps for children were set up in Sisak, Jastrebarski, Gornja Rijeka near Karlovac, Novska, Prijedor etc. 72 000 children, all of whom were tortured, passed through these concentration camps and 52 000 lost their lives. These children were mainly of Serbian descent” (Zivkovic and Stanojlovic 2012:125). “.They buried the victims in the mass graves, threw them into the Sava, incinerated in the crematoriums and then concealed their traces in different ways. According to the materials in possession of the Commission for establishing war crimes, 700 000 people, women and children were killed in Jasenovac. With the additional excavations, organized by the Memorial Museum in Jasenovac, it was established that only one site alone, on the right bank of the Sava river, held 380 000 skeletons. During the war, on the territory of NDH (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srem), around 800 000 people, women and children, more than four fifths of whom were Serbs, were killed in various camps as well as by being thrown into pits and in other fashions. The goal of the forefathers of the Ustasha ideology was an ethnically cleansed Croatia with a single, Roman Catholic religion.” ”(Zivkovic and Stanojlovic 2012:126).

The Bosniak textbook on the Ustashas and the Independent State of Croatia: “ As soon as NDH was proclaimed, the activities of the Ustasha authorities were aimed at changing the composition of the populace as soon as possible and the most grave method of denationalization was put in practice for that objective. They tried to realize that objective with the claim that Muslims were of Croatian descent, and on the other hand, they did it with the extermination of Serbs, Jews and Roma. Besides Serbs, Croats and Muslims who were proclaimed the traitors of the Croatian people also found themselves under attack of the Ustasha terror… Ustashas believed that only Croats and Muslims (who were, for nationalist reasons, proclaimed to be ‘the flowers of the Croatianhood’, just as Bosnia and Herzegovina being proclaimed ‘the heart and soul of Croatia’) could live on the territories of NDH… That way the Muslims were proclaimed Croats and became forcibly assimilated overnight by law. Starting with the autumn 1941, the term Bosnia and Herzegovina was not allowed to be mentioned in the media and Bosnian Krajina became Croatian Krajina, proclaimed ‘the heart of Croatia’, ‘the historical center of the old Croatian state’. The position of Muslims and Croats in NDH and Bosnia and Herzegovina was different. Despite being subjected to terror
in 1941, they were not subjected to the crimes of massive scale by the occupier and Ustashas as Serbs were.” (Sehic and Kucuk-Sorguc 2005:120,121)

The Croatian text books states the following: “In many ways, the Ustasha regime imitated the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. By that token, there were no political parties in Croatia, and the only political organization was the Ustasha movement. Apart from the ordinary courts, there were also martial law courts where the indicted were usually sentenced to death. The concentration camps were also established (Danica at Koprivnica, Tenja at Osijek, Jadovno at Gospic). Jews, Roma and Serbs were taken to the camps as well as many Croats who did not approve of the actions of Ustasha or supported the Communists. The biggest concentration camp was Jasenovac (at Novska), where 48 000 Serbs were killed as well as several thousand Jews. A number of Roma, Croats and others also got killed there (According to the data by Vladimir Zerjavica and Bogoljub Kocovic). The Ustasha regime also persecuted the supporters of HSS (Croatian peasant party). Even Macek was arrested and kept incarcerated in Jasenovac for several months. Embracing the Nazi racial politics, the Ustasha killed a great number of innocent people” (Matkovic et al 2006:183)

In the Serbian excerpt we see a very detailed account of Ustasha’s crimes and the character of their governance. The excerpt also seems more emotionally charged with a sequence of nouns used to describe the vileness of the Ustasha. In one of the sentences, it is stated that some of their practices were unlike any other in Europe at the time placing a special emphasis on the gravity of their crimes. Various numbers were also provided as well as a very long list of concentration camps. The special death camps for children were also mentioned, a piece of information missing from the other two accounts. At the end of the excerpt we see a particular stress placed on The Roman Catholic Church and its relation to the crimes.

The Bosniak excerpt is more focused on Bosnia within the Independent State of Croatia, first elaborating on the position of the Muslims (Bosniaks). However, it also mentions the Ustasha’s objective of exterminating Serbs, Roma and Jews. Even though the text dwells a lot on the forcible assimilation of the Muslims, it singles out Serbs as the greatest victims of the Ustasha terror. Serbs were also the first to be listed when mentioning the ethnic groups targeted by the Independent State of Croatia. However, unlike the other two excerpts, no concentration camps were mentioned by names, as well as the death toll.

The Croatian excerpt also puts a stress on the fascist nature of the Ustasha regime. It lists a number of concentration camps. However, the figures are drastically different compared to the ones found in the Serbian excerpt. It is stated that 48 000 Serbs were killed in
Jasenovac, while the Serbian excerpt mentions the figure of 700,000 people killed at the same death camp. The Serbian text also cites 800,000 people being killed in all camps with Serbs making over four fifths of these victims. It is conspicuous that the Croatian text book mentions the specific number of Serbs killed in Jasenovac and only following that figure, goes on to mention that several thousands of Jews, Roma, Croats and others were killed there as well, not specifying the exact number for those other ethnic groups. In the previous sentences it also lists Serbs following Jews and Roma despite the fact that Serbs comprised a great majority of victims. This is not the case with the other two excerpts. The discrepancy that exists between the figures provided in two different text books is also particularly striking even though both text books invoke particular, albeit different sources to back up the claims.

Even though all three text books are used by Bosnian students of different ethnicities, it is only the Bosniak text book that focuses more extensively on the circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the existence of the Independent State of Croatia. The other two text books are more focused on overall circumstances on the entire territory of the Independent State of Croatia.

7.5. World War II and the Chetnik movement

The Chetnik movement was a Serbian nationalist movement during the World War II which was closely linked to the Yugoslav government in exile. Here are the three textbook accounts on this movement:

The Bosnian Serb text books give the following account: “Having managed to avoid being imprisoned in the April war, the colonel of the Yugoslav army, Dragoljub Mihailovic, together with a group of officers moved to Ravna Gora in mid-May 1941, in order to continue the fight against the occupier by organizing a resistance movement- The Ravna Gora movement. This movement was comprised of the Chetnik units. Initially, he directed his activities towards establishing ties with the British Intelligence service, and the Yugoslav government through those channels. In the early August, he managed to inform the president of the royal government, Dusan Simic, about the objectives of the resistance movement seeking support and help, putting himself at the government’s disposal. As early as the summer 1941, he established a continuous contact with the English and the immigrant government. In the fall 1941, the British-Yugoslav military intelligence expedition arrived at Draza’s headquarters with Captain Bill Hudson at its helm. From that point until the full split between Mihailovic and the English (June 1944), the Chetniks had the continuous connection
and the complete support by the government in exile and the defense minister. Mihailovic stated his political and military-strategic agenda in ‘the Program’ from June 1941, the first point of which states the following: ‘Retain the hostile attitude towards the occupier and their helpers, but for now, until the further notice, do not engage in open confrontations except in case of self-defense as it is the case in Croatia’…In the part of the program addressing the period of ‘the occupiers’ breakdown’, two tasks are prevalent: ‘a) punish all who served the enemy and who consciously acted towards the destruction of Serbian people and b) make the Serbian state union homogeneous’.

Under the influence of the Yugoslav government which, apart from Serbs, also had Croats (Krnjevic and Sutej) and Slovenes (Krek and Snoj), as well as under the influence of the British, D. Mihailovic abandons his earlier concept of creating Yugoslavia with an ethnically clean Serbia within. He accepted the restoration of Yugoslavia with Istria, Slovene coast, Korushka, parts of the Croatian coast and the Dalmatian islands incorporated into it, the lands that remained outside Yugoslavia following World War I.

From everything stated, it can be concluded that the Ravna Gora Chetnik movement was against the occupier, but it was also in favor of the delay of the beginning of armed confrontations until specific conditions were met. Politically, he was in favor of retaining the monarchy and the restoration of Yugoslavia.

There were many examples of the joint fighting against the occupier up until the 1st of November 1941 (despite the fact that there was not a mutual agreement on the joint fighting between Chetniks and Partisans). For instance, the Chetnik commander, Colonel Veselin Misita’s unit liberated Loznica in August. Together. The Chetniks and Partisans liberated some other places as well (Krupanj, Banja Koviljaca, Gornji Milanovac, Uzice, Kraljevo etc.). Until 1942, the Chetniks and Partisans fought together against the occupier and Chetniks also protected the Serbian people from Ustasha terror in some regions” (Zivkovic and Stanojlovic 2012:120, 121, 122).

The Bosniak text book: “At the same time, Ustasha’s crimes against Serbs were taking place, the Chetniks started to commit a genocide against Muslims. The terror that took place in the summer 1941 was a harbinger of the crimes of massive scale on the territory of the South-eastern Bosnia and Sandzak, and the murders and the persecutions of Muslims lasted till the very end of the war. The Chetniks tried to realize one of their strategic goals of creating ‘the homogenous Serbia’, by complete cleansing of the Muslim population in Sandzak, and cleansing of Muslims and Croats in Bosnia. The plan of the great homogenous Serbia was based on the project by the member of the Chetnik political leadership and the
cultural circles in Banja Luka, lawyer Stevan Moljevic. This project was updated later with the program of the Chetnik Movement of Draza Mihailovic, where the main tasks were stated:
- Mark the borders of the de facto Serbian lands and make sure there is only Serbian people staying within them
- Radically cleanse the towns and fill them with the fresh Serbian element
- Devise a plan for cleansing and displacement of the village populace in order to achieve the homogeneity of the Serbian state union
- Within the Serbian unit, understand as a particularly difficult issue, the question of Muslims and solve it

During the realization of their program in the eastern Bosnia and Sandzak, The Chetniks applied for methods of genocide:
  a) Massive killings of the civil population;
  b) The persecution of the civilians
  c) The destruction of property so that the return and survival will be impossible
  d) The baptism of Muslims, that is, the conversion into the Christian Orthodox faith” (Sehic and Kucuk-Sorguc 2005:121)

The Croatian textbook elaborates on two conflicting conceptions of restoring Yugoslavia, the one propagated by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its leader Josip Broz Tito and the other propagated by the Chetnik movement (Ravna Gora movement) and Dragoljub Mihailovic (Matkovic et al. 2006:174): “’The second group, linked to the government in exile in London, also had an objective of restoring Yugoslavia, albeit, with the return of the previous political and social system. It also counted on the return of the king, that is, the return of monarchy. The official note that the government sent to the governments of the United Kingdom and the USA following its departure from the country, asserted the continuity of Yugoslavia and the continuation of war against Germany and Italy. The occupation of the country was not recognized, and the government counted on the victory of the western allies in the continuation of the war. The bearer of the restoration of the monarchist Yugoslavia and the domination of the Great Serbia was Draza Mihailovic’s Chetnik movement.’” (Matkovic et al. 2006:174,175)

Further on, under the title “Chetniks and their terror in Croatia” the textbook gives the following account: “The Chetnik movement already existed in the old Yugoslavia. It supported the monarchy and centralism, and its fundamental program was the Great Serbia. Following the breakdown of Yugoslavia, the new gathering of Chetniks ensued, led by the
colonel of the Yugoslav army, Draza Mihailovic. His objective was the restoration of Yugoslavia under the royal dynasty of Karadjordjevics and the reestablishment of the Great-Serbian hegemony.

…Chetnik groups initially operated on the territory of Serbia proper, but were later organized in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as on the territory of Croatia in Lika and Dalmatia (especially in the Knin area). This means that Chetniks operated on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, naturally, against the Croatian state. Even though the Chetnik movement was founded to fight for the restoration of Yugoslavia, its leader consciously delayed fighting, planning to gather forces for the moment of the allies’ arrival on the Yugoslav territory. However, Tito’s National Liberation Movement emerged around the same time. Despite profound differences (ideological and political), Tito and Draza met twice (in September and October 1941) with the intention to unite their fighting activities against the occupier, as well as The Independent State of Croatia. When the Germans started their first offensive against the Partisans in the western Serbia, Chetniks joined them and thus started the collaboration with the Germans and Italians. Their intention was to destroy Tito’s National Liberation Movement but they failed to do so as NLM was getting increasingly successful and gained more supporters.

As Italians aimed to suppress the Ustasha authorities on its occupied territory, they supported the Chetniks, collaborated with them and provided them with weapons. Frequently under the Italian protection, the Chetniks committed many crimes in various parts of the Independent State of Croatia, They pillaged houses, looted and destroyed the property and killed innocent civilians. Spreading terror against Croats and Muslims, they intended to create clean Serbian territories and solidify the Great-Serbian domination in the restored Yugoslavia” (Matkovic et al 2006:197)

While there is a great degree of overlap when stating the origins of the Chetnik movement and its initial objective of fighting the occupier and restoring Yugoslavia, the accounts diverge significantly. The Serbian textbook barely touches upon the Chetnik concept of the ethnically clean Serbia, mentioning how its leader would eventually abandon that concept and embrace the concept of expending Croatian and Slovenian territories within Yugoslavia. In this way, the movement’s multi-ethnic character is stated while its obvious chauvinistic tendencies are being just briefly mentioned. While the concept of the homogeneous Serbia is mentioned, the textbook never elaborates on it nor mentions the actions that came as a result of that particular agenda. In the end it is concluded that the
movement clearly opposed the occupier, the fact that is refuted in two other accounts present in the Croatian and Bosniak textbooks.

The Bosniak textbook on the other hand, depicts the Chetniks as war criminals realizing its plan of the homogeneous Serbia through the means of ethnic cleansing in specifically mentioned geographical areas. Unlike, the Serbian book the main stipulations of the Chetnik program are given as well as the name of its author.

The Croatian textbook depicts The Chetniks much in the same light as The Bosniak excerpt. However, it emphasizes the creation of The Great Serbia within the restored Yugoslavia and thus states the link between these two concepts as opposed to the Serbian textbook which insists on the Chetnik Yugoslav orientation claiming that its leader abandoned the concept of the homogeneous Serbia. Unlike the Serbian excerpt, here we have the Chetniks clearly depicted as the collaborators with Germany and Italy. There is also a strong emphasis of the Chetnik crimes against Croats and Muslims with a very vivid description of their actions. These descriptions are missing when the textbook delves into the Ustasha crimes where the concentration camps and number of victims are mentioned without the actual descriptions of the perpetrators’ actions. It can be argued that the more vivid descriptions in this excerpt as well as the excerpt on UstASHas in the Serbian text book are placed there to elicit a more emotional response on the behalf of the reader. In these two cases we see a different attitude towards the crimes committed against “our own people” and the others. In the Serbian book, there is a conspicuous absence of acknowledging any crimes committed by The Chetniks despite their concept of the ethnically cleansed Serbia being acknowledged.

These representations of crimes are at odds with each other and as such can be seen as hurtful and insulting for members of these respective ethnic groups. Given that they, as we have established, tend to greatly diverge from one another, they cannot contribute to tolerance between the groups as there is prevalent tendency to portray one’s own group as a victim and diminish or avoid addressing the crimes committed by the members of one’s own groups.

7.6. The tensions within the second Yugoslavia and the Croatian political movement in the early seventies (MASPOK)

Yugoslavia was changing in the early seventies which lead to more voices calling for the greater independent of its state units. Here’s what the Serbian textbook says on the Croatian MASPOK movement from the early seventies: “The tenth session of the leaders of
the Communist Union of Croatia in January 1970, during which ‘centralism’ was assessed to be the greatest threat to the Yugoslav society, gave rise to nationalism and internal turmoil in Croatia and Yugoslavia. It was said there that there was no ‘tendency of Croatian nationalism’ in Croatia.

Following the tenth session, where the nationalist concepts completely prevailed and the so call ‘maspok’, that is, the massive movement for the creation of the independent and completely sovereign Croatia with all the attributes of the independent state, suddenly took momentum. During ‘maspok’ (1970-1971), nationalist passions and hatred toward Serbs and Yugoslavia in general took very dangerous proportions. There was a threat of civil war breaking out. That kind of turn of events upset all citizens of Yugoslavia, so the leaders of the country were compelled to undertake certain measures. On December 1971 the 21st session of the leaders of The Communist Union of Yugoslavia was held. The Croatian party leaders were condemned and forced to resign” (Zivkovic and Stanojlovic 2012:159)

The Bosniak textbook does not address these events at all.

The Croatian textbook gives the following account: “The movement for the affirmation of the Croatian nation emerged, at first within the intelligentsia and manifested itself through the fight for the Croatian language. However, that was only the beginning of the changes that would grow into a democratic and national movement of great proportions in the wake of the sixties and on the eve of the seventies.

Young party officials within the leaders of the Communist Union of Croatia (Mika Tripalo, Savka Dabdžević-Kučar, Pero Pirker and others) brought new views to the party and advocated changes of the entire economic and political situation in the country. Student youth was increasingly more in favor of the democratization of the society and the demand for the respect for Croatian national sovereignty” (Matkovic et al. 2006:242)

On the next page, the failure of the movement is addressed: “When the reform of the federation was finished, a new rift emerged in the central committee of the Communist Union of Croatia. The group revolving around Vladimir Bakaric asked for the end of the ‘massive nationalist euphoria’ in Croatia and for the incapacitation of activities by political centers outside the party. Contrary to that group, the large part of the central committee asked for the democratization of the society, building of the national state and the transfer of the federal funds and foreign currency into the hands of manufacturers. The re-emerging Yugoslav centralism, behind which there was actually an imposition of Great-Serbian hegemony, was considered the main threat by that part of of the party leaders of Croatia.
During the spring and summer of 1971, the supporters of the ‘Croatian spring’ became the leaders of numerous organizations and public services. They took over the leading positions in the Youth Union, The Student Union, The Croatian Veterans Union, the newspaper publisher, Vjesnik, and radio and television. The president of the parliament and the president of the Croatian government backed up the movement. The main goal was the establishment of the Croatian state within the existing Yugoslav frame.

This turn of events caused a lot of disturbance within political circles and public in Serbia as well as Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The circles within the federal organs and Yugoslav army who could not come to terms with the implemented reform of the federation, were also upset. Vladimir Bakaric and Edvard Kardelj (who was among other things, the main author of the constitutional amendments), asked Tito to intervene. Croatia found itself in a very difficult position, especially now that Tito, after years of supporting the reformatory fraction within the top ranks of the Croatian party, decided to put an end to the process of national rebirth in Croatia” (Matkovic et al 2006:243)

Here we have two absolutely different characterization of the same movement. In Serbian textbook we see ‘maspok’ depicted as hate-mongering. On the other hand, Croatian textbook clearly depicts the movement as pro-democratic. The objectives of the movement were also stated differently. According to the Serbian textbook, the movement was in favor of independent Croatia while the Croatian textbook mentions that the goal was to establish the Croatian state within Yugoslavia. The Croatian textbook also describes Yugoslav centralism as Serbian hegemony in disguise without referring to any facts that confirm this. The Serbian textbook also makes vague and sweeping generalizations claiming that all people of Yugoslavia were upset by these events (by all, we can assume all inhabitants outside Croatia as the movement obviously enjoyed a lot of popular support there according to both excerpts) in order to intensify the negative feelings toward the movement. It also links the movement to the hatred toward Serbs and brings up an eventual civil war to intensify these negative sentiments. Again, we have two conflicting accounts presenting one people as victims and others as having a destructive agenda (In the Serbian excerpt the movements spreads hatred toward Serbs; in the Croatian excerpt the movement fights Yugoslav centralism which is Serbian hegemony in disguise). One cannot possibly know the actual truth of these events taking into consideration only these two texts.
7.7. The dissolution of Yugoslavia

The dissolution in Yugoslavia was a gradual process which culminated in 1991 and 1992 with several republics proclaiming independence and the outbreak of war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here are the events preceding the dissolution as described by three respective textbooks:

The Serbian textbook: “The increasing autonomy of republics and provinces contributed to certain democratization of political and cultural institutions, but it also contributed to an even more intense surge of nationalism. This initially came to prominence in Kosovo and Metohija in March 1981, when Albanian (the offensive term ‘šiptarski’ is used in the original text) masses acted very aggressively demanding their own republic and secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia.

The Communist Union of Yugoslavia as the only party in power (without opposition) mainly discussed some theoretical issues at its congress sessions (XI, XII and XIV) and neglected increasingly prominent nationalist and separatist tendencies in many parts of Yugoslavia. The leaders of Slovenia were particularly ahead of others in this regard, especially from 1989, anticipating secession from Yugoslavia.

To prevent the dissolution of the country, the Communist Union of Yugoslavia leaders were asked to urgently hold a special congress session which did take place (The congress was held in Belgrade between the 20th and 22nd of January in 1990). The advocates of the country’s dissolution knew very well that there were only two cohesive factors left on the state level: The Communist Union of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav army. That is why, according to the previously prepared plan, they decided to destroy first one (The Communist Union) and then the other (Yugoslav army) factor of the unity. That is how it happened. The Slovene delegates, endorsed by the leaders of the Croatian Communist Union, left the session which resulted in the 14th congress not finishing its work. The Communist Union of Yugoslavia ceased to exist as a political organization.

…During 1990, all republics held multi-party elections and pluralistic parliaments started to function, but the political crisis remained unresolved. The ultra-right forces won elections in some republics and they fulfilled their separatist and secessionist objectives under the auspices of democracy. That way, one single-mindedness was replaced with another in many parts of Yugoslavia. In addition, a very dire economic situation and a great decline of the living standard took place in Yugoslavia.” (Zivkovic and Stanojlovic 2012:162)
The Bosniak textbook: “The communist leaders of particular republics which were partly democratized and influenced by their population’s discontent, started to openly show dissatisfaction with the federal concepts. The consensus within the top ranks of the country that had existed by that point was completely disturbed. Communists of certain republics tried to exploit the rift between the communists on the federal level. The federal positions were being taken over by those forces that wanted to prevent changes in the country. The communists from the Republic of Serbia took the main role in preventing the democratization of the economic and political system in the country. They took that agenda into the main federal strongholds, the strong state police and the army (JNA).

The breakdown of the socialist system also signified the end of the state Communist party. During the democratization process, the nationalist forces emerged. Following forty years of internal peace, those forces found a very fertile ground again. There was not any force that could confront them. ‘The Yugoslav idea’ died for the second time and Tito’s state collapsed with it. The center of the nationalist turmoil that shattered Yugoslavia was in its leading centre, Serbia.

While Croats and Slovenes rightfully complained about Serbian dominance, Serbs, on the other hand, felt that they had suffered the most under Tito’s regime, as a victim of the “Croatian-Slovene” partnership who was able to deny Serbia of the rights it would ask for. In fact, Tito’s federal constitution that granted republics sovereignty took the leading position in the country from Serbia. It was not the only leading force in the country but just one of the six equal republics, not even the richest one. Serbian politicians believed that Serbia was the only republic without full sovereignty over its territory given that its two provinces, Vojvodina in the north and Kosovo in the south kept its autonomy according to the federal constitution and were practically outside Belgrade’s control. Besides, they complained that Serbia, that had given the greatest sacrifices in World War II, was relegated to the second rate status. Those accusation were far from reality but they lead to a horrible outcome” (Sehic and Kucuk-Sorguc 2005: 162.163)

The Croatian textbook:” In May 1989, Milosevic was elected as the president of the presidency of the federal republic of Serbia. He set in motion the destabilization of other republics. He wanted to stir unrest and remove the leaders of other republics by organizing political rallies outside Serbia. The violent methods were aimed at Croatia as well, so the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo served as an excuse to organize a great rally in Knin and the village of Kosova in its vicinity. Many Serbs from other parts of Croatia as well as Serbs from Serbia and Bosnia gathered there. Glorifying Milosevic, they
chanted the slogan, ‘This is Serbia’ which anticipated the completion of the great Serbia by means of stealing Croatian territories. 

…Milosevic continued his aggression in a different direction. Near the end of 1989 Serbia imposed economic blockade on Slovenia and took various discriminatory measures against Croatia. Many Croatian companies had their whole property in Serbia confiscated (INA’s gas stations, Marteks’s shops, many dealerships, tourist company branches), which caused considerable discontent in the broad layers of Croatian society and intensified the crisis within the state.

The Communist Union of Serbia forced a session of congress of the Communist Union Of Yugoslavia. Milosevic hoped that the session of congress would secure him the dominance within the top of the Yugoslav party ranks, which would finally enable the realization of the previously set goal. The session was held in January 1990 and two different concepts crystalized during its work: The Communist Union of Serbia asked for the restoration of the single Communist Union of Yugoslavia, while the Communist Unions of Croatia and Slovenia asked for the full transformation of the Communist Union of Yugoslavia into the union of the republic parties. This was not only about the Party structure but it was also about the equality of the republics and seeking the solution to end the economic crisis. The delegates from Serbia and Montenegro displayed a lot of aggression during the argument, attacking delegates from Croatia and Slovenia in a very rude manner which led to them leaving the session. The remaining delegates decided to postpone the congress session. However, the congress was never resumed and this interruption marked the dissolution of the Communist Union of Yugoslavia. This is how the political organization that held the one party state together disappeared” (Matkovic et al 2006:267).

The Croatian and Bosniak excerpts clearly point at Serbian political authorities at the time as the main culprits, whereas the Serbian excerpts goes from vague remarks about separatist and nationalist tendencies in some parts of Yugoslavia to naming Slovenian and Croatian political leaders as the main culprits. The vagueness of the Serbian text where the authors refuse to name specific geographical regions and republics that they accuse of nationalist and separatist tendencies could possibly be construed as portraying Serbs as the victims of all other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. Moreover, the offensive term ”šiptarski” is used to denote Albanians. This term is widely considered offensive by members of the Albanian minority in former Yugoslav republics.
The session of congress is differently portrayed. The Serbian text sees it as the last attempt to salvage things, while the Croatian text see it as being forced and as an attempt to secure the political domination of Serbs. Here we have a discrepancy that obviously reflects two opposing political views.

Unlike the Serbian text-book where Croats and Slovenes are denoted as guilty parties as well as the rest of the country, the Bosnian book cites Serbia as the center of turmoil. It goes further, to claim that Croatian and Slovenian grievances were justified whereas the Serbian ones’ were an exaggeration. The textbook never fully elaborates on these definitive claims leaving the reader without the full insight into the problems that plagued the relations of six republics. There is also an unnecessary and arguably a disparaging remark about Serbia not even being the richest republic. We are given the explanation behind the motivation of Serbian politicians and some of their grievances. However, we do not get any insight in the actions that led to the dissolution and violence. Much in the same way, the Serbian text book refers to the rising nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia. Rather than getting the information on the actions of the political agents, we get qualitative remarks. This way, the students cannot truly determine what the truth is and they are provided with the picture of the world of polar opposites and basically given the answers in advance without allowing for critical thinking and a more balanced discussion on the actions and individuals that caused the problems. Instead, we get vague and generalizing statements where the culprits are rarely fully specified (except in the case of Milosevic).

The Croatian text book also emphasizes the role of Milosevic and his political rallies which were not mentioned in the Serbian textbook. In one sentence it is mentioned that Serbs from all over the country gathered at one of the rallies to greet their leader. This can be construed as equating Milosevic with Serbian people as citing different geographical location that the participants of the rally came from could imply the broad support from all Serbian people.

In the end, the main issue with these particular excerpts is that yet again the accounts are obviously given from different political perspectives without the precise description of the events. The language used is also such that it implies collective rather than individual guilt. Even when Milosevic is singled out as a culprit, Serbs and Serbia are mentioned right alongside him. The Serbian textbook takes this step further with pinning the blame on a very vague notion of “some parts of Yugoslavia” and then both Slovenia and Croatia rather than singling out particular political actors and their actions.
7.8. Findings

7.8.1. How are other ethnic groups portrayed in the history textbooks?

Concluding from the examples above, there are not many instances with direct qualitative statements about an entire ethnic group. However, sometime the texts are vague when referring to actors from a certain state or region thus indirectly generalizing (“some groups and individuals from Croatia and Slovenia”, “Serbian bourgeois”, “Serbian political circles” etc.). Still, it is obvious that these textbooks are not characterized by prominent and straightforward hate-speech. The ethnic groups are more defined in terms of how crimes and repression are described depending on which particular ethnic group is afflicted. In that sense, more emotionally charged language is used when referring to the crimes afflicted on the ethnic group the textbook is written for. For instance, Ustasha crimes are described in a much more vivid detail in the Serbian excerpt. The Chetniks’ crimes are not even mentioned in the Serbian text book. In the Croatian textbook, the Chetniks’ actions are described with several verbs meant to emphasize the brutality of their actions. On the other hand, the Serbian textbook emphasizes their role in protecting the population from Ustashas without referring to any of their crimes. Therefore, the issue is not with direct sweeping generalizations but an obvious bias in addressing the perpetrators and victims. This bias is well reflected in the way the books address the death camps on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia where the numbers of victims are in such a grave collision that it is virtually impossible that both texts (Serbian and Croatian textbooks) are close to the factual account. The negative bias against the other states or ethnic groups can be seen in the sentences that place the focal point of the political turmoil in a particular geographical entity.

In cases of Chetnik and MASPOK movements as well as the portrayal of the pre-World War II political crisis, we get conflicting accounts with vague and generalizing statements used to back them up (“many people even believed that it was the only way to save the country from its dissolution”, “The center of the nationalist turmoil that shattered Yugoslavia was in its leading centre, Serbia”). The question remains whether such statements reflect personal beliefs or whether there is evidence behind it. While these statements might be seen as true, they inevitably serve to affirm a certain point of view without resorting to available facts and evidence. The same goes for ascribing guilt without offering definitive
proof, solely on the basis of indications (“This incident, which had been ordered by the
King…”).

The refusal to properly acknowledge victims belonging to other ethnic groups or even
justifying or excusing the perpetrators is evident in these excerpts. In most cases, the events
are portrayed such that the ethnic group the text-book is written for is presented as a perpetual
victim. Even when textbooks acknowledge the crimes of people belonging to their ethnic
groups, they are downplayed by comparison to those crimes committed by others. There is
also the tendency of omission of some facts or events (the Chetnik program was not present in
the Serbian textbook) so as to portray your own side as more righteous. If the transgression is
such there are still justifications or positive examples offered to balance things out (Chetnik
protected Serbian people from Ustasha, many Bosnian Muslims disapproved of Ustashas.).

7.8.2. Are historical events portrayed in irreconcilable ways?

As Salomon stated, the collective narratives of the groups in conflict delegitimize one
another and do not acknowledge the sufferings of the other group, thus, facilitating further
conflict (Salomon 2004:273). The different perspectives in text-books are anticipated
considering that “…there is no single perspective, no single ‘truth’ in post-conflict settings’
(Fischer 2006:321). The problems emerge when “…the facts are neglected or history is used
to reinforce the stereotypes of other group, justify acts of crime or support feelings of
superiority” (Fischer 2006:321). Fischer( 2006:321) offers the solution in relation to teaching
history in Bosnian schools, in form of introducing different perspectives to students. As seen
from the text-book excerpts, the perspectives are very singular without much room for
independent interpretation on the part of the students. The accounts widely diverge from one
another. Croatian and Bosniak textbooks are quite similar in their presentation of events with
the Croatian text-book placing more emphasis on Croatia and its own history. On the other
hand, the Serbian textbook drastically diverges from the other two mirroring the current
political divisions within two entities in the country. The fault of these textbooks does not
solely lie within overly subjective remarks made without much elaboration. The issue is the
absence of different perspectives ignoring the fact that Bosnia is a multi-ethnic and multi-
confessional society that recently emerged from a conflict that had claimed thousands of life.
Without providing the students with an objective and comprehensive array of perspectives,
there is a risk of passing on the existing ethnic tensions and overall sense of mistrust onto the
next generations of young citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Considering that the country is
already politically and systematically divided along the ethnic lines, this can potentially thwart any attempts to bring all political and social factors closely together and bridge gaps between parts of general population. The self-victimizing portrayal of three respective ethnic groups can only add to the vilification of the other groups, as it clearly sets the black and white picture in terms of collective guilt rather than addressing individual perpetrators and political accountability. Even when books specify individual guilt, it is more pronounced when a culprit of different ethnicity is being referred to. Furthermore, the lack of different perspectives and diminishment of other groups’ victims does not encourage empathy and understanding as the student is almost left with no choice but to solely empathize with victims of their own ethnic group.

7.8.3. How are new collective narratives constructed through history textbooks?

It can be argued that these excerpts essentially affirm the already-existing narratives relating to these historical events. One common thread in all three textbooks is the portrayal of one’s own people as a perpetual victim of historical circumstances as well as the actions of the others.

It is also conspicuous that textbooks for Serbian and Croatian students do not place as much emphasis on Bosnia as the textbook intended for Bosniak students. They are more focused on the history of their people as a single entity regardless of the state borders. Very often the Croatian and Serbian textbooks are much more focused on the developments in Croatia and Serbia respectively. Most relations of people in Bosnia are showed as divergent without many positive examples of the cooperation between the three peoples (The Bosniak textbook does mention that many Bosnian Muslims and Croats helped Serbs during World War II). It can be argued that the collective narratives are created in such a way as to emphasize the opposition between peoples rather than their common heritage.

Overall, it is clear that except in the case of the textbook intended for Bosniaks students, the other two textbooks do not clearly promote the sense of belonging to the Bosnian states. They are rather more focused on the ethnic identity disregarding Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia and Croatia seem to be treated as “motherlands” despite the fact that the students are for the most part native to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8. Conclusion

It is extremely difficult to predict the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the future power relations within the country and its respective ethnic groups. However, the current situation is such that the division seems to linger on. This is particularly visible within the school system. There is a prevailing sense that the ethnic divisions have become the norm within the society that seems to be overly resilient to change, despite a lot of good will on part of some agents within the society.

While trying to conduct my fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I observed a clearly divided town of Mostar where the division itself became so ingrained within the society that it was visible at almost every corner. It also seemed that the two school principals. I had an opportunity to talk to, did not find the school situation particularly problematic and one of them was openly annoyed when asked about this issue. On the other hand, while these ethnic divisions seem to be accepted on many levels to the point of being the social norm that seemingly does not bother people (at least most of those that I encountered), we have students being taught radically different versions of the same historic events involving their respective ethnic groups. We have events portrayed in such a way to maximize the victims of their ethnic group and minimize those of the others in a way that collectivizes the guilt. The history is taught in a way that does not necessarily point out the role of the individuals but makes vague and sweeping remarks that usually refer to a state or a nation. Bearing this in mind, it is only legitimate to ask whether the current divided education poses a security threat or at least represents a disintegrative element that might potentially divide the state in a nexus with other political and economic circumstances. While it can be argued that the ethnic groups’ autonomy is one of the pillars of the post-conflict attempts to build a fair and democratic state, the question is whether such autonomy still protects human and civil rights if it is used to portray others as traditional enemies, as it can be argued it is done through history textbooks.

What I observed in schools was that the division was maintained despite the school staff showing a positive attitude towards other groups. However, judging by my interview with an NGO representative, one of the most feasible ways to bring students together seem to be external activities organized in cooperation with another party such as The Nansen Centre for instance. It is questionable how frequent the encounters between students of different groups are. The positive aspect is that the students are free to choose their school regardless of their ethnicity. However, there is a clear lingual and ethnic division which also comes clearly
through the study content which in case of history textbooks seems very ethno-centric. The physical division also remains visible with cases of “two schools” within the same building.

The reintegration seems to be a daunting task given the circumstances. The Dayton agreement established autonomy for all peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina and this autonomy brought the peace to the land. It is thus no surprising that any perceived breach of such autonomy might be perceived as a threat and the status quo remains. It is important to acknowledge that sensitivity, especially in terms of the language issue. Yet, the situation where external efforts have to be made on the part of NGOs to bring the students together poses the question whether the linguistic division has been taken too far and whether small language peculiarities that some find so important are worth such a sharp split where students attend separate schools within the same building to learn the same craft (the principal I interviewed provided an example of auto-mechanics being taught in two different languages) in different languages that are essentially the same with respect to differences. All in all, it might be wise to seek the solution that will properly acknowledge the existing differences, as arbitrary as some of them may seem (for instance insisting on using one word rather than the other), and yet put an emphasis on integration by using the existing differences as the means of reunification. Simply, the existing differences should be cherished whether that means familiarizing with different languages or different versions of the same language (depending on the perspective) or providing students with different perspectives in history text-books (a single textbook for all citizens of Bosnia).

However, it seems that at the moment this issue is a part of a much larger issue of the political system and climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we observed in the chapter related to this issue, there is not a true social consensus as to what Bosnia and Herzegovina should be. Some, like Milorad Dodik, the president of the Serb Republic (one of the two entities that comprise Bosnia and Herzegovina), remain highly skeptical of the idea of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state and call for separation, while others call for a more unified state with more emphasis on individuals rather than collectives (Such as former Croatian president, Stipe Mesic). It can be argued that until a greater social consensus is achieved between the political elites of three peoples, issues such as the one of divided education will remain. Yet, one has to wonder whether there will be enough pressure on the political elites to introduce changes in this regard if students keep getting negative messages and images of the other groups through their education. In the interviews and conversations that I had during my fieldwork, it seemed that people employed in schools, the principals I talked with, felt that it was not up to them to address this issue. In the case of the principal that refused to give me an
interview, it seemed that she did not feel there was a problem to talk about, expressing her frustration with my desire to talk about these issues. The NGO representative that I talked with also made a point that this issue mostly hinged on political elites’ decisions.

Bearing that in mind, we seem to be stuck within a vicious circle where new generations are being indoctrinated to perceive their ethnic group as a victim of the others surrounding them and therefore it can be assumed that they will embrace the current division rather than trying to choose those in power who would put an end to it. Still, this is a bleak prediction for the future that might not come into existence considering that there are other factors in play, from the international community to local agents pushing toward the integration such as The Nansen Centre for Peace whose efforts, as we see, were embraced by students and parents (otherwise they would not have been able to put them in practice). In my opinion, this gives a hope that with the right passage of time, there might be enough will at the top to introduce changes to the educational system rather than sustaining status quo.

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Appendix:

Interviews:

The following text is a translation of the interview’s transcript. The questions were mostly prepared in advanced and slightly improvised during the interview. The questions in two interviews are different to an extent due to a different nature of participants’ positions: This interview was done with a representative of The Nansen centre for peace in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Me: Which activities have been undertaken in order to integrate students?

Interviewee 1: We have not done many related activities in Mostar, lately, but we are applying that principle in Stolac and what we are now starting in Mostar is essentially work on the integration of these schools that operate in accordance with two teaching curricula, two schools under the same roof, two schools with two curricula or one school with two curricula,…in essence these schools are multiethnic working in multiethnic and ethnically divided communities. Those schools pose a challenge due to their very organization. Unfortunately, they are a part of the wider context of the society and communities where they are situated, communities which, unfortunately, are as they are, divided along the ethnic lines for the most part. In that sense, these schools share these problems. Besides, the school system is what it is. There are three curricula in Bosnia and Herzegovina and schools teach in three languages, and that situation is particularly visible in the places, communities, where they exist in multiethnic or divided communities depending on which angle you choose to look at it from. Our main objective is the integration, increasing the extent of integration in these schools, but not just schools, but these communities as well, because schools are in every community…(pause)

So, the integration is one of the key things of our work and objectives. Now, the integration, you know what, it is one of those often mentioned issues where people have different views. We believe that the integration in these schools should take place on three levels. That is, one
level is building relations between different agents in that story, first and foremost, the citizens, teachers, school administration, students and parents and the local authorities, of course. That is that level of building relations where the dialogue is the main means. The second level would be the work on common projects and activities, creating activities where they will work together with these activities in an ideal setting being such that they respond to the needs of these communities and schools and that the very teachers, students and parents are the initiators of that idea, and that we are there only as some kind of pacificators or someone who will mitigate and carry out the organizational level and provide support if needed, even financially. The third level would be that administrative, political level. Unfortunately, as a small organization, or just like any other NGO, we do not have a big influence. It is a political question, which means that all three levels together would have achieving integration as a goal that would be long term and sustainable.

Me: What influence does this current situation have on the relations between the youth of different ethnicities?

Interviewee 1: You mean, this situation in the society. Unfortunately, the situation in the society is complex and problematic on many levels, one of it being the multiethnic relations and the political situations as well as numerous crises taking place on the levels of the state, entities, local communities and of course, all of it has a bad influence on the multiethnic relations between the students. Another thing worth pointing out is that the students attending school, who are teenagers now, if we speak of secondary schools, they are students born during or following the war, which means they do not have the memories of the life as it was before the war like older generations that know of that more normal life. Unfortunately, for most of them that division, and ethnic distance is something normal, something they grow up with from the beginning and the big issue is, particularly in small communities, that they do not have the opportunity to take part in some common activities where they would have contact, dialogue or some other form of work with the students of another ethnicity. It is one of the important thing we are trying to initiate through our projects. We want to change that negative influence that the whole situation has on them into a different kind of influence, a positive influence of sorts, to create, through some different, some positive values, a situation where they and everyone else would deem it normal to work, socialize, to reach out their community after all which is very important. Of course, the goal is not to make them all the same, to have an assimilation of sorts but simply, to have all those young people who want to
have, who have their ethnic and religious identity or any other identity, to keep it without anyone questioning I, to show despite everything it isn’t not such a problem, such an obstacle so that we can all work and live together.

Me: How great is the responsibility of schools for the current situation?

Interviewee 1: In essence, schools have a great responsibility because, the school as an institution of the educational and pedagogical character, that should have that pedagogical function apart from the educational one, that should simply promote some universal values. However, many schools work in very difficult conditions. They have many of their own problems, dire financial circumstances, pressures and so on…Teachers as well…So many of them, essentially, at the end of the day are themselves subjected to these situations related to the students. Therefore, we think it is important to support those schools. It is important to help in some way the teachers themselves, give the school authorities the chance for a dialogue and some joint projects where all that would reflect on the students, as one of the target groups and eventually it would reflect on the local communities. That is in the end, the ultimate goal. The integration of the local communities is the ultimate goal.

Me: Do you think that divided school curricula are a part of the problem? How do they affect all this?

Interviewee 1: Yes, as we mentioned, there are three different school curricula. That diversity is special. We all know that there is only one mathematics, one chemistry, most of the social sciences. However, those differences are expressed through the language and literature, history, religion as a school subject and so on. And well, it is understandable that in the state of three equal peoples, three equal languages, where those languages…where everyone wants to study in their own language, and have more of an emphasis on particular authors in the literature studies. However, despite all of this, it shouldn’t be the obstacle because eventually, that diversity should and could be a wealth of sorts rather than a problem. There often problems in those multiethnic communities. Fortunately to a much lesser degree lately, but sometimes one gets an impression that a community with a multiethnic composition have more of those ethnic problems, whereas, ethnically cleaned communities or almost ethnically cleaned communities do not have those problems but they could have them. This creates an impression that the ethnic diversity is a problem which cannot be acceptable by any stretch of imagination. It is a challenge but we need to work on that and all that diversity, school
curricula and all that. All that should be subjected to some form of better familiarization, and in the end, the promotion of diversity, which is one of the key values of the EU, which is being promoted, and which we all want to be a part of, but I have a feeling that we would like to go towards the EU, that we would like to be part of the community of those states, but we neglect our own community that we have had for centuries.

Me: What activities have been organized so far in order to integrate the students? What concrete steps have been taken in relation to that issue?

Interviewee 1: Besides these educational activities, such as seminars and teachers’ training, some activities were focused on the dialogue, mediation, the essence of which is to help teachers to be better at what they do, to acquire new skills and so forth. The second group of activities was focused on creating joint activities. So, given that the curriculum is what it is and that there is not much space in it for joint activities, then we try to create external activities in some creative way so that they can be an addition to the curriculum, to create room for joint work. In that respect, one of the first things we did in Stolac was creating a classroom called the Nansen classroom for joint activities, used by both teachers and students. We also arranged a lot of external activities such as ecological activities, sports, culture, acting classes etc, where teachers brought students together with our support. Then there were a lot of activities that we organized directly with the students counsels, the student representatives. For instance, they have been publishing the school newspaper for several years now. There is a journalist section working on that newspaper which comes out periodically, several times a year. Furthermore, there were several projects where they had the chance to show their creativity through joint work on several projects, making documentaries, short films on the subject of their own everyday life, then another time on the subject of dialogue etc where we hired some professional film workers who taught them how to write a script etc. Eventually, they had some products that they stood behind, that they signed and that they could promote and we organized the screening of these films in the local community which was met with great interest and where people were very surprised by the quality and the message of these films. In essence, that student activity is important and it is important to organize those activities that they deem interesting. They are not interested in some sections that used to exist back in the day, such as reciting or something like that. They are interested in this multimedia aspect. We are trying to do something in that context. We carried out several projects where we had a student exchange from Stolac and Lille Hammer in Norway.
where they visit each other, stay at their fellow Norwegian students’ homes, they host them here and essentially we get that sort of international context where they learn a lot about the geography and culture of another nation and people during those seven days in Lille Hammer and they also spend a lot of time together with their fellow students from their town from a different shift, where they often realize that those small differences in their communities are very small in that international context, and they cannot hear about that from anyone. It cannot be explained verbally until they see it for themselves. Then they return to their community, they pass on their impressions to their family, fellow students, parents…

Me: What is the overall attitude towards having teachers of different ethnic background work with students?

Interviewee 1: I think there are such cases in some schools in Mostar while I am not so certain when it comes to some other smaller environments. I hope that the time will come soon, that it will be normal that any subject will be primarily taught by a teacher who’s competent, professional, responsible, has professional qualities and can teach any subject. Unfortunately, even though such cases exist, they are exceptions.

Me: Does that mean that the overall attitude towards this issue is negative?

Interviewee 1: Yes, I simply think that when it comes down to the students and parents, they may not have any issues with it, maybe some of the fellow teachers would, but simply, the system is such, it is simply moving in that direction. There are two universities in Mostar teaching in two languages. However, there are many students that simply attend the university in the other part of the town without any problems. They do it because a particular faculty might not exist elsewhere or for some other reason they transfer to the other university and this has been normal the last couple of years. In that context, the question of how some else (from another ethnic group) can teach simply loses relevance and there are also guest lecturers coming from other towns and surrounding states where everything takes place without any difficulties.

Me: What is emphasized as the main issue in case a person of different ethnicity teaches students? What is perceived as the problem by those objecting to this idea?
Interviewee 1: Well, the problem, I don’t think that any makes it a problem publicly, but one of the arguments might be that that someone teaches in another language, that it’s not the real deal, that they are “our teachers” who can do it and so on. That would be the argument without being made public. I think there is simply a tacit agreement, inertia of sorts.

Me: What is the overall attitude on the part of parents when it comes to any attempts of integration?

Interviewee 1: Yes, the parents are a very essential group in this whole story and I think that parents often do not have all the information and the information that they get comes from the second or third source, and that they are just like any parents concerned about their children and wish them best and so on. Maybe in that context of integration, the main problem for people is that they feel that they would lose something in those sorts of integrations and connections, that they would be damaged somehow because they believe that it might better as it is now than to change anything as who know what the changes might bring, at least something uncertain. That is I think the problem. There is a fear which is a consequence of war and some of the post-war developments. However, very often that fear comes as a result of manipulation. That fear is being manipulates and I think most problems stem for that fear, the fear of losing one’s national identity, the fear of assimilation and so forth.

The end of the interview

The second interview was done with one of school principals in the school which could be described as one of “two schools under the same roof” cases, with separate schools for Croats and Bosniaks (still with somewhat mixed ethnic composition in both of these according to the school staff): This text is also a translation from Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian into English.

Me: Do you think that students of different ethnicity should go to schools separately?

Interviewee 2: They shouldn’t go to schools separately. However, due to the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they go to schools separately and as long as the common curriculum is not decided on on the levels that require it, they will attend schools separately.

Me: Should the students attend school in accordance with the same curriculum in relation to history lectures?

Interviewee 2: On the same issue, as long as the common curriculum for history is put in place, which again will be decided on a political level, where it’s decided on, at the level of
the ministry of education, the schools cannot decide whether they will attend (the history lectures according to the same curriculum). They will attend it when the history becomes common and when it’s possible to write a book on the common history. Look, you have the Hague Tribunal (for war crimes in Yugoslavia) verdicts that some comment on in one way and others in another.

Me: What are the relations between the students attending different programs in your school, to be specific, we have two schools. What are the relations between students of these two schools?

Interviewee 2: As far as the relations between the students are concerned, there are two different schools. They attend the lecture at different times where they meet rarely, only when certain joint activities are being carried out through the students’ council, different clubs, then, excursions, some projects. In those cases, the relations are immensely good.

Me: Do the students of different ethnic groups attend school together in your school?

Interviewee 2: In our school, we have students of different ethnic groups. We have the enrollment on the same day as the traffic school (the other school in the building) and students’ parents can decide, if they will enroll their children in the traffic school or the mechanical engineering school.

Me: What is your opinion on this division of schools in Bosnia on the basis of different ethnic curricula?

Interviewee 2: According to the nature of my work, I am not paid to think about how the ethnic division or integration should be carried out. I am paid to run the school I am the head of and make sure it is the most prosperous one. This means that I don’t think at all about carrying out unification or anything else but I just do the work I am paid for. Some other people should decide on the ethnic divisions.

Me: Do you know what the parents’ attitudes on these issues are?
Interviewee 2: Every parent made a statement when they enrolled their child. When they bring the student to enrolling one or the other school, then they accept that school or the other. That is what it should be or otherwise it wouldn’t… There are 27 schools in Hercegovina-neretva canton and each parent will decide where to enroll their kid.

Me: Do the students accept teachers of other ethnic groups?

Interviewee 2: Students accept the teachers if they are hired by school. Teachers get their employment through a public tender. Teachers of different ethnicities respond to the tender and there is no dispute that the students will accept a teacher of different ethnicity.

Me: So there are no issues there?

Interviewee 2: No issues…

Me: Are there external activities including students of different programs?

Interviewee 2: There are external activities that we do with the Traffic school as well as other schools, educational activities where both groups of students are included.

Me: So those activities often take place?

Interviewee 2: Yes, they often take place.

Me: What is students’ attitude toward these common activities?

Interviewee 2: They gladly accept them because each such activity brings something new, brings a new journey, a new exchange of experiences, socializing. Students’ nature is to socialize and meet new people.

Me: What is the parents’ attitude toward joint activities?

Interviewee 2: In relation to joint activities and parents’ attitudes, those people have no problems with them. In case students have to travel outside Mostar, they give the consent that their child can travel with other students because the students are minors without any problems.

Me: What are the relations between employees of different ethnic groups?
Interviewee 2: The relations are immensely good and fair. We socialize, me and and Mr (the principal of the other school) attended the university together. We exchange our opinions, use the same premises, we maintain them, take care of them. You never entered a more beautiful school, this clean and tidy. Enter the hallways and classrooms, it is clean and tidy. We take care of it even though thousands of students pass through it every day.