Troubled waters, troubled times
Fisheries policy reforms in the transition to democracy
in South Africa and Mozambique

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Map 1: Africa, with demarcation of areas of fieldwork sites (Source: van Riet et al. 1997)
List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADMAR</td>
<td>Administração Marítima – Maritime Administration, Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Consultative Advisory Forum, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Comissão de Administração Pesqueira – Fisheries Administration Commission, Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDQ</td>
<td>Community Development Quotas</td>
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<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>The Danish Agency for Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development, United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNP</td>
<td>Dirreccção Nacional de Pesca – National Directorate for Fisheries, Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FAWU</td>
<td>Food and Allied Workers Union, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPDC</td>
<td>Fisheries Policy Development Committee, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Liberação Moçambicana – Mozambican Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTC</td>
<td>Fisheries Transformation Council, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Economy and Readjustment, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICEIDA</td>
<td>The Icelandic International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICLARM</td>
<td>International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPPE</td>
<td>Instituto de Desenvolvimento de Pesca de Pequena Escala – Institute for the Development of Small-Scale Fisheries, Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFM</td>
<td>Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal Community Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIP</td>
<td>Instituto de Investigação Pesqueira – Institute for Fisheries Research, Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITQ</td>
<td>Individual Transferable Quota</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOS</td>
<td>Law of the Sea Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td>Chief Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management (previously Chief Directorate of Sea Fisheries), South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPAN</td>
<td>Projecto de Pesca Artesanal em Nampula – Artisanal Fisheries Project in Nampula, Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana – Mozambican National Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACFC</td>
<td>South African Commercial Fishermen Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Total Allowable Catch</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Oppsummering

Avhandlingen er en samfunnsvitenskapelig analyse av tidlige resultater av implementeringen fiskeriforvaltningsreformene i Sør Afrika og Mozambique. Forvaltningsreformene var del av landenes overordnede demokratiseringsprosesser i kjølvannet av hhv avskaffelse av apartheid i 1994 og slutten på borgerkrigen i 1992. Et av målene for forvaltningsreformene var sosioøkonomisk utvikling for fattige fiskersamfunn, og et viktig virkemiddel skulle være økt brukergruppedeltakelse både i beslutnings- og gjennomføringsfasene. Dette var et ambisiøst prosjekt, i og med at historisk sett var det svært lite rom for politisk deltakelse og organisering for folk flest, og dermed var det lite erfaring å bygge på. Et hovedfokus i avhandlingen er hvordan interne maktforhold i fiskerorganisasjoner påvirket prosessene og potensialet for økt medbestemmelse og innflytelse. Den påpeker betydningen av å ta høyde for lokale maktstrukturer og enkeltaktørers interesse i forvaltningssystemenes utforming og implementering. Hvis ikke, er forvaltningsreformer tilbøyelig til å mislykkes når man sammenlikner med de opprinnelige målene og gode hensiktene. Avhandlingen viser at til tross for at en viktig målgruppe for reformene var de fattigste fiskerne, var lokale makteliter best posisjonert til å delta i prosessene for å implementere forvaltningsreformene og nyttiggi seg mulighetene som følger med. Både i fiskerorganisasjoner og på myndighetsnivå var det mangefulle systemer for kontroll, ansvarliggjøring, og sanksjonering dersom prosessene tok feil vending. Til tross for at en stor målgruppe (de fattigste fiskerne) i liten grad evnet å nyttiggi seg mulighetene som kunne bidra til deres sosioøkonomiske utvikling, skjedde det en betydelig bevisstgjøring og læringseffekt for fiskerne og deres organisasjoner. Slike erfaringer er viktige byggesteiner i samfunn i overgang til demokrati. Over tid kan dette erfaringsgrunnlaget bidra til at fattige, marginaliserte grupper i større grad kan påvirke beslutningsprosessene, og dermed bidra til å definere betingelsene for egen utvikling.
1 Introduction

1.1 Fisheries policy reform in a co-management context

Fisheries co-management as a decision-making system has been promoted as a way of addressing problems such as overexploitation of fish resources and conflicts among fish resource stakeholders. A co-management system is based on the idea that the state and the resource users and their communities share decision-making power at various stages in resource management (Sen and Raakjær Nielsen 1996). The crux is user group participation, whereby people are entitled to participate in management of and influence decision-making on a particular natural resource they exploit and depend on. This principle contrasts with fisheries management decision-making systems of top-down and technocratic character. Such systems have not prevented over-fishing, but rather resulted in the deterioration of the resource base, and hence, top-down management principles are increasingly being challenged both in the Western world and in developing countries. The general trend is that with the spread of democratic ideals and political structures, and with the increasing insistence on user group participation, unrepresentative development and conservation projects have gradually been abandoned (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Also in the management of coastal and fisheries resources, a worldwide trend to involve local user groups and communities has emerged (Hauck and Sowman 2003). Other stakeholders than the resource user groups can also be part of co-management arrangements, such as fish processors, community organisations, environmental NGOs, research institutes, and the tourism industry. However, the focus of this dissertation is on the relation between the state and user groups of fishers as stakeholders, embedded in a social science approach to fisheries management.

Co-management is often seen as a fair way of making decisions. As with most concepts, the meaning of the term ‘fair’ is a matter of definition and interpretation. To some people, allowing market forces to work in a fishery through the transfer of fishing rights is the fairest way of making decisions about allocation. To others, fair includes considerations of fishery-dependent coastal communities or regions, or the notion of a level playing field at the outset (McCay 1995).

In South Africa and Mozambique, the policies of fisheries management were reformed in the 1990s. In several aspects, the policy reforms reflect values of the democratisation processes taking place in both countries, following the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 and the
end of the civil war in Mozambique in 1992. This includes objectives of poverty reduction for large parts of the population and the uplift of marginalised communities, which is reflected in policy reform documents on fisheries management. Both the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 in South Africa and the Fisheries Master Plan of 1994 in Mozambique emphasise the objective of managing fish resources in a way that is conducive to socio-economic development of small-scale fishers, of whom most are socio-economically marginalised. It was suggested to facilitate this by including user groups at different stages of fisheries management, which was encouraged in both countries’ policy documents (Republic of Mozambique 1994; Republic of South Africa 1997, 1998a). This has connotations to and traits of co-management as a decision-making system.

The research purpose of this dissertation and the corresponding identified research questions are presented in detail on page 8 and onwards. Based on field studies in South Africa and Mozambique, I explore to what extent the implementation of the policy reforms in the respective countries is in accordance with the intentions behind them, in terms of leading to a more democratic industrial sector facilitating the uplift of marginalised groups; and hence, whether there is a break with the previous systems. In other words, are the democratic ideals realised to the benefit for the targeted, marginalised groups? It is equally important to explore the mechanisms that counteract the realisation of the intentions. This way it is possible to evaluate whether the aspired effects of the policy reform can be realised or end up being a rhetoric exercise, while recognising that there are degrees of success in any management system. The analyses reveal to what extent preconditions for co-management are present. My case studies approach and empirically complement co-management theory from different angles, and thus represent different contributions to a co-management reform discussion. It is my intention to generalise the research findings analytically and contribute to co-management theorisation.

The co-management concept embraces a wide range of decision-making arrangements and management designs, and a challenge is how co-management can work in practice. Figure 1 below, based on ICLARM and IFM (1998), illustrates that decision-making in fisheries management can be seen as a continuum of institutional choices, where user groups and the government hold different degrees of influence.
The left hand side of the figure shows one extreme of the continuum, where the state holds all power and imposes decisions and regulations on the user groups for them to comply with, i.e. top-down management and decision-making. The right hand side shows the other extreme, where decisions concerning fisheries management are left to the user groups with a minimum of state involvement or other external interruption, in other words, a form of self-management. The extremes are the limit conditions defining the domain of co-management, and co-management is thus positioned as an alternative to these extremes. I will return to the specifications of consultative, co-operative and delegated forms of co-management in Chapter 2.

Central questions related to co-management arrangements are how user groups are to gain influence in decision-making; who are entitled to participate, in what phases (design, implementation, enforcement), and at what levels of management (national, local). In a developing country context, such considerations are part of democratic transitions. Thus, co-management is based on the perspective that management spans from the micro-level (the individual actor as participant) to the macro-level (democratisation of society). There are dilemmas, such as to what degree the state and the user groups should co-operate at different stages and levels of management. This is related to different actors’ ability and commitment.
to participate and their willingness to take on responsibility. Western practitioners and academics have developed co-management as a concept and decision-making system based on experiences and opportunities in the Western world, where co-management is embedded in a larger democratic system. In developing countries’ small-scale fisheries management, there has been a tendency to replicate Western nations’ emphasis on co-management principles, usually with donor organisations as facilitators (Degnbol 1992). This can be controversial. Resource assessment and management programmes have been implemented on the basis of very little reflection on the relevance in the specific context, as both Degnbol (1992) and Hara (1999) have pointed out. Models of participatory management are often implemented without considering important empirical conditions in the actual contexts. This happens in spite of limited documentation of what kind of co-management that has been successful, and under what conditions (Hersoug and Holm 2000). There is limited evidence that co-management is more viable than other models of fisheries management and decision-making systems, and there are few empirical studies that illustrate the costs and benefits of co-management more precisely. Hara (1999) contends that in most countries where it is practised, co-management is still at the trial and experimental stages. Many developing countries are themselves in a trial and transition phase to democracy, which will make the implementation of co-management seriously challenging. The issue of whether the institutional preconditions for co-management as a decision-making arrangement are present or absent, and if absent, whether they can be developed, tends to be ignored. Underestimating the significance of the social aspects of fisheries management and of the relevant historical and political contexts increases the risk that resource management in developing countries ends up being malfunctioning blueprints of resource management systems in Western countries.

In both South Africa and Mozambique, the fisheries policies reforms coincided with more general political reforms. The cases in the dissertation highlight different aspects of the initiation and first phase of the implementation of these reforms. At first glance, and even at second, the fisheries management policies of the two countries have strong features of co-management. Even though some may refer to them as examples of co-management, I do not uncritically view them as such. In Mozambique, the policy reform has been inspired and encouraged by donor organisations, and the co-management concept has been taken up by the state departments involved in the management of small-scale fisheries. The concept of co-management is widely used in Mozambique (in Portuguese: “co-gestão”), both by donors and government representatives, and increasingly so by actors in the small-scale fisheries.
However, this does not mean that the decision-making arrangements practiced indisputably are co-management arrangements, when compared to certain theoretical definitions. In South Africa, co-management is not an adopted fisheries management policy, nor is it a concept particularly used by politicians, decision makers and industry actors. Social science fisheries researchers, on the other hand, tend to use the co-management concept. Some small-scale fisheries management projects have been carried out in South Africa under the denomination of co-management. For example, experimental projects based on co-management principles have been carried out in the small-scale fisheries of Olifants River on the West Coast (Sowman et al. 1998), and in Hangklip-Kleinmond in the Western Cape (Hauck and Sweijd 1998). However, like in Mozambique, they are not necessarily and indisputably co-management arrangements.

1.2 Fisheries management: Politics, power, and democratic aspects

Worldwide, there is competition for access to the fish resources, and fish stocks have been overexploited for years, while a growing population is dependent upon fishing for a living. In developing countries, optimising the size and composition of the ‘resource pie’ and the distribution of access to it are increasingly seen as means to contribute to development of the marginalised fisheries dependent populations. For development researchers and policy makers of fisheries management, it is an important issue how the fish resources can accommodate the increasing number of fishers, and how to allocate the resources to the optimum benefit of society as a whole. The fish resources are scarce, which is a main argument for limiting access. Negotiations and compromises are central processes in fisheries management, and hence, the role of the state is important. One of the state’s duties is to allocate resource access, and it is often engaged in negotiations about who is to get what share of a specific resource. Fisheries management policy can be seen as a compromise between what can be defended biologically, legitimised politically, and accepted on social and economic grounds (Hoel et al. 1991). It is a political matter to define and establish priorities between criteria of the optimum combination of the biological, economic and social objectives in order to achieve the optimal use of the resources, and to achieve a fair and legitimate distribution and allocation of scarce resources.

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1 A stock is a group of individuals of a specific species which is functionally separated from other individuals of the same species, usually by the fact that spawning takes place in different areas. For this reason they often display different patterns of migration. However, stocks do not always appear separately and isolated from each other. It is common that two or more stocks of the same species mix in the feeding periods or exchange individuals in other ways (Fishery Statistics 2002-2003, Statistics Norway).
resources (Foreman 1984). Much of fisheries policy is about making regulations, which is likely to generate situations where conflicts must be solved, compromises worked out, and winning coalitions established. Consensus is hard to achieve on most issues in fisheries management, and few policies are conceived of as authoritative and final among all industry interests, according to Hoel et al. (1991). They say that if politics is mainly about conflicts, then fisheries are more political than most other sectors. In line with this, Jul-Larsen et al. (2002) in their study of the SADC freshwater fisheries state that

“...fisheries management is, and must be, politics: it regulates and differentiates between people and groups’ access to vital resources. Hence the management system in Lake Kariba thus inevitably reflects local as well as national relations of power.” (Jul-Larsen et al. 2002: 1)

Jul-Larsen et al. (2002) relate the politics of fisheries management to power. When power is asymmetrically distributed among actors with an interest in the same resource, as is often the case, it will generate a debate over who are the most eligible to gain access to a specific resource. Peters (2000) argues that power is under-addressed in institutional theory and in theories on resource management. This is despite the likelihood that when the resource is scarce and the demand for resource access is high, it will lead to conflicts over resource access. The more powerful actors are likely to gain the upper hand in such conflicts, and benefit from resource access at the expense of others. In developing countries, large part of the fisheries dependent population hold limited power. It follows that empowerment of the small-scale fishers is required, so that they can be able to negotiate and take advantage of the opportunities. In this respect, organisation of fishers is a crucial aspect. A potential benefit of being organised is the acquirement of power to be heard and considered in matters that influence the organisation members’ situation, for instance through a process of collective and individual empowerment.

The reformed fisheries management policies of South Africa and Mozambique have opened up new opportunities for different groups of fishing industry actors, and the small-scale fishers are encouraged to affiliate to fisher organisations in order to formalise their access to the fish resources and thus to take advantage of the opportunities. What enables and constrains who should benefit from the opportunities, is a question of who has power and how they use it. McAdam (1996) argues that a change only becomes an opportunity when defined
as such by groups of actors sufficiently well organised to act on shared perceptions of the situation. The responsibility of the small-scale fishers to take charge and use the available opportunities depends on their ability to mobilise and organise. As a group, they have a better chance of negotiating improved resource access and thus benefit from these opportunities than if they act on an individual basis. It also depends on how the state defines and practices its responsibility towards user groups. The concept of social capital is of relevance. Social capital is expressed by, among other elements, the ability to acquire and use knowledge and information, administrative capacity and co-operative ability. Social capital informs the ability to mobilise forces in order to benefit from access to the resources, for instance by being part of a network or organisation that works towards a common objective (Long 2001).

The South African and Mozambican fisheries policy reforms are part of a larger picture of democratic reforms. Beetham (1991) says that democratic politics require not only political contestation, but also that contestation be tempered by certain basic moral and political principles. Such principles may include securing popular control over government and political elites, and equality among all citizens. Kaldor and Vejvoda (1997, in Luckham et al. 2000) distinguish between formal democracy, which refers to the institutions, procedures or routines of democratic systems, and substantive democracy, which refers to the distribution of power, and the degree to what individual citizens are able to participate in the decisions that affect their lives. This has a strong influence on the prospects of socio-economic development. Hesselberg (1998) argues that a minimum requirement of the concept of development is that it includes fulfilment of basic needs, health requirements and participation in economic, social and political activities. Participation is both an outcome of and precondition for development, and by participating, marginalised groups can influence their own socio-economic situation. According to Kooiman and Bavinck (2005), participation is an expression of democracy and therefore a desirable state of affairs. Vedeld (2003) links democratic freedom of citizens to their access to participation in different arenas. In many countries, people seem to have great freedom related to local and national election processes, while freedom in other arenas of society is often denied, such as in the administrative, social, economic and legal arenas (Vedeld 2003). While political freedom is of importance, and also a catalyst for the processes that take place in South Africa and Mozambique, marginalised groups are equally, or more, concerned about socio-economic prosperity.

In summary, formal institutions regulate and differentiate people’s access to decision-making
and to the fish resources. This may generate conflicts, and power relations will decide the outcome of the conflicts. The state has a crucial role in distributing resource access and in establishing rules to be complied with. The fishing industry and the actors with a stake in fish resource access make up a societal sector, and co-management may contribute to the realisation of democratic ideals within that sector. For marginalised groups, social capital, empowerment and organisation influence their ability to use the opportunities that come with a democratic policy reform.

1.3 Research purpose and research questions

While the empirical focus of the dissertation relates to the fisheries policy reforms in South Africa and Mozambique, my intention is to discuss the problems of fisheries management in a developing country context in general. The cases themselves are interesting, but my goal is not to bring new insights about or propose solutions to specific problems relevant to them. Instead, they exemplify processes at a more general level. The cases demonstrate how the fisheries policy reforms sometimes interlink with processes related to democratic transition, which include participation. The co-management perspective is particularly interesting because it directly relates to issues such as democracy and legitimacy of power (Jentoft 1999). Hence, if the objective of a country’s fisheries management policy is to achieve a well-functioning co-management arrangement, chances of success are related to what is done in other areas of society.

Figure 1 on page 3 serves as a visual reference to the research questions. According to this figure, power seems to be a constant; if state power is reduced, fisher power is equally increased; i.e. power is a zero-sum game. In order to differentiate this picture, I add a dimension of development potential, as illustrated by the red dotted line in Figure 2 below illustrates that power is not a constant and given resource, and hence not a zero-sum game. The interaction between the state and the user groups is not only about juggling power between the parties, but a means to increase the development potential.
When power is shared and the power constellation between actors is altered in an interactive process in correspondence with the principles of the policy reform, it may result in production of social capital that can facilitate empowerment of the user groups and hence increase their power and development potential. A consolidated interaction with deliberate development of communication between the state and the fishers may create and enhance the legitimacy of fisheries management systems. If the point of departure is a natural resource management system in need of a democratic reform, it goes without saying that this is a lengthy and complicated social learning process, both for fishers and for government employees.

When the state one-sidedly sets rules and regulations for fisheries management, as would be the situation for the left hand side extreme of the Figure 2, there is a probability that user groups will not comply if they find these rules and regulations unreasonable and to their disadvantage. Hence, state power is not exhaustive. Likewise, the right hand side extreme of Figure 2 depicts a situation where communities of small-scale fishers enjoy self-management. They may risk that, for instance, outside competitors such as industrial fishers infringe their areas or disrespect their rules and regulations, and thus, their power has not reached its optimal potential. Collaboration between state and user groups can increase the power of both parties, and thus the total power and possibilities to realise the development potentials. Power and social capital are means for socio-economic development. For instance, the state’s efforts towards the user groups may catalyse and release the power potential, and thus contribute to
empowerment and enhanced social capital of the small-scale fishers, increasing their action space and opportunities. For this to happen, there is a need for actors whose rationality, objectives and actions are in line with the public objective of collective socio-economic improvement, and who channel their social capital and power to activate the synergy potential for a positive outcome. This may gradually realise the development potential at more levels and in other areas, reflecting an emerging harmony of interest between the different stakeholders.

As part of a general democratisation process, the fisheries policy reforms in South Africa and Mozambique are part of a larger system than it would be in, for instance, Norway. As previously mentioned, democratisation and user group participation are among the key objectives for the fisheries policy reforms. As a starting point, I want to explore whether such worthy and celebrated principles are likely to be realised in practice. The interactive aspect is central, relating to how and to what degree the state and the user groups co-operate and communicate. Small-scale fishers’ participation and influence in decision-making to a large extent depend on the states’ initiatives and implementation procedures, and on their own capabilities to respond to the state initiatives and to take on different management responsibility tasks. If the states’ facilitation measures succeed in including fishers in decision-making and increasing the interaction between the state and the fishers, it is likely that the fishers perceive an expansion of their action space and power. I pose the following research questions for studying these issues:

- What means do the states employ to facilitate and encourage user group participation in fisheries management?
- Do the state efforts have a notable effect on empowerment and social capital formation of marginalised small-scale fishers, and hence, on power sharing between the state and the small-scale fishers?
- Does the implementation of the policy reform lead to increased legitimacy of the management system and the actors with responsibility for said policy reform implementation and hence management responsibility?
- Is the state accountable to the user groups, and how?

The role of fisher organisations is important, as they function as the small-scale fishers’ voices and as arenas for participation, empowerment and formation of social capital. In this way, organisations influence the ability of the small-scale fishers to respond to state initiatives
and to participate in fisheries management. Organisation leadership is decisive. Neace (1999) uses the concept of entrepreneur to denote actors who see potentials and opportunities they can exploit in order to achieve changes, and who have ambitions of and abilities to establish organisations and take on management and leadership responsibility. Such entrepreneurs have taken the lead in establishing fisher organisations in South Africa and Mozambique. In order to include the social aspect of organising fishers, I refer to these actors as organisational entrepreneurs (Normann 1999, 2000). This concept is used for the case of South Africa in Chapter 4. Their Mozambican counterparts are members of local co-management committees, and are referred to as co-management committee members in Chapter 5. I apply the concept of organisational entrepreneur to both South Africa and Mozambique here. The organisational entrepreneurs’ mandates, the legitimacy they enjoy among the organisations’ members, and how they address emerging conflicts, all demonstrate how they use their power and to what extent they have a unifying role. My interest is to get an understanding of whether they actively align to democratic principles and how they serve the organisation members’ interests and contribute to their social capital formation and empowerment, and hence, increase the influence of small-scale fishers in fisheries management. If they fail to do so, I seek to explain the mechanisms behind such disappointing achievements. I have identified the following research questions:

- To what extent do different groups of fishers gain power through empowerment and enhancement of social capital by being members of fisher organisations?
- Are differences in power and socio-economic situation between different categories of small-scale fishers evened out or enhanced?

The above research questions identify the issues to be discussed throughout the dissertation, such as the form and extent of decentralisation, participation and empowerment. They form a basis for discussing to what extent the implementation and realisation of the policy reform align to theoretically defined principles of co-management. In any policy reform, there are prospects of failure despite tedious planning, so also for my case studies. In the concluding chapter of the dissertation, I discuss whether perceived failures and disappointment can generate positive consequences. One such positive consequence may be that there has been a learning effect that spurs incentives for change and organising otherwise. Co-management is not only a resource management decision-making system, but also a system of learning embedded in democratic principles of decentralisation, participation and empowerment. This
implies that the process towards co-management is gradual, whereby more responsibility can be rendered to the user groups as they acquire more knowledge and capacity. A part of the analysis of the dissertation is to evaluate whether South Africa and Mozambique have moved towards a more co-operative mode of decision-making, thus enhancing the development potential depicted in Figure 2. This, of course, does not happen overnight. Time is an important dimension. It is imperative to allow for a realistic time-perspective for democratic learning, in terms of building up relevant social capital for actors that are socio-economically marginalised, and for other actors that play a key role in implementing the policy reform.

Finally, the research findings provide insights that contribute to a theoretical debate on preconditions for co-management, towards an applicable model for developing countries’ small-scale fisheries management. This is addressed by the final research question:

- Which elements need to be explicitly considered in co-management theories in order to include the democratic interests of the marginalised small-scale fishers?

### 1.4 Structure of the dissertation

The theoretical framework is presented in Chapter 2, starting with elaborating on the concept of co-management, which serves as an umbrella for other theoretical concepts that are used to analyse the findings from the case studies. In Chapter 3, there is a description of the field sites, followed by methodological considerations. The research findings from South Africa and Mozambique are presented and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The background for the reformed fisheries policies is described. I use my fieldwork findings to analyse how the reformed fisheries policies include democratic principles and instruments, and how it is reflected in the implementation in terms of decentralisation, empowerment and disempowerment, participation, legitimacy and accountability. At the end of chapters 4 and 5, there is a discussion based on the findings for each country. Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter and follows up on the discussions in chapters 4.5 and 5.5. It is discussed whether there have been detectable improvements for the groups studied, and to what extent my findings align to co-management theory. Furthermore, I generalise my findings analytically to contribute and refine co-management theory. The final section considers to what extent the disappointments revealed in the study can be turned to a positive learning experience.
2 Co-management in Theory and Practice

2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on what co-management is in theory and what it can look like in practice. I use co-management as an umbrella for other concepts that need to be considered in a context of developing countries. Co-management theory is in general normative and emphasises the positive aspects of this decision-making arrangement, often omitting that the implementation of such a seemingly good management decision-making model may be disturbed by interest conflicts and power imbalances. Hence, I bring in theoretical elements from the domain of democracy as tools to explain patterns, challenges, and the dynamics of the management process. This includes conceptual reviews of decentralisation, power, social capital, empowerment and accountability.

Chapter 2.2 provides a short history of the institutionalisation of fisheries resource management. The concept of fisheries co-management is reviewed in more detail in section 2.3. Section 2.4 considers issues and challenges for the practical implementation and realisation of co-management in the context of a developing country in transition to democracy, including concepts related to democratisation, decentralisation and participation.

2.2 The institutionalisation of fisheries management

2.2.1 Hardin and the premise of property rights
Hardin’s article The tragedy of the commons (1968) influenced thinking around the principles of and rationales for natural resources management. Hardin argues that resources held in common will suffer overexploitation and degradation, and he uses a pastoral analogy to illustrate the argument that it is rational for an individual cattle owner to add more animals to the pasture. The individual cattle owner’s utility will be positive, but the negative utility will be only a fraction of it, because the costs of overstocking will be borne by himself and his fellow cattle-owners, who all use the same pasture. If all were to do the same, it would gradually accumulate to create an irrational outcome for the whole group, and eventually to a tragedy.

The notion of property rights is a basic assumption behind Hardin’s arguments; the analysis
assumed an open access, free entry, and free exit regime. Property rights consist of formal and informal rules that structure and define the economic interaction and the distribution of rights and privileges of access among stakeholders. Property rights designate use, control, and transferability of resources, and facilitate social interactions and provide guidelines for solving disputes involving property (Knight 1992). Neo-classical economics classify property regimes by open access, private property, state property and common property, the latter also referred to as communal property (ICLARM and IFM 1998; Weimer 1997). Open access is characterised by resource use rights that are free for all. No one can claim ownership and exclude others, because the rights are owned in common, and therefore there are no opportunities for buying and selling rights. One example is ocean fisheries beyond the EEZ, but as time has passed, fewer and fewer of the world’s fishery resources are exploited in the absence of property rights. Private property is when an individual, or group of individuals, or a corporation, is assigned the exclusive and transferable user rights, recognised by the state. One such management regime is the system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), which consists of user rights that can be bought and sold (Charles 2001). The fish stocks themselves are not subject to appropriation, and the allocation of use rights may be limited in time or

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2 Quota control regulates what comes out of the fishing process, and it is a system whereby government has the overall responsibility for setting and enforcing the conditions for the fishery. Total Allowable Catch (TAC), the quantity of biomass permitted caught for a certain species or fish stock, is shared among actors in the fishery. The quota rights may be collective by a sector of the fishery, with allocations according to boat size or gear used, or they may be assigned as community quotas, or to individual fishers or companies. Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) are harvest rights that are transferable by lease or sale, and can be permanently bought or sold. A quota is therefore valuable. The principle is that each qualifying actor in a specific fishery receives an individual quota as a specific percentage of that fishery’s annual TAC (Charles 2001). An argument for ITQs is that it will naturally restrict the race to fish, because the fishers who have a quota, will harvest only what is sustainable and thus save the resources from overexploitation. This is under the assumption that they do not sell their quota, but keep it as a long-term investment. Another argument is that ITQs are efficient for simplifying the regulatory system, since limiting access will provide efficient and sustainable management by giving the actors an asset that they can sell if they do not perform well, or for other reasons may want to exit the fishing industry. Thus, the problem of overcapacity will be reduced, and eventually, the system of trade of quotas will increase economic efficiency (Jentoft 1989). However, transferable quota systems have consequences for the economic structure of the fisheries, and the market principle of purchasing and selling quotas and limiting access may change the social relations among fishers. People may start to regard each other in terms of rational calculation, utility and competition. Social stratification may be intensified as a few members of the fishing community get the opportunity to accumulate capital (Jentoft 2000b). Another consequence is that small actors may be forced out of the industry altogether, while more affluent actors accumulate quotas (Keys 1997). In the case of the Icelandic cod fishery, the implementation of an ITQ-based system resulted in the concentration of fishing quotas among a few large industry actors (Eythorsson 1997; Pálsson and Helgason 1997). Effort control regulates what fishers bring into the fishing process, by regulating the total harvesting effort, by for instance restricting the number of participants, limiting the capacity per fishing vessel such as the size of the boat and the gear used, restricting time fishing, and limiting the location of the fishing (Charles 2001). One form of effort control that is mainly found in developing countries’ small-scale fisheries are territorial use rights, where fishers in a community operate in geographically delimited fishing areas. The main rationales are to create order, avoid gear conflicts and ensure fair access distribution and protect the areas from outsiders.
granted in perpetuity (Symes 1998, in Charles 2001). State property denotes the property regime where ownership and management rights are held by the state on behalf of its citizens. The government holds use and management rights, and thus determines access and level of exploitation that individuals are obliged to comply with. In common usage, the fish resources of a nation are often referred to as common property. Common property resources are those held ‘in common’ by a certain identifiable group of people. Typically, an inherent subtractability applies for this kind of property rights, implying that use by any single user detracts from the welfare of others. Groups holding common property can establish rules for access, use and management, and thereby exclude other actors (Berkes 1989; Charles 2001; Hara 1999). It is common to have a mixture of property rights systems, with the fish formally being state property, but the actual use of the fish being governed by local community rights (Charles 2001). Quotas can be combined with state property, like in South Africa, or it can be combined with communal property.

The assumption of lack of property rights in Hardin’s analysis was crucial to predicting resource overexploitation, along with the assumption that all individuals are selfish, norm-free, and maximisers of short-term profits. Hanna and Jentoft (1996) call the tragedy of the commons a caricature of how individual human behaviour responds to the incentives of open-access. It presupposes that society is but the aggregate of individual, atomistic actions, as opposed to an integrated whole of organised and negotiated relationships and networks (Boudon 1981, in Jentoft et al. 1998). Fortunately, theory does not necessarily coincide with reality, and extensive field research has revealed that people are able to communicate, to make rules and to sanction one another. Or as Agrawal and Gibson (1999) express it,

“If humans have shaped and used their environment in sustainable ways for thousands of years, it may be possible to establish partnerships that accomplish the same results today.” (Agrawal and Gibson 1999: 632)

Moreover, Feeny et al. (1996) point out that overexploitation is not exclusive to situations of open access; it has also occurred under private and state property regimes. Thus, the common property nature of the resource is not necessarily the problem.
2.2.2 The aftermath of Hardin
In the aftermath of Hardin’s article, solutions centred on either strong, centralised governance, or privatisation, letting the market do the regulative work (Hanna et al. 1996; McCay 1995). Agrawal and Gibson (1999) put it this way:

“...the way to effective conservation was through the heavy hand of the state or through the equally heavy, if less visible, hand of the market and private property rights.” (Agrawal and Gibson 1999: 631)

Agrawal and Gibson (1999) argues that the focus on either the state or the market as the manager of resources excludes local actors from resource management, exemplified by national parks and other protected areas. Those who depend on the natural resource as a source of living would thus have limited, if any, influence on the management of the very resources.

Efficiency and equity were arguments supporting states as resource managers. Efficiency demands that the state exercises strict control over harvesting capacity and catch volume in order to prevent a depletion of the resource base. Equity intends to secure the fair distribution of fishing opportunities and incomes among participant groups. Another argument is that only the state has authority and resources to implement management schemes (Jentoft 1989). State governance implies resource management based on a partnership between the state and science, where the role of science is to establish the size of the biomass, and suggest the effort and harvest levels that give the optimum return. In addition to funding science, the role of the state would be to manage the fisheries by restricting, guiding and measuring the activities of fishing industry actors, and thereby preventing them from destroying their means of livelihood and their economic basis. In theory, this would be conducive to sustainable fisheries management, which was strongly needed: International waters were earlier not regulated, and the anarchy of the ‘Mare Liberum’ led to an ‘arms race’ on international fishing grounds (Holm 1996). States worldwide got increasingly involved in resource management issues, and legal frameworks became important. The ‘cod war’ in waters around Iceland in the 1970s was the crisis that led to the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS). The law provides overall guidance to behaviour in the oceans, and specifically in fisheries on coastal stock (Charles 2001). It implied a redistribution of the global fish resources. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, states one by one implemented the
200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) (Holm 1996). The rationale behind the EEZ was to install nation states as responsible resource managers. Order and rationality imposed under the self-interested guidance of the nation states would improve resource management, based on a presumed interest in preventing the resources from depletion. Strict regulations were implemented and enforced by new institutions. Unfortunately, instead of being responsible resource managers, states in general provided neither efficiency nor equity; rather, they behaved as self-interested guardians of domestic industry, and eventually, the arms race continued on international fishing grounds. Fishers were increasingly alienated from the day-to-day relation to the sea. While they previously related to the fish resource through their local communities, they now had to relate to the state as a manager for resource extraction. One of the implications was that while the UNCLOS empowered the nation state, it largely disempowered the local fishing communities (Jentoft 2005). The implementation of the UNCLOS-convention proved to be complicated also for other reasons. Most stocks within the new EEZ regime were controlled by a multitude of coastal states at different stages of development. The strength of the states was manifested in the restriction of some groups’ fishing efforts, not so much in the protection of resources. This was illustrated by the overcapacity of the total fishing fleet, which exposed the state as an irrational fish resource manager. The tragedy of the commons was acted out on two levels: among the fishers, and among the states around the negotiation tables in international fisheries organisations. The mismatch between the available fish resources and the harvesting capacity was the basic cause of state involvement in the first place, resulting in an elaborate and expensive system of regulations. Presumably, this was in vain. To a large extent, overcapacity is created by and maintained through state subsidies (Holm 1996). Jentoft et al. (1998: 423) say that

“Not only have governments frequently failed to prevent fish populations from over-exploitation, but in many instances they have even exacerbated the problems through mismanagement.”

This paradox leads Holm (1996) to question whether resource management is a good idea at all. Furthermore, Asgeirsdottir (2000) argues that international laws are not sufficient to produce agreements on management, and they are not able to dictate the specifics of agreements reached through bilateral or multilateral negotiations. She argues that the scope of the UNCLOS-convention is too general and allows for few specifics in how to solve conflicts over straddling stocks. It lacks enforcement and monitoring power to be effective. It is left to
the individual states to monitor and enforce fishing conduct on the oceans.

In summary, top-down directed conservation practices have shown that the states have limited capacity to motivate or coerce their citizens to take part in, accept and follow up on development and resource management programs. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) see this as caused by the states’ incompetence in regulating complex fisheries, expressed by faulty design, inefficient implementation and corrupt organisations. They contend that in a developing country context, combined with conditions under which marginalised groups live, resource management and conservation are a particularly complex undertaking:

“Combined with local intransigence and lack of livelihood alternatives, this mix of factors has pushed most enforced conservation projects into spectacular failures.” (Agrawal and Gibson 1999: 632)

Wells and Brandon (1992, in Agrawal and Gibson 1999) argue that since state involvement led to such unimpressive results, other alternatives were enforced, such as including communities in management. In general, there has been increasing emphasis on the role of community in bringing about decentralisation and participation in developing countries (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). International agencies direct much effort toward community-based conservation and resource management programs and policies, which North (1990) takes as evidence of how the issue of community is manifested in development thinking. Increased user group participation in management is often a question of participation of whole communities of fishers, especially since groups such as fish plant workers and processors are also affected by the impacts of management. At the worst, for instance in case of a resource crisis, the entire society will be affected. Naturally, there is thus a public interest in fisheries management (Jentoft 2000c; Jentoft et al. 1998). Community participation is often seen in relation to co-management as a decision-making system. Co-management is the topic of the following section.
2.3 Fisheries co-management

2.3.1 Definitions and variations of co-management

According to Jentoft et al. (1998: 427), co-management is primarily about the communicative
and collaborative process through which rules that fishing industry actors have to comply
with, are formed, i.e. the decision-making arrangements. The main idea behind co-
management is the sharing of decision-making and management functions. Potential
participants in co-management include governments, fishers and their organisations, fish
processors, community organisations, environmental NGOs, and the general public, according
to Charles (2001). He defines co-management this way:

“...co-management can be defined as the creation and implementation of suitable
management arrangements through which a set of agreed stakeholders, i.e. fishers
and their organisations, work jointly with government to develop and enforce fishery
regulations and management measures.” (Charles 2001: 265)

Furthermore, Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) emphasise the importance of small-scale fishers’
capacity to and interest in taking part in management, and they define co-management as

“...a partnership arrangement using the capacities and interests of the local fishers
and community, complemented by the ability of the government to provide enabling
legislation, enforcement and conflict resolution, and other assistance.” (Pomeroy and
Berkes 1997: 465)

As illustrated in Figure 1 on page 3, co-management can take different forms within the frame
of top-down and bottom-up management, referred to as delegated, consultative and co-
operative management. Delegated management means that management authority is
delegated to industry actors, and the state is informed about the decisions that are taken. It
applies mainly to the practical decisions regarding when, where and how to fish, monitoring
the actions of others, and what information to be exchanged or withheld. In this regard,
fishers’ organisations may be legally entitled to enforce regulations on member fishers, to use
their right to exclude actors from sharing the territory or the quota, and to sanction members
who violate the rules. Consultative management presupposes the existence of institutional
structures for the government’s consultation with industry actors, but the government takes all
the decisions (ICLARM and IFM 1998). In Norway, Canada and the USA, consultative
arrangements have existed for many years, and usually involve an advisory board, in which the state consults representatives of the fishing industry before regulations are introduced (Jentoft 1989). The state gets advice from user groups, but it is not obliged to follow the advice. Since there is not real power sharing obliging the state to take users’ advice into account, there is a chance that consultation may be only a symbolic gesture aimed at relieving the political pressure for user-participation, according to Jentoft (2000a). He argues for a co-operative co-management arrangement, where the government and user groups co-operate together as equal partners in decision-making. It entails a mutual agreement of power sharing, based on a conviction that power must be shared in order to motivate participation. Without power sharing, co-management tends to be symbolic. Therefore, Jentoft (2000a) contends that co-management must be a formalised decision-making arrangement, which “specifies mandates, memberships and procedures for election, for representation, provision of knowledge, how and when to have meetings” (pp. 529-530). This means that rules for deliberation, voting, reporting and monitoring should be institutionalised, in order to enhance the democratic aspect of decision-making.

2.3.2 Rationales for co-management
There are several reasons for promoting co-management. The social rationale relates to democratic principles, considering bottom-up approaches, participation and empowerment, among others. If users have had influence in the decision-making of a specific management regime and its corresponding regulations, it is likely that both the process and the outcome have legitimacy among the users. People comply with regulations because they are forced to, or because of routine. Jentoft et al. (1998) are of the opinion that co-management should challenge illegitimate power, and press for consolidation of formal institutions that determine the standardisation and transparency of decision-making. Bringing in user groups at early stages is likely to increase legitimacy and compliance of regulations (Jentoft 2000c). If users obtain more management responsibilities, it is likely that they find the regulations legitimate, justified and reasonable, and accept them as appropriate and consistent with their needs and preferences. They become more knowledgeable of, committed to and supportive of regulations if they have had a say in the process. If fishers are involved and listened to in the decision-making processes and the content of the regulations coincides with the way the fishers define their problems, the regulatory process will be perceived as legitimate, even though the outcome may be dissatisfying. And likewise, when the decision-making processes
in co-management arrangements produce outcomes that do not fulfil expectations of user groups, they may be a source of disappointment and loss of legitimacy (Jentoft 1989). If decision-making processes and their outcomes lack legitimacy, there are two typical types of reactions: Exit and voice. Exit is the response whereby the actors show their discontent, for instance by disobeying the rules. Voice is the reaction whereby the actors try to influence decision makers and managers (Hirschman 1975).

In developing countries, the influence of donors may spur the setting up of co-management arrangements. Increasingly, aid is conditioned by the receiver country’s engagement in social, political and economic reforms, in order to facilitate democratisation (Øyhus 2001). Donor countries often pinpoint the necessity of decentralisation in democratic transition, which is a crux issue in co-management. From his studies in Africa, Smoke (2003) concludes that international agencies are often driving forces behind the wave of decentralisation in Africa. The international agencies have observed the failure of centralised approaches to development, and seek to motivate and facilitate decentralisation as a remedy.

According to Pomeroy and Berkes (1997), it is often the recognition of a resource management problem that triggers a process towards co-management. Hence, there is a biological rationale for encouraging and implementing co-management. This is based on the failure of top-down, bureaucratic and science-based approaches to prevent resource crises, which led to a recognition that a fishery cannot be managed effectively without the cooperation and participation of fishers (Jentoft et al. 1998). This has contributed to the understanding that user groups can be part of a strategy to prevent resource crises and improve management (Hara 1999).

There is also an economic rationale for implementing co-management. Efficient control, monitoring and surveillance systems are expensive, and fisheries management has in general been a government responsibility (Hersoug and Rånes 1997). Devolving some of the responsibilities may reduce the costs for government (Narayan 2002). The inclusion of user groups in decision-making is crucial to ensure that limited public resources build on local knowledge and priorities. Co-management is cost-efficient for the state if it leads to the user groups taking on more responsibility. More of the costs are transferred to the user groups; not only in the financial and economic senses, but also in terms of social costs and demands for effort and time. Furthermore, government agencies often lack knowledge of local resources,
and the costs of achieving it are high. The fishers may have more detailed information about
the local ecological conditions in various fisheries, and fisher involvement may add to
science, by providing information about the resource base and fish stock (Agrawal and

2.3.3 International experiences with “co-managementish” arrangements
Six examples of participatory fisheries management systems are presented here; three from
developed countries: Norway, Japan, the United Kingdom, and three from developing
countries: Malawi, St. Lucia, and Thailand. These examples serve to demonstrate different
variations of participatory management, as well as the rationales behind them.

NORWAY: A widely used example of a co-management arrangement is the Lofoten Islands cod fishery in
Norway. During centuries this fishery has attracted a large number of fishers from different places. There were
conflicts which the government was unable to solve, and in 1890 the Lofoten Act was introduced: A legislation
which enabled the central government to devolve the powers over the fishery to local institutions where fishers
had responsibilities in setting and enforcing regulations (Charles 2001; Jentoft 1989). Local knowledge of the
fishery and the natural conditions on the fishing grounds was recognised and politically sanctioned. The case of
Lofoten has been a prime example and standard reference of co-management. However, Holm et al. (2000) argue
that co-management in Lofoten is more about preventing gear conflicts by managing fishing space than it is
about managing fish stocks. They contend that often, too much is concluded from the Lofoten case. Hence, it
reflects a weakness of the co-management literature to read much of modern resource management into
traditional organisational forms and not consider the inherent problems of fisheries resource management.

The full-scale institutionalisation of organised fishers began in the 1930s, initiating the system of interest
representation, which became more fully developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Since then, all major interest
groups in the fisheries have established organisational platforms. The various fishers’ organisations have been able to
influence major decisions affecting their interests because they are represented in the preparatory planning
procedure where management is designed. Furthermore, fishers are represented and consulted in all phases and
at all levels of management through their organisations. The state sets the TAC, but consults the fishers’
organisations when the TAC is to be negotiated, both nationally and internationally. Technical regulatory
measures are discussed with the fishers’ organisations. The setting of quotas is based on institutionalised science
and on political considerations. In the Management Council, established in 1983, the fishing industry holds nine
of a total of eleven seats in the council. The Management Council has an advisory role for the government on all
fisheries management issues. It does not have decision-making power, although the Ministry most often adheres
to their proposals (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2003).

In the late 1980s the fishers’ position weakened as a result of a general political shift that reflected the ideals of
the competitive market. A major reform process was set in motion in the fisheries sector. The new organisational
model required the state to allow the problem of aggregation of interest to be settled via competition between
contending groups. The users were expected to participate more, and also compete more. The legal framework
related to Norwegian fisheries management secures participation, and the state has gradually disempowered
itself in order to give way to the industry actors. The fishers are represented at all levels of management and in
organisations that influence their situation, including the Norwegian Seafood Export Council (Hersoug and
Rønæs 1997). Despite this, their representation is rather contentious. The fishers take part in management
decision-making, but it does not automatically imply that all interests are fairly represented. In the Management
Council, the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association speaks for all fishers, but has only 60 per cent of the
Norwegian fishers as members. The challenge that the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association faces is to co-
ordinate the interest of the fishers. The Norwegian Fishermen’s Association has appeared as a fragile coalition of
big players offshore and small-scale operators in inshore fisheries, and consensus has been hard to reach. One
demonstration of this was that a fraction of inshore fishers broke out of the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association
and created the Norwegian Association of Inshore Fishermen (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2003). The Norwegian Fishermen’s Association has a legitimation problem at the grassroots level with regard to results obtained in council deliberations (Hoel et al. 1991; Jentoft 2000c).

JAPAN: In Japanese coastal waters, the fishers’ co-operatives have a prominent role in fisheries regulations. In the beginning of the 20th century, fisheries co-operatives were granted a legal status. The co-operatives started out as organisations to administer resource regulations, but expanded into the areas of marketing, processing, leasing out of fishing equipment, purchasing supplies, and education. In the 1980s, there were approximately 5000 co-operatives in Japan. On regional and national level these co-operatives form federations and umbrella organisations, and they have supporting institutions for finance and insurance. These arrangements are geographically limited, as each co-operative has ownership to the area up to ten km outside their port. These rights are regarded as the main reason for the success of the co-operatives. The co-operatives apply to the government for licenses, which they then distribute among their respective members. The co-operatives administer and distribute fishing rights. Co-operative membership is compulsory in order to participate in fishing activities. The individual fisher has limited freedom of choice in the case of disagreement with the co-operative (Jentoft 1989).

UNITED KINGDOM: In the United Kingdom, Producers’ Organisations were created in the 1970s, and their tasks were to organise sales and administer the EEC price support scheme. In 1984, the management functions were decentralised and the regulatory responsibilities were transferred to the Producers’ Organisations. Sectoral quotas were allocated to the Producers’ Organisations, which in turn became responsible for quota distribution among their members. The Producers’ Organisations allocate their quotas internally by means of flatrate monthly landing limits, with each member, or member vessel, facing the same monthly limits irrespective of its size and individual landing record. In 1989 there were 14 Producers’ Organisations, and by 1996 there were 19. Membership is voluntarily, and the Producers’ Organisations do not have monopoly rights, which means that a fisher can obtain an individual quota directly from the government. This weakens the organisations’ ability to enforce restrictions, while it secures the individual’s freedom to exit the organisation without losing rights to fish. Some claim that this contributed to undermining the system. The state’s rationale for empowering the Producers’ Organisations and for disempowering itself was to reduce the financial burden of the state. Rules for fishing operations and enforcement became the Producers’ Organisations responsibility. The advantage of being a Producers’ Organisations member is that it provides a degree of collective security of fishing opportunities, in comparison with non-Producers’ Organisations fishing industry actors. The average quota shares to the Producers’ Organisations members are larger than the corresponding averages for vessels in the non-Producers’ Organisation sector. The latter have to fish according to monthly landings limits set by the government. For each Producers’ Organisations the size of the quota for each stock depends on the track records of its member vessels over the previous three years. Different Producers’ Organisations have different quota portfolios according to the usual fishing ground of the membership and their fishing methods and target species. Relatively small and co-operative groups of vessel owners have had an advantage in the ability to manage their quotas jointly, for instance according to seasonal factors. There is a high degree of geographical and/or sectoral specialisation and concentration. The Producers’ Organisations are free to trade fishing quotas with each other. However, the system does not involve durable and legally defensible use rights. The UK quota management system is an internal arrangement between the government and the industry. The licences remain in the power of the government and can be revoked at discretion (Hatcher 1997; Jentoft 1989).

MALAWI: The Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River Participatory Fisheries Management Programme was a pilot programme for co-management in Malawi, launched in 1993. The collapse of the fish species chambo and the continuing decline of the fishery provoked a need for enhancing the resource base by making use of the competence of the co-operative forces of traditional leaders, local communities, resource users, and the government. Beach Village Committees were community level institutions that were created for working towards this goal. They were composed of fishers, local chiefs and village headmen. An umbrella organisation for all the committees, the Lake Malombe / Upper Shire River Fishermen’s Association, was proposed, and the Mangochi District Fisheries Office formed the government side of the co-management arrangement. The Participatory Fisheries Management Programme presupposed that the government was willing to relinquish some of its powers under the former arrangement, where it used to be the sole body responsible for managing the fishery. Simultaneously, the local communities had to be willing and capable of assuming new responsibilities. Problems encountered reflected an underlying tension between some committees and traditional leaders, concerning the question of authority. In one area, the chief dissolved the committee because it was allegedly weak. In another area, the village headman tried to disband the committee for his area because it sanctioned him for allegedly giving fishing permission to some fishers during the closed season of 1995. In a third area, the community appeared to see an advantage in retaining the Beach Village Committees because they could ignore
its rule and powers and could therefore continue to contravene regulation by which the rest of the Malombe community tried to abide. The village headman of the area claimed that he had no power to alter this situation. The problems of introducing co-management in the fisheries of Lake Malombe and the Upper Shire River in Malawi have been in the areas of institutional design and arrangements, delivery and timing of programme components, division of responsibilities, sustainability issues, and financial commitment by the government and communities to the programme (Hara 1998).

ST. LUCIA: In Soufriere, St. Lucia, the Caribbean, there were attempts to implement user group participation in small-scale fisheries decision-making in the 1990s. It soon became evident that the transition from vertical, centralised management to one based on power sharing and participation was difficult. "The Soufriere Marine Management Area" was a body set up to facilitate cooperation and participation. However, significant decisions were taken without consulting with this body, and contrary to the intentions at the outset, decisions regarding the fishing areas were made without consulting the users. The questions to be resolved were of participative character, but the decisions were taken without participation from the fishers. Many fishers were not members of the co-operative, and others were only peripherally involved. The co-operative that was intended to represent the fishers proved not to be representative of the area’s different gear groups. There was no outside agent to assist in the transition from a top-down management system, and there was a lack of commitment to a participatory model on the part of the fisheries authorities. Several times, the Fisheries Department circumvented the process, and failed to share and decentralise power. Due to the lack of transparency in the design and planning phase by the government and other stakeholders, who at the outset were to be co-operative, the small-scale fishers gradually lost interest in participating in the arrangement. There was an inconsistent and insufficient compliance with regulations on part of the fishers, which was partly due to a lack of clarity regarding the division of labour, responsibility for enforcement, and jurisdiction. Expectations had been set high, and there was a belief that by formally changing the institutions, changes would automatically occur. The state did not take charge, and nothing was done to improve the deficiencies in communication between the organisation leadership and the stakeholders. As a consequence of what happened, or did not happen, its legitimacy diminished, and fishers ended up openly defying regulations by placing their gear in prohibited areas. The design phase that led to the establishment of the “Soufriere Marine Management Area” was participatory to a certain extent, while the implementation, operation and enforcement phases were not participatory (Sandersen and Koester 2000).

THAILAND: Ban Laem Makhaam is a small-scale fisher community in Southern Thailand with a high degree of cultural homogeneity and close kinship connection. The state made a series of reforms of the country’s development planning towards decentralisation of power, which began in 1985. Most of the co-operative arrangements in Ban Laem Makhaam were newly established and influenced by outside agents. Previously, there had been a high degree of community autonomy. The dependency on the state had been low until the set-up of a formal community administration became compulsory. The claim for formal arrangements to manage fishery resources, in which the state to a large degree was part of decision-making and management, was a new phenomenon. In order to establish a basis for co-management, a network organisation was established as an umbrella for small-scale fishers. Thus, they could work together to protect their rights and benefits beyond the community level. NGOs and academic institutions were actively involved in empowering local people. Community homogeneity and local dependence on fisheries contributed to the reported success of the co-management effort in Ban Laem Makhaam. When fishers realised that the fishery resources were being overexploited, they were ready to participate in managing the fishery for the prospect of long term use. The dependence on the fish resources might have added to the fishers’ willingness to contribute to changing the system. Because of a history of cohesion and homogeneity, and of administrating themselves without much interference from outside, conflicts among community members were seldom serious and long lasting, and were resolved through mechanisms accepted by community members. The economic homogeneity encouraged in sharing of economic hardship among the members of the community. The organisation active in management in Ban Laem Makhaam was composed of both formal and informal leaders. The inclusion of informal leaders helped in strengthening the organisation, since they often have better relations with the grassroots than formal leaders of fishers’ organisation. Masae et al. (1999: 39-40) found that most of both formal and informal rules could hardly have been enforced without the active participation of local leaders. The inclusion of informal leaders in the organisation encouraged communication and secured integration of local cultural values into the working process of the organisation, which was considered in designing and implementing projects to fit the social contexts of the community. Support from outside agents, like the government, NGOs, and academic institutions, was important, because of internal lack of negotiating power and lack of mutual confidence of local people (Masae et al. 1999).
These six examples demonstrate biological, social and economic rationales for involving users in decision-making, and that fisheries management systems are strongly connected to general conditions of society. According to the examples, arrangements referred to as co-management relate to several areas; such as management of fishers’ space in Norway, and distribution of access rights. It also deals with the role of organisations and illustrates the importance of communities, especially in the examples from developing countries. For instance, the Thai example shows that increased state involvement, ascribed to donor influence through NGOs and academia, corresponds to international trends. While the implementation of a new system was satisfactory in the Thai example, it was a source of problems in St. Lucia and Malawi. The Malawian and Thai examples demonstrate the importance of considering traditional power structure and informal leadership. Reconciling different interests proved difficult, and the cases highlight the importance of considering community structures when superimposing new management systems upon old traditions. The case from St. Lucia indicates that resource harvesters and state agencies need training to alter their way of using and managing the resources. Successful participation presupposes a continuous and mutual process of confidence building, transparency, open dialogue, exchange, and commitment. Even though the change of the formal institutions have taken place, changing informal institutions does not occur overnight. In St. Lucia, the changes took place too fast, and the planning and implementation did not predict and allow for setbacks and mistakes.

The Norwegian, Japanese and UK examples demonstrate the importance of being well organised for the fishers to be able to take on different tasks. The systems are basically democratic, and decision-making arrangements are rather transparent. In the case of the UK Producers’ Organisations, quotas were distributed among members, and membership was voluntary. In Japan, on the other hand, fishers did not get resource access unless they were members of a co-operative. The Norwegian system benefits from decades of developing a legitimate legal system, and through organising, the fishers have become a strong counterpart to the state. The examples highlighted how organisations and communities are arenas for fishers, which is the topic of the following section.
2.3.4 Arenas of the fishers: The community and the organisation

Institutional changes as part of, for instance, a democratic transition, normally entail a shift of power. A shift in power balance meant to contribute to community development demands attention to the composition of users as well as the communities, that is, to the community’s institutional and ‘socio-legal personality’ (Wily 2000). However, even though community is increasingly accounted for in development thinking, communities are seldom discussed as a dimension of resource management (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Jentoft 2000b). Agrawal and Gibson maintain that

“Recognizing and working with the multiplicity of actors and interests is crucial for those advocating community-based programs. Such recognition indicates that empowering local actors to use and manage their natural resources is more than the decentralization of authority over natural resources from the central government to “a” community. The far more challenging task is to understand patterns of difference within communities.” (Agrawal and Gibson 1999: 637)

A community can be seen as an entity socially bound by a common cultural identity, and as people living within spatial boundaries who have a common economic interest in the resources. The community embodies multiple interests and actors. Asymmetrical power relations, inequities, gender and ethnicity contribute to explain why conflicts evolve (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Jentoft et al. 1998). The conflict perspective often tends to be played down.

It is maintained that communities are the best managers of natural resources, since they have a long-term need for the local resources, and possess more knowledge about these resources than other potential actors. According to Agrawal and Gibson (1999), this is often based on too optimistic assumptions, which ignore the internal relations and conditions in communities, and the conditions and relations between communities and other social actors. Peters (2000: 14) found that “...there is no neat relation between local control over resources and sustainable use”.

It is commonly held that in order to improve their ability to seize and create opportunities, marginalised people have the option to join forces and organise. Individual actors who join in a collective organisation are more likely to be heard and have their demands met, and ultimately be represented in policy negotiations and decision-making that affect their lives (Narayan 2002). According to Tarrow (1998), mobilisation of individual forces is often
motivated by new opportunities. Hence, emerging opportunities may spur the establishment of organisations, and in turn, organisations contribute to creating opportunities by engaging in and diffusing collective action. Those actors who are capable of seizing political opportunities can be catalysts for the mobilisation and organisation of marginalised groups. Politically created opportunities will often provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure. Another factor catalysing the mobilisation of individuals is interest conflicts, which is an incentive for creating alliances (Tarrow 1998). In fisheries, this may be exemplified by small-scale fishers organising in order to create a force facing large-scale fisheries, especially if they compete for the same resource.

Ideally, by acting through an organisation, by gaining access to the available opportunities and being enabled to reshape and create new opportunities, actors may gradually influence and alter the institutions and thereby influence their own situation. In other words, organisation is often related to the exercise of power. According to Dahl (1961, in Wrong 1997), social standing, access to cash, credit and wealth, local leaders’ access to legal powers of public office, and people’s control over and access to information are all resources that enable the exercise of power. Such resources are in deficit among marginalised groups. Nevertheless, these groups have resources, which may include free time, personal appeal, manipulative and persuasive skills; individual resources that may lie idle or are used for non-political purposes, but which can be pooled and mobilised in order to reach a common goal (Wrong 1997). When individuals’ capacities are reoriented towards collective action, the aggregate resources can be used to enhance social capital and exercise power. According to Ostrom (1990), social organisation, collective identity and solidarity are the fundamental collective resources underlying and enabling the mobilisation of all other resources. In order to achieve this, a challenge is to motivate individual action and mentality towards adopting co-ordinated strategies. A requirement is that organisations are based on social networks and resonant collective action frames, where actors may develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents.

A fisheries co-management arrangement assumes that fishers organise and thereby institutionalise their representation when negotiating resource access. Government programs and projects often stress the development of local organisations to handle different aspects of fisheries management (Sagdahl 1992). Fishers can organise in many different forms: co-operatives, businesses, workers’ unions, or interest organisations; any organisation that has
the objective of responding to special needs, demands and interests of the fishers (Jentoft 1989). Depending on how well organised the fishers are in the beginning, this can be done by strengthening existing organisations, extending or reorganising them to cover new functions, or by creating completely new ones (Sandersen 1999). Organising may be a complex undertaking, especially in developing countries, where small-scale fishers may live dispersedly and are often far from being a coherent group of individuals that can mobilise for a common goal. In other words, the process of organising depends on the organisational resources already established, which can enable collective mobilisation. For instance, in the United Kingdom, organisations with the capability to take on fisheries management responsibilities were already in place when the government decided to allocate responsibility to the fishing industry producers’ organisations (Jentoft 1989). Institution building can be a lengthy process. Experiences from the Philippines and St. Lucia show that community organising can take between three to ten years before a self-sufficient organisation is in place (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Even this may be a rather optimistic estimation. This means that time is a factor that has to be considered when contemplating institutional changes such as co-management and creating the corresponding organisations of fishers, because it depends on responsible actors who focus on long-term and group-oriented thinking and behaviour for achieving public goals. In the perspective of institutional choices, the process towards co-management is a long-term and step-by-step undertaking, which can be related to what Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) refer to as phasing in. Phasing in entails the gradual delegation of management functions to the fishers’ organisations as they become more experienced and able to take on management tasks:

“The phasing in will also depend on the form of both co-management and decentralization, but adaptive management or “learning-by-doing” in the evolution of co-management, and feedback learning in general, is likely to be critically important.” (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997: 478)

Phasing in can be related to the subsidiarity principle, which implies that management authority should be vested with the lowest possible organisational level (Jentoft 2000a). While defining the TAC (total allowable catch, the quantity of biomass permitted caught for a certain species or fish stock) necessarily will remain a state responsibility, daily tasks such as enforcement of regulations may be carried out at fisher organisation level, or community level. With time, practice and training, and experience, fishers’ organisations eventually
become more able to take on management responsibility.

Often the social landscape has to be recreated, almost from scratch, and this takes time. In a developing country context, poverty is rife, with a limited social capital among marginalised groups. Hence, it will demand a lot of time and patience to develop a co-management decision-making arrangement that includes marginalised user groups.

There are situations in which individuals may have every good reason to organise, but fail to find ways to co-operate. In a developing country context, part of the explanation is that the marginalised have been oppressed for decades, they have limited economic power, and they may have a deep-rooted distrust in the benevolence of others. Blake (1998) found that marginalised people, especially in the rural areas, are discouraged from actively participating in political and social life by a host of factors, including low levels of literacy, isolation and the hardship of poverty itself. Even though people realise that there may be a chance of benefiting from cooperation, they may suspect each other of opportunistic behaviour, and thus, they restrain from cooperating. In other words, trust is central. McAdam (1996) argues that group solidarity and trust are vital socio-psychological elements; whether people do or do not think that others will participate in collective action is relevant for their own participation. When members perceive their organisation as serving their own goals and values, their solidarity towards the organisation will increase and so will the organisations' legitimacy. And likewise, when the group members feel that information is being kept away from them, solidarity and legitimacy will suffer (Wrong 1997).

Representation is an integral aspect of decision-making and organisation. Mikalsen and Jentoft (2000c) ask how all legitimate stakeholders can be represented without undermining the need for efficient decision-making. The problem of representation increases with scale. A problem with broad interest representation is that organisations become more complex, internal conflicts are likely to arise, and costs often increase. Decision-making process may become less flexible and more bureaucratic. Paradoxically, this fuels the problems that co-management is supposed to solve. There is a fine balance; while broad participation and representation can enhance the legitimacy of an organisation, it can also create tension and conflicts (Jentoft 2000c). Hence, the social dynamics of organisations are important. Even organisations that are referred to as democratic are often characterised by oligarchic tendencies, group rivalry, conspiracy, and elite expropriation (Jentoft 1989).
Organisations’ leaders are expected to serve the interests of the members. Their mandate must be defined and their power limited. This may be procured through elections and by legislation defining the time and limits of their power exercise (Touraine 1998). Even though a group has a collective goal, it does not always mean that the goal is established by consensus by the members of the group. Although imposed through coercion by the group’s leaders, it may still be a collective goal in the sense that the activities of the group members are directed and co-ordinated toward realising it, even though not all agree on the goal per se (Wrong 1997). When this is the situation, the leadership of an organisation preferably has legitimacy among the organisation’s members. If there is disagreement or dissatisfaction with how the organisation addresses the original concerns, Wrong (1997) notes that an organisation’s members nevertheless are liable to submit to and accept what is going on, because the cost of opposing may exceed the potential gain. An actor may fear becoming unpopular and be sanctioned by getting too much involved, or fear change. A well-know situation is preferred to the risks of change, which demands conscious action (Freire 1970/1996).

2.3.5 The state in co-management
The role of the state in fisheries management is central because the state has the power and apparatus to define the formal institutions, rules and regulations that in turn define the action space of the small-scale fishers. For example, the choice of property right systems and management regimes are state initiatives that influence industry actors’ ability and options of taking advantage of the opportunities. The concepts of state and government are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation. I recognise that the state is more than just government, and that reference to state or executive authority as if it were the state, or reference to the state without regard to differences within it, could be misleading. In line with Migdal (1988), I refer to the state as an organisation, as singular, while I recognise that it is composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership, the executive authority. The state operates at different levels in the context of this dissertation. The policy makers are behind the formulation of the reformed fisheries management policies. At another level are the implementers, such as the civil servants, whose task is to implement the policy and interact with actors in the fishing communities. Other state institutions include entities that deal with control, surveillance, and sanctioning.

A process towards co-management entails a connotation of democratisation. According to
Friedmann (1992), the state’s activity, dedication, and determination to support grassroots movements are prerequisites for democratisation. The South African and Mozambican states have emphasised their dedication to socio-economic development of marginalised groups. In order to achieve development, Touraine (1998) calls for combining elements of the market economy with principles of development and democracy. This presupposes a state strong enough to claim its political authority to face opposition and to make interventions that address contentious issues, such as redistribution and poverty relief. Friedmann (1992) sees a strong state as a responsive state that is accountable to its citizens. A strong state enjoys support of an inclusive democracy, where the power to manage problems that may be best handled at the local level has been devolved to local units of governance, and to the people themselves. This requires establishment of supportive legal rights, authority frameworks, and administrative structure (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Through their command of legislative and policy instruments, states are in an advantageous position to define power sharing and decision-making arrangements. Only they can legally establish and defend user rights and security of tenure (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Ostrom (1990) advocates a range of state assistance modes to communities, because some groups of actors may have little capacity to communicate with each other, few ways of developing trust, and only a weak sense of having to co-operate in order to succeed with their claims.

Decentralisation, which is the essence of co-management, entails forms of corporatism whereby the central governments make a pact with various interest groups to bring them into processes of policy planning (Long 2001). Decentralisation implies a shift of power, which in practice means that the state must be willing to disempower itself, committing itself to sharing power and authority with the local government and user groups. In a fisheries co-management perspective, this means sharing power with local fishers and the community organisation, according to Pomeroy and Berkes (1997). They have observed that in general, decentralisation of fisheries management tasks has not lead to real sharing of power. A main cause is the scepticism of bureaucrats and state managers, for instance towards the knowledge and the ability of the fishers to manage the fish resources. This scepticism may be a reflection of what Wily (2000: 3) refers to as the “time-old reluctance of bureaucracies to share power”.

Managing decentralisation processes requires thorough knowledge of local level community institutions (Litvack et al. 1998). This demands a lot from civil servants who are to carry out the decentralisation tasks. They need to update and expand their knowledge of community
and fishing industry issues in order to value at what levels or stage devolution is feasible (Subsistence Fisheries Task Group 2000). With more intimate knowledge of what takes place at the community level, civil servants are more liable to interact with marginalised people as co-producers. This may generate a learning process that facilitates the devolution of authority and control over decisions and resources to the lowest appropriate level (Narayan 2002). This calls for some kind of education and empowerment of civil servants: For the state to be able to disempower itself, civil servants must be empowered to be able to adjust to new situations of interacting with the grassroots.

2.4 Issues and challenges under the co-management umbrella

As I said introductorily, the fisheries policy reforms of South Africa and Mozambique are part of a larger context of overall democratisation. This section deals with elements that must be considered regarding co-management in a context of developing countries in democratic transition. It starts with an elaboration of the concepts of institutions and institutional change. The actor perspective is important, as actors are agents of social change and thus influence institutions, while they at the same time are socially constituted by institutions.

2.4.1 Institutions and institutional change

The transition to a co-management system requires a process of institutional change. Institutions can be seen as laws, rules and regulations that tie individuals to society. They can be formal, as a set of structures designed and approved by for instance the government; and informal, as behaviour and actions, where actors interact with the formal institutions and to various degrees comply with or resist the guidelines that the formal institutions provide (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; North 1990).

Ostrom sees institutions as sets of working rules that are used, monitored, and enforced when people make choices; as such, they are patterns of regular, repetitive interactions among people (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1993). This way, institutions are rule- and norm-oriented; guidelines regulating behaviour in society, structuring social interaction, enabling actors to work together towards goals by reconciling rationality at the individual level with rationality at the collective level (Knight 1992). A major role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty and
contribute to predictability by establishing a stable structure for human interaction, defining and limiting the range of choices we have, and providing guidelines for what can be and cannot be done. In line with this, North (1990) defines institutions as the framework within which human interaction takes place. His definition is frequently quoted:

“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society ... the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” (North 1990: 3)

The emphasis is on the constrictive aspect of institutions. In natural resource management, institutions define who is eligible to make decisions and to participate in different management stages, what actions are accepted and allowed, what rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information to provide, and what returns will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions. Jentoft (2004) says that institutions are crucial to the structure and operation of the fishing industry, since they constrain and enable the actions of different actors who use and interpret them and have different ability to take advantage of them. With respect to co-management, institutions that facilitate co-management decision-making arrangements have a function of enabling, empowering, providing licenses, establishing mandates and creating opportunities (Jentoft et al. 1998: 427). In situations where actors disagree on goals and have different interests that may result in conflict, institutions reflect power relations and help to structure the interaction that take place around access to resources (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Distribution of access rights to the fish resource sometimes calls for institutional change or the creation of reformed or new institutions. This may generate opposition from those who risk losing out, and losing power. Power is related to the regulative dimension of institutions, with focus on how and which rules are established and how they are enforced. Jentoft et al. (1998) argue that the regulative dimension of institutions, or ‘the rules of the game’ as North (1990) calls it, is over-emphasised. Scott (1995) takes institutional theory beyond rule-orientation, and argues that institutions consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures operating at multiple levels of jurisdiction. As such, they are embodiments of culture, social structure and routines. According to Jentoft et al. (1998), this is close to the essential aspects of co-management as a decision-making arrangement.

The regulative pillar of institutions rests upon ‘expedience’ inasmuch as people recognise the
coercive power of rule systems. The normative pillar of institutions rests upon social obligations. It is prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory, and stresses social obligation as the basis of compliance to rules. It refers to the behavioural standards and values, and to prescriptions about how things should be done and what means are legitimate in the pursuit of goals. This signifies that institutions also are means that actors can apply in order to achieve something; they guide incentives and provide directions for what is right and wrong, and how to interpret and take advantage of opportunities. This way, institutions not only limit the range of choices, they also have an enabling effect, in terms of predicting the behaviour of others and defining what is possible to achieve (Scott 1995). In a co-management perspective, the normative dimension of institutions includes the view that the legitimacy and compliance of the resource management regulations are likely to be enhanced, since users tend to have a social obligation to comply with the rules and support management schemes that they have contributed to create. The cognitive pillar of institutions refers to the dependence upon taken-for-granted cultural assumptions. The cognitive dimension of regulations emphasises the importance of how situations are framed and social identities defined. Related to fisheries management and decision-making, the cognitive dimension questions the taken-for-granted objectivity of marine science (Jentoft et al. 1998).

Luckham et al. (2000) see democratic institutions as a set of arrangements that organise political competition, wherein rulers have legitimacy and implement rules. Democratic institutions generally involve popular participation, manifested through free elections conducive to the composition of the legislature and of the government. Luckham et al. contend that research and literature centring on democratisation tend to give preference to the “high politics of the state rather than the deep politics of society” (2000: 18), i.e. the focus on the consolidation of democratic institutions is over-emphasised, at the expense of more attention to democratic politics. Luckham et al. (2000) argue that the spread of democratic institutions does not necessarily mean the spread of democratic politics. It is the process of democratic politics, which consists of contestation, self-determination and struggle, that leads to the ‘deepening of democracy’, not the creation of the institutions in itself. Democratic politics depend upon processes and procedures of participation through which all citizens have the option of acquiring a political voice. The democratic politics develop according to continuous interaction between different groups of actors, whereby citizens are able to influence the democratic institutions; i.e. contribute to institutional change. Hence, it is imperative to relate actor perspectives to institutional change. The external framework
enables and constrains actions, and actors are constituted within this framework, and they also contribute to changing and developing the framework. Fishing industry actors are shaped and influenced by formal institutions, while they also shape and influence institutions. Individual and collective actors are behind institutional change, they are thus agents of social change, at the same time as they are socially constituted.

Institutional change leading to co-management requires responsible actors, who think, plan and act in a long-term perspective, and whose concern and practice revolve around a development to the benefit of the collective actor. According to Long (2001), an actor-oriented perspective offers insights into the processes of social construction and reconstruction; i.e. institutional change. It enables the conceptualisation of how small-scale settings interlock with wider frameworks, resource fields and networks of relation. Individuals are conscious actors, who challenge, interact with and possibly induce institutional changes. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) say that when new or reformed formal rules and principles are being superimposed upon old traditions, emerging conflicts may be a demonstration of how old institutions die hard and are resistant to external interventions. This depends on the rationality of the actors who construct and are embedded in the informal institutions. In other words, actors form informal institutions where norms of behaviour, codes of conduct and conventions are embodied. Such informal institutions can be obstacles to the realisation of politically approved formal institutional changes (North 1990).

2.4.2 Democratisation, decentralisation and participation
According to Ribot (2003), natural resources have a particular role in local level democratisation. Improving and securing access to natural resources are important for the socio-economic development of the people who depend on them as a source of income. The natural resources are a source of income and wealth, and in a context of democratic transition, the notion of redistribution is often central, along with expectations of participation and material benefits (Luckham et al. 2000). Equally, democratic aspects are important and necessary in a co-management debate; as to which role the state takes on, and how it contributes to expanding, improving and consolidating the action space of the marginalised fishers, facilitating socio-economic development. Development is not an automatic spin-off from democratisation (Hanlon 1996). Touraine (1998) argues that democracy and development cannot exist unless they co-exist. This is supported by Luckham et al. (2000:13),
who argues that democratic rights and basic entitlements of democratic citizenship are not compatible with poverty and gross social inequality.

Both the South African and Mozambican governments adhere to market economic principles. Touraine (1998) makes a distinction between market economy and political democracy. Open political and economic systems are necessary preconditions for democracy and economic growth, but other factors are needed in addition to achieve development. These include a legal system, and entrepreneurs and agents to accommodate the redistribution of the national product. For resource management, this includes establishing a legal framework and defining the property rights systems. Furthermore, fisher organisations or other groupings of individuals must be allowed and encouraged to take on management responsibility.

The reformed fisheries management policies of South Africa and Mozambique in different ways presuppose decentralisation of different forms of fisheries management responsibility, both explicitly and implicitly. Many of the factors that to some extent are treated or are implicit in co-management theorisation, are addressed in decentralisation literature. Decentralisation is a worldwide political reality. It has become a popular prescription for governance problems, especially in developing countries. Increasingly, it became a part of development strategies in the 1980s as part of human-centred approaches to development (Litvack et al. 1998).

The process of decentralisation can be complex, taking into consideration a diversity of existing cultural, political and institutional arrangements. It is a restructuring process that involves numerous stakeholders, different geographic entities such as international, national, sub-national and local levels, and a variety of actors representing central and local governments, private sector, community organisations, international donors, civil society and citizens (Nath undated, approx. 2000; Work 2002). Ideally, decentralisation can result in increased legitimacy and contribute to cutbacks in expenditure because the state can hand over some of its tasks to other actors; those arguments are used to advance co-management as well. Decentralisation of management responsibility involves a restructuring of authority, which in turn implies transfer of responsibility for tasks such as planning, management and resource allocation from central government agencies to lower levels of government (Work 2002).

In a democratic transition, decentralisation can be seen as a process as well as an end-in-itself,
as a means to further ends, and as ‘meaningful’ authority devolved to local units of governance (Blair 2000). It is also a means to bring decision-making closer to the people in order to better address local needs. When public services are adjusted to local needs, it means that they are closer to people, and the local situations and conditions can be considered (Work 2002). It is a general assumption that a state closer to the people in spatial and institutional senses, is more likely to develop policies which will meet the needs of the marginalised people (Crook and Sverrisson 2001). This will increase the opportunities for people to participate in economic, social and political decisions, which, on a long-term basis, will contribute to developing people’s capacities as well as enhance government responsiveness, transparency and accountability (Nath undated, approx. 2000; Work 2002). Increase in participation will have positive effects on aspects such as fair representation and empowerment, and ultimately, poverty reduction (Blair 2000: 23). To be able to get close to such objectives, the ‘paradox of participation’ must be overcome. The paradox of participation labels the situation in which the marginalised are more or less incapable of using the opportunities for enhanced participation provided by democratic decentralisation (Echeverri-Gent 1992, in Crook and Sverrisson 2001). This may occur when powerful groups use their power to co-opt, corrupt or subvert the democratic process (Luckham et al. 2000: 22).

Luckham et al. (2000) emphasise participation as a starting point of democratic deepening: Incorporating marginalised groups must be a necessary and inherent feature of democracy. There is often an overly positive view of participation, especially in a developing country context. However, participation is not unambiguously beneficial to marginalised groups. Peters claims that

“...too often, participation became a method for governments to mobilise cheap labour and involuntary contribution, supposed beneficiaries were treated as recipients of projects rather than architects of their own preferred activities, participation meant the devolution of responsibilities but not of rights, and the decentralization of tasks but not resources.” (Peters 2000: 13)

In case of the above, decentralisation is limited, and marginalised groups become passive beneficiaries. With delegation of powers comes the question as to whom power is being delegated, within what context and with what measures of accountability, according to Wily
(2000). She identifies two main paradigms of state–people joint management. One is founded upon a view of local communities as primarily user beneficiary co-operands, and the other seeks to involve communities as actors in management, endowing them with varying degrees of power to determine and regulate themselves. She argues that the latter power-sharing paradigm is more transformatory of centralised resource management. However, the dominant paradigm has been that of sharing the use rights or income from the resource with the communities, i.e. a passive participation regime, seeing users as beneficiaries, without authority or ownership.

A form of decentralisation is referred to as *devolution*, whereby local bodies are granted the political and financial authority to undertake responsibilities (Johnson 2001). This means transfer of responsibility, decision-making, resources and revenue generation to a local level public authority that is autonomous and fully independent of public authority. This is the form of decentralisation that often is considered “true” decentralisation. Decentralisation can also take the form of *deconcentration*, in which local bodies assume responsibilities that have traditionally been carried out by central line agencies (Johnson 2001). Work (2002: 6) defines deconcentration as the transfer of authority and responsibility from one level of the central government to another, while maintaining the same hierarchical level of accountability from the local units to the central government ministry or agency. Work (2002) calls it *divestment* when the government transfers planning and administrative responsibility, or other public functions, to voluntary, private or non-governmental organisations, which aim at involving the public. This may involve contracting out administrative functions, deregulation or full privatisation; in other words, a privatisation of tasks. A concept related to divestment is *deregulation*, which denotes when the government decentralises tasks to the market and to non-governmental organisations (Basta 2001); in Ribot’s (2003) words, privatisation in the name of decentralisation. If resources that should be available to the public are transferred to private bodies, they may turn more difficult to access by the public (Ribot 2003). This relates to the next section, which deals with the risk of elite capture and the need for accountability institutions.

### 2.4.3 Decentralisation drawbacks and the need for accountability

Crook and Sverrisson (2001) see a tendency to conflate decentralisation with democracy and increased participation, and to assume that decentralisation automatically leads to democracy
and participation. However, decentralisation may have its drawbacks, and meet with unpredicted barriers, such as informal community mechanisms and institutions. In resource management, user groups have different interests and preferences, and according to Agrawal and Gibson (1999), some will pursue self-interests in processes of policy change and development. Further, they claim that unchecked authority for community-level decisions is likely to lead to perverse outcomes in terms of management and resource conservation. Jentoft et al. (1998) warn that co-management actually may entrench or reinforce inequalities in communities. It is in the interest of those who already wield power in the community to take advantage of devolved management responsibility. This may have adverse influence on the process of mobilising and organising fishers, as well as on resource management outcomes, local politics, and strategic interactions within communities. This brings in the power perspective: Decentralisation as an institutional change is rarely a win-win situation. Those on the losing side (relatively seen) will not easily give up their privileges and benefits (Ostrom et al. 1993).

Crook and Sverrisson (2001) studied whether decentralised forms of government tend to be more responsive to the needs of the poor, and found that such responsiveness is a rather rare outcome. This observation is supported by Vedeld (2003) and Blair (2000), who agree that there is limited evidence for claiming that decentralisation leads to poverty reduction. The explanation is that local elites get most of the power because of their position, and they are able to channel the benefits to themselves, or “... at least maintain the existing distribution pattern (which largely benefit them, anyway)” (Blair 2000: 25). The asymmetrical power balance and unequal access to information, knowledge, and skills enable the elite to get the upper hand also in decentralisation processes (“elite capture”). Smoke (2003) argues that decentralisation can be a guise for renewed attempts by national political elites to expand their control through developing new local institutions or restructuring existing ones. Smith (1985, in Crook and Sverrisson 2001) says that decentralisation, particularly devolution to elected representative councils, tends to empower local elites, because they are best placed and most likely to be able to capture the benefits. Local governments and decision-making bodies are often dominated by elites. Manor (1999, in Blair 2000) claims that local elites may be even less likely than national elites to redistribute resources to the marginalised groups. He says that he has yet to discover evidence of any case where local elites were more benevolent than those at higher levels. Furthermore, Tarrow (1988: 88) argues that “…elites are unlikely to be persuaded to make policy changes that are not in their own interest”.

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This means that the stronger groups can use the position they already have to position themselves advantageously, and thus, they have an advantage in reaping benefits of new institutional orders. This makes the processes of local politics important, in terms of political engagement, contestation and struggles that challenge those elites. This will contribute to creating institutions with downward accountability and responsiveness of the governing actors (Vedeld 2003: 161). In other words, the choice of local institutional systems is a crucial matter in decentralisation. When establishing local institutions for decentralised natural resource management, it is important to empower the most broadly representative and downwardly accountable local institutions (Ribot 2003).

If the powers to manage natural resources are allocated to non-representative authorities, there is a risk of impediment of the progress of democratic transition. Ribot (2003) uses traditional chiefs as an example. In line with this, Peters (2000) points to the danger that even though some powers are extended to local groups, the lack of political accountability of local leaders may result in the benefits reaching only a small section of the community.

Despite of the best intentions of decisions made to undertake changes, governments in many countries are often not responsive to their citizens, and decision-making is rarely transparent and predictable (Litvack et al. 1998). In the words of Ostrom:

“Agreeing to follow rules ex ante is an easy commitment to make. Actually following rules ex post when strong temptations arise, is the significant accomplishment.” (Ostrom 1990: 93).

According to Narayan (2000), state officials, public employees, private providers of services, and politicians must be held to account, and made answerable to their policies and actions affecting the well-being of citizens. Accountability is when people are able to hold government responsible for how their decisions affect them. Litvack et al. (1998) emphasise the need for accountability institutions, governance and capacity, to protect marginalised people from abuse, fraud and further deprivation; i.e. watchdogs. The primary institution for accountability is election. Citizens must have the right to hold local leaders and public officials accountable through elections, collective action and other democratic means (Johnson 2001). However, they must be allowed to indicate their concerns also between elections. There must be ways to publicise citizen’s views and uncover wrongdoing of the
local government, or others who are in charge. Accountability demands active state involvement. Democratic politics is not just about monitoring the exercise of power by the state, but also about monitoring local bodies or powerful private interests (Luckham et al. 2000). When institutions for accountability are in place, it increases popular control over what the local government has done or left undone (Blair 2000).

2.4.4 Opportunities, power and knowledge
Changes in formal institutions at national and constitutional levels are politically decided. Thus, the opportunities for the small-scale fishers in the cases from South Africa and Mozambique can be seen as politically created, embedded in a larger agenda of democratic transition and socio-economic development. Opportunities are only realised when perceived and seized by someone. They are often situational, and in order to be able to take advantage of the opportunities, actors ought to act quickly before they vanish. The best positioned and most powerful ones have the capability to see the openings and take advantage of the opportunities, and also to participate in the creation and definition of opportunities. Tarrow (1998) says that opportunities that appear are external resources to people who lack internal resources, and they can be seen as openings where there used to be hindrances. Opportunities bring forward alliances that have not been possible before, and realignments can provide marginalised groups with power. However, opportunities are dynamic and may quickly change or vanish:

“But because these opportunities are external... political opportunities are fickle friends. The result is that openings for reform quickly close or allow new challengers with different aims to march through the gates that the early risers have battered down.” (Tarrow 1998: 89)

Knowing about opportunities is one condition for having access to them. The ability to facilitate or suppress knowledge makes one part considerably more powerful than another, according to Flyvbjerg (1998). A process of transition to democracy implies a change of the structural system of power, leading to new configurations of power (Friedmann 1992). This will almost always be contested and challenged by those who fear and risk losing power, for instance by restricting access for other groups and controlling knowledge and information. Power invariably relates to the concept of social capital, and to the interdependence of information and knowledge. Power may be financial, social, or traditionally inherited, and it
is related to individuals’ capacity to activate wealth, status and skills to get things done and to achieve desired outcomes (Tarrow 1998). Who gains the upper hand in negotiations for access to scarce resources partly depends on the power position already held and the ability to negotiate (Giddens 1984). Knowledge is an asset that may lead to power, and power defines what counts as knowledge and rationality. Ultimately, it defines what counts as reality, and what kind of interpretation that gains status as the dominant interpretation. Knowledge that is shared by members of a society entails expectations that structure behaviour, because the members of that society know the possible consequences of alternative action. Shared knowledge and beliefs do not necessarily mean shared goals. Who has access to knowledge and defines what knowledge is the right one, is a question of power. Flyvbjerg (1998) found that powerful actors use their power to manipulate the knowledge that supports their purposes and agenda, and they use it to suppress the knowledge that does not serve them. Other actors’ acquirement of knowledge may be a danger to their power, because knowledge acquired by the wrong persons can be applied in a way that may become an obstacle to achieving what the powerful want. Furthermore, Flyvbjerg (1998) found that powerful actors are in the position to manipulate and block knowledge and information flows between different levels of society. Thus, they can filter information and act as gatekeepers. This phenomenon is also described by Giddens (1984):

"...in many contexts of social life there occur processes of selective ‘information filtering’ whereby strategically placed actors seek reflexively to regulate the overall conditions of system reproduction either to keep things as they are or to change them." (Giddens 1984: 27-28)

Empowerment and the production and enhancement of social capital are processes that can enable marginalised actors to acquire and process information for strategic use, and to counter-act such filtering mechanisms.

### 2.4.5 Social capital and empowerment

The concept of social capital refers to actors’ ability to achieve and activate capacities that are relevant to reach their objectives. Social capital can be converted and put to use to achieve a material outcome (Bourdieu 1997; Coleman 1988). The ability to access and use information is according to Coleman (1988) one form of social capital. He argues that the value of social
capital is demonstrated in how social relations constitute useful resources to enable and facilitate actions in order to activate goals. This way, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends, which would not be possible without social capital. People do things for each other, with a tacit agreement that the favour is returned at a later stage. For this to work, there must be trust (Coleman 1988). Trust is the expectation that regular behaviour is honest, co-operative and predictable, based on shared norms. As such, trust is a major resource for the success of entrepreneurs in, for instance, the establishment of small businesses (Neace 1999). Trust lubricates cooperation, and cooperation breeds trust. Trust arises from norms of reciprocity, and from networks of civic engagement, and according to Putnam (1993), this contributes to accumulation of social capital. Yet another aspect of social capital consists of norms, emphasising the principle of going beyond self-interest and acting in the interest of the collectivity, so that individual actors work for the public good (Coleman 1988).

Since social capital is embodied in the dynamics of the relations among different actors, the network aspect is central. Social capital is the reciprocities that are derived from social networks, and that can be employed for achieving mutual goals. Long (2001) sees social networks as repositories of social capital, and social capital as a capacity to mobilise forces to gain access to decision-making processes and to acquire material resources. When activated, this capacity may increase its potency and generate increased possibilities for its continued utilisation. The ability to mobilise social capital on demand depends on how actors are situated in social relations, how they are able to create and make use of networks, and on how actors are able to use institutions and networks as social capital in order to achieve goals (Long 2001). Also Bourdieu (1997) defined social capital in relation to networking. Social network is a product of individual or collective, conscious or unconscious strategies that aim at establishing or reproducing the networks, which will be useful to the participating actors in the short or the long term. Ideally, members of a network have the backing of their collectively owned capital, and they can draw on the resources of that network in various ways.

Putnam links social capital to participation and cooperation. Networks, norms and trust are self-reinforcing and cumulative, and enable actors to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (Putnam 1993). The virtuous circles result in social equilibrium with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being, which
define the civic community. When economic and political negotiation is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism are reduced. The denser the networks of civic engagement in a community, the more likely it is that the citizens will be able to co-operate for a mutual benefit (Putnam 1995).

The above review demonstrates that social capital often entails positive connotations such as beneficial networking, cooperation, and trust. Aspects such as competition, conflict, and exclusion are often underplayed. Putnam (1993: 177) refers to the uncivic community, characterised by defection, distrust, exploitation, disorder and stagnation, which are also self-reinforcing and cumulative. Norms and networks that serve members of a group may be an obstruction to other actors. Those inside the networks benefit from the social capital, and those outside do not (Putnam 1993; Putzel 1997). Long (2001) argues that the building of one set of relationships implies the negation of other relationships, and leads to the exclusion of actors who otherwise could gain from participating. The very idea of the existence of social capital implies marginalising effects for some groups of actors, often those who are unsuccessful in competing for the same resources, or those who generally are socially disadvantaged. Furthermore, involvement in a specific network of relationships may entail negative consequences, since dependence on one relationship may impose limits on actions, or rule out some decisions (Long 2001).

In this respect, Putnam (2000) divides the networking effects of social capital according to bonding and bridging forms of social capital. Bonding social capital refers to the links between like-minded people, which builds strong ties, but may result in the exclusion of those who do not qualify to form part of such networks. This means that social networks and social capital can contribute to the increase and aggravation of social inequalities, thus consolidating some groups’ power, reinforcing the social stratification. Bridging social capital is the building of relations between more heterogeneous groups, which is likely to be more fragile, but also to motivate social inclusion (Putnam 2000; Schuller et al. 2000).

Reforming a management system towards more user group participation often involves reshuffling power and responsibility, accompanied by new opportunities and the acceptance of the power of some user groups to take increasingly more responsibility and be part of decision-making. However, in reality, marginalised groups often lack the power and social capital that could have enabled them to benefit, or even try to benefit from new opportunities.
This leads to the paradox of participation (see page 37). According to Tarrow (1998), most opportunities are situational and offer prospects of socio-economic improvements in a specific situation, but they cannot compensate for long for weaknesses in cultural, ideological and organisational resources. This means that people who suffer such weaknesses are likely to lose out in the competition for taking advantage of opportunities. Processes of empowerment can counter these weaknesses. Empowerment is about enabling and authorising (Jentoft 2005). One broad definition of empowerment that addresses impoverished and marginalised people is the following:

“Empowerment is the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives.” (Narayan 2002: xviii)

Jentoft (2005) argues that if there is no empowerment, co-management as a decision-making arrangement can hardly be established. Capacity building on individual and collective level is a precondition for co-management to function. Capacity building includes the acquirement of administrative resources, organisational capacity, and an ability to enforce restrictions on fishers’ behaviour (Jentoft 1989). A fundamental debate in co-management is whether resource users can be trusted to participate in management and take on responsibility (Berkes 1989). It is claimed that unless governments and decision makers can be convinced of the desire and the ability of users to participate at different levels of decision-making, not much progress can be made in co-management (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). In the context of developing countries, this may be much to ask from fishers, who in the past have been restricted or discouraged from participating and organising. Hence, the learning aspect is crucial; the fishers need to learn and be capacitated in order to take on management responsibility. Time and patience are important elements to consider in this respect, as Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) refer to as “phasing in” (see page 28). Blair (2000) puts it this way:

“People new to making public decisions must be expected to have a fairly long learning curve before they can actually shape local public policy in ways that benefit their constituencies.” (Blair 2000: 23)

Empowerment processes take place in a variety of ways. They can be initiated from above as
part of institutional reform. Often empowerment initiatives take place within the existing social order, without reduction of the power of those already powerful. Empowerment from bottom-up denotes when marginalised groups challenge the asymmetrical power balances. According to this perspective, empowerment can only take place when there is a structural transformation of economic and political relations towards a radically democratised society (Mohan and Stokke 2000). This relates to Wily’s (2000) reference to two main paradigms of state–people joint management, where the one is founded upon a view of local communities as primarily user beneficiaries co-operands, and the other seeks to involve communities as actors in management by recognising the need for power sharing. The latter is an empowering approach to participation, regarding marginalised people as co-producers with authority and control over decisions and resources (Narayan 2002). In line with this, Freire (1970/1996) says that access to information, inclusion and participation, accountability, and local organisational capacity are key elements for empowerment to take place. Information is central for empowerment, in order to make actors aware of the mechanisms that keep them in their socio-economic distress, and as a start to take due resistive action. Once informed, the consequence may be collective identity formation around common experiences with economic and political marginalisation, collective action and resistance to social marginalisation (Freire 1970/1996). Collective action can raise the individuals’ awareness of the factors that influence their life situation, and the ability to define problems and opportunities, and to exert influence on those conditions (Jentoft 2005).

Empowerment of individuals often starts with their involvement in socially and politically relevant actions. When individuals achieve success in social or political action, they may experience a psychological power and an individual sense of potency, leading to improved self-confidence. This may in turn have recursive positive effects on social and political power (Friedmann 1992). However, it is a time-consuming process, depending on the initial conditions and on the assistance from outsiders. Marginalised groups will often need assistance to initiate an empowerment process. The state can contribute to empowerment by providing training and capacity building. However, Romeo (2003) notes that central authorities often reduce the content of capacity to the individual qualities of the local actors and identify capacity-building programmes with training. This approach fails to recognise many situations in which governance outcomes depend less on the personal qualities of the local actors than on the incentives created by the institutional environment in which they operate. Ribot (2003) contends that the capacity argument is often evoked so that the central
government can avoid transferring powers. His study on decentralisation processes in various African countries demonstrates that the argument that powers cannot be devolved without capacity and resources, is widespread. A common argument is that until there has been a marked increase in local government institutions’ capacity to take on responsibility and manage power, they will not be able to address the needs of their constituencies, and hence, they will behave in unaccountable and inefficient ways. Jentoft (2005) advances a different view, that the capacity building process can proceed in a parallel process to the institutions building process, and it does not matter very much which process is undertaken first.

Outside actors can serve as catalysts by challenging and encouraging the marginalised groups to voice their concerns, reflect on their own circumstances and to act on their reflection (Freire 1970/1996). Tarrow (1998) refers to outside actors as influential allies that the marginalised can benefit from. When they have allies whom they can trust, and who may negotiate on their behalf, they can be encouraged to take collective action. This is the positive side of how external actors can contribute to empowerment. However, there are also negative sides. External actors often bring connotations of power being provided from outside. This is what Long refers to as managerialist and interventionist undertones embedded in participatory approaches, tending to “evoke the image of ‘more knowledgeable and powerful outsiders’ helping ‘the powerless and less discerning local folk’” (Long 2001: 185-186). Freire (1970/1996) is critical to actors offering external assistance and to outsiders’ behaviour with the pretext of being solidarity. Solidarity is a value of the co-operative culture and the forms of social relations, and thus an element of social capital. Solidarity is a skill, an activity, a relational pattern that is based on trust as a strategic resource, and it follows that it is an attribute of cooperation (Gherardi and Masiero 1990). Gherardi and Masiero further argue that solidarity generates organisation processes and networks between actors who have common objectives and realise that they need to defend a collective identity towards other forces. Freire (1970/1996) is sceptical to the idea of solidarity. His argument is that marginalised people are disposed to believe that those who represent them are benevolent and solidary. Being solidary means being committed, and according to Freire, solidarity requires joining the situation of those one is solidary with. Freire uses the concept of oppressor to denote decision makers, those in power. Any attempt to soften the power of oppressors in deference to the weakness of the oppressed often manifests itself in the form of false generosity, which means that in order to continue to express their generosity, the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the permanent source of this generosity, which is nourished
and can only be accepted when the situation of the marginalised is maintained. True generosity consists of engaging in the elimination of the causes of injustice and inequalities. According to Freire, this can rarely be motivated by outsiders. If action comes from the oppressed themselves and from those who are truly solidary with them, the chances of empowerment and development are better. This finds resonance in Long (2001), who in his studies in Latin America found it unrealistic to believe that outside facilitators can move people and organisations towards more participatory and equitable modes of integration and coordination:

“...no matter how firm the commitment to good intentions, the notion of ‘powerful outsiders’ assisting ‘powerless insiders’ is constantly smuggled in. This is the central dilemma of planning and designing the means for engineering change in the first place. It is not removed by stressing the goals of participation and empowerment.” (Long 2001: 89)

2.5 Chapter summary

The chapter started out by giving an overview of the institutionalisation of fisheries management, before approaching the crux topic of co-management. Co-management theory is often rather normative in the treatment of co-operative and promising aspects of management, and insufficiently addresses competitive aspects and hindrances to establishing co-management arrangements. There is a need for additional perspectives to explain mechanisms and phenomena relating to the context of developing countries in democratic transition. I have presented some explanations by choosing to use co-management as an umbrella for other aspects I view as necessary for establishing co-management in developing countries. Co-management theory has much in common with decentralisation theory. In the study of decentralisation and how it takes place, the following questions are central; How do certain actors get included and what roles do they play, once included? Who reaps the benefits and who gets excluded in the process? These questions account for aspects that can explain power plays and the positioning of different actors in the action space where negotiation about resource access takes place. Such aspects include democracy, decentralisation, participation, social capital, empowerment and accountability.

Figures 1 and 2 in Chapter 1 depicted various aspects of co-management. The increase in development potential does not happen if the further co-operation between the state and the
user groups is announced only by formal resolutions. It is a comprehensive and difficult process of institutional change that depends on the involvement of actors who are dedicated to the achievement of a collective goal and to a fundamental restructuring of the social system. In other words, a fair chance of establishing a co-management arrangement depends on social actors (individuals and organisations) that take on roles other than those required for the systems to be as at the extremes of the figures. This requires patience and consideration of the process as being time-consuming process and involving a multitude of actors. Past and well-known procedures and behaviour need to give way to a redirection of mind-sets and ideology that align with the formal institutional changes and guidance. Hence, co-management is not only a management decision-making model; it is also a process of learning, where capacity building and production of social capital are central aspects.
3 Methodological Considerations

3.1 Background

The empirical part of this dissertation consists of case studies from South Africa and Mozambique, based on literature reviews, interviews with different groups of actors related to the fishing industry, observation at seminars, workshops, meetings, and by moving around in the communities. The sources for the written data material date back to the beginning of the 1990s, and when available and applicable, I use older material. As a rule, my cut-off point is set when the fieldwork ended in June 1999, but I have later had occasional access to documents such as newspaper articles and reports, which I also used. The fieldwork material from South Africa includes interviews with 55 fishers, interviews with key informants, meetings with fisher organisation representatives, government representatives and researchers. In Mozambique, thirty interviews were undertaken with fishers. In addition, there were meetings and interviews with co-management committees, a traditional leader, NGOs and government representatives. The appendix on page 203 contains a detailed list of fieldwork activities.

I worked at the Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal Community Development (IFM) at the North Sea Centre in Hirtshals, Denmark from mid-1996 through 1998. There, I was involved in the research project “Fisheries co-management: A worldwide, collaborative research project”, administered by the International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM) and IFM, and financed by the Danish Agency for Development Assistance (DANIDA). Through this project, I was in South Africa and Mozambique in December 1996 and March 1997, and became acquainted with individuals and organisations dealing with fisheries management research and policy implementation. This spurred my application for a research grant that funded the fieldwork and other required research activities for this dissertation. I had a six-week long fieldwork in February and March 1998, and the main fieldwork was carried out during the period November 1998 through June 1999.

3.2 Contextualising the field sites

South Africa and Mozambique both have experienced emancipation: Mozambique from colonial rule in 1975 and civil war in 1992, and South Africa from the official apartheid
policy in 1994. Both countries are in a process of democratisation with corresponding principles of user group participation, embedded in a context of neo-liberal politics. Mozambique is more dependent on external donors than South Africa, and is heavily influenced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Both countries have significant small-scale fisher populations, many of whom have few alternatives to fishing. The small-scale fishers are marginalised from decision-making, illiteracy is high, and historically they have been deprived of possibilities to prosper both in terms of education and work. In South Africa, the small-scale fishers compete for access to valuable quotas. In Mozambique, small-scale fishers’ resource access is not quota-regulated, although there has been some discussion about implementing quota regulation.\(^3\)

### 3.2.1 South Africa

Map 2: South Africa with provinces (Source: van Riet et al. 1997)

\(^3\) Personal communication, NORAD representative (2002).
In South Africa, most of the fieldwork was done in the Western Cape province. The main fisheries are located in this province, and the bulk of the landings are made here. A Master’s thesis (Isaacs 1998) on fisheries socio-economics in the areas of Ocean View, Kalk Bay and Hout Bay in the Western Cape raised issues that contributed to my interest in carrying out research in this region. Cape Town is also the locus of fisheries policy decision-making, and the location of the Chief Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management (MCM), formerly
the Chief Directorate of Sea Fisheries⁴.

I conducted interviews with fishers in Ocean View, which is located on the Cape Peninsula, close to Cape Town (see Map 3 above). Ocean View had about 19000 inhabitants in 1999, according to the staff at the local social office and local library. Unemployment figures were not available, but according to the local social office, the unemployment rate was “very, very high”. The changes since the election in 1994 were perceived as negative for the community: State subsidies had been removed, and there was increasing drug and alcohol abuse. The average monthly household income was estimated to be R1000-1500⁵.⁶ Ocean View is an ‘artificial’ community, established as a result of the forced removals in the late 1960s (more on this in Chapter 4). The population originated from the surrounding areas of Noordhoek, Sun Valley, Simonstown, Kalk Bay, Glencairn and Kommetjie (Maralack and Kriel Undated). Many of the people who were relocated to Ocean View were fishers by occupation. The number of fishers fluctuated according to employment possibilities in other sectors. When I asked around, some claimed that there were 200-300 fishers, while others said there were closer to 1000 fishers.

Government officials and researchers at the University of Cape Town recommended Lambert’s Bay as an interesting community for doing social science fisheries research. Lambert’s Bay is located 290 km northwest of Cape Town, and the main industry is fishing. Lambert’s Bay had approximately 5000 inhabitants in 1999⁷. Lambert’s Bay has often been referred to as a fish factory community, because the community started to thrive when a fish processing plant was established there at the beginning of the 20th century. The community is regarded as “very political”, and the allocation of quotas generates major controversies.⁸ It is a relatively isolated community, and the ups and downs in the fishery sector influence the community as a whole. The largest fishing company is the Lambert’s Bay Fishing Company, owned by big business company Oceana. In addition to the Lambert’s Bay Fishing Company, there are other small fishing enterprises. Small-scale fishers deliver their catches directly to

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⁴ The Chief Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) changed name from the Chief Directorate of Sea Fisheries in 1999.
⁵ 1999: R4 to USD1.
⁶ Personal communication, representative at the Social Office in Ocean View, 1999.
⁷ Personal communication, Mayor of Lambert’s Bay, 1999.
⁸ Personal communication, Civil servant MCM, March 1998.
processing factories, either in Lambert’s Bay or other places along the coast.

Map 4: The Western Cape, demarcation of Lambert’s Bay, where fieldwork was undertaken (Source: Globetrotter Travel Atlas 1997: 45)

At the time of my fieldwork, the fishing industry had been declining for some time; processing plants had been relocated to Dooringbaai north of Lambert’s Bay, and to Elands Baai south of Lambert’s Bay. This led to increased unemployment in Lambert’s Bay. The Lambert’s Bay Fishing Company owned a French fry plant in the community, which supplied a chain of fast food outlets. In 1995, this plant employed 16 people, and by 2001 it employed 120 (Fishing Industry News Southern Africa 2001). Despite of this expansion, it did not
provide sufficient employment for the local workforce, and high unemployment was a serious problem (Yutar 1999). This was a major concern of fisher spokesmen and the local administration in Lambert’s Bay, and they saw a correlation with increases in crime, alcohol and drug abuse.⁹

In addition to the fieldwork in Ocean View and Lambert’s Bay, I conducted interviews with fishers in Hout Bay on the Cape Peninsula. Hout Bay is a busy harbour with a number of fish factories. I spent some time in Hout Bay because the headquarters of one of the small-scale fisher organisations was located here at the time, and I interviewed and had informal conversations with the organisation leaders. Furthermore, the fieldwork included interviews and observation at seminars and meetings other places where fishers lived and worked, among them the Cape Town harbour, the township referred to as Mandela Park, Glencairn Beach, and Kalk Bay on the Cape Peninsula, and Grahamstown and Port Alfreds in the Eastern Cape.

### 3.2.2 Mozambique

In Mozambique, I had through my previously mentioned employment at the IFM collaborated with the IDPPE (Instituto de Desenvolvimento da Pesca de Pequena Escala / Institute for the Development of the Small-Scale Fisheries), the state institution working with the development of small-scale fisheries and with policy implementation. During my initial visits to Mozambique, I collected preliminary information about the research area Angoche. A planned visit by the IDPPE to fishing centres in the Moma and Angoche areas in April and May 1999 coincided with my own main fieldwork, and I was invited to join the IDPPE team. I happily accepted, due to the near impossibility of going into this area as a foreigner unfamiliar with the local language Makwa, and lacking an appropriate vehicle for transport between the different villages.

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⁹ Personal communication, Mayor of Lambert’s Bay, 1999.
In the districts of Moma and Angoche there were about 12000 fishers in 1999, and 1460 boats, accounting for twelve per cent of the total number of vessels in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{10} It was common that a fisher household combined fishing and agricultural activities. The main economic activity in the Angoche district was agriculture, with cashew nuts as the main commercial crop, followed by peanuts and copra, and the main subsistence crop was cassava. The only processing industry in the Angoche district was cashew nut processing with two plants operating in the town of Angoche. The degraded state of the physical infrastructure, especially the poor conditions of the roads, was a major constraint to the development of economic activities (Lopes et al. 1998).

\textsuperscript{10} Figures presented by Instituto de Investigação Pesqueira (IIP), on a seminar on co-management in Angoche, April 1999.
Photo 1: A frequent occurrence during the fieldwork in the Moma-Angoche area: Stuck with 4x4s on a Mozambican forest road, April 1999 (Photo: Normann, A.K.)

Photo 2: Stuck again, on the way from Angoche to Kwirikwidge, April 1999 (Photo: Normann, A.K.)
The bulk of the interviews with fishers in Mozambique were done in Kwirikwidge fishing centre and Quelelene Island in the Angoche district. Kwirikwidge fishing centre is located in Morua village, twenty-five kilometres from the town of Angoche (Lopes and Gervásio 1999). Lopes and Gervásio (2000) estimate that there are about 700 fishers in Kwirikwidge, of whom about 100 are owners of fishing nets and fishing boats. About 85 nets were operating on a daily basis. During the peak period, the nets could be cast three to four times per day. A team of seven to twelve men, called marinheiros (crewmembers), with one appointed team-leader, operated each net.

Map 6: Fishing centres in the areas of Moma and Angoche in the Nampula province (Source: Lopes et al. 1998: 152)
During the fieldwork, we were based in the town of Angoche, and the only way to get to Kwirikwidge was to drive along the beach. The timing of the interviews depended to a large degree on the tides, and when there was an available 4x4 vehicle. Quelelene Island is one-two hours by boat from Angoche. Sixty-one fishing nets were used here. The tides also determined when we could go to Quelelene.

In addition to Kwirikwidge and Quelelene in Angoche, we visited the fishing centres of Pilivili, M’pwitini, Koropa, Mukoroge, Moma, Larde in the Moma district; and Inguri and Sangage in the Angoche district on the information tour. Information was also derived from meetings with fisher representatives in the other fishing centres we visited in the Moma and Angoche areas, and at other occasions such as meetings and workshops.
3.3 On small-scale fishers

The small-scale fishers belong to the target groups of the reformed fisheries policies in South Africa and Mozambique. There are a variety of alternative concepts to small-scale fishers in the literature, such as user groups, marginalised groups, the grassroots, small-scale industry actors, fishing industry stakeholders, and artisanal fishers. A term often used in South Africa is *bona fide* fishers. Charles (2001) synthesises the various nuances and differences of the concepts of small-scale and large-scale fisheries. He recognises that there are no clear-cut and universal boundaries between small and large scales of fishery systems, and argues for classifying fisheries as small-scale or large-scale on a case-by-case basis. In most Western countries, the notion of small-scale and large-scale is rarely used; the dominant dichotomy is made between *inshore* and *offshore* fisheries. Panayotou (1985: 11, in Charles 2001: 20) notes “it is not unusual to find that what is considered a small-scale fishery in one country would be classed as a large-scale fishery in another.” Table 1 below shows the dichotomisation between small-scale and large-scale fishers in developed and developing countries (from Charles 2001: 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small-scale fisheries</th>
<th>Large-scale fisheries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative terminology</strong></td>
<td>Artisanal (developing areas); inshore/small-boat (developed areas)</td>
<td>Industrial (developing areas); corporate (developed areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fishing location</strong></td>
<td>Coastal, including tidal, inshore and near-shore areas</td>
<td>Offshore, operating relatively far from the coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of objectives</strong></td>
<td>Multiple goals (social, cultural, economic)</td>
<td>Tendency to focus only on profit maximisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific objectives in developing regions</strong></td>
<td>Food production and livelihood security</td>
<td>Export production and foreign exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives relating to utilisation of labour</strong></td>
<td>Focus on maximising employment opportunities</td>
<td>Focus on minimising labour costs (and thus employment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market</strong></td>
<td>Subsistence fisheries as well as commercial ones, selling into appropriate markets</td>
<td>Market-driven commercial fisheries, often with a focus on export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ownership</strong></td>
<td>Typically individual / family; often a small business in developed nations</td>
<td>Typically corporate, often based on foreign fleets in developing nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mix of inputs</strong></td>
<td>Labour intensive, relatively low technological level</td>
<td>Capital intensive, emphasis on applying new technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural-urban mix</strong></td>
<td>Predominantly rural; located typically outside mainstream social and economic centres</td>
<td>Often urban or urban-tied; owners within mainstream social and economic centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community connections</strong></td>
<td>Closely tied to communities where fishers live; integral part of those communities</td>
<td>Relatively separate and independent of coastal communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common perceptions</strong></td>
<td>‘Traditional’, romantic, technologically simple</td>
<td>Modern, impersonal, multinational corporations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The dichotomy between small-scale and large-scale fishery systems.

As the concept will be used throughout the dissertation, the small-scale fishers may be owners
of gear and boats, or they may be crewmembers. They employ a low level of technology, operate from small boats, catch relatively small amounts of fish, and land their catches on the beach where buyers wait to bring it to the markets. The profits they derive from their operations are by and large modest, and they have few alternative income generating activities. They do the fishing themselves and ‘get their hands wet’, to use a common South African phrase.

3.4 Allowing for flexibility when preconceptions meet field experiences

The literature review revealed that there was limited research addressing the preconditions for implementing co-management in developing countries. Co-management theories are rather normative and oriented towards the co-operative aspect of management, and insufficiently address competitive aspects and hindrances to establishing co-management arrangements. Through my initial visits to Mozambique and South Africa, I experienced that there was much rhetoric and attention towards participatory management in general, and co-management in fisheries specifically. I became aware of the relevance and necessity of integrating actor and power perspectives from other theoretical stances, in a parallel process to collecting and analysing the data. I decided to focus on the relation state-society and relations among actors in the fishing industry. Bryman (2001), Kaarhus (1999) and Thagaard (2002) emphasise and argue for the importance of flexibility in qualitative research, allowing for a modification of the original research project design along the way, so that the course of action may be changed if the information generated by the data indicates that this is necessary. Even though the initially formulated research questions provide a basis for the design of the study and guide the procedures for collecting data, it does not mean that the research questions are final once the data collection procedures are initiated. The understanding, new knowledge and insight the researcher acquires during a project must be allowed to contribute to further elaboration, refinement and development of the project’s research questions. This is because the researcher does not know how the research project develops, and what direction it takes once the data collection is initiated (Thagaard 2002). In other words, research questions ought to reflect the knowledge and insight that the researcher has gained. The dialogue between the researcher’s ideas and the data facilitates flexibility. The researcher may change view and perception of which research questions should be central in the analysis and the project (Ragin 1987).
The new information and perspectives gained through the interviews contributed to the continuous elaboration of more relevant questions, which were posed to the next informants. I went through a process that Bryman (2001) refers to as an iterative strategy, involving communication between data and theory. Kaarhus (1999) sees this as a back-and-forth movement between data collection, interpretation and re-interpretation, which in her research lead to her continuously preparing and remaking her interview guides. This means a continuous consideration of how the data is collected, analysed and interpreted, securing an interaction between reflection over methodological decisions on one side, and flexibility and openness on the other (Thagaard 2002). This proved to be a necessary procedure for me. One example is information about local conditions that I got from interviews, such as how central and powerful individuals operated; what kind of information they communicated, and how fisher organisation members and leaders were recruited. This information made me curious about revealing more about their roles, by interviewing them, and by seeking to reveal how they were perceived by others. In other words, in the context of this dissertation, flexibility refers both to the problem definition phase and to the fieldwork phase.

3.5 Qualitative research and case studies
The nature of the research issue of this dissertation demanded a qualitative research approach. In qualitative research, both the conceptual understanding and the interaction and cooperation with the informants are important for how information is generated and transformed into data. In a sense, as researchers, we create the data: In the field, we acquire knowledge in cooperation with the informants, by observing them and/or interviewing them. Since we use ourselves as a means to get information, the collection of data demands an open interaction with the informant (Thagaard 2002). The qualitative research interview is as a rule partly structured, and the principle of flexibility allows the interviewer to respond to the direction the informants are taking the interview. This demands an open mind and flexibility towards the collection, interpretation and analysis of data on persons and their situation and contexts, as stressed in the previous section. Open-mindedness implies being receptive to the information conveyed by the informants, in order to achieve an understanding of social phenomena of interest.

It is a recurrent statement that social science case studies enable us to understand complex social phenomena (Yin 1994). According to Andersen (1997), a case can be seen as an
observation, or a rich configuration of observations. Case studies can occur at micro and macro levels. For instance, a case study can be an investigation of one organisation within a community, of various organisations within one or several communities, or of a particular fishery (Jentoft 1999). One reason for conducting case study research is that abstract formal theory does not explain phenomena we as researchers want to understand in a satisfactory manner. The attraction of doing case study research is that it enables us to use empirical observations to conceptualise and contribute to theory expansion and development. The relationship between theory and research, between what we study and its theoretical relevance, may emerge gradually.

Qualitative data may convey a strong sense of changing circumstances, and be suitable for studying processes in light of their contexts (Thagaard 2002). The emphasis on context means seeking an understanding of behaviour, values and beliefs within the context in which the research is conducted, according to Bryman (2001). He contends that qualitative research tends to view social life in terms of processes, where the concern is to show how events and patterns unfold over time. Pettigrew (1997: 338) defines process as “a sequence of individual and collective events, actions, and activities unfolding over time in context”, i.e. social reality in a dynamic process. Studying process means describing, analysing and explaining what Pettigrew (1997) refers to as the what, why and how of some sequence of individual and collective action. In this respect, my research is a study of implementation processes of fisheries policy reform; of dynamics involving actors with different power positions and interests.

The case studies reveal aspects of the course from the policy formulation to the initial implementation of the reformed fisheries policies. My research involved a combination of methods. The information obtained through interviews with small-scale fishers was combined with information obtained through interviews with policy makers, government representatives, fisher organisation representatives, and other relevant key informants, as well as thorough observations at meetings and seminars and information derived from different documents. This is in line with Yin (1994), who says that case study researchers deploy a wide range of methods in order to get a grip on the study object, which resonates with employing a qualitative research approach. The case studies from South Africa and Mozambique are composed and written with the theoretical perspectives presented in Chapter 2 in mind. It has been imperative to explore how actors interact with, influence, and use the
institutions and framework that condition the action space in which they operate, in order to be able to participate in decision-making. I have composed the cases so that they allow analyses of power relation, power sharing, and power struggle, communication and distribution of information, decentralisation, participation, social capital, empowerment and disempowerment, legitimacy, trust, and accountability.

3.6 Interviewing and sampling informants
A characteristic of social science qualitative research is the search for an understanding based on how those in focus of the study understand their own situation. This can be achieved through semi-structured and unstructured interviews. I assumed that detailed and rich information would be generated if the interviews were dialogue-oriented, and I therefore elaborated a list of topics to cover during the interviews, which served as a guide for a semi-structured type of interview.

In South Africa, I did most interviews with a research assistant, and in Mozambique, I interviewed together with an IDPPE-official or with an interpreter. We had a series of topics to be covered, and chose to digress from the interview guide whenever there was some topic we wanted to follow up on. According to Bryman (2001), digression should be encouraged in order to give insight into what the informants see as relevant and important, allowing for new questions to follow up replies. Following these procedures, my interviews reflect what Bryman (2001) refers to as qualitative research’ emphasis on greater generality in the formulation of initial research ideas, and emphasis on the informants’ own perspectives.

While the topics the researcher wants to discuss with or ask the informant about, in general are decided ex-ante, the sequence of topics may be decided along the way. This way, the researcher can follow up on the informant’s stories, and still get the information about the other topics. Different actors have different interpretations of how the external forces and structures affect them. Interviews are well suited to get information about persons’ experiences, viewpoints and understanding of their own situation, and the interview data reflect how the informants understand and interpret their own experiences. They may explain how they perceive of their present situation and how they understand their experiences, which I encouraged during the interviews. I relate the concept of story to what the informant chose to communicate (Thagaard 2002). The informants’ stories are used to illustrate how the
fisheries policy reform had influenced the situation for some of the marginalised groups. The stories are not quoted or reproduced as cases within the cases; I have chosen to extract information and use them as complementary information. The stories reflect how the informants perceived their situations; the stories are their reality as they chose to communicate it to me at the time of the interview.

The researcher can define certain categories of informants in order to secure information from a wider array of informants (Thagaard 2002). The categories I operate with include fishers of different status, such as boat owners, crewmembers, and part-time fishers. Some of the informants were retired fishers. Other categories of informants include civil servants, NGO representatives and policy makers. The primary sources of information are small-scale fishers. Some were open and talkative while others were reluctant to talk. Some people are more demanding to interview than others, which underlines Thagaard’s (2002) emphasis on the importance of the researcher’s presence and sensitivity towards the informants. This is a topic that Kvale (1996) deals with, and he describes the ideal informant the following way:

“Good interviewees are cooperative and well motivated, they are eloquent and knowledgeable. They are truthful and consistent, they give concise and precise answers to the interviewer’s questions, they provide coherent accounts and do not continually contradict themselves, they stick to the interview topic and do not repeatedly wander off. Good subjects can give long and lively descriptions of their life situation, they tell capturing stories well suited for reporting.” (Kvale 1996: 146)

It is not a given that such informants, if they ever existed, provide the most valuable knowledge about the research topics in question. According to Kvale (1996), the above-mentioned idealised informants reflect the upper middle class intellectual. These informants do not exist in my research, perhaps with the exception of foreign donor representatives and key informants among government representatives and academics.

How can the sampling be carried out practically? According to Thagaard (2002), in qualitative studies, informants with the characteristics relevant to the research questions are selected through strategic sampling. When the criteria for selecting informants are connected to theory development, or are guided by a theory, it is referred to as theoretical sampling. Ragin (1994) says that the goal and point of theoretical sampling is to sample in a way that contributes to the development of concepts and deepens the understanding of research.
subjects, rather than sample in a way that captures all possible variations. I sampled informants in correspondence with the principle of theoretical saturation. Saturation is achieved when the category is well developed in terms of properties and dimensions demonstrating variation, and the relationships between the categories are well established and validated (Bryman 2001). Thagaard (2002) asks rhetorically how many informants are needed, when do we reach the point of saturation? The number of informants, or amount of information, is sufficiently large when interviewing another informant, or generating information from other sources, does not seem to add to the understanding of the phenomenon researched. The key idea is to sample theoretically until no new data seem to be emerging; in an economist’s language, when the marginal rate of return is declining.

The sampling of informants in qualitative research is often a combination of convenience sampling and snowball sampling (Bryman 2001), both of which I relied on. They proved to be good methods for my research purpose, and I managed to interview informants from different categories. According to Thagaard (2002), convenience sampling is a strategic method in the sense that the characteristics of the informants are relevant to the research questions. The sampling procedure is based on the accessibility to the researcher, or as Bryman (2001) puts it, it is the result of restrictions placed on the researcher.

In Kwirikwidge, Mozambique, the fishers gathered on the beach every day, and we asked the local extension workers to help us choose informants according to certain criteria of owner or crew status and whether they were organised in the local co-operative or not, in order to be able to get informants from different categories. Extension workers are the government’s “prolonged arm” in the fishing communities in Mozambique. They circulate and channel information back and forth between the government and the fishers, and give technical advice to the fishers. They also keep records of the fishers and of the catch. The fishers lived scattered over an extensive area, which could have restricted us to get in touch with them. Thus, we (the IDPPE representatives and I) relied on convenience sampling. We also undertook some group interviews, primarily with co-management committee leaders.
Regarding snowball sampling, the analogy to a snowball implies that initially, the number of informants is small, but expands gradually, like a rolling snowball. According to Bryman (2001), snowball sampling is used to contact informants for whom there is no sampling frame. In practice, the snowball method requires that the researcher has contact with a few persons...
who have the characteristics relevant to the research questions. These persons are asked to suggest informants with corresponding qualities, or different qualities if that is the case (Thagaard 2002). Gullestad (1984) used snowball sampling in her research on family life and friendships of young working-class mothers in urban Norway. When searching for informants, she followed social networks of one informant to wherever they took her. Each woman of Gullestad’s research was connected to at least one another by friendship. This way, the selection of informants was fortuitous. Kaarhus (1999) refers to this method in her own research as the “cumulative process of interviewing”, where new potential informants would be suggested during interviews. This is similar to how I ended up getting informants in South Africa. At occasions, the leader of the fisheries co-operatives introduced me to small-scale fishers, and encouraged them to let me interview them, which was of great assistance to me. A problem with the snowball method that Thagaard (2002) highlights is that the bulk of informants may belong to the same categories. This can be counteracted if the researcher gets in touch with persons related to different networks, and then asks them to suggest new informants, thus getting informants linked to different networks or categories. I made sure to interview people from different categories. One example is from Ocean View, where one of the fishers’ organisations provided me with an incomplete list of their members. I interviewed some of the fishers on the list, and used them as snowball generators, which enabled me to include fishers who were not organised.

Some informants are key informants because they are important to the research in the sense that they may direct the researcher to situations, events, or people likely to be helpful to the research progress. They are well-informed and reflect around the issues that the researcher is interested in (Bryman 2001; Thagaard 2002). I relied on key informants, such as government officials, who were helpful and valuable informants. In South Africa, researchers at the University of Cape Town and the University of the Western Cape were eager to share their knowledge and views, as were the leaders of the fishers’ organisations. The interviews and discussions with representatives of fisheries authorities were useful, and I compared their information and points of view with how the small-scale fishers themselves perceived their situation. This contributed to my understanding of how well the different parties communicated and understood each other. Other informants, like the mayor of Lambert’s Bay, managers of fish factories, union leaders, and shop floor workers on industrial boats in South Africa, as well as traditional leaders in Mozambique, provided valuable information. Foreign donor representatives in both countries provided me with outsiders’ points of view. A
Norwegian fisheries management expert on a NORAD-mission in the MCM in South Africa kindly and energetically guided me through the MCM’s corridors. In Mozambique, Danish professionals who had been involved in the elaboration of the Mozambican Master Plan, informed me about their work procedures and the challenges they met during the implementation of planned projects. This involved a short visit to the city of Beira north of Maputo during my pre-fieldwork, where a project for semi-industrial fisheries was running.

3.7 Observation, documents, and media

Observation provides a basis for acquiring information about how people act and relate to each other (Thagaard 2002). The researcher is present in situations and at the premises where the informants are. I was allowed to be an observer at different meetings of public and private committees dealing with fisheries policy issues, including meetings and seminars between South African fisheries authorities and foreign experts, as well as fishers’ organisation meetings. I joined a three-day long so-called road show in the Eastern Cape where government representatives informed the public about the new policy. In Mozambique, I went along with civil servants on a five-day long journey to a number of fishing communities in Moma and Angoche, where the purpose was to inform about the principles behind co-management, and to get feedback from and interact with fishing industry actors. I also attended information meetings and seminars between the government and representatives of the fishing communities in Moma and Angoche, and in Maputo.

Reading government bills, laws and newspaper clippings provided an understanding of the context the fishers had to relate to, and contributed to the formulation of the interview guide. The South African government pursues the principles of transparency, through which the public has the right to gain insight into public documents. For the fisheries sector, this should include access to review quota applications and lists of successful applicants, which is stated in the policy document White Paper:

"...all applications for the allocation of fishing rights will be made available on request for public scrutiny...” (Republic of South Africa 1997: 39)

However, it turned out to be rather challenging to get access to quota application documents,
partly due to a lag of registration in the Chief Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management. While most civil servants were positive and helpful regarding the requests related to my research, it was time-consuming to arrange the formal procedures. Eventually, I was allowed to examine lists of quota applicants and their quota applications. In Mozambique, access to public documents was easier, as the IDPPE lent me an office and granted me access to the archive. After the fieldwork, IDPPE research partners updated me, by e-mail, on their work in the fieldwork area.

Newspapers can also be a source for social scientific analysis (Bryman 2001). The Mozambican media hardly reported on issues related to fisheries socio-economics, and I have no information originating from newspaper articles in Mozambique. In South Africa, on the other hand, newspapers proved important data sources, mainly the Cape Town newspapers Cape Times and Cape Argus. The fisheries policy process in South Africa was relatively transparent and generated conflicts between stakeholders. There were some quite violent encounters between different groups of fishers, and between the fishers and government officials. Furthermore, poaching, which is not treated in this dissertation, was prevalent (Hauck and Sweijd 1998), and a topic of current interest for newspapers. I approached the newspaper clipping service from the Chief Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management, but I was informed that it was neither complete nor updated. I therefore spent some time at the South African Library in Cape Town, going through newspapers on microfilm, and paper copies for 1998 and 1999. On a later visit in October 2000, I went through some more recent newspapers. Colleagues have also provided me with newspaper clippings. I realise that one has to be cautious when using newspapers as sources. As Bryman (2001) points to, authenticity issues are sometimes difficult to ascertain in the case of mass media output. A problem with using newspapers as a source, which Flemmen (1999) discusses, is the risk of inaccuracies. Articles referring to conversations with people often include quotes such as “The woman said…”, and we as researchers may want to use such quotes. The press uses quotes extracted from texts, and journalists therefore often construct quotes based on conversations with people (Scott 1990, in Flemmen 1999). Therefore, we cannot be certain that the interviewed person actually said exactly what the journalist is quoting. Nevertheless, the newspapers provided a rich material which has contributed to my understanding of the tension of South African fisheries policy, illustrating the dynamics, the public interest, and the political importance of the fisheries policy. Moreover, much of the information as reported in the newspapers corresponded with my own field observations.


3.8 On credibility, transferability and theoretical / analytical generalisation

Having presented the field sites and some methodological considerations, it is timely to question how credible and transferable my research and the results I arrive at are. Credibility refers to the trustworthiness criterion: Ensuring that research is carried out according to good practice and that it has been undertaken in a trustworthy manner (Bryman 2001; Thagaard 2002). The information I present from the interviews is as credible as the information given by the informants. What people say, they say, and I chose not to double-check individual informants’ credibility. However, there might have been a risk of co-optation (discussed on page 76), which I countered by triangulating information. In addition, the fact that social science research can be a snapshot in time has to be considered, which I illustrate by an example showing that the time period during which I interviewed the fishers may have influenced their life situation: In South Africa, part of the fieldwork was carried out when fishing activity was low among the small-scale fisheries, due to a court case between different interests to the quotas (more on this in Chapter 4). This meant that fishers were idle and the frustration level was high. They felt unfairly treated by the government and the decision makers, which had an immediate adverse impact on the legitimacy of the government and of the fishers’ representatives. This was an extreme situation that I could not possibly have foreseen, and illustrates how social science research often is situational. This may also have an influence on credibility, which I believe to have countered by triangulation. It nevertheless illustrates that timing of the fieldwork may influence research results. When we as social scientists are unable to undertake longitudinal studies, research questions relating to policy reform processes may quickly seem obsolete. We are not always in the position to relate to and grasp what takes place beyond the relatively short time frame in which we undertake fieldwork. Neither are we always able to stay in touch with key informants in the fieldwork areas to continuously update us on the topic. A few months or years down the lane, the answers to the same research questions may be different because the processes have developed or changed direction. However, this does not make our questions obsolete; rather, they serve to highlight the dynamics of processes. Hence, they have a generalisation value with respect to processes of implementation: what to expect and what to look out for. In my case, the timing of the fieldwork enhanced my possibility to get an insight into mechanisms that the state and the fishers had to relate to and struggle with in the early implementation phase of policy reforms. The combination of these experiences was used to generalise my findings analytically to contribute to theory building.
On the issue of transferability, qualitative studies tend to be oriented towards the contextual uniqueness and significance of the aspects of the social world being studied. This relates to whether my study can be replicated for other case studies (Thagaard 2002). Will my findings hold in some other context, or in the same context but at a different time (Bryman 2001)? I have provided rather detailed contextual descriptions of the case studies, and this may provide others with a basis for making judgements about the possible transferability of my findings to other settings. Contexts will always differ, but in line with Garcia-Godos (2006), I believe that lessons learned from a particular case can help us understand and put into perspective other similar cases. This contributes to enabling analytical and theoretical generalisation.

According to Bryman (2001), qualitative research and its findings are associated with the generation of theories, and the logic and quality of the theoretical reasoning are decisive in considering the generalisability of the findings of qualitative research. Andersen (1997) argues that sometimes the case study is the only possibility to present valid theoretical generalisations, because the phenomena we face are unique in one way or another. A case study is not a sample of one drawn from a known population, and the informants are not meant to be statistically representative (Bryman 2001). Furthermore, qualitative research may add to and develop existing theories, seeking theoretical patterns that are not explained in existing theory to a satisfactory extent. This may also lead to the development of new concepts or modification of existing concepts (Andersen 1997). Jentoft (1999) argues that a particular case does not have to be representative in a statistical sense to be scientifically valid, but the unit of analysis of case studies may well be typical for a larger population. Thus, case studies of fisheries management arrangements can be generalised to theoretical positions, and can be used to develop theories pertaining to co-management. My intention is to use the findings to elaborate on and add to what I perceive as shortcomings of co-management theory.

3.9 Research assistants, interpreters and recording methods

Sources of misinterpretation and misunderstandings abound when we do research in foreign cultures with different languages. I cite informants in English, translated from the informants’ language. Some South African informants spoke English well. Many of the fishers interviewed speak only Afrikaans, and I do not. I worked successively with two different research assistants and interpreters, both female university-students, who had grown up in one of the communities where I did fieldwork. Their mother tongue was Afrikaans, and they
commanded English as a second language. They were well acquainted with the challenges of South African fishing communities and contexts, and were able to be cultural as well as linguistic interpreters. In Mozambique, Portuguese is the official language, and the local language in the fieldwork area is Makwa, which neither of the IDPPE researchers nor I knew. There were interpreters to assist us if the informants did not speak Portuguese. I know Portuguese fairly well, and the IDPPE researchers spoke English well, and between us, we clarified issues that seemed unclear. We camped together on the IDPPE premises in Angoche for three weeks, and during the evenings we had useful discussions, while word-processing and interpreting the information from the interviews. I realise that there may be objections regarding working with civil servants, as I did in Mozambique, when the objective includes studying participation and how fishers view the actions of the government. As it turned out, the small-scale fishers were in general comfortable with the IDPPE, and were not afraid to criticise civil servants and give suggestions on how to improve policy implementation to their own advantage. According to IDPPE-representatives, this was a line of interaction and conduct that the IDPPE had been encouraging and working to achieve over the past few years.

The pilot interviews revealed that some informants were hesitant to talk when a tape recorder was running. This reaction is also noted by Gullestad (1984), who realised that the use of tape recorders negatively influenced encounters and made informants less confident. So, instead of relying on audio devices, I made notes when interviewing. It is a challenge to write down the important issues the informants are talking about during the interview and at the same time give them sufficient attention for the interview to run smoothly. Writing notes and selecting what to write down, imply an analysis in itself, because the researcher must sort out the information at the same time as writing (Thagaard 2002). In my case, the choice of research assistants and partners proved wise, as we complemented each other. I made a summary after the interview had taken place, while the impressions were still fresh, in order to preserve immediate reflections following the interview. This was part of a daily routine of word-processing the interviews, and helped in clarifying ambiguities with the research assistants or research partners, reducing the risk of flaws and sources of misinterpretation.

3.10 Ethical considerations
The direct contact between the researcher and the informants implies certain ethical challenges that one is constantly faced with when doing research (Kvale 1996; Thagaard
The personal interaction between the interviewer and the informants can be seen as a moral enterprise. The researcher develops personal relationships with people in the field, and must at the same time constantly consider moral and ethical aspects related to the purpose and implementation of the research itself (Punch 1998). As Thagaard (2002) says, it is important that the researcher respects the limits of the informants. Even though a person agrees to be interviewed, it does not mean that she/he has to answer all the questions. Whenever an informant seemed uneasy about answering a question, I did not pursue the question, as it felt wrong trying to pressure answers out of the informants.

The ethical aspect must be considered, with regard to informed consent, whether the respondents are informed in detail about why they are interviewed (Punch 1998). According to Thagaard (2002), the focus of this principle is on the respect for the individual’s control over her/his own life, and the control with how the information given to the researcher is shared with others. The informant is thus entitled to be informed about the objective of the study or research project, enabling her/him to balance the pros and cons of participating before agreeing to participate. However, due to the flexibility of a qualitative research approach, there is a danger of informing too much about the purpose of the interview. The research purpose may be modified and thus, the information given may turn out to be misleading (Kvale 1996).

Thagaard (2002) says that the researcher may often be perceived by the informants as representative of the forces that contribute to the marginalisation that they are subject to, or associated with a category of people that the informant already knows. She mentions social workers, journalists or leaders as examples. Such associations may disturb the interview situation, because the informants may expect the researcher to contribute to more than what can be expected from the interview situation, and which is beyond the researcher’s competence. This may influence the behaviour of the informants, for instance, they may want to accentuate problematic sides of their life in order to convince the researcher about their difficult life situation. In South Africa, it was likely that because I was white and a foreigner, I represented an impersonation of someone who could provide immediate benefits in the form of a quota or money. This was certainly food for reflection. Some informants, especially the organisational entrepreneurs, were more or less familiar with the role Norwegian authorities had played in contributing to the fisheries policy reform. Thus, some believed that I had the power and opportunity to influence their situation, which I did not. Hence, it was important to
be precise about the purpose of the interview. This is also an experience of Thagaard (2002), that researchers may create expectations among people in fieldwork areas. I was conscious to inform about my purpose in order to counteract the expectations my presence evoked. I explained to the informants that the only thing I could offer was the producing and synthesising of information and knowledge that I would make available to policy makers, and that issues related to the new fisheries policy of importance to fishers would be highlighted. Nevertheless, it often did not matter what I told the South African informants about the purpose of the interview, as some tirelessly kept requesting small and large donations or assistance in other matters, such as bringing forwards their claims to the fisheries authorities. This behaviour may be due to the enormous expectations of material prosperity that had been created among the marginalised majority before the elections in 1994. People were disappointed when their expectations did not materialise in the short time-span that had passed. Thus, I saw it as particularly important to inform about what Kvale (1996) refers to as risks and benefits of being informants, or rather, the lack of benefits. These are aspects that may influence the interview situation positively or negatively. It has significance for the reliability of the information, as some informants may have presented their situation differently than it was, in order to evoke my interest for acting to their benefit. Some informants emphasised the hardship they had to suffer, and there was no reason to doubt their stories. In South Africa, informants were in general more expressive than in Mozambique. Mozambican informants were less frustrated, angry and disappointed than their South African counterparts, and thus they had less to gain from lobbying their situation. This may be due to the fact that they were promised less and had fewer expectations with respect to the reformed fisheries policy. Moreover, as a contrast to their South African counterparts, they did not have the pressure of having to compete for quotas and resource access, and they did not have to fear being denied resource access.

Kvale (1996) discusses the researchers’ risk and potential weakness of co-optation and of not keeping a professional distance. The informants may have used me as an escape valve to vent their frustration, and therefore their stories may be biased towards the unfairness they might perceive, as mentioned by Thagaard (2002). I was constantly and consciously aware of the influences and impressions I was exposed to, and discussed and analysed them with the research assistants. This was important in order to be able to deal with what Bryman (2001) calls the sympathy, and antipathy, for the people being studied, aspects that were not present at the start of the research. Information from the interviews was furthermore balanced with
interviews and data from the other sources mentioned earlier.

Critics will claim that researchers exploit informants by using their time and creating knowledge out of the information, without providing anything in return. This can lead to the informant feeling empty after the interview, as the informant has given much information and may not have received anything in return (Kvale 1996). I agree with some of this. I told the participants that they were doing me a favour and that I could not give them anything tangible or material in return. Some of the people I approached declined when they were asked for an interview, and I asked them to contact me should they change their mind, though nobody did. This only happened in South Africa. To balance this, some of the informants expressed that they appreciated being asked their opinion, to have a conversation and to express their views about issues of importance to them. Kvale (1996) argues that for some people, being interviewed may entail a positive experience, since they get to talk about what is important to them. He contends that a common experience after interviews is that the informants have experienced the interview as enriching, have enjoyed talking freely with an attentive listener, and have sometimes obtained new insights.

Ensuring informants confidentiality is important, especially if they regret having been too open or straightforward about sensitive issues, according to Punch (1998). He emphasises that as researchers, we are obliged to protect the privacy and identity of the informants; they should not suffer harm or embarrassment as a consequence of research. There is an obvious conflict between the ethical demand for confidentiality and the basic principle of scientific research, such as intersubjective control and the possibility of replicating the findings by other researchers. As expressed by Smith (1990, in Kvale 1996: 115): “How can research results be checked by other researchers if no one knows who participated in a study, and where and when it took place?” This problem has yet to be resolved. I considered the issue of confidentiality and chose a compromise. Places and to some extent fisher organisations are identifiable, while the individual informants are anonymous. I explained to the informants that I would not disclose their names and that their information could not be attributed to them personally. Most of them seemed indifferent, as they probably did not foresee any controversial aspects coming out of the interview situation.
3.11 Summary and reflection

When I started out this work, I was seeking information in a field that had evoked my interest. The fieldwork was challenging and eye opening, and provided me with a large amount of information, some of which was both anticipated and unexpected. A researcher, consciously or unconsciously, has some preconceptions and beliefs about the field he/she is to explore. These preconceptions by and large need to be modified once in the field, and I have therefore chosen to emphasise the necessity of flexibility in the different phases of research, both practically in the field, and when analysing the data. The method chosen has both limitations and advantages. On the one hand, the weeks I spent in each site were not enough to be thoroughly familiar with the social contexts. This limits the potential for in-depth analysis. In all settings I was an outsider, and the observations were made through a foreigner’s eyes. On the other hand, a potential advantage of being an outsider, which Thagaard (2002) points to, is that it is easier for the researcher to question the phenomena that the informants take for granted. My choice of research assistants proved wise, since they shared many of the experiences with the informants; they understood the culture, and could give me input about how to approach different situations.
4 The South African Case

4.1 The fisheries and fisheries management

South Africa, with a coastline over 3000 km, is the largest fishing nation in Africa. On a global scale, the South African fishing industry is medium-sized, with landings of between half a million and one million tons of fish annually during the period 1975-1997 (Stuttaford 1999). The total population of South Africa is 43.4 million (The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2001), and the fishing industry provides a livelihood for many communities. The commercial fishery provides direct employment to 25000-30000 persons, and approximately 60000 additional people are employed in sectors closely related to the fisheries sector (Republic of South Africa 1997). There are 19 different fisheries, dominated by the industrialised hake sector, and a great diversity in catching techniques, processing, marketing, capital investment, equipment and infrastructure (Martin and Raakjær Nielsen 1998). The commercial fishing industry actors focus on species that have high value or can be caught in large quantities. These actors are part of the quota-sector, which is traditionally made up of a few large companies and a number of smaller ones (Rights Allocation Unit 2000). The commercial actors in the fishing industry are individual employers, co-operatives, shareholding companies, or closed companies; the latter is a company structure for up to ten participants. A wide spectrum of technology is applied in the commercial fisheries, from capital-intensive high-technology fishing gear and methods of processing, to labour-intensive methods. Close to 90 per cent of all South African fish landings are made in harbours in the Western Cape, where the most important harbour is Cape Town. The wholesale value of the fishing industry represents 0.5 per cent of the GNP, and the industry is an important earner of foreign exchange, with annual exports normally exceeding R400 million, or USD100 million (in 1999). The commercial sector produces a considerable surplus for the operators involved, and competes on foreign markets (Hersoug and Holm 2000).

The biological management of the South African fish resources is internationally recognised as being well founded and based on high-level scientific research (Hersoug 2002a). A series of Fisheries Acts have imposed a limited entry system on the South African fisheries over the past decades. A broad range of statutory controls and restrictions on fishing have been imposed under these acts, including fishing permits, licensing requirements and quota allocations (Hutton and Lamberth 1998). The first comprehensive legislation for marine resources management was the Sea Fisheries Act of 1940, followed by new acts in 1973 and
1988. The quota system was introduced to the fisheries in the 1960s. In practice, quotas were given mainly to whites, and many people depending on the fisheries were marginalised (Hersoug 1998). Quotas were traditionally granted by the Minister acting on the advice of officials stationed primarily in Pretoria. These officials dealt with fisheries matters on an ad hoc basis, far away from where the fishing took place. This led to criticism by a variety of enquiry commissions, for instance the Du Plessis Commission in 1971 and the Treurnicht Commission in 1980. The control post in Cape Town was upgraded to Chief Directorate in 1982, becoming a component of the head office in Pretoria (Republic of South Africa 1997). Today, the Marine and Coastal Management office (MCM) in Cape Town is a Chief Directorate of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in Pretoria.

In 1986, the Diemont Commission stated that it was not right that the Minister should determine individual quotas, because

“Factors which are not strictly relevant to the promotion of the fishing industry are pressed on him and the danger of wrong decisions being made is increased.”

(Republic of South Africa 1997: 36)

The argument was that the Minister would be subject to lobbyism and political pressures, which was also the case. There was a general perception that ministers in the past had distributed quotas to friends and family members, many of whom were not actively engaged in fishing (Republic of South Africa 1997). Eventually, quota decisions were removed from the political arena and a Quota Board became operative in 1990. However, the situation did not improve. The fisheries administrative system still served the interests of white owners and operators, and paid little attention to marginalised fishers and communities. There was minimal transparency in the allocation process, and the legislation protected established companies and right holders. The whole process of allocating quotas and licences was considered corrupted, and accusations were made that the Minister, the Quota Board and the administration were all liable to political pressure from the established owners and processors. The Quota Board was later dissolved because of allegations of corruption and the corresponding lack of legitimacy (Hersoug 1998).

In the 1990s, it was evident that 40 years of apartheid and more than 300 years of colonial discrimination had left the fishing sector with an uneven distribution of resources between...
whites and non-whites (Hersoug and Holm 2000), the latter being the losing part: They did not obtain licenses and had poor working conditions with restrained bargaining power as to selling prices for their catch. Of the TAC for 1994, only 0.75 per cent was allocated to non-whites, and of the 2700 registered commercial fishing boats, non-whites owned seven per cent. Of 4000 fishing licenses issued, six per cent were issued to non-whites (Republic of South Africa 1997). In comparison to the overall ethnic distribution, in 1993, seventy-six per cent of the population were black Africans, eleven per cent Asians and coloureds, and 13 per cent whites (Murray and Lane 1996). This allocation system led to widespread lack of trust in the administration and corresponding lack of legitimacy of the regulations, and poaching was seen as acceptable at the grassroots level, targeting valuable species like abalone and West Coast rock lobster (Hersoug 1998). There was an attitude among small-scale industry actors that they were not obliged to contribute to conserve a stock that they had no insurance of sharing (Le May and Lestrade 2000). This was reflected in the data from my fieldwork:

“Many people steal [fish] ... I don’t think it’s wrong. What else can people do?”

The authorities did conduct some management experiments with the objective of favouring small-scale fisheries. In 1992, the government experimented with a programme entitled ‘Fishermen’s Community Trusts’, with the pretext of improving the socio-economic conditions of fishers and fish factory workers in coastal communities. A certain share of the revenues earned from the TAC of the offshore capital-intensive hake fishery was allocated to Community Trusts in communities in the Western Cape. According to van der Elst et al. (1997), most of the fishers involved in the Fishermen’s Community Trusts did not have the opportunity to legally access the fish resources. A combination of poor implementation, huge expectations and an inadequate ability to satisfy everyone’s expectations dismantled this experiment. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that the problem was the lack of consideration of the communities’ ability to take full responsibility at short notice for the

11 With respect to agriculture, whites control 87 per cent of South Africa’s land (Beukes 2000).
12 Interview, fisher from Ocean View, crewmember.
13 Community trusts in the following communities: Lambert’s Bay, Doringbaai, Hondeklipbaai, Port Elizabeth, Port Alfred, Jeffreys Bay, Port Nolloth, St. Lucia, Richards Bay, Gansbaai, Hermanus, Mtnzini, Tugela, Plettenberg, Knysna, Arniston, Struisbaai, Stilbaai, Mossel Bay, Hout Bay, Cape Town Harbour, Langebaai, Saldanha, Elandsbaai, Kalk Bay, Kleinmond/Betties Bay/Pringle Bay, Paternoster, Velddrif, Helderberg, Cape Peninsula, St. Helena Bay, Vredenburg, and False Bay.
administration and spending of income from the Fishermen’s Community Trust. Conflicts arose in the communities over who the main beneficiaries were, and the controversies culminated in a Supreme Court decision in 1995 to bring about an end to the system (Hutton and Lamberth 1998).

4.2 The fisheries policy reform

4.2.1 Addressing imbalances
With the Government of National Unity, which incorporated all parties that won five per cent or more of the votes in the 1994 election (O’Meara 1996) and was headed by the ANC, the fisheries policy underwent a radical institutional change in the 1990s, in line with the overall societal changes that were meant to take place towards a democratic society. Redistribution of access to income generating activities was supposed to be a means towards democratisation and development. The elaboration and drafting of the fisheries policy documents were to reflect the principles of the national Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), in which poverty reduction was the first priority of the government (Blake 1998). In order to gain legitimacy and reach a general consensus, the government encouraged different interests from various sectors to take part in the development process. The principles of participatory democracy and people-driven development were central in the Reconstruction and Development Programme, and it embodied demands for a radical social and economic transformation (Adler and Webster 1999). O’Meara (1996) sees the Reconstruction and Development Programme as a mild form of market-driven social democracy which focused on bringing education, housing and health services within the reach of the majority of South Africans. The ANC’s election promises applicable to the fisheries sector stated that

“...the primary objective of fisheries policy is the upliftment of impoverished coastal communities through improved access to marine resources and the sustainable management of those resources through appropriate strategies.” (African National Congress 1994, in Hersoug and Holm 2000: 221)

In the case of scarce fish resources prone to overexploitation, it can be seen as a zero-sum game: If some groups gain, others have to lose. An issue that was under-addressed during the policy process, was whether it was possible at all to expand access to the fisheries with the objective of achieving a more equitable and fair distribution of power and wealth without
destroying the biological and economic basis of the fishing industry (Hersoug and Holm 2000). Quota applicants, who before 1994 were disqualified from participating based on racial classification, were with the new policy defined as belonging to the historically / previously disadvantaged groups. These groups were to be accommodated by improved access to the fisheries. The fundamental problem the South African fisheries authorities came to face was the great number of claims for access to the fish resources while attempting to ensure a fair and equitable manner of distribution of fish resources without compromising the economic basis of the industry. In four years, the number of quota applications increased from 500 to 12000 (Le May 2000a), and there were far too many applicants for the fish resources to sustain. According to Hersoug (2002a), in the first round of quota allocations in 1999/2000, approximately one out of ten applicants received a fishing right and an accompanying quota. The MCM saw the risk of fishers safeguarding by enlisting for various organisations that applied for quotas. Civil servants crosschecked lists of quota applications in order to avoid either that one applicant had more than one company or that individuals were members of more than one company. Since the fish resources were scarce and the fleet overcapitalised, it was difficult to broaden access. Bennett (1999) used the example of hake quotas to illustrate the shortage of space in the industry. Of the total long-line hake quota of 150000 tons, a few big actors shared 110000 tons, and about 200 smaller fishing companies shared the remaining 40000 tons. As Cochrane and Payne note,

“The new system must be developed in an environment in which the opportunities for expansion of the fisheries are very limited, given the underlying principle of sustainable utilization.” (Cochrane and Payne 1998: 87)

In addition to the groupings of big business actors and small-scale fishers, the classification of subsistence fishers was created with the intention of accommodating the quota applicants who were unsuccessful when applying for commercial quotas. During the apartheid era, a group of fishers were referred to as informal fishers; later as subsistence fishers with the new policy; and in 2001 as micro-commercial fishers, or as ‘holders of limited commercial fishing rights’ (Hersoug 2002b). The Subsistence Fisheries Task Group was appointed by the Chief Director in December 1998 to elaborate a subsistence fisheries management system. It opted for quotas as the management measure. The quotas allocated to the subsistence fishers were small, and their harvest generated only sufficient returns to meet the basic needs of subsistence. Furthermore, there were restrictions with respect to marketing of the catches. In the first
round of allocation of rights and quotas, about 10000 applicants were unsuccessful. Applications for subsistence fishing rights for West Coast rock lobster were called for in late 2000, and the MCM subsequently imposed relatively strict guidelines for how to apply for these quotas. This led to the use of consultants by subsistence fisheries applicants to assist them with the application procedures. Of the 3431 applications for subsistence fisheries quotas received by the MCM in 2000/2001, 1700 were successful. A substantial number of people who depended on fishing for a living did not succeed. And vice-versa, many persons not involved in active fishing received quotas, and there were allegations of cheating (Hersoug 2002b).

The Reconstruction and Development Programme soon proved too ambitious. Therefore, there was a shift of focus with the publication of the Reconstruction and Development Programme White Paper in September 1994, in which a neo-liberal framework replaced what Blake (1998) calls the broad Keynesian thrust of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. It highlighted fiscal restrictions as a principle and significantly downplayed the issue of redistribution. The Reconstruction and Development Programme was the official policy for only two years. In its place, the macro-economic strategy of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) was introduced in 1996, and the transformation was to a large degree left to the market forces. The GEAR rested on pillars such as fiscal reforms, removal of exchange controls, industrial policy reforms such as promoting competition, privatisation, governmental focus on infrastructure, wage flexibility, and a social agreement for wage and price moderation (Venter 1997), of which the International Monetary Fund approved, as presented in the media:

“...the strategies for growth, employment and redistribution...are exactly right.”
(Sunday Times 1996)

The Deputy President at the time, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, and the Finance Minister claimed that GEAR did not represent a departure from the RDP, but a wide spectrum of organisations disagreed and criticised the policy (Blake 1998). They documented that the GEAR was strongly influenced by global capitalism and prioritised the interests of private capital at the expense of the communities, and argued that the state to an increasing degree turned to neo-

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14 This led some critiques to nickname the programme Rumours, Dreams and Promises (Bond 2000).
liberal policies. Hence, by relying on market-driven approaches, the state moved away from key principles of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. With the shift from the Reconstruction and Development Programme to the GEAR policy, there were in reality few possibilities to address the marginalised population’s needs (Morris 1999; Xundu 2000). Morris (1999) in the newspaper Cape Argus claimed that South Africa was in the grip of a liberal capitalistic ideology strongly favoured by the powerful, increasingly wealthy black elite, reinforcing economic division in the country, and that there was no economic debate, leaving South Africa “stuck behind a neo-liberal iron curtain”. Bond observed that

“It is sometimes remarked that the inexorable journey from a self-radiant, anti-imperialist political-economic philosophy to allegedly ‘home-grown’ structural adjustment that took Zambian, Mozambican/Angolan and Zimbabwean nationalists 25, 15 and 10 years, respectively, was in South Africa achieved in less than five, indeed, two years, if one takes the Growth, Employment and Redistribution document as a marker.” (Bond 2000: 1-2)

Five years after the introduction of democratic government, the main perception was that allocation of access rights had shifted only slightly to the advantage of small-scale fishers. The Chief Director of the Marine and Coastal Management disagreed and pointed out that compared to the recent past, there had been a real change. Whereas big companies held 92 per cent of the quota allocations in 1993, they held about 71 per cent in 1999 (Bennet 1999, in the newspaper Sunday Times).

4.2.2 Towards a new Law for the fisheries
The South African government sought assistance from outside agents and experts in order to make the process of fisheries policy reform as legitimate as possible. A legal task team was set up to evaluate the possibility of implementing a new policy through the existing legislation. The team consisted of lawyers from South Africa, the law department of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, and the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. The team concluded that the formal institution had to change, that profound legislative changes were necessary in order to implement the new policy, and recommended making a new law for the marine fisheries (Sletten 2000).

In October 1994, the process of working out a new fisheries policy was initiated. In April
1995, the Fisheries Policy Development Committee (FPDC) was set up, representing both geographical and functional interests. The FPDC consisted of 70 members: one national government representative, one representative from each of the four maritime provinces of the Northern Cape, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal, and five representatives from 13 different sectors in the fishing industry (Hersoug 2000). The mandate of the Fisheries Policy Development Committee was to work out a Green Paper on the fisheries policy (Sletten 2000).

The members of the Fisheries Policy Development Committee consulted their constituencies and requested all stakeholders to submit their ideas for a first integrated document. Drafts were widely circulated for comments, and the committee meetings were open to the public. A Working Committee, headed by the General Secretary of the Food and Allied Workers Union, carried out the practical work of writing out the policy. In addition to the Fisheries Policy Development Committee and the Working Committee, six task teams were set up to suggest solutions where the Fisheries Policy Development Committee was not able to find a common solution. The process was delayed by the demand from the constituencies for an open, democratic and participatory process, by the need for the actors to become organised before being able to participate, and by the fact that insufficient resources were committed. The completion date was postponed twice, but in June 1996 the Fisheries Policy Development Committee presented its recommendations to the Plenary Committee, and the process of developing a White Paper started (Martin and Raakjær Nielsen 1998). As would be expected, the issues concerning access rights and transferability were contentious. The Working Committee unilaterally recommended an Individual Transferable Quota system for most fisheries, and part of the justification for making quotas transferable was that a wider group of interested actors then could make a living by buying and selling shares in the fishery. However, the Working Committee did not provide guidelines for how the quotas were to be redistributed to the previously disadvantaged groups (Republic of South Africa 1997). An Access Rights Panel was set up by the Minister in order to evaluate this, consisting of two lawyers, a social anthropologist and a business economist (Cochrane and Payne 1998). The essence of the Access Rights Panel recommendations was that access rights should be real, long-term property rights, transferable and inheritable. It would still resemble Individual Transferable Quotas, and the limit for the validity of rights was a maximum of 15 years (Republic of South Africa 1998a: Sections 18-6 and 20). This was written into the White Paper, which was finished and published in May 1997. Because of time constraints, the
Marine Living Resources Bill was prepared in a parallel process, and the team writing the White Paper provided the legal task team with steady inputs. The Marine Living Resources Bill was introduced in September 1997, and passed in Parliament with only technical amendments (Hersoug and Holm 1999). The Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 was in operation from September 1998.

4.2.3 Democratic principles in the public policy documents

Hutton et al. (1999) document extensive state-industry partnerships in South African fisheries big business over the last few decades. The decision-making processes were structured in order to formalise the management arrangements between industry associations and the state in the form of resource management committees. The policy documents established that participatory principles would be extended beyond established state-big business partnerships, addressing democratic principles such as user group participation, accountability, power sharing, transformation and transparency as an integral part of the policy reform. This is related to the commitment to address past injustices, as stated in the section on ‘Objectives and principles’ in the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998:

“The Minister and any organ of state shall in exercising any power under this Act, have regard to [...] the need to restructure the fishing industry to address historical imbalances and to achieve equity within all branches of the fishing industry”
(Republic of South Africa 1998a: Section 2h)

This would be provided by, among other means, user group participation. For instance, it is stated in the White Paper on the Marine Fisheries Policy that: “local communities, labour, scientists and resource users will play an active role in the management of marine resources”, and furthermore, that: “all resource harvesters will be required to keep data for management purposes” (Republic of South Africa 1997: 14). The latter quote refers to the fact that fishers were urged to daily register their catches. There is an overall lack of specification and operationalisation of, for example, what ‘active role’ implies, and at what stages and levels that active role will be played out: In planning, decision-making and / or implementation; or at the local, regional or national level? The policy documents include other undefined concepts, for instance empowerment. The lack of operational definition invites actors to interpret the concepts. However, this is not a South African peculiarity:
Policy texts and laws are often open to interpretations (Asgeirsdottir 2000).

The Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 links accountability and participation, and states that

"...the Minister ... shall have regard to the need to achieve to the extent practicable a broad and accountable participation in the decision-making processes provided for in the Act." (Republic of South Africa 1998a: Chapter 1, Section 2h: 14)

The White Paper on the Marine Fisheries Policy states that “Administrators and stakeholders will be accountable for their actions” (Republic of South Africa 1997: 13), and further that

“The Minister and department will be fully accountable, and public hearings can be held to ensure such accountability. Those responsible for making decisions will be required to make full disclosure of beneficial and other personal interests.” (Republic of South Africa 1997: 39)

Participation depends on, among other things, power sharing, which means that the state delegates power. The South African state does not commit to power sharing, and it is at the state’s discretion to recall the powers it has delegated. This way, the state has consolidated itself as the ultimate decision maker, as is stated in the Marine Living Resources Act 1998, section 79, which treats the issue of power delegation:

“1) The Minister may a) upon the conditions that he or she deems fit, delegate any or all the powers conferred upon him or her in terms of this Act, save the power to make regulations, to the Director-General or an officer of the Department nominated by the Director-General; or b) by notice in the Gazette, delegate any power conferred upon him or her in terms of this Act, excluding the power to make regulations, to an authority in the local sphere of government.  
2) The Director-General may delegate any power conferred upon him or her in terms of this Act to an officer in the Department upon the conditions that he or she deem fit.  
3) No delegation of any power shall prevent the exercise of such power by the Minister of the Director-General.”

Transformation is a core issue in the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998. Hara and Isaacs (2001) outline a threefold definition of transformation: Political transformation entails an
equitable racial distribution of access rights, ownership and participation; economic
transformation involves increased welfare gains; while in structural transformation, the
development of small and medium enterprises is emphasised. One of the difficulties of
designing and implementing the new policy was that there was no consensus on what
transformation should imply,\textsuperscript{15} and consequently, there were no operational targets for the
transformation. O’Riordan (1999) defines transformation in South Africa as the process
through which the wrongs of the past will be righted. This means restoring the rights of
groups discriminated against under the apartheid regime, and equity across the racial divide.
In the fisheries, it would include restructuring resource access by redistributing quotas to the
benefit for marginalised groups.

Transparency is seen as a necessary element of the transformation process towards
democracy. In the White Paper on the Marine Fisheries Policy it is stated that

\begin{quote}
“The management of living marine resources and all aspects of the decision-making
process will be open and transparent. (Republic of South Africa 1997: 13)
\end{quote}

There is no specification of sanctions if these principles are violated.

\section*{4.2.4 Empowerment the South African way}

It became clear early in the fieldwork that empowerment of the small-scale fishers was

\begin{quote}
“During all years fishermen were considered low class, they have no self-esteem. It is
difficult to raise their self-esteem. In the near future, the new policy will maybe help
this. There will be job opportunities. The fishermen will be proud of what they are
doing. But today, too many fishermen waste money on alcohol and drugs. There are
too many social problems.”\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

Empowerment of the whole South African society was prioritised on the agenda for

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{15} Speech by Tanya Abrahamsee, Deputy General Department of Environment and Tourism, at “Workshop on
the management of marine living resources”, Cape Town, 10\textsuperscript{th} February 1999.
\textsuperscript{16} Interview, fisher and member of the Ocean View co-op leader-group.
\end{quotation}
politicians, NGOs and the media. ‘Black economic empowerment’ was a means of addressing past injustices, and the concept as well as the discussions generated by it applied to most sectors (Leshilo 1999). The ‘Black Management Forum’ was a leading exponent of empowerment and affirmative action in South Africa. Its message was that black economic empowerment was primarily about dispersing access to resources, capital, and equity of ownership and management control to the majority of disadvantaged people. A spokesman for the Black Management Forum, quoted by Leshilo (1999) in the newspaper Cape Times, said that

“Black economic empowerment must be a holistic, integrated and measurable programme that is geared towards the effective acquisition of assets and their deployment through control and management for the benefit of black people first … it is informed by the National Strategic Vision, the GEAR strategy and the Reconstruction and Development Programme.”

The above quote demonstrates that the emphasis was on distribution of wealth and benefits. This contradicts Wily’s (2000) viewpoint that power sharing should be at the heart of participation and empowerment, in order to enable marginalised groups to acquire the skills and possibilities to generate their own wealth and benefits. As it was practiced, the marginalised actors in South Africa became recipient beneficiaries rather than active participants. Baard (1998) argues that empowerment must focus on assisting the marginalised at the grassroots, and that employment creation should be a principal objective of an empowerment process. He claims that meaningful and sustainable black economic empowerment cannot and will not take place if the poor and the unemployed are neglected. Empowerment is related to formation of relevant and adequate social capital. This is a challenge to South Africa. Venter (1997) points to the fact that there are few efforts to train people for work and progress, and he claims that South Africa lags behind the rest of the

17 On affirmative action: "The goal of affirmative action in the Public Service is to speed up the creation of a representative and equitable Public Service and to build an environment that supports and enables those who have been historically disadvantaged by unfair discrimination to fulfil their maximum potential within it so that the Public Service may derive the maximum benefit of their diverse skills and talents to improve service delivery" (Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Affirmative Action, 1998b: 4).

South Africa embarked on probably the most extreme affirmative action program anywhere. Private companies above a certain size are obliged to try to make their workforces "demographically representative" (that is, seventy-five per cent black, fifty per cent female) from factory floor to board room. "Black" is a generic term that refers to African, Coloured and Indian (Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Affirmative Action, 1998b: 30).
world in this respect.18

‘Black empowerment company’ is a denomination of companies owned and managed by non-white people. Such companies were supposed to be catalysts of empowerment of the previously disadvantaged. However, despite the intense focus on empowerment, Mabaso (1999) in the newspaper Cape Argus reported that since the beginning of 1999, the share prices of most listed black empowerment companies decreased rapidly, and that this partly was due to corruption. Most black empowerment took place through investment firms, which benefited only a small share of the population. The critiques were harsh, illustrated by the following quote from Loxton (1999) in the newspaper Business Report:

“Of particular concern has been the fact that most black empowerment has been based on self-aggrandisement through the acquisition of fine clothes, expensive cars and Cuban cigars, rather than real grassroots empowerment.”

One explanation why actors central to black empowerment did not perform as anticipated was that they sought to build their fortune by the same methods as their predecessors, namely

“... pyramids, boardroom handouts unrelated to profits made, and the wheeling and dealing in stocks which enabled South African’s Randlords to create the most unequal and oppressive society on earth.” (Turok 1999, in Sunday Argus)

Black empowerment as it was practiced was a far shot from redistributing power, consolidating capacity building processes, producing and enhancing social capital, and creating employment among the marginalised. Horst (1999) in the newspaper Cape Argus commented that this practice was

“... a living proof that post-apartheid South Africa is changing from a race-based society into a class-based society... The complaint is that yesterday’s comrades are merely interested in self-enrichment through financial mega-deals, while they have not used their newly acquired power to create jobs for the unemployed black masses...”

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18 Estimations show that South Africa spends one per cent of total employment costs on training whereas the USA spends five per cent and Japan ten per cent (Venter 1997).
Horst (1999) places this in a perspective of South Africa’s history, and explains that the failure of black economic empowerment is not surprising, since South Africa is a country where raw capitalism is part of its recent history: The modern economy was born of the gold rush of the late 19th century, and the get-rich-quick-mentality was still very much alive a century later.

In the fishing industry, established big business was encouraged, or pushed, to contribute to the empowerment of new quota holders. The White Paper has a section on “Methods of empowerment”, stating that there are several ways whereby existing big business actors can enable others to achieve the empowerment criteria which will enable them to compete for access rights. These are as follows; expand equity ownership in companies, restructure the industry in order to move in the direction of larger proportions of the quota being sold to small-scale fishing operators, encourage contracts with fish-processing companies, help small-scale operators improve efficiency, and assist in formation of co-operatives and other forms of formal commercial co-operation (Republic of South Africa 1997: 18). In other words, big business was encouraged to facilitate newcomers to compete for access rights, as the following quote from the White Paper illustrates:

“The established, larger fishing companies can and should play an important, active key role in the process of restructuring the industry in ways leading in the direction indicated by the policy objective of broadening participation in fishing activities. Such an attitude would no doubt be in the long-term interest of those companies from the point of view of securing reliable supplies of raw material for fish processing, seeing that they cannot in future rely on maintaining equally substantial proportions of available TACs as they have today” (Republic of South Africa 1997: 20).

The White Paper on the Marine Fisheries Policy furthermore indicates that unless white-owned and white-managed stakeholders contribute to the implementation of the new fisheries policy, they will not be prioritised when fishing quotas were to be allocated.

According to Hersoug (2000), big business preferred the empowerment strategy which in the first round included some shareholding schemes for employees and a modest reorganisation of the company management. The intention of this strategy was that ownership would be gradually shifted to the previously disadvantaged, and it would allow transfers of skills and experience. One mode of transferring ownership and equities was letting a previously
A disadvantaged group buy a portion of equity in a large company, or selling it to employees through a share participation scheme (Republic of South Africa 1997). This way, the policy reform also addressed empowerment of fish plant workers. However, according to Merten (1999), there was still only limited empowerment taking place in the fishing industry. As an example: By late 1998, only one company was controlled by non-whites. It promoted people who had worked for the company for 15 years into key posts, and invested in socio-economic development projects (Le May 1998). The newspaper Sunday Times reported an example of a black empowerment consortium with shareholders representing interests of 14 welfare and community organisations entering the fishing industry. A representative of the consortium claimed that previously disadvantaged individuals were appointed to collaborate with established white business with the sole purpose of “window-dressing” their companies, and that no real transference of rights had taken place by October 1999 (Bennet 1999). Another example is the Lambert’s Bay Fishing Company, which implemented a share holding scheme in which every employee had 500 shares in the company. Workers claimed that having shares did not make any difference; they did not have any influence in decision-making matters of the company. Another company, the big business company Irvin and Johnson, had since 1996 provided their employees with 800 shares after two years’ service, and after five years with 1200 shares. This share-system was not perceived as offering a practical and real change for the employees, and the workers were neither expected nor invited to participate in decision-making. This was in line with the newspaper Sunday Argues, which reported that small-scale industry actors were of the opinion that the acquisition of shares by black empowerment groups only swapped shares and brought few benefits or power to bona fide fishers (Le May 1998). As such, it became a window-dressing gesture, as emphasised by Horst (1999) in the newspaper Cape Argus:

“White companies see it as a temporary new way of doing business to win government tenders. They bring in token black people, just to have a black name on the bottom of the letterhead... There is a lot of corruption happening under the name of black economic empowerment.”

In the fishing communities, it was a common opinion that big companies used black

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19 Focus group interview with fish processing workers at Lambert’s Bay Fishing Company.
20 Interview with shop stewards, Irvin and Johnson.
empowerment groups in their competition for access to the resources.\textsuperscript{21} In line with this, the informants expressed frustration over the lack of changes and did not see themselves as empowered despite the formal institutional changes, as illustrated by these informants:

\begin{quote}
\textit{“Money has no colour. It doesn’t matter whether it is a white or a black capitalist. Nothing will change. Now it is only black faces oppressing blacks… Most of the people have forgotten who they are going to uplift; they have forgotten where they came from.”}\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{“For some guys, the new policy is definitively an improvement. But not for most fishermen. It benefits other people, like the black empowerment groups.”}\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

4.3 The state: Efforts at policy implementation

This section illustrates some state initiatives to implement the policy reform, including:

- The Fisheries Transformation Council (FTC), which was set up in 1998 to assist the state in aligning to the policy objectives when allocating quotas.
- Informing about the policy reform. I describe the procedures of informing people from an information tour carried out by MCM civil servants.
- Redistribution of quotas in order to accommodate new entrants.
- Response to threats to legitimacy.

4.3.1 New state institutions

In order to implement the fisheries policy reform as efficiently as possible, the state restructured the fisheries administration. The composition of civil servants in the fisheries administration was to reflect the ethnic composition of the South African population. Some of the white civil servants left the central fisheries administration, and were replaced by relatively inexperienced civil servants (Sletten 2000). This process took place so quickly that it often was at the expense of training new employees, which partly explains the often limited capacity of the fisheries administration to handle the increasing amount of tasks. Morris (1999) claims that affirmative action often was pushed too hard at the expense of skills and capacity in state departments. Hence, the state’s capacity was weakened, at least in a short-term perspective. Venter (1997) contended that until the general education levels and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{21} Personal communication, Leader Group SACFC, 1998.
\textsuperscript{22} Interview, representative of Hout Bay Widow’s Association.
\textsuperscript{23} Interview, fisher from Ocean View.
\end{flushright}
economic under-performance began to improve, there would be a critical shortage of skilled candidates who qualified on grounds other than their colour. However, not all agreed that the composition of the fisheries administration changed too fast. There was criticism that the substitution of civil servants did not happen fast enough, and therefore actually slowed down the transformation and the possibilities of training and empowering civil servants. O’Riordan (1999) refers to the ‘Sunset Clause’ in the Constitution, which states that no official in the apartheid administration was to be removed from office for at least five years, that is, until 1999. Some saw this as a situation in which old civil servants formed a part of institutional resistance. Black empowerment groups were among the critics who claimed that the old status quo existed due to bureaucrats “stuck in the past” (Bennet 1999).

The Fisheries Transformation Council (FTC) and the Consultative Advisory Forum (CAF) were set up to assist in the implementation of the policy reform. Some of the Minister’s power to implement the policy was delegated to the FTC, that in turn was to redistribute a portion of the Total Allowable Catch for the various species. Its role was to insure that the intentions of the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 were fulfilled, by facilitating fair and equitable access to the fish resource through the leasing of rights (Republic of South Africa 1998a):

“The main object of the Council shall be to facilitate the achievement of fair and equitable access to the rights referred to in section 18” (Republic of South Africa 1998a: Section 30, page 28)

By allocating and leasing fishing rights to new entrants, the FTC would contribute to development and capacity building of the previously disadvantaged and small- and medium-sized enterprises, with reference to the empowerment objectives of the Act:

“The council shall lease rights, according to criteria determined by the Minister, to persons from historically disadvantaged sectors of society and to small and medium size enterprises.” (Republic of South Africa 1998a: Section 31-2, page 28)

One of the criticisms of the FTC was that several applicants in various sectors received allocation of rights and quotas, even though they clearly did not fulfil the criteria set up by the
According to the Marine Living Resources Act (Section 34-1), the FTC was to consist of five members, appointed by the Minister (Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1998). To accommodate the quest for legitimacy, the formal criteria were that the FTC members must have specific skills for the task, they must broadly represent South Africans, and they could not be involved in the fishing industry in any way. This is clearly stated in the White Paper and in the Marine Living Resources Act, respectively:

“…no politician holding office or any other public official / civil servant may be allocated commercial access rights or directly or indirectly benefit from such rights.” (Republic of South Africa 1997: 39)

“No person who has a direct interest in any manner whatsoever in commercial fishing or mariculture shall be appointed in terms of this section.” (Republic of South Africa 1998a: Section 34-4)

As it turned out, the FTC was controversial, and not everyone was convinced that corruption ended with its establishment. When it was revealed that some members had interests in the fishing industry, the credibility of the FTC plummeted. For example, the newspaper Sunday Argus reported that a member of the FTC commission, who later became ambassador to the USA, obtained one of the first four special quotas to disadvantaged communities, which he later sold. Two prominent members of the ANC executive committee in the Western Cape were heavily involved in managing fishing companies, and the wife of the chair of the FTC owned a fishing company that got quotas (West 2000b). All of this contributed to discrediting the transformation process, since one of the rationales for creating the FTC was to end corruption. Furthermore, quotas could not be allocated to a body such as the FTC, in addition to the lack of consideration of the large volume of applications, failure to record sessions, failure of the FTC members to meet regularly, and not the least, disputes regarding their remuneration. An internal audit revealed that the FTC members were paid up to R450 an hour, while R87 an hour was the rate allowed by government tendering regulations (Le May 2000b). All in all, the FTC had a short existence, and in March 2000, all but one of the members resigned, claiming that they had not been paid in six months. The FTC was

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24 Information from anonymised letter (2000).
eventually dissolved. In the end, the FTC can be described as a failure, with accusations of nepotism and mismanagement. Nevertheless, when the FTC was dissolved, the state lost one of its main institutional pillars for carrying out the new policy (Le May 2000 a, b).

The Minister made decisions based on the advice from scientists, managers, different groups of resource users, and from the Consultative Advisory Forum (CAF) in particular. The CAF was to be a representative and multidisciplinary advisory body to the Minister, and its role was to advise the Minister on the Total Allowable Catch, marine living resources management and related legislation, fishing regulations, and research. Other tasks included the establishment and amendment of operational management procedures, including management plans (Cape Argus 1999; Republic of South Africa 1998a: Section 6). The CAF was to have at least five members appointed for a period of a maximum of three years at a time (Republic of South Africa 1998a: Section 7). As per 31.08.1998, the CAF consisted of 17 members representing the marine provinces; nine from the Western Cape, four from the Eastern Cape, three from KwaZulu-Natal, and one from the Northern Cape. They represented business, conservation, environment, biology, labour, law, economics, recreational fishers, and social sciences (Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1998). The CAF dealt mainly with biological matters, and put little emphasis on socio-economic features of the fishery, for instance how the resources should be distributed. The CAF was supposed to serve as a link between industry actors and decision makers, and industry actors could provide input to the CAF. However, my fieldwork revealed that small-scale fishers were often not aware of the existence of CAF.

In sum, the state established the FTC in order to delegate tasks and responsibilities to a legitimate body, and to assist in the allocation of quotas, while the CAF was to give advice on the Total Allowable Catch and regulations. Despite their varying success, their establishment illustrates that there were intentions to delegate responsibilities for policy implementation to legitimate institutions.

4.3.2 Dispersing information
In June 1999, two MCM civil servants undertook an information campaign in the Eastern Cape; to coastal community Port Alfred, and to Grahamstown located 55 km from the coast. Both areas suffered from unemployment and poverty. The objective of the tour was to inform
about the structure of the fisheries administration, the policy reform, and how to qualify and apply for a quota. A representative for Norwegian fisheries authorities and I came along as observers. A meeting was arranged between MCM representatives and a group of female social workers in Grahamstown. They were concerned about the serious situation in their community, with unemployment, poverty, hunger, HIV/AIDS and crime. They saw a possibility in using a fishing quota to generate employment, in order to relieve these problems.

Photo 6: Photo session after the meeting with social workers in Grahamstown, June 1999 (Photo: Mr. Zuki, MCM)

Another meeting with a different group was arranged later the same day at the Noluthando Hall in Grahamstown. About 120 people showed up, most of them women, as demonstrated in Photo 7 below. After the presentation by the MCM, the attendees were eager to know how they could go about to benefit from the fisheries policy, to create employment, reduce poverty and eventually cut crime. They were not the only ones with expectations to the fisheries policies, other fieldwork material shows that the mayor of Lambert’s Bay placed high expectations on the prospect of getting quotas to the community, which could be used to uplift
the community through job-creation.

A meeting had also been planned with the fishing community in Port Alfred in the Eastern Cape. Seven men appeared at the meeting in the city hall, none of them small-scale fishers. Most of them were white, representing the mayor, the local council and some fishing companies. Due to the absence of small-scale fishers at the meeting, it was agreed to convene an additional meeting the following morning. However, no small-scale fishers appeared at this meeting either. This time, only five men were present, of whom three had been present the previous day, and two other white men, a fisher and a councillor respectively. After some time, more people came to attend the meeting, but none of them were fishers and most of them were white. When I later talked with the two civil servants at the local Port Alfred MCM office, who were inspectors and advisors to the local fishers, they were of the opinion that the small-scale fishers possibly did not know about the meeting or that they were allowed to attend. If the fishers had known, the inspectors were positive that they would have been there, as they had approached the local MCM several times to get information about the new policy.
When we moved around the community of Port Alfred, we saw no placards or signs providing information about this meeting in the places where small-scale fishers would be. This indicates a lack of information on the fisheries policy, which applied both to fishers and fisheries authorities. The above mentioned local MCM civil servants in Port Alfred had received little information on the policy reform from the central authorities. One of them had recently gone to a public workshop in Cape Town by his own initiative to get information, to talk to MCM head quarter civil servants, and to learn about the policy reform.

These incidents show that the state indeed made an effort to spread information about the fisheries policy in the fishing communities. It turned out to be difficult to reach the grassroots. I discovered one explanation: A short and easy-to-understand summary of the White Paper was published in different languages directed at the different ethnic groups in the fishing communities. A Lambert’s Bay organisational entrepreneur had received several boxes from the MCM containing copies to distribute in the community. He had not distributed the copies to the fishers, and explained that it would be a useless effort, as the fishers would not read it anyway, let alone understand the content, because many of them were illiterate. I cannot judge whether it was right or not, but it was nevertheless puzzling. During my interviews in Lambert’s Bay, it was obvious that very few small-scale fishers were informed about the fisheries policy reform, and that they wanted information. Even though illiteracy is a problem, most fishers can hear and would be able to perceive orally transmitted information. As a contrast, informants in Ocean View were rather well informed about the content and implications of the policy reform. The local organisations informed fishers about aspects of the fisheries policy reform and about further action to be taken by the local organisation. Despite this, some informants were of the opinion that information was held back. One informant had on one occasion wanted to double check some information that the local organisational entrepreneurs had given, and went to Cape Town and collected the White Paper on the Marine Fisheries Policy and the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998, and talked to MCM officials. This is an indication that resourceful persons who know their way around can acquire some of the information they want and need. It also demonstrates that distance matters. Ocean View is close to Cape Town, while for Lambert’s Bay fishers it would be a much larger effort, both in terms of cost and initiative, to travel to Cape Town and

seek out relevant information.

4.3.3 Efforts of redistribution of quotas
Redistribution can take place without problems, as long as it is based on a willing-seller-willing-buyer policy (Venter 1997). In the efforts of adhering to the principles of the South African fisheries policy reform, redistribution was problem-ridden, which the following example illustrates. The state aimed at addressing the historical imbalances when the TAC for the West Coast rock lobster was distributed for the 1998/1999 fishing season (Le May 1999b). In order to allocate quotas to new applicants, the old quota-holders’ quotas were cut by an average of 25 per cent, whereby they took the state to court. The case between dissatisfied old quota holders and new entrants, referred to as ‘Laaiplek See Produkte and 59 others versus the Minister of Environmental Affairs and 169 others’, started in the Cape High Court in December 1998. On 22nd of April 1999, judgement was passed against the Minister. The Court ruled that the new Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 required the Minister to enforce the criteria of the old Quota Board, that had been dissolved, for up to six months after the new act had been passed (Rippenaar 1999; Republic of South Africa 1998a: Section 85). Furthermore, the Constitution obliged the government to negotiate the transformation with the existing stakeholders (O’Riordan 1999), which in practice meant that redistribution of quota allocations had to be negotiated with the large fishing companies. The policy makers had “forgotten” to consult important stakeholders. The outcome was that the new entrants had their newly allocated quotas withdrawn, and the settlement gave back the quotas to the established fishing companies and individuals.

Because of the following chaotic conditions in the fishing industry after the Cape High Court ruling, and fear of similar court actions, the Minister was unable to award new quotas for other species. Deep-sea hake and pelagic fishing stopped completely (Le May 1999b). The media reported that in Mossel Bay in the Eastern Cape, about 700 employees on trawlers and factory workers were directly affected. Six months after the judgement, many catching and operating licences had not been issued to the fishing industry, and licences for at least 16 fish species were still not issued (Le May 1999a). According to the newspaper Sunday Times, the disagreement over fishing quotas were estimated to cost the industry R3 million a day in the period when fishing was stopped. The longline hake fishery lost one fishing season after the Chief Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management failed to reallocate quotas for an
estimated value of R46 million. A total of approximately R2 million in legal fees was incurred by all parties (Schoonakker 2000a). All this meant that fishers and fish factory workers lost millions in salaries. Politically, this may have cost the ANC a substantial number of votes in the fishing communities of the Western Cape, and may even have cost the party the election in the province, which was won by the opposition. Not all of this can be ascribed to the lack of consulting the stakeholders, but it proves the importance of involving stakeholders when decisions are made.

In the aftermath of the court ruling, the Deputy Minister criticised the court for making its findings on purely technical grounds. According to him, the courts did not judge according to the intention of the law, and had paid no attention to what the department wanted to achieve with the new law (Yeld 1999). This assessment finds support in Beetham (1991, in Jentoft 2000b). The argument is that the law is no more than a first step, because rules cannot justify themselves simply by being rules, but require justification by reference to considerations that lie beyond them. As such, a legal framework is not a sufficient condition for a legitimate fisheries management regime. The management system must pass a legal test, but the law must also be examined with reference to overarching concerns and standards. To be legitimate, a management system must be justified according to a set of moral principles and values. If a management system cannot be defended on grounds of social justice, it is likely to be challenged, no matter how solid the legal and written foundations are found to be (Jentoft 2000c). However, the text of the Marine Living Resources Act 1998 was clear. Huge values were at stake for established companies, and it proved overly optimistic to expect the established quota holders and big business to act according to social principles of redistribution, when they faced a decimation of their basis of existence. The long-term goals of the established industry were underpinned by national and international market access gained through many years, and the need to provide security for their large workforce of fishers and supportive workers. With the new policy, big business experienced insecurities and unpredictability, which influenced their operation planning procedures (Cockroft and Payne 1999). As Du Plessis (1999) in the newspaper Cape Argus states:

“You might find that a completely healthy quota owner with a lot of invested capital this year, sits without quota next year. Not the kind of industry I’d like to invest in right now.”
In the eyes of big business, the way of implementing the fisheries policy did not encourage sustainable fishing operations.

4.3.4 Legitimacy

During apartheid, the legitimacy of the state was low among most South Africans, but it was expected to increase with the implementation of the democratically elected government in 1994. However, according to a national survey conducted by Statistics South Africa in October 1999, covering 30000 households around the country, there was a general sense of political disempowerment among people. Fifty-eight per cent of all households believed that they had no say in decisions affecting the country, and more than half of the households believed they had no say in decisions affecting their community (Cape Argus 2000).

Due to the unrest around the quota redistribution policy, the state had lost legitimacy among certain groups of actors in the fishing industry. After the court case, the state tried to regain legitimacy. Early in 1999, big business company executives, trade unions and fishers pressed for the removal of Dr. Jordan, the Minister of Environmental Affairs responsible for fisheries management at the time. The opposition claimed that the new quota system had become a vote-catching ploy for the ANC. Moreover, many of the people and organisations dissatisfied with Dr. Jordan’s performance were traditional ANC supporters. Fishing industry representatives claimed that Dr. Jordan had not bothered to familiarise himself with the fishing industry and often displayed an astonishing ignorance of it. This impression was consolidated by the fact that he had lost the court case, which temporarily paralysed further action for transforming the fishing industry because of fear of new court cases. The legal battles cost the department millions of rands in legal expenses, in addition to a considerable loss of face. In June 1999, Dr. Jordan was omitted from President Mbeki’s new cabinet, and since he had been a prominent ANC figure, the media speculated that he lost his job over the fishing quota issues. By not giving him the confidence to carry on as Minister, the state signalled that it wanted better performance from responsible politicians, and that it wanted to regain legitimacy (Le May 1999c).

Legitimacy fluctuated at the community level. The fact that a redistribution of quotas actually happened led to increased state legitimacy among small-scale fishers, even though the decision was revoked by the court case. Right after the quotas had been distributed, but before
the court case, one of the new entrants to the commercial fisheries put it this way:

“Our attitude [towards the government] changes all the time. If you had asked a couple of months ago, I would have told you that we were thinking about [intensifying the struggle for our rights]. Now, however, we know that the system works and that we received our quota, so now we believe in the system. The quota is not big, but it is a start.”26

A few weeks later, this same informant was disappointed and disillusioned after the quota had been withdrawn due to the Court’s ruling. Fishers who did not have commercial access rights had to buy recreational and seasonal fishing rights in order to be able to fish legally. Fishing rights were expensive to the small-scale fishers. A permit to fish from a boat cost between R50 and R100 per season. The prices of the permits had increased, for example did a permit for catching the fish species hottentot cost R35 and a mussel permit R50. The informants explained that a fisher needs three to four permits for one season. The daily limit for catching crayfish had been reduced from five to four. This arrangement created dissatisfaction, as expressed by one informant:

“I am very disappointed. I believed in the promises made before the elections. But now everything is worse – and more expensive.”27

Many of the informants perceived that the management system was unfair, and that some fishers simply had to poach:

“Nowadays, we must have permits for everything. This new system is creating criminals.”28

A corresponding perception was that the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 did not benefit the small-scale fishers. The quote below exemplifies this perception:

______________________________
27 Interview with fisher from Ocean View, crewmember.
28 Group interview, fishers from Ocean View.
“Sea Fisheries [MCM] does not do a good job for us the artisanal fishermen. They can improve their performance by cutting more from the big ...[business actors] and give to the small guys.”

Such perceptions have negative influence on the legitimacy of the state and the fisheries policy decision makers. One consequence of that is illustrated in the following: In February 2000, approximately 300 members of the Food and Allied Workers Union protested outside the Parliament, calling for an end to what they called a corrupt and criminalizing fishing quota system. They carried banners and placards proclaiming “Fishing rights for fishermen, not businessmen”, “Give quotas to real fishermen” and “Protect fishermen’s rights to earn a living”, and they argued that the quota allocations were crippling the industry. In the same month around 3000 commercial fishers from the Western Cape took to the streets in Cape Town to demand government action against the chaotic state of fishing quota allocations and the failure to open up the industry to previously disadvantaged fishers (West 2000a).

In sum, the overall legitimacy of the South African policy was low, in that people believed that they had little influence. The informants were yet not inclined to trust that the policy reform would benefit them. After a quick appearance, legitimacy crumbled away in the fishing communities.

4.4 Small-scale fishers: Issues and challenges

4.4.1 Capacity of organising

The reformed fisheries policy encouraged the fishers to organise in order to get resource access. However, this was easier said than done, as the legacy of apartheid had left an imprint that hampered peoples’ capacity of organising. Western Cape fishers are generally coloured. During the apartheid system, the Western Cape coloureds fell between the politics of the white minority and the black majority. They did not have a history of organising into political pressure groups. From its formation in 1910 and until 1994, the South African state practised a constitutionally entrenched racism, whereby the majority of the population was excluded from formal aspects of political life, and was denied most other civil rights. The systematic and formalised repression of South African people meant that many people were restricted

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29 Interview, fisher from Ocean View, non-owner, crewmember.
from organising. The policy of denying full citizenship to the black majority was elaborated and strengthened into apartheid by the National Party in 1948. Tens of millions of black Africans living in South Africa were classified not as South African nationals, but as belonging to one of ten ethnic homelands which would eventually become independent (O’Meara 1996). The Group Area Act from 1950 systematised the restriction of ownership and occupation of land in proclaimed areas to specified population groups. It disfavoured blacks, uprooted communities, destroyed businesses and left property rights to the discretion of a single government minister, administrative functionaries or local municipalities. Traditional communities were destroyed through forced removals, and certain areas were declared for whites only. The Western Cape was designated a Coloured Preference Area, and black Africans were removed from urban and rural areas to resettlement camps and townships, located especially in the Eastern Cape and remote rural areas. One consequence of, and probably the rationale behind, these political manoeuvres of forcing groups of people together, were distorted community structures and thus distortion of community actors’ ability to co-operate and organise (Asmal et al. 1996).

When apartheid ended, the coloured community was split. One group continued to side with the oppressed. Another group sided with its former oppressors, voting for the National Party, suspicious that a black-led government would neglect the coloureds and unconvinced that the ANC would represent their interests. As a consequence, in contrast to the rest of South Africa, the National Party retained control of Western Cape in 1994 with 53.3 per cent of the vote, against the ANC’s 33 per cent. The voters consisted of conservative whites and the coloured working class (Venter 1997; Van Niekerk and Ludman 1999). Coloured voters provided one-third of all votes cast for the National Party (Marais 1998).

The main rationale for fishers to organise was to get quota access, but the above indicates that organising is a challenging undertaking. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the rationale of establishing fishers’ organisations was to get quotas. However, the conditions for organising and working towards a common goal were not the best. It would be especially

30 Thirteen per cent of South African territory was reserved as homelands for 75 per cent of the population, and 3.5 million people were moved from the land they occupied (Venter 1997).
31 The only area where the National Party could count on grown electoral support in recent years was within the coloured community. Its only growth potential was in the areas where the coloured voters are numerous, which are the provinces of the Western Cape and the Northern Cape (Venter 1997; Van Niekerk and Ludman 1999).
challenging when whites, coloureds and blacks were to be members of the same organisations. The process of organising would depend much on the incentives and follow-up from the state, and on the organisations’ leadership.

4.4.2 Formal quota application procedures and the role of organisational entrepreneurs

Since the commercial fisheries were regulated mainly by the quota system, access to a quota was the main entry ticket for the fishers to participate in the fisheries. Fishing rights were allocated based on an application to the Minister, who decided how many rights to allocate in total and how much fish to allocate to each permit holder, which could be either of those groups or companies referred to earlier, i.e. individuals employing people, co-operatives, shareholding companies or closed companies. All rights granted were to be valid for a period not exceeding 15 years (Republic of South Africa 1998a). Hersoug (2002b) explains that most fishing rights in South Africa are granted for a period of four years, after having been granted on an annual basis in 1999, 2000 and 2001.

The authorities requested multiple pieces of information from the applicants to prove their eligibility for a quota, such as current fishing capability and whether they had access to the technology required to the species applied for. Applicants had to substantiate their intention to create employment and outline details of labour practices (Republic of South Africa 1997). In the White Paper on the Marine Fisheries Policy, labour practices were emphasised:

“Holders of fishing rights will provide acceptable conditions of employment for all employees with respect to income, health and safety, training, job security, retirement and other employment benefits” (Republic of South Africa 1997: 14)

“A culture should be encouraged where labour is seen not merely as a cost of production but as mankind with the dignity it entails.” (Republic of South Africa 1997: 42)

Applicants without access to appropriate means of production were required to prove capability of acquiring such capacity within two years of obtaining a right, as stated in the ‘Interim selection criteria and guidelines for the granting of fishing rights in terms of the Marine Living Resources Act (1998)’. To facilitate this, fishers were allowed to sell their first time quota to build up financial assets to invest in production means. Other information to be
included in the quota applications were details of geographical representation and documentation of the applicants’ historical involvement and past performance in the fisheries.

The requirements made the quota application procedures rather complicated for new quota applicants. Applying for quotas entailed extensive paperwork, which was much to demand from previously disadvantaged, who for a multitude of reasons lacked the skills to administer the amount of information required, let alone to fulfil with the formal criteria of the application procedure. O’Riordan (1999) contended that the requirement of applicants to establish commercial companies with business and marketing plans placed the sector in a straightjacket, where quotas would be awarded only to certain types of company structures. Companies and organisations that aligned to the policy were created. The competition for quotas was hard, and many applicants would need assistance with the formal procedures. A common practice was that quota applicants outsourced the application process in order to make sure that all criteria of the applications and business plans were complied with. This created a new range of employment for consultants and lawyers, who charged R2000-R10000 for their services.

The individuals who set up the different organisations often became the organisations’ leaders, whom I refer to as organisational entrepreneurs. In theories of the firm, as synthesised by Ostrom (1990), entrepreneurs recognise an opportunity that may generate profits, and may strategically interlink with other actors. Barth (1972, in Gilje and Grim 1995) defines an entrepreneur as a profit-seeking innovator, searching for new ways of interacting and trading. Entrepreneurs can also have roles as agents for creating and mobilising social capital (Neace 1999). Johannisson and Nilsson (1989) introduced the term community entrepreneurs, who have obligations in terms of facilitating and supporting the undertaking of activities of the business entrepreneurs and nurturing the networking capabilities of other actors. The concept of organisational entrepreneur includes actors who take advantage of the new opportunities following the reformed policies, who position themselves and eventually mobilise other actors and create organisations in order to gain resource access. Ideally, organisational entrepreneurs embody the properties of both community entrepreneurs and business entrepreneurs. Thus they are left with the challenging and demanding task of striving to achieve socio-economic development through, for example, generating employment at the same time as securing business profits. The organisational entrepreneur is positioned between the state and the grassroots, and may take on some of the state’s responsibilities, facilitating power sharing
between the state and the grassroots. Figure 3 below illustrates the positioning of the organisational entrepreneurs:

The state at the top level is represented by the Chief Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management. By establishing the legal framework, the state defines the formal institutions and opportunities for different groups of actors to exploit the fish resource. The state has the power to allocate the fishing rights and quotas. The small-scale fishers are at the bottom level, and the fishers’ organisations, headed by the organisational entrepreneurs, form the link between the fishers and the state. The state allocates quotas to the organisational entrepreneurs, according to the fulfilment of quota application criteria. In the figure, the
organisational entrepreneurs are stereotyped as community development oriented or business- and profit oriented. These are the ideal-types and the extremes of a continuum. The organisational entrepreneurs fall in between the need and desire to make profits according to commercial requirements, and the obligation to work for the socio-economic benefit of the communities. This is a demanding task, as the community development entrepreneurs also must invest and make a profit. The arrows in Figure 3 illustrate flows between the different levels: flows of quotas, information, expectations, legitimacy, and trust. The state entrusted fisheries management responsibilities to the organisations, and in order to function well, the organisations depended on having legitimacy both among the fishers and with the state in order to fulfil their role. The dotted horizontal line between the level of the organisational entrepreneur and the grassroots level illustrates the filter that may hinder and influence some of the flows. In practice, this means that the organisational entrepreneurs are positioned so that they have the possibility of filtering and monopolising information and quotas.

To sum up, organisations were created for the purpose of achieving quotas. The quota application procedures can prove challenging and difficult for marginalised small-scale fishers, and they need to affiliate to an organisation in order to have quota access, unless they are able to create their own company. The organisational entrepreneurs who represent the organisations have a powerful position, first and foremost opposite the small-scale fishers, but also towards the state, as the state to a certain extent depends on them to undertake fisheries management tasks in the form of access distribution.

### 4.4.3 Paper quotas

For many informants, the opportunities that were provided by the policy reform were synonymous with the possibilities of getting a quota. A common saying was that “if you get a quota, you get rich.” The new entrants could use the allocated quota to invest in production means in order to be able to exploit a quota within a two-year period. As it turned out, several of the new applicants lacked the financial means or practical skills to make use of their quotas in a profitable manner, and failed to use the incentive of using the first quota as investment in production means. The fieldwork material reflects a practice described by Jentoft (2000b), that Individual Transferable Quotas can easily be sold out of the community to which it has been allocated. The issue of paper quotas quickly became a source of controversy (Schoonakker 2000b). A paper quota is a quota that a quota-owner sells instead of working.
Big business representatives pointed to the paradox of the practice of paper quotas, and how it undermined the process of redistributing quotas. One example reported in the newspaper Sunday Argus was the Lusitania company, which together with three other big companies, Premier, Oceana, and Hout Bay Fishing Industries, formed the South Coast Rock Lobster Associations and spent R7 million buying back quotas from new entrants (Schoonakker 2000a, b). In October 1999 the companies Sea Harvest and Irvine & Johnson complained to the Chief Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management over the quota allocation to three front companies denoting other industry players. allocations were made specifying the quota holders as new entrants to the market, even though they were linked to established companies (Merten 1999). While established businesses complained, they were also criticised for buying up these quotas instead of making an effort to assist new companies, for example by going into joint ventures (Doonan 2000). Others criticised the new small-quota holders for not taking responsibility for being innovative about how to use the new opportunities, such as pooling their quotas to make them viable (Bennet 1999).

The question of how to get a quota had a tendency to overshadow the concern of how quotas could be put to use to benefit the marginalised fishers. One informant in Lambert’s Bay put it this way:

“People in this community connect quotas with chequebooks. But this is wrong. It is important that the fishermen see job creation in relation to the quotas, not only money.”

Another informant in Lambert’s Bay agreed to this statement, but saw it from the perspective of the fishers:

“Those who want to sell [their quota], think short term. They have suffered for many years, so one must look at this in various respects.”

As part of the first round of quota redistribution, the Lambert’s Bay Fishing Company’s quota for west coast rock lobster was cut for the 1998/1999 season, and a share equivalent of their

32 Interview with leader of a small business, Lambert’s Bay.
33 Interview with fisher from Lambert’s Bay.
reduced quota was redistributed to other Lambert’s Bay quota applicants. The total value of quotas in Lambert’s Bay was estimated to approximately R21 million for the 1998/99 season. However, not all of it remained in the community. Quotas and catches were sold out of the community, and thus, much of the potential benefits in terms of value adding and employment creation were not realised.\footnote{This is based on information from different informants, including the General Manager of the Lambert’s Bay Fishing Company, and the mayor of Lambert’s Bay.} One argument for selling the quota out of the community was that the largest local fish plant paid less for the catches than other fish plants further south on the coast. The former would pay R30 per kilo, while down the coast, for instance in Elandsbaai, fishers could obtain R34 per kilo. According to the management of a local fish plant, the company was not prepared to offer a higher price.

In sum, paper quotas turned out to be a problem, as the quotas represented a potential source for quick money for those who acquired a quota at the expense of long term planning and job-creation. It was counterproductive to the intentions behind the policy. While the quota applications were formulated according to the criteria, it turned out that the implementation of what was stated in the quota applications was at the discretion of those who received the quotas.

\section*{4.4.4 The case of an organisation: The South African Commercial Fishermen Corporation}

In order to have quota access, small-scale fishers must be affiliated to organisations that are set up according to the quota application criteria. The main focus in this section is on the South African Commercial Fishermen Corporation (SACFC), which became operational in November 1998. The SACFC encouraged the set-up of and acted as the umbrella for 24 locally affiliated co-operatives in communities in the Western and Eastern Cape, including Ocean View, Lambert’s Bay and Hout Bay.

In line with the policy guidelines, the SACFC argued that the needs of marginalised fishing industry actors and their communities could be met by creating companies that align to market principles, but demonstrate strong social obligation towards their constituencies.\footnote{Interview with Leader Group SACFC, 1998.} The objective of the SACFC was to become the largest employer in South African fishing
industry. Among its strategies were to set up local affiliations along the whole coast of South Africa, enter into joint ventures with bigger fishing companies, and invest in other types of businesses. Another idea was to invest in tourism and hiking trails, with the objective of creating income generating activities for women, along with plans of setting up a clothing factory for women in Lambert’s Bay, and bursaries for fishers’ children. There were prospects of creating an international, southern African network of fishery workers. The social profile included supporting fishers who were unable to work, as well as widows of fishers.\textsuperscript{36} Throughout the duration of the fieldwork, this remained plans.

In order to increase the chances of getting quotas, the organisations’ local level representatives (i.e. local level organisational entrepreneurs) recruited as many fishers as possible in the different communities. Many fishers signed up as members of local co-operatives. They had to submit personal information such as their ID-numbers, pay membership fees that varied between R2 and R100, and sign a membership form as proof of membership to be attached to the organisation’s quota application. A membership criterion was to be an active bona fide fisher earning less than R1500 per month.\textsuperscript{37} The SACFC became a large organisation in relatively short time. By 2000, its administration employed 15 people. There were no exact figures of affiliated fishers at the time I did fieldwork; different sources gave different figures and the co-ops had lists of members. The SACFC claimed to have a total of 3000-3800 members. The number of members in Ocean View was between 160 and 200, recruited from Ocean View and the neighbouring communities of white-dominated Kommetjie, and the township Masiphumelele. There were 130-200 members in Lambert’s Bay, and 200-350 in Hout Bay.

Each of the 24 local co-operatives was to have a board of between five and nine members, who were to appoint a managing director to serve on the Advisory Committee of the SACFC. This Advisory Committee was supposed to meet monthly to discuss matters of importance to their constituencies and the SACFC. I was allowed to be an observer at different occasions when the SACFC had meetings with local fishers, also at an Advisory Committee meeting. In Ocean View I attended a local co-operative meeting, and another meeting for the local leaders. Observing gave me some insight into how fishers interacted and participated, and

\textsuperscript{36} Interview with Leader Group SACFC, 1998.
\textsuperscript{37} Interview with Leader Group SACFC, 1998.
how they were represented. In Lambert’s Bay there were no formal meetings when I was there, and presumably these had not taken place for some time.

To ensure compliance with the policy criteria, expertise such as lawyers had assisted in establishing the SACFC and preparing its quota applications. All of the application criteria were complied with. The application included a detailed business-plan with a list of members and their signatures. The members would be employees and thus benefit from the quotas. The SACFC applied for quotas on behalf of the 24 co-operatives, and in late 1998 they were allocated 130 tons of crayfish, twenty tons of abalone, fifty tons of hake longline, and forty squid permits. The intention was to apportion these quotas among the local co-operatives, and the SACFC informed the local co-operatives about this. The quotas were withdrawn due to the court case. Due to the standstill and insecurity because of the court case, the SACFC had to pass on counter-information, the basic message being that not many decisions could be made anyway since the quota had been withdrawn. In a newsletter to the local co-operatives, the SACFC wrote:

“Unfortunately, the 1998/1999 allocation of 130 ton of crayfish to SACFC was not harvested due to a court action brought by those who reaped the sea wealth for years in the past... This hindered SACFC seriously in its attempts to create employment opportunities.”

The business principle of the SACFC co-operatives was intended to reward each member’s effort. The idea was that each individual member kept a book for catches, so that “you earn what you catch”. The surplus was to be used to invest in means of production in the co-operative. Some of the informants were sceptical to and dissatisfied with this system. They were not pleased with their individual prospective revenues, and they were not convinced that it would benefit them in the future. The following quote illustrates the unease expressed by many informants:

“The fishers are to get R14 per kilo for crayfish they catch from the co-op. The guys are unhappy with this price. They would have been happy with R20 per kilo. The co-

38 Personal information civil servant MCM, 1998.
40 Personal communication with Leader Group SACFC, 1998.
This is a classic dilemma in co-operatives: Should the bulk of the profit be invested or should it be dispersed among the members? These informants saw that the co-operative paid them less for the catch than they could receive by selling to factories or restaurants (which they were not legally entitled to anyway). The informants expressed scepticism and were hesitant to trust that the business principles of investing the surplus would benefit them. What was important to some of the informants was to improve their situation now. This can be related to the expectations created both by the ANC election promises and by the organisational entrepreneurs, when recruiting fishers to the organisations. The fishers were yet not willing to trust that their efforts would render future benefits. A point some informants made was that they had waited long enough for the policy to be changed to their advantage, and they were not inclined to wait any longer:

“What is short term and long term? What does it mean to the fishermen? In a year I could be dead, so what is a short, and medium and long term?”

The SACFC was a young organisation, and it had not yet been able to perform to the satisfaction of the expectant and impatient informants. This also illustrates a deep scepticism towards co-operative models, which is quite common worldwide, as pointed out by Jentoft (1989). The lack of confidence accompanied speculations around corruption:

“Basically, the co-op is the right thing, but now there is too much corruption and nepotism... There are different rules for different people.”

The interviews with fishers affiliated to the SACFC, especially the Ocean View informants, revealed a topic of controversy and insecurity related to the pressure to work exclusively for the organisation. This was a problem for informants who worked at the local fish processing plant. Since the plant also was a quota applicant, it was a competitor to the SACFC. The local

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41 Interview with fisher from Ocean View.
42 Fisher and factory worker from Ocean View, during group interview.
43 Interview with fisher and factory worker from Ocean View.
organisational entrepreneurs had recruited these fishers when they established the co-operative. After the co-operative was set up, they felt that they were being pressured to leave the other job. They understood the rationale behind this demand, but were hesitant to let go of their relative secure, albeit fluctuating income at the plant, while at the same time they were eager to be part of the organisation. The following quote from an informant illustrates the dilemma:

“I am a member of the co-op, but the co-op does not worry about the people in the factory. The others get cross because the factory has a quota. I feel that our names were used by the co-op, also the names of the guys at the factory. I used to go to the meetings [of the co-operative], but now there are too many arguments because we are in the factory. Most people from the factory stay away from the co-op meetings.”

This was a problem recognised also by other organisations and companies. An organisational entrepreneur of a Cape Town-based fishing business tried to make sure that his 20 employees worked exclusively for his organisation. He believed that this was conducive to the establishment of a strong and coherent organisational structure that would have good chances of succeeding in future quota applications. The Lambert’s Bay fishers were not preoccupied with this to the same extent, but the director of the Lambert’s Bay Fishing Company expressed scepticism about employees belonging to new organisations, as they would become future competitors. Although it was not a problem at the time, it was a potential conflict issue.

4.4.5 Organisation in-house adherence to democratic principles
Jentoft (2000c) says that the test of success for a particular management design is whether or not members of an organisation continue to show up at meetings and support the process when decisions are made, even though they have experienced disappointments. In order to include and involve members in the internal dynamics of the organisation, there are few other options than to arrange member meetings. The SACFC arranged meetings at different levels of the organisation. My interviews revealed that informants had different perceptions as to

44 Interview with fisher from Ocean View.
45 Interview with the leader of a Cape Town-based fisher organisation.
46 Interview with the general manager of the Lambert’s Bay Fishing Company.
whether local co-operatives and meetings were democratic, inclusive, and participatory, and that informants belonging to the same co-operatives did not necessarily share perceptions. Some were of the opinion that the organisation allowed them to talk freely and that they were heard at meetings, and the co-operatives made decisions by consensus. Others claimed that they did not have influence, and that the leaders made decisions without consulting the members. The following quotes illustrate some of the more discouraging perceptions among the fishers interviewed:

“When the fishermen express disagreement, they get the message that if they are not happy, they can leave the organisation. There is no democracy... The fishermen are only told about the process, about what is going on, but they do not have a say in the decision-making process.”

“The co-op rules are made by the directors, and there is no voting in the co-op meetings. The co-op members do not have a say in decision-making.”

Some of the SACFC administration representatives also expressed scepticism to how the organisation was run; they were critical to how fishers were represented, and sceptical to the expansion plans for the organisation. It was perceived that there was little consultation, both within the leader group, and downward to local co-operatives and to members in the different communities. One SACFC administrative employee cancelled an interview appointment I had with him as I got there. He was clearing his desk and proclaimed that he was leaving the organisation. He explained that he did not approve of how the organisation’s policy objectives had developed, and his perception was that there was a lack of commitment to the grassroots. His opinion was that the plans of expanding both geographically and in sectors other than fisheries were contradictory to the objectives of uplifting communities and empowering people, at least within a short-term perspective.

In Lambert’s Bay, there was a low frequency of meetings in the local co-operative, among other factors due to contention, conflict and competition for the leader position. Mr. N and Mr. T had been competing for the local co-operative leader position since the initiation of the

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47 Fisher and factory worker from Ocean View.
48 Fisher and factory worker from Ocean View.
49 However, his leaving could have been a personal conflict, rather than a matter of consciousness, because he returned a few weeks later when the top leader of the organisation resigned.
SACFC. Mr. N had appointed himself as the leader of the local affiliation, something Mr. T also had tried to do. In a letter to the leadership of the SACFC, around 30 fishers had signed as a proof that they preferred Mr. N to Mr. T. In the aftermath of this cockfighting, there were accusations of corruption and stealing; discrepancies in the Lambert’s Bay co-operative books were reported, indicating that Mr. N. had been cheating the company. The conflict between them created unrest among the members of the Lambert’s Bay co-operative, and eventually, the SACFC leadership lost patience. The conflict was on the agenda of the SACFC Advisory Committee meeting in January 1999 (more on this on page 120), whereby the Advisory Committee suspended both Mr. N and Mr. T from the SACFC.

Regarding the purpose of local level co-operative meetings, informants who had attended some of the previous meetings in Lambert’s Bay expressed scepticism, and had difficulties grasping the purpose of the meetings:

“\textit{I attend meetings. I go when Mr. N says there is a meeting. The meetings are very noisy, there is a lot of talking but nothing is very organised. The fishermen argue too much. No problems are solved at the meetings.}”\textsuperscript{50}

Meetings at local community level were often interrupted by unruly attendants:

“\textit{Meetings are not fun. There are a lot of arguments and drunken fishermen. It is difficult to quiet them down.}”\textsuperscript{51}

When asked what the noise and arguments were about, most informants referred to the controversies around quota allocations. However, not all of the informants had a gloomy picture of the situation:

“\textit{The meetings are very unorganised. But I still think the co-op is good for the fishermen, it will be good to solve problems.}”\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with retired fisher from Lambert’s Bay, not owner, active fisher when the co-op was started.  
\textsuperscript{51} Fisher from Ocean View.  
\textsuperscript{52} Informant from Lambert’s Bay.
Coherence among fishers is important for organising. It will partly depend on whether fishers themselves believe that they are able to collaborate successfully in organisations. To my question whether they thought there was a collaborative potential in the communities, informants expressed more pessimism than optimism. I asked why it seemed so difficult to agree on a strategy towards a common goal. One of the explanations coincides with South African history and policy of split-and-rule that has made it difficult to organise. The following quote by an Ocean View informant is illustrative:

“The coloured people never stood together in the past, therefore they never made anything. They were looking to themselves, and people were not fighting together to reach one aim. But the co-op is a positive thing, now people stand together. They solve problems together.”\(^{53}\)

Lambert’s Bay informants were not overly convinced about their local organisation’s potential:

“People fight about the quotas... I don’t think the fishermen can stand together, they just argue.”\(^{54}\)

Ocean View informants also reported disagreements and discussions at the meetings:

“In the co-op meetings, fishermen argue about money, quotas and other members’ income.”\(^{55}\)

Nevertheless, Ocean View interviewees were overall more convinced than their Lambert’s Bay colleagues that organising was the way to prosper:

“I think the co-op will be to my benefit. One must give it three-four years to see how it really works to benefit the people.”\(^{56}\)

\(^{53}\) Fisher from Ocean View, crew.  
\(^{54}\) Retired fisher from Lambert’s Bay, not owner.  
\(^{55}\) Fisher from Ocean View, non-owner.  
\(^{56}\) Fisher from Ocean View, non-owner, on-and-off factory worker.
This was at the local level. At a higher organisational level, meetings were seen as a way to introduce fishers’ to participation. At the SACFC Advisory Committee meeting held in Hout Bay on 23rd of January 1999, there were approximately 30 observers including myself, the others mostly local fishers. Some attended drunk, and created noise and expressed disagreement, discontentment and contempt, interfering and interrupting with the agenda of the meeting. One of the leaders of the SACFC told me that such meetings were a learning process of participation and inclusion, for the fishers as well as for the staff of the SACFC. The meeting was in the “spirit of democracy”, and therefore, the fishers were entitled to know what was going on. He believed that suspending unruly participants from the meeting would do little good; it would be detrimental to the legitimacy of the organisation, and to the process itself. This finds resonance in literature on empowerment and participatory democracy. Pateman (1970, in Jentoft 2005), say that participatory democracy is also in itself a learning process, and is best learned through participation. Jentoft (2005) continues by saying that it takes practice for users to learn how to become competent and effective co-managers. This includes to learn how to prepare for meetings, how to argue, and how to listen and respect other opinions.

In June 2000, a year after my fieldwork had ended, the newspaper Cape Argus reported that some of the 24 co-operatives decided to cut their ties to the SACFC umbrella organisation. Some members asserted that the fishing quotas granted since 1998 yielded R15 million a year, but that the members did not benefit. One by one, conflicts surfaced both in the SACFC centrally and in some of the local co-operatives, related to how the umbrella organisation was run, and to the fact that members felt cheated. The newspaper Cape Argus reported that many co-operative members were frustrated and disappointed because the SACFC had not kept to its promises to attend the members’ needs for socio-economic improvements; its actions resembled any other profit-driven business, not directed towards benefiting the fishers (Le May 2000c). For example, the SACFC moved its office from the busy Hout Bay harbour, to inland Cape Town-suburb Wynberg, and was no longer physically close to where many fishers worked and spent their time. Thus, it had become less approachable to their members. The accumulated dissatisfaction eventually led to violent encounters. Cape Argus reported that in the middle of a meeting called by the SACFC to vote formally on decisions taken earlier by the co-operatives at separate meetings, a busload of angry fishers came from the townships Khayelitsha and Guguletu. They stormed the company’s office in Wynberg and assaulted two directors. The office was trashed and a vehicle was stolen (Le May 2000c).
Some of the discontented members eventually left the organisation, and created a new organisation. The new organisation’s spokesman emphasised that they intended to shift the focus from expanding the organisation based on business principles to development for people at the grassroots. The breakaway group set up a small business, and invested R7000 on advice from lawyers and payments for applications for fishing quotas for west coast rock lobster, longline hake, perlemoen, anchovy, and licences for white mussels and commercial linefish (Le May and Lestrade 2000).

To sum up, in-house democracy of the organisations seemed to suffer from conflicts, power imbalances between different groups of stakeholders, lack of coherency and lack of communication and understanding of common goals. However, there was an understanding among organisational entrepreneurs at head quarter level that the organisation had to go through a demanding learning process requiring patience and acceptance of a wide range of actor and behaviours.

4.4.6 Possible adverse agendas of organisational entrepreneurs
This section draws on fieldwork material related to the SACFC and other fisher organisations, and demonstrates that there can be a delicate balance between working for the collective benefit as a mediator between the state and the grassroots, and using this position to attend to other agendas. Experiences from the fieldwork and incidents reported in the media revealed that the temptation of attending to a private agenda could be hard to resist for some organisational entrepreneurs. When arriving in Lambert’s Bay for the first time, the research assistant and I asked around for the local leader or representative for the small-scale fishers, and several people mentioned Mr. N. We introduced ourselves to him and informed him about the purpose of the research, whereby he offered to assist us. He repeatedly emphasised his dedication to community work, and said that:

“My vision and my mission are to take the fisheries further. I will form a corporation to take the fishermen out of the situation they are in now. Now they basically do not have the right to fish.”

This sounded convincing. Nevertheless, it contradicts his unwillingness to disperse the easy-
to-understand summary of the White Paper on the Marine Fisheries Policy to local small-scale fishers (see page 100). Other episodes were puzzling, nurturing our doubt about his agenda. He soon asked us to bring a camera and accompany him around the community, because we were to visit typical fisher households. He took us around to impoverished households. One was a tiny shed in a backyard, and he asked us to take pictures of the man living in the shed. Mr. N told this man that his picture was to be in a big newspaper, so that the world could see the bad conditions of the community. Taken aback, we afterwards explained to Mr. N. that he could not use us like that, and that as students we had nothing to offer. He appeared to understand and agree. The next house he took us to was inhabited by three elderly people, living under miserable and unhygienic conditions. To our astonishment, without a sign of embarrassment, he told them that he had managed to bring us to Lambert’s Bay to take pictures to put in the newspaper, in order to help them. After some time and more knowledge about Lambert’s Bay, we realised that the people he took us to probably lived under the worst conditions in the community. This could be termed “social pornography”. While it was an unpleasant experience, it is useful for illustrating how some actors may make use of unconventional means to keep a face as a powerful person in the community. One possible rationale for Mr N was that he wanted to give people an impression of himself as an influential man who would use his power to their benefit, and that he was able to get outsiders (in this case, “journalists”) to the community to serve this purpose.

There were other ways organisational entrepreneurs could use their position and power. Several informants referred to episodes of organisation leaders having “forgotten” their obligations as employers once the organisation had received a quota. Fishers who in quota applications were listed as employees and beneficiaries were simply eliminated from the list of the organisation to which they had signed their name. This was not at all a new practice, and some of the organisational entrepreneurs had themselves been exposed to the same practice previously. Mr. N of Lambert’s Bay showed us correspondence with his lawyer, regarding a similar case. One of the leaders in the SACFC head quarters explained how he two years earlier had been included in an established company owned by white people in order for the company to comply with the empowerment requirements of the policy. When the company got a quota, he had been deleted from the list of beneficiaries. He was resourceful enough to hire a lawyer to pursue the case, but there had been no progress.

Another example of the practice of kicking people out of the organisation was found in the
Hout Bay Widows of Fishermen’s Association, reported by Lilford (1999) in the Sentinel News. The organisation was formed in 1997 by Ms. D and had approximately 50 members. The organisation received a five-ton crayfish quota in 1997/1998, and for the following season, the association was allocated a quota of 3½ tons. At the time of my fieldwork, this was an issue of controversies and conflicts, and members of the association accused each other of corruption. Many of the women alleged they had been cheated, and there was a high level of confusion about what was going on in the leadership group. One member was quoted by Lilford in the Sentinel News (1999):

“We just don’t know what is going on... There are no meetings. We can’t get Ms. A and Ms. B to meet with us. Mr C, Ms. A’s son, has given up his job to work the quota which he is telling people is his mother’s quota.”

Ms. A and Ms. B, and Ms. A’s son, Mr C, had taken control of the association and hired a lawyer who secured their legal rights to do so, without the knowledge of the members. The founder of the organisation, Ms. D, claimed that her legal rights with respect to leadership of the association were taken away, and that there had been no meeting to discuss her firing. Ms. D said that when money from the quota started to flow into the bank, she was told by Ms. A and Ms. B that she was no longer a director. The members of Hout Bay Widows of Fishermen’s Association claimed that they had not been informed about this, and they felt cheated. The source of the conflicts was obviously about money. Some of the women received a R1000 payoff before Christmas 1998, and were suspended from the organisation immediately afterwards. The amount of R200000 earned from the 1998 crayfish quota was half of what the association should and could have gotten, according to some of the women. They accused the company that worked the quota for them of taking advantage of the confusion in their association and paying them less than the going rate (Lilford 1999).

The MCM was aware of this practice of “kicking people out”57. One local MCM civil servant in Lambert’s Bay was of the opinion that the new quota system had split the fishers, and that the most deprived actors often ended up being cheated. He was concerned that many people were exploited, as kicking people out once a quota had been allocated to a company was not an uncommon practice. One explanation for why this practice could continue was that the

57 Expression used by a local MCM civil servant in Lambert’s Bay.
MCM was understaffed both for the purpose of processing quota applications and performing control and surveillance (O’Riordan 1999), an explanation that was supported by the local MCM official.

A continuing debate was who were to benefit from the opportunities following the reformed policy. Fisher informants complained about the practice of allowing non-fishers access rights, and the following quotes from the interviews illustrate the challenges of having different groups of people in the same organisations, or competing for the same quotas:

“The problem with the new law is that everyone has rights. The Bill is not coming back to the fishermen.”  

“They have a retirement package from previous work, and they use the money to buy boats... That means ... we have to share the quota with people who are not bona fide fishermen.”

“The newcomers are coming in and get quotas, while the real fishermen have been fishing for years and get little...it is very, very unfair that non-fishermen have quotas.”

“The problem is that people who used to be teachers, or in the police, use the names of poor people, and that way they get quotas. They are literate; they know how to know the law. They get people on their side, but at the end of the day, they stab the people. This creates conflicts.”

“One of the conflicts is that the whites are part of the co-op. They have ski boats, four-by-fours and are a lot better off. They are fishermen by choice, not by force.”

“Me, and other fishermen I know, apply for quotas every year. We never get anything. The Sea Fisheries should keep a record of us, what we are doing – we need some justice.”

However, the informants agreed that it was reasonable that certain groups that were not bona

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58 Informant from Lambert’s Bay.
59 Group interview, Ocean View.
60 Interview, fisher from Ocean View.
61 Informant from Lambert’s Bay.
62 Interview, fisher from Ocean View.
63 Interview, fisher from Ocean View.
fide fishers, such as fisher widows, could benefit from a quota. The following example is included to illustrate one of the main challenges of participatory management: *Who is to participate?* Among the successful new applicants for the 1998/1999 season was an organisation in Lambert’s Bay consisting of 41 widows of fishers. Their leaders and spokesmen were Mr. Smith and his son, Mr. Smith Jr, who I categorise as organisational entrepreneurs. The organisation had received a three-ton crayfish quota. Mr. Smith explained that his rationale for taking on this role as an organisational entrepreneur was that he was a Christian, driven by idealism and dedication to the case of the poorest of society. He decided that among the poor, he would fight for the widows, since they had a particularly hard life and were always struggling to make ends meet, for instance lacking money for their children to go to school. He must have meant their grandchildren, as most of the women in the organisation he set up were quite elderly. Thirty-one of the 41 women in the organisation were between 60 and 80 years old, two were approaching 100, while the rest were between 40 and 50 years old. We asked Mr. Smith and his son if they could help us to get in touch with the women, for instance by making a list of the women’s names, which we could use to approach them, introduce ourselves and ask for an interview. They refused and Mr. Smith explained that:

“...it is difficult to interview them [the women], because they are illiterate, you see, they don't see the consequences of what is happening, so I would not recommend you to interview them.”

Illiteracy does not necessarily stop people from talking, but we realised that we would risk eliminating a source of information if we insisted. We reached a compromise to conduct a group interview with some of the women the following afternoon in Mr. Smith’s house. This implied that we had no control of which women he would invite, or what he would tell them beforehand about us and why we wanted to talk to them. Anyway, the following afternoon, four lively, good-humoured, and talkative elderly women were lined up in chairs next to Mr. Smith and Mr. Smith Jr. We told them about the purpose of our visit, and conversed about the fisheries of Lambert’s Bay for a while. At a point, we found it opportune to ask how much

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64 In my fieldwork data, two relatively similar examples in Lambert’s Bay illustrate the phenomenon explained here, but it is sufficient to present one of them.

65 Mr. Smith told us there was no official list of the widow’s names. Despite of this, I came over an official list at the Chief Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management a few weeks later, from where this information was derived. The list was signed by Mr. Smith and dated before our visit in Lambert’s Bay.
each of the widows had received of the quota, but Smith Jr. immediately interrupted and said that “the quota does not render much money, but at least they have a foot in the door.” A couple of other attempts from us to reveal how much each woman received of the quota were interrupted in a similar manner. Then we tried to ask what the women wanted to do with the quota, but Smith Jr. cut us off again. After some time, we realised that the interview was going nowhere, wound it up, and left with an impression of a group of women who were not intimidated at all by their presumed illiteracy and lack of knowledge of what was going on. In order to participate formally in the competition for quotas, all they had to do was to sign their name on a list as a proof that they were part of an organisation and thus would be the beneficiaries of a quota that would be administered by Mr. Smith. According to a rough estimation based on what we knew about the value of quotas, each woman could receive on average a gross maximum of R3600. The Smiths kept telling us that the sum of money was so low that it meant basically nothing to the widows. However, this amount would by no means be small for deprived people. Could it be that the Smiths kept a share of the quota value for themselves? I will never know. However, what had become clear was that at the time of the fieldwork, the fishers in reality had no institutions to approach if they disagreed with the management of the quotas to which they felt entitled. One informant from Ocean View put it this way:

“A watchdog is missing. Even if the government still has commitment to the people on the ground, corruption is always there.”

There was no watchdog, or accountability institution, to modify, adjust, and correct the unforeseen consequences of the policy reform implementation, for instance, if quotas were used in unintended manners, or if people were kicked out of the organisation. Established fishing business saw this as problematic:

“Unless we are able to verify the information that is contained in every application for fishing rights we will never succeed in building a credible and equitable allocation system.” (Fishing Industry News Southern Africa 2000: 11)

The need for an accountability unit not only applied to the fisheries sector. According to Johnson (2000), independent watchdog bodies are a prerequisite in several sectors of South
Africa in order to enhance a democracy that is meaningful to ordinary citizens. The benefits of implementing a control unit for the future reallocation process and the legitimacy of the authorities would be tremendous, as it would assure people that their rights were being attended to. A verification unit was appointed in 2000 to assist the MCM in challenging untrue or only partly true information in applications, and it was expected to be a key institution to the enforcement of permit conditions associated with a right (Fishing Industry News Southern Africa 2001). In line with other areas of the policy implementation, the state outsourced this task. The verification unit was run by the accounting firm Deloitte and Touche in partnership with Sithole AB and T, assisted by 18 people with legal skills (Le May 2001).

To sum up on this section, some organisational entrepreneurs used their positions to attend to adverse agendas. This strongly indicates the need for consolidating an accountability institution.

4.5 Discussion on South Africa

In this section I discuss the findings from the fieldwork in South Africa, in light of the research questions and the theoretical framework. It is essential to highlight the impacts of the policy reform as held against its democratic intentions and development potential.

The fisheries policy reform heralded a transformation of the fishing industry, addressing past injustices, such as the skewed distribution of quotas, and nepotism and corruption related to quota allocations. Thus, there was reason to expect that there would be a break with habits and attitudes of the past. The state was under pressure from various stakeholders who claimed their rights to be heard and their opinions to be considered, and endeavoured to secure a neutral and impartial policy reform process. Foreign experts were involved in the design and planning phase, and working groups were appointed to do the drafting of the fisheries policy reform. Since each issue had to be publicly debated before decisions were made, it was a time-consuming process, and the complexity of the fisheries sector soon proved challenging and overwhelming. It is tempting to characterise the design and planning phase of the fisheries policy reform as participatory and representative. Fishing industry actors had different opportunities, motives for and capabilities to participate and being represented in this phase. The small-scale fishers, on line with everyone else, were eligible stakeholders and
had the right to participate in public hearings and working groups, and to contribute to the policy reform drafts that were distributed to all relevant and interested stakeholders for comments and inputs. Despite this, the informants in my study were by and large not convinced that they had been partakers in this early phase of the policy reform. This indicates that they had not been able to claim their representation and that the possibilities for participation were not the same for all. It is also an indication that the procedures through which the small-scale fishers were represented were not communicated to them well enough. The state made efforts to counteract this in the implementation phase by informing the public about the reformed policy and the opportunities herein, and thereby implicitly encouraging marginalised groups to apply for a quota, as was demonstrated in the fieldwork material from information meetings in Grahamstown and Port Alfreds in the Eastern Cape. On the one hand, the outcome of these visits may have been futile for the bulk of the attendants, and thus contributed to the impression of the state as a hope-generating machine. Unfulfilled expectations did not only apply to the fishing industry. Marais (1998) says that in South Africa, high hopes and lowly realities go hand-in-hand. This appears to be a common trait of democratic transition. Luhmann (1990) argues that on a general level, participatory democracy often has been founded on unrealistic assumptions. Aspirations for and expectations of increased participation and legitimacy have been placed within contexts where they cannot be fulfilled. On the other hand, it illustrates that the state made efforts to meet with the grassroots and spread information about the challenges and opportunities of the policy reform. Another demonstration of this was that the small-scale fishers were encouraged to visit the MCM premises and interact with civil servants face to face, which some frequently did. Geography matters; those living in communities near Cape Town were more aware of these possibilities than fishers located in more remote and isolated communities, since they had easier access due to the shorter distance.

The technical side of fisheries management was pre-determined, defining the external frames of the fishing industry actors’ action space. This meant that in practice, the new quota applicants would have to operate in and adjust to a well established system with little elasticity. Within these frames, quota applicants were to be prioritised according to eligibility criteria centring on employment generation, previous performance in the fisheries, and the ability to operate profitably. The quota applicants consisted of a mix of already established big business actors, small-scale fishers who had not had a quota before, and actors who had limited or no experience with the fishing industry, who had “never got their hands wet”. In
order to allow for new entrants, old quota holders had to give way, by a reduction of their quotas. Of course, this created tension and opposition among those who risked a decimation of their quota. The fishing industry became increasingly politicised, and turned it into a battlefield of different interests. A gap between the intention and formulation of the policy on the one side, and its implementation on the other, became evident quite early. The fisheries authorities recognised that the process of reforming the fisheries policy and writing the policy documents might have gone too fast. The deputy director-general to the MCM, who was appointed early in 2000, was of the opinion that the Marine Living Resources Act was inadequate. As he saw it, the policy guidelines were imprecise or absent, despite four years of work by different committees, forums and workshops (Fishing Industry News Southern Africa 2001). Fishing industry stakeholders experienced that there was not a consistent structural transformation of intra-industrial socio-economic relations, and the asymmetrical power balances remained. Within short time, the issue of poverty became separated from the quota question. The quota system spurred competition and generated creative and innovative organisational solutions, demonstrated in its extreme by the cases of the widows’ organisation in Hout Bay and the women’s organisation in Lambert’s Bay. The quota system as it was practiced soon earned a reputation of creating losers and winners. In order to make sure that the quota applications complied with the criteria, the fishers’ organisations bought services from consultants and lawyers, to assist in the quota application procedures. This was a costly undertaking, and certainly a filtering process, excluding those who could not afford external assistance. Lawyers and consultants formed an apparently unexpected group of winners of the policy reform.

A conscious approach to development implies making decisions, prioritising, and using the means at hand, such as allocation and redistribution of fishing rights and quotas. Ben-Yami (2001) says that all means of management produce social, economic, and political ramifications, and their selection depends on the political attitude of the government. In dealing with management of small-scale fisheries, the South African state lacked determination and efficiency. Without de facto restrictions on purchase and sale, quotas could be taken away from the fishing communities to which they had been allocated in the first place. Some quota recipients sold their quotas to actors outside their fishing communities, thus failing to use the quotas to create local employment. This contributed to adverse effects of the policy reform, detrimental to development. Jentoft (2000a) questions whether it is possible to achieve development in small fishing communities when the regulation system is
blind to geography, thus running the risk that a fishing community all of a sudden finds itself practically excluded from the fishery. The policy makers could have applied past experiences when considering how quotas could benefit communities in order to prevent the implementation of the policy reform from being sabotaged by informal, local level mechanisms, power structures, and institutions. One such experience was the failure of the Fishermen’s Community Trusts in the early 1990s, which highlighted the relevance of the role of the community as an important actor in management.

The Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 allows for decentralisation of power. However, limited, if any, power and responsibility for policy implementation had been delegated to local fisheries authorities at the time of the fieldwork. The mandate of local MCM civil servants was to control that fishers did not catch fish illegally, and they did not have a mandate to sanction irregularities such as organisational entrepreneurs monopolising quotas. They had received only limited information and training on their role within the policy reform, which indicated that the state hesitated about letting go of power and control. It may also signify that the policy reform process was taking place too fast, and that the MCM needed more time to train local level civil servants in the different fishing communities. With the multiplication of quota applications, a heavy workload had been added to the already strained state apparatus. It was an extra burden of affirmative action, and naturally, it would take time to train a body of new civil servants at both central and local levels. This way, the lack of decentralisation and of civil servants’ mandates and sanction powers can be seen as a trade-off between affirmative action and efficiency.

The Fisheries Transformation Council (FTC) was meant to be an unbiased body and a central part of decentralisation, as it was to assist the state in quota application reviews and quota allocations, i.e. some tasks, responsibilities and powers were decentralised. As it turned out, some of the quota allocations made by the council were incompatible with the impartiality principle, and the FTC proved to be a far shot from the neutral and incorrupt institution that it was intended to be. The members of the FTC had not grasped and integrated the very idea of their role in this council, and they were not overly serious about acting in correspondence with the intentions of the policy reform. The state had failed to appoint actors who were up to the task, able and willing to sacrifice their short-term personal interests for long-term planning in endeavouring to reach the public goal of a democratised societal sector. This is an example of how formal institutions may change, but informal institutions do not work in
correspondence with them. The actors who were to promote and implement the principles of the reformed fisheries policy through their roles in the FTC were at the same time carriers of habits and informal institutions from the past. The malpractices that were carried over from the past created institutional inertia that slowed down or hindered the realisation of the intentions behind the policy reform. In this respect, there was not a break with the previous system.

The state rendered some practical management tasks to fishers’ organisations, and this can be seen as one mode of decentralisation. The leaders of the organisations, referred to as organisational entrepreneurs, used their social capital and established a relation to the state, in the property of being mediators and links between the state and the fishers. Due to the restrained capacity of the state, a mutual dependency developed between the organisational entrepreneurs and the state. Once an organisation had received quotas, the responsibilities of the state towards the marginalised fishers seemed to vanish. Whether the small-scale fishers would benefit from the opportunities of the policy reform depended on whether the organisational entrepreneurs facilitated empowering forms of co-operation and participation, and were true to the principles of creating employment. It was to their discretion to redistribute the quotas among the members of the organisations and use the profits derived from the quotas. Hence, the fate of each individual fisher was in the hands of the organisational entrepreneurs.

The organisational entrepreneurs who were successful quota applicants constituted a group of actors that benefited from the policy reform. Information was the clue to get a hand on a quota in the first place, a key to controlling the quotas. Thus, access to information was part of the organisational entrepreneurs’ power, and once they got a quota, their power increased. One way of keeping control of the quota was to monopolise information. There were episodes of what Giddens (1984) calls information filtering, which enabled the organisational entrepreneurs to perform as gatekeepers. Their positions allowed them to decide who among the previously disadvantaged groups could pass through the gate. In line with this, the practice of excluding members from the organisations enabled the organisational entrepreneurs to monopolise the organisations’ quotas. This was a far shot from the intentions behind the policy reform: The state had rendered power primarily to the organisations, and the intention was to benefit the small-scale fishers. As with the FTC experience, at the level of fisher organisations there was a deficiency of the right kind of actors who could contribute to
institutional change. I assume that there may have been organisational entrepreneurs who were able to comply with the demanding and challenging role of attending to both social and economic requirements. Such entrepreneurs would have their constituencies’ best in mind, and would not have the dubious habit of expelling members from their organisation once they had received a quota. Unfortunately, I have insufficient material to support or disclaim this assumption. Hersoug (2002b) also observed that there was a deficit of actors who fulfilled with what they promised in their quota applications. It is tempting to agree with the saying that power corrupts, at all levels. It takes stamina to endure prosperity and resist temptations to exploit private agendas. Those who have experienced the abuse of power by others can become worse power abusers when they get the opportunity (Freire 1970/1996, NRK 2005).

With respect to empowerment, the state in certain aspects disengaged and placed itself on the sideline, thus opting for being an inactive counterpart to the small-scale fishers in empowerment, and again, the small-scale fishers were subject to relying on others in order to prosper. The state opted for decentralising and privatising part of the empowerment of marginalised groups, counting on the assistance of big business industry actors. As the policy implementation unfolded, the concept of empowerment changed content; from embracing capacity building of marginalised groups, with the purpose of them being able to take on responsibility and to increase their power, to the more tangible and short-term objective of acquiring a quota. In other words, empowerment became synonymous with enrichment. The state’s approach implied a trust in some undefined solidarity spirit of big business with the marginalised small-scale fishers, implicitly counting on a harmony of interests. This was far from reality: Big business and small-scale fishers were in many cases competitors for the same resources and asymmetrically equipped in terms of social and financial capital; they were positioned differently in the power hierarchy, and there was little harmony of interest, as the court case demonstrated. The result of the court case was an indication of the strength of the established industry actors, and expressed that initially, politicians and policy makers did not understand the underlying conflicts of interests. The court case indicated that the process had gone too fast for the established big business industry actors. It may be seen as a demonstration of the lack of solidarity on behalf of the established industry towards the new entrants, as some politicians claimed; at least the spirit of solidarity had to give way to the urge to stay in business. The belief that it would be possible to bridge the different actors’ interests proved naïve, at least within such a short time frame. The policy makers found it appropriate to threaten big business with sanctions: Unless big business assisted in the
empowerment of marginalised small-scale fishers, they would have their quotas partly or
totally cut. This did not make a notable impression. The practice of paper quotas contributed
to the undermining of the basis for social capital formation and empowerment of the small-
scale fishers. Following Freire’s (1970/1996) line of arguments, it is not likely that big
business would display solidarity and empower future competitors. The policy reform put big
business in a vulnerable position since they had their quotas reduced, and they were keen to
stay in business. Big business could keep controlling part of the redistributed quotas, through
the acquisition of paper quotas. It is hard to see how competitors in a context of a tough
market would adhere to solidarity principles, unless there are some strong motivating factors,
or sanctions in case of the opposite. It also illustrated that the aims of the state were too
optimistic and maybe a bit blue-eyed. The formal institutional change did not automatically
motivate a host of actors to commit to changing the structures defining access rights.

Because the small-scale fishers had to be affiliated to an organisation to access the
commercial fisheries, they were actually put in a position of dependency and somehow
trapped there. Their possibilities of participating in the fisheries depended on their quota
access through the organisations, since quotas were the entry ticket to the fisheries. It is
questionable whether compulsory organisation membership corresponds to democratic
principles. Anyway, the small-scale fishers lacked experience in participating in policy
decision-making matters, and they were inexperienced in working together as a consolidated
group towards a common objective. Consequently, they had difficulties in claiming a fair
representation. The same factors explain their perpetuated poverty, lack of education,
restricted access to information and lack of skills in using information strategically. These
factors add up to a serious initial disadvantage of the small-scale fishers when the policy
reform started, which is reflected in a lack of ability to demand a fair and legitimate
representation. This is a common phenomenon: Tarrow (1998) explains how the opening of
opportunities supposed to bring the target groups of policy reforms in a better position, may
instead bring other groups to the same opportunities. This is what happened to large groups of
the previously disadvantaged small-scale fishers; they were not able to seize the opportunities,
and other groups benefited. They were not yet able to fight and overcome these hindrances.
Now that organising was an obligation for quota access, the limited experience of joining
forces in the past represented a true challenge.

The practice of handing over responsibility for quota allocation to non-governmental actors is
what Ribot (2003) denotes privatisation in the name of decentralisation. As was elaborated in Chapter 2, Work’s concept of divestment embraces the situation when the government transfers responsibility to private organisations (Work 2002), and Basta (2001) uses the concept of deregulation, denoting when the government transfers tasks to the market. In the South African case, quotas proved to be too valuable to be left in the hands of organisational entrepreneurs without a control mechanism to counter adverse behaviour and effects. An intriguing question is why organisational entrepreneurs acted this way, despite their pledge to comply with the quota application criteria. It is even more intriguing considering that some organisational entrepreneurs had been subject to the same ill-treatment previously. Following Freire’s (1970/1996) line of argument, a thorough institutional change would require a rejection of the old image, and a shift in attitude and way of behaviour. This could have been achieved within the frames of structural change, with a shift of power and a conscious use of the policy at hand to achieve changes and development objectives. Only by consciously acting in correspondence with this, by channelling resources for training and empowerment of the small-scale fishers, there could be a break with the previous system. However, the practice implied continuity with the past system. The changes that had taken place, including promises of redistribution of quotas, and which lead to only limited structural change, can be seen of as a false generosity, as Freire would have put it. Expectations had been created, and in order to continue to express generosity, the continued injustice from the past could nourish the image of generosity. Unchanged social order gives policy makers and powerful outside agents a pretext for playing the role of a permanent source of generosity, which is nourished and can only be accepted when the situation and position of the marginalised is unchanged. True generosity would have been to eliminate the causes of injustice and inequalities.

Delegating responsibility by divestment is not necessarily inherently negative. The policy implementation took a turn that the fisheries authorities and policy makers behind the reform hardly could have foreseen. The organisational entrepreneurs were obliged to balance business principles of generating profits from quotas with social demands of creating employment. These requests and conditions may have been too challenging. The fishers’ organisation I used as a main case, as well as the supporting examples, started out with the intention of complying with the criteria to get quotas, including the social obligations. Unfortunately, the social obligations eventually became undermined by the quest for fulfilling business objectives.
At the time of the fieldwork, there was no apt accountability institution for controlling how the organisational entrepreneurs performed and for countering adverse effects. The state was not accountable to the fishers for a policy implementation gone astray, and avoided interfering with the organisations’ operations, even though it was apparent that small-scale fishers lost out. Without an accountability unit, organisational entrepreneurs had the opportunity to escape their obligation, which some did. Thus, it is fair to say that the action space of the organisational entrepreneurs proved too wide. One way of reaching the marginalised small-scale fishers and fulfilling the redistribution objectives, could have been to restrict the relatively free quota trade, and follow up the implementation by an accountability unit. Corrective advices by an accountability unit could thus have been justified in a transition period. An accountability institution may reflect that the state takes its responsibility seriously by ensuring that the policy is being implemented in correspondence with the intentions. It specifically implies the follow-up of actors who are entrusted with management responsibility, and eventually the sanctioning of actors who fail to comply with the agreed-upon procedures and intentions. This could have led to a break with the previous system.

Legitimacy is a likely result when the fishers are involved and listened to in the decision-making processes. If the organisational entrepreneurs under-performed, the natural reactions of the fishers who were affiliated to the organisations were disappointment, frustration, lack of trust, and fluctuating legitimacy. This was strengthened by the recurring perception among the informants that they had limited influence in their organisations.

In general, when legitimacy is missing, and actors disagree with the rules they are subject to, there are typically two types of reactions: Exit or voice. One example of exit was when fishers in South Africa claimed that they had no other options than poaching, since the fisheries policy put them at disadvantage. At the organisation level, exit was when a group of fishers broke out from the large organisation. Voice is the reaction whereby the actors try to influence decision makers and managers. Big business actors definitely used their voice when they took the state to court and won the court case. While the organisational entrepreneurs were in the position to voice their claims, the bulk of the small-scale fishers were not able to act strategically and use their voice. Since the organisations were not truly representative of them, and there was no established accountability institution, they did not have a loudspeaker to fortify their voice.
Putnam’s (2000) division of bonding and bridging social capital is useful in understanding the South African case. Bonding social capital can build strong ties and networks among likeminded actors, but may result in the exclusion of those who do not qualify to form part of such networks. Organisational entrepreneurs were able to seek and absorb information and use it to their advantage. They had the option of bonding by their common interest in obtaining quotas, and to establish and maintain their position at a level above the regular small-scale fishers. If the policy reform had been implemented according to the intentions, it would have been a bridging form of social capital, building relations between more heterogeneous actors as well as motivating social inclusion. This could have led to a strengthening of small-scale fishers’ social capital. Likewise, if big business industry actors and small-scale industry actors had interacted according to the policy reform’s intentions, it would have been an expression of bridging social capital. The opposite happened, and the social capital of organisational entrepreneurs contributed to maintaining, and maybe even to increasing, social inequalities and social stratification. Being affiliated to organisations that had to operate according to business principles did not enhance the social capital of small-scale fishers or contribute to their empowerment. There were few attempts within the local organisations to build capacity and empower the organisations’ members. One exception was when the organisation SACFC used an Advisory Committee Meeting as a device for democratic learning. But in general, small-scale fishers had insufficient capacity to mobilise forces to counter the lack of empowerment and social capital formation, and to participate in decision-making. They were excluded from networks created by the organisational entrepreneurs and experienced negative workings of social capital, in Putnam’s (1993) words: defection, distrust, exploitation, disorder and stagnation. The differences between these different categories of small-scale fishers were thereby enhanced.

Social capital is strongly related to social relations and networking. I regard the way that small-scale fishers viewed their own capacity to co-operate and organise towards a common goal as an expression and reflection of their social capital. Trust is an important part of this; in the words of Putnam (1993), trust lubricates cooperation and cooperation itself breeds trust. The interviews revealed that professional networking, trust and solidarity among small-scale fishers were not strong, and insufficient to make them appear as a coherent and empowered group that could use opportunities following the policy reform. While some small-scale fishers were positive regarding their ability of working together and the potential of the organisations to impact positively on socio-economic development, the dominant attitude was
scepticism about how they could work towards a common goal. The informants were aware of how the past had deprived them of a fundament of solidarity and of the ability and reason to trust others. The policy of forced removal had disturbed community coherence, generated and increased distrust and hindered the creation of a common identity among community actors, with a subsequent lack of marginalised groups’ experience in standing together. The bulk of small-scale fishers risked losing out rather quickly, unable to benefit. This is an example of the paradox of participation: There were opportunities that partly or wholly were earmarked for small-scale fishers, who were not able to take advantage and benefit.
5 The Mozambican Case

5.1 The fisheries and fisheries management

Mozambique’s coastline is 2780 km long, and the areas of the country’s territorial waters and the EEZ in the Indian Ocean amount to about 100000 square kilometres and 400000 square kilometres respectively. During the colonial era, which ended in 1975, development of the fisheries was not a priority, and Mozambique was considered only a market for fish products from Angola, Portugal and South Africa. There was a regulation against trawling in Mozambican waters, but the prohibition was lifted in the early 1960s and a national fishing fleet developed (Lopes et al. 1998). There are three rather distinguishable subsectors: the industrial, the semi-industrial and the artisanal fisheries (the latter is hereafter referred to as small-scale). The industrial and semi-industrial fleets have the same shallow-water shrimp as their principal resource, and the small-scale fisheries to a lesser extent exploit these stocks. There are increasing conflicts between the small-scale fisheries and the other subsectors in the nearshore areas relating to competition for resources and trawlers interfering with fixed gear (Eide and Degnbol 2001).

The fish exports were 8362 tons in 1995, and contributed to about 22 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings. In 1997, the fisheries sector accounted for approximately eight per cent of the GDP, and exports from the fisheries sector amounted to about 39 per cent of total exports (FAO Artisanal Fisheries Development Project 1999). In 1997/1998, the industrial fishery accounted for 47 per cent, and the semi-industrial fishery for 20 per cent of the total registered catch, while the share of the small-scale fishery was 33 per cent. The shallow-water shrimp fisheries are in commercial terms by far the most important. More than 85 per cent of the export-value comprises shallow-water shrimp, the bulk of which is exported to the EU, Japan and South Africa. In 1999, the export volume of shallow-water shrimp was 8000 tons and the export value was USD78 million (Eide and Degnbol 2001)

Sources vary with respect to how many inhabitants there are in Mozambique; the World Almanac and Book of Facts (2001) report that there are approximately 19.1 million

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66 The registered catch is what is recorded in the database of the National Directorate of Fisheries. Most of the missing data are those for the artisanal sector, and the registered catch for this sector is reckoned to be about 30 per cent of the estimated actual catch. Catch effort data of the industrial shrimp fishery are believed to be reliable. Crosschecks with export data match substantially. Separate data sets are supplied by the fishing enterprises to IIP, monthly log sheets; and DNP, ten-day per vessel summaries, respectively (Stuttaford 1998).
inhabitants. About 50 per cent of the Mozambicans’ intake of protein comes from fish. The fisheries provide direct employment for 90000-100000 people, and indirectly to a large number of people who are involved in marketing of fish and fish products. Of the fishers, 55000 belong to the category of small-scale fishers in 640 fishing centres. The small-scale fishers dominate fishing activities in terms of total production and supply to the domestic market. Semi-industrial and industrial fisheries are most important in terms of foreign exchange earnings since they specialise in catching shrimp for export. The catch from the small-scale fishery is marketed mainly locally, or iced or frozen to regional markets (Eide and Degnbol 2001).

Only about 25 per cent of the exploitable resources were being utilised at the time of the fieldwork. This was an overall national average figure, and there was concern about overfishing of some pelagic species in areas with heavy concentration of beach seiners. Harmful fishing practices, like the *use of mosquito nets* in beach-seines, have led to excessive catches of certain immature fish species, particularly small pelagic and demersals (FAO Artisanal Fisheries Development Project 1999). There are few scientific studies on the coastal fish resources, and therefore there are scarce data on the potentials and sustainability of the fish resources accessible to the small-scale fisheries, according to Lopes and Gervásio (2000). They conclude that the few data available nevertheless indicate a need for introduction of fish stock conservation measures, which have been absent for the small-scale fisheries.

License limitations and quotas are the principal management measures employed to control industrial and semi-industrial crustacean fishing companies in Mozambique. Fishing licences are issued annually, and the quota fees are in the range of 1-15 per cent of the estimated catch value, depending on the profitability of the fishery and the level of taxes (Stuttaford 1998). Small-scale fishers need permits issued by the Maritime Administration in order to take part in the fishery. The fisheries regulations consist of closed seasons, effort regulations and informal regulations. In terms of management of the fisheries, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has the ultimate decision-making power. The IDPPE (the Institute for the Development of Small-Scale Fisheries) has since 1990 been responsible for promoting coastal fisheries development in Mozambique (Lopes et al. 1998). IDPPE undertakes socio-economic research related to living conditions in coastal communities and studies of management in small-scale fisheries. Furthermore, it has as the mandate to improve knowledge of coastal fisheries and to identify development programmes. It co-operates with the fishing
communities, promoting and facilitating structures for user group participation, and operates as an extension organisation providing technical inputs to fishing communities, through local level extension workers serving as a link between the government and the fishing communities. Extension workers inform the fishers about regulations and technical matters, and communicate requests and inquiries from fishers to the government. They have no executive or legal power (Eide and Degnbol 2001).

The DNP (the Direcção Nacional da Pesca/National Fisheries Directorate) handles legal aspects, and deals mostly with industrial fisheries. The IIP (the Instituto de Investigação Pesqueiro/Institute of Fisheries Research) undertakes biological research on fish resources, and provides stock assessment. The ADMAR (Administração Marítima/Maritime Administration) has since Independence been responsible for the control over fishing activities and enforcement of the fishing regulations in small-scale fisheries. It collects gear taxes and licence fees from small-scale fishers and contributes to conflict resolution among small-scale fishers. Unfortunately, it has insufficient financial means to carry out some of its duties. For example, the Maritime Administration in Angoche had approximately 20 staff members, but the staff was being reduced when I did my fieldwork, due to financial cutbacks. There was a shortage of equipment needed to patrol the coastal waters. The Maritime Administration in Angoche did not have a boat, which made it difficult to control vessels at sea.

Donors such as ADB, DANIDA, DFID, EU, ICEIDA, IFAD, NORAD, OPEC, in addition to a range of national and international NGOs, are involved in development of the fisheries sector (Eide and Degnbol 2001). After Mozambique gained independence, the donors have seen the rationale for developing the fisheries sector, with the emphasis on increasing exploitation through more efficient fishing technology (Brochmann and Ofstad 1990). Important activities for the donor organisations have been related to institutional development in the government sector, support to export capacity, and technological development in the

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67 ADB: African Development Bank
DANIDA: The Danish Agency for Development Assistance
DFID: Department for International Development, UK
EU: European Union
ICEIDA: The Icelandic International Development Agency
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development
NORAD: The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
small-scale fisheries sector. Despite a wide array of development activities in the fisheries, an evaluation team concluded in 2001 that the implementation of planned activities within the small-scale fisheries sector has been modest if not almost absent, except from a credit line and the Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project, and a few smaller projects. There is only a limited co-ordination of these different donors’ activities (Eide and Degnbol 2001).

5.2 The fisheries policy reform
This section deals with issues and challenges related to the fisheries policy reform. It starts with describing the development of the fisheries management system, focusing on the legacy from the colonial rule, the consequences of the civil war, and donor dependency, which all have impacted on present day management. Then there is a description of the process of policy reform, and how the state encouraged the set-up of co-management committees.

5.2.1 Colonial legacy, civil war and donor dependency
Before independence from Portugal in 1975, the Portuguese and their descendants occupied the bulk of the positions in the state administration and education. During the years after Independence, white settlers and skilled black and Indian workers and professionals fled Mozambique, fearing chaos and violence accompanying Frelimo’s68 take-over (Newitt 1995). According to Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1995), unclear messages of political reconciliation from Frelimo during the liberation struggle made the Portuguese susceptible to propaganda from Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa regarding the future situation of the white population under a black majority regime. Through mass emigration, most of Mozambique’s educated workforce disappeared after independence; over 185000 of a total of 200000 Portuguese left. This influenced the fishery sector in the sense that the experience and expertise of those working in the fisheries administration were lost or fragmented, and resulted in a void in the fisheries management and the control of fishing activities. The new institutions created by the government to promote the fisheries sector were characterised by

68 Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – The Mozambican Liberation Front) was founded in 1961 as an anti-Portuguese guerrilla movement under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane. It controlled most of the northern region of the country by 1964. After independence in 1975, Frelimo established a one-party state based on socialist principles with Samora Machel as president. As a political party, Frelimo has ruled Mozambiques since 1975 (en.wikipedia.org 2005a).
During the civil war (1975-1992), fisheries grew in importance, both in terms of foreign exchange earnings, and by providing food and income to a large coastal population. Part of the population left their inland villages and settled by the coast and on islands along the coast, which were considered safer than the inland areas. More and more people took up fishing as a means of survival, which implied more pressure on the resources in certain areas along the coast (Brochmann and Ofstad 1990; Lopes 1999). In the 1980s, the strategy for developing small-scale fisheries in Mozambique was based on Combinados Pesqueiros, a co-operative set-up implemented by the Frelimo government to supply fishing inputs and services to the small-scale fishers, and to market their surplus production. The strategy included facilitating the establishment of fishers’ associations and providing more efficient fishing technology. One problem was that the structure and function of the Combinados Pesqueiros were planned according to what the government assumed were the fishers’ needs, without adapting to the conditions under which the small-scale fishers were working. Along with the claim for privatisation that followed the structural adjustment programme, this was considered the main reason why the Combinados Pesqueiros did not function as planned, ran into chronic economic difficulties, and eventually were shut down (Alberts et al. 1988; Johnsen 2002).

During the civil war, Mozambique was in a chronic state of economic crisis, and the governing party Frelimo decided in 1977 to centralise decision-making as an attempt to overcome underdevelopment within ten years. Frelimo pursued a top-down management strategy and played out the role as a paternalistic government (Newitt 1995). At the same time, the state was exposed as weak and dependent upon foreign aid. During the war, the central government was hardly present at the local level; for instance, schools and health-care posts ceased to function, and a large part of the physical, social and commercial infrastructure was destroyed (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). The country was trapped in a downward spiral with falling production and increasing poverty, crime and corruption. A ceasefire agreement between Frelimo and the opposition Renamo⁶⁹ was signed in Rome in October 1992. Then the full weakness of the Frelimo government was exposed to the international

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⁶⁹ Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana – The Mozambican National Resistance) was founded as an anti-Communist political organisation in 1975, following independence and the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist, Soviet-backed one-party state. Renamo insurgents were accused of widespread brutality and human rights abuses against civilians. Today, Renamo has been disarmed and is the main opposition party in Mozambique. Renamo currently holds 117 of the 250 parliamentary seats (en.wikipedia.org 2005b).
community. The economic collapse was followed by a collapse of the bureaucracy. Civil servants were not paid, and corruption had become endemic, manifested by the disappearance of much foreign aid. The army was demoralised and committed atrocities in the countryside (Hanlon 1996).

Despite being one of the world’s poorest and most indebted countries, Mozambique has been heralded as one of Africa’s success stories, with one of the fastest economic growth rates in the world and a booming capital city. The end of the civil war in 1992 permitted two million refugees to return to their homes and rebuild their villages. After the war ended in 1992, Frelimo’s strategy for consolidating the legitimacy of state power included a substantial expansion in education and health-care for those sections of the population that colonialism had neglected. Improvements in social sectors in the communities led to increased legitimacy and trust in the state (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). However, peace for everyone and prosperity for a few has come at a price. Mozambique’s government does not have any real say over economic and social policies, which are decided by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Foreign aid dominates the Mozambican economy (Hanlon 1996; McGreal 1999). Newitt (1995) argues that the breakdown of government authority partly can be explained by the influence of foreign aid. Western aid channelled through Western-controlled agencies bypassed the Frelimo government, donor initiated health programmes were rarely co-ordinated with government officials, and some NGOs were determined to change Frelimo policy. Since 1987, the World Bank structural adjustment programme has guided the Mozambican economy. A process was initiated, aimed at enhancing the role of the private sector in the development of the national economy, placing the country on a progressive path to a full market economy (Lopes and Gervásio 1999).

5.2.2 Reforming fisheries management
During the civil war, fisheries management was not prioritised, and after the war, policy makers and donors saw a need to address the fisheries sector, including the small-scale fisheries. The Fisheries Master Plan, covering small-scale, semi-industrial and industrial fisheries, was approved by the Mozambican government in 1996 as an instrument to identify strategies and prioritise development initiatives in the fisheries sector. For the small-scale fisheries, the overall goal was to increase employment and raise the standard of living in fishing communities. The Master Plan outlined three specific actions with regard to small-
scale fisheries:

- Increased exploitation of the fish resources, by reduction of post-harvest losses through improved traditional means and use of ice and refrigeration.
- Increased volume of production through improved vessels and fishing techniques, and incentives to invest in means of production; and
- Development of co-management mechanisms to resolve problems of over-exploitation.

Both the state and the private sector were supposed to contribute to this development. Services, marketing, infrastructure and human resources should be improved by promoting private entrepreneurial activity. The private sector was considered the engine of growth that would generate employment and gradually resolve the fundamental shortages of capital and foreign exchange (Republic of Mozambique 1994).

The design and planning phase leading to the final document of the Fisheries Master Plan was a joint effort by government and donors. Even though fishers were not participating in this initiating phase, the Fisheries Master Plan emphasised the involvement of the small-scale fishing industry actors in the implementation and enforcement of the principles of the policy reform. It would be imperative to develop “…fisheries management systems in collaboration with the artisanal fishing communities so as to find solutions to local overfishing problems” (Republic of Mozambique 1994: 6). Furthermore, the state was to be an active collaborator, and one of its strategies referred to involved “…artisanal fishing communities in defining and applying sustainable solutions for management and conservation of artisanal fishery resource (Republic of Mozambique 1994: 8). Small-scale fishers would be involved also in enforcement and control:

“In the area of management systems with local community participation, efforts will be concentrated on the direct involvement of local communities in defining and controlling the enforcement of fishing regulation.” (Republic of Mozambique 1994: 32)

The above quotes from the Fisheries Master Plan refer to fisher involvement in technical and biological matters. Socio-economic matters, such as resource access and participation in decision-making processes, were not referred to directly, although it can be assumed that this
is part of “developing fisheries management systems”, which implies that

“The State will promote involvement of coastal communities in live aquatic stock management and its respective exploitation so as to take advantage of local management know-how, with the purpose of facilitating the introduction of biologically sustainable natural resources usage patterns which are at the same time socially and economically efficient.” (Republic of Mozambique 1994: 36)

The overwhelming emphasis on biology is reflected in research; research-based management advice is biased towards biological issues, and there is little research-based input to fisheries management in terms of social and economic considerations (Eide and Degnbol 2001).

On 1st of January 1997, the Marine Fisheries Regulation was approved, and an advisory body was established to formally institutionalise participatory management: the CAP (Fisheries Administration Commission/Comissão de Administração Pesqueira). The CAP was to meet four times a year to make recommendations to the Ministry on the management measures. Its responsibility included revising and proposing regulations of fishing activities, such as determination of:

- Fishing quotas and of closed periods for fishing.
- The maximum number of licences to be granted for the various fisheries.
- Defining the criteria and terms for the fishing licenses.
- Defining protected areas.

Representatives from the small-scale, semi-industrial and industrial fisheries had seats in the CAP together with representatives from different government institutions (Lopes et al. 1998). This would be an incentive to participate. However, there were financial constraints for the small-scale fishers to participate in CAP meetings. Meetings were held in the capital Maputo, and there was no system of reimbursing costs for delegates. The few times when the small-scale fishers had been represented at these meetings, they had been dissatisfied, because the main issues discussed had been of interest to the industrial fisheries only, who strongly influenced the agenda for the meetings (Lopes and Gervásio 1999).
5.2.3 Encouraging the set-up of co-management committees

In the aftermath of the Fisheries Master Plan and due to the interaction between state civil servants and donor organisations, the state encouraged the establishment of co-management committees. The co-management committees were intended to be arenas of co-operation for small-scale fishers, and to function as the state’s counterpart in fisheries management. In 1996, the IDPPE initiated the work of motivating the establishment of co-management committees in fishing centres in the districts of Moma and Angra. This was in collaboration with the PPAN project (The Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project / Projecto de Pesca Artesanal em Nampula). The project was funded by IFAD (the International Fund for Agricultural Development), and OPEC. The project components were fisheries support, financial services, institutional strengthening and rural infrastructure. The PPAN project focused on rehabilitation of roads, bridges, rural health centres and agriculture development (Bukali 1998; Awale et al. 1999). In addition, it focused on provision of foreign exchange for input supply, adaptive research and extension services, and on provision of credit to fishers and micro-enterprises.

The co-management committees were set up in 1997 and 1998, and had about ten members each (Lopes 1999). The mandate of the co-management committees covered three main areas:

- Resource management, through promotion of and education in sustainable fishing practices.
- Conflict resolution, between local fishers sharing the same area, local fishers and semi-industrial and industrial fishers, and local and migrant fishers, through conflict resolution forums and reporting systems.
- Representation of interests, to forward complaints and problems that are beyond the capacity or mandate of co-management committees, to a higher level (IFAD 2001).

At the time of the fieldwork, there were 17 co-management committees in Mozambique, of which twelve were in the Nampula province where my fieldwork was undertaken, and five in the Inhambane province south in Mozambique. An important rationale for setting up co-management committees in Nampula relates primarily to the use of mosquito nets as fishing gear. Mosquito nets were initially used as part of the fishing gear because of supply restriction on ordinary fishing gear during the civil war. After the war, its use had become a matter of habit and perceived cost efficiency. For example, the fieldwork data reveal that the fishers in Koropa, Moma were convinced that they would get less fish if the mosquito nets were
replaced with standard 0.5-inch mesh nets, even though they had never seen an actual proof for that. There was a meeting in Larde, Moma on 21st of November 1998, which was also the designated International Day of Fishers, attended by representatives for the fisheries authorities and small-scale fishers from the fishing centres of Moma and Anoche. They agreed that from 31.12.1999 there was going to be a complete stop to the use of mosquito nets in their areas, starting with the fishing centres of Quelelele, Kwirikwidge, and Koropa. This was related to the donor impetus for implementing co-management. In order to set an example for accomplishing replacement of mosquito nets, the PPAN project agreed to distribute ten sets of 0.5-inch nets to each local co-management committee, to be distributed to selected seine owners. The nets were financed by soft loans, and the beneficiaries were to pay back the amount of the USD210 interest-free loans within twelve months.

Photo 8: Working the beach seine in Kwirikwidge fishing centre, April 1999 (Photo: Normann, A.K.)

The idea was that local co-management committees would address problems such as the use of mosquito nets as part of the fishing gear. The co-management committees had no legal status or officially defined roles in the fisheries policies negotiation process and regulation enforcement. However, the Ministry of Fisheries had initiated a process of elaborating
procedures and models of how to integrate the co-management committees in the Marine Fisheries Regulation. A study focusing on legal aspects related to fisheries co-management was initiated in 1999. The intention was to collect information for the future design of the legal framework for co-management arrangements, the definition of legal actions required to establish this structure, and the methods for the state to transfer the duties and enforcement power to regional and local co-management structures (Empresa de Consultoria Organizacional 1999).\footnote{I do not know the conclusion of the study. An idea for further research is to study how the state used the findings and conclusions of the study in terms of consolidating the position and mandate of the co-management committees in Mozambique.}

The fieldwork material demonstrates that in the early stage of consolidating routines, the different co-management committees in Nampula defined some of their objectives and mandates, such as to:

- Increase the income for small-scale fishers by increasing catches through promoting replacement of mosquito nets.
- Solve conflicts between fishers in a smooth way.
- Come to an agreement with other co-management committees on how to regulate the traffic of migrating fishers to and from the different fishing centres.
- Reduce theft of fishing gear.
- Improve the cooperation between boat- and gear-owners and their crew.

The co-management committees had not yet co-ordinated their objectives and mandates between them, and each co-management committee operated on a rather individual and isolated basis, though there were signs of increasing awareness towards cooperation. The Inguri co-management committee had a goal of managing the fish resources with active fisher participation, by strengthening the network between the fishery sector, the state, and researchers. Guidelines for this to take place had yet to be elaborated. The co-management committee of M’pwitini, Moma, had decided that it wanted to appear as a formal organisation, and one simple means was to use co-management committee specific stamp for official occasions, for instance when issuing licences. The IDPPE encouraged other co-management committees to follow this example. Other kinds of advice included keeping records of fishers, meetings and attendance, and documenting different kinds of conflicts and how they were resolved.
There were both biological and economic rationales for initiating a process towards a co-management system. The rationale for initiating co-management was first and foremost biological, demonstrated by the focus on cutting the use of mosquito nets in fishing gear. The economic rationale related to the fact that the state had insufficient financial means to implement a system of control and management of the fisheries. Seeing that it could not perform all the duties it was supposed to, the Maritime Administration in Angoche appreciated new approaches to fisheries management. It would cut costs if the fishers could participate and assist in control and enforcement of the regulations.\textsuperscript{71}

One argument against replacement of mosquito nets was that the larger fish caught with larger mesh size was too expensive for local consumers, who could afford small fish only. According to this argument, the market was not a good incentive to replace mosquito nets. The fishers served a poverty market, in which consumers could afford only small and low-quality items (Hesselberg 1981). In order to reach markets with higher purchasing power, it would be necessary to upgrade the availability of ice and cold storage facilities in the area, in addition to improving the road system. During the heavy rains, the roads to Nampula often would be impassable and trucks could be stuck for days (Awale et al. 1999), as can be figured from Photo 1 on page 58.

Not all informants agreed that mosquito nets were necessary to supply the market with what it wanted. A Kwirikwidge informant explained how he had previously used mosquito nets, until a friend had explained to him how harmful this fishing practice was for the fish resource. When the informant had realised that mosquito nets “took everything” in the sea, he had bought a one-inch net. Since then, he had caught more than the other fishers, he got “good and clean” and rather big fish which he easily sold, and he earned more than other fishers. As an example, “the other day” he had got 140 kg in a throw while colleagues only got about 60 kg, which he contended was rather typical. He objected to the practice of using mosquito nets, first of all because “using mosquito nets is like killing a pregnant woman”, as he dramatically explained, and secondary because mosquito nets were much heavier to pull than the nets with larger mesh size. He believed that the reason why his colleagues did not exchange the mosquito nets was because of habit. This may be illustrated by the fact that when he had bought the one-inch net, four marinheiros had refused to work for him. Another more obvious

\textsuperscript{71} Interview with leader of the Maritime Administration office in Angoche, April 1999.
argument for not giving up the use of mosquito nets was that few of the fishers could afford to replace their mosquito nets. The cost of a fishing net was USD210, far beyond the reach of most small-scale fishers (Awale et al. 1999).

![Fish buyers waiting for the catch. Kwirikwidge fishing centre, April 1999 (Photo: Normann, A.K.)](image)

### 5.3 The state: Policy implementation efforts and challenges

#### 5.3.1 Interacting with co-management committees

The small-scale fishers and the state civil servants had little experience to draw on in order to interact with and collaborate with each other in fisheries management. To try to reverse this, the IDPPE affiliation in Angoche, with one civil servant from IDPPE Maputo in co-operation with two biologists from the IIP (Institute of Fisheries Research), conducted a five-day long information tour to the different fishing centres in the Moma and Angoche areas in April 1999. I came along as an observer. The IDPPE and IIP wanted to learn how far the co-management committees had come in their establishment. Furthermore, the intention of the tour was to provide more information to co-management committee members about the fisheries policy, and to get feedback from the communities in terms of ideas, input, and
critique. The co-management committee members were informed that the state intended to delegate management responsibilities gradually to the co-management committees, and the fishers were encouraged to contribute to establishing the procedures for collaboration between the state and the co-management committees.

After a few meetings with the members from the different co-management committees, it was clear that they had varying perceptions about the purposes of the very co-management committees, and they were insecure about their roles. For instance, not all of them were aware of the participatory aspects, and the following bundle of perceptions conveyed by some of the co-management committee members illustrates this:

- In Kwirikwidge, the chairman of the co-management committee defined co-management as a co-operation between the fishing community and the state. The other Kwirikwidge co-management committee members did not account for the state.
- Another Kwirikwidge co-management committee member defined it as being “instruction to the net-owners on their economy and how to manage their gear, and about the use of the sea”.
- A third co-management committee member said that he did not know what co-
management was, because “nobody told me”.

- In Pilivili, the co-management committee members understood the co-management concept as “rules for co-ordinating the fishery”.
- In Moma, they understood it as “a way of solving problems in the fisheries”, and that “it is the best way to manage the resources”.
- In Larde, Moma, the co-management committee members simply stated that “it is a better form of fishing!”

The co-management committee members in Inguri, Anacohe were aware that co-management implied co-operation between the state and the fishers. They used the occasion to criticise the IDPPE for not having trained the co-management committees sufficiently during and after their set-up. They argued that the IDPPE should have given the fishers a training seminar on management in general and co-management in particular. Such a seminar had fortunately been planned for the following week.

The co-management committee members’ various understanding of co-management as a concept came as a surprise to the IDPPE and IIP, and a training element was immediately improvised and included on the agenda of the information tour, mainly related to definition and implications of the co-management concept.

Other fieldwork material reveals that not all co-management committee members agreed with the basic principles behind co-management, as illustrated by a Quelelele informant:

“The state should not have any responsibility; it is the fishers who live in the reality of fishing.”

This was a somewhat surprising statement from a member of a co-management committee, whose mandate, per definition, was to contribute to the enhancement of state-fisher cooperation. Considering the lack of consistent perception of co-management and its implications among committee members, it is not surprising if the small-scale fishers outside the co-management committees were equally, or even more, confused. The Kwirikwidge co-management committee members believed that all the fishers in the community knew about the co-management committee and its rationale, even though they had not actively informed

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72 Interview, fisher from Quelelele, owner, co-management committee member.
about it. When interviewing fishers, it was clear that the co-management committees were often associated with the PPAN donor project mentioned above, and that there was confusion related to the role of the committee. Kwirikwidge informants expressed it this way:

“I have heard about co-management. I think it is a plan to distribute nets or maybe a company to distribute nets. This is good; the mosquito nets kill the fish resources. People are realising this; they discuss and argue over the resources, so the substitution of nets is appreciated.”\(^73\)

“Co-management is the project. The objectives of co-management are to organise the fishers and give nets to the owners.”\(^74\)

Since there was confusion with respect to the rationale behind the co-management committees, a challenge to the co-management committee members would be to inform the fishers in their respective communities about the co-management committees’ purpose and role. This could be a double challenge since several of the co-management committee members also were insecure about it. Few of the co-management committees had a routine of making their constituencies aware of whom they were. The IDPPE encouraged the committee members to make the fishers aware of who they were, what they did, what issues fishers could bring forward to the co-management committees, and to inform about rules and decisions.

In the course of the information tour, the co-management committees used the opportunity to discuss other concerns with the civil servants. The committee members in M’pwitini, Moma, expressed dissatisfaction about what they perceived as broken promises. They referred to the time preceding the set-up of co-management committees, when they had the impression that new fishing nets would be provided to fishers for free. The staff of IDPPE and the IIP could not understand nor recall how and by whom such promises had been made. Some said that this was promised in the early planning stage of the PPAN project in order to get approval in the communities for implementing the project. This created expectations among the fishers, which turned into disappointment when they were not fulfilled. Other co-management committees complained about a lack of government support. They wanted to interact and cooperate more with the state, and asked to be included in planning and decision-making. They

\(^73\) Interview, fisher from Kwirikwidge, owner.
\(^74\) Interview, fisher from Kwirikwidge, non-owner.
wanted more co-operation and support from for instance the IDPPE, because at times they found it too demanding to work with communities. The Inguri co-management committee highlighted the relevance of interacting with other state institutions. Referring to the unsuccessful request to discuss the size of the fines that the Marine Administration had imposed on fishers for violating the rules, the committee requested the Maritime Administration to discuss its decisions with the committees.

On 22nd of April 1999, the PPAN project in collaboration with the IDPPE and the IIP arranged a workshop on the experiences of co-management in Angoche for the Angoche area co-management committees. A few days later, a similar workshop was arranged in Moma for the co-management committees in the Moma area. Three members of each co-management committee were invited to these workshops. In Angoche there were about 50 participants including observers, representatives of the IIP, the IDPPE, and the municipality administration. The co-management committees were encouraged to exchange experiences, and discuss how to interact and co-operate with the state, with each other, and with the fishers in their respective constituencies. For example, the co-management committees were informed about the formal procedures to undertake if they observed illegal fishing or if industrial boats entered zones reserved for small-scale fishers. This was in order to prevent incidents of small-scale fishing gear being damaged by industrial fishing boats that entered the small-scale fishing zones. Other kinds of damages were marine pollution and destruction of the marine fauna. The intruders seldom risked being caught and sanctioned. The IDPPE encouraged the co-management committees to implement reporting procedures, and assist the small-scale fishers in reporting violations of rules. The small-scale fishers were encouraged to take down the industry vessel’s registration number, and then report it to the local co-management committee, which again would contact the Maritime Administration for considering further action. A co-management committee member objected that they could not do that, because they did not carry pens aboard, whereby the IDPPE gently encouraged them to bring a pen and a piece of paper on board. This illustrates a fundamental need for making the fishers aware of the existing possibilities and rights, and the need for basic training.
Although not being able to quantify the effect, the Maritime Administration was convinced that the frequency of conflicts between industrial and small-scale fishers had been reduced after the establishment of the co-management committees.\textsuperscript{75} This was also the impression of the IDPPE, which had perceived that gear destruction and other problems of trawler violation had decreased as a result of expanding the small-scale zone.\textsuperscript{76} To substantiate this, co-management committee representatives from Kwirikwidge reported that in their experience, there were fewer problems with the trawlers at present, compared to before the establishment of the co-management committees.

\textsuperscript{75} Interview, leader of Maritime Administration in Angoche, April 1999.
\textsuperscript{76} In e-mail from IDPPE, 27\textsuperscript{th} of February 2001.
5.3.2 **Gaining legitimacy and trust**

The IDPPE had a section on the agenda at the workshop mentioned above, where the co-management committees were encouraged to make an effort to earn respect, trust and legitimacy among their constituencies. The focus was on democratic procedures, such as elections of co-management committee members. The IDPPE explained to the seminar attendants that a system of electing members eventually would improve the legitimacy of the co-management committees. One co-management committee member debated this, explaining that statutes would be elaborated and approved, but “in time”. Other attendants reacted to that by raising critical questions such as who would be responsible for making the statutes, and who was to decide when it was time and how to elect people to the committees. There was no evident solution to these issues, however, there was a consensus about addressing these questions on later occasions.

The informants did not seem to reflect too much on the election procedures of co-management committee members. Most were rather indifferent, as illustrated by the following informant:

“I don’t know which criteria were used to select the members of the committee. The members were presented the day of the first meeting. If they do a good job, I will be fine with it. Then re-election means nothing.”

Legitimacy partly depends on how fishers’ concerns are attended to. On different occasions in 1998 and 1999, the co-management committees in Angoche approached the IDPPE local affiliation and aired their discontent with certain aspects of the fisheries regulations. The legal mesh net size had been set to 38 mm/1.5 inches, and the co-management committees on behalf of the small-scale fishers in the Angoche area argued that the mesh size was far too wide and not compatible with their fishing operations. Since most fishers had been accustomed to using mosquito nets, it was a too long step to shift to such large mesh size. It simply did not make sense to the fishers, and there was a chance that the regulations would not be complied with. The IDPPE in Angoche suggested to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries reducing the legal mesh size in this area to 0.5 inches, whereby the Vice-Minister called the concerned parties to discuss the issue in September 1998, and requested the CAP to

77 Fisher from Quelelene, owner.
include this subject into the agenda. In January 1999, the IDPPE presented the case to the CAP, and argued for changes in the fisheries regulations. As a result, the CAP recommended that the proposed amendment should be approved for a pilot period of one year in the districts of Angoche, Moma and Mogincual. After this recommendation, a formal document on the subject was prepared for the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries to sign. Likewise, in January 1999, the small-scale fishers approached the IDPPE in Angoche about expanding the zone reserved for small-scale fishers from one to three miles. The IDPPE wrote a letter to the Minister about this request, and the government approved for one year. The following year the fishers re-submitted the proposal to consider the same rules for an extended period, and again, it was approved. The informants appreciated that their concerns were attended to. This was related to the impetus of the donor projects, exemplified by the following quote:

“This project [The Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project] allows the fishers to interact with government technicians and talk about the fishery. Before, that was impossible. We don’t have to travel to talk about and solve our problems, we appreciate that the government [IDPPE] comes to us and talks with us.”

The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, following the advise of the CAP, rescinded the periodical fishing moratorium period, the *veda*, in Moma and Angoche. This might as well indicate increased legitimacy. The argument from the co-management committees was that the *veda* was established according to the market seasons of interest to the semi-industrial and industrial prawn fisheries, which did not correspond to the interests of the small-scale fishers. Data from the IIP proved that prawn was by-catch for the small-scale fisheries, so there was little reason to close the season for the fishers who mainly caught fish. The co-management committees submitted a letter of request to rescind the *veda*, and the Ministry responded positively for a trial period of one year.

Another indication of state and fisher co-operation that enhanced legitimacy, as experienced by the co-management committee in Kwirikwidge, was the influence of the co-management committee on the local Maritime Administration’s procedures. The Maritime Administration

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78 Personal communication, IDPPE Angoche, April 1999.  
79 In e-mail from IDPPE, 27th of February 2001.  
80 Interview, co-management committee member, Kwirikwidge.  
81 In e-mail from IDPPE, 27th of February 2001.
used to come unannounced to the fishing centres and control fishers’ licences, to the
dissatisfaction of the fishers. The Kwirikwidge co-management committee and the Maritime
Administration came to an agreement that the Maritime Administration would notify their
arrival in advance, instead of surprising the fishers as earlier. This way, the fishers had the
opportunity to get their licences in order. Other informants experienced satisfaction that state
institutions took them seriously and that they thus actually had some influence, illustrated by
this informant from Quelelene:

“The fishers work directly with the sea, and the government helps in control and
surveillance. Now we can see a unity with the government and the fishers, and the
Maritime Administration also advises on payment of licenses. IDPPE always talks
with the fishers and knows about our problems... Yes, the situation has changed a
lot.”

With respect to the local level relation between the co-management committees and the
fishers, certain efforts of the Kwirikwidge committee demonstrated that they aspired to be
credible and legitimate institutions. The co-management committee had recently suspended a
previous committee chairman when it was discovered that he had confiscated money: He had
charged Mts70000 for migration licences while the going rate was Mts10000, and he had
kept the difference to himself. Soon after, another co-management committee member, Sr. C,
was punished for not having withdrawn his mosquito net after receiving the 0.5-inch net from
the Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project. The new co-management committee chairman, Sr.
V, caught Sr. C and confiscated his net, and the co-management committee denied him the
right to fish for the subsequent ten days. To make the process more intriguing: The same Sr. C
a few days after caught another co-management member, Sr. S, for the same offence, even
though he already had a 0.5-inch net. Subsequently, Sr. C summoned the rest of the co-
management committee who decided to prohibit Sr. S to fish for ten days as well. Co-
management committee members and informants confirmed these incidents, which caused a
bit of laughter and jokes. The reactions were seen as fair and just and set good examples; they
thus represented one step in the transformation process towards shedding old habits and
applying new regulation enforcement principles.

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82 Fisher from Quelelene, owner.
83 Mts10000 equalled approximately USD0.80 at the time of the fieldwork.
5.4 Co-management committees: Issues and challenges

5.4.1 Composition of co-management committees and in-house democracy

Regarding the above mentioned concern of tuning the co-management committees toward democratic principles, it is of interest to explore how co-management committee members had been selected in the first place. The members were either boat- or gear-owners or held a high social position in the communities, such as the traditional authorities called régulos. Or they had good relations with government institutions, or other useful connections and skills. In Larde, only a few boat owners had been involved in appointing co-management committee members. In Inguri, a group of community leaders had seen the need for and the opportunity to create an institution, and taking the initiative to establish a co-management committee, they installed themselves as co-management committee members. None of the co-management committees had systems of re-elections of members. This was distressing for some, as discussed at the workshop previously mentioned.

In practice, the criteria for being co-management committee members ruled out those who did not own boats or gear. The Kwirikwidge co-management committee consisted of ten members, and a formal criterion for becoming a member of the committee was to own boat and gear. The committee members were in general either influential community members already before the co-management committees were established, or they were related to the leader of the co-management committees. As an example, the chairman of the Kwirikwidge co-management committee, Sr. V, was already a prominent community member. In Quelelelène, the co-management committee leader, Sr. AB, was referred to as the community leader by informants and by the IDPPE. When the co-management committee was set up, the IDPPE publicly approved Sr. AB as the co-management committee leader of Quelelelène.

The Kwirikwidge co-management committee members had been nominated and elected at a meeting where the IDPPE, the Maritime Administration and 40 fisher owners were present. This means that of the approximately 700 fishers in Kwirikwidge, less than six per cent participated in the election meeting. The Kwirikwidge co-management committee members had not considered broader participation. The argument for not involving the marinheiros was that the owners were the ones who experienced the problems, and that the marinheiros did not have problems. Therefore, the marinheiros had nothing to contribute to in cases of for instance conflict resolution, as they did not make investments or have ownership
responsibility. Hence, while owners’ interests would be self-evident issues in the co-management committees, one could not assume that they would take care of the marinheiros’ interests, and marinheiros had no influence on decision-making. This was despite that the marinheiros were in touch with day-to-day challenges related to the fishing operations. This way, the composition of the co-management committees was not representative of the fisher constituencies, and a large share of those who derived their income from the fishing industry was not eligible for participating. This had an impact on the role of the co-management committees as being the link and information conveyor between the small-scale fishers and the state. An IDPPE representative reflected on this, realising that the IDPPE had given the co-management committees few, if any, guidelines and advice in this respect. Now that the IDPPE had become aware of this, it opted for challenging the co-management committee members, and encouraged them to include marinheiros in decision-making.

The marinheiros expressed concerns about their relation to the owners of fishing gear and boats. The following quotes from Kwirikwidge marinheiros illustrate that contrary to what the co-management committee members seemed to believe, marinheiros were attentive towards the processes going on, and were interested in participating:

“*The marinheiros should also be allowed to participate in the meetings because they also have their problems, for instance with their relations to the owners. Some owners treat their marinheiros in a bad manner, and the co-management committee should be aware of that.*”

“I know about the co-management committee. It controls the sea, and advises on how to avoid problems. The members are capable of solving problems... I have seen them on the beach, and I know who they are... I was never invited to a meeting, but I get the information given there anyway, I ask around... Why? Because of interest.”

The marinheiros were not in the position to insist on being invited to the co-management committee meetings. They were excluded from all the co-management committees we visited in Moma and Angoche, and thus from important local decision-making arenas. This was not unnoticed by external actors. In an evaluation of the PPAN, Awale et al. (1999) commented that most of the issues that were of relevance to local co-management committees also

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84 Interview, fisher Kwirikwidge, non-owner.
85 Interview, fisher Kwirikwidge, non-owner.
concerned the marinheiros. Furthermore, they suggested that the inclusion of the marinheiros in co-management committees should serve the purposes of information sharing, and in the long term basis, economic and social empowerment. This, in turn, could contribute to the successful future implementation of community development projects of various types. In other words, including marinheiros in co-management committees would clearly improve the democratic prospects of the fisheries management decision-making procedures:

“For the co-management process to be fully representative, it is crucial that the marinheiros have an allocated number of seats in each local committee.” (Awale et al. 1999: 3)

In a long-term perspective, this would be important for training purposes, as some marinheiros were future gear-owners. 86

In Quelelele, a co-management committee member we interviewed was a relative of Sr. AB, who was the community leader and the co-management committee leader. He said that Sr. AB had recruited him to the committee because of his qualifications. However, he claimed that he did not have power or influence in the co-management committee. The tradition was that the elderly had more power and should not be contested. Therefore, he never gave his opinion at co-management committee meetings, because he was one of the youngest members, and “one must respect the elder”. This way, his membership of the co-management committee did not entail a voice in decision-making matters. Despite of this, he was of the opinion that the co-management committee worked in a democratic manner, basing its decisions on consensus. Other informants in Quelelele, who were not members of the committees, did not agree with this, and doubted that a group of family members could work for the benefit of the rest of the fishers:

“Most committee members are in the same family. The problem is that they only solve problems for certain persons...and the eventual benefits will stay within the family...As it is now, I am not prepared to trust the co-management committee.” 87

86 This topic deserves further research: Have the crewmembers been accepted as worthy of being represented in the co-management committees in Mozambique as a result of the state’s encouragement of this? And if they have, what impact have they had?

87 Interview, fisher from Quelelele, non-owner.
Some informants saw Sr. AB as authoritarian; others did not, or were indifferent. They all agreed that one of the roles of Sr. AB was to solve problems of the community. It had been like that for many years, he had “always” had power. One Queleleene informant had much to say on this:

“I don’t know how Sr. AB was elected into the co-management committee. I don’t think there was an election, he is just the “chefe” who decides over other persons. He takes the decisions, sometimes on meetings, other times it is imposed on people. Most of the time it is imposed, I would call it dictatorship… I have doubts about the work of the co-management committee… No problems have been discussed with the fishers after the committee was officialised… I am a bit afraid of the members, and I do not approach them to participate in their meetings… One thing is sure, it is Sr. AB who knows how to handle problems, he has many roles in our place.”\(^{88}\)

Lopes (1999) later reported that the fishers of Queleleene refused to meet with the local co-management committee, as the small-scale fishers did not regard them as serving their interests. This was related to a controversial issue: Who were to benefit from the ten nets that the PPAN project distributed in each fishing centre? The fishers in Queleleene did not approve of the fact that only the co-management members received the nets that the PPAN project distributed in Queleleene, and thus opted for non-interaction with the local co-management committee.

The ways decisions are made are reflected in adherence to democratic principles. Some fishers contested the decision resulting in the ban of the mosquito nets in fishing gear, as illustrated by this Queleleene informant:

“I know there was an agreement in Larde. The problem is that the fishers are not yet prepared to stop the use. The “chefe” here does it because he already has a net; the nets were distributed to the committee that is composed of family and friends of the “chefe”. The committee did not discuss with the people about abandoning the use of mosquito nets.”\(^{89}\)

With respect to participation, it should not be neglected that not everybody is interested in

\(^{88}\) Interview, fisher from Queleleene, owner.

\(^{89}\) Interview, fisher from Queleleene, owner.
participating in decision-making bodies. In Pilivili, the co-management committee members said that “only a few” of the 82 invited gear owners participated in co-management committee meetings. Furthermore, this co-management committee experienced a problem with non-compliance with the decisions and regulations it made. These problems were common also in other co-management committees. Of the 85 owners who were encouraged to attend the meetings in Kwirikwidge, 30-35 attended, and the co-management committee members regarded this attendance as low.

5.4.2 Resistance of traditional authority
Newitt (1995) highlights the importance of accounting for traditional authority when implementing new institutions and systems in Mozambique. This is because traditional beliefs are still influential, and if they are not harmonised with existing institutions, the new projects that are often interlinked with new institutions will be going against what the vast majority of people believe. When the areas of operation for the different co-management committees in Kwirikwidge and Quelelele were defined, a co-operation between the co-management committees, the Maritime Administration and traditional leaders was deemed necessary (República de Moçambique 1999). Traditional power in Mozambique is conducted by approximately 1600 families, whose chiefs are designated régulo. In the 19th century, the régulos were petty chiefs or village headmen that were used by the colonisers to collect hut tax, recruit labour and carry out other rudimentary governmental functions (Bukali 1998; Lopes et al. 1998). Berry (1993) explains that while colonial regimes promoted and engaged in the exploitation of Africa’s economic resources, they sought to maintain order and exercise control over the conduct of the Africans through using traditional leadership. This was done by incorporating customary systems of law and authority into the apparatus of colonial administration. In Mozambique, Portuguese colonialism broke apart some of the pre-colonial reciprocity, but at the same time the Portuguese saw the need to retain parts of society’s traditional norms and principles of legitimacy. The Portuguese government administration tried to adapt the local structure in Angoche and Moma to its own political and economic interests (Newitt 1995).

The régulos’ functions in the area were primarily aimed at the collection of licence fees and taxes from the fishing community. The village secretaries represented the district administration, as Frelimo did. There was little distinction between politics and
administration, so that people confused the competencies of legislative, executive and judicial powers, and confusion increased when the opposition party Renamo set up party secretaries at the village level. After independence in 1975, the political and economic situation in Mozambique led to reluctance in the Frelimo government to assign resource management responsibility to the local communities. During the assemblies elections held by Frelimo in 1977, traditional chiefs and régulos were barred from participating in the elections, since they had held posts under the colonial regime. Great tension was created in some areas where party nominees with no local standing replaced traditional community leaders. In fisheries management, this was manifested by considering traditional and non-scientific methods to regulate the fishery as outdated, and consequently seen as obstacles to any development action (Lopes et al. 1998).

Although the power of traditional authorities has been weakened formally, communities are still subject to their authority. To some extent, it can be argued that the authority of traditional and informal leaders have been strengthened due to the human, financial and material weakness of the district administration. In July 2000, the government published a resolution, "Decreto 15/2000", which formalised the participation of the different traditional leaders in planning and development processes, including natural resource management and conflict resolution.90

Together with IDPPE, I visited the régulo in Kwirikwidge. Before Independence, he had powers to command people to pay taxes, make roads, clean cashew nuts, participate in traditional ceremonies and rituals, and he could expel people from his area. His power became more limited when the post-independence government changed the structures, involving other actors in decision-making positions. The Kwirikwidge régulo was a fisher, but explained that he did not have formal influence in fisheries decision-making and did not have a seat in the co-management committee. A Kwirikwidge co-management committee member expressed content with this solution:

"Before the project [The Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project], conflicts were solved by the unofficial leader of the fishers, the régulo, and the secretary. Today, the régulo is not participating. Now it is the state institutions, especially the Maritime Administration, and the committee [that solve the conflicts]. It is better the way it is"

90 In e-mail from IDPPE, 28th of February 2001.
done today.”

The relation between the régulo and the co-management committees could be tense. The Kwirikwidge régulo said that he was not on good terms with Sr. V, the leader of the Kwirikwidge co-management committee. Sr. V had been part of the co-management committee from the beginning and was later appointed to co-management committee leader. The Kwirikwidge régulo was concerned that while the co-management committee did not invite him to their meetings, nor to meetings with authorities, he was occasionally called upon to solve problems among the fishers. He gave as an example the last time he was called upon to assist in problem resolution. This was when the ten nets from the PPAN project were to be distributed in the Kwirikwidge fishing centre. All the fishers wanted nets, and the Kwirikwidge régulo was expected to support certain decisions. Since most fishers would be disappointed not to receive nets, he refused to participate in these decisions, because he did not want to put himself in a scapegoat position. The régulo did not regard the co-management committee as a legitimate institution, claiming there was a lack of mutual understanding of its role and mandate. It was a mistake of Sr. V not to subordinate himself to the régulo. He operated in an arbitrary way, and to a limited degree only consulted those who would be influenced by his decisions. “All Sr. V does, he does alone, and it ends with him”. Concerning this matter, the IDPPE-representative reminded the Kwirikwidge régulo about the time when the IDPPE came to Kwirikwidge in 1995 and 1996 in order to discuss the idea of creating co-management committees. At that time, the régulo had actually recommended Sr. V as a representative for the fishers, because he had good connections to the Maritime Administration, he knew most of the fishers in the area, and would thus be a good counterpart to the IDPPE. To this the Kwirikwidge régulo responded that the régulo indeed is the most influential person, but he had recommended Sr. V because he was literate and knew Portuguese, an advantage when co-operating with state officials. The Kwirikwidge co-management committee members had a different view on this relation, and claimed that his relation with the Kwirikwidge régulo was good, and that he actually had influence in the co-management committee. According to them, the régulo occasionally took part in problem resolution, and his goodwill was seen as important. In other words, there were different versions regarding the role of traditional authority. Practice varied in the other co-management committees, and I have little data on them. Some co-management committees had local régulos as members, and some did not. In M’wpitini, Moma, the co-management
committee claimed that traditional leaders were hindering their work, but my fieldwork data do not contain information to elaborate on this.

5.4.3 Collaborative and organisational capacity
The Mozambican authorities encouraged the fishers to organise in order to take part in management, and organising was an important step towards realising co-management and user group participation. Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) argue that unless governments and decision makers who implement government policies can be convinced of the desire and the ability of users to take on responsibility for management, not much progress can be made in co-management. However, not only the government may doubt local forces. Jentoft (1989) says that also resource users themselves may be sceptical towards the ability of the local forces and of the co-operatives. Fishers do not necessarily trust co-operatives more than they trust the government. As in the chapter on South Africa, my fieldwork data from Mozambique reveal that there are diverse opinions among the small-scale fishers with respect to their own ability to co-operate. A Kwirikwidge co-management committee member was positive that the fishers could work together, but put their situation in a larger context:

“If there were more possibilities, people would have something to work for; it would have been easier with a common goal. It is obvious that fishers can solve problems in cooperation with the co-management committee, I myself go out in my boat and advise people on how to set the nets, and people comply with the rules”.

This informant was of the opinion that it was difficult to come up with convincing reasons to motivate collaboration and organisation. For instance, one obstacle related to the physical difficulty of reaching customers with higher purchasing power, due to the lack of production facilities and physical infrastructure. Other informants had little confidence in local collaborative and management capacity. As indicated earlier, not all were convinced that the co-management committee members worked towards the common good for the whole community. This also applied to an informant who received credit for a new fishing net:

“There is no spirit of working together and helping each other. The committee does

91 Interview, fisher from Kwirikwidge, owner, co-management committee member.
not make any difference, the leaders only think about themselves...The government must help us organise. Then the fishers can work together.”

There was scepticism to the idea that management responsibilities should be delegated entirely to a co-management committee, and some informants emphasised the necessity of continued state involvement in fisheries management:

“Both the state and fishers should take part in fisheries management. Then there will be two hands that can help each other. One hand does not kill a flea.”

“The state should have more responsibility than the fishers. If the responsibility is given to the fishers, they cannot manage. There is no union between the fishers”.

“The state and the fishers must both have responsibility for management. Not the state alone, because it does not know the reality. And not the fishers alone, if only Sr. V [co-management committee leader] was to decide, it would not have been good. One must have somewhere to turn if something goes wrong.”

In other words, as the informants quoted above indicated, the presence of and cooperation with the state was wanted and needed. In the absence of a specific accountability unit, the state would have to be the supportive counterpart to the fishers and the co-management committees. Other informants approved of the idea that the state should participate in the management, but only when there were concrete problems to attend to:

“The state and the fishers should work together when there are problems that only the state can solve. But in general, I cannot see what the state has to do with the fisheries.”

92 Fisher from Kwirikwidge, owner, received credit for nets.
93 Interview, fisher from Kwirikwidge, non-owner (“Uma mão não mata uma pulga” – One hand does not kill a flea).
94 Interview, fisher from Quelelene, non-owner.
95 Interview, fisher from Kwirikwidge, non-owner.
96 Interview, fisher from Kwirikwidge, non-owner.
5.4.4 Preliminary results of the co-management committees’ work

Some results of the co-management committees’ work have been demonstrated above. Even though the co-management committees were relatively new establishments, there had already been some changes that could be ascribed to their efforts. According to the Larde agreement, the use of the mosquito nets was to be abandoned, but opinions varied with respect to the effects of this agreement. Some informants were quite positive, illustrated by the following quote:

“The use of mosquito nets is going down... The number of conflicts is reduced... People respect each other more than before.”

In Koropa and Mukoroge, the co-management committees claimed that the practice of mosquito nets had been abandoned in their fishing centres, and the co-management committee in Moma claimed it had been reduced. Despite of this, the Koropa co-management committee argued that it had not seen any increases in catches. The Inguri co-management committee experienced the same, even though the Inguri fishers had reduced the use of mosquito nets. The Inguri co-management committee members claimed that it was due to fishers from other areas intervening with the fish stocks in their area: Fishers from Moma fishing centres migrated to Inguri and other fishing centres in the Angoche area, where they used mosquito nets, to the annoyance of the Inguri co-management committee members.

The regulations in Quelelene prohibited the use of mosquito nets after 25th of April 1999. However, it turned out that people complied with the regulations only for a short time, before returning to using mosquito nets. In Kwirikwidge, the co-management committee said that there had been a reduction in the use of mosquito nets, meaning that those who already owned a 0.5-inch net had reduced the use of fishing nets with bags of mosquito nets. Of the 85 nets operated in Kwirikwidge, only ten had been substituted by nets not using mosquito nets by April 1999. In 2001, the fishers who did not own a 0.5-inch fishing net still used mosquito nets. Although the total of these changes was relatively small, it nevertheless reflected increased consciousness and a dawning shift of attitude.

97 Interview, fisher from Kwirikwidge, owner.
98 IDPPE, in e-mail in February 2001.
Another topic of concern to the fishers was the migration resulting from the changes following the civil war. During the civil war, people migrated to the coast and to islands along the coast, because it was considered safer than the inland areas. This implied more pressure on the resources in certain areas along the coast. The informants were aware of these mechanisms, and had observed a reduction of catches in some areas. This is why the co-management committees saw the need to formalise a system for controlling the traffic of migrating fishers to the different fishing areas. However, the co-management committees realised that this was a double-edged sword. In communities where there were few alternatives to fishing, and in periods of scarce fish resources, the options were either to violate the established norms for fishing or to migrate to other fishing areas. While the fishers in general agreed that migration between different areas had to be restricted, they also realised that they needed the possibility to migrate to other areas. On the previously mentioned workshop on 22nd of April 1999, and on the information tour conducted by the IDPPE and the IIP, the co-management committees discussed the migration issue. The practice they had agreed upon was that the migrating fishers approach the co-management committees in order to obtain licenses for migrating, and thereafter the Maritime Administration must approve. The different co-management committees reported on different results of their efforts. The co-management committee in M’pwitini found conflicts between migrating fishers easier to resolve after the co-management committee had been set up. In Inguri, the committee charged the fishers who wanted to migrate Mts10000 (approximately USD0.80). The co-management committee in Quelelene Island claimed that the process of training people in resource management issues was already started, and that the migration of fishers was already under control. The co-management committee in Larde fined migrating fishers without licence Mts100000 (approximately USD8). This co-management committee had written a letter to inform the neighbour fishing centres that they would allow a maximum of 30 beach seines from other centres. No mosquito nets were allowed, and the migrant fishers had to carry a yearly fishing permit and a statement of the co-management committee from which they originated. Furthermore, they had to comply with decisions taken by the local co-management committee. The IDPPE saw this as a positive initiative, and held it as a statutory example, of which not all approved: The co-management committee in Inguri argued that the Larde co-management committee should have consulted the other co-management committees beforehand, in order to reach a mutual understanding. In Kwirikwidge, there was also a limit of 30 nets for outside fishers, and in this case the co-management committee had discussed its decisions beforehand with the co-management committees from the areas where the fishers
usually came from. The Kwirikwidge committee had experienced that the collaboration between the different co-management committees had improved over the past few months, and emphasised the importance of consulting other co-management committees in the area before taking decisions. During its almost two years of existence, the Kwirikwidge co-management committee had noted a positive change. Before establishing the co-management committee, the locals and migrants occasionally destroyed each other’s nets, but now, there was more respect for the rules. The Kwirikwidge co-management committee believed that its work had made a difference and had influenced the fishers’ behaviour.

The increasing number of fishers had aggravated problems such as theft, and crossing of nets causing damage to the fishing gear. Also in this respect there were indications that the co-management committees had had a positive effect: Kwirikwidge and Sangage reported fewer problems with nets being crossed, and the rate of thefts had been reduced. Possibly, the explanation could be that the co-management committee had a preventive and reconciliatory effect, and that the relationship between the local and migrant fishers had been addressed. One informant expressed satisfaction with the work of the co-management committee in this way:

“The conflicts between the local fishers and thefts of nets have been reduced after the committee was created […] because of God and maybe because of the committee. In general, there are few problems in the fishery here now.”

Also the co-management committee in Larde emphasised that there had been improvements with regard to conflicts. Whenever nets were crossed, the new procedure as arranged by the co-management committee was that the net-owners or the team leader of the marinheiros met with the co-management committee to discuss a solution for damage pay. Generally, they would find a fair solution.

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99 Interview, fisher from Kwirikwidge, non-owner.
5.5 Discussion on Mozambique

In this section, the findings from the fieldwork in Mozambique are discussed in light of the research questions and the theoretical framework.

The process towards establishing and implementing a participatory decision-making system in the small-scale fisheries was a donor-induced and donor-supported process. A practical step towards including the small-scale fishers in the implementation of the policy reform was to establish local level co-management committees. By being present in the fishing communities, civil servants were approachable to the small-scale fishers, and it also implied that there was a mutual learning process: By interacting with co-management committee members and other fishers, civil servants learned more about the conditions in the fishing communities. One result of this was that the IDPPE and the Maritime Administration readily supported the co-management committee suggestions, such as expanding the fishing zone reserved for the small-scale fishers, or adjusting the legal mesh size to comply with the local fishing practice. These practices demonstrated some impacts of state institutions being close to the grassroots; it increased the likelihood of the voice of the small-scale fishers being heard, and that the small-scale fishers’ concerns were taken seriously.

Neither civil servants nor small-scale fishers had much experience with state-community collaboration. An effort to remedy this was demonstrated in the course of the information tour that the IDPPE and IIP undertook in the regions of Moma and Angoche, where they also checked and assessed the progress of the co-management committees since their initiation. This interaction turned out to be a mutual learning process, as civil servants increased their knowledge and understanding of the fishing communities. This way, civil servants were empowered, both in terms of theoretical aspects of fisheries management, and in terms of gaining knowledge about the practical local contexts in which the policy reform was to be implemented and embedded. The state approach to empowerment of the fishers implied informing about how to set up and run organisations, and how to establish organisation routines. The IDPPE and IIP arranged workshops and seminars for co-management committee members, where the principles of co-management were presented and discussed, as were the different co-management committees’ experiences.

The co-management committees formed a level, and hence the link between the state and the fishing communities. The co-management committees were to undertake tasks such as
training of fishers; for instance with respect to use of fishing gear, making them aware of natural resource conservation principles and destructive fishing gear’s adverse effect on the fish resources. In this respect, co-management committee members would take on a role as advisors and controllers. In practice, by sanctioning co-management committee members that had been caught in questionable fishing practices, the co-management committees demonstrated that they wanted to be taken seriously in their mandate of controlling and sanctioning, and thereby gain legitimacy. The results of their actions with respect to conflict resolution were recognised both by the co-management committees, other small-scale fishers, and the state institutions.

The majority of the small-scale fishers were not eligible as co-management committee members, and hence, the co-management committees were representative only of the owners of fishing boats and gear. They were of the opinion that the marinheiros had no business being involved in the co-management committees’ work. This is a demonstration of how the outcomes of policy reforms and institutional changes depend on key actors’ behaviour, awareness and determination to contribute to the democratisation of an industrial sector such as the small-scale fisheries. While the policy intentions was to uplift the marginalised small-scale fishers by, for example, increasing their opportunities for participation and hence, expand their representation, the opposite happened. This is an example of informal institutions working in a direction that counteract ambitious policy intentions: The co-management committee members were carriers of habits and norms that were counterproductive to achieving broad user group participation and fair representation. This is because the same people who were community leaders, or otherwise had prominent positions, were now members of the co-management committees. It means that the committees were constituted by community elites, and their behaviour was not conducive to increased and broadened user group participation. Their positions in the co-management committees only confirmed and consolidated the positions they already had before the establishment of the committees. Their acquiring new fishing nets though soft loans from the PPAN project created controversies, generating confusion and misunderstanding as to what the PPAN project was about: Was it about dispersing nets, or about fisheries management? The small-scale fishers who were not eligible for loans found it unfair that others were assisted by the PPAN project, while they had to struggle financially to replace their nets to comply with the agreement to abandon the use of mosquito nets. This had a negative effect on coherence among small-scale fishers, which was especially obvious in Quelelele.
I regard the small-scale fishers’ perception of their collaborative capacity as an expression of their social capital, as it relates to social relations, trust and networking. A dominant perception among the informants was that the people in the communities did not co-operate easily, and those who were not members of co-management committees were of the opinion that the establishment of the co-management committees had not made any difference to that. It may be due to, as Newitt (1995) pinpoints, the fact that most of the peoples of Mozambique have historically lived in small, dispersed social and political units. This influenced negatively on coherence and the ability to trust each other, and correspondingly on networking abilities. The civil war had made it extremely difficult to counterbalance these processes. There were limited social capital among the small-scale fishers, but the accelerating process of awareness-making created a foundation for production of social capital.

With respect to social capital, at one of the field-sites, some of the co-management members were kindred, and hence, there was a specific kind of bonding social capital among the co-management committee members. The informants who were not members of the co-management committee perceived them as excluding, and were of the opinion that the co-management committee members did not address issues of concern to the fishing community as a whole. Another example of bonding social capital was when members from the twelve co-management committees in Moma and Angoche met at workshops, they had the opportunity to develop relations, i.e. to bond among the co-management committees, and there were processes of cooperation and developing mutual understanding in fisheries management matters. However, the co-management committee members were not yet ready to include and bridge with the marinheiros. By shaking off the marinheiros’ rights to be heard in decision-making, assuming that they did not experience problems of any significance, the co-management committee members displayed a patronizing attitude. By this, they also disregarded that decision-making should be representative. This, in turn, lowered the prospects for the committees taking on a role of empowering individual fishers in their constituencies. The co-management committee members did not use their power and social capital to catalyse and enhance the social capital of other groups. They did not take on responsibility for empowering the marinheiros and contributing to enhancing their social capital. The power asymmetries within communities maintained the working of informal institutions; with the co-management committee members also being leaders of the very communities, there was no change in terms of who had power and influence, and thus, whose voice and interest claims got the upper hand. In other words, the local structures remained as
they were before the policy reform, and hence, the changes towards a more democratised and participatory industry sector would have to take place within unchanged structures conditioning local social, economic and political relations. An exception to this was that it seems like the policy reform and the establishment of the co-management committees had an impact on the position of traditional authority. There were indications that the reduced influence of traditional authority was perceived as an advantage of the policy reform. However, there were different opinions, and further research on this issue would enable a thorough analysis of the changing role of traditional authority in the fisheries policy reform.

The state had played an initial key role in supporting the constellation of the co-management committees. Civil servants learned from their experiences and observations in the fishing communities, and recognised that the state initiatives had to be adjusted along the way. For instance, when the IDPPE perceived that the marinheiros were at risk of becoming forever marginalised from participation in decision-making matters of relevance to them, it took on an advisory role towards the co-management committees. Both the IDPPE and representatives from the donor community recognised and suggested that for the co-management committees to be representative, the marinheiros ought to have seats in the local co-management committees, as this would serve the purpose of information sharing, participation, and economic and social empowerment. The IDPPE made the co-management committees aware of the fact that this was exactly what democracy entailed. Some relatively powerful local actors questioned this principle. Representation is but one indication of the democratic imprint of organisations. An interrelated issue is the principle of election and re-election of co-management committee members. There was a lack of understanding of the rationale of a system of election and representation in the co-management committees. The lack of election procedures and the inertia in including marinheiros as eligible decision makers may be an indication that the co-management committees had been established too fast. There had been little time to develop adequate institutions for the purpose of consolidating a representative system of fishers’ organisations, which went at the expense of democracy, empowerment and training.

As stated earlier in the dissertation, legitimacy of a regulation regime is necessary for user group compliance. When legitimacy is missing, there are typically two types of reactions: exit and voice. One example of exit was when the Mozambican small-scale fishers who actually possessed a legal size mesh net continued to use mosquito nets, even though it was
banned. Another example was when the fishers refused to meet with the co-management committee, and thereby demonstrated their discontent with its composition. This means that the fishers displayed discontent with technical regulations conditioning their working procedures and prospects for income, and also with the local social system. To balance this, the Mozambican small-scale fishers’ voice was audible through their interaction with the state; the state responded to certain episodes, and took action towards other actors with responsibility and the power to act on such issues. The interaction with the state and the state’s determination to support the small-scale fishers strengthened their voice.
6 Concluding discussion

In this final chapter, I follow up the discussions in chapters 4.5 and 5.5. The chapter is divided in four sub-sections that deal with the following: To what extent the institutional changes in the aftermath of the fisheries policy reforms led to real opportunities for the small-scale fisher to prosper, preconditions and prospects for co-management in the field sites; empirical observations contributing to co-management theory based on analytical generalisation; and finally, whether the disappointments experienced in some areas can be turned to a constructive learning experience. In this aspect, reflections around the time aspect are imperative.

6.1 Realisation of opportunities to prosper

One of the social ambitions of the South African and Mozambican fisheries policy reforms was to expand the opportunities for marginalised groups of fishers, with the ultimate objective of socio-economic development and poverty reduction. Opportunities refer to increased participation and influence in decision-making arenas, with a corresponding consolidation of access to the fish resources and a potential for socio-economic prosperity. According to the intentions of the policy reforms as expressed in such formal policy documents as the White Paper on the Marine Fisheries Policy for South Africa, the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 in South Africa, and the Fisheries Master Plan in Mozambique, the action space of the small-scale fishers had been expanded with new opportunities for socio-economic development. However, intentions expressed in policy documents are one thing, implementation and outcomes another. With this in mind, I wanted to explore whether the small-scale fishers actually were able to exploit these opportunities. During the fieldwork, I found that the role of the state was crucial to the small-scale fishers and their opportunities to prosper. I use the concept of “state” in singular when discussing the role of the state in general or for one of the cases, and “states” in plural when the analysis is valid for both countries. As said earlier (page 30), even though I treat the state as the actor “the state”, I do realise that states are complex actors, and that they are often fragmented in their affiliation to different interests. However, this has not been a subject of research in my dissertation. Anyway, the state has the power to establish external frames and conditions for the action space of the small-scale fishers, and is as such the principal supplier of conditions and frames that fishing industry actors have to relate to. Within the action space, the small-scale fishers negotiate
with the state and with other actors who have a stake in, and the power to, restricting and promoting the small-scale fishers’ socio-economic development. Figure 4 below outlines the context that conditions the action space of the fishing industry actors in the two countries.

**Figure 4: Interaction between the state and resource users within the action space**

The formal institutional changes that form the external condition for the small-scale fishers’ action space, denoted 1) in the figure, followed independence at the end of civil war in Mozambique in 1992. Then the election of an ANC-led government in 1994 formally ended apartheid in South Africa. The overall objectives were democratisation and socio-economic development. The states had varying approaches to and varying success in implementing the policy reforms in the two countries. As treated in the theory chapter, essential state activities include the establishment of formal institutions to define legal rights, authority frameworks, and apt administrative structures. This is done in order to motivate and consolidate user group participation. Initiatives from the state directed towards reforming the fisheries policies, denoted 2) in the figure, include the elaboration of the public policy documents, and choice of property rights system and management regime. The success of the implementation of the policy principles to a large extent depends on how the state chooses to facilitate, support and motivate mobilisation of user groups to be able to benefit from the opportunities. The responses and reactions from the grassroots to the state initiatives, denoted 3) in the figure,
include local mobilisation and organisation of individual fishers. The process of organising fishers can be initiated in different ways, and often involves actors with conflicting interests. The state and the grassroots co-operate and interact in different ways; and in their interaction, the opportunities become visible and eventually materialised, resource access are negotiated, and conflicts may emerge (point 4 in the figure). The outcomes of this interaction reflect who has been able to use the opportunities and how they have used them. This is a matter of influence and power, social capital and processes of empowerment; issues that are central both at the grassroots level and in the interaction between the industry actors and the state.

The outcomes of the interaction between the state and the user groups, 5) in the figure, include realisation of decentralisation, empowerment and increased social capital as part of a development process, and the establishment of a resource allocation pattern. These are dynamic processes that continue also after formal institutions and corresponding regulations have been established and endorsed.

The outcomes of the policy implementation express whether the high politics of the state is reflected in the deep politics of society, as Luckham et al. (2000) express it, i.e. whether formal institutional changes and the intentions behind them are realised and reflected in the actions of actors with the power to implement the intended changes. In order to achieve this, there is a need for key actors to take the lead in the realisation of substantive democracy, being the executors and driving forces of democratic politics. The “right kind” of actors use their social capital and power to respond to the initiatives from the state and elaborate on opportunities for the achievement of collective benefits. They take on responsibility and undertake imperative changes. Such key actors interact with and relate to the state, which has set the frames for the rules of the game. Unless such actors step forward and are supported both by the state and by their constituencies, the policy reform becomes nothing more than abstract formal institutions and guidelines without obligation.

Empowerment was a pending and inconclusive matter in both South Africa and Mozambique. There were vague guidelines on what empowerment should entail, and it was to take place within the existing social order. There were no actors who took on responsibility for initiating a profound empowerment process that would lead to the more marginalised fishers being able to de-marginalise and acquire power. The way it worked, the organisational entrepreneurs and co-management committee members used their social capital to position themselves so that they had influence on the implementation of the policy reform; thus, they had in their own
right empowered themselves, but at the expense of the bulk of their constituencies.

In South Africa, the state allocated quotas to the organisations, and did not engage in intra-organisational matters, such as how the quotas were redistributed within the organisations and how the incomes of the quota were used. Thus, the organisational entrepreneurs leading the organisations had been rendered a tremendous responsibility. They faced challenges, obligations and responsibilities both towards the state and the fishers. Unfortunately, there were strong tendencies that they failed their obligations and attended to adverse agendas. Their private agendas conflicted with public goals, and counteracted the realisation of the intentions behind the fisheries policy reform that could benefit the bulk of the small-scale fishers. As elaborated in Chapter 2, Tarrow (1998) discusses the phenomenon of dynamic opportunities that may quickly change and vanish, such as openings for a group of people closing or allow actors other than the target groups of the policy reform to benefit. The marginalised fishers as target groups in South Africa were not overall successful in taking advantage of the opportunities. The fisher population did not form a unity, and lacked basic skills to take on administrative and management tasks. In addition, small-scale fishers had to compete over quotas. In reality, the opportunities for small-scale fishers to prosper and benefit from the policy reform were reduced to the opportunity of getting a quota. Despite the policy reform being intended differently, this created an extremely competitive atmosphere, accompanied by distrust, envy and claims of corruption. Empowerment of the marginalised fishers was essential to them to be able to rise to the occasion. As discussed in the theory chapter, to have a fair chance of leading to acquirement of power, empowerment needs to be a bottom-up process, where marginalised groups eventually challenge asymmetrical power balances. This way, empowerment is interlinked with a transformation of economic and political structures as part of democratisation of society. Through democratisation, the marginalised become co-producers of decisions; with authority, influence and control over resources. As it was now, empowerment was not a bottom-up undertaking. Only an elite of organisational entrepreneurs had been able to acquire decision-making power, which means that empowerment was more of a middle-level - up process than bottom-up.

On the whole, the policy reform led to increased participation of the organisational entrepreneurs in South Africa. The democratisation process had not lead to increased participation and representation in decision-making arenas of direct relevance and importance to the small-scale fishers, namely the fisher organisations. At the time of my fieldwork, the
policy reform was more rhetoric than reality, especially so for those who actually lost out in the process; those who did not get a quota, or who experienced being kicked out of their organisations. For them, the policy reform was a disappointment; it had not fulfilled the expectations that had been aroused before the democratic elections. They remained marginalised: still poor, with difficult access to information, unable to take on responsibility or to benefit from the opportunities in the new policy.

The situation was somewhat different in Mozambique. Part of the participatory approach was to influence fishers’ attitude and behaviour regarding fishing practices and to motivate them to abandon destructive fishing gear such as mosquito nets. The long term benefits of this would be to secure the small-scale fishers’ source of income. The intention of the state was to train fishers, through the co-management committees, to adapt to “co-managementish” behaviour. The dominant perception among the informants in my study was that there had been positive changes as a consequence of the policy reform, and they appreciated the emerging interaction between the state and the fishing communities. However, the co-management committees were representative only for the owners of boats and gear, which constituted only a small share of the fisher population. There was an obvious inertia in terms of key actors leading a process towards a common goal, whereby all groups of small-scale fishers would be represented. This inertia did not have the same profound and devastating consequences for individual fishers in Mozambique as it had in South Africa, as Mozambican fishers in general did not risk being excluded from the fisheries altogether. For the co-management committee members, the fisheries policy reform had a positive impact in terms of increased user group participation, and opportunities of contributing to the establishment of a new order of management opened up. Those who had benefited from soft loans to buy new fishing nets were likely to improve their catches and thus their income. For the marinheiros, who make up the bulk of the small-scale fishers, the policy reform did not imply much of a change. Quite to the contrary, the marinheiros were probably more on the sideline than ever before, as it now became obvious that they were not eligible partakers in decision-making arenas.

6.2 Prospects for co-management in the cases studied

Co-management theory is normative and positive, based on empirical generalisations from various experiences with participatory management, mainly from developed countries. Co-
management theory is often not apt for the complexities of developing country contexts. I have argued for a set of criteria to consider when contemplating co-management in developing countries, related to decentralisation and power sharing, social capital, empowerment of user groups and disempowerment of authorities, participation, representation, legitimacy, trust, solidarity and accountability. It is difficult to identify and pinpoint exactly which systems can be defined as co-management systems, and how co-management can be realised in different contexts. Figure 1 on page 3 illustrates different combinations of state and user group co-operation in management that are referred to as co-management. It would be easy to claim that “everything” can be referred to as co-management as long as there is a trace of state or user group involvement in any phase or level of decision-making. When analysing preconditions for co-management, it is important to explore and understand the discrepancies between the ideal co-management model and the socially complex reality. In this section, I elaborate on the foundation and preconditions that exist for co-management in the field sites studied. Some factors are in place for co-management to be a realistic option, while other traits are counterproductive.

A dedicated and alert state, formalising institutions and facilitating frameworks which motivate and support user group participation, is a criteria and a precondition for co-management to function. The dedication and alertness of the South African and Mozambican states (i.e. the fisheries authorities) have been duly discussed in the dissertation. In terms of direct contribution to democratisation and user group participation in small-scale fisheries, the South African state was not strong enough. It had not defined legal rights in terms of user group participation for small-scale fisheries. Despite that an important part of fisheries management was decentralised to the fisher organisations, there were no clear-cut frameworks and structures guiding the behaviour and responsibilities of the organisational entrepreneurs who got this important responsibility, and de facto no sanctioning in case of diverging from their obligations. Another aspect that underscores the weakness, or perhaps evasiveness of the state in the early implementation phase, is that the state was not being explicit beforehand about the drawbacks and restrictions that came with the fisheries policy reform. For example, it did not make the fishing industry stakeholders aware of the fact that resource access had to be strictly regulated; quite to the contrary, the message was that more people would benefit from broadened access. It was assumed that those who were already established quota-holders would have to agree to the principles behind the policy reform and act accordingly, in terms of sharing, and hence decimating, their long-established privileges. Lots of hopes and
expectations were created among marginalised groups in the transition from the apartheid government to the democratically elected government, which by and large were not fulfilled, at least not in the pace that the small-scale fishers had expected. Part of the problem was the lack of an accountability unit to control that the actors responsible for the policy implementation did not wander off and attended other private agendas. An accountability unit, or apt watchdog, could have countered some of these effects.

The Mozambican state had taken steps to look into the legal aspects of the role of the co-management committees in fisheries management. Frameworks and structures for authority and administration were under elaboration in order to train the co-management committee members to act in correspondence with the policy reform. The state was frequently present in the fishing communities, and was thus able to observe and follow up on the implementation of the policy reform. When irregularities were spotted, such as for instance the co-management committee members not even considering the rights of crewmembers (marinheiros) to be represented in the fisher organisations, the state tried to influence the co-management committee members to act in accordance with democratic principles of representation and inclusion. This means that there was a dimension of accountability included in the state’s strategy in the interaction with the fishing communities. Hence, the state endeavoured to include a broader aspect of fishers to be part of the policy reform, and be participants in different aspects of management. The state institutions IDPPE, IIP and the Maritime Administration were active and dedicated in their interaction with the fishing communities. However, most activities depended on donors: As long as donor organisations approved the rationale for promoting co-management and were financially supportive, the processes were likely to continue. The interaction between state and donors was advantageous to the process of stimulating co-management, and the collaboration with researchers also gave input to the process. A crucial question is whether this will continue beyond donor funding.

I have indicated that the Mozambican co-management committees were established too fast, and that the South African organisational entrepreneurs got access to a too wide action space before structures and institutions to counteract adverse effects were in place. An alternative view is that these procedures are reflections of the respective states’ earnestness of decentralising fisheries management responsibilities and tasks. Their actions balance Ribot’s (2003) observation from various African countries that the capacity argument is often evoked so that the central government can avoid transferring powers. According to this argument,
powers cannot be devolved without capacity and resources in place of those who are rendered more responsibility. In this perspective, IDPPE representatives explicitly reckoned that it was better to get started than to wait for the small-scale fishers to be capacitated to take on tasks. The set-up of the co-management committees was a first step towards institutionalising training and empowerment for participation, and IDPPE expected that democratic spin-offs would gradually take place.

To sum up, both states to a certain extent disempowered themselves; South Africa by rendering power to the organisations, and Mozambique by interacting with the co-management committees with the specific aim of them being able to gradually take on more management responsibilities. This was positive from a co-management point of view. While the South African state was strong in terms of internationally recognised biological fish resource management, it proved rather weak and evasive in other aspects of fisheries management. It was not sufficiently dedicated to the process, partly due to lack of manpower and insufficient financial means. It opted for decentralising and privatising large part of the responsibilities for implementing the policy reform, including empowerment and the enhancement of social capital of the marginalised fishers. It underscores the fact that once distribution of resources is involved, it gets complicated and political. This has implications for co-management prospects, as one focus of co-management is on fair distribution. It was a strength of the Mozambican state that it was present in the communities, which proved its sincerity in contributing to the transformation efforts. Its weakness was displayed as it had not foreseen the turn the implementation would take, in that the majority of the fishers were left out from the participatory arena. This was somewhat counterbalanced when the IDPPE urged the co-management committee members to consider the inclusion of the marinheiros. Another weakness was its dependence on donors. The strength of the Mozambican state in terms of co-management was a result of its dependence on foreign donors.

The extent to which user groups participate in the different stages of planning and implementing fisheries management policies is an indication of their ability and eligibility as potential co-managers. For organisations to partake in co-management systems and contribute to their consolidation and predictability, they need to have specified mandates and standard procedures for membership and elections. Furthermore, they need to be representative of the fishers, and have routines for meetings and knowledge sharing. This enhances the democratic aspects of decision-making. There was a deficit in these preconditions in my case studies.
Though the organisations had been established, and had a structure of leadership, administration and relation to the state, they were still in the making and lacked much with respect to establishing and consolidating their relation with the fishers. In order to be part of democratic deepening, the organisations would need a different composition of responsible leadership, which would reflect dedication to the social aspects in order to align with the principles of the policy reform.

In Mozambique, state and user group collaboration was a new experience, and in addition, the small-scale fishers were not used to be affiliated to an organisation. A step towards co-management had been taken by actively applying the concept of co-management and setting up local level co-management committees. The fact that the co-management committees actually had been set up was a proof that an institutional change according to democratic and participatory principles was in the making. Co-management had become a terminology among actors in the small-scale fishing industry, and even though not all were aware of what it implied, it is an indication that the fishing industry actors were in a learning process. What had taken place within a short time-span was in fact a long step. The framework of the co-management committees had been established, supposed to align to democratic institutions; however, despite these democratic imprints, democratic guidelines were by and large missing. This was made worse by the lack of solidarity and a bridging sense of social capital between the co-management committee members and the crewmembers. The former had “always” regarded the latter as pure manpower to work their gear, and not as eligible decision-making partners. The co-management committee members simply did not seem to approve of the necessity of and rationale for including the crew in the co-management committees.

While there to a certain extent was mutual understanding and trust between the state and the organisations in South Africa, the organisations were distant from the fishers. There was an obvious deficiency of trust. High expectations that had not been fulfilled had been aroused among the marginalised fishers. The policy implementation process had succeeded only to a very limited degree to re-establish trust in a fisheries management system that would consider also the marginalised small-scale fishers and to address past injustices. There was a lack of solidarity, and little desire on the part of organisational entrepreneurs to co-operate, join forces and work towards a common goal with the bulk of fishers. This means that in fact, there was a lack of solidarity along two dimensions; intra-industrially between big-business fishing industry and the small-scale fisher organisations, and inter-organisationally between
the organisational entrepreneurs and their constituencies. The organisations that were created in South Africa had quotas as their main reason for existing. The actors who were in the position to make a difference did not seem to grasp that their role was to apply their social capital, experiences and competence to smoothen the implementation of the policy reform. This was evident both at the state level where policy makers operated, such as the case of the Fisheries Transformation Council, and at the local level, with the intra-organisational interaction between the organisational entrepreneurs and the small-scale fishers. This, in turn, generated further mistrust. The strong power asymmetries that were a legacy of apartheid were not rebalanced with the new policy reform, at least not as quickly as the policy makers had expected. There is a short way from unfulfilled expectations to disappointment, and then to loss of legitimacy of the state, the management system and the democratisation process in general. This has a negative impact on trust, and thus on incentives for collaboration; and on small-scale fishers’ willingness to put effort into an eventual participatory management system.

Figure 2 on page 9 depicts the development potential within a fisheries management context, where the middle co-operative solution provides a likelihood of realising increased development and power potentials. Figure 5 below adds the dimension of movement from one decision-making arrangement to another.

![Figure 5: The power dimension of decision-making in fisheries management. South Africa and Mozambique: Moving towards state-fisher collaboration?](image-url)
Figure 5 illustrates that the point of departure of the South African system at the beginning of the policy reform, was at the left hand side of the figure, where the state is responsible for quota allocations and for restricting peoples’ resource access. The point of departure of the Mozambican system was at the right hand side of the figure, with a low degree of state intervention at the beginning of the fisheries policy reform. My intention has been to reveal whether South Africa moves to the right and Mozambique to the left, bringing both towards the middle of the figure and hence towards a co-operative form of fisheries management, thus creating a positive synergy for increasing the total power and development potential.

According to the formal institutions and the rhetoric in both South Africa and Mozambique, the policy reform would entail a movement towards the middle of Figure 5; towards co-operative forms of management with consolidated interaction between the state and the user groups. For the case of South Africa, there had been a movement towards increased interaction between the state and the organisations, however, limited to and centred on allocating quotas. Once this was done, the state-organisation interaction came to a halt until the next round of quota allocations. There was little direct interaction between the state and the small-scale fishers beyond the contact with the organisations. This could have been an efficient arrangement, if the organisational entrepreneurs had been representative of and accountable to their constituencies, which as a rule they were not. The way it was, it only contributed to consolidating the inequalities that were already there before the policy reform. However, one change was that the small-scale fishers were welcome to visit the MCM premises and interact directly with civil servants. Whether this was efficient and conducive to change for the individual fishers is difficult to say. This arrangement gave preference to the small-scale fishers living close to Cape Town, and to those who were more resourceful in the first place. The overall picture was that the movement towards more state-fisher collaboration that had taken place certainly had not led to a co-operative sense of fisheries management, in terms of both the small-scale fishers and the state having strong management influence. While it had increased the development potential and power of the exclusive elite of organisational entrepreneurs, it had not increased the power of the state, and certainly not the development potential of the marginalised small-scale fishers.

The situation was somewhat different for Mozambique. By being present in the communities, the state civil servants interacted with the co-management committees and also directly with the fishers, for instance through the extension workers who served as a link between the fishing communities and the state. Though the state did not apply sanctions when the co-
management committees hesitated in aligning to democratic principles, it took the role of advising the co-management committees how to democratise their organisations and approach the fisher constituencies. The development potential and power of the co-management committee members had increased, and so had the power of the state, in that it had gained legitimacy and acceptance among the fisher population. The realisation of the development potential of the majority of the fishers (the marinheiros) was rather bleak, as they to a certain extent seemed even more left at the sideline with the policy reform. It was more or less “official” that they were not represented in the co-management committees.

In sum, there were movements towards the middle for both South Africa and Mozambique. Although the movements were small, they can be seen as steps towards a deeper change. Implementation of co-management all comes down to context. I find it difficult to denominate either system co-management in the cooperative sense with the state and user groups as partners with equal degree of influence and power. However, in Mozambique, the state and the fishers are both directed towards a co-management ideology, and their interaction is a huge step towards a democratic management system and eventually co-management. In South Africa, it is more difficult to work towards co-management within the organisations. As emphasised, the organisations were established with their primary objective of getting quotas. In practice, the organisations did not have ambitions of being arenas for participatory management functions, and in their present state, they were not democratic inclusive organisations that could comply with the intentions of the policy reform. There were few indications that this would change, at least not with the involvement of the state; the state had placed itself on the sideline and this way marginalised itself from interaction with fishers at the grassroots.

### 6.3 Learning from the case studies – generalising to theory

Throughout the dissertation, I have elaborated on aspects to be considered for co-management to be implemented in a developing country context. In this section, based on my case studies, I substantiate why these aspects are important. The cases are set within different contexts, and approach the research questions from different positions. My research findings are analytically generalised to complement and elaborate on co-management theory in developing country contexts.
Fisheries management theory has often been based on assumptions and concepts instead of empirical experiences. Comprehensive fisheries management institutions have been designed based on these assumptions, but they have often failed when facing complex, real contexts. Hence, when contemplating whether to design and implement co-management as decision-making arrangements in a developing country context, assumptions need to be transformed into empirical questions derived from experiences that reveal needs for further investigations and trigger researchers’ curiosity. It is imperative that social, political and historical contexts are considered. In case of the opposite, it is likely that co-management in developing countries becomes a malfunctioning blueprint of co-management in the West. Already at the sketching board it is important to include actors who are going to be affected, including and considering the voices of those who live in the specific situations and are familiar with problems, challenges and potentials for improvements. Possibly, the result could be that the planners or initiators realise that co-management is a premature undertaking, and that preconditions are lacking and need to be produced.

The co-management concept is symbolically laden, and much of the co-management literature is based on democratic arguments and principles that seem just right and self-evident. When implemented, such principles often risk being suffocated by practical and technical considerations of a complex reality. In order to be able to achieve a functional co-management system, it is crucial to assess the present situation. Given that real influence rendered to user groups is a criterion of co-management, key actors who do not align to basic democratic principles and act in accordance with the policy reforms may slow down or obstruct the policy implementation, thus counteracting the intentions of the policy reforms. This is why the actor perspective is imperative in co-management theory. In this respect, local power relations and power asymmetries need to be accounted for when contemplating whether to encourage co-management: The relation state-fishers, the relation fishers-fishers, and the corresponding status of power sharing, social capital, ability and desire of disempowerment (state) and empowerment (fishers). This will give a realistic perception of whether the user groups are up to the responsibilities and tasks that come with co-management, and whether the state is mature and strong enough to be ready to disempower itself. Such tasks demand actors who understand that with great power comes great responsibility, and act accordingly. In line with this, the fishers’ initial situation must be considered; their point of departure, and whether they are in a situation characterised by initial disadvantage. Part of this is to understand how their situation reflects the prevailing status of
and mechanisms of power asymmetry, social capital, and accountability, and to understand the need for empowerment. For co-management theory to include considerations of power relations between stakeholders at different levels, it needs to map key actors’ positions in the decision-making system. This will give a qualified opinion of who has power and influence in decision-making and who is most likely to take advantage of the opportunities, and which actors are apt to take on a responsibility for contributing to the transition. In other words, it is important to account for human nature, to outline a strategy for how to influence and re-allocate positions and roles, and to counteract detrimental behaviour and mechanisms. An important consideration is to what extent the fishers are organised into interest groups. If organisations exist, it is crucial to explore how the fishers are represented in the organisation, and fishers’ access to and use of information and knowledge. This will give a picture of the potential for applying the social capital that already exists, for the production of social capital, and of facilitating a bottom-up empowerment process.

The paradox of participation labels the situation in which the marginalised are more or less incapable of using the opportunities for enhanced participation provided by democratic decentralisation. Explicit reference to empowerment as a bottom-up effort instead of a half-hearted state initiative needs to be a part of co-management theory. Empowerment must also apply to developing the capacity of civil servants, so that they are trained to interact with communities, as a step towards familiarising themselves and the state apparatus with the fishing communities and the fishers they interact with. The Mozambican approach, with central level civil servants occasionally present in the fishing centres where fishers work and interact, enabled them to observe power structures in local communities. This observation was used to change the state’s approach to empowerment. In a long term perspective, this can contribute to counteracting a situation of the paradox of participation.

Linked to this is the issue of harmony and disharmony of interest among relevant actors. One reason for the difficulties of the South African policy reform implementation was that there was limited harmony of interest between the different fishing industry stakeholders. There was a too large distance between fishing industry big business and the new entrants belonging to the small-scale fisheries, especially since they competed for the same resources. It was even more complicating that there was a disharmony of interest between the organisational entrepreneurs and the organisations’ members, who ideally ought to work towards a common objective. There was more harmony of interest in Mozambique, due to the fact that there was
more equality between the different fishing industry actors in the first place. However, there was also a dimension of disharmony, as the crewmembers were not seen as eligible decision makers. Harmony or disharmony of interest will be reflected in legitimacy of organisations, the state and management regimes. Hence, legitimacy needs to be an inherent part of co-management theories and is decisive for whether rules will be complied with. Legitimacy refers to how the state chooses to communicate and interact with the user groups, whether the fishers trust the state and the promises are being fulfilled. A low degree of legitimacy is a hindrance to co-management. The South African case demonstrated the temptation of the state to operate as a hope-generating machine. In a short-term perspective this may create legitimacy; however, when the expectations are not fulfilled, legitimacy plummets and is hard to re-establish. Co-management theory should contain a device for policy makers not to mislead fishing industry stakeholders and create unrealistic expectations. In other words, policy makers need to communicate clear and plain messages, and be prepared to stand for unpopular decisions. At the end of the day, it is close to impossible to satisfy all interested stakeholders; some will gain, while most will be disappointed in situations where resources are scarce and the system is exclusive. This may go against the image of co-management as a participatory and democratic decision-making system, especially if some are excluded after the system has been established, which is likely with a quota system, as the South African case illustrates.

The cases proved that accountability has a justified place in co-management theory, in order to consider the need for controlling and protecting the interests of marginalised groups. When there are accentuated conflicts of interest, and the objective is to have a more democratic and developed social or industrial sector, there is need for an accountability unit (watchdog) that, to say it bluntly, anticipates, prevents and attacks counter-productive forces. This is based on the decision makers’ need to consider in advance what kind of risk factors there are that may hinder the realisation of the policy reform, and not the least to preserve legitimacy among certain groups. A well functioning accountability unit can take due action based on early warnings, whereas absence of an accountability unit too often leads to late lessons from warnings that are still early. Accountability of the state is downwards, both to the fishers and to the fisher organisations. Accountability of fisher organisations is twofold, directed upwards, proving accountability to the state, and downwards to the fishers. In processes of democratic transition, where the objectives include to reform systems and facilitate the transition towards a democratic system with the ultimate objective of poverty reduction,
accountability units can correct off-track market mechanisms that are diverting the course of the transformation.

6.4 The time aspect of democratic learning: Using the disappointment constructively

Through the work on this dissertation, I have gained insights into the significance of power plays, external intervention in the action space of marginalised groups, elite capture, and the need for accountability in the implementation process of a policy reform, to mention but a few aspects. As the cases have demonstrated and reconfirmed, it is easier to approve and endorse a policy reform and a new order of management than to realise it, also in societies that are loud about their democratic transition.

I recognise that my case studies tend to display a sense of disappointment; not in the implementation of a participatory management system or of co-management as such, but in the impacts and outcomes of the policy reforms and hence in the real effects of the democratic transition. However, it is thinkable that the disappointment can generate positive lessons and eventually be turned towards being a valuable learning experience. This is based on the conviction that it is crucial to learn from experiences, and actively use them as building blocks for further action and development. The combination of time and social dynamics may be drivers of institutional changes. My fieldwork was undertaken in the early phase of the policy reform implementation process. The democratisation process is still ongoing in both South Africa and Mozambique. Therefore, the disappointment must be related to the aspect of time, and to the fact that implementation of a policy reform is a complex, multifaceted and long-term process. It demands a conscious approach with patient actors; such an approach will prevent hectic quick-fixes that may have detrimental effects and create unrealistic expectations within a short time frame. The transformation process towards a democratised industrial sector can be seen as a process of democratic education and training. Co-management cannot be introduced as a participatory management system simply because someone approved of its convenience. The same decision makers need to recognise that co-management is a social learning process: It takes time and demands conscious dedication, monitoring, and the involvement of the right kind of actors. This way, co-management is a device for power production and institutional reform.
The case studies revealed a deficiency of key actors to assist the state in implementing the policy reform. However, this does not mean that such key actors do not exist; what it means, is that they have not been identified and appointed accordingly. It goes without saying that it takes time to recreate the social landscape and empower stakeholders who historically have been marginalised from decision-making arenas. To return to Pomeroy and Berkes’ (1997) concept of “phasing in”: it suggests to give due consideration to time and to appreciate that a shift towards participatory management and co-management in societies where actors have limited practical experience of being part of democratic systems inevitably takes place over time. Projects that deal with the implementation of participatory systems and co-management cannot be abandoned before they have had a chance to prove their eventual justification. A recreation of the social landscape involves active actors who can plan and follow strategies to benefit from opportunities from democratisation and policy reform.

The South African case study demonstrated that some fishers did not put up with what they perceived as unfair and futile workings of their fisher organisation, and broke out of the organisation and created a new fisher organisation. This is an exemplification of social dynamics with potential to change the course. If key actors in groups such as this break out group have learned from their experiences, they may use their social capital and power in a constructive way; displaying it as a positive instead of a negative power. Due to the perceived negative experiences from an organisational set-up that did not align to the benevolent intentions behind the policy reform, key actors in the break out group may apply their experiences and act differently. Hence, seeking a new order, they can represent the right kind of organisational entrepreneurs for fishers that affiliate to this organisation. In other words, the disappointment can be an impetus for development and improvement, contribute to co-management theory as an evaluation model for how to improve processes and procedures and hence, to contribute to the realisation of the potentials of the policy reform.
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### Appendix: Chronological account of interviews and meetings

<table>
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<td>9.2.99 Kommitte Primary School, information about stakeholder consulting for establishing crayfish farming</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>10.2.99 MCM, Cape Town: Workshop on the management of marine living resources in South Africa. Observing</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>11.2.99 Meeting Consultative Advisory Forum. Observing</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>12.2.99 Interview with government social worker, working in fishing communities, Wynberg</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>12.2.99 Interview with government social worker in Ocean View</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>16.2.99 Cape Town harbour, observing public meeting between SACFC and fishers</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>19.2.99 Lambert’s Bay fishing company, group interview fishers</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>19.2.99 Lambert’s Bay, interview co-op representative</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>19.2.99 Lambert’s Bay, group meeting with 16 widows, quota applicants</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>21.2.99 IDPPE, donor representative, briefs about the situation in Angoche</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>23.2.99 Trawler and linefish fishermen union</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>1.3.99 Mandela Park, township near Hout Bay, with Social worker, group meeting with fishers</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>3.3.99 S.A. Pelagic Fishing Industry Association, leader</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>5.3.99 Sea Fisheries, on community trusts</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>8.3.99 Hout Bay, Widows organisation, two representatives</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>9.3.99 Trawler and line fishermen union, two representatives: shop steward and worker on engine of the ships</td>
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<td>82</td>
<td>10.3.99 Sea Fisheries, Consultative Advisory Forum-meeting, observing</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>11.3.99 Sea Fisheries, Subsistence Fishery Task Team, observing</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>15.3.99 University of Cape Town, researcher on subsistence fisheries, key informant</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>15.3.99 Yzelfountain, meeting with confused fishers</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>16.3.99 Sea Fisheries, Legal task team session. Observing</td>
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<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>15.3.99 Sea Fisheries, quota policy expert, key informant</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>16.3.99 Meeting with the co-management committee in Kwirikwidge, group interview</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>16.3.99 Briefing from IDPPE meeting in Sangage, Angoche (AKN did not go there)</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>16.3.99 Quelelana, interview Mestro marinheiro</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>19.4.99 Quelelana, interview owner</td>
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<td>20.4.99</td>
<td>Quelelene, interview marinheiro</td>
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<td>21.4.99</td>
<td>Quelelene, interview owner, member of the co-management committee</td>
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<td>22.4.99</td>
<td>Seminario sobre experiencias sobre co-gestião Angoche/ Moma/ Mogincual, observing</td>
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<td>23.4.99</td>
<td>Briefing from meeting between IDPPE and ADMAR Maputo, visiting in Angoche</td>
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<td>24.4.99</td>
<td>Maritime Administration Angoche, interview</td>
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<td>24.4.99</td>
<td>Kwirikwidge, interview owner</td>
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<td>Kwirikwidge, interview owner, member of the co-management committee</td>
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<td>Kwirikwidge, interview marinheiro</td>
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<td>Quelelene, interview Mestro marinheiro</td>
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<td>Quelelene, interview metre marinheiro</td>
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<td>24.4.99</td>
<td>Quelelene, interview owner</td>
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<td>24.4.99</td>
<td>Interview with the Kwirikwidge régulo (in Morua – with Simeão Lopes and Florence Bukali)</td>
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<td>26.4.99</td>
<td>Co-management seminar in Angoche</td>
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<td>26.4.99</td>
<td>Kwirikwidge, interview owner, member co-management committee</td>
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<td>Kwirikwidge, interview marinheiro</td>
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<td>Kwirikwidge, interview mariheiro</td>
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<td>30.4.99</td>
<td>Meeting with Finnish KNOPS-consultant</td>
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<td>3.5.99</td>
<td>Meeting with fisher women in Inguri, Angoche</td>
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<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
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<td>3.6.99</td>
<td>Meeting with Chair of the Consultative Advisory Forum</td>
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<td>7-8.6.99</td>
<td>Sea Fisheries, workshop Sea Point, observing</td>
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<td>9.6.99</td>
<td>Grahamstown, Eastern Cape, meeting with group of women</td>
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<td>9.6.99</td>
<td>Grahamstown, Noluthando Hall, township</td>
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<td>10.6.99</td>
<td>Port Alfred, Eastern Cape, Sea Fisheries inspectorate</td>
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<td>10.6.99</td>
<td>Port Alfred, City Hall, meeting, Sea Fisheries presentation</td>
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