Artikler, rapporter og annet (filosofi og førstesemesterstudier)
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/1220
2024-03-28T08:33:41ZSubstituted Decision-making
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/33213
Andersson, Anna-Karin Margareta<br />
A core principle of medical ethics states that patients should be allowed to determine whether they wish to accept or refuse treatment, if they possess the relevant decision making capacity at the time treatment decisions need to be made. In cases where patients lack capacity to make decisions regarding their own treatment, substitute decision makers must make such decisions for them. This chapter begins with explication of criteria for decision making capacity and decision making incapacity. It then outlines the main standards of substituted decision making in the legal context: the Substituted Judgment Standard and the Best Interests Standard. It then discusses the moral groundings of these standards. The moral groundings are commonly understood to be two of the cornerstones of medical ethics: the principle of respect for patients’ autonomy and the principle of beneficence respectively. It then discusses how these standards apply to the formerly capacitated patient and the never-capacitated patient. It finally discusses conceptual, metaphysical, and moral challenges of substituted decision making. The chapter concludes with a summary of the most pressing issues of the contemporary debate on substitute decision making, and suggestions for fruitful future research focus.<br />
2023-01-01T00:00:00ZSubstituted Decision-makingAndersson, Anna-Karin MargaretaA core principle of medical ethics states that patients should be allowed to determine whether they wish to accept or refuse treatment, if they possess the relevant decision making capacity at the time treatment decisions need to be made. In cases where patients lack capacity to make decisions regarding their own treatment, substitute decision makers must make such decisions for them. This chapter begins with explication of criteria for decision making capacity and decision making incapacity. It then outlines the main standards of substituted decision making in the legal context: the Substituted Judgment Standard and the Best Interests Standard. It then discusses the moral groundings of these standards. The moral groundings are commonly understood to be two of the cornerstones of medical ethics: the principle of respect for patients’ autonomy and the principle of beneficence respectively. It then discusses how these standards apply to the formerly capacitated patient and the never-capacitated patient. It finally discusses conceptual, metaphysical, and moral challenges of substituted decision making. The chapter concludes with a summary of the most pressing issues of the contemporary debate on substitute decision making, and suggestions for fruitful future research focus.Rowman & LittlefieldChapterBokkapittelAndersson: Substituted Decision-making. In: Di Nucci, Lee, Wagner. The Rowman & Littlefield Handbook of Bioethics, 2023. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers p. 54-61Kann und soll der Wille zur Macht überwunden werden? Ein Versuch des späten Nietzsche
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/33150
Himmelmann, Beatrix<br />
Das Prinzip des Willens zur Macht spielt von Beginn an, das heißt spätestens seit dem kurzen Stück über Homer’s Wettkampf, bis in Nietzsches letzte philosophische Texte hinein eine hervorgehobene Rolle. Doch es fällt auf, dass Nietzsche am Ende neben und gegenläufig zu diesem Prinzip ein Verständnis und eine Haltung dem Leben gegenüber zu konturieren sucht, die über den Willen zur Macht hinausweisen. Dies wird vor allem deutlich im Antichrist, auf den ich mich deshalb im Folgenden besonders konzentriere.<br />
2023-11-01T00:00:00ZKann und soll der Wille zur Macht überwunden werden? Ein Versuch des späten NietzscheHimmelmann, BeatrixDas Prinzip des Willens zur Macht spielt von Beginn an, das heißt spätestens seit dem kurzen Stück über Homer’s Wettkampf, bis in Nietzsches letzte philosophische Texte hinein eine hervorgehobene Rolle. Doch es fällt auf, dass Nietzsche am Ende neben und gegenläufig zu diesem Prinzip ein Verständnis und eine Haltung dem Leben gegenüber zu konturieren sucht, die über den Willen zur Macht hinausweisen. Dies wird vor allem deutlich im Antichrist, auf den ich mich deshalb im Folgenden besonders konzentriere.De GruyterJournal articleTidsskriftartikkelPeer reviewedHimmelmann. Kann und soll der Wille zur Macht überwunden werden? Ein Versuch des späten Nietzsche. Nietzscheforschung. 2023NietzscheforschungDeontologischer Objektivismus? Ein Kommentar zu "Sinn im Leben"
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/33139
Himmelmann, Beatrix<br />
Im Folgenden möchte ich die Hauptthese des Buches, „dass das sinnvolle Leben am intuitiv plausibelsten durch eine Theorie beschrieben werden kann, die sich als ‚deontologischer Objektivismus‘ bezeichnen lässt“ (P 1-2), kritisch beleuchten. Vor allem drei Fragen sollen meine Diskussion leiten: Was genau beinhaltet der von Markus Rüther vorgeschlagene „deontologische Objektivismus“? Kann er überzeugen? Gibt es grundlegende Gesichtspunkte, die Rüthers Versuch unberücksichtigt lässt, denen eine philosophische Untersuchung des Sinns im Leben jedoch Rechnung tragen sollte?<br />
2023-12-01T00:00:00ZDeontologischer Objektivismus? Ein Kommentar zu "Sinn im Leben"Himmelmann, BeatrixIm Folgenden möchte ich die Hauptthese des Buches, „dass das sinnvolle Leben am intuitiv plausibelsten durch eine Theorie beschrieben werden kann, die sich als ‚deontologischer Objektivismus‘ bezeichnen lässt“ (P 1-2), kritisch beleuchten. Vor allem drei Fragen sollen meine Diskussion leiten: Was genau beinhaltet der von Markus Rüther vorgeschlagene „deontologische Objektivismus“? Kann er überzeugen? Gibt es grundlegende Gesichtspunkte, die Rüthers Versuch unberücksichtigt lässt, denen eine philosophische Untersuchung des Sinns im Leben jedoch Rechnung tragen sollte?IngentaJournal articleTidsskriftartikkelPeer reviewedHimmelmann B. Deontologischer Objektivismus? Ein Kommentar zu "Sinn im Leben" . Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung. 2023;77(4):510-515Zeitschrift für Philosophische ForschungAgeing in Place and Autonomy: Is the ‘Age-Friendly’ City Initiative Too Elderly-Friendly?
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/33092
Angell, Kim<br />
This chapter discusses the ‘age-friendly cities’ initiative aimed at enhancing people’s opportunity to age in place. It presents an autonomy-based defence of the idea and examines the moral claim that the elderly can make in support of their ability to age in place. The chapter emphasizes, among other considerations, that ageing in place can have cognitive benefits through the routines and habits made possible by familiar environments. However, the chapter also highlights that the claims of the elderly can come into conflict with the claims of the young. We should not only look at today’s elderly but also anticipate how today’s young will fare when they get old. The chapter concludes by making the case for an ‘all-age-friendly’ (or even ‘young-friendly’) interpretation of the age-friendly cities initiative, while also insisting on the importance of policies benefiting low-income families (regardless of age) and promoting intergenerational housing initiatives.<br />
2023-05-01T00:00:00ZAgeing in Place and Autonomy: Is the ‘Age-Friendly’ City Initiative Too Elderly-Friendly?Angell, KimThis chapter discusses the ‘age-friendly cities’ initiative aimed at enhancing people’s opportunity to age in place. It presents an autonomy-based defence of the idea and examines the moral claim that the elderly can make in support of their ability to age in place. The chapter emphasizes, among other considerations, that ageing in place can have cognitive benefits through the routines and habits made possible by familiar environments. However, the chapter also highlights that the claims of the elderly can come into conflict with the claims of the young. We should not only look at today’s elderly but also anticipate how today’s young will fare when they get old. The chapter concludes by making the case for an ‘all-age-friendly’ (or even ‘young-friendly’) interpretation of the age-friendly cities initiative, while also insisting on the importance of policies benefiting low-income families (regardless of age) and promoting intergenerational housing initiatives.Oxford University PressChapterBokkapittelAngell K: Ageing in Place and Autonomy: Is the ‘Age-Friendly’ City Initiative Too Elderly-Friendly?
. In: Bognar G, Gosseries A. Ageing Without Ageism?: Conceptual Puzzles and Policy Proposals, 2023. Oxford University Press p. 214-228Who Needs to Tell the Truth? - Epistemic Injustice and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions for Minorities in Non-Transitional Societies
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/32950
Reibold, Kerstin<br />
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have become a widely used tool to reconcile societies in the aftermath of widespread injustice or social and political conflict in a
state. This article focuses on TRCs that take place in non-transitional societies in which
the political and social structures, institutions, and power relations have largely remained
in place since the time of injustice. Furthermore, it will focus on one particular injustice
that TRCs try to address through the practice of truth-telling, namely the eradication of
epistemic injustice. The article takes the Canadian and Norwegian TRCs as two examples
to show that under conditions of enduring injustice, willful ignorance of the majority, and
power inequality, TRCs might create a double bind for victims which makes them choose
between epistemic exploitation and continued injustices based on the majority’s ignorance. The article argues that the set-up and accompanying measures of TRCs are of the
utmost importance if TRCs in non-transitional societies are to overcome epistemic injustice, instead of creating new relations of exploitation.<br />
2024-01-08T00:00:00ZWho Needs to Tell the Truth? - Epistemic Injustice and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions for Minorities in Non-Transitional SocietiesReibold, KerstinTruth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have become a widely used tool to reconcile societies in the aftermath of widespread injustice or social and political conflict in a
state. This article focuses on TRCs that take place in non-transitional societies in which
the political and social structures, institutions, and power relations have largely remained
in place since the time of injustice. Furthermore, it will focus on one particular injustice
that TRCs try to address through the practice of truth-telling, namely the eradication of
epistemic injustice. The article takes the Canadian and Norwegian TRCs as two examples
to show that under conditions of enduring injustice, willful ignorance of the majority, and
power inequality, TRCs might create a double bind for victims which makes them choose
between epistemic exploitation and continued injustices based on the majority’s ignorance. The article argues that the set-up and accompanying measures of TRCs are of the
utmost importance if TRCs in non-transitional societies are to overcome epistemic injustice, instead of creating new relations of exploitation.Cambridge University PressJournal articleTidsskriftartikkelPeer reviewedReibold KS. Who Needs to Tell the Truth? - Epistemic Injustice and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions for Minorities in Non-Transitional Societies. Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology. 2023:1-21Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemologyGender balance
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/32835
Mittner, Lilli<br />
Gender balance is defined as equal participation of women and men. Aiming for gender balance can be one pathway towards more equal, diverse, and inclusive societies. Gender balance can be achieved both vertically and horizontally within an organisation. Vertical gender balance is defined as an equal proportion of women and men in ranked positions of power. Horizontal gender balance is defined as an equal proportion of women and men across different fields of practices. A major limitation of the concept is that it builds on a binary understanding of gender which leads to statistical data handling that does not take gender diversity into account. Gender balance in academia needs to be seen in a broader context of transformational processes towards a more gender equal society. Innovative measures to map and monitor gender balance in research leadership have been recently developed in Norway. Those who work with the concept need to keep in mind that balanced representation does not necessarily lead to a redistribution of power.<br />
2023-04-12T00:00:00ZGender balanceMittner, LilliGender balance is defined as equal participation of women and men. Aiming for gender balance can be one pathway towards more equal, diverse, and inclusive societies. Gender balance can be achieved both vertically and horizontally within an organisation. Vertical gender balance is defined as an equal proportion of women and men in ranked positions of power. Horizontal gender balance is defined as an equal proportion of women and men across different fields of practices. A major limitation of the concept is that it builds on a binary understanding of gender which leads to statistical data handling that does not take gender diversity into account. Gender balance in academia needs to be seen in a broader context of transformational processes towards a more gender equal society. Innovative measures to map and monitor gender balance in research leadership have been recently developed in Norway. Those who work with the concept need to keep in mind that balanced representation does not necessarily lead to a redistribution of power.Taylor & FrancisChapterBokkapittelMittner: Gender balance. In: Duarte M, Losleben K, Fjørtoft K. Gender Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in Academia
A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Transformation, 2023. Routledge p. 232-238Epistemic injustice
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/32834
Reibold, Kerstin<br />
Epistemic injustice groups together different phenomena that inhibit us from accessing or producing knowledge due to prejudices about certain groups. Epistemic injustice describes situations in which speakers’ knowledge is falsely discredited due to their group membership. It can also describe the lack of concepts for describing experiences, and the connected knowledge, of marginalised groups as well as mechanisms that lead to the dismissal of certain areas of knowledge and research. For universities, it is important to be aware of when, how, and why epistemic injustices arise to foster an environment that includes all knowledge relevant to a certain subject.<br />
2023-04-12T00:00:00ZEpistemic injusticeReibold, KerstinEpistemic injustice groups together different phenomena that inhibit us from accessing or producing knowledge due to prejudices about certain groups. Epistemic injustice describes situations in which speakers’ knowledge is falsely discredited due to their group membership. It can also describe the lack of concepts for describing experiences, and the connected knowledge, of marginalised groups as well as mechanisms that lead to the dismissal of certain areas of knowledge and research. For universities, it is important to be aware of when, how, and why epistemic injustices arise to foster an environment that includes all knowledge relevant to a certain subject.Taylor & FrancisChapterBokkapittelReibold KS: Epistemic injustice. In: Duarte M, Losleben K, Fjørtoft K. Gender Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in Academia
A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Transformation, 2023. Routledge p. 129-139LGBTQ+
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/32832
Vitikainen, Annamari Eliisa<br />
This chapter discusses some of the challenges and potential solutions for better treatment and inclusion of LGBTQ+ persons (lesbian, gay, bi, trans, queer students and staff) in higher education. The chapter provides a theoretical background on the understanding of the LGBTQ+ categories, as well as the ethical questions relating to the treatment of LGBTQ+ persons in contemporary societies. Specific issues surrounding LGBTQ+ in higher education are discussed under the broader categories of discrimination, lack of knowledge, bias, and representation. Practical solutions for improving the situation of LGBTQ+ persons in higher education are suggested.<br />
2023-04-12T00:00:00ZLGBTQ+Vitikainen, Annamari EliisaThis chapter discusses some of the challenges and potential solutions for better treatment and inclusion of LGBTQ+ persons (lesbian, gay, bi, trans, queer students and staff) in higher education. The chapter provides a theoretical background on the understanding of the LGBTQ+ categories, as well as the ethical questions relating to the treatment of LGBTQ+ persons in contemporary societies. Specific issues surrounding LGBTQ+ in higher education are discussed under the broader categories of discrimination, lack of knowledge, bias, and representation. Practical solutions for improving the situation of LGBTQ+ persons in higher education are suggested.Taylor & FrancisChapterBokkapittelVitikainen A: LGBTQ+. In: Duarte M, Losleben K, Fjørtoft K. Gender Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in Academia
A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Transformation, 2023. Routledge p. 19-30Policing, Undercover Policing and ‘Dirty Hands’: The Case of State Entrapment
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/32793
Tanyi, Attila Geza; McLeod, Stephen K; Hill, Daniel J.<br />
Under a ‘dirty hands’ model of undercover policing, it inevitably involves situations where whatever the state agent does is morally problematic. Christopher Nathan argues against this model. Nathan’s criticism of the model is predicated on the contention that it entails the view, which he considers objectionable, that morally wrongful acts are central to undercover policing. We address this criticism, and some other aspects of Nathan’s discussion of the ‘dirty hands’ model, specifically in relation to state entrapment to commit a crime. Using János Kis’s work on political morality, we explain three dilemmatic versions of the ‘dirty hands’ model. We show that, while two of these are inapplicable to state entrapment, the third has better prospects. We then pursue our main aim, which is to argue that, since the third model precludes Nathan’s criticism, a viable ‘dirty hands’ model of state entrapment remains an open possibility. Finally, we generalize this result, showing that the case of state entrapment is not special: the result holds good for policing practices more generally, including such routine practices as arrest, detention, and restraint.<br />
Manuscript submitted to <a href=https://link.springer.com/journal/11098>https://link.springer.com/journal/11098</a>.<br />
2024-01-01T00:00:00ZPolicing, Undercover Policing and ‘Dirty Hands’: The Case of State EntrapmentTanyi, Attila GezaMcLeod, Stephen KHill, Daniel J.Under a ‘dirty hands’ model of undercover policing, it inevitably involves situations where whatever the state agent does is morally problematic. Christopher Nathan argues against this model. Nathan’s criticism of the model is predicated on the contention that it entails the view, which he considers objectionable, that morally wrongful acts are central to undercover policing. We address this criticism, and some other aspects of Nathan’s discussion of the ‘dirty hands’ model, specifically in relation to state entrapment to commit a crime. Using János Kis’s work on political morality, we explain three dilemmatic versions of the ‘dirty hands’ model. We show that, while two of these are inapplicable to state entrapment, the third has better prospects. We then pursue our main aim, which is to argue that, since the third model precludes Nathan’s criticism, a viable ‘dirty hands’ model of state entrapment remains an open possibility. Finally, we generalize this result, showing that the case of state entrapment is not special: the result holds good for policing practices more generally, including such routine practices as arrest, detention, and restraint.Journal articleTidsskriftartikkelTanyi A, McLeod SK, Hill DJ. Policing, Undercover Policing and ‘Dirty Hands’: The Case of State Entrapment. Philosophical Studies. 2024Philosophical StudiesReassessing the Needs for Carbon Dioxide Removal: Moral Implications of Alternative Climate Target Pathways
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/32695
Voget-Kleschin, Lieske; Baatz, Christian; Heyward, Jennifer Clare; van Vuuren, Detlef; Mengis, Nadine<br />
Non-technical summary. Scenarios compatible with the Paris agreement’s temperature goal
of 1.5 °C involve carbon dioxide removal measures – measures that actively remove CO<sub>2</sub>
from the atmosphere – on a massive scale. Such large-scale implementations raise significant
ethical problems. Van Vuuren et al. (2018), as well as the current IPCC scenarios, show that
reduction in energy and or food demand could reduce the need for such activities. There is
some reluctance to discuss such societal changes. However, we argue that policy measures
enabling societal changes are not necessarily ethically problematic. Therefore, they should
be discussed alongside techno-optimistic approaches in any kind of discussions about how
to respond to climate change.<p>
<p>Technical summary. The 1.5 °C goal has given impetus to carbon dioxide removal (CDR)
measures, such as bioenergy combined with carbon capture and storage, or afforestation.
However, land-based CDR options compete with food production and biodiversity protection.
Van Vuuren et al. (2018) looked at alternative pathways including lifestyle changes, low-population projections, or non-CO<sub>2</sub> greenhouse gas mitigation, to reach the 1.5 °C temperature
objective. Underlined by the recently published IPCC AR6 WGIII report, they show that
demand-side management measures are likely to reduce the need for CDR. Yet, policy measures entailed in these scenarios could be associated with ethical problems themselves. In this
paper, we therefore investigate ethical implications of four alternative pathways as proposed by
Van Vuuren et al. (2018). We find that emission reduction options such as lifestyle changes
and reducing population, which are typically perceived as ethically problematic, might be less
so on further inspection. In contrast, options associated with less societal transformation and
more techno-optimistic approaches turn out to be in need of further scrutiny. The vast majority of emission reduction options considered are not intrinsically ethically problematic; rather
everything rests on the precise implementation. Explicitly addressing ethical considerations
when developing, advancing, and using integrated assessment scenarios could reignite debates
about previously overlooked topics and thereby support necessary societal discourse.
<p>Social media summary. Policy measures enabling societal changes are not necessarily as ethically problematic as commonly presumed and reduce the need for large-scale CDR.<br />
2024-01-05T00:00:00ZReassessing the Needs for Carbon Dioxide Removal: Moral Implications of Alternative Climate Target PathwaysVoget-Kleschin, LieskeBaatz, ChristianHeyward, Jennifer Clarevan Vuuren, DetlefMengis, NadineNon-technical summary. Scenarios compatible with the Paris agreement’s temperature goal
of 1.5 °C involve carbon dioxide removal measures – measures that actively remove CO<sub>2</sub>
from the atmosphere – on a massive scale. Such large-scale implementations raise significant
ethical problems. Van Vuuren et al. (2018), as well as the current IPCC scenarios, show that
reduction in energy and or food demand could reduce the need for such activities. There is
some reluctance to discuss such societal changes. However, we argue that policy measures
enabling societal changes are not necessarily ethically problematic. Therefore, they should
be discussed alongside techno-optimistic approaches in any kind of discussions about how
to respond to climate change.<p>
<p>Technical summary. The 1.5 °C goal has given impetus to carbon dioxide removal (CDR)
measures, such as bioenergy combined with carbon capture and storage, or afforestation.
However, land-based CDR options compete with food production and biodiversity protection.
Van Vuuren et al. (2018) looked at alternative pathways including lifestyle changes, low-population projections, or non-CO<sub>2</sub> greenhouse gas mitigation, to reach the 1.5 °C temperature
objective. Underlined by the recently published IPCC AR6 WGIII report, they show that
demand-side management measures are likely to reduce the need for CDR. Yet, policy measures entailed in these scenarios could be associated with ethical problems themselves. In this
paper, we therefore investigate ethical implications of four alternative pathways as proposed by
Van Vuuren et al. (2018). We find that emission reduction options such as lifestyle changes
and reducing population, which are typically perceived as ethically problematic, might be less
so on further inspection. In contrast, options associated with less societal transformation and
more techno-optimistic approaches turn out to be in need of further scrutiny. The vast majority of emission reduction options considered are not intrinsically ethically problematic; rather
everything rests on the precise implementation. Explicitly addressing ethical considerations
when developing, advancing, and using integrated assessment scenarios could reignite debates
about previously overlooked topics and thereby support necessary societal discourse.
<p>Social media summary. Policy measures enabling societal changes are not necessarily as ethically problematic as commonly presumed and reduce the need for large-scale CDR.Cambridge University PressJournal articleTidsskriftartikkelPeer reviewedVoget-Kleschin, Baatz, Heyward, van Vuuren D, Mengis N. Reassessing the Needs for Carbon Dioxide Removal: Moral Implications of Alternative Climate Target Pathways. Global Sustainability. 2023:1-11Global Sustainabilityinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/819566/EU/Project on Integrated Assessment model-based Scenarios for Sustainable development Objectives/PICASSO/