• Gender balance 

      Mittner, Lilli (Chapter; Bokkapittel, 2023-04-12)
      Gender balance is defined as equal participation of women and men. Aiming for gender balance can be one pathway towards more equal, diverse, and inclusive societies. Gender balance can be achieved both vertically and horizontally within an organisation. Vertical gender balance is defined as an equal proportion of women and men in ranked positions of power. Horizontal gender balance is defined as an ...
    • Getting personal: Can systems medicine integrate scientific and humanistic conceptions of the patient? 

      Vogt, Henrik; Ulvestad, Elling; Eriksen, Thor Eirik; Getz, Linn (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2014)
    • Group rights, collective goods, and the problem of cross-border minority protection 

      Vitikainen, Annamari (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2019-02-02)
      This article argues that there are both practical and conceptual reasons for relaxing the prevailing state-centric frameworks for minority protection in the global arena. The article discusses two example cases: the indigenous Sami and the Roma travellers. It draws on analyses of the kinds of rights protected by the key international minority rights documents, and the kinds of goods these rights ...
    • Heller død enn udødelig 

      Holmen, Heine Alexander (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017)
      «Hva er det vi egentlig mener når vi sier, mennesket er dødelig?» spør Woody Allen i boken The Insanity Defence. Han legger til: «Det er åpenbart ikke et kompliment.»1 Jeg tror Woody tar feil her. Vår dødelighet er et kompliment – eller i det minste av det gode – siden livet uten døden ville være katastrofalt. Udødelige liv fører til dyp kjedsomhet, eksistensiell angst og en radikal form for ...
    • Heteronomi som forutsetning for autonomi 

      Nilsen, Fredrik (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2021-06-15)
      In his major works in ethics, Immanuel Kant (1724—1804) does not pay much attention to the question how humans become moral. The main tasks for Kant in these works are to establish the moral law and discuss its application. However, in his minor works in ethics and pedagogy he draws our attention to the question mentioned and claims that humans first become moral when they get 16 years old. Before ...
    • "Hidden Inwardness" and "Subjectivity is Truth": Kant and Kierkegaard on Moral Psychology and Religious Pragmatism 

      Fremstedal, Roe (Chapter; Bokkapittel, 2019)
      This chapter reconstructs the concept of hidden inwardness, arguing that this term refers to moral characters (and religious characters) that are expressed with deeds and words, rather than referring to a private inner world. By relying on the distinction between morality and legality, the chapter argues that “hidden inwardness” is not compatible with all kinds of behavior, and that it is better ...
    • How many women judges are enough on international courts? 

      Føllesdal, Andreas (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2021-02-21)
      The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) made history on August 27, 2018. The majority of its judges were female—six of 11, and the first among international courts and tribunals (ICs) to secure sex parity—that is, numerical equality.1 This achievement is even more remarkable given that only 23% of the judges and arbitrators of the ICs are women.2 The milestone also prompts us ...
    • How Much Better than Death Is Ordinary Human Survival? 

      Labukt, Ivar Russøy (Chapter; Bokkapittel, 2019-03)
      According to common sense and a majority of philosophers, death can be bad for the person who dies. This is because it can deprive the dying person of life worth living. I accept that death can be bad in this way, but argue that most people greatly overestimate the magnitude of this form of badness. They do so because they significantly overestimate the goodness of what death deprives us of: ordinary ...
    • How to Gauge Moral Intuitions? Prospects for a New Methodology 

      Tanyi, Attila; Bruder, Martin (Chapter; Bokkapittel, 2014)
      Examining folk intuitions about philosophical questions lies at the core of experimental philosophy. This requires both a good account of what intuitions are and methods allowing to assess them. In the paper we propose to combine philosophical and psychological conceptualisations of intuitions by focusing on three of their features: immediacy, lack of inferential relations, and stability. Once this ...
    • Hvorfor ethvert samfunn trenger filosofi 

      Himmelmann, Beatrix (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017)
      Discussing three issues that are central to philosophical thinking, the article argues that each and every society requires the kind of reflection that philosophy entails. The first issue concerns the claim that we have to give reasons for our assertions, the second addresses the idea and significance of truth, and a third pivotal philosophical question deals with the importance of acknowledging ...
    • Hvorfor handlingskunnskap ikke er slutningsbasert 

      Holmen, Heine Alexander (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017-01-06)
      Anscombes handlingsfilosofi har gjort et klart comeback. Særlig har filosofer som David Velleman og Kieran Setiya gjort mye for å fremvise fordelene ved hennes type rammeverk, nemlig at det kan forklare en nær forbindelse mellom å handle intensjonelt og å ha kunnskap (om hva en gjør og hvorfor) ved at kunnskap inngår som konstitutiv komponent i handling. Sarah K. Paul har utfordret dette synet ved ...
    • Hvorfor undervise kanoniserte mannlige filosofers kjønnsperspektiver? Om universalitet og kjønnsnøytralitet i Aristoteles’, Kants og Mills etiske teorier 

      Nilsen, Fredrik (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2022-05-30)
      I artikkelen diskuterer jeg hvorfor vi bør undervise kanoniserte mannlige filosofers kjønnsperspektiver til examen philosophicum. Dette er ofte et neglisjert tema i lærebøker i filosofiens historie. Etter mitt syn finnes det i det minste tre grunner for inkludering av kjønnsperspektivene: For det første, har de kanoniserte mannlige filosofenes syn hatt avgjørende innflytelse på hvordan vi har ...
    • Improving Arguments for Local Carbon Rights: The Case of Forest-Based Sequestration 

      Heyward, Clare; Lenzi, Dominic (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2022-11-20)
      Land-based climate mitigation schemes such as REDD+ imply the creation of ‘rights to carbon’ for actions that enhance carbon sinks. In many cases, the legal and normative foundations of such rights are unclear. This article focuses on special rights on the basis of improvement. Considering improvement in relation to carbon sinks requires asking what it means to ‘improve’ an environmental resource. ...
    • In Defense of Moderate Inclusivism: Revisiting Rawls and Habermas on Religion in the Public Sphere 

      Jakobsen, Jonas; Fjørtoft, Kjersti (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2018-11-17)
      The paper discusses Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories of deliberative democracy, focusing on the question of religious reasons in political discourse. Whereas Rawls as well as Habermas defend a fully inclusivist position on the use of religious reasons in the ‘background culture’ (Rawls) or ‘informal public sphere’ (Habermas), we defend a moderately inclusivist position. Moderate inclusivism welcomes ...
    • Indigenous citizenship, shared fate, and non-ideal circumstances 

      Vitikainen, Annamari (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2020-10-27)
      This paper discusses the notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ as a potentially inclusive and real-world responsive way of understanding Indigenous citizenship in a non-ideal world. The paper draws on Melissa Williams’ work on ‘citizenship as shared fate,’ and assesses some of the benefits and drawbacks of using this notion to understand citizenship in Indigenous and modern state contexts. In ...
    • Institutional consequentialism and global governance 

      Tanyi, Attila; Miklós, András (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2018-03-13)
      Elsewhere we have responded to the so-called demandingness objection to consequentialism – that consequentialism is excessively demanding and is therefore unacceptable as a moral theory – by introducing the theoretical position we call institutional consequentialism. This is a consequentialist view that, however, requires institutional systems, and not individuals, to follow the consequentialist ...
    • Introducing Normativity in African International Politics 

      Abumere, Frank (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2020-07-21)
      With fifty-four states, Africa represents a microcosm of the Westphalian world. In conjunction with the Westphalian fragmentation of the continent, other fragmentations have compounded the intractable problem of ‘othering’ on the continent. The fragmentations sum up an African condition in the twenty-first century because they simultaneously represent the ‘divisions’ based on which Africans are ...
    • Introduction to special issue on world government 

      Tanyi, Attila (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2019-05-22)
    • Introduction: Symposium on Acceptable and Unacceptable Criteria for Prioritizing Among Refugees in a Nonideal World 

      Vitikainen, Annamari; Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2020-12-11)
      All persons have a right to seek and find asylum. Arguably, the international community, or the states that comprise it, have a duty to provide such asylum. In the present circumstances, such rights of refugees, or the duties of the receiving states, are not always fulfilled. Not everyone is able to seek, let alone find, asylum, and many refugees, all deserving of asylum, are left unprotected, ...
    • Is Logic Distinctively Normative? 

      Labukt, Ivar Russøy (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2019-07-01)
      Logic is widely held to be a normative discipline. Various claims have been offered in support of this view, but they all revolve around the idea that logic is concerned with how one ought to reason. I argue that most of these claims—while perhaps correct—only entail that logic is normative in a way that many, if not all, intellectual disciplines are normative. I also identify some claims whose ...