• Arbeidsmarkedet for norske filosofer i dag 

      Fremstedal, Roe (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017)
      Denne artikkelen gir en kort gjennomgang av arbeidsmarkedet for norske filosofer og vektlegger noen av de største problemene filosofer i dag står overfor innen akademia og arbeidslivet for øvrig. Jeg relaterer problemene på arbeidsmarkedet (for kandidater på høyere og lavere akademisk nivå) til svakheter innen utdanningssystemet og akademisk publisering. Avslutningsvis tar jeg til orde for en ...
    • Demonic despair under the guise of the good? Kierkegaard and Anscombe vs. Velleman 

      Fremstedal, Roe (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2019-04-30)
      The aim of this paper is to clarify Kierkegaard’s concept of demonic despair (and demonic evil) and to show its relevance for discussions of the guise of the good thesis (i.e. that in φ-ing intentionally, we take φ-ing to be good). Contemporary discussions of diabolic evil often emphasise the phenomena of despair and acedia as apparent counter-examples to the guise of the good. I contend that ...
    • "Hidden Inwardness" and "Subjectivity is Truth": Kant and Kierkegaard on Moral Psychology and Religious Pragmatism 

      Fremstedal, Roe (Chapter; Bokkapittel, 2019)
      This chapter reconstructs the concept of hidden inwardness, arguing that this term refers to moral characters (and religious characters) that are expressed with deeds and words, rather than referring to a private inner world. By relying on the distinction between morality and legality, the chapter argues that “hidden inwardness” is not compatible with all kinds of behavior, and that it is better ...
    • Morality and Prudence: A Case for Substantial Overlap and Limited Conflict 

      Fremstedal, Roe (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017-06-07)
      <i>INTRODUCTION</i>: It is virtually impossible to say anything substantial about how morality and prudence relate to one another unless we make assumptions about their content. In what follows, I will make use of a minimal definition, according to which prudence concerns the rational pursuit of personal interest and happiness. In this connection, I use happiness as an evaluative term, as something ...
    • Rational Hope against Hope? A Pragmatic Approach to Hope and the Ethics of Belief 

      Fremstedal, Roe (Chapter; Bokkapittel, 2019)
      The aim of this paper is to explore apragmatic approach to hope and the ethicsof belief that allowsrationalhope against hope. Hope against hope is hope thatgoes beyond what the evidence supports by hoping for something that is bothhighlyunlikelyand highlyvaluable.¹However,this could take different forms.One could either hope against the evidence or merelygobeyond it; the evidencecould be inconclusive ...