Blar i forfatter Artikler, rapporter og annet (Handelshøgskolen) "Clark, Derek J."

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    • The all-pay auction with cross-shareholdings 

      Clark, Derek J.; Konrad, Kai A.; Riis, Christian (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)
      We consider an all-pay auction between several firms under asymmetric information in which each firm owns a share in its rival. We characterize the equilibrium and show how much these cross-shareholdings serve to dampen competition. Additionally, we explain why the well known relationship between the equilibrium strategies of the standard first price and all-pay auctions breaks down in our setting.

    • Bargaining with asymmetric externalities 

      Pereau, Jean Christophe; Clark, Derek J. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)
      We consider sequential bargaining between three firms that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the firms is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other firms have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...

    • Contingent payments in selection contests 

      Riis, Christian; Clark, Derek J. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-04)
      The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an ...

    • Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries 

      Clark, Derek J.; Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-06-26)
      This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition outcome is one between the two most ...

    • Fragmented property rights, R & D and market structure 

      Konrad, Kai A.; Clark, Derek J. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-04)
      Fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms’ willingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new products. This paper studies the interaction between markets for products and markets for intellectual property rights (patents) where product innovation requires several complementary patents, each of which is obtained as the result of a patent race. We show that ...

    • Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions 

      Clark, Derek J.; Nilssen, Tore (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2018-05-22)
      We investigate a model of a series of contests in which a contestant's past and present success gives a head start over a rival in the future. How this advantage from winning affects contestants' efforts, whether the laggard gives up or keeps on fighting, and how the head start develops over time, are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival ...

    • Managerial Incentives for Technology Transfer 

      Clark, Derek J.; Michalsen, Anita (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-03-27)
      This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects a firm’s incentives to transfer knowledge about technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. We consider a three-stage strategic delegation game, where there are two technologies available; one with increasing returns to scale and the other with constant returns to scale. Whilst the former is known to both firms, only the ...

    • Merger and bilateral bargaining : A note 

      Clark, Derek J.; Musy, Olivier; Pereau, Jean Christophe (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-02-05)
      In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain ...

    • Product and process innovation in a differentiated goods duopoly 

      Clark, Derek J.; Armstrong, Claire W. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09)
      This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D competition or cooperation, where R&D may affect both unit cost of production and the size of the market. This combination of product and process innovation is shown to allow for the reversal of some results found in earlier models that only look at one of the two types of R&D effects. We find that for a ...

    • R&D and knowledge transfer strategies 

      Clark, Derek J.; Østbye, Stein E. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-04)
      We study the incentives for firms to share knowledge when they engage in R&D in order to make an uncertain innovation. The ini- tial stock of knowledge may be unevely distributed, and we look at how this affects the type of cooperative agreements that the firms will find it profitable to enter in to. Specifically, we consider the cases in which firms share initial knowledge only (reciprocal ...

    • Rational benevolence in small committees 

      Clark, Derek J.; Riis, Christian (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09)
      We consider a pie-splitting game involving three committee members. In response to the large literature on sequential procedures in this type of game, we propose an institution that is inspired by auction theory. The (sealed) bids of the players are proposals for a distribution of the pie and are given simultaneously. If any of the bids is preferred to all others in a pairwise comparison (i.e. ...

    • Simultaneous versus sequential offers in dominant player bargaining 

      Clark, Derek J.; Pereau, Jean Christophe (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-01-10)
      We consider bargaining between a number of players that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the players is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other players have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...

    • Tournaments with multi-tasking 

      Clark, Derek J.; Konrad, Kai A. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-08)
      The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximizing effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), ...