We consider bargaining between a number of players that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the players is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other players have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...

In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain ...

The paper presents a simple three-region, two-sector general equilibrium model that is used for analysing the effect of regional tax policies. The model includes exogenous asymmetry in terms of transport costs as well as a vertical industry structure that can account for endogenous location development in order to distinguish between the effect of ‘first nature’ and ‘second nature’ on the required ...

I sommer har konflikten om havområdene utenfor Lofoten-Vesterålen toppet seg, med sterke utspill fra fiskerhold om seismikkskyting på fiskefelt. Økende bruk av havet til ulike aktiviteter, det være seg fiske eller petroleumsvirksomhet, oppdrett, transport eller turisme, gjør at en bredere forståelse av hvilke verdier havet tilbyr er et viktig innspill i politiske avgjørelser. I dette arbeidet ...

This paper applies a bioeconomic model in order to study different interactions between a harvested renewable resource and a non-renewable resource without commercial value that is negatively affected by the harvesting activity. This enables the analysis of for instance cold water coral habitats and their importance to commercial fish species. The fish is harvested either in a manner that does ...

This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects a firm’s incentives to transfer knowledge about technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. We consider a three-stage strategic delegation game, where there are two technologies available; one with increasing returns to scale and the other with constant returns to scale. Whilst the former is known to both firms, only the ...

Models of sequential bargaining under asymmetric information often exhibit equilibria which are characterised by the fact that agreement is reached only with a delay and that the final (period) solution is ex ante inefficient. The latter means that agreement is not reached though it is efficient (aggregate pay off exceeds aggregate costs). In this paper we analyse how intervention by a third ...

This paper investigates a market with strictly complementary inputs, with a particular emphasis on how efficiency can be implemented when the productive firms undertake unobservable effort. It is shown that simple linear sharing rules cannot implement socially optimal effort, but a modified linear sharing rule can implement the first-best outcome and a restricted linear sharing rule can be used ...

Assuming externalities from aquaculture to fisheries, we use a Verhulst-Schaefer model of fish population-dynamics and production, coupled with an aquaculture production model, to investigate effects on open-access and rent-maximising fisheries. Externalities are modelled by letting carrying capacity, intrinsic growth rate or catchability coefficient in the fishery depend on aquaculture production. ...

This paper gives an overview of bioeconomic modelling of marine reserves, and illustrates how economists have responded to the modelling results found in the ecological literature. The economic analysis is shown to be far more pessimistic with regard to the potential of marine reserves as a fisheries management tool, than what one finds in the purely ecological analysis, the reason being the ...