Now showing items 1-2 of 2
Simultaneous versus sequential offers in dominant player bargaining
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-01-10)
We consider bargaining between a number of players that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the players is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other players have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...
Merger and bilateral bargaining : A note
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-02-05)
In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain ...