Søk
Viser treff 1-10 av 12
Managerial Incentives for Technology Transfer
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-03-27)
This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management
affects a firm’s incentives to transfer knowledge about technology to
a rival in a Cournot duopoly. We consider a three-stage strategic
delegation game, where there are two technologies available; one with
increasing returns to scale and the other with constant returns to scale.
Whilst the former is known to both firms, only the ...
Contingent payments in selection contests
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-04)
The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed
prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing
the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra
effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of
selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an ...
Bargaining with asymmetric externalities
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)
We consider sequential bargaining between three firms that are all
essential in creating a surplus. One of the firms is dominant in the
sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created.
The other firms have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for
themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it
profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...
Tournaments with multi-tasking
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-08)
The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well
understood and documented. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition
ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is
awarded a prize. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of
maximizing effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), ...
Fragmented property rights, R & D and market structure
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-04)
Fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms’ willingness
to invest in the development and commercialization of new
products. This paper studies the interaction between markets for
products and markets for intellectual property rights (patents) where
product innovation requires several complementary patents, each of
which is obtained as the result of a patent race. We show that ...
Product and process innovation in a differentiated goods duopoly
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09)
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D
competition or cooperation, where R&D may affect both unit cost of production and the
size of the market. This combination of product and process innovation is shown to allow
for the reversal of some results found in earlier models that only look at one of the two
types of R&D effects. We find that for a ...
The all-pay auction with cross-shareholdings
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)
We consider an all-pay auction between several firms under asymmetric
information in which each firm owns a share in its rival. We characterize
the equilibrium and show how much these cross-shareholdings serve to
dampen competition. Additionally, we explain why the well known relationship
between the equilibrium strategies of the standard first price and
all-pay auctions breaks down in our setting.
Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-06-26)
This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric
firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by
their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively
and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition
outcome is one between the two most ...
R&D and knowledge transfer strategies
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-04)
We study the incentives for firms to share knowledge when they
engage in R&D in order to make an uncertain innovation. The ini-
tial stock of knowledge may be unevely distributed, and we look at
how this affects the type of cooperative agreements that the firms will
find it profitable to enter in to. Specifically, we consider the cases in
which firms share initial knowledge only (reciprocal ...
Rational benevolence in small committees
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09)
We consider a pie-splitting game involving three committee members. In response to
the large literature on sequential procedures in this type of game, we propose an
institution that is inspired by auction theory. The (sealed) bids of the players are
proposals for a distribution of the pie and are given simultaneously. If any of the bids
is preferred to all others in a pairwise comparison (i.e. ...