Using history dependence to design a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections

dc.contributor.author	Armstrong, Claire W.
dc.date.accessioned	2007-04-18T06:51:02Z
dc.date.available	2007-04-18T06:51:02Z
dc.date.issued	2003-11
dc.description.abstract	A transferable quota system is analysed in a two-period model with market power. So far, the management mechanisms presented in the literature to remedy market power have either not succeeded in securing efficiency in the distribution of quota within and across time periods, or have resulted in only one of the two inefficiencies being eliminated. In this paper a new mechanism is introduced where allocation of quota is made dependent upon historic quota acquisitions. This opens for a trade-off between distributional and time efficiency, or under specific circumstances securing overall efficiency.	en
dc.format.extent	215703 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10037/913
dc.identifier.urn	URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_726
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Universitetet i Tromsø	en
dc.publisher	University of Tromsø	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper series in economics and management, 2003, nr 5	en
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess
dc.subject	VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212	en
dc.subject	transferable quota	en
dc.subject	market imperfection	en
dc.subject	history dependence	en
dc.title	Using history dependence to design a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections	en
dc.type	Working paper	en
dc.type	Arbeidsnotat	en