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
# New Public Management-practices in the Norwegian school sector:

Appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining in upper secondary schools

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Writing a master's dissertation is hard work, and writing it while you are working full-time is not any easier. This dissertation is a product of three years of hard work, a great deal of curiosity, hours of dedication, and a sincere interest in the matter. Despite many obstacles along the way, it is now complete and holds a standard I can vouch for. This would not have been possible had it not been for the support of my supervisors, employers, fellow employees in Østfold County, and family and friends.

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# Abstract

This dissertation set out to explore NPM's presence in the Norwegian public school sector through a single case study. It employed a mixed method approach, using document analysis, a quantitative questionnaire, and semi-structured interviews. The study focused initially on attitudes and impact of NPM in two practices in the upper secondary schools in Østfold County: the use of appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining. As the research progressed, a new research question emerged, focusing on a potential link between the two. The research results showed that both practices were well established, and to some extent influenced by NPM. In light of how they were carried out, their content, and the employees' attitudes towards them, it seemed this influence was more in theory than in reality. With respect to appraisal interviews, the County guidelines described a quite formal and necessary practice aimed at developing the staff and the organisation as a whole. In practice, they were more informal and mainly provided the employees with a sense of validation. Whether or not employees were in favour of a local pay system, hardly any of the participants were happy with the current system of local collective bargaining. While Østfold County described a thorough process and an active pay policy, it seemed to have little impact on the employees, and many took little interest in and had little knowledge of the practice.

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# **1** Introduction

New Public Management (NPM) is the idea that organisational practices from the private sector are suitable also in the public sector. It is believed that NPM-practices will enhance efficiency and reduce bureaucracy, and therefore improve the public sector – a sector that has received much criticism (Hernes, 2007). NPM designs and methods have not been static, but have evolved gradually since their emergence. Some scholars claim the idea itself has evolved into something new, while others believe it is still intact and alive. While it is quite difficult to establish the exact year the NPM ideas appeared, we can trace their implementation to public sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (see for example Johnson, 2007; Sørensen, 2009).

As a public sector institution, the Norwegian public school system was also introduced to NPM, which is well documented by both trade unions and researchers. The use of NPM-practices in schools is often subject to debate, which is one of the reasons I chose this particular dissertation topic. In 2014, the debate became heated again when the national collective bargaining started (appendix 3). As employers wanted to have more control over the teachers' work hours, the teachers' frustration with the NPM practices (amongst other grievances) came to the forefront. The temperature was high between the employer's union and the teachers' trade unions, and many voiced their opinions on teachers' workload through letters and articles in national newspapers. Finally, after the negotiations again had broken down between the two parties, the teachers went on national strike from June to August 2014 (Lohne et al., 2014).

# 1.1 Choice of topic

The topic for this dissertation is NPM-practices in the public school sector in Norway. NPMreforms are frequently debated, and both the theory and particular practices are currently being evaluated around the world. This will be commented on in chapter 2.2. The goal of this dissertation is to add to the general debate on NPM through evaluating two specific NPMrelated practices used in the Norwegian public school sector. The two practices of focus are appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining. Both of these are often subject to debate, the second more publicly than the first. Occasionally, academics carry out research on the effectiveness of performance appraisal interviews, but there is little public debate on the matter. The debate regarding local collective bargaining, however, resurfaces approximately every second year - depending on how heated the national bargaining process becomes. The first of these two practices is fairly well known, and the use of performance appraisal interviews is common in both the public and the private sector. While some might argue it existed before the introduction of NPM, this reform has influenced the practice (chapter 2.4), and it fits well within the NPM framework of performance management. The Norwegian model for determining pay locally, here called local collective bargaining, does require a more substantial introduction than the performance appraisal interview. In Norway, the teacher's salary is determined every second year in a national collective bargaining between the employer organisations and the trade unions. A small amount of the money will be allocated during this process to the local units (municipalities and counties), where the local parties (trade unions and employers) will decide on the criteria for the division of the local funds. The local process is the topic for this thesis. It should be noted that the 'employer' in the Norwegian school sector is not the principal; it is the municipalities for class 1-10, the county administration for upper secondary school (class 11-13), and the state for universities and university colleges. The principal does however have a say and can suggest how the funds should be divided.

From a personal point of view, the rationale for choosing NPM in the school sector as a topic stems from both a theoretical and professional interest. As a political scientist and local politician, I have always taken great interest in public administration and policies, and particularly in the school sector. During my five years as a sixth form college teacher in Norway, this interest developed and shifted to a more academic focus. The topic was thus an easy choice from an interest point of view. In terms of practicality, it also seemed feasible to gain access to source material and to accomplish it as a part time project next to a full time job. As this was merely a master's thesis, the investigation was focused on a limited area; upper secondary schools in Østfold County in Norway. The research was conducted between June 2014 and April 2015, through a mixed method case study combining document analysis, a quantitative questionnaire and semi-structured interviews.

## 1.2 The research questions

While deciding my main topic was quite simple, the exact research questions were more difficult to establish, as I was aware of several obstacles. One obstacle were the debates in the aftermath of the 2014-strike regarding work hours. I therefore needed research questions that were neutral enough so the principals would give me access, and be reassured that my intentions were not to add fuel to these debates. I consequently decided against studying work

hours in relation to local collective bargaining. Secondly, a recent official report on freedom of speech<sup>1</sup> in Norway had just indicated that public employees were now increasingly worried about speaking up. This meant I had to be careful in finding and formulating research questions the teachers were able and willing to talk about. I therefore chose two well-established, administrative practices, and carefully selected demographic factors that would ensure complete anonymity. Finally, I needed research questions that would prevent me from being biased. This is addressed further in chapter 3.

The research questions of this dissertation did evolve slightly throughout the research period, which is not uncommon in case studies. The topic and the two practices did nevertheless remain the same. The aim of the research was to search for evidence of NPM in performance appraisals and local collective bargaining, through exploring both use and attitudes towards them. This is the final formulation of the research question with its sub-questions:

If NPM is an integrated part of public school administration today, how is this reflected in practices such as performance appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining?

- *How do the performance appraisal interviews comply with the main principles and goals of NPM?*
- To what extent is the current pay policy in Østfold County influenced by NPM through practice and criteria?
- *Is there, and should there be a link between the performance appraisal interviews and the local collective bargaining?*
- Which attitudes towards NPM in the school sector can be found through assessing the two practices?

The main research question was chosen because it reflects two different practices rooted in the NPM tradition, which in the private sector are often connected and deemed useful. The research question also opened for two parallel focus points of the dissertation. On the first hand, it questions how integrated NPM actually is in terms of these practices. On the second hand, it encourages an evaluation of the success of the practices and through them, the success of NPM in the school sector. As NPM was introduced to make the public sector more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Status for ytringsfriheten i Norge: Hovedrapport fra prosjektet http://www.frittord.no/images/uploads/files/Ytringsfrihet\_Hovedrapport\_DIG.pdf

efficient and reduce bureaucracy, practices influenced by the reform should be useful and comply with these goals.

The appraisal interview was selected because I wished to explore the purpose and usefulness of this practice in a public sector environment. In the private sector, the interviews often have a clear agenda and can result in tangible outcomes such as pay, promotion or career development. In comparison, the hierarchy of the public sector makes it difficult for middle managers to provide such outcomes, as they are not the decision makers. I therefore found it interesting to see how appraisal interviews worked in the public sector, and if they complied with the NPM-values. The first sub-question embodied this, and required exploring if appraisal interviews is an effective, necessary and useful practice, and how to optimize it.

The second practice, local collective bargaining, was chosen because I was curious of the criteria used to determine who received bonuses or pay-rises. Local collective bargaining is part of the collective bargaining tradition, and the criteria should thus reflect equality. It is nevertheless also a product of NPM and the wish to decentralise decisions, such as giving local units more control and the ability to use pay as a tool. If the pay criteria in Østfold County are related to performance related pay (PRP), this could indicate that the implementation process of NPM has come quite far with respect to decentralised pay systems. This development would be quite contradictory to the traditional opinion that acceptance for PRP in the school sector is relatively small. The second sub-question focused on these pay criteria and their relation to ideas of reward emerging with NPM.

At the early stages of the research process, the focus was quite even between the two practises. However, based on early interview results, I realised quickly that I also should devote my time to a potential link between them. This is not a new, but for some a controversial idea in the school sector, as there has not been a culture of performance evaluations or performance criteria related to pay. This will be addressed in chapter 2. The third sub-question was therefore formulated to embody the potential existence of such a link. While this third question may correspond with recent debates on PRP in the school sector, it was not meant to be a comment on this matter – the interest was purely academic.

The fourth sub-question is strongly connected to the main research question. Through assessing the two practices, it may be possible to find attitudes towards NPM as a whole. If there is, much negativity related to both practices, this could imply negativity also towards the

entire NPM-framework. As chapter 2 will show, there are critical voices regarding both NPM as a whole, and other practices than appraisal interviews and local pay systems.

# 1.3 Outline

This dissertation will continue through exploring literature and research related to the topic, before covering methodology, and presenting the research results. A discussion of the material will follow, before a conclusion and a recommendation will be attempted.

The literature review will present NPM as a theory as well as research on effects of the reform ideas in the public sector in general. A particular section will establish NPM's presence in the public school sector. To provide a more substantial context for the dissertation, this section will also describe traits of the Norwegian public school, and comment on two other NPM-practices found in the sector. Most importantly, chapter 2 will use academic literature and research to explain and explore appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining as NPM-practices in general and within the school sector. To fully comprehend the relationship between appraisals and pay in the private sector compared to the public, chapter 2 will also include a chapter on PRP.

Chapter 3 on methodology focuses on how the data for this dissertation has been collected, and describes and comments on research design, research methods and sampling. The strengths and weaknesses of both research methods and data are discussed, as well as ethical considerations. The findings from the primary and secondary sources are subsequently presented in chapter 4 by topic. The secondary sources include documents establishing the outline for local collective bargaining in Østfold County, and the primary sources consist of results from the quantitative questionnaire and the semi-structured interviews. The questionnaire as well as the outline for the interviews can be found in the appendices, while links to the documents are listed in the list of references. In chapter 5, the research results are discussed and evaluated in relation to the research questions, before the dissertation concludes in chapter 6 with final remarks and suggestions for future studies.

# 2 Review of literature and research

The theoretical foundation for any discussion or evaluation of research results needs to be sound. It is imperative that more than one source is visited and used to support or contradict the findings. This chapter will therefore explore definitions and practices of NPM with reference to academic literature and research. The focus will mainly lie on appraisal interviews and collective bargaining, but the chapter will also include a section on performance-related pay (PRP). As a pay practice within the performance management system, knowledge of PRP is important to the discussion of local collective bargaining.

To provide a more substantial context and grounds for understanding the implications of NPM in the Norwegian public school, a section on the sector is also included in this chapter. This section both describes traits of the sector, and comments on two other practices influenced by NPM: the school leader's role and performance management.

This chapter presents literature and research by scholars representing political science and business studies, as well as pedagogy and school management. As this is a dissertation based on research conducted in the school sector, it is important to include the latter. This chapter will also include information on research results from other, relevant master dissertations.

# 2.1 Theoretical perspectives of NPM

While the introduction provides a simple definition of NPM, it is necessary to explore the theory more thoroughly to understand its impact on the public sector. As we will see, various academics have explained NPM quite similarly. Finding a definition and description of the theory is consequently not as difficult as establishing when the theory actually surfaced. Nevertheless there is, as mentioned, a debate regarding NPMs current existence. While some suggest that the NPM-framework is dead and that it has been replaced (see i.e. Dunleavy et al. 2006; in Christensen and Lægreid, 2007), others disagree (Pollitt, 2003 in Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Christensen and Lægreid (2007)). As many are continuing to evaluate and study NPM today, it seems it is still alive. Though it could have provided an interesting context for the results, this debate on metatheories will not be addressed further due to space limitations and focusing on the topic at hand.

Røvik (2007) explains NPM as the last 25 years of attempts to transfer business-inspired ideas to the public sector. These include ideas on professional leadership and management; fragmentation of divisions and departments; increased competition; and the use of contracts in political management. Hernes (2007), and Christensen and Lægreid (2007) have a similar understanding, and explains NPM as a set of ideas inspired by market theory that are transferred or translated to the public sector. Following these ideas, the actors in the public sector should be viewed as consumers, sales representatives and producers. Central values are competition, supply and demand, and that the customer is always right (Hernes, 2007). Christensen and Lægreid (2007) explains that the market ideology promoted a new focus in the public sector on efficiency, decentralisation, horizontal specialisation, competition, administrative principles, increased use of contracts, and the idea to 'let the managers manage'. These ideas have been implemented and executed differently in many different countries and sectors, at a different pace, degree and emphasis. Christensen and Lægreid (2007) also distinguish between 'hard NPM' and 'soft NPM'. Hard NPM focuses on accounting, evaluation, performance management, and measuring outcomes; soft NPM focuses on the human factors, user experience, quality improvement, and individual development. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 10) embody all of these scholars' explanations when they describe NPM as:

#### [...] a bundle of specific concepts and practices, including:

- Greater emphasis on 'performance', especially through the measurement of outputs
- A preference for lean, flat, small, specialized (disaggregated) organizational forms over large, multi-functional forms
- A widespread substitution for contracts for hierarchical relations as the principal coordinating device
- A widespread injection of market-type mechanisms (MTMs) including competitive tendering, public sector league tables, and performance-related pay
- An emphasis on treating service users as 'customers' and on the application of generic quality improvement techniques such as Total Quality Management (TQM)

In their studies of NPM implementation in New Zealand, Boston et al., (1996: 26) have a similar understanding of the reform as the scholars above. They believe that the private and

the public sector should be managed according to the same principles, as the two sectors are quite similar. According to them, the basic ideas of NPM are that administration is more important than policy; larger bureaucratic units should be divided into smaller units; and one should seek to devolve administrative control along with developing systems for reporting, monitoring and accounting. The ideology also favours private ownership over public, and celebrates competition and outsourcing. Moreover, the focus should primarily lie on quantifiable results, measurements and goals as well as on cost cutting, and monetary incentives are preferred to non-monetary. Boston et al., (1996: 26) also explain that practices that represent the NPM-ideology are all imitations of administrative practices from the private sector. These practices include more use of project positions, strategic planning, performance agreements, mission statements, development of new information systems, performance related pay, and paying more attention to the public opinion. Another product of NPM is the changing of contracts in the public service terms of length and more specific work instructions (Boston et al., 1996: 26). This list of basic NPM ideas and practices corresponds quite well with the explanations provided by the scholars above.

According to Hernes (2007), the reason why NPM have become popular is related to the common critique of the public sector as a whole. This critique is often called 'bureaucracy-critique', and can include comments on staffing, rules and regulations, organisational structure, mistakes or double work, poor quality, reluctant to change, lack of resources, old-school and not innovative, dependence and generally efficiency. It can also include criticism regarding the transactional costs. Consistent with Busch et al., (2013) the need for a reform (such as NPM) came from the failure of public governance. As the public sector had not been able to deliver public services efficiently and effectively and because of the rising stagflation of the 70s, they Keynesian economic credibility was lost. Both Røvik (2007) and Christensen and Lægreid (2007) support that NPM originated in the 1980's.

As seen in this section, several scholars have defined NPM in quite similar terms, agreeing on both background and practices. This dissertation will consequently draw upon the general understanding that NPM is an idea of how management processes from the private sector should and could be used in the public sector. Specific to this dissertation are the processes and practices related to human resource management in terms of performance appraisal interviews and local pay negotiations.

## 2.2 Research on effects of NPM

Research into the effects of NPM in the public sector has produced several articles, commentaries and books. While many studies can be referenced, such as research from Australia, Canada, Italy and Russia, this section will focus on research done in the Nordic countries.

One of the studies done on the effects of NPM in the public sector can be found in Johnsen's work from 2009 where he evaluates performance management as a whole in the public sector. In the education sector specifically, Nielsen (2013) has conducted several studies on performance management in the Danish schools. His focus has however been on the entire system of performance management and importance of managerial roles in relation to general outcomes. According to Nielsen (2013), there have been many attempts to map the effects of performance management in public organisations, but the knowledge of these effects is still quite limited and often contradictory. Many positive effects have nevertheless been suggested, such as the possibility to obtain relevant data for efficiency- and productivity evaluations. When these evaluations are placed in political and organisational settings, Johnsen (2007) suggests they may contribute to more rational and improved decisions by public officials. Critics, on the other hand, claim that the politicians often tend to focus on the negative results and that they are too busy evaluating results to actually do anything about the potential issues (Johnsen, 2007).

Despite the suggested positive effects Johnsen (2007) lists, a general study on performance management in the public sector by Hvidman and Andersen (2013) concluded that the effectiveness of performance management tools did not transfer from the private to the public sector. The two set out to challenge the idea that the two sectors are quite similar, and focused on how five performance management tools could influence the pupils' exam results in private and public schools in Denmark. The tools included quality development, management by objectives, company contracts, written objectives, and written evaluations or feedback on staff results. Interestingly, public schools in Denmark seemed to use the tools much more than the private (Hvidman and Andersen, 2013).

Blossing, Imsen and Moos (2014) have collected articles covering the effects of NPM from 19 different researchers from various disciplines. Their book is introduced as *an excellent* 

*account of how the five Nordic countries are coping with the pressure of this global trend*<sup>2</sup> (2014: vii). The articles debate the effects of various NPM ideas and practices such as privatisation (in Norway and Denmark) and deregulation and decentralization of the administration (in Finland). With respect to the school systems, the authors suggest that even though the 'School for All' could have resulted in a school for the elite, it has largely *survived* the introduction of NPM. They also suggest that the financial crisis in Europe has resulted in less support for political ideas rooted in NPM, including privatisation, competition and accountability.

Currently there are many students and researchers exploring the effects of NPM in various countries. Several different NPM-ideas and practices in a variety of sectors are covered, and their research suggest positive, negative, or no effects of the reform. What is interesting and relevant to this dissertation, is the desire to review and discuss the reform. Amongst more recent studies, Kristianssen and Olsson (2016) focused on the establishment of municipal service centres in Sweden by exploring four trade-offs: open change process or end-result-focus, democracy values or efficiency, key actors (politicians or administrators), and perception of the citizens – customers or co-creators. The same year, Sundström (2016) explored performance management in the governing of the Swedish public sector. He concluded that it was not necessary to pick one of two models to govern modern administrations, but argued that a reduced focus on management by results would not result in a too disconnected and autonomous administration.

Many Swedish Bachelor-theses on NPM-effects from 2016 also contribute to the current evaluation and debate of NPM in Sweden. This debate on NPM in Swedish media was also analysed in one of these Bachelor-theses by Wandemo (2016), who concluded the debate to some extent pushed for a post-NPM. In an additional Bachelor-thesis, Mustafa (2016) found that the effects of NPM in the Swedish school sector were teachers spending more time on documentation and administrative work than before, and reduced efficiency. The extensive debate in Sweden finally culminated in an announcement from Swedish authorities saying that they would no longer govern by NPM principles, but instead through trust-based leadership (Kuvaas et al., 2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Global trend is here NPM.

In Norway, master students have focused on the competition between private and public actors in welfare services for the elderly (Halvorsen, 2016), and mental health care (Sivertsen & Dybvik, 2016). Halvorsen found that private nursing homes to some extent prioritised other and cheaper elements of quality than the public, such as fewer staff on duty. Sivertsen and Dybvik found that the implementation of NPM principles affected the professional autonomy to the extent that they challenged ethical values and the ability to differentiate care. This had an impact on both quality of care and the work environment.

As we can see, NPM seems to be an integrated part of the public sector in terms of both principles and practices. Examples include privatization and decentralisation, as well as cost efficiency. It is nevertheless quite evident, that the support for NPM can be questioned.

## 2.3 NPM in the school sector

While the implementation of NPM in the general public sector can be traced back to the 1980s, it took a little longer before it was introduced in the school sector, as we will see in chapter 2.3.1. One reason is the complexity of the public school organisation. To provide a more comprehensive context and understanding for the discussion of appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining in chapter 5, this chapter will describe the Norwegian public school sector. Additionally the chapter will comment on NPMs impact on the sector and mention two NPM-elements that have been subject to research and debate in the school sector. The two elements are decentralisation of leadership, and management by results.

#### 2.3.1 The Norwegian school sector

According to Imsen (2009: 181), *the school is not an 'isolated institution' – it lives and breathes together with its surroundings*. This is supported in Røvik et al., (2014) where the school is described as a unit always subject to extensive reform pressure from external actors. The school must pay attention to continuous feedback from politicians, international tests, the department of education, central directorates, county administrations, local councils, pedagogic research, parents and pupils, and the media. Imsen (2009) furthermore asks who actually decides the public schools' future and development, and who should make the decisions. She explains that there are many groups in today's society, who want power over the school. These include the parents, the elected politicians, the state government, the private sector, the church and, naturally, the teachers. With respect to who should make the decisions

in the school sector, Imsen (2009) identifies two perspectives: the consensus-perspective where everyone is supposedly heard and they reach a compromise; and the conflict-perspective where there is a power struggle between the parties.

That the Norway's public school organisation is quite intricate is also supported in Skandsen et al., (2011) who explains the school as a complex organisation with varied tasks, which continuously must adapt to new demands. Ogden (2012) describes demands as an increased focus on self-evaluation and the ability to renew itself. White papers (such as Stortingsmelding nr. 30, 2003-2004 Culture for learning and Stortingsmelding nr. 16, 2006-2007 ... and nobody was left behind) also show how demands are increasing in areas such as strategic planning, cooperation and openness about results and pedagogic practices. The school must consequently be able to change and adapt to new demands, and become a 'learning organisation' – an organisation that easily can adapt to and renew practices when necessary (Skandsen et al., 2011). This is also emphasized in a strategy document from the former Ministry of Research and Education (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2004: 6) where the 'learning organisation' is explained as a culture where everyone is responsible for and feel obligated to reach the organisation's common goal. This culture should emerge through cooperation and sharing in addition to evaluation and reflection. Ogden (2012) largely supports these definitions and refers to the works of Sammons et al., (1995) and Rutter and Maughen (2002) who identify the 'learning organisation' as one of the eleven necessary hallmarks of an effective, successful school. A governmental project to turn the public schools into 'learning organisations' was supposed to last from 2005-2008, but it seems the process is still ongoing as the Norwegian Directorate of Education held a seminar for school managers and leaders in Norway in 2015 on this topic (UDIR, 2015).

Despite the focus on the public school as a learning organisation and the constant demands for development, Norwegian teachers and schools are sometimes perceived as reluctant to change. Scholars such as Hernes (2007) suggests that change is difficult to achieve in the public sector in general, and Imsen (2009) explains how challenging it is to change schools. Being a large institution with many different units and people, and solid framework of values and routines, changes will take time. In relation to the national collective bargaining processes in 2014, the public debate also focused on this reluctance to change. An academic example of how schools are seen as change resisting institutions can be found in a study from 2012 of the implementation of information technology in the school sector. This study concludes that

such as implementation will not work unless the entire school culture is reformed to become more change friendly (Dalaaker et al., 2012).

As we can understand, schools and teachers are constantly responding to external pressures and frequently have to comply with new demands. With regard to larger organisational changes and reforms, perhaps schools and teachers are a little reluctant to change. Nevertheless, difficulties with change processes may also come from the amount of internal and external actors who must be included in the planning, execution, and evaluation. As we will see in the next section, it is still possible to implement changes and reforms successfully in the school sector – at least to some extent. There are however many aspects to consider to achieve this. One vital aspect is the importance of knowing and respecting the organisational culture (Skandsen, et al., 2011). Røvik et al., (2014) advocate the use of a 'translative' model for the implementation of ideas in schools. The change process is described as a twofold process in which the school changes because of the idea and the idea changes because of the translation and implementation process. The success of a change process consequently depend on the organisation's competency to translate the specific idea (Røvik et al., 2014).

#### 2.3.2 NPM in the Norwegian public school

As part of the public sector, education has naturally been subject to the NPM-changes. According to a report by a committee appointed by the Ministry of Education in 2001, these changes can be traced back to the early 90s. The principles of managing by objective and management by results have since been directional for the Norwegian school sector (Gjertsen et al., 2001). This timeframe for the introduction of NPM in the school sector is also supported in Møller (2004).

Imsen (2009) explains how NPM gradually has established itself in the Norwegian public school sector, particularly throughout the 2000s. She identifies the NPM elements in the sector as management by objective, decentralisation, increased responsibility of school leaders, and the focus on controlling and reporting achievements. These elements are linked to the neoliberal ideas of market control. Examples of how the elements affect the school sector in practice include the focus on competition between schools, the publication of pupils' results, the question of PRP for teachers, more privatisation, and the increased importance of user influence (Imsen, 2009: 185-187). According to Røvik et al., (2014) the use of performance management techniques is quite common in the school sector today. This is visible in both how the school leader' has changed, and the focus on management by results.

With the decentralisation of leadership – a well-known NPM principle (see chapter 2.1) – the Norwegian school leaders' role has changed. Møller (2004) explains that the increased focus on goals and results has given the school leaders more responsibilities and control, and their particular schools have to develop clear missions and quantifiable criteria for success. The results determine the school's competitive edge and will aid in decisions regarding resource distribution. According to the NPM-theories, this element of competition will enhance standards and reduce costs (Møller, 2004). The school leader is also recognized as one of the most important factors to successful change (Møller, 2004; Skandsen et al., 2011; Røvik et al., 2014).

The multiple roles a school leader inhabits are well described on a webpage called 'God Skole', which offers advice to school leaders, teachers, parents and pupils on how to achieve a good school. This description embodies both the different roles and tasks a school leader must fulfil. The school leader is a leader, guide, inspirational source, management developer, administrator, HR-manager, and in charge of arranging and delegating responsibilities. Sometimes he/she is also a construction manager, substitute teacher, head of purchasing, recruiter, advisor, phone operator, office worker, change leader and motivator, and disciplinarian. A main difference between the school leader and a leader in the private sector is that he/she must have sufficient knowledge and competency to complete any task alone. The school leader must furthermore always be flexible to ad-hoc tasks, and be prepared to stand in the crossfire between for example the demands the public administrators and politicians on the one hand, and his/her pedagogic staff on the other. Additionally the school leader must pay attention to his school's reputation and demands from parents and the media (God Skole, n.d.)

According to the findings of Alværn (2014) in her master's thesis, the school leaders spend most of their time today on administration. This she finds to be a paradox as she claims that extensive research shows that the pupils' outcome and results benefit from a strong pedagogic leader, not an administrator. This is supported in Vivian Robinson's studies (mentioned in Smestad, 2015), and Hargreaves and Fullan (2014) who emphasise that the principal should pay more attention to research than data. Møller (2004) found that the principals she interviewed were largely critical to the NPM practices in the school sector. While they often welcomed the opportunity to have more control over the individual school, they were sceptical towards the increased focus on economy and effectivity (Møller, 2004).

Another area, where the NPM influence is evident, is the focus on management by results in the Norwegian public school. Performance management, also called management by objectives or management by results, is an idea that having a specific goal increases the effort, focus, stamina, and inspires tactical thinking. Its effectiveness has been proven in several studies, and simple, measurable goals produce the largest effect. Good goals must be clear, achievable, result in feedback, and be sufficiently challenging. A reward can be used for motivation, but it is not necessary – reaching the goal can be a reward in itself (Strand, 2007).

In the school sector, management by results was introduced with the last education reform of 2006 'Kunnskapsløftet'. Until 1997, the Norwegian national curriculums had contained largely open and general goals. L97 also followed this tradition, but had a more demanding tone. The 2006 reform was largely based on the idea of management by results, and came with wide, yet challenging, competence aims, designed so any student should be able to achieve them at least in part. This reform also embodied the NPM desire for decentralisation, as local authorities and schools gained control over their budgeting as long as they fulfilled national goals (Imsen, 2009). While 'management by results' was quite new in the Norwegian curriculum, the idea was introduced already in 1949 in Ralph W. Tyler's work *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* (Imsen, 2009: 235)<sup>3</sup>.

One of the main issues with management by results in the public sector is related to evaluation and measuring results. Christensen et al., (2009) and Sørensen (2009) are concerned with this, and question both the choice of factors for evaluation, and if they are possible to measure. According to Sørensen (2009), Norway uses more than most countries on education (above 6 % of GDP), but is not satisfied with the return on this investment (or 'input') in terms of the PISA score. Sørensen (2009) stresses that we must distinguish between 'outcome' and 'output' when we determine results. Output – such as the amount of teaching hours or how many students who complete their education is easy to measure. The outcome of the teaching, however, is not necessarily quantifiable, and many factors can affect the results. This problem with 'outcome vs. output' is part of an ongoing debate on the usefulness of the national testing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This book presented the Tyler rationale, which contains the (most) important questions developing curriculum and teaching: 1) Which goal should the school try to achieve? 2) Which learning experiences should be created to achieve these goals? 3) How can these learning experiences be organised as efficiently as possible? 4) How can we evaluate if the goals have been achieved? (Imsen, 2009: 235)

Johnsen (2007) believes it is important to differ between the time before and after the disappointing PISA<sup>4</sup>-results from 2001 when it comes to performance management in the school sector. Before these, there was a lot of scepticism towards evaluating and comparing schools' test-results. According to Johnson (2007), this changed after the results came in, and the government initiated several changes, such as a renewed focus on improving basic skills, result-evaluation through national tests, and the publication of school results.

Research on the Norwegian testing-regime conducted by Aarhus University implies that these national tests are more a tool for bureaucrats than teachers and students. Moreover, results from *The Cambridge Primary Review* researching forty years of national tests in England showed that neither teachers, school leaders nor researchers found the test results useful (Marsdal, 2012). Additionally, a number of 90 researchers from 11 different countries wrote a public letter to the PISA leader in 2014, where they criticised the PISA-system. Around 2000 signed to support the researchers (Røvik et al., 2014). Finally, the research results from NIFU<sup>5</sup>, who was hired by UDIR<sup>6</sup>, claimed that the national test results were not particularly useful in terms of feedback on progression or suggestions for improvement (Marsdal, 2014).

As we can see, NPM is well established in the Norwegian school sector. The reform is nevertheless widely debated and questioned. This dissertation is not looking to re-establish the general presence of NPM in the school sector. Instead, it wishes to explore how the theory is reflected in appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining. These two practices are somewhat less covered in academic literature and research, than the other aspects of NPM in the school sector mentioned in this chapter.

## 2.4 Performance appraisals

According to Beardwell and Holden (2001), performance management systems designed to motivate, reward and sanction managers, have become more attractive since their beginning in the 80s. Such a system can be illustrated as a cycle that consists of five elements (Mabey & Salaman, 1995 in Beardwell & Holden, 2001: 388): *setting performance objectives*,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Program for International Student Assessment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, Research and Education

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training

*measuring outcomes, feedback of results, rewards linked to outcomes, and amendments to objectives and activities.* Two vital factors in this cycle are performance appraisals and PRP. The first functions as a mechanism for establishing goals and performance criteria, while the other functions as an external reward for motivation (Beardwell & Holden, 2001).

This dissertation explores both performance appraisal interviews and the pay system local collective bargaining, as they function in the Norwegian public school sector. Section 2.4 will explain what performance appraisal interviews are, and present two approaches on how they can be conducted. It will also place the practice within NPM, and present research on its effectiveness within the school sector and the public sector in general. The two subsequent sections, 2.5 and 2.6 will focus on two pay systems: PRP and local collective bargaining. While PRP is not the main focus of this dissertation, the criteria and arguments for the pay system provide a necessary context to understand the debate on local collective bargaining. Section 2.5 will consequently present a definition of PRP and describe its presence in the Norwegian public sector. Section 2.6 will focus on local collective bargaining and view it in an NPM-context. The question of criteria will be addressed, before research will be presented on the use of local collective bargaining in the Norwegian school sector.

#### 2.4.1 Explanation and approaches

Performance management can be explained as an HR-practice within the ideology of NPM, as its predominant focus is to enhance organisational performance through frequent use of goals and evaluations. The idea is that instead of emphasising input and process control, performance should be the underlying goal for all of the organisation's decisions and strategic planning, as well as changes in routines and structures (Swiss, 2005 in Nielsen, 2013).

The use of performance appraisals as a tool in the performance management system is subject to debate. The practice can be viewed as quite ineffective, which may be because appraising performance is a subjective assessment, or because it is not a precise, quantitative measurement. Additionally, performance appraisals are frequently conducted badly. Nevertheless, if used properly it can be invaluable to both the employer and the employee (Torrington, et al., 2005).

Specific problems with the exact appraisal interviews can stem from the relationship between the appraiser and the appraisee. As the appraiser normally is a middle manager, who usually knows the employee better than the executive managers, several factors could inhibit the success of the interview. These factors may be prejudice or likability-issues (both positive and negative), lack of knowledge of the employee's work, or lack of understanding of the context in which the employee works. Furthermore, the degree of formality may cause a problem along with too extensive appraisal schemes with multiple documents and rigid forms to fill out. Other common problems with appraisal interviews can occur if the outcomes are ignored, everyone gets the same feedback, or the wrong features are appraised (Torrington et al., 2005). According to Kuvaas and Dysvik (2012) a vital factor to the success of an appraisal interview, is the trust between manager and employee.

There are several different ways of conducting performance appraisal interviews, but all are normally driven by one of two approaches: the management control approach and the development approach. An interview following the first could begin with a statement that represents the view of the controlling, responsible authority (the head of the organisation). This statement could explain what the organisation demands of the employee, and include information on requirements for promotions. This management control approach can cause resentment, as the employees may feel pressured. On the other, it could also be useful in a context where the targets are specific and competition is part of the organisational culture (Torrington et al., 2005). The management by results 'recipe' for deciding valuable goals (see chapter 2.3.2), could contribute to an appraisal model of the management control approach. These appraisals should then focus on individual development goals and contribution to the organisation, in addition to be a place for feedback (Strand, 2007; Grimsø, 2015). Given that job descriptions for public employees sometimes are quite wide, one could nevertheless question the usefulness and effectiveness of such a model as the employees' results would be difficult to quantify, measure or assess objectively.

An interview following the second approach will focus more on the employee's need for validation. This will be a place where the employee can express his/her wishes for learning, progress, hopes, fears, etc. If the process is explained well by the authority figure, the approach could lead to a positive development of internal motivation. Simply explained, internal motivation is that the employees do their jobs well because they 'want' to do so, and not because they are 'required' to. The development approach can also result in increased cooperative behaviour and loyalty, and is useful for solving issues. It can be useful in organisations where the employees are confident in their professionality and open to discuss their possibilities for improvement with an equal (Torrington et al., 2005). According to Ingebrigtsen (2005), it is often important for pedagogic employees to maintain their

professional autonomy, and they have traditionally been quite negative towards measuring the results of their work. Consequently, a development approach may suit the school sector better than the management control approach. While there are many potential positive effects of this approach, two problems should not be ignored. Firstly, it does not facilitate management control, as systematic reporting is not vital to the organisation. Secondly, it requires a high level of trust to function well, and it is not likely that everyone will be able to have that kind of trusting relationship with his/her middle manager (Torrington et al., 2005).

Regardless of which approach the organisation follows, Torrington et al., (2005) present two general advices for the appraisal interview. Firstly, the question of pay should not be debated in a performance appraisal interview. This is supported by Ingebrigtsen (2005) who explains that because of their content, appraisal interviews must remain confidential and cannot be used in a local bargaining process. However, Ingebrigtsen (2005) also recommends the use of pay conversations held separately from the appraisal interview. According to *Hovedtariffavtalen*<sup>7</sup> 2015-2017, any employee in the public sector does have the right to request a pay conversation with their employer (Ingebrigtsen, 2005). From their studies in 2005 (Sollund et al.) to their studies of 2010, Rødvei and Lien found a positive development in the use of pay conversations in local municipalities. It was still less common in the school sector than other sectors in the municipalities.

The second advice from Torrington et al., (2005), is that the employee should be briefed on the form of the interview in advance. If the scheme allows it, the employee can be told to prepare by filling out a form. Such self-appraisal can give the employee some control over the situation and enables the appraiser to cover topics that the employee is comfortable with and feel are important (Torrington et al., 2005). It would perhaps be more natural to include such a preparation when following the development approach.

#### 2.4.2 Research on appraisals in the public sector

Research on performance appraisal interviews focus on a variety of aspects, such as impact on the employees, frequency, content and style, usefulness, and effect in accordance with performance management.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The main tariff agreement between KS (municipalities' and counties' employer organisation) and trade unions

In Norway, Røvik's (1998) findings from 1975-1995 of 130 publications on performance appraisal interviews show that it is not a new practice, and perhaps not a consequence of the NPM-implementation. Despite the long tradition, a Norwegian employer is not legally bound to hold performance appraisal interviews with the employees. The law on work environment still requires the employer to provide good working conditions for the employee, and it is therefore difficult to avoid the practice. The interview is also included in Health & Safety regulations, and consequently falls under §4 of *Arbeidsmiljøloven*<sup>8</sup> (Iversen, 2015). Despite being an old and well-known practice, a Norwegian report from 2010 called *Lederskapsbarometeret* presented results showing that only about 60 % of employees participate in performance appraisal interviews on a regular basis (Nordrik & Stugu, 2011).

According to Røvik's research (1998), the Norwegian version of the performance appraisal interview was a dialogue aimed at creating trust more than a traditional appraisal situation. The model appeared in the 1970s perhaps as a reaction to the American style of appraisal interviews, which solely focused on performance evaluation. The Norwegian appraisal model seemed to be closely linked to the development approach as described in chapter 2.4.1, based on its focus. Røvik (1998) also identifies a hybrid of the American and the Norwegian model for performance appraisal interviews – a conversation focusing on both guidance and performance.

For her master's thesis, Karen Bjordal (2010) researched the use of and changes in the appraisal interview practice in the Norwegian public sector over the last 40 years. She found expectedly that the practice had changed in some respects, and related some of these changes to the NPM-inspired shifts from leadership to management or soft to hard HR. These shifts were results of trends, legislation, and the growing market for consulting companies. The changes in the appraisal interview practice were most evident in purpose and content. How they were conducted seemed to follow the recommendations from the 1970's. Bjordal (2010) imagined that the lack of change in the latter could be frustrating, as organisations and leaders would keep making the same mistakes they were warned about 40 years ago. It could be mentioned that scholars back in 1993 described appraisals as an idea whose time had gone (Fletcher, 1993 in Torrington, et al., 2005).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The Norwegian law on work conditions and -environment

Despite the negative numbers from 2010 and the pessimistic attitude towards the practice in 1993, there are research indicating positive outcomes from performance appraisal interviews. Results from an employee survey in the public sector on state level, conducted in 2012 and published in 2013, indicate that the 128 000 employees are quite satisfied with the performance appraisal interviews. In fact, this was one of the questions with the most positive responses (Viken and Sæterbakk, 2014). Viken and Sæterbakk (2014) are nevertheless critical to how the government has obtained these results, and to the results themselves. As the survey was purely quantitative, it is impossible to know why the employees were so satisfied with the practice.

Whether or not employees are satisfied with the use of appraisal interviews, Kuvaas' three studies from 2006, 2007 and 2011 show little to no correlation between the employees being satisfied with their appraisal interviews and their actual performance. Based on his results, Kuvaas emphasizes the importance of finding what effect appraisal interviews actually have on employees. If the practice has a negative effect on the employees, it should either be modified, stopped or perhaps be a volunteer arrangement. The main positive effect of the practice that Kuvaas found was the employees' sense of loyalty. Negative effects were found particularly amongst employees with high autonomy because they felt controlled (Kuvaas & Dysvik, 2012). As previously mentioned, teachers often fall into this category.

#### 2.4.3 Appraisal interviews in the school sector

Amongst the studies of performance appraisal interviews in the school sector, the main focus lies on topics such as purpose and effects, and on how they can be conducted successfully. This dissertation wished to see if the appraisal interview practice in this sector comply the NPM ideas. Consequently, the appraisal interviews must be conducted efficiently and have a clear purpose and outcome.

As mentioned in section 2.4.1, it seems a development approach to performance appraisal interviews may suit autonomous employees such as teachers, better than the management control approach. A study by Nornes (2008) supports this. Nornes found that the teachers needed to 'be seen', build relationships and prevent conflicts. With respect to their own work situations, the teachers were preoccupied with their desires for next school year and feedback on their performance by the principal. The variables that scored the lowest were the need to discuss pedagogic work in a specific classroom, the pupils' results and the school's development plans.

Bergersen and Tvete (2008) used a qualitative research model in their master's thesis to address the purpose and function of performance appraisal interviews in schools. According to their findings, one of the purposes was to follow up the school's strategic goals where both the school and the individual teacher were important. Additionally, the appraisal interviews were supposed to contribute to a good psychosocial work environment and build relationships. The teachers also focused on how the appraisal interview could aid personal development (Bergersen & Tvete, 2008). Based on their research results, literature evaluation, and assessment of government demands, Bergersen and Tvete (2008) argued that there should be more focus on results in the appraisal interviews. This variety of purposes seem to require the hybrid model for appraisal interviews Røvik (1998) found (see 2.4.1).

Another master's thesis by Røseth (2013) covered the same topic as Bergersen and Tvete (2008), but through a quantitative research model. She found that using a 'management by results' approach with systematic use of clear objects could have a positive impact on the teacher's feeling of accomplishment, the teacher's individual decision making, and competence development. She also suggests future studies where the pupils' learning outcome would be measured and included in the appraisal process. Røseth's (2013) findings and suggestions seem to support Bergersen and Tvete (2008) and advocate the use of the management control approach. Still, given the focus on accomplishment, autonomy and development, which clearly resemble a development approach, Røvik's (1998) hybrid model is perhaps more accurate.

Research from 2003 about performance appraisals of British teachers found that the appraisal itself often resulted in sickness absence due to the stress of the situation. This was attributed to the challenge of avoiding subjective judgement in a situation where finding appropriate, measurable criteria was difficult and capability was linked to personal qualities. The subjectivity of the justification was evident in the generalised descriptions offered during the meeting such as 'not meeting standards' or 'unable to do the job properly' (Torrington et al., 2003 in Torrington, et al., 2005: 335).

From this research, we can understand that teachers and managers may find the appraisal interviews purposeful if focus lies on the teacher's individual well-being and development. From theory, we can also conclude that there are models for how appraisal interviews can be conducted efficiently. A hybrid model based on a structured development approach may

function well as long as it is based on trust between the employee and the manager, and both parties take it seriously without being too formal.

## 2.5 Performance-related pay (PRP)

One of the effects of NPM in Norway and the introduction of performance management was the decentralisation of pay in the public sector. The decentralisation involved both the use of PRP, and the introduction of local collective bargaining processes in Norway. The latter will be the focus of chapter 2.6. While this is not a dissertation on PRP, the purpose and the criteria for determining PRP are interesting to the debate on local collective bargaining. Particularly because PRP is widely debated and often criticised in relation to teachers' pay.

### 2.5.1 Definition and purpose

Performance-related pay can be defined as *a system in which an individual's increase in salary is solely or mainly dependent on his/her appraisal or merit rating* (Swabe, 1989: 7 in Beardwell & Holden, 2001: 523). Potential positive effects of PRP are motivation, recruitment and retention of employees, encourage acceptance of change, weaken trade union power, enhance the role of the line manager, moral justification, and greater financial control. Possible problems that can occur in performance systems with PRP are difficulties with establishing exact criteria for rewards, and potential conflict and jealousy between co-workers (Beardwell & Holden, 2001; Kuvaas, 2009). The criteria used to decide reward or disciplinary actions can in other words vary greatly. An example of tangible criteria could be timekeeping or sales, while less tangible criteria could be appearance, communication skills, extra effort, organisational skills, flexibility, and building relationship with staff, peers and management (Taylor, 2008).

When it comes to motivation, PRP is often linked to what is called 'hard HRM', which is based on the perception that employees are quite lazy or egoistic. Motivation in a company where 'hard HRM' is established comes from external reward such as pay, bonuses, promotions, and a wish not to be punished. The opposite approach, 'soft HRM', implies that the employee likes doing his or her job, they want to develop their skills, and help the organisation achieve its goals. Their motivation lies within performing their job, not just the results or reward (Kuvaas, 2008). Kuvaas (2008) claims that such internal motivation is more effective than external motivation in professions where quality, understanding, development

and creativity is more important than quantity. Consequently, external motivation from PRP may work when the tasks are simple and standardised. In workplaces with complex tasks, and where autonomy is important, PRP can result in reduced motivation because employees feel controlled and devalued despite clear connections between task and reward (Kuvaas, 2009). Given the teachers' variety of tasks and the importance of autonomy (see section 2.4.1) it seems PRP should not be an advised tool in the school sector.

#### 2.5.2 Pay policies in the public sector

Along with the implementation of NPM, several countries have changed pay systems for their public service. Examples of these changes include decentralisation of the pay negotiations, flexibility, individualisation, performance- or outcome-related pay, and market-adjustment. Although Norway has been hesitant to apply many of these factors, several employees in the Norwegian public service are subjects to them (Christensen et al., 2002).

Some of the countries where the implementation of NPM was quicker, like New Zealand and Australia, have had systems for PRP since the beginning of the reform. There has however been much criticism of performance management, and particularly PRP, in these two countries. In New Zealand and in Australia public sector employees have not taken to the pay system, and the support kept declining according to surveys by the Australian National Audit Office from 2004 and the Australian Public Service Commission from 2005. Regarding support for PRP, there is not much data available on benefits or costs of the system. This can be seen in the Australian survey from 2004, which concluded that despite the investments in performance related pay systems, the outcome was *'patchy results and uncertain benefits*' (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007: 60).

According to Christensen et al. (2002), Norway also tried to implement a PRP-system for executives in the public service in 1991. Within 6 years, Norway realized that it was difficult to tie salary directly to individual results in this sector. Instead, factors such as traits of the position, tasks and market, affected the salaries. Consequently, the same pay rise was given to several in similar positions, and the pay system gradually evolved back to a collective, instead of an individual system. In 1997 about 90 executive positions were returned to the collective bargaining system, and it seemed the initial desire to have PRP in the public sector had been modified to a softer version. Reasons for this development are related to the difficulties with identifying the individual employee's exact goals, which makes it difficult to evaluate what has been achieved. The criteria for a pay rise are thus often unclear. Additionally, appraisals

and evaluations in the public sector tend to focus more on intangible and subjective factors, as well as comparisons with other employees or previous performances, rather than analysing effectivity and concrete results. (Christensen et al., 2002).

Despite being quite positive to performance management in the public sector, and factors such as mission development, measuring and monitoring results, and allowing for comparisons and competition, Johnsen (2007), is sceptical of PRP in the public sector. He claims that tying financial incentives to individual performance in the public sector can provide undesired results. As the public sector is complex and subject to influences from largely uncontrollable surroundings, the implementation of PRP can impair productivity and efficiency. Additionally, it could potentially increase current administrative and managerial problems. Johnsen (2007) furthermore celebrates the employee culture of the Norwegian public sector, where values related to internal motivation are strong. This description of the civil servants is supported in Christensen et al. (2002).

According to Ingebrigtsen (2002; 2005) a main principle in the Norwegian public sector's pay policy has been equality, and it is important that a salary is perceived as fair. Ingebrigtsen (2005) explains that a fair salary depends on whom you compare yourself to, what you expect, or what you are used to. Traditionally, fair pay in the public sector has been related to function, education and experience. It would subsequently be deemed unfair if someone had not been paid the same as another in a similar position, with the same tasks and workload, same education, and approximately the same amount of experience. In her studies from 2002, she found that the most accepted criteria for deciding pay were position and function. Nevertheless, a few were positive towards some focus on performance-related criteria such as effort, skills and results.

Some argue that a focus on fair pay can be an obstacle when they must focus on recruitment and retention. Ingebrigtsen (2005) claims that this is not normally a problem, as most employees understand the importance of finding and keeping competence. Nevertheless, if experienced and capable employees continuously are overlooked in terms of remuneration, this may have a negative effect on their motivation and their willingness to stay in their job. Basing pay policy massively on market is therefore not recommended (Ingebrigtsen, 2005). Rødvei and Lien (2010) support the use of PRP for recruitment purposes in certain public sectors. An interesting master's thesis on PRP by Arnesen from 2008, questions if PRP is an appropriate tool for recruitment, retention and motivation of staff in the local governments. With respect to motivation, he found some correlation between PRP and enhanced effectivity and motivation in some municipalities in the north. Arnesen (2008) nevertheless did not find any clear positive effects of PRP on recruitment or retention, but concluded that PRP has some effect on all the three variables. Compared to academic theory, the situation in constituencies not using PRP, and previous research in private and public sector, his results showed smaller effects than expected. He therefore advised careful use of PRP in the public sector, and stressed the importance of its ambience for cooperation and internal motivation. In other words, Arnesen (2008) supports Johnson's (2007) and Christensen et al.'s (2002) descriptions.

#### 2.5.3 PRP and the Norwegian school sector

In the Norwegian school sector, there is little tradition for PRP. Teachers are known to be sceptical towards performance criteria for pay, and favour easily measurable pay criteria such as function, education or professional experience in decentralised negotiations. Nevertheless, those who open for other criteria like 'effort' are often also more positive to PRP-systems (Ingebrigtsen, 2005). Sollund et al. (2005) agree that there is not much of a culture for PRP in the sector, and a low degree of acceptance for the practice amongst the employees and the trade unions. While employers and managers seem to have a more positive attitude to the practice in the general public sector, school managers are still more critical of individual criteria for pay than many of their peers.

According to Ingebrigtsen (2005) PRP in the school sector is challenging, both because of the lack of quantifiable goals, but also because PRP is strongly related to competition. In schools, as the public service in general (see section 2.5.2) it is more important to have a culture for cooperation than competition (Ingebrigtsen, 2005). Ingebrigtsen (2005) does however explain how a bonus-arrangement could work without quantitative goals. Qualitative goals for example, could be connected to a particular task. It is, nevertheless, vital to decide and agree on the criteria before such an arrangement is announced (Ingebrigtsen, 2005).

Regardless of this pessimism towards PRP in the school sector, media has shown on several occasions how the practice already exists. A Norwegian national tabloid newspaper, *VG*, discovered that the principals in Oslo were rewarded based on how well their pupils did on national tests. This was revealed when *VG* obtained and published the headmasters' 'secret'

contracts where the pupils' results could give 'points' to the principal for a job well done (Sarwar, 2013). The local council of Oslo contested this, but the public debate resurfaced 4 February 2016 when a representative in Oslo's local council Tone Tellevik Dahl reportedly said to *Dagsavisen* (Norwegian newspaper) that teachers and principals could be rewarded through pay if bullying decreased in their school. This should be measured for example through pupil surveys.

Professor Kuvaas reacted to the statement, and questioned exactly how this should be measured in order to determine rewards. He also commented that it was probably easier to reduce the number of bullied pupils, than the bullying itself (Fladberg, 2016). It should be noted that it would not be the first time numbers were 'improved' in the schools of Oslo. According to Marsdal (2012), the competition between schools in Oslo resulted in some schools 'cheating' on national tests through illegitimate rehearsing and the exemption of students with lower marks.

Tellevik Dahl responded to the critique in a statement called *The principal's pay is not based on results* where she claimed the school in Oslo had a criteria-based salary system where bullying *could* be an extra criteria. The other criteria decided by the municipality of Oslo and the school leaders' trade union were area of responsibilities, competence, recruitment and retention, and goals and results (Tellevik, 2016). By viewing the contracts VG published in 2013 and these criteria, it seems the principals' salaries in Oslo are partly based on results. As mentioned earlier, Norway attempted to introduce a PRP solution for public managers in 1991, but the practice gradually returned to a more collectivised approach. To some extent, the criteria used to determine pay for principals in Oslo could imply a new attempt.

Another example of PRP in the school sector was introduced in 2015, when the Norwegian government announced the 'super teacher'. These teachers were supposed to be specialists in their field, to spend more time on studying research, and to help the learning organisation (the school) develop and reach its goals. 280 teachers in 31 local municipalities were given a pay rise of 48.000 Norwegian kroner per annum, and the minister of education, Thorbjørn Røe Isaksen, explained that recruitment and retention was one of the main reasons for the new practice. When asked, he claimed he was not worried there would be any conflicts between the teachers in these schools, as he believed the respect for academic development was substantial. Røe Isaksen finally stated that the new arrangement was not in breach with the traditional criteria for pay in the school (experience and education); and that this was not an

attempt to introduce PRP where the principal decided the salary (Holterman, 2015). As this arrangement has just recently been introduced, there is little data on the effects. With reasons as recruitment and retention, and tasks focusing on organisational development, this new arrangement resembles NPM-practices. It is still possible to deem 'super teacher' as a function, and consequently inherent with the most accepted pay criteria in the Norwegian public sector.

# 2.6 Local collective bargaining

As can be seen in this chapter, Norway has a long tradition for collective bargaining. The worker's rights are regulated in legislation, but the law on work environment also opens for organisations to decide on regulations that are more specific. Examples of this include decisions regarding work hours. Nevertheless, no work agreement must be unfavourable to the employee (*Arbeidsmiljøloven*<sup>9</sup>).

As local collective bargaining is a collective arrangement, finding evidence of NPM in the arrangement could perhaps be difficult. There are nevertheless arguments, which places it well within the NPM framework. This chapter will consequently address criteria used in local collective bargaining, and present research of the practice.

# 2.6.1 Collective bargaining and NPM

Norway has a long tradition for using collective bargaining as a means to regulate pay as well as employee rights. The umbrella organisation of the workers (LO) was established already in 1889, and the employers' umbrella organisation (N.A.F/NHO) a year later. The good relationship between the two organisations took years to build, but cooperation between them can be traced back to 1902 when the two agreed on the duty to negotiate and arbitrations for their sub-organisations (Stokke, et al., 2013). In 1935 the general agreement between LO and N.A.F established the mutual right to organise, rules for trade union representatives, the right and duty to negotiate, and regulations for collective dismissal and voting. The agreement from 1935 was groundbreaking, but not all the organisations established central agreements right away. Still, it was recognized as a sign that regulations between the actors were more accepted and useful in some matters, than legislation. This view has been respected ever

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The Norwegian law on work conditions and -environment

since. While it was important to N.A.F to keep the managers' salaries out of the collective agreements, LO managed to organise the line managers from 1937. After WWII, the combined use of a central agreement with subordinate collective agreements gradually became more common. Additionally, work conditions of more line managers (organised or not) were regulated by a collective agreement. Nevertheless, leaders' salaries should be set locally whenever possible (Stokke, et al., 2013).

In the 1980s and 1990s, Norway experienced several strikes in the public sector. Teachers, nurses, public employees were frustrated by how the salaries mainly increased in the private sector. They were not only critical of the size of pay-rises; the entire pay system was subject to debate (Stokke, et al., 2013). The time-period these changes took place corresponds with the introduction of NPM to the Norwegian public sector. During the 90s, the pay-profile shifted from centralisation, standardisation and collective agreements to decentralised solutions, flexibility, individualisation, PRP and market-adjustments (Christensen et al., 2002).

The NPM-focus on decentralisation also inspired a new process where additional pay rises could be distributed locally, or what we call local collective bargaining. Several of the trade unions of LO, like the teacher union *Utdanningsforbundet*, were not in favour of neither the process nor the principle of local collective bargaining. Both trade unions in LO and YS (another employee umbrella organisation) wanted to keep the amounts allocated to local bargaining as small as possible. They also may have done their best to even out the potential differences that could arise from these negotiations through i.e. favouring those with low salaries (Stokke, et al., 2013). In recent years, the amount allocated to local collective bargaining process has been around 1 % of the national settlement (Utdanningsforbundet, 2014; 2016).

Despite the resistance towards local collective bargaining, it is now quite an accepted part of the Norwegian negotiation processes. This could be a result of the support from some trade unions within the employee umbrella organisation *Akademikerne*, where a teacher's trade union *Lektorlaget* is represented. The teacher's trade union *Utdanningsforbundet* belonging to LO, is still against the arrangement (Rødvei & Lien, 2010). Other reasons why local collective bargaining is still in use, includes to promote predictability in pay negotiations; create acceptance for pay policies; develop common knowledge for selecting principles and criteria; create acceptance for the pay procedure in itself; and use salary as a tool

(Ingebrigtsen, 2005). It should be noted, that school middle managers and specialised employees in the school sector are often completely dependent on the local collective bargaining process for pay rises. This can be understood from chapter 3 of the main tariff agreement (HTA, 2014; 2016).

Given how NPM advocates the use of decentralised pay systems, local collective bargaining seems to be a product of the NPM-framework. To what extent the individual local bargaining processes are influenced by NPM can depend on the applied criteria.

### 2.6.2 The question of criteria

What is interesting with the local collective bargaining processes in Norway is that they, on the one hand, are collective solutions for determining pay. This is where the recognised principles of the public sector, 'equal pay for equal work' and fairness, become evident. On the other hand, the processes sometimes seem to aspire to PRP, which can be seen through chosen criteria for pay rises. Sollund et al., (2005) explain how the opportunity to negotiate pay locally does provide an opportunity for individual pay rises or PRP, but it is not a natural consequence. They do nevertheless support the idea of a link between local collective bargaining and PRP, based on the content and interpretation of general agreements. This section will focus on the criteria used for deciding pay in collective bargaining processes.

According to Ingebrigtsen (2005), teachers are known to be sceptical towards performance criteria for pay, and favour easily measurable pay criteria such as function, education or professional experience in decentralised negotiations. The main tariff agreement provides four criteria for determining salary, which Ingebrigtsen (2005) discusses in relation to fairness. The four are competency, function, effort and market. Function is traditionally the most accepted and applied criteria in the school sector. It is however possible to debate which functions that are most important and should induce a higher salary. With respect to competency, Ingebrigtsen divides it in two: education and experience. While both being traditionally accepted criteria in the school sector, not everyone agrees on their content. Some argue for example that one must differ between years of experience and relevant experience, as well as years or education and relevant education for municipal leaders according to Rødvei and Lien (2010). This frustration was related to the main tariff agreement, which says that a teacher who completes extra studies always should gain a pay rise whether the studies are relevant to the job or not.

Of the other pay criteria Ingebrigtsen (2005) discusses, effort is often valued by those who value skills and results as well, and sometimes are positive to PRP. They recognize performance as the most important factor to customers or users, and find it is unfair that you are not rewarded for putting in extra effort. Consequently, using the criteria effort when determining pay can potentially increase motivation. In general, people in the private sector are more welcoming to this criterion than the public sector. The critics of using effort as a criteria focus on the difficulty in measuring it, and a negative competitive culture (Ingebrigtsen, 2005). Both of these arguments have been debated in previous chapters in this dissertation. Ingebrigtsen (2005) also discusses market (see chapter 2.5.3) and leadership as criteria, which mostly leaders are positive towards.

As we can understand, certain criteria that embodies the traditional value of equality are more accepted in collective bargaining than others. Thus, a local collective bargaining process taking advantage of less traditional criteria is perhaps more influenced by NPM-ideas.

## 2.6.3 Local collective bargaining and the school sector

Recent research on local collective bargaining in the school sector is scarce. Still, there are a few interesting reports and dissertations published after 2008 on use and successfulness of local collective bargaining in the school sector. This section, will primarily present research results from 2008 by Agenda and from 2010 by Rødvei and Lien. Additionally a few master's dissertations on the subject will be commented on. The Agenda report was commissioned by the largest teacher trade union (Utdanningsforbundet), and by the employers' union for counties and municipalities (KS). The research results provide a great context for this dissertation, and illustrates differences between municipalities and counties. The thorough studies by Rødvei and Lien from 2010 present several obstacles to local collective bargaining, which provide an outline for this chapter.

Increasing the use of pay differentiation in the school sector through local collective bargaining proved difficult for many reasons according to Rødvei and Lien's (2010) findings. Some of the obstacles they found included attitude and resistance, allocated money and time consumption, finding appropriate criteria for determining pay in the school sector, decentralisation and obtaining information about performance, and resistance.

#### Attitude and resistance

Agenda (2008) found initially that most of their respondents claimed that the negotiations did not have an impact on the work environment, and that any impact registered was mostly negative. In their closer analysis, the answers revealed less consensus on the matter. When asked how local collective bargaining had a positive impact on work environment, a leader claimed there was a positive correlation between reaching organisational goals and remuneration, and a KS-member supported the general idea of PRP. In addition, a teacher and a trade union representative saw positive aspects of the local collective bargaining process. The teacher saw the process as an effort to maintain competency and education, and the representative described how a pay rise could show that job effort was appreciated (Agenda, 2008).

When asked how the process had a negative impact on the work environment, a leader focused on the difficulties in finding appropriate criteria, and the lack of culture for individual salaries. In a sector where cooperation was essential, individual salaries could cause an unhealthy work environment. A KS-member took issue with the teachers' and trade unions' lack of understanding for the pay policy's priorities and disagreement with employer's evaluation. Both a trade union representative and member of the employees' negotiating team were concerned with equal pay for equal work. The trade union representative also claimed that the work environment was not perceived as positive as before. Additionally, the member of the team commented on the lack of explanation for pay-rises, and said that the criteria seemed to be applied quite randomly (Agenda, 2008).

In 2010, Rødvei and Lien presented a study of municipal leaders' view on local collective bargaining as a development tool for the employer. The majority of the leaders were positive towards the idea behind the practice, and believed there was less resistance towards it in 2010 amongst department heads and middle managers. With respect to the teachers, they were more in doubt. According to their studies from 2005 (Sollund et al., 2005) where the employees were in focus, employers were more enthusiastic about the local pay processes than employees were. This was supported in Agenda's (2008) findings. Rødvei and Lien also believed the situation to be the same in 2010.

With respect to the trade unions, the municipal leaders normally reported that the climate was good, but while the employers wanted to focus more on differentiating pay, the trade unions

strongly disagreed. One of the municipal leaders described how they would try to find criteria closely linked to what was decided nationally in the main tariff agreement (HTA), but the trade unions would simply not budge. Another municipal leader explained this problem by the trade unions understanding of fairness as equality (Rødvei & Lien, 2010).

### Appropriate criteria for the school sector

The problem with finding appropriate criteria for measuring outcomes and deciding on rewards have been mentioned in several different contexts in this dissertation (see i.e. 2.6.2). As we can see in this the paragraphs above, both leaders and teachers are concerned with finding and explaining sound criteria for the school sector. According to Agenda's (2008) results, negative outcomes of the bargaining process mainly occurred in municipalities where the parties had not come to a consensus on criteria. Interestingly, one of the issues Agenda (2008) found was with the traditional criteria function, as both parties were worried it had become too 'accepted', and that some employees had more functions than they actually were able to perform.

That establishing appropriate criteria for local collective bargaining processes in the school sector is problematic, has also been found in studies by Sollund, Rødvei and Lien in 2005. Rødvei and Lien's studies from 2010 also showed this issue was still present, as the majority of respondents claimed it was difficult to find easily measurable criteria. While the criteria seemed simple enough on paper, it was difficult to assess individuals, both in terms of information and fairness. Most of the municipal leaders nevertheless believed decisions were fair despite these issues. This is an interesting perception given that the majority of their respondents stated that local bargaining processes could result in turbulence and unease in the units (Rødvei & Lien, 2010).

Despite the difficulties in establishing appropriate criteria, Rødvei and Lien's (2010) results show it to be possible. One municipality used the main tariff agreement's criteria as a basis for four wide headlines. Each year they would decide on what their main goal was, and which specific criteria that should be of focus. Still, the respondent of this municipality questioned if pay criteria were applicable at all in the public sector.

#### Decentralisation and information on performance

According to Rødvei and Lien (2010), some of the obstacles to local collective bargaining were related to lack of decentralisation. They found that the municipalities to very little extent delegated the negotiation process to the individual unit. Negotiations were always conducted by one of the municipal leaders, and never by for example a principal. The respondents defended the arrangement by referring to the importance of control with how pay was decided and planned locally, and how time consuming such as process would have been. Additionally they were worried about the turbulence a bargaining process on a lower level could create. The municipal leaders nevertheless stressed that while they did not decentralise the negotiations, they did spend a lot of time before a bargaining process began, cooperating with the involved actors (Rødvei & Lien, 2010).

When pay negotiations are held at a level on which the middle managers are not present, individual assessments of teachers would be difficult. Rødvei and Lien (2010) found that the practice was more common in other departments than education, and attributed this mainly to practical obstacles. With the amount of teachers in a municipality, individual assessments of employees would be very time consuming. Another potential cost related to individual assessments, is the fear of how your relationship with your manager could affect your salary. Nevertheless, one respondent explained that the success of a local pay system was dependent on the middle managers, and their ability and willingness to see their employees and arrange pay conversations (Rødvei & Lien, 2010).

#### Allocated money and time consumption

Both Agenda (2008) and Rødvei and Lien (2010) identified the allocated money as one of the biggest problems in achieving a good local bargaining process. Rødvei and Lien (2010) found that if the process should be a success in the school sector, more of the funds had to be transferred from the national process to the local. As of 2010, the local processes could be explained as negotiations where much time and resources were used to divide very little money amongst a large number of employees (Rødvei & Lien, 2010). With respect to time, Agenda (2008) did however find that both the employer and the employee organisations were critical of how little time they sometimes were given for the preparation period, and during the bargaining process.

#### Differences between municipalities and counties

According to Agenda (2008) it is, in theory, easier to create a professional negotiation process and a comprehensive employer policy in the county administration, because it is substantially larger than the municipalities'. Moreover, given that upper secondary school is the largest organisation run by the county, they are competing with fewer departments than the primary schools in the municipalities. Nevertheless, the larger size does prevent management from knowing and assessing the employees, which can be an obstacle to a successful local pay policy as seen above. Another challenge for the county is that the upper secondary schools often have a more diverse staff from different backgrounds in terms of education and experience. With many viewpoints to consider, not everyone would necessarily be happy with the final outcome.

Agenda's (2008) research results showed a lower level of satisfaction with the outcomes of the bargaining process of '06 in the counties than in the municipalities. Interestingly, the counties reported to have more knowledge of pay policies and criteria, as well as better explanations for the division of funds. Additionally, the negotiation climate was better in the municipalities than in the counties in terms of trust and willingness to find a solution. Nevertheless, Agenda (2008) claimed the negotiation climate had improved from '04 and '06.

Another difference between the county and the municipalities were the chosen criteria. In the county traditional criteria such as experience, workload, recruitment and retention were not as important as in the local administrations. Instead, criteria such as individual skills, de facto competency, and results were valued more. Nevertheless, performance based criteria related to skills and results were strongly disagreed on (Agenda, 2008). While Rødvei and Lien (2010) decided to treat the leaders of counties and municipalities as one group because the apparent variables and systems were quite similar, they also found differences in the employed criteria, and the counties were more motivated to differentiate pay than the municipalities. Interestingly, the leaders of county administrations claimed to have fewer problems establishing criteria, and in obtaining solid information about their employees, including the teachers Rødvei and Lien (2010).

#### Dissertations

Regarding interesting dissertations on local collective bargaining in the school sector, there are a few focusing on the universities of Oslo<sup>10</sup> and Bergen<sup>11</sup>. More relevant to this dissertation are two by Rystad on the success of local collective bargaining and local pay in the municipality of Bodø, and Einvik on the attitudes to the practice amongst teachers in Nordland County.

Rystad (2011) found that Bodø had not been successful in their plan to employ individual pay criteria such as responsibility, competence, results and effort, and particularly the two last ones. Amongst staff in the school sector, only a few administrators, consultants or office workers saw this practice in use. The teaching staff did not. The municipality had employed, to some extent, the use of individual pay in relation to recruitment, but salary was still decided based on traditional criteria as function, education and experience in addition to market.

Einvik (2015) focused on teaching staff in upper secondary schools in Nordland County. She found that the teachers saw local collective bargaining as stressful, and that they were not comfortable bragging about their own performance. The teachers still claimed a local pay rise could make them feel more 'seen' and appreciated for their job, and were quite positive towards using the school's mission as criteria for reward. As salary and fairness are closely related to comparisons between co-workers, the results of the local collective bargaining processes were kept secret to avoid conflicts. The teachers were not in favour of publishing the results, but they requested more openness and willingness to answer questions by the trade unions, the leaders and the school owner (the county).

#### To sum up

A successful local bargaining process should, according to NPM ideas, be effective and produce positive results. As we can understand from this chapter, the local collective bargaining process is an integrated part of the Norwegian school sector. As a decentralised pay system, it is a product of NPM, although one could question the efficiency and usefulness

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Senum, G., (2006) Middelklassens opprør: en analyse av lokale lønnsforhandlinger ved Universitetet i Oslo i 2002
<sup>11</sup>Aarre, M., (1994) Akademia eller management? En studie av lokale lønnsforhandlinger for vitenskapelig pesonale ved UiB etter iverksettingen av det nye lønnssystemet i staten, perioden 1991-1993

or the practice based on the small amount of allocated money. Additionally, the process seem to produce unwanted results in terms of work environment. Local collective bargaining in the school sector has traditionally focused on equal pay for equal work, and employed criteria such as function and competency to determine pay for groups. From Agenda's as well as Rødvei and Lien's research, it seems there is willingness to focus more on the individual employee, and NPM-friendly criteria such as effort and results. For local collective bargaining to be a success, the two reports stress the importance of reaching an agreement with the trade unions regarding criteria, and that the criteria must be clear and understandable. Moreover, the process must be thorough and open, and enough money must be allocated.

# 3 Methodology

The research was conducted throughout June 2015 to April 2016 amongst teaching staff, local trade union leaders, and middle managers in upper secondary schools in the county of Østfold. The research was exploratory and was based on the case study methodology using a single-case study design with a mixed method approach. The research methods chosen were a quantitative questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, in addition to document analysis. This chapter will explain and discuss the research process in detail.

# 3.1 Data collection

The data for this research was collected from public documents and guidelines from the Østfold County administration, and staff from the majority of upper secondary schools in Østfold. The department of education in Østfold County also supplied me with numbers of how many teachers and middle managers there were in the upper secondary schools in Østfold at the time. The research had been cleared with the head of education in Østfold County, and with the principals of each school that distributed the questionnaire. Table 1 below shows a general overview over the collected data.

| Table 1 - Overview of collected data     |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| Method                                   | Sources  |  |
| Document analysis<br>(see 'works cited') | Østfold County (2012): Appraisal interview – Procedure<br>Østfold County (2014): Appraisal interview – Form Østfold<br>County (2015): Local pay policy |  |
| Questionnaire                            | 124 teachers<br>22 middle managers   |  |
| Semi-structured interviews               | 19 teachers<br>20 middle managers<br>8 trade union representatives   |  |

The link to the questionnaire was sent to a total of 1104 teaching employees in 8 upper secondary schools in Østfold County. Of these, 146 responded. This gives a response rate of 13.2 %. Some respondents decided to skip some questions or sub questions, which means that not every question has the same response rate. The last questions regarding local collective bargaining received a somewhat lower response rate than those on performance appraisals. Some of these questions were also skipped because the questionnaire would jump ahead when certain answers were provided.

# 3.2 Research design and methods

The chosen research design was an embedded single-case study design with research methods including an online quantitative questionnaire with a few open ended questions created with *SurveyMonkey* and semi-structured interviews. While the case study design normally advocates the use for qualitative methods, there is support for using quantitative data collection as well (Bryan & Bell, 2007) and it has been suggested that quantitative data in exploratory case studies can improve the possibility of generalization and the transferability of the results (Czaja & Blair, 1996). As the research methods differed, various sampling strategies were applied. The remainder of this chapter will explain the choice of research methods, how they were used, and which challenges they posed.

The rationale for choosing the embedded single-case study design was that the research focuses on one case in one confined space, but several units: The county of Østfold as the confined space, and different upper secondary schools as units in which there were additional units including the academic staff, union leaders, middle managers and principals. Looking to Yin's (2003) presented conditions under which single-case studies are appropriate, this research falls in under the description of a test of existing theory. Limitations of the research design could be lack of clear data and flexibility. While flexibility can be useful, it could also result in a change of direction and research question because of new information, which could lead to that the chosen research design might no longer be appropriate (Yin, 2003).

#### 3.2.1 Official documents

In order to evaluate the practices of appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining in Østfold County, I needed to know which intentions or plans the county had for them. It was therefore necessary to add the procedural documents from Østfold County to the investigation. As procedural documents are not always followed to the letter by all the parts of an organisation, these documents alone could consequently not have been used to explore NPM in the public upper secondary schools. To find answers, it would nevertheless be necessary to evaluate them and the results from the questionnaire and interviews in an NPMcontext.

The three documents evaluated, included two documents regarding the practice of appraisal interviews in Østfold County, and one related to pay policy. All of the documents were and are available online, as can be found under 'works cited'. The first of the two documents on appraisal interviews, described the procedures a performance appraisal interview in Østfold

County should follow. The second was a document with proposed topics and forms to fill out both by the employee beforehand, and during the interview by both participants. The first document in essence describes the interview process, while the latter can aid the interview and it covers the documentation demands to fulfil the control purposes. With regard to the third document, the pay policy from 2015, this was changed during the research process. The document originally used for this dissertation, the pay policy of 2010, was replaced shortly after the questionnaire was closed. I did however study the 2015 version, and found that the new edition did not contain changes that affected this research largely. The pay policy of the Østfold County Administration is a part of their employer strategy document, and covers criteria, regulations and process in relation to local collective bargaining. It was made by Østfold County Administration in cooperation with the trade unions.

## 3.2.2 The questionnaire

The quantitative questionnaire was a suitable research method for this dissertation because the desired respondents were clearly defined and had sufficient knowledge and experience with the topic of our research question. Additionally, this research method can, as previously mentioned, increase the possibility for transferability and validity of results. A potential drawback with a quantitative questionnaire is that while the information obtained is clear and quantifiable, the respondents cannot explain why or how. Given the use of the commentary fields added to the questionnaire, this was to some extent avoided. The use of interviews also provided necessary explanations to the obtained questionnaire data.

Teachers and middle managers were invited via e-mail to answer the questionnaire in the end of May/beginning of June 2015 and closed 4 weeks later. This e-mail contained a link to the questionnaire, in addition to a brief explanation of the topic and method, and assured the participants of full confidentiality. It was distributed to all the teaching staff in the participating schools by the principals or wise-principals on my behalf. The chosen sampling strategy for the questionnaire followed a probability design as all the employees were invited to participate. To limit participation to teachers and middle managers, an obligatory question on position was included.

The questionnaire contained 21 questions regarding both the appraisal interviews and the local collective bargaining. Of the 21 questions, 20 questions were to be answered, and the respondent could choose to skip a question. The questions were furthermore divided in two categories: the performance appraisal interview and local collective bargaining. There were

more questions regarding the first, than the latter. All the questions were close-ended, but wherever appropriate, there was an open space to comment. Many respondents took advantage of these, and their remarks were a great asset to the investigation as they provided explanations just like the qualitative interviews.

The response alternatives in the close-ended questions (apart from the demographic denominators) were modelled in three ways. On some questions, the respondents could choose how many alternatives they would mark; on one, they had to rank different alternatives; and on some questions, they had to respond following the Likert-scale. A Likert-scale is used to scale the responses of a questionnaire and typically uses answer alternatives such as strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree (Bryman & Bell, 2007).

All the questions were reviewed before the final questionnaire was sent out to ensure that they were understandable and not leading; two points vital to obtain valid results (Kleven et al., 2007). In this review, it became clear that question 21 was difficult to understand. This was a ranking question, and I attempted to explain it more thoroughly before I sent it out. Despite a rather thorough review, there were still a few drawbacks with the final questionnaire: it was a little too long and sometimes asked too similar questions, one of the questions had too many criteria, an important demographic variable was not included, it was possible to 'skip' questions, and the final question was still difficult to understand.

While I claimed the questionnaire would take about 10-15 minutes to complete, it possibly took 15-20. Some respondents also said they became a little impatient when similar questions were asked, and question 11 did perhaps have too many 'statements' to mark. With respect to the demographic factor 'position' (question 1), in retrospect I should perhaps have included the title 'counsellor'. I do, however, not regret having left out 'trade union representative' of question 1, as this factor was considered at a later stage. Nor do I regret limiting the respondents to choosing one of the titles. An analysis with one person representing several groups would have become too complicated for this research.

The possibility to skip questions was an educated choice. This gave the respondents freedom to answer the questions they wanted to answer, which I knew from experience people in the education sector often preferred. It did however result in some questions gaining lower response rate than others. With respect to the final question, despite my efforts to explain it more clearly, some 'gave up'. Pull-down menus could potentially have been helpful on this

question, or a Likert-scale as some respondents requested. Some respondents also explained that they had become 'a little impatient' because it seemed I sometimes asked similar questions several times (i.e. in relation to preparing for an appraisal interview).

The last questions regarding local collective bargaining (questions 18-21), were skipped by 31 respondents. This is the highest number of unanswered questions. While the last question posed a challenge, and the questionnaire was quite long, I do have reason to believe that the response rate perhaps was due to lack of knowledge given the interview results. I will return to this matter in chapter 4.

### 3.2.3 Semi-structured interviews

The rationale for choosing semi-structured interviews as a research method was that it could provide the researcher with the necessary answers without excluding new, important and unanticipated information. This is recognized as a positive aspect of the semi-structured interviews (Bailey, 2007). Another strength of the semi-structured interview is its conversational fashion, which limits the need to ask many direct questions and provides a less formal situation in which the participant perhaps is less timid in expressing their true opinions. Drawbacks with interviews in general as a qualitative research method, is that they mainly provide subjective information and that qualitative methods rarely can produce results with the same degree of external validity as quantitative methods (Bryman & Bell, 2007). The use of the quantitative questionnaire can improve this drawback.

The interviews were conducted in three rounds and took place November 2015-April 2016. The first round of interviews was held primarily with teachers, the second focused on trade union representatives, and the third on middle managers. The invitation to the first round of interviews came in the first e-mail with the questionnaire link, and on the first page of the questionnaire. As the interview process was meant to begin during autumn 2015, an additional invitation was distributed on my behalf by the principals or vice-principals in October. For this first interview round, initially a voluntary response sample design was used. Such a sample could be biased, as people with strong opinions are most likely to participate. As the amount of volunteers was limited, a third sampling design called simple random sample was also employed (Moore & McCabe, 1999).

For the second and third interview rounds, with the trade union representatives and middle managers, a non-probability or purposive sampling was needed, as they were the specific

employees that held necessary information to this research (Anderson, 2009). The middle managers were again approached through an e-mail distributed on my behalf by the principals or vice-principals of participating schools. With respect to the second round of interviews with the trade union representatives of the two largest trade unions in Østfold County, I contacted them directly via e-mail. As my research focused on NPM-practices in the entire county and they were contacted as trade union representatives and not teachers, I did not approach principals for permission, but distributed this e-mail to every local trade union representative in all the upper secondary schools of Østfold.

In total, 47 interviews were conducted, distributed as shown in table 1. All the interviewees, regardless of position, were asked questions related to both appraisals and local collective bargaining. The main focus for the interviews with the teachers who were trade union representatives was still local collective bargaining. With respect to the middle managers, the focus was initially the appraisals, but as the research questions developed, the importance of the questions related to local collective bargaining increased.

A drawback with my interview process was that I had to use phone interviews in addition to the preferred face-to-face interviews. Particularly for middle managers and trade union leaders, this became the best option due to busy schedules. Interviews over the phone are generally seen as less informative, as the researcher has fewer means to interpret the interviewee's attitude and emotions related to the questions and answers. This is supported by Elmholdt (2006, in Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015). Because of the phone interviews, I had to vary between taking notes and recording the interviews. In order to have as natural a conversation as possible, I preferred taping the interviews. When recording, I could also be more aware of details in body language than when I had to write. The interviewees were always asked in advance if I could record it, and the recordings were deleted as soon as the interviews were transcribed. Every participant asked, agreed to the recording, but a very few expressed they were uneasy with the situation in the beginning of the interview. After a few minutes, they felt at ease.

As the interviews were semi-structured, there was an opportunity to expand on the original questions where appropriate, and where the participants wanted to share something they found relevant. Consequently, the interview questions could change slightly in each interview, which could be deemed a potential drawback to my investigation. The same questions were used on the majority of the interviews, but a few sub-questions were added

where appropriate to keep the interview flowing as an informal conversation. It is consequently not a grave error, but should be remembered in the analysis of the data.

When interviewing it is also important for questions to be neutral and not leading the interview subject towards any 'desired' answer (Kleven et al., 2007). This was a factor I was keenly aware of, particularly in the last interview round spring 2016, as I gradually began to expect certain answers. As the answers varied, it seems the questions were sufficiently open and neutral. Nevertheless, I might have been a little too hesitant in my questioning on local collective bargaining, as I knew the topic could be controversial. I wanted to create an environment as open and comfortable as possible, and let the respondent feel heard and appreciated for their comments, I was perhaps a little too careful.

# 3.3 Discussion of data

Many aspects can affect the validity and transferability of data. As this research process took a longer time than anticipated, there were also room for more potential drawbacks. This section will comment on the data foundation, address potential aspects that could have a negative impact on the quality of the collected data.

# 3.3.1 Analysis and bias

The data analysis followed Yin's (2003) strategies for analysing case study research, and in particular, the strategy relying on theoretical propositions, which he claims is the most useful. The quantitative data was mainly used for charts and were subject to basic quantitative analysis focusing on quantity and simple correlation. The data analysis used the procedural documents as a background for the discussion, the questionnaire responses as a quantitative foundation, and questionnaire commentaries and interview results as explanations. All the questions from the questionnaire were addressed to a different extent, apart from the six first demographic questions. Of these, three were applied to explore a possible correlation between the research results and the demographic factors. The three factors were position, trade union membership, and employment in the private sector compared to the public. We will return to this in chapter 4.1. From the semi-structured interviews, I did at times obtain interesting and relevant information that was not addressed in the questionnaire. From this, the third research question derived. Consequently, this data was also analysed and discussed.

In a qualitative analysis the researcher's persona and the subjectivity of research methods are more accepted than in a quantitative analysis where the goal is to be as objective as possible (Kleven et al., 2011). With regard to this analysis, as a teacher in Østfold County, it was vital that I maintained a balance between not letting my personal opinions influence the analysis while still taking advantage of my subjective experience and knowledge. In respect to the element of local collective bargaining, this did not pose any significant issue, as I am not a member of a trade union. I have neither been part of a local collective bargaining process, or handed in a pay demand. I do, however, have personal experience related to the appraisal interviews. As I have more an academic interest in its use from previous HR-studies and not strong opinions on the matter, I am confident that it did not pose a bias in the results.

### 3.3.2 Ethical considerations and confidentiality

Taking into account that the research methods and analysis are predominantly qualitative, it is vital to consider the ethical guidelines for conducting qualitative studies. Robert E. Stake (2005, cited in Merriam, 2009: 231) says that 'Qualitative researchers are guests in the private spaces of the world. Their manners should be good and their code of ethics strict'. The qualitative researchers can comply with this principle through always respecting the contestants and their surroundings in their research and always take into consideration the impact he/she can have on their participants in the critical research situation the impact their perceptions and background can have on their analysis of the results. Throughout this research process, I have been aware of my impact in the interview situations, and have strived to create a neutral and safe environment for the participants.

Furthermore, it is imperative that the researchers respect their duty of confidentiality and is careful in both how we communicate about the participant to not violate their integrity and how we store the information. This has been taken very seriously during these studies. To ensure anonymity, I did not pay attention to (neither in questionnaire nor interview) which school the participant worked at. This decision was made to ensure the participants' anonymity and make it easier for the principals to accept my request for access as they would not be held accountable or compared. Furthermore, all data has been safely stored and made anonymous in transcripts or lists, and in the research results presented in this dissertation. Before sending the questionnaire in May 2015, the Norwegian Centre for Research Data also approved my request to conduct this research.

### 3.3.3 Potential errors and quality of data

The first potential error in the investigation was the timing. The original plan was to distribute the questionnaire in January/February, as teachers often are more available at this time. The interviews were supposed to take place shortly after, in March/April, to ensure that the employees remembered the questionnaire and had approximately the same knowledge of the research topic. In retrospect, gaining access to the schools for doing research in the midst of debates and a local bargaining process could have proven difficult. Requesting permission from the principals, in May-June instead, was therefore preferable and a success as the majority of the schools participated. The choice of June for the questionnaire, and November-December, February-April for the interviews also worked well, as these were all time-periods in which the teachers were busy, but still available. The amount of time that transpired between the questionnaire and the interviews was nevertheless not optimal, as it would have been useful that the participants, who had completed the questionnaire, remembered it. It would still not have been possible to know if the interview themselves.

The second potential error lies in the research question. As Yin (2011) establishes, it is possible to have a qualitative research strategy where the research questions appear during the process. This could have a negative impact on the validity of results. While this dissertation attempted to have a clear research question or aim in the beginning, it was more a broad topic. Consequently, the research questions evolved with the research results, and were amended and specified at a later stage in the process. The questions changed more in wording than in actual content, and neither the focus nor the content of the research topic was changed. Two sub-questions were added during the research process: One focused on a link between the two original sub-questions, and the other sub-question mostly specified results derived from the main research questions.

A third potential error with respect to the questionnaire could be a result of the measures I took to gain access and ensure the participants' anonymity. As I never asked which schools the employees worked at in the questionnaire, one school could be overrepresented. Based on the different dates the school leaders issued the questionnaire link, the statistics from *SurveyMonkey*, and questions regarding the final question, I still have reason to believe that there were respondents from several schools.

Regarding quality of data, the response rate of 13.2 % on the questionnaire is quite low. This was not surprising to me, but not because of a potential issue with timing. Staff in public upper secondary schools receive numerous surveys throughout the year. Some of these are obligatory and work related, while others are dissertations like mine. Consequently, surveys are not a priority in a busy workday. Nearly all the principals I asked for access confirmed this situation by stressing that they could not promise responses. It was also used as a reason for why I did not get access to a few of the schools.

Despite the response rate on the questionnaire, the collected data for this dissertation has a professional quality. The research design opening for data from different sources, the amount of questionnaire commentaries, and the substantial amount of in-depth interviews, improve the quality of the data and gives it validity. The participation of the majority of upper secondary schools in Østfold, also adds to the quality. Still, with respect to transferability of the results to other upper secondary schools in Norway, or even just the remainder of the public organisations in Østfold County, the response rate of 13.2 % would still be quite low. The questionnaire results together with the interview results did nevertheless provide a solid foundation for the discussion in chapter 5.1 and 5.2 s. While this dissertation can be a small contribution to the current debate on NPM in the school sector, my results should be analysed and viewed in a context of external research results focusing on similar variables.

# 4 Results

The purpose of this investigation was to explore how the practice of appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining complied with NPM-principles. The results were obtained from two primary sources, the quantitative questionnaire and the interviews, and from the secondary sources of public procedures and documents provided by the Østfold County administration. This chapter will present the demographics of the respondents, and the research results divided two sub-chapters: one on appraisal interviews, and one on local collective bargaining.

# 4.1 Demographics

The questionnaire looked for six demographic factors: 'gender', 'years as a member of staff', 'department', 'professional background', 'position', and 'trade union membership'. Of these, the last three had an impact on the research results and will be presented in this chapter. With respect to first three, 'gender' and 'experience' showed little impact on the research results, and the respondents were evenly distributed between the categories. There were for example about as many male participants (48.63 %) as female (51.37 %); a division also reflected in the interviews. The third factor, 'department', proved to have unclear categories. Many teachers taught both general studies and vocational classes, and some with a general education could teach only vocational classes. Consequently, the categories did not distinguish sufficiently between respondents for the factor to have any particular effect on the results.

The three most interesting demographic factors were then 'professional background', 'position' and 'trade union membership'. To ensure anonymity, these three were rarely combined in the analysis. The first factor, 'professional background', asked if the respondents' had experience from both the private and the public sector, and where they had spent most of their professional career (table 2). The second factor, 'position', had five categories including three different titles for teachers, and two for middle managers. As a

division between the five had little impact on the analysis, the respondents were treated as two groups

| Table 2 - Demographic factor: Professional background                    |        |  |
|--|--------|--|
| I have only worked in the public sector                                  | 35.6 % |  |
| I have briefly worked in the private sector                              | 32.2 % |  |
| I have worked just as long in the public sector as in the private sector | 13.0 % |  |
| I have worked longer in the public sector than in the private sector     | 19.2 % |  |

(see table 1 in chapter 3): teachers and middle managers.

While 'professional background' and 'position' were explored in relation to both appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining, the third, 'trade union membership' (table 3), was only addressed in relation to the latter. To maintain anonymity, only responses from members

and representatives of the two largest teacher unions were included in the analysis. As the interviewed trade union representatives also were teachers, they and the teachers were treated as one group when analysing

| Table 3 - Demographic factor: Trade union membership |       |  |
|--|-------|--|
| Member of Utdanningsforbundet                        | 64.5% |  |
| Member of Lektorlaget                                | 14 %  |  |
| Member of Skolenes Landsforbund                      | 6 %   |  |
| Other trade unions                                   | 8 %   |  |
| Not a member of a trade union                        | 7.5%  |  |

the interview results regarding the appraisals.

# 4.2 Appraisal interviews

As we have seen in chapter 2.4, the tradition for appraisal interviews is long, but content and style can contribute in determining NPM's influence. This section will present the research results regarding appraisal interviews from both the primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources will explain how the Østfold County administration have envisioned the practice, while the primary will show the reality of how it works.

## 4.2.1 Frequency and preparation

The procedure document defines the appraisal interview as systematic, well-prepared conversations between a manager and a subordinate that should take place at regular intervals. It seems important to Østfold County that both interviewer and employee come well prepared to the appraisal interview, and they refer to the second document (Østfold fylkeskommune, 2012). The second document includes favoured topics the employee should consider beforehand, and has standardized forms to be completed during the interview (Østfold fylkeskommune, 2014). It is also recommended that the interviewer and employee go through the minutes from the last appraisal agreement, as this is supposed to be the starting point of every interview (Østfold fylkeskommune, 2012).

With respect to frequency, the results of the questionnaire showed that the use of appraisal interviews was quite common (question 7). The vast majority (see table 4) of the respondents reported that they were invited to interviews once a year or more, while between 25-27 % said they took place more rarely. As we can see there are not many differences between teachers and middle managers, but it seems a few middle managers participate in appraisal interviews

more frequently. Additionally only teachers (1.38 %) claimed never to have been invited to one.

The interviews and commentaries in the questionnaire, showed different reasons for why some

|                                   | Teacher | Middle man. |
|-----------------------------------|---------|-------------|
| Never                             | 1.6 %   | 0.0 %       |
| More seldom than once a year      | 25.2 %  | 27.3 %      |
| Once a year                       | 59.4 %  | 54.5 %      |
| Once per semester                 | 12.2 %  | 18.2 %      |
| More often than once per semester | 1.6 %   | 0.0 %       |

rarely or never had appraisal interviews. While some participants explained that they had recently changed jobs and had not yet had time for an appraisal interview, others cited issues with their superior, mismanagement, or lack of trust in the organisation. A small group of teachers claimed appraisal interviews was not a normal practice in their school, and some teachers explained that they had never had one, because they did not recognise them as 'real' appraisal interviews. These respondents often had longer work experience from the private than the public sector.

Amongst those who did not partake in appraisal interviews regularly, some teachers missed having them, and saw the appraisal interview as a unique forum for being seen and heard. Others were quite satisfied with the situation as one of the interviewed teachers explained:

*I am quite satisfied with my work situation. If I were unhappy or faced challenges, I could probably have benefitted more from it.* 

To move on to the preparation period, when asked if they were expected to prepare for the appraisal interview (question 8), the questionnaire results showed this was a quite common practice, but there was a slight difference between the teachers and the middle managers

(table 5). These numbers were consistent with the explanations in the interviews. With respect to how the employees were asked to prepare (question 9), the two groups favoured the

| Table 5 - Are you expected to prepare for the appraisal interview? |        |        |  |  |  |
|--|--------|--------|--|--|--|
| Teacher Middle ma  |        |        |  |  |  |
| Never  | 12.8 % | 4.8 %  |  |  |  |
| Sometimes  | 29 %   | 23.8 % |  |  |  |
| Usually  | 38.5 % | 42.8 % |  |  |  |
| Always   | 19.7 % | 28.6 % |  |  |  |

same two descriptions in opposite order (highlighted in table 6). While the more teachers chose the more formal approach with filling out a form, the majority of the middle managers claimed they were asked to think about a topic. The teachers' third choice was more formal than their first, and the middle managers' was less formal. This could indicate that the

teachers' appraisal interviews are somewhat stricter in nature, which corresponds well with interview results.

| Table 6 - Content of preparation period   |         |             |  |
|---|---------|-------------|--|
|   | Teacher | Middle man. |  |
| I get a topic from my middle manager a few days before the appraisal interview      | 12 %    | 23.8 %      |  |
| I get a form to fill out, which corresponds with Østfold County's guidelines        | 28.2 %  | 23.8 %      |  |
| I am asked to think about what I would like to talk about                           | 26.5 %  | 33.3 %      |  |
| I am told to complete a self-evaluation form  | 16.2 %  | 9.5 %       |  |
| I am told to find examples of how I have fulfilled the plan from the last interview | 0.9 %   | 0 %         |  |
| I am not asked to prepare   | 9.4 %   | 9.5 %       |  |
| Other?  | 6.8 %   | 0 %         |  |

Of the respondents who chose the option 'other', some explained in the commentary field that they did not remember as it had been awhile since the last one. The majority of these respondents were teachers. Others again were specifying how their form looked, or explaining that more than one of the options were accurate.

While the interviews revealed a quite substantial differences in how the middle managers would conduct an appraisal interview (section 4.2.2), the majority of the interviewees agreed on the use of preparation material, and consequently supported the findings from the questionnaire. The preparation material could either be the provided forms from the county administration; it could be something the school or the manager's department was working on; or it could be the middle manager's own suggestion.

## 4.2.2 Style and content

Regarding style, the procedure document identifies managers of all levels as those responsible for the appraisal interview. It also stresses the importance of that the appraisal interview should be a pleasant conversation where focus lies on the good aspects of the work place and what the employee does well. Topics that should be covered in the appraisals are identified in both documents as work execution, work environment, relation to and cooperation with manager, responsibilities and participation, expectancies, and development and goals. When the employee is above fifty-five the conversation should also focus on how long the employee envision to work and the final years before retirement. Difficult topics should be avoided, unless brought up by the employee, and should be covered in other types of meetings. The appraisal interview is not a place to discuss salary, but the interviewer should be able to clarify possible, realistic pay-development in the future. Despite using a soft-HR approach to the appraisal interview setting, Østfold County administration claims that it should result in an agreement that obligates both parties. This agreement should include areas for improvement, and how and when these should be accomplished. It could be signed, but it is not a requirement. When the agreement has been drawn up, the employee should get a copy and the original should be safely stored. The content of the appraisal interview is confidential and should not be disclosed to anyone else. The only thing that should be included in the employee file is that it has been conducted (Østfold fylkeskommune, 2012).

| Table 7 - Which model describes best how appraisal interviews are conducted at your workplace?   |         |             |  |
|--|---------|-------------|--|
|  | Teacher | Middle man. |  |
| a) My middle manager controls the conversation and tells me his/her impression and expectations of me. The form is completed during the conversation and signed.                     | 19.7 %  | 0.0%        |  |
| b) My middle manager asks me how things are going at work and we have an informal conversation, which is summed up in a document we both agree on and sign.                          | 57.3 %  | 57.1 %      |  |
| c) There is no real structure to the appraisal interview and we do not fill out any forms.<br>We have a pleasant conversation about everything and anything in the workplace.        | 13.7 %  | 33.3 %      |  |
| d) There is no real structure to the appraisal interview and we do not fill out any forms.<br>The conversation is very short and seems to be something we are simply required to do. | 3.4 %   | 0.0 %       |  |
| e) I have never had a performance appraisal interview with my middle manager.  | 0.9 %   | 0.0 %       |  |
| f) None of these alternatives corresponds with my perception of the appraisal interview.   | 5.1 %   | 9.5 %       |  |

According to the questionnaire results (question 12), the majority of the respondents had a similar perception of how appraisal interviews were conducted in Østfold County. About 57 % (table 7) of both teachers and middle managers agreed on alternative b), which is a hybrid solution of a strict and soft approach to performance appraisal interviews. It is strict in that it follows protocol and fills out forms, soft in that it is perceived as an informal conversation. These results were supported in the interviews, as many teachers described this hybrid solution. As can be seen in table 6 many teachers also chose alternative a) describing a stricter form of a performance appraisal interview, and alternative c) describing a very informal interview process. Interestingly, none of the middle managers chose the stricter approach, while a large group agreed with the more informal c). Again, it seems the interview process is perceived as more formal amongst more teachers than middle managers.

From the interviews with the middle managers, it seemed the content of the appraisal interviews differed, and could be divided in two main categories. Some middle managers were more concerned with performance and/or the school's principal missions, while others were more focused on the employee's well-being and wishes for the future. The middle

managers did nevertheless largely agree that the appraisal interview should be a conversation for the employee, and on the importance of setting time aside for the individual employee.

The majority of the interviewed middle managers belonged to the second group, and believed the appraisal interview should have an informal, conversational style where they could build trust, talk about future prospects, and provide support if needed. These results corresponds with the preferred appraisal interview style in table 7. Interestingly, some of the interviewed teachers who described the process in similar terms, were not particularly satisfied with the informality of it, and often found the appraisal interviews quite useless. Reasons for this included that the interview just became another friendly chat; the practice was undermined through treating it as nothing but a requirement; and the lack of ability to follow up on what was decided. A few teachers did not see much need for the appraisal interviews, because they felt the middle managers open-door policy was sufficient. Some of the interviewed middle managers shared these views, and favoured their informal leadership style.

It should be noted that it was on this question (question 12), the mentioned commentaries regarding the appraisal interviews not being appraisal interviews, surfaced. From the questionnaire results, it seems the majority of those critical to how the interview is conducted, are teachers with experience from the private sector. One of the commentators reflected on his/her previous experience from the private sector and described how b) (table 6) can work well. This respondent also indicated that the success of performance reviews in the school was dependent on the middle managers. If the middle manager did not follow up on the employee and give good feedback, such a loose interview process could not be successful.

About 1/3 of the interviewed teachers, of which many had experience from the private sector, supported this respondent. They all requested more follow-ups on their development and performance, yet many emphasized that they sought feedback on their competency, not on their pupils' marks. One of the teachers explained:

I would have liked some constructive feedback that is both direct and honest from my leader. The feedback need to focus on both how I can improve, and what I do well. Another teacher said: I recently had a very good experience in my performance appraisal interview where my leader 'forced' me to give feedback both to him/her and myself.

In general, the interviewed teachers differed greatly in what they wanted the appraisal interview to contain – many still preferred it to be a quite informal conversation about tasks, wishes and job satisfaction.

As mentioned, some of the interviewed middle managers were also preoccupied with the school's mission statement and particular goals, and claimed that the appraisal interview was the only arena where they could discuss the employee's work in relation to those. As the questionnaire has shown, a more formal practice also exists in Østfold, and some respondents even claimed that the interview process was stricter than the given alternatives. They described an appraisal interview where standard forms were applied and the teacher had to write their own summary of the interview. Another explained that spreadsheets were a part of the appraisal process. Nevertheless, appraisal interviews in Østfold County touched very rarely upon pay according to the questionnaire results (question 14).

It should be noted that some of the questionnaire respondents submitted explanatory comments where they explained it had been so long since their last appraisal interview, that they could not remember how they were conducted. The interviews also revealed that more than 3/4 of the participants could not remember what had been discussed in their last appraisal interview. The majority of these respondents were teachers. One could question the importance of a practice only a few remember.

#### 4.2.3 Purpose and outcome

According to the procedure document, the purposes of the interviews include development and improvement of the employee's work situation, to clarify mutual expectations of work conditions and results; and to develop trust and openness that helps daily communication and cooperation (Østfold fylkeskommune, 2012).

Based on the questionnaire results, it seems the employees were largely aware of the goal of the appraisal interviews beforehand. Both the majority of middle managers and teachers answered yes to this, but there were more teachers than middle managers who also said no, or sometimes (question 10).

With respect to the purpose and outcome of performance appraisal interviews, the answers on the questionnaire varied (question 11). The rating average showed both similarities and differences between the teachers and middle managers, one being that the teachers' preferred the last description of potential outcomes: '[it] does not result in any particular change in my work situation' (table 8). Additionally, more teachers than middle managers felt the appraisal interviews were conducted just to meet requirements. Some of the interviewed teachers and, interestingly, a few middle managers for their part disagreed that the goals of appraisal

interviews were unclear. They were also more in favour of outcomes such as feeling included in development plans, and allowing you to influence your work situation. The interview results showed little support for these statements, particularly amongst the teachers.

Despite these disagreements, there was consensus on several alternatives, and the teachers' second to fifth choices were the middle managers' first to fourth (highlighted in green). The interview results also supported these four factors (table 8) in that the appraisal interview was a place for praise, to be 'seen' and valued, and to obtain help if needed. As one teacher said:

### *I like the appraisal interviews – they make me feel valued, seen and heard.*

The majority of both interviewed teachers and middle managers expressed support for this statement, but some questioned if there perhaps should be other outcomes than 'being seen' and getting support. With respect to the latter, a few of the questionnaire respondents marked the option 'not relevant'. This might be because they had never needed support in an appraisal interview, as we saw in the quote in chapter 4.2.1. That the option 'to gain help' received much support both in questionnaire and interviews, contradicts to some extent the questionnaire results regarding lack of outcome (table 8).

Regarding the outcomes with the lower scores, there was also some consensus between the middle managers and teachers. Only a very few did for example mark that the appraisal interviews made them feel insecure (table 8). This alternative received the lowest score amongst middle managers, and the second to lowest amongst the teachers – only the 'clarifying pay possibilities' scored lower. The latter scored however a little higher amongst middle managers. Both how the appraisal interview could clarify demands, and the potential purpose of using it as a means of controlling the employees, also received low scores from both groups.

The questionnaire results showed little support amongst the teachers for the statement that the appraisal interview was an arena for career development and new, exciting challenges. The interview results were here somewhat contradictory, as both several teachers and middle managers claimed that appraisal interviews was a place for discussing job satisfaction, development, and future challenges. These discussions did however seldom lead to any specific changes – at least not in a short-term perspective.

| Table 8: The appraisal interview  |         |             |  |
|---|---------|-------------|--|
|   | Teacher | Middle man. |  |
| is a place for praise   | 3.27    | 3.90        |  |
| makes me feel 'seen' and valued   | 3.22    | 3.86        |  |
| can result in needed help and support   | 3.21    | 3.86        |  |
| can result in new, exciting challenges if desired                               | 2.73    | 3.43        |  |
| is a place to discuss future career opportunities                               | 2.54    | 2.94        |  |
| clarifies the possibility of a pay rise   | 1.60    | 2.05        |  |
| gives me the opportunity to influence my work situation                         | 2.93    | 3.67        |  |
| makes me feel included in my department's development plans                     | 3.12    | 3.55        |  |
| makes me feel included in my school's development plans                         | 2.51    | 3.67        |  |
| exists to evaluate my performance and plan follow-ups                           | 3.03    | 3.52        |  |
| clarifies demands   | 3.12    | 3.29        |  |
| controls me and my work   | 2.52    | 1.71        |  |
| makes me feel insecure of my performance  | 1.98    | 1.55        |  |
| can contribute to increased trust between me and my employer (here: the school) | 2.89    | 3.81        |  |
| can contribute to increased trust between me and my middle manager              | 3.28    | 4.37        |  |
| is held just to meet requirements   | 3.08    | 1.76        |  |
| has unclear goals   | 2.89    | 2.11        |  |
| does not result in any particular change in my work situation                   | 3.51    | 2.67        |  |

With respect to the middle managers' perception of outcome, the interviews showed that middle managers in general found the appraisals with their employees more useful than the employees themselves did. Interestingly, some middle managers also reported in their interviews that they were less satisfied with their own appraisal interview with their superior.

# 4.2.4 Final comments on the research results

Østfold County administrations idea of how an appraisal interview should be conducted, seem to be a hybrid between the management control and the development approach as explained in chapter 2. While the appraisal interview uses the softer approach in focusing on the employee's welfare and cooperation, it also advocates for formality in its use of forms and signed agreements, and in its focus on expectancies, results and goals.

When considering the amount of schools participating in this investigation, it is unsurprising that the practices differ somewhat, even though every school and department should follow the same guidelines. Some of the middle managers follow the models closely, while others trust their own more informal style. It seems the majority of the employees partake in appraisal interviews regularly, but there is little focus on the county's mission and performance feedback. The majority of both middle managers and employees still seemed to agree that it is a place to facilitate relationships and trust, and being seen and heard according

to both interviews and questionnaire results (table 8). With respect to attitudes to the practice, some of the interviewed employees who claimed they rarely had appraisal interviews missed them, while others felt they were unnecessary. Many also questioned the practice in terms of outcome and style.

The most vital element in having a successful appraisal interview was identified, in both commentaries and interviews, as the middle manager or the relationship with the middle manager. While the majority claimed that this was not normally a problem, many had experienced poorly executed appraisal interviews. A few even claimed to not having had one due to a bad relationship with their superior. Another factor related to the middle manager and the success of an appraisal interview, was a middle manager's potential lack of knowledge or competency. While most of the interviewees agreed that their middle managers were nice, hard-working people, some interviewees questioned middle managers' positions as pedagogic leaders as they often lacked both experience and education relative to the staff they were managing. Many middle managers supervise courses they have not taught or studied, and are consequently not that familiar with the challenges a teacher can face.

According to the NPM-ideas, efficiency is a key factor. Consequently, a practice such as an appraisal interview must be useful and provide positive outcomes. Whether or not Østfold County's appraisal interviews comply with the principles of NPM, based on the results presented here, will be discussed further in chapter 5.

# 4.3 Local collective bargaining

As we have seen in chapter 2.5, local collective bargaining is an integrated part of the pay system in the school sector. It is a product of NPM, but the question remains how influential this reform is on Østfold County's pay policy today. This section will present the research results regarding local collective bargaining from both the primary and secondary sources. The secondary source, the pay policy of Østfold County administration, will explain how the County imagines the practice, while the primary will show the reality of how the system works

## 4.3.1 Purpose

Østfold County's pay policy is meant to ensure the individual employee and the management that the question of pay is not treated arbitrarily and randomly. Salary should be determined

based on objective, defendable criteria, and the principle of equal pay for equal work upheld. The policy should be an asset in contributing to retention, development, reputation, and employee attractiveness. It should also support the Østfold county administration's process towards reaching its goals and objects. According to the pay policy, it is important to Østfold county administration how employees are rewarded for working towards the county's common goals and following the mission (Østfold fylkeskommune, 2015)

While the general purpose of local collective bargaining was not addressed in the questions of the questionnaire or the interviews, it is necessary to know what Østfold county as the employer believes it to be. Therefore, it has been described here. The topic was nevertheless touched upon during interviews, particularly in relation the middle managers salaries. Several of the teachers familiar with local collective bargaining, questioned the purpose of the process, when much of the locally allocated money had to go to the middle managers. As we have seen in chapter 2, middle managers' salary depends on local collective bargaining in the school sector. Additionally, a common practice in Østfold county rewarding groups – such as class teachers – was also criticized in the interviews.

### 4.3.2 Negotiation process and pay conversations

Østfold County's pay policy states that the provisions of the main tariff agreement (HTA) are vital, and ensures the employees' right to participation. In a salary negotiation process, all three forms of participation must be in place: information, deliberation and negotiation. In regards to negotiations, these are normally conducted between the employer and the trade unions, and any pay negotiation follows HTA provisions. It should be noted that only organised employees are allowed to ask for a pay rise during the local bargaining. This pay demand must be communicated through the trade union representative, as one does not negotiate on one's own behalf. Furthermore, in the local bargaining process, only individual pay rises are treated; pay rises are not to be negotiated on behalf of groups in similar positions. This rule can however be evaded if the parties have agreed beforehand to let a representative negotiate on behalf of for example a team. Despite the requirement of having someone represent you in order to hand in a salary claim, the employer must ensure that all employees' salaries are following HTA – with or without a trade union membership (Østfold fylkeskommune, 2015).

| When the questionnaire       | Ta       |
|------------------------------|----------|
| respondents were asked how   | _        |
| much knowledge they had      | Ve       |
| about the local collective   | Go       |
| bargaining process (question | Ba<br>Le |
| 18), the results showed big  | No       |

| Table 9 - How is your knowledge of the local bargaining process? |         |             |  |
|--|---------|-------------|--|
|  | Teacher | Middle man. |  |
| Very good  | 5 %     | 18.8 %      |  |
| Good   | 18 %    | 56.3 %      |  |
| Basic  | 37 %    | 18.8 %      |  |
| Less than basic  | 35 %    | 6.3 %       |  |
| No knowledge   | 5 %     | 0 %         |  |

differences between the teachers and the middle managers. While the majority of the middle managers had good or very good knowledge of the process, the majority of the teachers reported to having basic or less than basic knowledge. Some also claimed to have no knowledge of the process. The interviews showed that the vast majority of the teachers knew very little about how the process actually worked or which criteria that were employed, of which many were apologetic. Some were not particularly concerned with the process and had consequently not sought more knowledge on the subject, but several wished that the information was more easily available and for a more open process. Another few claimed they would not get information even if they asked. There was also a difference in whether or not the employees felt they knew where to find information (question 19). The majority of both teachers (63 %) and middle managers (87.5 %) responded positively to this.

Despite these results, some of the participating middle managers seemed somewhat uncertain of which impact the local bargaining process had or should have on them, and a few claimed they relied on national negotiations. The majority, nevertheless, was familiar with the importance of the local collective bargaining processes in terms gaining a pay-rise. Interestingly, both interviewed teachers and middle managers recognised that this system could create problems. If middle managers were not given anything in the local settlement, the minimum wage of a sixth form college teacher could become almost the same as the middle managers'. A small or negative wage difference could cause recruitment problems to middle management positions according to some interviewees. Teachers with higher education and much experience would rarely want to be paid less or the same for more responsibility as a middle manager.

On question 15, asking if the employees handed in pay claims in the local bargaining processes, there was naturally a few differences between the middle managers and teachers. Given that a middle managers' pay rise is determined locally, they also submitted pay claims more frequently than the teachers did. Amongst the interviewees, this ratio seemed to be more evenly divided.


With respect to those who rarely submitted pay claims, the reasons differed both within and between the two groups (question 16). As table 10 shows, there was not any clear trend in why. Many did nevertheless not agree that they were paid enough through the national bargaining process. With respect to the middle managers, the trend seemed somewhat clearer as the majority stated that they trusted the management to know who should get what. Many of the questionnaire respondents also marked 'other' and decided to comment on this question. According to the commentaries, it seemed one of the main reasons for not submitting a pay claim amongst teachers was the struggle to understand the system. This was also a supported in the interview rounds. Both interviews and commentaries showed that some teachers were not even aware of the possibility of submitting pay claims – some despite being members of trade unions. A few also explained that they were not organised, and others claimed everyone would get the same anyway.

| Table 10 - Why do you not submit pay claims?             |         |             |  |
|--|---------|-------------|--|
|  | Teacher | Middle man. |  |
| I am not going to get anything anyway                    | 27.6 %  | 0.0 %       |  |
| Am uncomfortable bragging about myself                   | 25 %    | 9.1 %       |  |
| I get enough through the national bargaining process     | 9.2 %   | 0.0 %       |  |
| I trust the management knows who deserves a little extra | 17.1 %  | 54.6 %      |  |
| Other  | 21.1 %  | 36.3 %      |  |

The reasons why employees frequently decided to submit a pay claim also differed (question 17). As table 11 shows, there was no particular trend amongst the middle managers. The teachers, on the other hand, mostly saw the importance of informing the management about their contribution, and felt they deserved it. The majority of those who marked 'other' submitted comments. The middle managers and some of the teachers said that this was how the system worked, and that they would not get any pay rise unless they submitted a claim. A few teachers also explained that it could be difficult to be paid for extra work and responsibility. Pay claims were therefore needed to highlight this issue. Both comments and interviews revealed that some handed in pay claims because the trade union asked them to.

| Table 11 - Why do you submit pay claims?                           |         |             |  |
|--|---------|-------------|--|
|  | Teacher | Middle man. |  |
| I usually get one when I ask                                       | 12.8 %  | 11.1 %      |  |
| I think my salary is generally too low                             | 5.13 %  | 22.2 %      |  |
| Because I deserve it   | 25.6 %  | 22.2 %      |  |
| Because the management does not always know how I have contributed | 30.8 %  | 22.2 %      |  |
| Other  | 25.6 %  | 22.2 %      |  |

The final questions of the survey asked who the respondents believed got pay rises during the local bargaining and who should. Regarding the first question, table 12 shows clearly that the majority of the respondents felt there was no clear trend (above 50 %). Nevertheless, the middle managers seemed to be favoured according to 20 %, while interestingly 12 % cited 'other' and provided comments. Research into differences between middle managers and teachers showed that both groups ranked these three equally. With respect to the fourth, the teachers believed those with the highest level of education was favoured, while the middle managers believed employees experiencing larger challenges would be remembered in the local bargaining process. None of the other categories surpassed 2 % in either of the groups.



Of those who cited 'other' about half of them commented that they did not know. A few claimed everyone got something, that the pay rises circulated from employee group to

employee group, or that the local additions were used to even out differences from the central wage settlement. It was also stated that responsibility as a class teacher had been a factor, but now the middle managers were favoured. Finally, some claimed that those who had contributed especially that year would benefit in the local bargaining, but not every achievement would be noticed during the year, so the selection became somewhat random.

Every interviewee was also asked which criteria that were actually used to determine local pay rises. The majority described processes where groups were favoured such as class teachers, where everyone got something, and where the extra money was divided in turns on different employees. Apart from these descriptions, knowledge of other criteria was quite slim particularly amongst teachers. This was often the case amongst lower middle managers as well, although their overview usually was a little better. Most of the interviewed local trade union representatives were naturally very up-to-date on how the process had worked last time. With respect to performance related criteria, some of the middle managers reported that these were in fact used in determining local pay rises in their school. Others were nevertheless highly sceptical, as they worried about increased competition in the work environment (see also chapter 2.5 and 2.6).

Østfold County's pay-policy also explains that any employee can request a conversation with the employer about their salary. This conversation can be held outside of an appraisal interview, and should contain a discussion of how the employee should work towards higher remuneration. The employee's salary expectations as well as the possibilities and demands to comply with these, are factors the manager at all times should be aware of. It is nevertheless important that the manager knows the salary framework and bargaining policies well, and that he or she does not promise anything that is contradictory to the main tariff agreement (HTA). When asked if they had had individual meetings about their salaries (question 13), the majority of both teachers and middle managers answered 'never'. There were however more middle managers who had participated in a pay conversation than teachers: 9.5 % had had one once, and 23.8 several times. Amongst the teachers, 7.6 % had partaken in such a conversation once, and 1.7 several times. None reported having annual individual meetings about their salary.

### 4.3.3 Criteria and attitude

Østfold County administration's criteria for determining salary at the point of employment include responsibility and tasks, competency, market pay, co-workers' salaries, and how

much the closest middle manager earns. The criteria for local bargaining should reflect if the employee has experienced changes in responsibility and tasks, results and quality of the work alone or in a team, and new, useful competency. Furthermore, the effort the individual shows in developing and helping the County Administration reach their goals, and the employees' ability and willingness to change and adapt to new tasks, should be reflected. Finally, the signals already agreed on by the central organisations for employer and employee must be taken into consideration. The criteria mentioned here are quite general. In the preparation period before the local negotiations begin, the employer and the trade unions agree on and establish more specific criteria based on local or current situations. While the main principle is equal pay for equal work, there is still room for individual differences. These must nevertheless be defendable through tasks and responsibilities, competency, effort and results (Østfold fylkeskommune, 2015).

During the interviews, everyone was asked what their attitude was towards local collective bargaining. About half of the interviewed teachers and middle managers were against or questioned the practice for different reasons: some because they did not approve of the system in general, others because it was not used right. Examples of how it was used incorrectly included illustrations of the management favouring who they liked and not using tangible criteria; that the practice created insecurity and competition in a workplace needing cooperation; or that it was frequently used to reward positions that should be regulated through other funds. In the questionnaire comments and interviews, some explained that the local bargaining system was unfair because firstly, everyone usually got the same no matter how much effort they put in; and secondly not everyone's effort was noticed and acknowledged in the local bargaining processes.

Regardless of their attitude to local collective bargaining, every interviewee was asked which criteria that should be taken into account, given that the system was already in place and not likely to dissolve. Here the teachers differed greatly, some favoured rewarding positions and formal responsibilities, and others higher education and professional experience. The final questionnaire question (21) asked the respondents to rank their preferred criteria for local collective bargaining. Table 13 shows how the answered differed according to demographic factor. As we can see, the teachers favour extra responsibility (green), while the middle managers prefer to reward those who take on extra responsibility (green). Both groups list 'extra large challenges at work' as their second criteria (orange).

|   | Teachers | Middle man. | Utdanningsforb. | Lektorlaget |  |  |  |  |
|---|----------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|--|--|--|--|
| Highest education                         | 4.55     | 3.81        | 4.18            | 5.67        |  |  |  |  |
| Relevant part time studies                | 4.93     | 4.13        | 4.71            | 5.11        |  |  |  |  |
| Trade union membership                    | 2.68     | 3.94        | 3.07            | 1.89        |  |  |  |  |
| Position/title                            | 2.96     | 3.06        | 2.79            | 3           |  |  |  |  |
| Extra responsibility (i.e. class teacher) | 6.05     | 5.19        | 5.96            | 5.39        |  |  |  |  |
| Taking on extra tasks voluntarily         | 4.92     | 6.13        | 5.14            | 5.44        |  |  |  |  |
| Extra large challenges at work            | 5.87     | 5.56        | 5.93            | 6.17        |  |  |  |  |
| National bargaining results               | 4.04     | 4.19        | 4.21            | 3.33        |  |  |  |  |

Table 13 - Rank the criteria from the most acceptable (8) to the least acceptable (1)

The questionnaire respondents were also invited to comment on question 21. The comments focused on both principles and criteria, and differed depending on title. Middle managers were largely focused on two aspects: they had to be paid more than their teachers and that contributing to school development should count. This was also supported in many interviews.

Amongst the teachers, some stressed the importance of education, flexibility and extra effort, while others were more focused on the importance of finding durable, objective criteria. As can be seen from both the questionnaire and interviews, using education as a criterion for determining pay locally was quite accepted. A few even argued that there should be a simple model based on 'the higher education, the higher the pay', and that the trade unions of today were obsolete. Nevertheless, several teachers advocated professional experience above education in their questionnaire comments – a subject that also appeared during the interviews. Many interviewed middle managers and teachers with experience from the private sector questioned why years of professional experience counted less than a master's degree with respect to expertise and payment.

Interestingly, the questionnaire respondents who were most positive to performance criteria, were those who had as much experience from the private as the public sector, and not those who had more experience from the private. The difference between the two groups were nevertheless small in both the questionnaire and interview results. In the interviews, many teachers suggested using performance related criteria, if the system of local collective bargaining were to have any function. Regardless of having a positive or negative attitude towards the local pay system, the majority of interviewed teachers and middle managers also felt it was acceptable to reward someone 'who did a little extra'.

According to the interviewees representing the two largest trade unions, one trade union (*Utdanningsforbundet*) was against local collective bargaining on principal, and wanted very little money to negotiate over, and wanted to favour groups and traditional criteria such as function (i.e. class teacher). This corresponds well with the results shown in table 13. The other trade union (*Lektorlaget*) wanted more money to negotiate over, and to favour the most academically well educated of the teachers. This was also supported in the questionnaire findings (table 13). Still, members of both trade unions chose 'extra large challenges' as one of their two top criteria.

Regardless of trade union belonging, the teachers differed greatly in their attitude to local pay systems. One teacher claimed:

I am not positive to individual differences with respect to teachers' pay. For example, this arrangement with the 'super teacher' - I am not certain this will work well. It is the ordinary teacher who stands in the classroom every day, who does the hardest and the most important job.

Another teacher's statement contradicted this:

There should be more room for individual pay in the school sector. It is not wrong to reward someone for doing a little extra. This shows appreciation for someone's effort, and can inspire others.

Despite some positivity towards performance related criteria, the vast majority of the interviewees regardless of title, recognized problems in 'measuring' these performance related criteria and 'seeing everyone' in a school. They believed it difficult to employ the system successfully in terms of treating everyone fairly. Even those who thought it unfair that everyone was given the same pay and nobody was rewarded for their extra effort were concerned about this. It should be noted that it was emphasized by the majority of the interviewees that pupils' final marks could not be used solely to evaluate the quality of the teaching, and with that pay. When commenting on criteria, a middle manager said:

How are you going to measure results? The pupils' marks? Then the teachers just have to hope they get a clever class so they get paid more. Poor teachers who have struggling pupils, who do everything in their power, but gets less money because the pupils' marks are low. However, as we will see in 5.3, a few teachers claimed it was possible to 'measure' performance to some extent.

In the interviews where the respondents were more positive to performance criteria, the question of the middle manager's role came up. If pay should be related to performance, middle managers would have to play a more active role. A teacher said:

I am positive to middle managers having more influence on pay. They know us best, so if this arrangement with performance criteria is going to work, they must be included more.

Some of the middle managers wished they were allowed to have more influence on remuneration and reward, while a few were sceptical and claimed it would be a hard process. One middle manager explained:

If the system was linear, a manager with HR responsibilities should be able to influence pay.

### 4.3.4 Final comments on the research results

As we can see from these findings, it seems employees in Østfold County have little knowledge of local collective bargaining and how it affects their pay. A frequent request was more openness and more understandable processes if the local collective bargaining process should fulfil its purpose.

Despite not knowing the system very well, the majority of the respondents were quite sceptical or negative to local collective bargaining for different reasons. There was also little knowledge about the criteria in the county's pay policy or in the processes. Still, a larger group of interviewees advocated more use of a local pay system and performance related criteria. Interestingly, the research results from both questionnaire and interviews, showed that one specific criterion received substantial more support regardless of position, trade union belonging or professional experience. This criterion was related to compensating or rewarding someone in a challenging work situation. As it focuses on an individual's performance and retention, it could be deemed a performance related criteria. This could open, to some extent, for more differentiation of pay in Østfold County.

Given the NPM-principles of efficiency, and with that usefulness and positive outcomes, NPM's influence on Østfold County's pay policy could be questioned. The following chapter will discuss this, and address NPM's place in the Norwegian public school system.

## **5** Discussion

This dissertation set out to find evidence of NPM in two practices in the public upper secondary schools of Østfold County: performance appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining. NPM was originally introduced to the Norwegian public sector because it was often perceived too bureaucratic and inefficient. Consequently, any practice influenced by NPM should enhance efficiency. This dissertation has understood efficiency as useful and legitimate practices that produce positive outcomes in terms of enhancing an organisation's performance.

This chapter will discuss the research results in relation to the research questions, and evaluate the influence of NPM in the two practices. The first section focuses on Østfold County's use of appraisal interviews; the second on local collective bargaining; and the third discusses if the two practices could and should work together. Every section will also treat the fourth sub question regarding attitude and comment on NPM as a whole.

### 5.1 The appraisal interviews and NPM

To determine if the appraisal interview practice in Østfold County has been influenced by NPM, this dissertation has focused on its style and content, as well as outcome or usefulness of the practice. As we saw in chapter 2.4, appraisal interviews have been conducted in Norway even before the introduction of NPM. Initially, they were quite conversational and focused on soft HR aspects, but now seem to have changed in terms of content and structure according to Bjordal (2010). Appraisal interviews are now for example more formal in style, and goal-oriented in content, which resemble the performance management ideas of NPM. This category of appraisal interview falls under the management control approach, as described by Torrington et al. (2005) in chapter 2.4.1.

Østfold County's universal plan for conducting appraisal interviews shows evidence of NPM in that their forms and guidelines are quite formal, result- and goal-oriented. Following the documents, the purpose of the appraisal interviews seems to be retention and development of employees. The research results from interviews and questionnaire showed that while the preparation process and a short report were widely accepted as formal requirements, the content and structure of the performance appraisal interviews differed greatly within the county. Some middle managers described appraisal interviews similar to the management

control approach, while others went even beyond the softer development approach (chapter 2.4.1).

Of the interviewed middle managers using more formal appraisal interviews, some described the importance of communicating the school's vision and mission statement to the employee, and wished to focus more on evaluation. This desire to communicate the school's strategic goals was also found in Bergersen and Tvete (2008), but it is also related to the teachers' least favoured topic in an appraisal interview (school development), according to Nornes (2008). This interview model resembles both Torrington et al.'s (2005) management control approach, and NPMs goal-orientation and focus on performance evaluation.

The research results nevertheless showed that the majority of the middle managers in Østfold County seemed to focus less on demands and goals, and focused instead on the interview as a relationship-builder. Interviews often had an informal style, and few employees had negative feelings towards the process. The research revealed that many respondents were quite satisfied with the practice as it made them feel 'seen' and 'heard', and that it sometimes could be a place to find help and support. 'Being seen' was also a main positive outcome in Nornes' (2008) studies. Østfold County does in other words not have the same issue as the British teachers in Torrington et al. (2005), who found the practice very stressful. Despite this, many of the interviewees criticized this appraisal interview model for being too informal and quite useless (see 4.1.2). They also requested more evaluation and feedback from their supervisors. These findings are similar to those of both Nornes (2008) and Røseth (2013). Nornes (2008) claimed the teachers desired more feedback from their principal, and Røseth (2013) found that follow-ups in relation to clear goals could enhance the teacher's competency. While many respondents were positive towards more feedback, they were still adamant that it had to be related to their performance, and not to pupils' results. It appears that the teachers of Østfold County desire a model more closely linked to Torrington et al. (2005) development approach (see 2.4.1), or perhaps the hybrid model Røvik (2008) described as a conversation focusing on both guidance and performance.

The findings from Østfold County indicate that NPM-ideas are less integrated in the appraisal interview practice than perhaps some of the teachers would wish in terms of both content and outcome. While the majority of the interviewed teachers still enjoy the informal style of the appraisal interviews, the research results showed that there were few tangible outcomes of the process. In the interviews, some questioned the usefulness of the practice, and it was evident

that many teachers as well as middle managers were positive to an updated form of appraisal interviews where their own professional development was in focus. The teachers' desire for feedback and personal development is quite contradictory to the general opinion of teachers as quite unwilling to change. Given that Østfold County's documents show that NPM has influenced the appraisal interviews quite clearly, and several employees wished some of these guidelines were followed more closely, perhaps NPM has had a positive effect on appraisal interviews. Still, when taking into account the studies by Torrington et al. (2005) and by Kuvaas (Kuvaas & Dysvik, 2012), the practice should not be transformed into controlling performance appraisal interviews as teachers traditionally seek a high level of autonomy.

### 5.2 Local collective bargaining and NPM

Chapter 2.6 established that the presence of NPM in a pay system could be determined by the level of decentralisation and the criteria for allocating pay rises. To explore NPM's influence on Østfold County's local collective bargaining processes, this dissertation has focused on local practice and criteria. As NPM's main goal is to improve efficiency, this discussion will also address the question of usefulness and legitimacy.

Through Østfold County's pay policy, it seems local collective bargaining is well established as a decentralised pay system in the County. The document states that they wish to have an active pay policy, and salary is viewed as an HR tool in terms of rewards. Results of the local bargaining should therefore reflect changes in responsibility and tasks, results and quality of work, cooperation, new and useful competency, ability and willingness to change and adapt, and helping the County reaching their goals. The pay policy consequently opens for differentiating pay and individual performance criteria such as tasks and responsibilities, competency, effort and results. As a decentralised pay process, albeit a collective one, with performance criteria, Østfold County's pay policy reflects NPM-ideas.

The research results show that the majority of the employees were negative towards the current local collective bargaining process. The reasons did however differ, and were frequently related to trade union membership. While members of *Utdanningsforbundet* usually were opposed to the entire system of local collective bargaining, members of *Lektorlaget* were mostly critical of how it was carried out. Given the massive lack of support for the current practice, one could question the legitimacy of the pay system.

Apart from attitude, the lack of knowledge of the system could harm the legitimacy of the arrangement. The results showed that the majority of the employees (particularly the teachers) had little knowledge of how the process worked or of accepted criteria. If a pay policy is supposed to be a successful HR tool, it must be known throughout the organisation, and the employees must be aware of how their salary is determined. It therefore seems that while Østfold County wishes to pursue a decentralised pay policy in theory, the element of decentralisation stops to some extent with the pay policy. Some interviewees also criticized that the final decisions in local collective bargaining were made far away from the employees themselves (on county level instead of unit). Additionally, other interviewees – often members of *Lektorlaget* – were frustrated with the small amount of money allocated to local collective bargaining, and questioned the usefulness of the process. These issues were also raised in Rødvei and Lien's studies from 2010 (see 2.6.3).

Apart from the decentralised aspect of the process, the criteria used to determine local pay rises, could tell something about the presence of NPM and the success of the practice. The research results showed that Østfold County opened for a variety of criteria, and interestingly the participating schools seemed to favour one performance related criteria more than many traditional ones. As explained in chapter 2, the traditionally accepted criteria in the school sector include function, education and experience, but retention could also be accepted. The questionnaire results showed that function (i.e. class teacher) still was the most accepted criteria regardless of background, but 'extra challenging work' was the second most favoured criteria. While this criterion could be linked to 'effort', it is not necessarily directly linked to performance. It could also be viewed as a focus on retention or as compensation.

Whereas interviews and questionnaire results corresponded well in their support for 'extra challenging work', interviewees were not as positive towards the criteria function and education. With respect to function, a substantial group of interviewees questioned this criterion because they claimed it prevented 'real' negotiations. In the questionnaire, two education criteria also received substantial support, but several of the interviewees claimed it was emphasized too heavily and that relevant work experience should matter more. This point was also raised in Ingebrigtsen (2005) in 2.6.2.

Several middle managers and interviewed teachers were also positive to a performance related reward that reflected 'extra effort'. Some interviewed teachers even expressed it was unfair that they were not compensated for this. Ingebrigtsen (2005) also mentions this relationship

between rewards and fairness, and Einvik's (2013) studies support that teachers may feel more appreciated when given a little extra. The questionnaire results also showed clearly that middle managers wished to reward effort, as their preferred criteria for local bargaining processes was 'taking on extra tasks voluntarily'. Interestingly, not all the interviewed middle managers were as positive as many of the interviewed teachers to performance related rewards. This could contradict Rødvei and Lien's (2010) findings of middle managers being more positive than teachers to such rewards. The overall results nevertheless show more support amongst teachers, than what Sollund et al. experienced in 2005.

Regardless of many interviewees' positive attitude to more performance related criteria, they shared the concerns of using them in the school sector. Nearly every interviewee feared pupils' results as a pay criterion, and were adamant it was impossible to use it. Additionally, many interviewees were concerned with the impact of performance criteria on the work environment. According to scholars such as Ingebrigtsen (2005), the main issues with performance criteria for pay in the school sector is the lack of quantifiable goals, and that sharing and cooperation is more important than competition. These are concerns were also shared by participants in Agenda's studies and scholars such as Johnsen (2007) and Kuvaas (2008),

Through Østfold County's procedural documents, it seems NPM has influenced the pay policy in terms of decentralisation and criteria. Nevertheless, a practice as described by the participants in this study, where everyone receives something or it rotates between groups, has little relation to NPM values. The used criteria favour groups and not individual performance, and the current practice is widely criticised. Neither the purpose nor how the current process works, seem to be known throughout the organisation. While the implementation of NPM seem to have stagnated with respect to local collective bargaining, it must be remembered that a substantial amount of respondents wanted a localised pay system and/or more focus on individual performance. The idea of a decentralised pay system, where rewards could be appropriate, is not as unpopular as the current local bargaining process. By not employing the County's guidelines more directly, the upper secondary schools are avoiding potential problems of localized pay systems, but are neither gaining any positive outcomes. Nevertheless, the difficulties with finding objective and accepted criteria, and running an open and including local bargaining process in such a large organisation could make success unlikely.

### 5.3 A link between appraisals and local collective bargaining

Both the literature and the research results of this dissertation show that using performance criteria is not necessarily welcome nor easy in the school sector – or the public sector in general. Thus suggesting how these criteria could be used successfully can be quite controversial. Nevertheless, if local collective bargaining in practice does not fulfil its purposes and everyone just gets the same amount, it is difficult to defend spending time and resources on the process from an NPM perspective.

In the private sector, pay conversations are normally held with a middle manager that has more say in matters of remuneration than a middle manager in the public sector. It would be difficult for middle management in the public sector to have any definite say in these matters given the hierarchy and the importance of the cooperation with the trade unions. Today, middle managers in the school sector can only compensate the teacher through time off or confirming the teachers' additional work hours and asking their superiors whether they can compensate the teacher financially.

The research results showed that the majority of the interviewed middle managers wished they had more to say in the pay negotiations and some were confused as to why they were not consulted more. This was particularly the case with the 'lower' middle managers, even though a few claimed they had enough say already. Some teachers also questioned the lack of use of middle managers in local collective bargaining and argued that if performance criteria should be used more fairly, it was important that the middle managers were more involved. Many interviewees were nevertheless quite satisfied with their trade unions' work. An issue raised regarding middle managers' potential increased involvement, was if having a good relationship with them would become too important. A few others worried about the additional workload as middle managers already had too many tasks to cover.

Some of the interviewed teachers suggested how performance criteria could be used more effectively in the school sector, but still stressed the importance of openness and clear, well-known criteria. Amongst the suggestions of how to assess a teacher's effort, one described how a teacher's work could be evaluated through the computerized documentation system (Oppad). Here, the teacher had to document what he/she had done through the last year such as giving tests, making projects and providing feedback/feedforward (a focus-point in Østfold County) to the pupils. Through this process, the teachers themselves would be responsible for showing why they should be additionally rewarded in the local bargaining process. In other

words, teachers could decide themselves whether they wanted to spend time on documenting everything. Another few interviewees focused on how the teachers who had particularly challenging tasks, quickly adapted to new systems and tasks, tested new teaching tools, and lead others in the same development process, should be easy to notice and remember in the local bargaining rounds.

If any of the suggestions or considerations in the paragraph above should be taken into account in the local collective bargaining, the central person would be their supervisor or middle manager. They would be the only ones with sufficient knowledge about the teacher's workload or performance to evaluate the teachers according to Østfold County's performance criteria. This could perhaps be done through conducting more than one performance appraisal interview a year, but as they should be confidential today (see 2.4.1), they must change to meet necessary formal requirements in both structure and content. Regardless, the middle managers would have to be released from other duties, and spend more time on evaluating and documenting the employees' performance in the classroom and meetings, their professional development, and the completion of formal documentation requirements. Moreover, the middle manager's competency and attitude would be vital to its success.

A larger problem to the potential success of a local pay system, which presented itself in the research results, was the lack of knowledge amongst the employees. Local collective bargaining cannot be a legitimate local pay system if those who are supposed to benefit from it cannot partake. Given that many of the middle managers also had little knowledge of how the process actually worked and which criteria that are used, it seems information on local bargaining usually derives from the trade unions. Consequently, if an employee is not an active member in one of these, they are not likely to know how the system works. Teachers who are not members are also excluded from information and participation in process, according to Østfold's pay policy. The problem of information and understanding could be mended by educating the middle managers thoroughly on the topic, and addressing it in appraisal interviews. The top management must also take responsibility to educate their staff on their opportunities for pay development. An informed employee in a predictable environment could also be less likely to feel controlled or treated unfairly – consequently undesired effects of local pay systems could be avoided.

Making the school management responsible for informing the employees of local collective bargaining, could take the process somewhat away from the trade unions. Given the trade

unions' position in Norway, this is perhaps a controversial suggestion, but it is not meant to limit their power. Instead, it is a way of sharing the responsibility to care for the employees' interests and to empower the employees by giving them knowledge to influence their own work situation and salary.

If local collective bargaining in Østfold County should embody the NPM-principles and fulfil its purposes as described in the pay policy, the middle managers (particularly the lower) are likely to need a more important position in the negotiation process. As they are the ones closest to the employees, they must spend more time on evaluating the employees and cooperate with the higher-level management to suggest who should be rewarded. While it certainly would be possible to establish such as arrangement, one must consider the potential negative implications of exposing the school sector to the use of more performance criteria. As commented on several times in this dissertation, a school is an institution in need of a cooperative work environment where employees value their autonomy. The use of performance criteria may cause a more competitive environment as well as jealousy, and the teachers could see more evaluation as an element of control. This in turn, could reduce their internal motivation. A careful approach must therefore be taken, if such as system was to be introduced, and the trade unions must be included in the decision and implementation.

## **6** Conclusion and final comments

The final chapter of this dissertation will attempt to sum up the research results and comment on the research questions. Subsequently, it will comment on transferability of the results, and suggest how the studies can be developed further.

## 6.1 Research results and research questions

The research question set out to find out if NPM is an integrated part of public school administration today through exploring two practices in the upper secondary schools in Østfold County: performance appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining.

The first sub question addressed performance appraisal interviews in relation to NPM. Østfold County's description of how an appraisal interview should be conducted complies with NPM principles in terms of content and structure. The interview is not just supposed to be a conversation about 'how you are', it should also focus on accountability, and an agreement about further development should be signed at the end. For managerial control purposes, the practice could consequently be efficient.

From the research results we find that the practice is well established in the school sector, but the appraisal interview is mostly described as a well-prepared conversation about 'how you are'. Many employees still find it useful in terms of relationship building and feeling acknowledged. Apart from this, there are few specific outcomes, and some interviewees find the practice to be quite useless for employees. Given the underlying goal of NPM to enhance efficiency and reduce bureaucracy, a practice deemed useless, does not qualify. The research results also revealed that the success of an appraisal interview is determined by how it is conducted. If the wrong topics are appraised, if there is no feedback and no tradition for follow-up, and if the relationship between manager and employee is poor, the final signed agreement could merely be an evidence of an inefficient, bureaucratic practice.

The second sub question addressed the local pay policy in Østfold County where local collective bargaining is used. As the research results and the discussion showed, the element of NPM was mostly visible in the pay policy. In practice, the decentralised pay system was widely unknown, and the criteria were largely traditional. While a substantial group wished for an improved decentralised solution with more allocated money and lower level

negotiations, the majority were opposed to the arrangement as a whole. Nearly all of the employees were concerned with how performance criteria could be applied to salary in the school sector, and particularly with the idea that the teacher's salary should be determined by pupils' results. The research results showed nevertheless substantial support for using an individual pay criteria focusing on those who had extra challenging work, and some support for giving a smaller bonus to those who put in an extra effort. In practice, though, there was little tradition for or focus on performance or effort in local bargaining processes in Østfold County. The normal practice was to give everyone a small contribution, or having a plan for giving one group of employees something extra one year, and another the next time.

That Østfold County has a fairly unknown, unpopular, and unfollowed pay policy implies that while the NPM ideas formally have been introduced, they have not had much success in practice. Additionally, the limited funds for local negotiations in Norway, limits NPMs possibility to establish itself in public pay policy in Norway.

During the research process, some of the respondents suggested a link between the two practices. This has also been suggested before (for example Rødvei and Lien, 2010), but it does not appear that the idea has been carried out in practice – at least not in Østfold County. The interviewees who were in favour of such a link, usually wished for more formal appraisal interviews with clearer outcomes and more feedback, and suggested that the middle managers should play a larger role in local collective bargaining. If performance criteria should be part of an appraisal interview, the middle managers should also have a part of the local pay process. Such a link is quite controversial, as the appraisal interviews would have to become more formal and focus on evaluation. Many respondents also feared the idea of more performance criteria in the school sector, as we have seen throughout this dissertation. Suggested negative outcomes have been subjective assessments and arbitrary rewards, a competitive work environment preventing cooperation, and reduced internal motivation amongst employees.

While there certainly is a potential for such a link, it would take courage for any public employer to suggest such a system. Firstly, trade unions would protest and stress the importance of equality for pay in the public sector. Secondly, employees accustomed to these equality values could become worried and suspicious, and consequently lose some internal motivation. Thirdly, such a process would be very costly in terms of time and effort. Studies on local collective bargaining, for example by Rødvei and Lien (2010), suggest that even

today's process costs too much. Nevertheless, the attitude amongst teachers towards performance criteria might have changed. This dissertation's research results indicate that upper secondary school teachers perhaps are more open to the idea now, than when Sollund et al. conducted their studies in 2005. This may be because the staff in upper secondary schools, compared to primary schools, is quite diverse in terms of background and experience. That counties and upper secondary schools could be more open to local collective bargaining is also supported in Agenda (2008).

As we saw in chapter 2.2, NPM is widely debated and it is difficult to establish whether the reform has been a success or not. Research results are inconclusive and some studies even show the implementation have had no impact, such as Hvidman and Andersen's (2013) studies in Danish schools. When NPM is viewed in relation to Østfold County's documents, it could however be argued that the reform has influenced the Norwegian public school administration. With respect to actual practice, this was not as evident. Neither the current practice of appraisal interviews nor local collective bargaining seemed to be successful. There was nevertheless substantially more support for the first than the second. This dissertation therefore concludes that NPM-ideas seem more integrated in the appraisal interview practice than local collective bargaining.

The attitudes towards appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining, and to some extent NPM in general, are however also important to the discussion of NPMs impact on the public school sector. Interestingly, it seems NPM-influenced ideas regarding appraisal interviews and local pay systems are more accepted than the current practices in Østfold County. As we have seen, the majority of the respondents accepted the appraisal interview practice, but many wanted it to evolve and become more useful in terms of feedback. With respect to local collective bargaining, the vast majority were opposed to the current system. Most of the respondents were negative because they wanted salary to be determined nationally, but another substantial group was negative because the system did not work well. It therefore seems there is some future for a revised decentralised pay system. Still, NPM-ideas regarding appraisal interviews seem to be more accepted and thus more integrated than those regarding local collective bargaining.

## 6.2 Transferability and suggestions for further research

NPM was introduced in the 80s and 90s to the Norwegian public sector as a solution to the efficiency problems of a large, bureaucratic system. Whether it has improved efficiency in the sector is nevertheless frequently debated. A recent, interesting turn of events was that Sweden has officially announced they will no longer govern by NPM principles (Kuvaas et al., 2017).

Sweden's choice does however not mean that the debate on NPM in the Norwegian school sector is over. Current public debates focus on the importance of PISA-results, teachers' work conditions, the new arrangement with the 'super teacher', the problem with school drop outs, PRP for school leaders, and first graders' (6-year-olds) demanding competency aims. This dissertation has aspired to contribute to the overall debate on NPM in the school sector by evaluating NPM's implementation or presence in two practices: appraisal interviews and local collective bargaining. As there are no recent studies on them in the Norwegian school sector, and this dissertation has a somewhat original approach in exploring them at the same time and suggesting a potential link between the two, it could be a small but valuable addition to this debate. From chapter 3, we know that the transferability of my research could be limited due to the low response rate. The validity of the data is still sound, given the amount of in-depth interviews and quality of obtained data.

If this had been a research project beyond a master's thesis, it would have been interesting to expand my research to cover also public primary schools in Østfold. This desire is particularly inspired by Agenda's (2008) studies, who found clear differences between upper secondary schools and primary schools. It would also have been interesting to employ a comparative study between different counties and address additional NPM-practices. Particularly, the question of the teachers' fixed work hours would have been interesting to investigate. Another focus could be to see how national guidelines translate to counties and municipalities, such as the national curriculum.

A final, interesting direction for future studies could be to focus on school development. As Imsen (2009) highlighted in chapter 2, many different actors would like to influence the public school's development. Some matters that previously were the school's decision, such as homework, is now subject to public debate and parents may put pressure on an individual school to amend their practice. Furthermore, school leaders are supposed to have more power over their individual school and finances, but the quantity of teachers, local curriculums, education demands, teachers' work hours, are all decided on different levels.

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# **Appendix 1: The questionnaire**

NPM-praksis og lokale lønnsforhandlinger i ØFKs skolesektor

Velkommen til spørreundersøkelsen!

Før du går igang vil jeg si tusen takk for at du har tatt deg tid til å svare og gi deg litt informasjon.

#### Tid:

Spørreundersøkelsen vil ta ca. 10-15 minutter å besvare.

#### Spørsmål:

Spørsmålene er "multiple-choice-spørsmål" og du er nødt til å besvare samtlige som har en " \* ". Flere av spørsmålene kommer med et kommentarfelt hvor du står fritt til å komme med ytterligere informasjon om du skulle ønske det - dette er ikke et krav.

#### Anonymitet:

1) Informasjonen som innhentes fra spørreundersøkelsene vil kun være tilgjengelig for og bli brukt av meg

2) Alle resultater vil bli makulert/slettet når masteroppgaven er forsvart og bestått

3) Det vil være umulig for meg å vite hvem som har svart hva på spørreundersøkelsen da IPadressene ikke vil bli lagret

4) Også skolene er anonyme i denne undersøkelsen

5) Masterprosjektet er godkjent av Personvernforbundt for forskning.

Dersom du ønsker mer informasjon om oppgaven, har kommentarer eller spørsmål, eller kunne tenke deg å delta på et lite intervju, er det flott om du tar kontakt! Kontaktinformasjon finner du i mailen hvor du fant linken.

Ha en fin dag!

Vennlig hilsen Ida M Pettersen

| NPM-praksis og lokale lønnsforhandlinger i ØFKs skolesektor   |
|---|
| Bakgrunnsinfo/demografi   |
| Hentes inn for å få best mulig analysegrunnlag. Vil ikke kunne brukes til å identifisere deg som<br>respondent. |
| * 1. Hva er din stillingstittel?  |
| Lærer     Adjunkt     Lektor     Fagleder     Utdanningsleder   |
| * 2. Hvor mange år har du jobbet som lærer i videregående skole:  |
| 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20+   |
| * 3. Velg ett alternativ:   |
| Kvinne Mann   |
| * 4. Hvilken seksjon hører du til under? (Hvis du hører til flere, velg den hvor du har mest undervisning.)     |
| En seksjon for en yrkesfaglig studieretning   |
| En seksjon med fellesfag for både YF og ST + programfag på ST   |
| * 5. Er du medlem av en fagforening?  |
| Skolenes Landsforbund   |
| C Lektorlaget   |
| Utdanningsforbundet   |
| Jeg er ikke medlem av en fagforening  |
| Annen fagforening:  |
|   |
| * 6. Har du vært ansatt i det private næringsliv?   |
| Jeg har vært ansatt lengre i det private enn det offentlige   |
| Jeg har vært ansatt ca. like lenge i det private som i det offentlige   |
| Jeg har vært ansatt i kortere perioder i det private (sesong/prosjekt)  |
| Jeg har kun vært ansatt i det offentlige  |
|   |

| NPM-praksis og lokale lønnsforhandlinger i ØFKs skolesektor  |
|--|
| Medarbeidersamtalen  |
| * 7. Hvor ofte blir du innkalt/invitert til medarbeidersamtale?  |
| Aldri Sjeldnere enn 1 gang per skoleår 1 gang per skoleår 1 gang per semester     Oftere enn 1 gang per semester |
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|--|---|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Nedarbeidersamtalen  |   |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bruk, gjennomføring og nytte   | ay medarb4                              | eidersamtal    | en                |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Blir du bedt om å forberede d  |   |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Aldri Av og til Vanligvis  | •                                       | medalbeide     | Contribution :    |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | <u> </u>                                |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ). Hva forbereder du deg på til n  |   |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jeg får et tema fra min nærmeste   | -                                       |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jeg får et skjerna jeg må fylle ut i e<br>Jeg får beskjed om å tenke på om   |   |                | te                |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jeg får beskjed om å fylle ut et skj   |   |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jeg får beskjed om å finne eksem   | -                                       | -              | planen fra forrio | e medarbeidersa | imtale      |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jeg får ingen beskjeder om å forbe   |   |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Annet?   | -                                       |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |   |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |   |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |   |                |                   |                 |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | arbeidersam                             | talen skal in  | neholde og/el     | ler hva som e   | r målet for |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10. Får du beskjed om hva meda<br>nedarbeidersamtalen?<br>) Ja Nei Av og til Ve  |   | talen skal ini | neholde og/el     | ler hva som e   | r målet for |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| nedarbeidersamtalen?   |   | talen skal in  | neholde og/el     | ler hva som e   | r målet for |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| nedarbeidersamtalen?   | t ikke<br>darbeidersa                   |                | -                 |                 | Medarbeid   |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| nedarbeidersamtalen?   | t ikke<br>Idarbeidersa<br>I svært liten | mtalen: Ta si  | -                 | ndene under.    |             |             |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| nedarbeidersamtalen?   | t ikke<br>Idarbeidersa<br>I svært liten | mtalen: Ta si  | illing til påsta  | ndene under.    | Medarbeid   | lersamtalen |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| nedarbeidersamtalen?<br>Ja Nei Av og til Ve<br>1. Mål med og resultater av me<br>er et sted jeg får mye ros for  | t ikke<br>Idarbeidersa<br>I svært liten | mtalen: Ta si  | illing til påsta  | ndene under.    | Medarbeid   | lersamtalen |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ja       Nei       Av og til       Ve         Ja       Nei       Av og til       Ve         1. Mål med og resultater av me      er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt      er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt        er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt      er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt      er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt        er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt      er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt      er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt        er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt      er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt      er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt        er esufter et at jeg får hjelp og      er esuftere i at jeg får hjelp og | t ikke<br>Idarbeidersa<br>I svært liten | mtalen: Ta si  | illing til påsta  | ndene under.    | Medarbeid   | lersamtalen |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ja       Nei       Av og til       Ve         Ja       Nei       Av og til       Ve         1. Mål med og resultater av me        er et sted jeg får mye ros for arbeidet mitt        bidrar til at jeg føler meg «sett», verdsatt og ivaretatt som ansatt   | t ikke<br>Idarbeidersa<br>I svært liten | mtalen: Ta si  | illing til påsta  | ndene under.    | Medarbeid   | lersamtalen |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| er et sted jeg får mye ros for<br>arbeidet mitter et sted jeg får mye ros for<br>arbeidet mittkan resultere i at jeg får hjelp og<br>støtte i en utfordrende<br>arbeidssituasjon dersom jeg trenger  | t ikke<br>Idarbeidersa<br>I svært liten | mtalen: Ta si  | illing til påsta  | ndene under.    | Medarbeid   | lersamtalen |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

|   | I svært liten<br>grad | l liten grad | I noen grad | I stor grad | l svært stor<br>grad | lkke relevant |
|---|-----------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------|
| er til for å diskutere videre<br>karriereveier og muligheter i<br>stillingen og eventuelt tilby meg<br>utviklingsmuligheter/videreutdanning | 0                     | 0            | 0           | 0           | 0                    | 0             |
| klargjør mine muligheter for<br>lønnsvekst  | 0                     | 0            | 0           | 0           | 0                    | 0             |
| er til for å gi meg mulighet til å<br>påvirke min arbeidssituasjon  | 0                     | 0            | 0           | 0           | 0                    | 0             |
| bidrar til at jeg føler meg inkludert i<br>min seksjons videre utvikling  | 0                     | 0            | $\odot$     | $\circ$     | 0                    | $\bigcirc$    |
| bidrar til at jeg føler meg inkludert i<br>min skoles videre utvikling  | 0                     | 0            | 0           | 0           | 0                    | 0             |
| er til for å kartlegge min utførelse<br>av arbeidsoppgavene og planlegge<br>videre oppfølging av denne                                      | 0                     | 0            | 0           | 0           | 0                    | 0             |
| klargjør kravene til meg som<br>arbeidstaker  | 0                     | 0            | 0           | 0           | 0                    | 0             |
| er til for å kontrollere meg og<br>arbeidet mitt  | 0                     | 0            | 0           | 0           | 0                    | $\odot$       |
| gjør meg usikker på om jeg<br>mestrer arbeidsoppgavene mine   | 0                     | 0            | 0           | 0           | 0                    | 0             |
| kan bidra til økt tillit mellom meg<br>og arbeidsgiver (her: skolen)  | 0                     | 0            | 0           | 0           | 0                    | 0             |
| kan bidra til økt tillit mellom meg og<br>nærmeste leder  | 0                     | $\bigcirc$   | $\bigcirc$  | 0           | $^{\circ}$           | 0             |
| gjøres kun for å oppfylle kravene<br>om medarbeidersamtale  | 0                     | $\circ$      | $\circ$     | 0           | $\circ$              | 0             |
| har uklare mål  | $\bigcirc$            | $\bigcirc$   | 0           | 0           | $\bigcirc$           | 0             |
| resulterer ikke i noen spesiell<br>endring i arbeidssituasjonen min   | 0                     | 0            | $\bigcirc$  | $\bigcirc$  | 0                    | 0             |
| Andre mål/resultater?   |                       |              |             |             |                      |               |

| * 12. Gjennomføringen av medarbeidersamtalene: Hvilken av disse modellene stemmer best i følge din<br>erfaring som medarbeider?   |
|---|
| Min nærmeste leder styrer samtalen og forteller meg sitt inntrykk av mitt arbeid og hva som forventes av meg. Skjemaet fylles ut underveis og undertegnes på stedet.                        |
| Min nærmeste leder ber meg fortelle hvordan det går på arbeidsplassen og vi har en uformell samtale som ender med at vi blir<br>enige om hva som skal stå på skjemaet og begge undertegner. |
| Det er ingen fast struktur på medarbeidersamtalen og skjemaer benyttes ikke. Vi har en hyggelig samtale om løst og fast på<br>arbeidsplassen.   |
| Det er ingen fast struktur på medarbeidersamtalen og skjemaer benyttes ikke. Samtalen er svært kort og bærer preg av at dette kun er noe som skal gjennomføres.                             |
| Jeg har aldri hatt medarbeidersamtale med min nærmeste leder  |
| Ingen av disse alternativene stemmer med min opplevelse av medarbeidersamtalen  |
| Kommentar/forklaring?   |
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| NPM-praksis og lokale lønnsforhandlinger i ØFKs skolesektor   |
|---|
| Lokale lønnsforhandlinger   |
|   |
| Gjennomføring, regler og kriterier  |
| * 13. Har du hatt lønnssamtale noen gang?   |
| Aldri Én gang Flere ganger Hvert år   |
| * 14. Har du noen gang diskutert lønn med en av dine nærmeste ledere på arbeidsplassen i forbindelse med<br>f.eks. en medarbeidersamtale? |
| ◯ Ja ◯ Nei ◯ Husker ikke  |
| * 15. Har du noen gang levert inn lønnskrav til din fagforeningsrepresentant?   |
| Aldri O Noen få ganger O Mange ganger O Ved hvert lokale lønnsoppgjør   |
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| NPM-praksis og lokale lønnsforhandlinger i ØFKs skol |
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### Lokale lønnsforhandlinger

16. Dersom du svarte "aldri" eller "noen få ganger" - hvorfor?

Kommer ikke til å få noe tillegg uansett

Syns det er ubehagelig å fremheve meg selv

Syns jeg får god nok uttelling i de sentrale lønnsoppgjørene

O Har tillit til at skoleledelsen vet hvem som fortjener noe ekstra og at de innstiller på dem

Annet (vennligst spesifiser)

| NPM-praksis og lokale lønnsforhandlinger i ØFKs skolesektor                               |
|---|
| Lokale lønnsforhandlinger   |
|   |
| 17. Dersom du svarte "mange ganger" eller "ved hvert lokale lønnsoppgjør" - hvorfor?      |
| Får vanligvis tillegg når jeg ber om det  |
| Syns lønnen min generelt er for lav Fordi jeg fortjener det                               |
| Fordi skoleledelsen ikke alltid har oversikt over hva jeg har bidratt med i løpet av året |
| Annet (vennligst spesifiser)  |
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| NPM-praksis og lokale lønnsforhandlinger i ØFKs skolesektor   |
|---|
| Lokale lønnsforhandlinger   |
|   |
| * 18. Hvor god kunnskap vil du si at du har om hvordan de lokale lønnsforhandlingene foregår?                           |
| Svært god kunnskap God kunnskap Noe kunnskap Lite kunnskap Ingen kunnskap   |
| * 19. Vet du hvor du kan finne/få informasjon om hvordan de lokale lønnsforhandlingene skal foregå?                     |
| Ja Nei  |
| * 20. På din arbeidsplass - ser du noen trend i hvem som pleier å få lokale tillegg etter lokale<br>lønnsforhandlinger? |
| O De med høyest utdannelse  |
| De med lavest lønnsvekst i tilhørende lønnsoppgjør  |
| Mellomiederne   |
| Medlemmer av en spesiell fagforening  |
| Ansatte som opplever større utfordringer enn vanlig på arbeidsplassen dette året  |
| Ansatte som frivillig legger ned ekstra arbeid dette året (organisering av ekskusjoner o.l.)                            |
| Det er ingen klar trend   |
| Andre?  |
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| * 21. Hva bør spille inn når man beslutter l       | hvem som skal få lokale tillegg? Ranger svarene dine under fra  |
|--|---|
| minst viktig (1) til viktigst (8). (NB! Kun et     | tt svar pr. kolonne og pr. rad - dvs. at du kan kun rangere ett |
| alternativ til "8", ett til "7", ett til "6" osv.) |   |

|   | 1              | 2               | 3              | 4           | 5       | 6          | 7          | 8          |
|---|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------|---------|------------|------------|------------|
| Høyest utdannelse   | $\bigcirc$     | $\odot$         | $\bigcirc$     | $\odot$     | $\odot$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\odot$    | $\odot$    |
| Gjennomføring av<br>videreutdanning i løpet<br>av skoleåret       | 0              | 0               | 0              | 0           | 0       | $\circ$    | $\bigcirc$ | 0          |
| Fagforeningstilhørighet   | $\bigcirc$     | 0               | $\odot$        | 0           | 0       | $\odot$    | 0          | $\odot$    |
| Stilingstittel  | 0              | 0               | 0              | 0           | 0       | 0          | 0          | $\odot$    |
| Ekstra ansvar (f.eks.<br>kontaktlærere)                           | 0              | $\odot$         | $\odot$        | $\odot$     | $\odot$ | $\circ$    | $\odot$    | 0          |
| Frivillig<br>engasjement/ekstra<br>arbeid i løpet av<br>skoleåret | 0              | 0               | 0              | 0           | 0       | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |
| Ekstra store utfordringer<br>i løpet av skoleåret                 | 0              | 0               | $\odot$        | 0           | 0       | $\circ$    | $\odot$    | $\bigcirc$ |
| Resultater fra siste<br>sentrale lønnsoppgjør                     | 0              | $\bigcirc$      | $\bigcirc$     | $\odot$     | 0       | $\odot$    | $\bigcirc$ | $\odot$    |
| Fr det andre faktorer som bø                                      | r spille inn i | når de lokale i | tilleggene ska | I fordeles? |         |            |            |            |
|   |                |                 |                |             |         |            |            |            |

# Appendix 2: Semi-structured interviews – topic list

(Translated from Norwegian)

### **Teachers:**

Demographics:

- Background
- Title/Position
- Years in the school sector

Performance appraisal interviews:

- What is your opinion of the performance appraisal interviews?
- How does the performance appraisal affect you? What are the outcomes?
- Is the practice necessary and needed?
- How should it be organised to result in the best possible outcome?

Local collective bargaining:

- What is your attitude towards local collective bargaining?
- Do you know the process well?
- What is your opinion of the process?
- Which criteria are used to determine bonuses?
- Do you agree with these? Why/why not?
- Should more individual pay rises be allowed? Why/why not?

### Middle managers:

Demographics:

- Background
- Title/Position
- Years in the school sector

Performance appraisal interview:

- How do you conduct a performance appraisal interview?
- What do you think of it as an appraiser and an appraise? Is there a difference?
- Is the practice necessary and needed?
- How should it be organised to result in the best possible outcome?

Local collective bargaining

- What is your attitude towards local collective bargaining?
- Do you know the process well?
- What is your opinion of the process?
- Which criteria are used to determine bonuses?
- Do you agree with these? Why/why not?
- Should more individual pay rises be allowed? Why/why not?

### **Trade union representatives:**

Demographics:

- Background
- Title/Position
- Years in the school sector

Local collective bargaining

- What is your opinion of the local pay rises?
- Who gets the bonuses normally?
- How is the trade union and the school management involved in the selection process?
- Which criteria are employed? Have they changed?

Performance appraisal interviews:

- What is your opinion of the performance appraisal interviews?
- How does the performance appraisal affect you? What are the outcomes?
- Is the practice necessary and needed?
- How should it be organised to result in the best possible outcome?

# Appendix 3: Public debate 2014 (examples)

Published: 29.01.2014

Faannessen, M.: Jeg vil bestemme over lærerens arbeidstid! (I want to decide the teachers' work hours!) Available at: <u>http://kommunal-</u> <u>rapport.no/debatt/jeg\_vil\_bestemme\_over\_laerernes\_arbeidstid?fb\_comment\_id=1384041181</u> 859640\_11155

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<u>Published: 31.01.2014</u> Doksheim, M.: Arbeidstid i skolen (Work hours in the school sector) Available at: <u>https://www.civita.no/2014/01/31/arbeidstid-i-skolen</u>

<u>Published: 12.02.2014</u> Larsen, T.: KS og lærernes arbeidstid (KS and the teachers' work hours) Available at: <u>https://www.utdanningsforbundet.no/Hovedmeny/Grunnskole/Andre-artikler/KS-og-larernes-arbeidstid/</u>

Published: 27.05.2014

Ertesvåg, F.: Lærere dundrer løs mot normalarbeidstida (Teachers fight against 'normal' work hours)

Available at: http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/skole-og-utdanning/laerere-dundrer-loesmot-normalarbeidstid/a/10124173/

Published 25.06.2014 NRK: <u>https://www.nrk.no/norge/det-blir-laererstreik-1.11797242</u> Available at: https://www.nrk.no/norge/det-blir-laererstreik-1.11797242

<u>Published: 14.07.2014</u> Walde, Ø.: La lærerne være i fred (Leave the teachers alone) Available at: <u>http://www.bt.no/btmeninger/debatt/La-larerne-vare-i-fred-271764b.html</u>