

# **THE ARCTIC UNIVERSITY OF NORWAY**

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## **THESIS**

### **HOW PEACEKEEPERS SUCCEED: INVESTIGATING THE DYNAMICS OF UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS**

*by*

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## **ABSTRACT**

By sending peacekeeping and observer missions to the world's troubled spots over the past seventy years, the United Nations (UN) has devoted its attention and resources to promoting living standards and human rights throughout the world. Despite this, the peacekeeping missions often fail to establish peace in a turbulent region. What dynamics play into the strategy of the peacekeepers? How can a peacekeeping effort use its limited resources to increase its chances of success? This study evaluates 56 completed peacekeeping missions and highlights the most important factors that contribute to their outcome. The analysis has two phases. Firstly, it will separate each peacekeeping operation into successful and failed sections. This is conducted by assessing each case's achievements based on three criteria: implementation of mandate, establishment of order, and procurement of long-lasting peace. The second phase of the study proposes five hypotheses that will bring to light the most important factors that contribute to the outcome of the mission. Those factors are not based on the actions of the peacekeepers, but rather on the conditions they were given to succeed. The findings are important to anyone who must understand what aspects drive the peacekeepers toward eventual success or failure. The results can also simplify past peacekeeping dilemmas and can be applied to improve the dynamics of on-going and future missions.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AU – African Union  
 CAR – Central African Republic  
 CIS – Commonwealth Of Independent States  
 COIN – Counterinsurgency  
 CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement  
 DMZ – Demilitarised Zone  
 DOMREP – Mission Of The Representative Of The Secretary-General In The Dominican Republic  
 DRC – Democratic Republic Of Congo  
 ECOMOG – Ceasefire Monitoring And Observation Group  
 ECOWAS – Economic Community Of West Africa  
 EUFOR – Smaller European Force  
 FDTL – Timor-Lesle Army  
 FMLN – Farabundo Marti National Front  
 GDP – Gross Domestic Product  
 HNP – Haitian National Police  
 ICJ – Court Of Justice  
 IKBDC – UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission  
 IPTF – International Police Task Force  
 MICIVIH – International Civilian Mission In Haiti  
 MINUCI – UN Mission In Côte d’Ivoire  
 MINUGUA – UN Verification Mission In Guatemala  
 MINUJUSTH – UN Mission For Justice Support In Haiti  
 MINURCA – UN Mission In The Central African Republic  
 MINURCAT – UN Mission In The Central African Republic And Chad  
 MINURSO – UN Mission For The Referendum In Western Sahara  
 MINUSCA – UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission In The Central African Republic  
 MINUSMA – UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission In Mali  
 MINUSTAH – UN Stabilization Mission In Haiti  
 MIPONUH – UN Civilian Police Mission In Haiti  
 MONUA – UN Observer Mission In Angola  
 MONUC – UN Organization Mission In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo  
 MONUSCO – UN Organization Stabilization Mission In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo  
 MPLA – Popular Movement For The Liberation Of Angola  
 OAS – Organisation Of American States  
 OAS – Organisation Of American States  
 ONUB – UN Operation In Burundi  
 ONUC – UN Operation In The Congo  
 ONUCA – UN Observer Group In Central America  
 ONUMOZ – UN Operation In Mozambique  
 ONUSAL – UN Observer Mission In El Salvador  
 PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Of Namibia  
 PNTL – Timor-Lesle Police  
 PoC – Protection Of Civilians  
 RENAMO – Mozambican National Resistance  
 RPA – Rwandan Patriotic Army  
 RPF – Rwandan Patriotic Front  
 SAF – Sudan Armed Forces  
 SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army  
 SWAFT – South West Africa Territorial Police  
 SWAPO – South West Africa People’s Organisation  
 TSZ – Temporary Security Zone

UAR – United Arab Republic  
UNAMIC – UN Advance Mission In Cambodia  
UNAMID – African Union-UN Hybrid Operation In Darfur  
UNAMIR – UN Assistance Mission For Rwanda  
UNAMSIL – UN Mission In Sierra Leone  
UNASOG – UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group  
UNAVEM I – UN Angola Verification Mission I  
UNAVEM II – UN Angola Verification Mission II  
UNAVEM III – UN Angola Verification Mission III  
UNCPSG – UN Civilian Police Support Group  
UNCRO – UN Confidence Restoration Operation In Croatia  
UNDOF – UN Disengagement Observer Force  
UNEF I – First UN Emergency Force  
UNEF II – Second UN Emergency Force  
UNFICYP – UN Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus  
UNGOMAP – UN Good Offices Mission In Afghanistan And Pakistan  
UNIFIL – UN Interim Force In Lebanon  
UNIIMOG – UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group  
UNIKOM – UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission  
UNIPOM – UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission  
UNISFA – UN Organization Interim Security Force For Abyei  
UNITA – National Union For The Total Liberation Of Angola  
UNMEE – UN Mission In Ethiopia And Eritrea  
UNMIBH – UN Mission In Bosnia And Herzegovina  
UNMIH – UN Mission In Haiti  
UNMIK – UN Interim Administration Mission In Kosovo  
UNMIS – UN Mission In The Sudan  
UNMISSET – UN Mission Of Support In East Timor  
UNMISS – UN Mission In The Republic Of South Sudan  
UNMOP – UN Mission Of Observers In Prevlaka  
UNMOT – UN Mission Of Observers In Tajikistan  
UNOGIL – UN Observation Group In Lebanon  
UNOMIG – UN Observer Mission In Georgia  
UNOMIL – UN Observer Mission In Liberia  
UNOMSIL – UN Observer Mission In Sierra Leone  
UNOMUR – UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda  
UNOSOM I – UN Operation In Somalia I  
UNOSOM II – UN Operation In Somalia II  
UNPREDEP – UN Preventive Deployment Force  
UNPROFOR – UN Protection Force  
UNSCOM – UN Special Commission  
UNSF – UN Security Force In West New Guinea  
UNSMIH – UN Support Mission In Haiti  
UNSMIS – UN Supervision Mission In Syria  
UNTAC – UN Transitional Authority In Cambodia  
UNTAES – UN Transitional Administration For Eastern Slavonia, Baranja And Western Sirmium  
UNTAET – UN Transitional Administration In East Timor  
UNTAG – UN Transition Assistance Group  
UNTEA – UN Temporary Executive Authority  
UNTMIH – UN Transition Mission In Haiti  
UNYOM – UN Yemen Observation Mission

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# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 OVERVIEW

Peacekeeping operations became one of the most prevalent forms of conflict resolution in the modern era. Particularly since the post-Cold War era, many conflicts have been ended through UN mediation or the action of third parties operating conjointly. Three basic principles have traditionally served the UN peacekeeping operations: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. At the onset of the conflict, peacekeeping forces have numerous challenges that will define the operation's outcome as a success or failure. To deploy the UN peacekeeping forces, the Security Council must take in consideration a set of factors that will be applied to implement the potential objectives of the mission. One of the emerging questions is, what dynamics play into a successful strategy of the peacekeepers? How can the peacekeepers improve their course of actions during the operation?

This thesis highlights some of the most important criteria that define the success of the mission and brings to light the key factors that contribute to those criteria. The three criteria that this thesis uses to assess the mission are implementation of mandate, establishment of order, and procurement of long-lasting peace. The results of this project shows that one of the most notable factors of the peacekeeping success is the ability to adapt the mandate in accordance to the changing situation in the conflicting area. On the other hand, it also shows that the presence of other peacekeeping forces, for example NATO or OSCE, does not influence the outcome of the UN mission *per se*. Beyond the dynamics of the three success criteria, this study used a qualitative approach to demonstrate the “causal recipes” that explain the outcome of a peacekeeping operation. In addition, the results showed that the peacekeepers strongly require a safe haven to operate effectively. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the peacekeepers are not in such need of generous financing, but more of the suitably trained and coordinated personnel. The methodology used in this thesis uses two overarching procedures: the quantitative and qualitative approaches. A set-theoretic approach that uses 56 UN peacekeeping missions and 13 independent variable

indicators will show the correlation between the success and failure factors.<sup>1</sup> The 13 variable factors are listed and explained in Table 8 in Chapter 3. These findings are important to anyone who must understand what actions drive a peacekeeping mission to an eventual success or failure. The findings can provide useful information to explain past mission and suggest what can be improved in the on-going or future peacekeeping efforts.

## 1.2 PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of all the completed peacekeeping operations and to determine what practices affected the outcome of the conflict. By conducting a historical analysis of the cases of peacekeeping missions since the establishment of the UN, this thesis correlates common features that may lead to either mission success or failure. What factors have had an impact on the outcome of the conflict? What conditions are most essential for the peacekeeping missions outcome? Ultimately, this thesis seeks to identify key features from past cases of peacekeeping operations by using both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Although the findings may be valuable to policymakers, strategists, and academics, the primarily target audience are the UN peacekeeping planners who must understand what factors drive a peacekeeping operation toward success. Eventually, the findings will provide the UN with an in-depth understanding of the operating environment surrounding peacekeeping missions.

Most peacekeeping-centred research projects face challenges identifying the root causes of successfully defusing a conflict. Those studies seek to identify several issues. The first issue is why the peacekeepers succeed in some environments, while in other under conflicts with similar features, they failed. The second is what are the criteria to determine the success of the operation. Both approaches seek to draw insight from past missions and conflicts to predict the course of the future operation by focusing on observed pre-existing conditions. This thesis will not predict where will the next UN peacekeeping operation be deployed or how to stop a potential conflict in the future; several other researchers have covered this topic.<sup>2</sup> Instead, this study looks closely at each completed operation to determine how peacekeepers succeed to implement their given tasks. For the UN planners, this

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<sup>1</sup> The set-theoretic methods are processes used to study social reality through the idea of sets and their specific outcomes. See, Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

<sup>2</sup> See Tabler, Andrew J. "Syria's Collapse: And How Washington Can Stop It." *Foreign Aff.* 92 (2013): 90. and Allison, Graham. "How to stop nuclear terror." *Foreign Aff.* 83 (2004): 64.

approach will highlight the priorities that are most influential to develop a conflict resolution effort.

Recommendations of this thesis will come in the form of planning considerations for UN peacekeeping planners. These considerations are not intended to be a set of stand-alone tools, rather they should be used in conjunction with other peacekeeping planner resources. This will improve the understanding of any peacekeeping operations environment. However, the applicability may diverge under different circumstances and geography, which would require planners to redetermine their approaches. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to make future analysis more complete. Additionally, a proper evaluation of peace operation success would result in several policymaking benefits. Firstly, it would provide a prerequisite for valid interferences concerning what conditions are associated with success. Secondly, it would give a broader, multifaceted assessment of peace operations. Lastly, it will give opportunities for a necessary baseline upon which to make real-time judgements and accompanying policy changes. Ultimately, by specifying what constitutes success of a peacekeeping operation, we can set a prerequisite for theoretical development.

### 1.3 SCOPE OF WORK

The UN Security Council approved 71 peacekeeping missions since 1948. The operations' purposes varied in terms of their mandate and scope. Some missions are archived under several categories. For example, conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement are recipes of the UN to maintain peace and security around the world. Yet, if those recipes are combined with unsystematic partial measures or with slow response, the missions could "fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict and hence reduce the risk of conflict recurring."<sup>3</sup> Consequently, such practices will taint the UN's reputation and affect the deployment of future operations. Therefore, there is a need of an in-depth and in-breadth updated knowledge of the geographical, political, and social situation of the conflicting region before, during and potentially after deploying the peacekeepers.


Figure 1 shows the locations of all the 71 UN peacekeeping operations. This study excluded the 15 ongoing missions from the analysis because they would require a different

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<sup>3</sup> Peacekeeping.un.org, *Terminology* accessed on 04/05/2019, available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology>

approach to determine their outcomes. The 56 finished operations analysed in this study are divided into successful and failed cases.

**Figure 1 UN map showing 70 years of peacekeeping across four continents<sup>4</sup>**



The cases in each section are presented chronologically by start and finish date. This thesis does not focus on a universal set of specific methods to evaluate the success of a UN mission, but it combines numerous studies and extracts the most applicable criteria for each case. Data for the case studies come from secondary sources. The analyses of each case study were based on available English-language history and secondary analysis of the peacekeeping operations. Documentation proved voluminous for some cases and much scarcer for other cases. Yet, for all the cases the available information was sufficient to meet the criteria predetermined to evaluate each peacekeeping operation. The references under each case demonstrate the range and depth of the available literature. Specifically, the criteria used to evaluate the success or failure of the operations were extracted from the *Oxford Handbook for UN Peacekeeping Operations*, Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman's *Evaluating Peace Operations*, and other publications. The key facts of each operation, for example, the maximum amount of deployed personnel, overall financing, and fatalities were taken from official UN webpages.<sup>5</sup> The discussion of the relationships between this section's presented concepts, factors and case outcomes are offered in the "Discussion" chapter.

<sup>4</sup> Un.org *UN Peacekeeping: 70 years of service and sacrifice*. 2016 Accessed on 03/05/2019, available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-peacekeeping-70-years-of-service-sacrifice>

<sup>5</sup> There are various official UN sources that provide information regarding its peacekeeping missions, some of which are: UN.org, peacekeeping.un.org, unmissions.org

### 1.3.1 Research questions

The research question of this thesis revolves around what constitutes to the success of a UN peacekeeping operation. By examining 56 UN peacekeeping operations, this thesis correlates the common conditions that lead to a peacekeeping operation success or failure. By analysing the history of the missions, the question that this thesis will try to answer include:

- What factors and conditions led to the operation's success?
- What shortcomings and limitations led to the mission's failure?
- Are there similarities among peacekeeping successes and failures, or each one is exceptional?
- What cultural, geopolitical and economic features should be taken under consideration?

#### *a. What does the literature say about peacekeeping operations?*

From the military standpoint, this study does not provide information on how to prevent a conflict, but it is focused on how conflicts are mediated. Surely, conflict prevention is a nominal field of research. Yet, the literature on insurgencies and modern warfare is extremely diverse and there is no single approach for resolving a conflict. For this reason, this thesis's theory tries to distance itself from being a collection of hunches, existing hypotheses, or normative preferences. Instead, it focuses on the practices based on empirical evidence. In addition, lessons about peace operation successes depend fundamentally on one or several yardsticks used to evaluate the process. Therefore, studies that use different benchmarks for success may reach different or even opposite conclusions, which can undermine the evaluation factors. As Diehl and Druckman stress, "allowing peacekeepers to use offensive military tactics, or permissive rules of engagement, could help secure areas and prevent human rights abuses [...] but increase civilian casualties"<sup>6</sup> Those criteria can be identified as success and at the same time—as failure. This is why one of this thesis's aims is to determine what criteria has more value than the other, given the circumstances of each case.

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<sup>6</sup> Diehl & Druckman p. 5

The fundamental criteria to determine the peacekeeping success was noted by Paul Diehl in *International Peacekeeping*, which are: the implementation of mandate and establishment of order.<sup>7</sup>

In a similar fashion, political science professor Duane Bratt defined three other criteria in 1996: facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment from future escalation, and limitation of casualties.<sup>8</sup> Today, Bratt's approach is widely outdated in comparison to some other scholars' studies. For example, consultant for peace operations Jair van der Lijn defined nine criteria to evaluate the United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Those criteria are:

1. The parties are sincere and willing to cooperate with the operation's enactment;
2. The operation can enforce an efficient sense of security for both parties;
3. The operation has enough attention to the causes of conflict both in depth and in breadth;
4. The operation receives assistance and cooperation from important outside actors and organisations;
5. The operation is implemented at the right time and place;
6. The operation is supported by competent staff under competent leadership, with clear command structures;
7. The operation has a long-term commitment;
8. The operation's actions and the 'policy tools' are coordinated within the operation, as well as supported externally;
9. The operation provides 'ownership,' in terms of persuasion responsibility, and obligation.<sup>9</sup>

Although all van der Lijn's nine criteria are applicable to most of the UN operations, the scholar himself acknowledged that the first two are the most essential.<sup>10</sup> Yet, he also stressed that while the implementation of the first two criteria is essential, the long-term commitment to peace also plays a nominal role in defining the mission's success.

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<sup>7</sup> Diehl, Paul F. "International peacekeeping (Perspectives on security)." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 3 (1993): 34.


<sup>8</sup> Bratt, Duane. "Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations." *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 4 (1996): 64-81.

<sup>9</sup> A similar evaluation was conducted by Van der Lijn, Jaïr. "Success and failure of UN peacekeeping operations: UNMIS in Sudan." *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 1-2 (2010): 27-59.

<sup>10</sup> Van der Lijn (2010): 59

Furthermore, failing to scale the significance of other factors could lead policymaker to implement certain damaging regulations, leading to distressing long-term consequences. For instance, slow economic recovery can be the result from devoting too much attention to security matters. This was evident in the case of the lengthy 1999-2010 UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Indeed, Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased ever since the mission's deployment.<sup>11</sup> Surely, the deployment of the peacekeepers would not be *the* reason for capital stagnation, but their actions could have contributed more to improve it. Figure 2 shows DRC's GDP per capita decline between 1989-2009.

**Figure 2: DRC's gap in per capita GDP 1989-2009**



A notable research was also conducted by international relations professor Darya Pushkina who analysed another peacekeeping effort in Congo, the 1960-1964 UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The mission can be considered an overall success by Diehl's standards, as ONUC's mandate implementation was successful and the recurrence of war was prevented due to order of security forces in the area. Yet, the conflict spread beyond the borders of the country. Therefore, it was noted by Pushkina that "judging success based on mandate fulfilment and concentrating only on a small set of potential factors for success may ultimately be of little value in making general claims about UN peacekeeping."<sup>12</sup> As contrary

<sup>11</sup> Bove, Vincenzo, and Leandro Elia. "Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host Countries." CESifo Economic Studies 64, no. 4 (2017): 718

<sup>12</sup> Pushkina (2006): 147

to interstate disputes, civil wars may require more weight on Lijn's seventh factor "The operation has a long-term commitment." Indeed, if tensions reoccur in the aftermath of the peacekeeping mission, its mediation efforts would be entirely compromised. Therefore, this study adds the procurance of long-lasting peace to Diehl's implementation of mandate and establishment of order criteria to evaluate the 56 missions.

*b. What are the gaps in the literature?*

It is evident from the literature covered in the previous section that more research must be conducted towards understanding the dynamics of peacekeeping operations. The literature above may answer the question on how a peacekeeping mission should be evaluated, but they do not reveal how those same factors work on a broader scale of peacekeeping around the world. Indeed, as this study suggests, dynamics change throughout time, so the UNSC must be ready to provide the necessary conditions for the peacekeepers to adapt to the changes of the situation. Benjamin de Carvalho and Ingrid Aune argue that despite the rapid growth of financial and logistical features of the peacekeeping operations, "few studies of the overall effects of this shift towards greater accountability have been published, and the literature addressing this shift is scant."<sup>13</sup> Therefore, this study also tries to address the evolving nature of evaluative standards to highlight the best practical measures of success criteria of the peacekeeping efforts.

One notable study that identifies the evolving nature of the assessing methods is *Evaluating Peace Operations* by Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman. They answer the question of what explains the great divergence in assessment. The scholars suggest that "much depends on the standards used to evaluate peace missions, as well as evidence used to make judgements according to those standards."<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, by following one set of criteria for determining what constitutes success or failure in peace operations we would fail to build a general outline for making good policy choices for conflict resolution. Similarly, Charles Hauss in *International Conflict Resolution* argues that there is no blueprint for conflict resolution. The author stresses that "[c]onsider, for example, that the parties involved

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<sup>13</sup> de Carvalho, Benjamin, and Ingrid J. Aune. "Assessing Complex Peace Operations. Some Considerations of Methodology and Procedure." (2010). P.5

<sup>14</sup> Diehl & Druckman 2010 p. 1



in the conflict in South Africa all agreed that they had to share the same territory. Such an agreement has not been in place for most of the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”<sup>15</sup>

Therefore, we must take note that despite the centrality of certain evaluations, the literature on peacekeeping and related peace mission is not well developed. Diehl and Druckman also note that excessive attention has been given to “inputs (or independent variables) in peace operation studies, and considerably less (if at all) is given to the outcomes (or dependent variables).”<sup>16</sup> Hence, this thesis will firstly incline its attention by defining the dependent variable of success or failure of a peacekeeping mission based on three of the arguably most important criteria. Those are implementation of mandate, establishment of order, and procurement of long-lasting peace. Secondly, it produces 13 independent variables developed from the five hypotheses. The study will illustrate how those 13 factors contribute to the three criteria and determine which ones are more influential than others.

### 1.3.2 Hypotheses

This thesis separates the theories discussed in the previous literature review into five hypotheses. Each unit focuses on a specific peacekeeping dynamic that to a certain degree may affect the outcome of the operation. Therefore, the primary focus of this thesis is to test the validity of each premise. The five hypotheses can respectively be defined by five compositions of words: safe haven, amount of personnel, amount of financing, efficient timing, and external support. A more detailed explanation of the thesis can be found below.

- *Hypothesis 1*, The peacekeepers require a safe haven from which to operate.
- *Hypothesis 2*, An ample amount of financing does not necessary lead to the mission’s success.
- *Hypothesis 3*, The mission needs a sufficient and appropriate amount of personnel
- *Hypothesis 4*, The longer duration of the mission does not necessarily mean the success of the mission
- *Hypothesis 5*, External support and cooperation with other peacekeeping organisations is necessary to ensure the success of the mission

The above hypotheses do not focus on the actions conducted by the peacekeepers. Instead, they focus on the provisional aspects of each operation. To determine the validity of

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<sup>15</sup> Hauss, Charles. *International Conflict Resolution* 2nd Ed. A&C Black, 2010: 202

<sup>16</sup> Diehl & Druckman 2010 p. 1

each hypotheses, this study takes information from secondary sources. Those sources provide a detailed information for each hypothesis's factor. For example, to answer the first hypothesis, regarding whether the peacekeepers were operating in a safe haven, this study uses numerous secondary articles and books that specify the degree of danger that the peacekeepers were operating in. For example, UNOSOM II had an extremely hostile environment for the peacekeepers, who were also considered by certain armed groups as part of the conflict.<sup>17</sup> Hence, the peacekeepers experienced 147 casualties. In addition, the official UN sources provide detailed information on the quantity of personnel deployed, and the maximum amount of finances attributed to each operation. Furthermore, available copies of resolutions of mandate amendments, and presence of another peacekeeping organisation cooperating with the UN peacekeepers help answer the other hypotheses of this thesis. A similar study was conducted by Watkins, but instead of peacekeeping operations, he analysed modern insurgencies. Watkins notes that "insurgent actions have little influence on the outcome of an insurgency."<sup>18</sup> Indeed, this study also argues that the actions of the peacekeepers have little to do with the mission's outcome. Instead, it focuses on the conditions that are provided and approved by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Therefore, it is important to determine and calculate the independent variable of the operation, which eventually reveal how each of those factors contributed to the dependant variable (success or failure).

### 1.3.3 Methodology

This thesis uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches to determine whether there is a causal relationship between the aspects of the peacekeeping forces and the outcome using a set-theoretic analysis method. The main aim of the study analyses the factors that determine the peacekeeping mission's success. The data correlation, using 13 independent variables will determine how a peacekeeping operation performed and reveal a set of recipes and determine how peacekeepers can use their resources in the best way. This thesis will firstly identify the success or failure outcomes for each UN peacekeeping operation. Secondly, it will compare the existing facts, for example, the maximum deployed personnel, and overall budget spent per each operation. Then, the two sections of successful and failed

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<sup>17</sup> Williams, Paul D. "UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. P.5


<sup>18</sup> Watkins, Christopher L. *How insurgents win: examining the dynamics of modern insurgencies*. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA, 2014. P.13

operations will show how amount of personnel and budget affected the operation’s outcome. Moreover, the study identifies whether the peacekeepers operated in a safe haven, and whether they work alongside other peacekeeping forces, for example, those of NATO or the EU.

*a. Dependent variables*

The primary dependent variables for this thesis are the outcomes of each peacekeeping operation. The cases are categorised in terms of either success or failure. Many cases produced complicated outcomes, so they required a certain degree of improvisation to assess the outcome. For example, when the operation had a highly limited mandate with insufficient resources to procure a peaceful environment for the local population, for example UNOMUR in Rwanda, the case is considered a failure. On the other hand, if the operation was also extremely small, for example UNTMIH in Haiti, but it set the ground for the next successful bigger mission, the case is also considered a success. Figure 4 illustrates the logic behind how each case was evaluated. Similarly, Paul et al. use insurgent win or loss variables during COIN operations using a similar logic diagram.<sup>19</sup>

**Figure 4: Logic for assessing the case outcomes**



<sup>19</sup> Paul et al., *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, 17.

### *b. Independent variable groupings*

All the independent variables used in this study are combined into five categories, which this thesis calls *independent variable groupings*. These groupings are branded H1-H5 and each one relates to one of the five hypotheses. This thesis classifies all the variable groupings under specific criteria that to a certain degree will impact on each peacekeeping mission's success or failure.<sup>20</sup>

The five independent variable groupings are:

- H1, the peacekeepers operated in a reliable and secure haven
- H2, the peacekeepers received enough funding
- H3, the peacekeepers operated experienced no staff shortages, and were suitably trained and coordinated
- H4, the peacekeepers managed their time effectively and ended the mandate aptly
- H5, the peacekeepers operated conjointly with non-UN peacekeeping forces

### *c. Statistical analysis*

The statistical analysis for this study consists of two overarching procedures between quantitative and qualitative analysis. Firstly, the quantitative approach focuses on frequency analysis and proportion comparison. This procedure is applied to narrow the amount of variables and eliminate any factors that show weak result. Secondly, the qualitative approach uses the remaining strong values to determine the direct correlation with the desired outcome, which is either a peacekeeping success or failure. This is achieved by using a set-theoretic method called qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA includes two approaches: the crisp and fuzzy set methods. The crisp set method uses binary indicators, and the fuzzy set method uses percentage indicators. By applying both methods, this study will increase the accuracy of the findings.

## **1.4 ORGANISATION OF THESIS**

This thesis is organised into four chapters. The following chapter identifies the case outcomes by categorising each operation by either success or failure. The third chapter outlines both quantitative and qualitative data analyses processes. It also discussed the key

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<sup>20</sup> Watkins, 2014. P.12

findings of the research project by illustrating the data correlation results and comparing the results with the hypotheses offered in Chapter 1. The third chapter will additionally provide graphs and tables used to illustrate the difference between the successful and failed operations. This process will be implemented by calculating several concepts including the number of personnel, budget, and the duration of each mission. The fourth and final chapter discusses the larger significance to the peacekeeping field of research. It also suggests recommendations for evaluating future peacekeeping mission and what areas of this thesis could be analysed with more accuracy.

## CHAPTER 2: EVALUATING THE CASES

This thesis analyses 56 out of 71 UN peacekeeping mission. The study excludes 15 on-going missions because they require a different method of analysis, especially they cannot be evaluated in the same way in terms of long-term peace commitment. Many of the 56 cases could not be assessed easily, as their implementation of mandate was allegedly tainted by the low budget, or the UN peacekeepers were depending on the actions of other forces. For example, MINURCAT was highly depending on EUFOR forces. While the mixed opinions on the outcome of each case are high, this study identifies all the operations as either a success or a failure.

To adjudicate unclear case outcomes, this thesis followed the logic illustrated in Figure 3. Firstly, the diagram in Figure 3 asks whether the peacekeeping operation implemented its mandate and established order—being some of the main requisites of a successful mission noted by Diehl. If the peacekeepers failed to follow up with the mandate objectives and providing order in the area of deployment, this study assesses the mission as a failure. However, during the Rwandan post-genocide period, MONUC in Congo had severe problems implementing its mandate due to the post-genocide situation. Yet, the peacekeepers managed to implement their given objectives and protect many Congolese, so the mission is defined as a success. The next frame asks whether the operation had a long-term commitment towards procuring peace in the region, which is van der Lijn's seventh criterion. Again, in the case of MONUC, the situation was extremely complicated in country, but the mission is praised for achieving its aims and mediating tensions between Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. Overall, applying the logic from figure 3 to the 56 selected cases resulted in 39 successes and 17 failures.

Table 1 in Appendix 1, lists the peacekeeping missions chronologically by their date span, and their outcomes. Each entry is arranged by its (1) official name, acronym, and the period of time during which the mission operated; (2) the case outcome; (3) and a short summary describing what was the mission's mandate and objectives, highlighting the key achievements and shortcomings that contributed to the case's outcome.

## 2.1 DETAILED OVERVIEW OF THE CASES

### 1. UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), November 1956-June 1967

*Case outcome: operation success*

The first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) was established to supervise the withdrawal of French, Israeli and the UK forces from the Egyptian territory after the establishment of the ceasefire. The mission meant to serve as a buffer zone between the Egyptian and Israeli troops, supervise Suez Canal's cleaning operations, and secure cooperation from the parties in implementing the armistice agreement.

Although most of the operation's aims were implemented, Diehl noted that this operation had its shortcomings.<sup>21</sup> This is because war erupted between Israel and Egypt in 1967, which happened immediately after Egypt requested the UN to withdraw UNEF I from its territory. Yet, UNEF I is one of the exceptions that can be deemed a success, as it provided precedents for traditional peacekeeping missions and set general benchmarks for operations until at least the end of the Cold War. For instance, it introduced the term 'holy trinity' of traditional peacekeeping: consent, neutrality, and minimum use of force.<sup>22</sup>

### 2. UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), June 1958 December 1958

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established in response to a complaint by the Lebanese authorities to the Security Council on 22 May, 1958 amid the interference of the United Arab Republic (UAR).<sup>23</sup> Slovenian defence expert Maja Garb evaluated UNOGIL's success by three criteria: the fulfilment of the mandate, the political and security situation, and assistance to the local population.<sup>24</sup>

It is debated whether UNOGIL directly contributed to stabilising the political situation and secure order in Lebanon. The operation was initiated during the complex Middle Eastern

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<sup>21</sup> Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. *Evaluating peace operations*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010 p.2

<sup>22</sup> Diehl & Druckman 2010, p.9

<sup>23</sup> *Letter Dated 22 May 1958 from the Representative of Lebanon addressed to the President of the Security Council*, Security Council Document S/2007, 23 May 1958.

<sup>24</sup> Garb, Maja. "Evaluating the success of peace operations." *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 42, no. 1 (2014): 44-63.

political context exacerbated by Cold War belligerents that added regional and international significance. However, UNOGIL's force reached full strength and achieved its mandate only after the situation calmed down and its services were no longer necessary. Yet, the operation's mandate seemed deliberately limited and that was practically all that could be provided by the divided Security Council.<sup>25</sup> Yet, Mesquita and White claim that "[t]hrough restricted in its tasks, UNOGIL made the most of its mandate and was able to implement it within the realms of its capacity."<sup>26</sup>

### **3. UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), July 1960-June 1964**

#### *Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was created to address the conflict between Belgium and its former territory of Congo, which gained independence on 30 June 1960. The mission's objectives included the withdrawal of Belgian troops and 'foreign military personnel,' including the prevention of a civil war. Given the nature of the changes in the situation on the ground as well as at the international level, Jane Boulden argues that the achievement of mandate was a significant factor of the operation. Yet, at the peak of divisive and highly charged political climate of the Cold War, both inside and outside of the operation, "restored law and order in Congo, ensured the country remained a single unit, facilitated a restoration of a functioning government, and oversaw the withdrawal of foreign troops."<sup>27</sup>

### **4. UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), October 1962-April 1963**

#### *Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) was responsible for providing policing enforcement to the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) for the period of seven months. The mission was initiated amid the relinquishing of colonial rule by the Netherlands and the absorption of the territory by Indonesia. UNSF faced some political and

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<sup>25</sup> The dispute was addressed first by the League of Arab States. However, internal divisions within the organization, which pitched pro-Nasser forces, mainly comprised of Egypt and Syria (forming the UAR) and Yemen, against more pro-Western states, such as Lebanon and the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan, blocked a possible settlement.

<sup>26</sup> Mesquita, Ana Guedes, and Nigel D. White. "UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 p 6-7

<sup>27</sup> Boulden, Jane. "UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2017. P.5



operational challenges in carrying out its functions, especially between the local police and the Indonesian military. The mandate of the mission did not require its forces to directly engage in any serious conflict. Yet, the success of this operation is that it persuaded to accelerate the transfer of the power and the progressive replacement of UNSF personnel by Indonesian forces in the later stages of the handover.<sup>28</sup>

## **5. UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), July 1963-September 1964**

### *Case outcome: operation failure*

The UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was given the responsibility to oversee the withdrawal agreement of Egyptian and Saudi intervention in the Yemen Civil War. Asher Orkaby states that contemporary and historic perceptions of UNYOM have been tainted by a “clash of personalities between the mission leader, Carl von Horn, [...] and Secretary General U Thant.”<sup>29</sup> Orkaby adds that UNYOM has been portrayed as a “first failure in a new era of ‘tin-cup peacekeeping’ that could scarcely feed and supply UN personnel.” The Egyptian troop level continued to grow (40,000 by spring 1964), and there seemed no sight of a resolution of the civil war. Surely, the civil war outcome was not the UN’s responsibility, but it would have permitted the withdrawal of UNYOM with at least some credibility.<sup>30</sup>

## **6. Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), May 1965-October 1966**

### *Case outcome: operation success*

Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) was comprised of only a small number of observers to oversee the ceasefire amid the country’s civil conflict. DOMREP was also tasked to report to the Secretary-General on the situation leading up to the elections of the new constitutional government. The mission was not the main international actor in the Dominican conflict. Its limited mandate and small resources did not allow for great latitude of actions. Yet, the mission’s ability to act independently from the OAS and gathering information on the events in the country played

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<sup>28</sup> MacQueen, Norrie. "UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015.

<sup>29</sup> Orkaby, Asher. *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68*. Oxford University Press, 2017.

<sup>30</sup> UN document S/5927, 2 September 1964: (final) Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Functioning of UNYOM

an important role. Bernardo dos Santos argues that DOMREP was able to fully implement its mandate contributing to the country's pacification process and mediating the civil conflict.<sup>31</sup>

## **7. UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), September 1965-March 1966**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) was set to supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal of all armed personnel along the India-Pakistan border other than in Jammu and Kashmir. UNIPOM highlighted the importance of following constitutional norms in “establishing, supporting, and extending missions.”<sup>32</sup> While UNIPOM's had to supervise a ceasefire over a distance of more than a thousand miles, it could not facilitate accurate reporting about what was happening in the area. Yet, UNIPOM is a successful mission as it completed its mandate with very limited resources deployed in a complex environment in a short frame. In addition, the mission's peacekeepers negotiated an agreement with the two sides in mid-December to limit air activity, ultimately contributing to peace in the entire area.<sup>33</sup>

## **8. UN Emergency Force (UNEF II), October 1973-July 1979**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) was established in October 1973, following its predecessor mission UNEF I. Paul Diehl identifies two criteria that the operation succeeded: (1) limit armed conflict, (2) promote conflict resolution. Indeed, UNEF II kept peace along the Egyptian-Israeli border and aided the conflict resolution that preceded the Camp David Accords.<sup>34</sup> In addition, UNEF II reinforced the experience of other UN operations, which suggested that “a traditional force could be better effective in interposition and monitoring missions.”<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, it set new approaches for the future peacekeeping missions, securing the outcome of the operation as a clear success.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> dos Santos, Bernardo Rodrigues. "Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*.

<sup>32</sup> Singh, P. K. "UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 p. 5

<sup>33</sup> Singh, P. K. "UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 p. 5

<sup>34</sup> Diehl, Paul F. "International peacekeeping (Perspectives on security)." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 3 (1993): 92. **CHECK!!!**

<sup>35</sup> Diehl, Paul F. "Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2014. :9

<sup>36</sup> Diehl, 2014: 9

## **9. UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), May 1988-March 1990**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

The UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was established to assist the two countries to ensure the implementation of the Geneva Accords and to investigate and report any violations of the Accord. Adam Baczko and Gilles Dorransoro state that the cooperation between the two sides did not go well as Islamabad and Kabul were not willing to cooperate with UNGOMAP.<sup>37</sup> Instead, they were following their own agendas and the UN mission had neither the political support nor the means to accomplish the mission. In addition, without the cooperation of the actors involved in the conflict, UNGOMAP was limited to registering the complaints from each side without investigating them in depth. Hence, it could not take any measures to coerce them to comply them with the accords. The mission's mandate had an explicit part of supervising the voluntary return of millions of refugees. Yet, Baczko and Gilles argue that because the mission was under-resourced, "UNGOMAP could not collect sufficient information."<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the operation could only register complaints, but not act upon them.

## **10. UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), August 1988-February 1991**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was deployed to verify and monitor the ceasefire between Iran and the mutual withdrawal of their troops. Brigadier General Shahedul Anan Khan states that "UNIIMOG was a successful example of an UN observer mission that managed to verify, monitor, and maintain a ceasefire between two former belligerents." Although UNIIMOG faced several challenges and limitations in an extremely volatile environment, the mission "managed to contribute to the prevention of escalation to large-scale violence or a return to major inter-state conflict between Iran and Iraq."<sup>39</sup>

## **11. UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), January 1989-June 1991**

*Case outcome: operation success*

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<sup>37</sup> Baczko, Adam, and Gilles Dorransoro. "UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015

<sup>38</sup> Baczko, 2015 p.6

<sup>39</sup> Khan, Shahedul Anam. "UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015, p. 7-8

The first UN Transition Assistance Group (UNAVEM I) was created to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angolan territory. The mission is one of the first multidimensional UN peace operations that succeeded in carrying out its mandate. Particularly, the operation succeeded to verify consensual troop withdrawal, which corresponded closely to the category of first-generation peacekeeping operations.<sup>40</sup>

Gwinyayi Dzinesa confirms that UNAVEM I “successfully discharged its tasks by monitoring the withdrawal of Cuban military personnel and equipment from Angola”<sup>41</sup> While the end of the overall conflict was far from being resolved, the mission can be regarded as successful as it formally ended the interstate conflict in Angola by successfully ridding it of its “overt international attributes.”<sup>42</sup> Therefore, given its limited capacity, UNAVEM I designed a blueprint for the following missions (UNAVEM II, III, MONUA) even though their achievements are far being considered a successful exception.

## **12. UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), April 1989-March 1990**

### *Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia was in most respects a political operation tasked with creating and managing conditions for a democratic transition to independence following a prolonged colonial occupation.<sup>43</sup>

On April 1, 1989, when the ceasefire was to come into effect, South African forces clashed with the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) combatants, and People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in the northern border areas. Dzinesa claims that UNTAG “fulfilled its central objective of ensuring a peaceful, transparent electoral process and a smooth transition to independence.”<sup>44</sup> Pushkina also states that the overall degree of consent and cooperation was high during the mission, and the South Western Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the Namibian regime (South Africa) complied and supported with the UN peacekeepers, which contributed to the mission’s overall success.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Dzinesa, (2004): 646

<sup>41</sup> Dzinesa (2004): 646

<sup>42</sup> Dzinesa 2004: 646

<sup>43</sup> Dzinesa 648

<sup>44</sup> Dzinesa 649

<sup>45</sup> Pushkina, (2006): 142

### **13. UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), November 1989-January 1992**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was deployed in the five countries of Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. It was mandated to monitor the implementation of a far-reaching peace agreement “Esquipulas II.” The accord intended to lay the foundations for overcoming nearly three decades of civil war, violence, and authoritarianism in Central America. ONUCA was the first UN’s peacekeeping mission with an explicit disarmament and demobilisation mandate. Professor Joachim Koops states that “despite some limitations, the operation was a successful example of the UN’s ability to support a regional peace process through confidence-building measures, ceasefire monitoring and the more demanding tasks of separation of forces, disarmament, and demobilisation.”<sup>46</sup> Indeed, ONUCA helped to support the regional process in Central America by achieving the implementation of two of its major tasks: verification of the peace agreement and monitoring of cross-border rebel and weapons movement. The achievement of the two objectives served as confidence-building for the five Central American governments.<sup>47</sup>

### **14. UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), April 1991-October 2003**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution for the deployment of the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and the establishment of the demilitarisation zone (DMZ) between Iraq and Kuwait. UNIKOM was tasked to aid other missions operating in Iraq, including the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (IKBDC). Moreover, UNIKOM was tasked to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in the surveillance of the demilitarisation zone. Lastly, it served to observe any potentially hostile actions from one State against another. The mission concluded its duties

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<sup>46</sup> Koops, Joachim A. "UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2014 p. 2

<sup>47</sup> Koops, Joachim A. "UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2014 p. 5

after the invasion of Iraq in October 2003, as it became purposeless when the Saddam's regime was forcibly removed.<sup>48</sup>

Although the liberation of Kuwait was successful, UNIKOM is labelled as a failure due to several reasons. Firstly, in the context of the invasion of Iraq, UNIKOM failed to prevent hostilities between the initial belligerents. Secondly, the operation proved incapable of reporting the violations of the DMZ by Iraqi's adversaries, which were likely caused by navigation mistakes due to poor training. Thirdly, the cooperation of the parties proved dubious, as Polish politician Jan Bury claims, "UNIKOM was significantly financed by one side of the conflict, which undermined its credibility and impartiality."<sup>49</sup>

### **15. UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), June 1991-February 1995**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

The second UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), was tasked to verify the implementation of the peace agreement namely the "Bicesse Accords." The agreement was signed between the government of Angola led by the Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the major opposition movement, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Dzinesa confirms that apart from UNAVEM I, all the subsequent UN operations in Angola (UNAVEM II, III, MONUA) failed to implement their mandates and secure order in the country.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, UNAVEM II kept its impartiality and only monitored ceasefire, observed and verified the democratic Angolan presidential and legislative elections of 1992. Yet, hopes for peace building in the country vanished as UNITA rejected the results of the votes pushing Angola back into civil war.<sup>51</sup> The local context hindered UNAVEM II's objectives as both sides of the conflict were uncooperative and violated the Bicesse Accords from an early stage. Overall, the lack of compliance with the demobilisation troops obliged the UN observers to assume extended monitoring duties, such as counting of troops and weapons under extreme conditions.<sup>52</sup>

### **16. UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), July 1991-April 1995**

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<sup>48</sup> Bury, Jan. "UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2014. P. 1

<sup>49</sup> Bury, 2014. P. 9

<sup>50</sup> Dzinesa, (2004): 644

<sup>51</sup> Guyot, Caroline, and Alex Vines. "UN Angola Verification Missions II and III (UNAVEM II and III)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015: 2

<sup>52</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Angola Verification Mission II. Security Council document S/23191, 31 October 1991.

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) monitored the results of negotiations between the El Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Marti National Front (FMLN). As Dr. Shannon O’Neil explains, “ONUSAL expanded its initial human rights mandate to encompass broad peacebuilding measures, such as the construction of new security and juridical institutions, as well as the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.”<sup>53</sup> Ultimately, the mission’s military division was the definitive factors of its success. ONUSAL’s peacekeepers knew that militarisation was the chief problem of El Salvador’s conflict, hence their attention was highly devoted to discontinuing both the military’s and the FMLN’s armed grip of the country.

However, while we define the mission as ambitiously successful, there are some of the mission’s shortcomings that need to be mentioned. For instance, O’Neil states that the UN, following the ONUSAL operation, “should overcome its financial limitations, focusing particularly on coordination of international efforts and creation of international standards in post-conflict reconstruction and not in the implementation of peace accords.”<sup>54</sup> Additionally, the initial mandate of the mission expanded numerous times, which undoubtedly led to the mission’s success.

**17. UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), October 1991-March 1992***Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was a short reconnaissance operation deployed to prepare the ground for the bigger UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).<sup>55</sup> Although the mission operated under ill-defined UN authority, UNAMIC could be considered a success. Its difficulties consisted of language barriers between its personnel and the Cambodians. Yet, despite these hitches, Benny Widyono argues that the mission fulfilled its most important functions and succeeded in several tasks, “[i]t also allowed infrastructure to be built in anticipation of the repatriation of refugees which was the first objective of UNTAC to be fulfilled.”<sup>56</sup> Therefore, following this thesis’s

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<sup>53</sup> O’Neil, Shannon. "Rethinking the United Nation's Role in Peacekeeping: Lessons from El Salvador." *JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS-PRINCETON-* 10 (1999): 142-161.

<sup>54</sup> O’Neil 144

<sup>55</sup> Widyono, Benny. "UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2014

<sup>56</sup> Widyono, 2014 p.6-7

logic of assessment, UNAMIC implemented its mandate and provided long-term security to the region of deployment.

### **18. UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), February 1992-March 1995**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

The UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) was tasked to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid during the Bosnian War. Tardy argues that the fall of the town of Srebrenica to the Bosnian Serbs in July 1995 and the massive violations of human rights that followed, “made UNPROFOR one the UN peacekeeping failures of the early 1990s.”<sup>57</sup> Indeed, while UNPROFOR was the biggest operation of the immediate post-Cold War period, the massacre of more than 8,000 Bosnian mostly Muslim men and boys by the Bosnian Serb forces is viewed as an even bigger disaster than UNAMIR in Rwanda. The main reason consists in Srebrenica being declared a “safe zone” protected by the Dutch force.<sup>58</sup>

### **19. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), March 1992-September 1993**

*Case outcome: operation success*

UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was created to implement key provisions of the October 1991 Paris Agreement and facilitate the transition towards peace, stability, and democracy in Cambodia after two decades of civil war. This operation could be classified as successful, but not without mentioning its shortcomings. For instance, UNTAC fulfilled its mandate, but only in part. As Pushkina explains, “it managed a successful withdrawal of foreign forces and the implementation of free and fair elections, yet it failed to achieve disarmament and demobilization or maintain law and order.”<sup>59</sup> In addition, although it preserved violence from spreading beyond national borders, numerous ceasefire violations occurred and the number of casualties raised to 100, including 179 wounded in election-related violence. Yet, Cambodia enjoyed a substantial return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), which were around 365,000. Additionally, UNTAC displayed a

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<sup>57</sup> Tardy, Thierry. "UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR—Bosnia and Herzegovina)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015: 2

<sup>58</sup> Brunborg, Helge, Torkild Hovde Lyngstad, and Henrik Urdal. "Accounting for genocide: How many were killed in Srebrenica?." *European Journal of Population/Revue européenne de démographie* 19, no. 3 (2003): 217

<sup>59</sup> Pushkina, (2006): 138



high level of flexibility and adaptability and it “provided an important overarching institutional support to the country’s stabilisation and political normali[s]ation.”<sup>60</sup>

## **20. UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), April 1992-March 1993**

### *Case outcome: operation failure*

The first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was dispatched to monitor the ceasefire that was in effect at the time to protect UN personnel during their humanitarian operations working along with US-led multinational task force (UNITAF). UNOSOM I had a very limited capacity due to Somalia’s central government collapse, therefore, the UN had to seek wider consent to deploy its military troops. Given the absence of an effective political agreement, and the persistence of fighting in Magadishu it is indeed difficult to highlight any major achievements of UNOSOM I. Williams argues that the mission’s failure lies within its strategic and operational limitations. But most importantly, the scholar notes that “[UNOSOM I] failed to deploy on time and in full.”<sup>61</sup> Because of this, in the Comprehensive Report for Lessons Learned from UN in Somalia, the text states that “to gather, analyse and feed information to the responsible security, political or humanitarian officials [...] was non-existent in UNOSOM I.”<sup>62</sup> Therefore, the mission failed to implement its basic mandate and establish order in the region.

## **21. UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), December 1992-December 1994**

### *Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was established to secure a lasting peace in Mozambique following the civil war between the government and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). Pushkina states that during this operation, all major violence ceased, demobilisation was partially implemented, and “the overall security situation prior to the elections was improved.”<sup>63</sup> In addition, a detailed investigation by UN peacekeepers on human rights abuses further contributed to stabilisation of the situation, which in turn created a stable environment for the return and resettlement of refugees. After the operation was terminated in late 1994, “large-scale violence did not recur and Mozambique began the process of peacebuilding and reconstruction, yielding impressive

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<sup>60</sup> Widjono, Benny. "UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015: 11

<sup>61</sup> Williams, Paul D. "UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015: 7

<sup>62</sup> The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from UN Operation in Somalia, para. 17.

<sup>63</sup> Pushkina, (2006): 135

results in just a few years.”<sup>64</sup> According to the logic in figure 3 and the four criteria that Pushkina developed, UNOMOZ secures a strong indicator of a successful operation.

## **22. UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), March 1993-March 1995**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

The second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was a following mission after UNOSOM I and UNITAF. UNOSOM II was tasked to rehabilitate Somalia’s political institutions and economy and promote political settlement and national reconciliation between the principal factions in the civil war. The mission had to cover the whole territory of Somalia, which eventually occurred, but not as smooth as planned, for several reasons. Firstly, while UNITAF’s strength was approximately 37,000 troops to cover 40 percent of Somalia’s territory, UNOSOM II was granted only 28,000 military and police troops to cover the entire country. Consequently, some parts of the country were left without a UN presence.<sup>65</sup> Additionally, Pushkina says that there was a delay in the provision of finance, and after attacks on the UN peacekeepers in June 1993, “the level of commitment further declined.” She adds that “major delays in the supply of resources continued, followed by the final withdrawal of the resources by the United States and Western European countries.”<sup>66</sup> Therefore, the lack of sustained UN commitment to the resolution of the Somalia conflict contributed directly to the overall failure of the mission, despite the US providing initial political and military support.<sup>67</sup>

## **23. UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), June 1993-September 1994**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

Given the magnitude of the tensions between the countries, the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) had only 81 military observers and had limited equipment and air surveillance. UNOMUR’s mandate focused primarily on transit or transport, by road or tracks of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border between Uganda and Rwanda. As UNOMUR’s commander Romeo A. Dallaire noted, “given my tiny force of eighty-one

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<sup>64</sup> Pushkina, (2006): 135

<sup>65</sup> Williams, Paul D. "UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. P.5

<sup>66</sup> Pushkina, (2006): 139

<sup>67</sup> Pushkina, (2006): 140

observers and the fact that we had no helicopters with night-vision capability, the task of keeping the border under surveillance was at best symbolic.”<sup>68</sup>

Similarly, Linda Mevern states that “[t]he Security Council, hoping to save money, decided that UNOMUR would focus its efforts on main roads.”<sup>69</sup> Yet, while UNOMUR cannot be evaluated individually regarding UN’s disastrous effort in Rwanda, it still failed to implement its mandate and establish order at the border between the countries.

#### **24. UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), August 1993-June 2009**

##### *Case outcome: operation failure*

The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was deployed to verify compliance with the ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia. During its sixteen years of deployment, UNOMIG had to deal with the consequences of the protracted Russian-Georgian skirmish.

Professor Bruno Coppieters argues that “UNOMIG did not have the means necessary to halt the unfolding spiral of conflict escalation affecting the triangular dispute between Russia, Georgia, and Abkhazia.” The scholar adds that “[i]ts mandate was not overambitious for an observer mission, and it did manage to achieve a significant number of its objectives.”<sup>70</sup> Indeed, UNOMIG was totally dependent on Russia as both the facilitator and a peacekeeper. As the five-day Russo-Georgian War broke out, the mission’s withdrawal proved premature and its overall ineffectiveness against Russia’s supremacy in the diplomatic and military fields against Georgia deems the mission as a failure.

#### **25. UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), September 1993-September 1997**

##### *Case outcome: operation success*

During the continuing unrest and fighting, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) deployed its Ceasefire Monitoring and Observation Group (ECOMOG), originally to act as a military monitoring group. Subsequently, The UN Observer Mission in

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<sup>68</sup>Dallaire, Roméo (2003). *Shake Hands with the Devil*. Carroll & Graf: New York. ISBN 0-7867-1510-3, pp. 93-96

<sup>69</sup>Melvern, Linda. "UN Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR) and UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda I (UNAMIR I)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. p.2

<sup>70</sup>Coppieters, 2015. P.9

Liberia (UNOMIL) was also installed to assist ECOMOG in monitoring, verifying, and reporting violations of the 1993 Cotonou peace agreement.<sup>71</sup>

While the UN Secretary-General referred to the “successful conclusion” of UNOMIL, it is difficult to evaluate what failure looked like beside the official evaluation.<sup>72</sup> Yet, despite its limitations and problems—for example, its late deployment and small resource—the mission succeeded. Particularly, it succeeded in bringing together the fractions and eventually persuading the belligerents of the Liberian civil war to agree to elections and thus paving way for brief respite. Furthermore, one of the main factors that defines the mission as a success was the mediation of power struggles and disputes, which allowed the July 1997 elections with no significant violence.<sup>73</sup>

## **26. UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), September 1993-June 1996**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was created to assist and monitor the police and to modernise the armed forces of Haiti. UNMIH’s contribution to peace in Haiti could be seen from three factors. Firstly, UNMIH provided guidance and training to the Haitian police and monitored its operations, and it created the Criminal Investigation Unit to investigate human rights violations in place since the 1991 coup. Secondly, although the overall national infrastructure remained insufficient in Haiti, UNMIH progressed small projects aimed at repairing water, sanitation, and electricity facilities, including roads. Thirdly, the mission’s key role in providing financial, technical, and logistical support to the 1995 elections, created free and fair polls. Ultimately, UNMIH brought its practices to the subsequent UN missions by generally implementing its mandate and establishing order in Haiti.<sup>74</sup>

## **27. UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), October 1993-March 1996**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was created to assist the security of Kigali, monitor ceasefire agreement, establishing a demilitarised zone, and monitor the

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<sup>71</sup> Jennings, Kathleen. "UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. P.1

<sup>72</sup> Final Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (Security Council Document S/1997/712), 12 September 1997, p. 21.

<sup>73</sup> Jennings, 2015. P.6

<sup>74</sup> Ramalho, Antonio, and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto. "UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015, p. 6

security leading to elections. The failure to prevent, and ultimately to stop the genocide, labels the overall UN presence in Rwanda as a disastrous failure.

Indeed, while UNAMIR kept to its scrawny mandate's limitations, it led to 700,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus being slain by the hands of genocidal extremists that took control of governmental institutions. Therefore, the operation may have kept to its limited mandate, but it failed to establish order catastrophically.<sup>75</sup>

## **28. UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG), May 1994-June 1994**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) is the shortest, smallest and most inexpensive peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN. Lasting a little longer than a month, UNASOG had nine military observers and six international civilian staff. They were tasked with monitoring the withdrawal of Libyan armed forces from the previously disputed territory of the Aouzou strip between southern Libya and Chad. Joachin Koops and Hubertus Jürgenliemk argue that despite the modest nature of the operation, “[i]t represents a successful instance of confidence-building and verification that helped to implement a ruling of the international Court of Justice (ICJ).”<sup>76</sup> The scholars add that UNASOG also marked a successful end of a border dispute that had been the cause of violent tensions, frequent skirmishes between the two states for more than a decade.

## **29. UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), December 1994-May 2000**

*Case outcome: operation success*

After a short but devastating civil war in Tajikistan, the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was deployed to fulfil diplomatic and administrative functions by assisting the Joint Commission in monitoring and implementing the Tehran Agreement. The mission was also in charge of investigating any ceasefire violations, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and liaising closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Peacekeeping force.<sup>77</sup> Joachin Koops evaluates UNMOT as “one of the lesser known though relatively successful post-Cold

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<sup>75</sup> Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 1

<sup>76</sup> Jürgenliemk, Hubertus, and Joachim A. Koops. "UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*.

<sup>77</sup> Security Council Resolution 968, S/RES/968, 16 December 1994.

War peacekeeping operations to be deployed in the immediate aftermath of civil war.”<sup>78</sup> Indeed, the mission marked one of the few successes after the fall of the Soviet Union.

### **30. UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), February 1995-June 1997**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

On February 8, 1995, UNAVEM II was replaced by UNAVEM III to assist the government and UNITA in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation against a “fragile politico-military background.”<sup>79</sup> UNAVEM III had a larger number of troops and resources than its predecessor mission. Furthermore, while its main objective was to “assist the parties in national reconciliation by monitoring the ceasefire and the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol,” UNAVEM III failed to fulfil its mandate because of ongoing ceasefire violations observed as early as October 1995.<sup>80</sup>

### **31. UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), May 1995-January 1996**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

In 1995, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia was transformed into the UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), which became a component of the UN Peace Forces. Despite its smaller size, UNCRO kept its mandate by ensuring the supervision of the March 1994 Ceasefire Agreement, facilitating the implementation of the December 1994 Economic Agreement, and implementing other elements of the existing UN plans. Yet, the relapse into conflict in May and then in August 1995, proved the ineffectiveness of the mission to contain the Croatian offensive against Western Slavonia and the Krajina. Particularly, Tardy argues that UNCRO’s failure was in its passivity “illustrated by its lack of response to the Croatian military operations of May and August 1995.”<sup>81</sup> Therefore, while this operation initially implemented its mandate, the subsequent resumption of conflict indicates that the mission is a failure.

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<sup>78</sup> Koops, Joachim A. "UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2018, p. 6

<sup>79</sup> Dzinesa 647

<sup>80</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Angola Verification Mission II. Security Council document S/1995/1012, 7 December 1995).

<sup>81</sup> Tardy, Thierry. "UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR—Croatia)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 (I), p.9

### **32. UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), March 1995-February 1999**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Security Council Resolution 983 split UNPROFOR into three separate operations: UNPROFOR in Macedonia became the UN Preventive Deployment Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP). Its mandate remained largely unchanged, only added additional tasks of monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other prohibited activities. Although the UN was not chosen to monitor the 2001 Ohrid Agreement that ultimately ended the conflict in Macedonia, the overall success of UNPREDEP could be assessed by two of its achievements. Firstly, despite the talks that the mission needed a more robust force, UNPREDEP was able to operate without harassment and work constructively with their counterparts. Secondly, the absence of fighting facilitated the mission's mandate implementation and it preserved its freedom of movement and impartiality.<sup>82</sup> Surely, if the operation was deployed in the same degree of violent environment as the Bosnian operation did, the outcome could have been much different. Yet, its ultimate role proved to be successful in Macedonia.

### **33. UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), December 1995-December 2002**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was established as part of the post-war peacebuilding mechanisms. This was the first time the UN deployed a mission primarily composed of a police force. The conflict started in Bosnia in April 1992 and ended in October 1995 after the offensive of both Bosnian and Croatian forces against the Serbs over the summer of 1995. Surely without NATO's airstrikes on the Serb positions in August and September 1995 (Operation Deliberate Force) the conflict would have had a different outcome.<sup>83</sup> A ceasefire was agreed after the formal signature of the Dayton Agreement by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudman, and Serbian President Slobodan Milocevic. Therefore, UNMIBH played a crucial role in establishing peace in the region and securing its status as a successful mission in this thesis.

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<sup>82</sup> Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention. Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace Press, 2003, p. 211

<sup>83</sup> On the conflict in Bosnia, see Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia. The Third Balkan War*, 3rd edn. (London: Penguin Books, 1996); Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999)\

### **34. UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), January 1996-January 1998**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) was established along the UN Police Support Group (UNPSG) to monitor the conflict in Eastern Slavonia. The missions were examples of high-level commitment that yielded great future ideas for the UN peacekeeping. During the two-year period, the UN staff demonstrated a high level of commitment to the mission from the very beginning, supplying most of the necessary finance, troops and logistical resources in a timely fashion. Specifically, the mission received all 5,000 troops appointed, and 561 of the 700 uniformed observers and policemen. Pushkina argues that “[t]his level of commitment did not diminish through the duration of the deployment, and it is likely that this was a primary reason for the mission’s success.”<sup>84</sup>

### **35. UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), January 1996-December 2002**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) was the smallest of the UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Its maximum capacity had 28 military personnel. While its dimensions were extremely limited, UNMOP took and completed important roles. The mission monitored the short border between Croatia and Montenegro, particularly on the Adriatic side by the contested Prevlaka peninsula. This area was infamous for being a flashpoint in any new regional war. Ultimately, UNMOP was a successful mission despite its rather peripheral role to history. Particularly, it played a substantial role in defusing the potential escalations around the border. The fact that both Prevlaka and Bay of Kotor are now largely overlooked by scholars who study the history of the Balkans, is a good indicator of how UNMOP kept the tensions in check.<sup>85</sup>

*Case outcome: operation success*

### **36. UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), July 1996-July 1997**

*Case outcome: operation success*

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<sup>84</sup> Pushkina, (2006): 139

<sup>85</sup> Gowan, Richard. "UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2014 p. 7



Following the termination of the previous mission, UNMIH, which main achievements included bringing fair elections and a peaceful transfer of power, the country experienced a tangible insecurity from a weak economy and high levels of social inequality. The creation of the UN Security Council authorised the Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), culminating the UN Security Council to reduce its continued presence in Haiti. Therefore, it granted the mission only 300 civilian police and 600 troops.

Despite the shortcomings of the mission, UNSMIH can be evaluated as success as it contributed to Haiti's minimum level of security. Particularly, it was visible when the Haitian National Police (HNP) was assisted by the UNSMIH's helicopters to dangerous locations around the country.<sup>86</sup>

### **37. UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), January 1997-May 1997**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) took on several forms during its deployment, tasked with a broad and complex peacekeeping function in the Guatemalan peace processes. The thirty-six-year-long internal armed conflict in Guatemala was formally settled through negotiations in which the UN played a key role. During this time, MINUGUA took on the role as a human rights observer mission from November 1994 to December 1996. Subsequently, it became a peacekeeping interlude in Spring 1997 separating the belligerents and demobilising the rebels.<sup>87</sup>

Yet, Amy Ross argues that while MINUGUA facilitated the formal end of the conflict in Guatemala, "it fell too weak to force the successive government to implement the reforms necessary to reali[s]e all the terms of the peace accords."<sup>88</sup> Therefore, MINUGUA provides a good example of why peacekeeping missions should not be judged primarily on mandate implementation. The main reason for such is that its mandate was changed multiple times. However, while the mission failed to achieve all its tasks, it should be labelled as a success. One apparent reason is that MINUGUA strengthened Guatemala's institutions and

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<sup>86</sup> Siman, Maira, and Vahan Galoumian. "UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015: 6

<sup>87</sup> Ross, Amy. "UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)." In *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. P. 1

<sup>88</sup> Ross, 2015. P. 7

local actors, which was evident in the prosecution of the former head of state for the crime of genocide.<sup>89</sup>

### **38. UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), June 1997-February 1999**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

In June 1997, UNAVEM III was replaced with a smaller and cheaper UN Observer Mission for Angola (MONUA). MONUA's aim was to focus on diplomatic mediation rather than persist on military intervention. This time, it was the UN's excessive optimism chiefly influenced by financial considerations that led to the MONUA's failure. The initial decision to establish MONUA was also resonated with the UN's adopted policy of downsizing its presence in African countries, partly as a "result of the difficulties it had encountered in Somalia and Rwanda."<sup>90</sup>

As, Dzinesa argues, "the general strained nature of Angola's politico-military relations negated the prospects of an effective demobilisation and reintegration exercise."<sup>91</sup> Simply said, the following deterioration of the military situation between the Angolan parties reduced MONUA to an ineffectual presence. Although MONUA completed some minor tasks like confirming the free movement of people and commodities, it still falls short to demonstrate its achievements.

### **39. UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), August 1997-December 1997**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The official termination of UNSMIH was followed by the August 1997 creation of the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) to support and contribute to the professionalisation of the Haitian police and also promoting the concept of community policing. Blanca Antonini states that "[a]s the country faced urgent challenges stemming from political confrontation, institutional paralysis, and social unrest, UNTMIH's presence with a residual military element and the promise to follow-on UN mission had a moderating influence that helped to preserve some stability."<sup>92</sup> Indeed, the mission helped minimise the impact of a change that entailed an apparent decline of the UN presence and a diminished political profile. Yet, Antonini adds that "[w]hile UNTMIH complied with the short-term

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<sup>89</sup> Ross, 2015. P.8

<sup>90</sup> Dzinesa 648

<sup>91</sup> Dzinesa 648

<sup>92</sup> Antonini, Blanca. "UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 (II) p.6

effects of its mandate, it was constrained by the severe limitations resulting from political and financial restrictions placed on peace operations.”<sup>93</sup> Yet, the main achievement of UNTMIH, was that it reinforced the Haitian police, which contributed to the country’s order despite the country’s remaining economic struggles.

#### **40. UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), December 1997-March 2000**

*Case outcome: operation failure*

The UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) was launched as the fourth mission in Haiti and its mandate entailed technical assistance and training to the HNP. Unlike the first three missions MIPONUH had no military component, relying exclusively on international civil police. During its twenty-seven months duration, the mission was unable to contain the violence or exercise a moderating influence on political leaders since its functions had no executive power and only limited strength and visibility. Antonini argues that “a stronger leverage could have enabled MIPONUH to be more convincing in breaking the logic of polarisation and introducing a dynamic of change.”<sup>94</sup> Yet, Antonini adds that “MIPONUH’s main weakness lay in the absence of a sense of ownership of the HNP among political leadership and the majority of Haitians.” Overall, MIPONUH failed to pass the logic from figure 3 by falling short of establishing order through its mandate, but also confirming its stabilisation efforts’ futility as the 2004 crisis emerged in Haiti.

#### **41. UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG), January 1998-October 1998**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG) took over policing tasks after UNTAES terminated its duties in January 1998 to continue monitoring the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region. Particularly, the mission was tasked to assist the return of displaced persons for a single nine-month period. The UN Secretary-General evaluated the overall performance of the mission as satisfactory, although acknowledging a continuing and worrying trend of ethnically motivated incidents. Indeed, UNCPSG prevented the return of instability in the region, and it also proved to be a cost-effective instrument in helping to maintain conditions that were ultimately handed over to the police monitoring programme of OSCE.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Antonini, 2015 (II) p.7

<sup>94</sup> Antonini, Blanca. "UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 (I) p.7

<sup>95</sup> Stodiek, Thorsten. "OSCE International Police Missions." *OSCE Yearbook 2001 7 (2001)*. P. 333

#### **42. UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), April 1998-February 2000**

*Case outcome: operation success*

UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was deployed in response to the crisis that started in 1996. The operation marked a turning point in the UN's engagement with Africa after it became reluctant to intervene amid its failures in Somalia and Rwanda. MINURCA played a key role for the Central African Republic (CAR) to hold the elections after a period of relatively no incidents. Most importantly, MINURCA allowed the UN Security Council to regain confidence for crisis management in the continent. The mission also reinforced several trends in the field of peace operations. For example, it reflected the growth of collaboration between the UN and regional actors.<sup>96</sup> Surely, while the operation had its limitations, like the lack of resources and equipment to ensure the country's security, MINURCA was a moderately successful role in the UN's gradual re-engagement in Africa.

#### **43. UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), July 1998-October 1999**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was a small observer mission that worked alongside a much larger enforcement operation deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Since its start, UNOMSIL knew that its size could not cope with the magnitude of the war in the country. Therefore, the mission's prime role was to show UN's presence and bolster the legitimacy of the ECOWAS operation. UNOMSIL success could be defined for its singular act of appending an addendum to the Lome Peace Agreement, which prevented the blanket amnesty granted to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from being applied universally. In the end, this act allowed the creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the deployment of UNAMSIL.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, given its minimal size, UNOMSIL was successful in implementing its given tasks and allowing the succeeding to operate in a safe environment.

#### **44. UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), October 1999-December 2005**

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<sup>96</sup> Esmenjaud, Romain. "UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015.

<sup>97</sup> Olonisakin, Funmi. "UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. P.7

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was officially authorised to implement the July 1999 Lome Peace agreement and assist the government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process. The mission also focused on the delivery of the humanitarian assistance previously set by UNOMSIL. The operation faced tremendous problems when the RUF continued to fight the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Civil Defence Forces in the countryside. This prevented UNAMSIL to access the diamond-rich areas in May 2000. This incident brought several of its peacekeepers killed, holding around 500 hostages, and seizing their heavy weapons and vehicles.

Professor Funmi Olonosakin argues that the May 2000 tragedy was the “necessary evil” that spurred the UN to reinvent itself and this is arguably the most important factor that led to UNAMSIL’s success.<sup>98</sup> Particularly, amid the crisis the UN increased its troop strength by 17,000, and took several steps to improve international coordination to signal support and reorganisation of UNAMSIL by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Overall, the mission is a success as its recovery from the year 2000 ordeal offers a wealth of lessons for current and future peacekeeping operations.<sup>99</sup>

**45. UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), October 1999-May 2002***Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established as a temporary governing authority for East Timor with three main components: covering governance, humanitarian assistance, and security. Norrie MacQueen stresses that “[b]eyond sporadic—and lessening—difficulties on the Indonesian border [...] UNTAET continued to pursue its mandate in a more or less stable internal environment.”<sup>100</sup> This was evident as peaceful elections for an eighty-eight-seat constituent assembly were held in August 2001.

Yet, UNTAET was faced with a socio-political dilemma of how to bring the territory to independence as quickly but also as effectively. Indeed, speed and effectiveness are not

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<sup>98</sup> See *Twenty-seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone* (S/2005/777, 12 December 2005)

<sup>99</sup> See *Twenty-seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone* (S/2005/777, 12 December 2005).

<sup>100</sup> MacQueen, (2015). P.12

always going along in harmony. To have properly developed local capacity, MacQueen explains that “UNTAET would almost certainly have delayed independence beyond 2002—and in so doing may well have provoked the resentment of those for whom capacity was being built.”<sup>101</sup> Overall, this operation can still be considered successful, but not without remembering its shortcomings due to its rapid pace of implementing its tasks.

#### **46. UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), November 1999-June 2010**

##### *Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was formed following the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In the aftermath of the massacre, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) defeated the Hutu-dominated Rwanda armed forces (FAR) and the Hutu extremist militia (*Interahamwe*). The aftermath embroiled four countries: the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. In an effort to create some confidence and lower the tensions that periodically involved fighting, MONUC established and facilitated an indispensable reconciliation between the countries. After more than ten years of its existence and a record of financing for a single UN operation, MONUC helped to secure the implementation of both the 1999 Lusaka and 2002 Pretoria Agreements. The accords helped overtake foreign intervention in the DRC, reunified the country, and created a new constitutional order, which eventually led to generally accepted national elections. One significant shortcoming of MONUC was that it was unable to end the systemic violence against the civilians in the eastern Congo. This created an impression of ineffectiveness despite the protection to countless vulnerable Congolese.<sup>102</sup> Yet, while MONUC struggled to implement all its tasks, it is an overall exceptional success considering that it had to operate in a highly complex post-genocide environment.

#### **47. UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), July 2000-July 2008**

##### *Case outcome: operation failed*

The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was deployed after various international actors sought to stop the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

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<sup>101</sup> MacQueen, (2015). P.13

<sup>102</sup> Doss, Alan. "UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. P.4

Andreas Sugar and Patrick Cammaert argue that “[t]he peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea seemingly had all the ingredients for success and yet ended in failure.”<sup>103</sup> Perhaps, the operation’s failure could be attributed to the country’s themselves. For instance, by the end of 2006, UNMEE’s utility was merely operating as the mission was unable to fulfil its original mandate or even play a deterrent role to ensure the separation of forces or the integrity of the TSZ. The failure of implementing its mandate was due to the lack of cooperation, especially from the side of Eritrea.<sup>104</sup>

#### **48. UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), May 2002-May 2005**

*Case outcome: operation failed*

The UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) was a peacekeeping operation as a successor to the UN transitional administration in the territory. The mission’s mandate included the provision of direct military and civilian support to help promoting national capacity building during East Timor’s early period as an independent state.

On the positive side, MacQueen argues that “[g]iven the constrains of resources and timescale within which it was required to operate, UNMISET produced some significant results.”<sup>105</sup> On the other hand, UNMISET’s shortcomings overwhelm its achievements, which could be addressed to the elements of its malfunctional mandate. MacQueen adds that the failures could be derived “not from inherent faults within its own organi[s]ation but from the larger setting in which it was established and required to operate.”<sup>106</sup> This was proved after the mission’s premature withdrawal in May 2005. The tensions contained and managed by the UN exploded just a year after its peacekeepers left. Therefore, this proves that if the mandate of an operations is defective, the peacekeepers’ efforts would be futile.

#### **49. UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), May 2003-April 2004**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The creation of the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) was established as a small political mission to facilitate the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement by Ivorian parties. Its mandate included the provision of advice to the Special Representative on military matters,

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<sup>103</sup> Cammaert, 2015. P.11

<sup>104</sup> Cammaert, 2015. P.12

<sup>105</sup> MacQueen, Norrie. "UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 (II), p. 9

<sup>106</sup> MacQueen, 2015 (II), p. 9

monitoring the military situation, and providing input to forward planning on the DDR program. Given the small amount of personnel, MINUCI achieved its goals. Particularly, it established liaison with the French and ECOWAS. Subsequently, following an attempted coup in April 2004, MINUCI was replaced by the full-fledged multidimensional peacekeeping operation—the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).<sup>107</sup>

## **50. UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), April 2004-June 2017**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), was deployed amid a failed *coup* attempt of the president Laurent Gbagbo by the soldiers of the Ivorian armed forces. The mission’s focus was to lead the country towards the presidential elections that was one key point of contention in the overall peace process. The implementation of UNOCI’s mandate was repeatedly constrained by the weak consent of the country, the French policies, and the mixed feelings of the UN Secretariat on the mere existence of the mission. Yet, the mission managed to lead the country towards the presidential elections.<sup>108</sup>

Indeed, although very few of the components of peace are in place in Côte d’Ivoire, the 2015 elections became less interesting after the country experienced the second economic miracle of consecutive nine percent annual growth.

## **51. UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), June 2004-October 2017**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established in April 2004 to replace the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) that had been deployed to stabilise the country earlier in February 2004. Following MINUSTAH’s deployment, Haiti president Aristide was once again ousted amid political turmoil and violence.<sup>109</sup> MINUSTAH’s mandate included support for security sector reform, promotion and protection of human rights, and the assistance in organising and monitoring the following elections.

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<sup>107</sup> Novosseloff, Alexandra. "UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. P.1

<sup>108</sup> Novosseloff, 2015. P.7

<sup>109</sup> Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas, and J. A. Koops. "UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)." *The Oxford handbook of UN peacekeeping operations* (2015). P.1



While the operation has undoubtedly contributed to the ‘stabilisation of Haiti, a string of sexual assaults scandals afflicted the military components of MINUSTAH and fuelled an anti-UN sentiment in the country. Yet, as Lemay-Hebert argues, “[h]ad it not been for the UN presence, the transitional government would probably have been engulfed in the 2004-06 surge of violence.”<sup>110</sup> Overall, MINUSTAH’s implementation of mandate and a mere establishment of order in the country could label the mission as a success.

## **52. UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), June 2004-December 2006**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established to monitor and support the implementation of the Arusha Agreement between the warring Hutu and Tutsi tribes. Arthur Boutellis claims that “ONUB has generally been presented as a UN success story.”<sup>111</sup> Indeed, its relatively rapid and effective deployment, including a realistic mandate, allowed the peacekeepers to secure ceasefire agreements with remaining rebel groups. Furthermore, these efforts led to their disarmament and demobilisation process.

Ultimately, the first post-transitional democratic elections in Burundi solidified the mission’s success. The UN Secretary-General claimed that “without extensive political, military, technical and logistical support from ONUB, the referendum and five subsequent elections could not have been successfully conducted between February and September 2005.”<sup>112</sup> Although the loss of leverage and the request of the ONUB to withdraw by the host government, the mission’s reputation should not be tainted by it. Instead, the request for its withdrawal should be seen as a broader tendency of host government “to assert their sovereignty by refusing the prolonged presence of peacekeepers as an obstacle to ‘normali[s]ation’.”<sup>113</sup>

## **53. UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), March 2005-July 2011**

*Case outcome: operation success*

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<sup>110</sup> Lemay-Hébert, 2015, p.1

<sup>111</sup> Boutellis, Arthur J. "UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. P.8

<sup>112</sup> Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Burundi, Security Council document S/2006/994, 18 December 2006, para. 6.

<sup>113</sup> Boutellis, 2015. P.9

The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was created to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the government of Sudan including its armed forces (SAF), and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Wibke Hansen evaluates the UN mission by stating that "success in mandate implementation was contingent, inter alia, on two factors: the will of the parties to advance the CPA and their acceptance of UNMIS's supporting role."<sup>114</sup> Indeed, the mission was most successful when both parties welcomed its involvement..

The most severe shortcoming of the mission was regarding its tasks for protection of civilians (PoC).<sup>115</sup> Specifically, when fighting erupted between SAF and SPLA in Abyei in May 2008, UNMIS was criticised for "not having done enough to protect civilians."<sup>116</sup> Yet, while UNMIS's environment proved to be very challenging, the mission managed to implement an extremely overambitious portfolio, which stretched well beyond immediate CPA issues.<sup>117</sup>

#### **54. UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), August 2006-December 2012**

*Case outcome: operation success*

The UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was deployed in August 2006 in the aftermath of widespread civil disorder. The previous peacekeeping mission in Timor (UNMISSET) was different in terms that it was created to support the country's "resumed" national independence in May 2002.<sup>118</sup> UNMIT included operational police component and a group of military liaison officers as a range of civilian specialists. The seventy-six months operation was tasked to support the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, support the government to consolidate stability and enhance democratic governance. Additionally, it helped strengthening the national capacity for monitoring and promoting human rights.

Overall, the success of the operation could be attributed to the 2012 national elections that gave way to the future of the parliamentary system. Specifically, five years after the 2007 appointment of José Ramos-Horta, he was replaced in "efficiently organi[s]ed and carried

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<sup>114</sup> Hansen, Wibke. "UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2014. P.7

<sup>115</sup> see Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping operations* (New York: UN, 2009)

<sup>116</sup> Hansen, 2014. P.8

<sup>117</sup> Hansen, 2014. P.10

<sup>118</sup> MacQueen, Norrie. "UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 (I) p.1

through elections”<sup>119</sup> by former military leader Taur Matan Ruak. The new head of state was well known to UN officials and his succession took place in an entirely calm atmosphere.<sup>120</sup>

### **55. UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), September 2007-December 2010**

#### *Case outcome: operation failure*

The UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was deployed to address some of the spill-over effects of the war in Darfur, Sudan. MINURCAT was enforced by a smaller European Force (EUFOR), which helped to carry out its mandate to protect civilians in danger, refugees and displaced persons, including the facilitation for delivering humanitarian aid to Chad.<sup>121</sup>

MINURCAT could be considered as the UN’s first ‘pure’ civilian protection operation. As John Karlsrud argues, this was facilitated by the government’s position that the mission should not have a political mandate.<sup>122</sup> This meant that MINURCAT had a limited amount troops and it highly depended on EUFOR. Considering that the European Union can deploy much faster than the UN, the subsequent cooperation between the two organisations did not go well. Specifically, their operational coordination was malfunctioning. For example, while the EUFOR was equipped with armoured personnel carriers and other heavy vehicles, its commanders failed to recognise that the real threat to civilians was armed banditry and other low-level threats in eastern Chad.<sup>123</sup> Therefore, MINURCAT can hardly be considered as a successful mission, as it was failing to implement some of its initial tasks due to the lack of establishing an effective liaison with EUFOR.

### **56. UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), April 2012-August 2012**

#### *Case outcome: operation failure*

The UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was tasked to monitor a cessation of armed violence and support the implementation of Kofi Annan’s six-point plan for Syria.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> MacQueen, 2015 (I) p.9

<sup>120</sup> MacQueen, 2015 (I) p.10

<sup>121</sup> Karlsrud, John. "UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad I and II (MINURCAT I and II)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 p. 3

<sup>122</sup> Karlsrud, 2015 p. 6

<sup>123</sup> Karlsrud, 2015 p. 10

<sup>124</sup> Gowan, Richard. "Kofi Annan, Syria and the Uses of Uncertainty in Mediation." *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 1 (2013).

Richard Gowan states that “UNSMIS was a small, short-lived and unsuccessful attempt to end a rapidly escalating civil war that would go on to claim hundreds of thousands of lives and drive millions from their homes.”<sup>125</sup> Indeed, the mission was a clear failure if judged by the basic criterion of whether or not it helped ending the Syrian war. Although UNSMIS prioritised the promotion of lower-level political contacts between the belligerents, it failed in implementing these efficiently for affecting the war.

On one side, the mission was unable to “systematically monitor and report” either the journalists’ freedom of movement or peaceful protests. On the other, the UN officials observing protests came under attack.<sup>126</sup> Overall, had the operation been in place for longer, it would still have a similar outcome. As UN National Security Advisor Susan Rise stressed, “a mission of 300 unarmed observers could not play an important role in deterring or preventing violence.”<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Gowan, Richard, and Tristan Dreisbach. "UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015 p.1

<sup>126</sup> Security Council Report, “Negotiations on Syria Mission renewal & Tremseh Press Statement,” What’s in Blue, 15 July 2012 para 39

<sup>127</sup> Gowan & Dreisbach 2015 p.10

## CHAPTER 3: APPROACH TO DATA ANALYSIS

### 3.1 DYNAMICS OF PEACEKEEPING

To fit the scope of the project into the size of a master's thesis, it was determined that the list of peacekeeping factors would need to be within realistic boundaries. The method for deducting only the most appropriate number of independent factors is a three-step process. Firstly, the political situation, the social system, or the environmental factors of the conflicted region were rejected. This thesis only focuses on features related to the dynamics of the peacekeeping operations. Simply said, step one reveals 13 factors that were derived from previous studies that analysed UN peacekeeping operations. Therefore, these essential factors seem appropriate to the scope of this thesis that covers 56 peacekeeping missions for fundamental accuracy. The next step merges similar factors and eliminates any factor that does not relate—at a certain extend—to one of the five hypotheses illustrating only 13 peacekeeping factors. These factors act as independent variables for each of the qualitative and quantitative methods. The process reveals how these independent variables are used in the final qualitative comparative analyses process. Table 5 lists the 13 peacekeeping factors, their number, and the independent variable grouping for each. The factors are abbreviated as f1-f13. Each narrative is assigned to a specific hypothesis, for example, f5 is allocated within the variable grouping of H2.

Table 5 List of peacekeeping factors used for each hypothesis

VARIABLE GROUPING	FACTOR NUMBER	CONCEPT
H1	<i>f1</i>	The environment was secured and safe for the peacekeepers
H1	<i>f2</i>	The UN peacekeepers were targeted by the conflicting parties
H1	<i>f3</i>	The UN peacekeepers experienced casualties
H2	<i>f4</i>	The mission received appropriate equipment and technology
H2	<i>f5</i>	Each peacekeeper was sufficiently funded
H3	<i>f6</i>	The mission received enough personnel to implement its aims
H3	<i>f7</i>	The personnel were appropriately trained and coordinated
H4	<i>f8</i>	The mission was deployed in a timely and effective manner

H4	<i>f9</i>	The mission held an appropriate mandate and amended it when the situation changed in the region
H4	<i>f10</i>	The peacekeepers were forced to withdraw by the request of the local government
H5	<i>f11</i>	The mission operated in cooperation with non-UN external organisations (e.g. NATO, OSCE, AU, etc.)
H5	<i>f12</i>	Non-UN professional military engaged in fighting to protect the UN peacekeepers
H5	<i>f13</i>	Non-UN external support acted independently from the UN and engaged in fighting without UNSC's consent


## 3.2. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

### 3.2.1 Frequency

A study was conducted by Watkins examined the dynamics of modern insurgencies.<sup>128</sup> This study follows Watkins's structure by illustrating the frequency of each factor, creating a quad-chart for the five independent variable groupings. Each independent variable grouping is related to a hypothesis, which holds either two or three factors in its section. For instance, H1 corresponds with hypothesis 1 "The peacekeepers require a safe haven from which to operate." and includes factors f1-f3. The X-axis divides cases of peacekeeping success from cases of peacekeeping failure. The Y-axis divides the peacekeeping cases where the factor was present from peacekeeping cases where the factor was absent. The number of each quadrant represents the number of cases that correspond to those respective criteria. Figure 4 illustrates how the concepts were applied. The upper quadrant contains the quantity of cases where the factor was absent, and the peacekeeping operation failed. The lower left quadrant represents the number of cases where the factor was present, and the operations succeeded. Correspondingly, the upper right quadrant contains the number of peacekeeping cases where the factor was present and the operations succeeded; while the lower right quadrant represents the number of cases where the factor was present, and the operations failed. Factors in the upper right and lower left quadrants support the hypothesis, while the factors from the upper left and lower right quadrants undermine the hypothesis.

<sup>128</sup> Watkins, 2014: 23

Figure 4 Example independent variable group frequency quad-chart



### 3.2.2 Cross tabulation

The next step in the quantitative analysis is to calculate the frequencies at an in-depth level and examine the proportion of cases in each quadrant. This practice will produce insight into which factor influences the outcome. To illustrate this process this thesis uses cross-tabulation charts. These charts are produced initially by using QCA methods but are later calculated in Excel so that the results will be easily applied to the discussion chapter. There is a single chart for each case sorted by independent variable grouping. The following cross-tabulation sample shows the occurrence percentages for the frequency data in each case. In Table 5, the columns separate the number of cases where the factor was present from the number of cases where the factor was absent. Rows of the table indicate the separation of the cases of success versus the cases of failure. The four sets of numbers inside of the enclosed boxes represent the number of operations, their row percentage, their column percentage, and their total percentage respectively. The digits at the end of the table show the column totals and the numbers at the far right show the row totals.

Table 5: Example cross-tabulation chart

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor # (f#)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	N	N	# SUCCESS
	Row %	Row %	
	Column %	Column %	
	Total %	Total %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	N	N	# FAILURE
	Row %	Row %	
	Column %	Column %	

Total %	Total %
# NO	# YES

### 3.3 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The qualitative analysis consists of crisp and fuzzy set QCA, also used in Watkins's and Paul et al. studies to analyse insurgencies and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, respectively.<sup>129</sup> Given that each study covered more than 70 cases each, this thesis attempts to reproduce this approach by suiting it for the analysis of 56 peacekeeping operations.

QCA is a type of research method that shares three features. As defined by Schneider and Wagemann, "first, they work with membership scores of cases in sets; second, they perceive relationships between social phenomena as set relations; third, these set relations are interpreted in terms of sufficiency and necessity as well as forms of causes that can be derived from them [...]"<sup>130</sup> In other words, QCA is a case-based historical analysis tool designed to "access configurations of case similarities and differences using simple logical rules."<sup>131</sup> This thesis analyses the crisp and fuzzy sets in a similar way, just instead of using 71 COIN operations, it studies 56 UN peacekeeping operations.

As suggested by Carsten Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, the recipe to productively use QCA requires 10 steps:

1. The appropriateness of the set-theoretic methods
2. The choice of the conditions and the result
3. The choice of the QCA variable
4. Calibration of set-membership scores
5. Analysis of necessary conditions
6. Analysis of sufficient conditions
7. Presentation of results
8. Interpretation of results
9. Reiteration of the research cycle

<sup>129</sup> Paul et al., *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, 193–196. And Watkins, Christopher L. *How insurgents win: examining the dynamics of modern insurgencies*. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA, 2014: 23-25

<sup>130</sup> Schneider and Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences*, 3.

<sup>131</sup> Paul et al., *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, 193.



## 10. The use of appropriate software<sup>132</sup>

Beyond the process itself, Legewie argues that six terms need to be understood. These terms are important because they show up in the final QCA results and they are used to “gauge the appropriateness of the causal conditions.”<sup>133</sup> Those are:

- *A casual recipe*—a formula of factors that are combined to explain the outcome
- *Consistency*—indicates to what degree the data is in line with the assumed causal conditions
- *Raw coverage*—indicates the extent to which a specific combination of factors can explain the outcome
- *Unique coverage*—indicates the number of cases that can be explained exclusively by that combination of factors
- *Solution consistency*—indicates the combined reliability of all the causal recipes
- *Solution coverage*—indicates the combined coverage of all the causal recipes<sup>134</sup>

### 3.2.1 Crisp data

The Crisp data is used in this study to define the success and failure dependent variables. The binary method of the crisp data allows full membership or full non-membership for each factor. Either the factor is present, or it is absent. This thesis will separate each operation into phases so that each case has a single data point for each factor. If the factor is observed in 50 percent or more of the phases, the factor is coded as full membership. If the factor is observed in less than 50 percent of the phases, it is coded as full non-membership. The resulting crisp data is then analysed using the steps described above.

### 3.2.2 Fuzzy data

As Schneider and Wagemann state, a fuzzy dataset is a set, “which allows for partial membership, in addition to full membership and full non-membership.”<sup>135</sup> In other words, within the field of social sciences, it enables the researcher to work with concepts for which the establishing of differences in degree among qualitatively similar cases is both “conceptually plausible and empirically feasible.”<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Schneider and Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences*, 275–284.

<sup>133</sup> Legewie, “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis,” 20.

<sup>134</sup> Legewie, “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis,” 20.

<sup>135</sup> Schneider and Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences*, 326.

<sup>136</sup> Schneider and Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences*, 326.

Factors of the dataset are coded with the percentage of time they are observed. The only difference between the fuzzy set data and the crisp set data is the numbers assigned to each factor during the case phase combination process. That is, the fuzzy set valuables equal the number of phases in which the factor was present, which is then divided by the total number of phases in that case. For instance, if only three out of four phases are present in the case, the fuzzy set value for that factor would be 75 percent membership. In the crisp set, the same factor would equal one because it had more than 50 percent of the phases or more. Therefore, fuzzy set QCA produces results that are more precise. This study uses both methods to determine the robustness of the findings and hence determine how well these findings would apply to other cases.

## CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION

### 4.1 KEY FINDINGS

#### 4.1.1 Evaluating the hypotheses

This section will review the three hypotheses and the independent variable groups, which include several indicators, used to test each premise. This chapter will go on to test the robustness of each hypothesis based on the results presented in this section. Overall, the aim of this section is to demonstrate how they support or oppose the concepts in the previous chapter.

*Hypothesis 1:* The peacekeepers require a safe haven from which to operate.

The independent variable used to test this hypothesis asked whether the peacekeepers require a safe and secure environment to successfully implement their objectives. To prove this enquiry, this thesis asked whether there were any casualties experienced during the course of the mission. The overall result showed that the result of the successful case did not deviate significantly given the amount of casualties. In the case of UNAMSIL, the casualties phenomenally played an important role to reshape the mission's objectives and lead to its success. Indeed, the May 200 tragedy served as the "necessary evil" for UNAMSIL and its successful mandate implementation and establishment of order, procuring the region a relatively lasting peace in the aftermath.<sup>137</sup> On the other hand, the percentage of the failed cases that had the casualties resulted in 83 percent. This may indicate that the factor may not have played an important role *per se*, but it most certainly forced the mission to reconsider its strategies. Overall, the factor indicated that even a small amount of deceased personnel is highly connected to the mission's failure criteria.

Factor 1 asked whether the peacekeepers were deployed into a safe environment, the result showed that the successful cases produced the result of 89 percent. Indeed, the initial environment for the UNSMIS in Syria proved to be too hostile for the peacekeepers, especially given the mission's small size and capacity. Factor 2 asked whether the peacekeepers were targeted as part of the conflict. The result showed that it is not

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<sup>137</sup> Olonisakin, Funmi. "UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)." *In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. 2015. P.7

significantly important to the outcome of the cases with 59 percent failed cases with peacekeepers experiencing hostilities from the conflicting parties. While it may be true that some specific peacekeeping operations did benefit greatly from a reliable and secure haven, the assessment of this study demonstrated that the concept is not universal.

*Hypothesis 2:* An ample amount of financing does not necessary lead to the mission's success.

The independent variable used to test this hypothesis question whether the peacekeepers received the necessary amount of funding to operate successfully. To support the testing of the hypothesis, this study developed an equation to determine the approximate amount of financing given to deployed personnel of the mission.

To calculate the average financing of each operation, this thesis used the statistical information derived from the official UN webpages that list the amount of maximum deployed personnel and the overall financing that each operation received. The following formula used to calculate the average financing per each staff member of each operation was conducted in the following manner. First, it divided the maximum amount of personnel in each operation including troops and civilian personnel (excluding volunteer staff) by the number of months of each operation. Finally, the average amount of time spent by each employee was divided by the overall financing of the operation.

$s$  – total amount of financing of the mission in USD

$p$  – maximum amount of personnel deployed during the operation

$m$  – total amount of time of the mission by months

$n$  – average amount of USD per person per each month of the operation


$$\frac{(s/p)}{m} = n$$

For example, UNYOM had the maximum amount of 189 personnel who spent 10 months in Yemen with the overall financing of USD \$2 million. Therefore, the average amount of USD for each member of staff of the UNYOM operation was \$1,058. Surely, the equipment and the support provided to the peacekeepers would be a significant contribution to the calculation, but this thesis relied on the statistical data available from the UN official

website. The UNYOM average amount of financing per each staff was conducted in the following way:

$$\frac{(\$2,000,000/189)}{10} = \$1,058$$

The interesting result of calculating the median amount of financing for each staff of successful and failed operations showed a deviation of almost 50 percent. This calculation supports the fuzzy set calculations for factors f4-f5. The fuzzy set analysis shows that the two factors showed a significant difference between the successful and failed mission at the median 40 percent and 8.9 percent, respectively. Therefore, this would suggest that this hypothesis is sound: better financing of the operation significantly affects its outcome.



*Hypothesis 3: The mission needs a sufficient and appropriate amount of personnel*

The next hypothesis focused on the amount of personnel authorised by the UNSC for the deployment of the mission. The factors f6-f7 were set to determine whether the mission received enough personnel to implement their tasks, and whether the forces were appropriately trained and coordinated. The results showed an interesting deviation between the successful and failed cases. The successful cases had an average of 70 percent of factors f6-f7, while the failed cases had an 83 percent average of not having the factors. Therefore, the hypothesis is sound because it plays a significant role in ensuring the success of the mandate, order, and lasting peace. Yet, it also plays a strong role for failure if the mission has inexperienced and insufficient personnel. Surely, this hypothesis provides a peripheral

statement of a mission needing a sufficient and trained personnel. However, cases like MINURCAT, which was considered highly over-resourced for the impact it contributed, is still considered understaffed, and highly depending on personnel from EUFOR forces. This finding provides important information that a peacekeeping mission has to possess enough personnel of its own beside being highly financed and supported externally.

*Hypothesis 4:* Longer duration of the mission does not necessarily correlate with the success of the mission.


Figure 8 shows few interesting patterns. First, on average, the successful peacekeeping operations had longer durations than the failed peacekeeping missions. This can be indicated from the successful cases' curve which is mostly above the failed cases' curve. Second, figure 8 shows that the time distribution for both successes and failures were not uniform. Otherwise, the lines would be straighter and more closely aligned with the diagonal on the figure. Instead, both curves show that they incline towards the lower right of the figure, meaning that some cases lasted a great deal longer than others, disproportionately longer. The fuzzy set results proved that hypothesis 4 is sound. Particularly, factor 9, the amendment of mandate, showed a great divergence between successful and failed cases by 82 percent present and 100 percent absent, respectfully.

Factor 10 proved that it does not play a significant role for the mission's outcome as the premature withdrawal could signify that the mission failed to establish order, hence violence escalated. As in the case of UNOMIG's termination due to the Russo-Georgian War in 2008. Or, as in the case of ONUB, the premature withdrawal of the peacekeepers signified that Burundi's government wanted to "assert their sovereignty by refusing the prolonged presence of peacekeepers as an obstacle to 'normali[s]ation'."<sup>138</sup> Therefore, the amendment of mandate in accordance to the increase or decrease of violence in the region is a major factor to the success of the mission. The worst of examples would be UNPROFOR that continued its initial functions amid escalated tensions in the region resulting to the killing of 5,000 people. UNMISSET showed that the premature withdrawal due to its malfunctioning mandate also plays an important role for the mission's outcome.

Figure 8: duration of successful and failed missions

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<sup>138</sup> Boutellis, 2015. P.9



*Hypothesis 5:* External support and cooperation with other peacekeeping organisations is necessary to ensure the success of the mission

The last hypothesis tested whether external support and presence of other non-UN forces increased the UN peacekeepers’ chances of implementing their objectives, rather than acting independently. The variable contains three factors, two of which ask whether the mission operated with non-UN organisations, the second, whether the non-UN organisation acted independently from the UN mission. Both factors showed relatively strong indicator of absence in failure cases of 81 percent and 78, respectively. In the case of MINURCAT, being too reliant on a non-UN forces can lead to its failure of implementing the objectives due to the limited possibilities to act independently. Overall, the hypothesis can be rejected as the presence of non-UN forces does not necessary mean that the UN mission will implement its mandate with long-term commitment.

#### 4.1.2 Answering the questions

In this section, this thesis will try to answer the question posed in the first chapter. So, the questions modelled at the beginning of this thesis were: What dynamics play into the strategy of the peacekeepers? How can a peacekeeping mission use its limited resources to increase its chances of success?

The answers to those questions are now more apparent. While the limited resources can play a significant factor for the peacekeepers to fail to implement their tasks, it is important to not be overambitious or have very little objectives. This study found that the large budget or a large number of personnel have much less impact on the outcome than the time and effort spent to find the right objective of the mission. Therefore, the UN Secretariat must devote just the sufficient resources to have a major impact. This will be done by allowing an appropriate number of promptly trained and coordinated personnel with assertive tasks that they would be capable of implementing. In addition, ensuring in-depth and in-breadth knowledge of the situation is necessary for the operation's success, but this strategy may not be sufficient in and of itself. At some point during the mission, the peacekeepers may need to show that they can de-escalate the conflict by demonstrating military capabilities.

## **4.2 BROADER QUALITATIVE FINDINGS**

### **4.2.1 Frequency analysis**

The first step to test the validity of the 13 independent factors is to look at the frequency in which each indicator occurs across the 56 cases. Analysing frequency is the quantitative step to identify which factors sturdily support the hypotheses. Chapter 2 illustrates how the quad-charts operate and how data are allocated. Appending A contains the quad-charts of the frequency for each hypothesis. This section will only demonstrate three important takeaways from this initial step in the analysis process. Firstly, grouping H1 illustrates that the peacekeepers require a safe environment to start the operation. The studied cases showed that the peacekeepers were deployed into a de-escalated environment that was either established by the previous mission or by a non-UN force. While it is apparent that the vast amount of peacekeepers require a safe haven to effectively operate, at this point of the study it is unclear how it affects the outcome of the mission.

Secondly, grouping H4 contains three factors that determine how the peacekeepers managed the time of the operation. Factor 9 (The mission held an appropriate mandate or amended it in case of change of situation) was present in 89 percent of the successful cases, while it was 100 percent absent in the failed missions. While the criteria to evaluate the missions relied on the implementation of mandate, it did not state whether it was amended or not. But this research shows that to successfully contribute to the peace process, the mandate must be altered in accordance to the escalation of the situation in the region.



Thirdly, grouping H3 shows that the operation required a high amount of personnel to ensure the implementation of the given tasks. Yet, quantity does not mean quality. Factors 6 and 7 ask whether the mission received enough personnel to implement its tasks, and whether that personnel was appropriately trained and coordinated. The results show that while the successful operations did not always have the appropriate personnel, for example UNAMIC that was plagued by language difficulties showed that the personnel was not properly trained for the mission, yet, they achieved their tasks. Or, MINUSTAH in Haiti that was able to do its job, but a string of sexual assaults from the UN military operatives fuelled an anti-UN sentiment in the region. However, the failed cases showed that the peacekeepers were not ready for the degree of violence in the region, for example in UNSMIS in Syria or UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Therefore, H3 showed some mixed results, but only 17.6 percent of the failed cases could claim that they received an appropriate amount of personnel. Ultimately, the validity of the factors and the degree to which they support the hypotheses is still undermined and this requests a second step in the quantitative process.

#### **4.2.2 Proportion analysis**

This step in the quantitative analysis process examines the cross-tabulation charts of each factor. Chapter 2 illustrated how the cross tabulations work and how they are used. Appendix B contains all the cross-tabulation charts for each factor. This method is a good way to assess general tendencies across all the cases. Furthermore, as Charles Ragin noted, it is a good way of reducing the factors used in the subsequent qualitative steps to only those with a high degree of support.<sup>139</sup> Table 5 shows an example of a simplified chart between the four possible scenarios (cells 1-4) and the validity of the factor's concept (causal conditions). The study of the cross-tabulations charts suggest that out of 13, only 5 concepts have strong support and are therefore valid from groupings H1-H4, the H5 grouping concerning external support for the operation did not show significant impact on the mission's outcome. Below you can see the description of each valid concept and the indicators that demonstrate the assessment.

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<sup>139</sup> Charles C. Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 21.

Table 7: conversional cross-tabulation of presence/absence of an outcome against presence/absence of a causal condition<sup>140</sup>

	Causal condition absent	Causal condition present
Outcome present	Cell 1: cases undermining the researcher's argument	Cell 2: cases support the researcher's argument
Outcome absent	Cell 3: cases the researcher's argument	Cell 4: cases undermining the researcher's argument

### *Factor 1*

The parts of the area of deployment were secured before-hand the peacekeeping mission arrived. The chart for this factor showed that when the operation was a success, 73 percent of the time, the factor was present. On the other hand, when the operation failed, the factor was present only 26.6 percent of the time. This factor is the only indicator from the group showing visible effect on the outcome.

### *Factor 4*

When the mission received appropriate equipment and technology the operations succeeded 82 percent of the time, and when the peacekeepers lacked the appropriate equipment and technology to effectively operate in the area, they succeeded only 41 percent of the time. In the failure cases, the factor was present only in 17.8 percent of the time.

### *Factor 6*

This factor focused on the number of personnel that was authorised for the mission. 90 percent of the time, the personnel was sufficient during the successful operations, while only 10 percent of the failed missions were not experiencing the lack of required personnel.

### *Factor 7*

The second factor from grouping H3 enquired whether the personnel received the appropriate training and coordination. This factor has a slightly less impact than the previous factor from the same group

### *Factor 9*

<sup>140</sup> Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*, 21.

This factor is seemingly the most influential from all of the five groupings. When the mandate was fittingly amended in accordance to the situation in the conflicting region, 94 percent of the time the missions succeeded. The failed cases show only 5 percent of the times when the mandate was adapted to the situation. The failed cases that were determined to have converted their mandates but still failed are two. The first is UNIKOM in Kuwait that implemented its given tasks in accordance to the situation but failed overall amid the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The second mission is UNOMIG that served its purpose during its lengthy duties but could not act independently from Russia's influence in the region and failed due to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.

#### **4.2.3 Validity Matrix for all factors**

Table 6 illustrates the results of the quantitative findings by assigning a degree of support to each factor. In a similar manner to Paul's et al. study of 24 concepts for COIN forces, this thesis tests the 13 factors of the peacekeeping mission in both kind (for or against) and degree (strong or weak). Just like in the previous sections, each factor is categorised in the order according to its factor number and sorted by independent variable grouping. A brief explanation of the factor's concept is provided in the centre column preceded by the factor's degree of support. The results produced five levels of support. Strong support for and strong support against a factor shows that it had a significant impact on the outcome of the peacekeeping mission. No support for or against a factor illustrates that the factor had neither a positive nor a negative effect on the outcome of the mission.

Only five of the 13 factors analysed displayed strong support for the concept that they represented. In fact, four show strong support and one is showing weak support for the concept. The one result that is worth mentioning from this analysis is that it is not as important to have strong international support but it is the way the peacekeepers adapt to the situation and act upon. A nominal example for such is UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, which had no significant external support after the withdrawal of ECOMOG forces, and experienced the May 2000 crisis, but still managed to implement long-lasting peace in the country.

Table 8: validity of all the 13 peacekeeping factors

VARIABLE GROUPING	FACTOR NUMBER	CONCEPT	
H1	f1	The environment was secured before the deployment of the peacekeepers	Strong support for
H1	f2	The UN peacekeepers were targeted by the conflicting groups	Weak support for
H1	f3	The UN peacekeepers experienced casualties	Weak support against
H2	f4	The mission received appropriate equipment and technology	Strong support for
H2	f5	The personnel were paid fittingly to the degree of violence in the region	Weak support for
H3	f6	The mission received enough personnel to implement its aims	Strong support for
H3	f7	The personnel were appropriately trained and coordinated	Strong support for
H4	f8	The mission was deployed in a timely and effective manner	Weak support for
H4	f9	The mission held an appropriate mandate or amended it in case of change of situation	Strong support for
H4	f10	The peacekeepers were forced to withdraw by the request of the local government or due to disagreement at the UNSC	Weak support against
H5	f11	The mission operated in cooperation with non-UN external organisations (e.g. NATO, OSCE, AU, etc.)	Weak support for
H5	f12	Non-UN external professional military engaged in fighting in the UN mission's region	Weak support against
H5	f13	Non-UN external support acted independently from the UN	Weak support against

Beside the degree for each factor, the quantitative approach brought to light some results that are counterintuitive to some of the assumption that are widely accepted. Firstly, there is a weak support that the mission's outcome depends on the external support from non-UN peacekeeping forces. When UN mission operated with other organisations, for example NATO, AU, or OSCE, f11 (the mission operated along with non-UN organisations) only 55.1 percent of success cases. When the case was present in the failed mission, the result shows 44.8 percent. While this numbers do not provide strong support against the necessity of external support for the UN peacekeepers, it is counterintuitive because this thesis assumes that any external support is vital to the operation's outcome. A possible explanation could be that the forces may fail to cooperate. Yet, the joint missions are a relatively new pattern in the

UN peacekeeping. The first officially combined mission is the African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which was established only in 2008.<sup>141</sup>

Therefore, there is presumably a lot of room for improvement for the joint peacekeeping operations to have significant impact on implementing their tasks together. Second, the mission can be deployed with all its imperfection, but it must be ready to adopt to the given difficulties and limitations in the conflicted area. Indeed, when the conflict starts, the peacekeepers must have the ability to amend their original objectives to what occurs in the region. Factor 9 showed that this is one of the main reasons why operations fail to secure long-lasting peace.

### 4.3 BROADER QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

The previous section revealed the five concepts that showed strong support. This section of the broader findings process determines which combinations of factors have the most significant impact on the dependant variable, which represents the success or failure of the mission. The QCA approach in this section will reveal a combination of causal recipes. At the final stage, the peacekeeping missions' best and worst practices can be deducted from the commonality of factors within these recipes. This thesis suggests that there are no definitive recipe for success of a peacekeeping mission. Not a single set of factors nor a specific combination of factors can explain success in every case. Yet, this study shows that certain factors have more effect than other factors on the outcome of the mission. This study follows a similar approach of *Paths to Victory* that analysed the concepts for COIN operations, and of Watkins study of modern insurgencies, only it applies the structure of both studies to the assessment of the UN peacekeeping missions.<sup>142</sup> To assess the outcomes of the peacekeeping missions, this thesis studies approaches of several authors and extracted the criteria illustrated in figure 3.<sup>143</sup> Those criteria are the implementation of mandate, establishment of order, and the enactment of a long-lasting peace in the formerly conflicted region.

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<sup>141</sup> This mission is not analysed in this thesis because it is still on-going

<sup>142</sup> Paul et al., *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*; Watkins, Christopher L. *How insurgents win: examining the dynamics of modern insurgencies*. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA, 2014.

<sup>143</sup> Bratt, Duane. "Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations." *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 4 (1996): 64-81

Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. *Evaluating peace operations*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010. Pushkina; Darya. "A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission." *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 2 (2006): 139; Van der Lijn, Jaïr. "Success and failure of UN

To illustrate the QCA results in a more comprehensible way than those depicted in Appendix 3, this thesis uses a framework developed by Nicholas Legewie.<sup>144</sup> This section also includes an enhanced table of the QCA results for both the crisp and fuzzy datasets. Each table provides the recipe and solution parameters and illustrates the consistency scores, coverage scores, and the simplifying norms.

### 4.3.1 Crisp set results

The data in table 6 demonstrates two of the most important recipes from the crisp set analysis. Firstly, when the peacekeepers received enough personnel (f6), who were appropriately trained and coordinated (f7), and amended its mandate appropriately (9), the peacekeeping operation succeeded at all times. This is crisp set recipe 1. Recipe 1 covers 22 successful cases out of 38. Recipe 2 combines factors regarding safe haven (f1), appropriate equipment and technology (f4), and appropriate mandate amendment. Recipe 2 covers 15 out of 38 successful cases. Both recipes have a 100 percent successful score. Yet, exclusively, the recipes represent only 13 cases. This means that the unique section contains cases that are unique for each recipe and do not overlap between the two. The next section will test whether these findings withstand analysis that is more precise.

Table 6: enhanced table of crisp QCA results

<b>Recipe parameters</b>	<b>Recipe 1: <math>f6+f7+f9</math></b>	<b>Recipe 2: <math>f1+f4+f9</math></b>
Consistency	1	1
Raw coverage (# of cases)	0.57 (22)	0.39 (15)
Unique coverage (# of cases)	0.23 (9)	0.1 (4)
<b>Solution parameters</b>	<b>All recipes</b>	
consistency	1	
Coverage (# of cases)	0.97 (37)	
Unique coverage (# of cases)	0.34 (13)	
Overlap (# of cases)	0.63 (24)	
	Condition f1 (present)	The environment was secured
	Condition f4 (present)	Appropriate equipment and technology
	Condition f6 (present)	Enough personnel
	Condition f7 (present)	Personnel appropriately trained and coordinated
	Condition f9 (present)	Appropriate mandate change

### 4.3.2 Fuzzy set results

peacekeeping operations: UNMIS in Sudan." *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 1-2 (2010): 27-59.

<sup>144</sup> Legewie, Nicolas. "An introduction to applied data analysis with qualitative comparative analysis." In *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, vol. 14, no. 3. 2013.

By observing how these results hold up using the fuzzy set method of QCA, this thesis discovered some similarities and some differences. As discussed in Chapter 2, the fuzzy data was derived from the same data as the crisp set. However, the fuzzy set QCA provides us with the analysis of a higher level of certainty. In the same way as with the crisp set results, this approach also reveals two causal recipes with a significant proportion of raw coverage. In this table, there is only one recipe, which combines all the five factors (f1, f4, f6, f7, f9) and illustrates them to determine the most successful missions out of the 38 set. These 11 cases are determined as the cases in this study for holding the five most influential factors of the peacekeeping operation success. They are: UNOGIL, ONUC, UNSF, UTAG, ONICA, UNAMIC, UNAMSIL, ONUB, UMIS, and UNMIT.

Table 7: Enhanced table of Fuzzy QCA results

<b>Recipe parameters</b>	<b>Recipe 1: <math>f1+f4+f6+f7+f9</math></b>	
Consistency	1	
Raw coverage (# of cases)	0.29 (11)	
Unique coverage (# of cases)	0.29 (11)	
<b>Solution parameters</b>		
consistency	1	
Coverage (# of cases)	0.29 (11)	
Unique coverage (# of cases)	0.29 (11)	
Overlap (# of cases)	0	
	Condition f1 (present)	The environment was secured
	Condition f4 (present)	Appropriate equipment and technology
	Condition f6 (present)	Enough personnel
	Condition f7 (present)	Personnel appropriately trained and coordinated
	Condition f9 (present)	Appropriate mandate change

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS

### 5.1 CONCLUSION

The peacekeeping planners' efforts should focus on generating a moderate mandate for a mission, but keep in mind that it will need to be adapted as soon as the blue-helmets get deployed to the conflicting environment. This study also showed that the five most important factors that lead to the mission's implementation of mandate, establishment of order, and ensuring a long-lasting peace. Those factors are: (1) a safe and secure haven for the peacekeepers to operate; (2) the procurement of appropriate equipment and technology for the peacekeepers; (3) a sufficient number of personnel to cover all the fields of work; (4) ensure that the personnel is appropriately trained for the specific mission; and (5) ability to adapt its objectives as soon as the situation changes in the region. In addition, the results showed that the conjoint operation with non-UN peacekeepers does not necessarily lead to the successful outcome of the mission due to possible conflicts of interest or failed communication. One of the notable example is MINURCAT that failing to establish liaison with EURFOR.

Above all, this thesis found that the amendment of the mandate is the most important factor that lead to the success of the mission. Indeed, as we discussed in the cases evaluation section, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone experienced a devastating crisis that had several peacekeepers killed and 5,000 taken hostage. Yet, the mission overhauled due to the crisis and solidified its position within the notably successful operations. In addition, MINUGUA also ensured its success by changing its mandate several times.

This study started by evaluating 56 peacekeeping mission by three criteria: implementation of mandate, establishment of order, and ensuring long-lasting peace. The results showed 39 successful cases and 17 failed cases. The thesis used both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyse the cases and determine what factors played the most important role for the mission to be evaluated as a success or failure. Most notably, while mission like UNOSOM I or UNOMIG failed to implement their mandates hence falling under the failure criteria, other missions like UNCRO, initially implemented their limited mandate, but the subsequent resumption of violence compromised the UN's efforts in the region.



Overall, this study found that the combination of factors 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 is one of the best recipes to ensure a successful outcome of the peacekeeping mission. Therefore, those variables show a strong correlation between the peacekeeping mission’s dynamics and its outcome, proving that some factors are much more influential than others. Table 9 is a summary of the results presented throughout this thesis.

Table 9: summary of results

Hypothesis /factor	Concept and valid peacekeeping factors	Results
<b>H1</b>	<b>The peacekeepers require a safe haven from which to operate.</b>	<b>Sound</b>
f1	The environment was secured before the deployment of the peacekeepers	Strong support for
f2	The UN peacekeepers were targeted by the conflicting groups	Weak support for
f3	The UN peacekeepers experienced casualties	Weak support against
<b>H2</b>	<b>Bigger amount of funding for the mission does not necessary lead to its success.</b>	<b>Sound</b>
f4	The mission received appropriate equipment and technology	Strong support for
f5	The personnel were paid fittingly	Weak support for
<b>H3</b>	<b>the mission needs a necessary amount of personnel to ensure the implementation of its objectives</b>	<b>Sound</b>
f6	The mission received enough personnel to implement its aims	Strong support for
f7	The personnel were appropriately trained and coordinated	Strong support for
<b>H4</b>	<b>Longer duration of the mission does not necessarily correlate with the success of the mission.</b>	<b>Sound</b>
f8	The mission was deployed in a timely and effective manner	Weak support for
f9	The mission held an appropriate mandate or amended it in case of change of situation	Strong support for
f10	The peacekeepers were forced to withdraw by the request of the local government or due to disagreement at the UNSC	Weak support against
<b>H5</b>	<b>External support and presence of other peacekeeping forces are necessary to increase the UN mission’s implementation of objectives</b>	<b>Unsound</b>
f11	The mission operated in cooperation with non-UN external organisations (e.g. NATO, OSCE, AU, etc.)	Strong support for
f12	Non-UN external professional military engaged in fighting in the UN mission’s region	Strong support against

f13            Non-UN external support acted            Weak support against  
independently from the UN

## 5.2    QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

To ensure reliability and allow future researchers to repeat a similar strategy to analyse a social phenomena, this section provides a set of suggestions for future studies using the same technique. The data collected for these 56 cases will support analyses that go well beyond those reported in this thesis. And should future inquiry require data that are not yet available, for example information on future peacekeeping operations, additional variables could be added relatively easily. Below, you can find some questions that future studies would want to investigate.

### **What factors lead to peacekeeping operations success?**

All the data analysed in this study investigated what factors influenced the outcome of the mission. Although the evaluations in this thesis considered a set of factors that lead to an operation's success, those factors can be redefined to determine the best practices in accordance to new cases.

### **When should a peacekeeping operations end?**

While this study focused on the best and worst practices of the peacekeeping operations, once that outcome is secure, the subsequent events may change the outcome of the operation, as conflict resumes shortly after. The questions remain, what is the degree of commitment in relations to its budget that an operation should have? What are the conditions that will likely minimise the probability of the resumption of a conflict? What are the DDR approaches that the peacekeepers should prioritise?

### **How many personnel are required?**

One of the main pinnacles from this research is that an operations needs appropriate funding and enough personnel to implement its targets. So how many armed troops are necessary? This study collected the maximum amount of personnel deployed during the peacekeeping operation. The result from figure 4 suggests that the failed peacekeeping missions had just above half of financing provided for the amount of personnel. Therefore, the result suggests that the quality of the peacekeeping operations is more important than quantity.

**APPENDIX 1: CASES OUTCOMES**

Table 1: UN peacekeeping missions and their outcomes

	<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>MISSION NAME</b>	<b>DATE SPAN</b>	<b>OUTCOME</b>
1.	UNEF I	First UN Emergency Force	Nov 1956-Jun 1967	Case success
2.	UNOGIL	UN Observation Group in Lebanon	Jun 1958-Dec 1958	Case success
3.	ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo	Jul 1960-Jun 1964	Case success
4.	UNSF	UN Security Force in West New Guinea	Oct 1962-Apr 1963	Case success
5.	UNYOM	UN Yemen Observation Mission	Jul 1963-Sep 1964	Case failure
6.	DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	May 1965-Oct 1966	Case success
7.	UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission	Sep 1965-Mar 1966	Case success
8.	UNEF II	Second UN Emergency Force	Oct 1973-Jul 1979	Case success
9.	UNGOMAP	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	May 1988-Mar 1990	Case failure
10.	UNIIMOG	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	Aug 1988-Feb 1991	Case success
11.	UNAVEM I	UN Angola Verification Mission I	Jan 1989-Jun 1991	Case success
12.	UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group	Apr 1989-Mar 1990	Case success
13.	ONUSCA	UN Observer Group in Central America	Nov 1989-Jan 1992	Case success
14.	UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	Apr 1991-Oct 2003	Case success
15.	UNAVEM II	UN Angola Verification Mission II	Jun 1991-Feb 1995	Case failure
16.	ONUSAL	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	Jul 1991-Apr 1995	Case success
17.	UNAMIC	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia	Oct 1991-Mar 1992	Case success
18.	UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force	Feb 1992-Mar 1995	Case failure
19.	UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	Mar 1992-Sep 1993	Case success
20.	UNOSOM I	UN Operation in Somalia I	Apr 1992-Mar 1993	Case failure
21.	ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique	Dec 1992-Dec 1994	Case success
22.	UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia II	Mar 1993-Mar 1995	Case failure
23.	UNOMUR	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	Jun 1993-Sep 1994	Case failure
24.	UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia	Aug 1993-Jun 2009	Case failure
25.	UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia	Sep 1993-Sep 1997	Case success
26.	UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti	Sep 1993-Jun 1996	Case success
27.	UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda	Oct 1993-Mar 1996	Case failure
28.	UNASOG	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May 1994-Jun 1994	Case success
29.	UNMOT	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	Dec 1994-May 2000	Case success
30.	UNAVEM III	UN Angola Verification Mission III	Feb 1995-Jun 1997	Case failure
31.	UNCRO	UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	May 1995-Jan 1996	Case failure

	<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>MISSION NAME</b>	<b>DATE SPAN</b>	<b>OUTCOME</b>
32.	UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force	Mar 1995-Feb 1999	Case success
33.	UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dec1995-Dec2002	Case success
34.	UNTAES	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	Jan 1996-Jan 1998	Case success
35.	UNMOP	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	Jan 1996-Dec2002	Case success
36.	UNSMIH	UN Support Mission in Haiti	Jul 1996-Jul 1997	Case success
37.	MINUGUA	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	Jan 1997-May 1997	Case success
38.	MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola	Jun 1997-Feb 1999	Case failure
39.	UNTMHI	UN Transition Mission in Haiti	Aug 1997-Dec1997	Case success
40.	MIPONUH	UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	Dec1997-Mar 2000	Case failure
41.	UNCPSG	UN Civilian Police Support Group	Jan 1998-Oct 1998	Case success
42.	MINURCA	UN Mission in the Central African Republic	Apr 1998-Feb 2000	Case success
43.	UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	Jul 1998-Oct 1999	Case success
44.	UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone	Oct 1999-Dec2005	Case success
45.	UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	Oct 1999-May 2002	Case success
46.	MONUC	UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Nov 1999-Jun 2010	Case success
47.	UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Jul 2000-Jul 2008	Case failure
48.	UNMISSET	UN Mission of Support in East Timor	May 2002-May 2005	Case failure
49.	MINUCI	UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	May 2003-Apr 2004	Case success
50.	UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	Apr 2004-Jun 2017	Case success
51.	MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	Jun 2004-Oct 2017	Case success
52.	ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi	Jun 2004-Dec2006	Case success
53.	UNMIS	UN Mission in the Sudan	Mar 2005-Jul 2011	Case success
54.	UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	Aug 2006-Dec2012	Case success
55.	MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	Sep 2007-Dec2010	Case failure
56.	UNSMIS	UN Supervision Mission in Syria	Apr 2012-Aug 2012	Case failure

**APPENDIX 2: FREQUENCY QUAD-CHARTS**

This appendix contains the frequency quad-charts for all factors grouped with their relevant hypothesis. Figures 3-6 divide cases of peacekeeping operation success from the cases of peacekeeping operations failure in the X-axis. The Y-axis divides the cases where the factor was present from cases where the factor was absent. The number in each quadrant represents the quantity of cases that meet those respected criteria. as explained in section 3.2 of Chapter 3, the upper left quadrant contains the number of cases where the factor was absent, and the peacekeeping operation succeeded; the lower left quadrant contains the number of cases where the factor was absent and the peacekeeping operation failed. Conversely, the upper right quadrant contains the quantity of cases where the factor was present, and the peacekeeping operation succeeded; while the lower right quadrant contains the quantity of cases where the factor was present, but the peacekeeping operation failed.

Figure 6: H1 frequency Quad-Chart

		<b>SUCCESS</b>				
		<i>f1</i> 5		31		
		<i>f2</i> 26		17		
		<i>f3</i> 18		21		
<b>NO</b>				<b>YES</b>		
		<i>f1</i> 6		12		
		<i>f2</i> 10		7		
		<i>f3</i> 3		14		
		<b>FAILURE</b>				

Figure 7: H2 frequency Quad-Chart

		<b>SUCCESS</b>				
		<i>f4</i> 16		23		
		<i>f5</i> 15		24		
<b>NO</b>				<b>YES</b>		
		<i>f4</i> 12		5		
		<i>f5</i> 12		5		
		<b>FAILURE</b>				

Figure 8: H3 frequency Quad-Chart

		<b>SUCCESS</b>			
		<i>f6</i> 12	27		
		<i>f7</i> 12	16		
<b>NO</b>		<i>f6</i> 14	3		<b>YES</b>
		<i>f7</i> 14	14		
		<b>FAILURE</b>			

Figure 9: H4 frequency Quad-Chart

		<b>SUCCESS</b>			
		<i>f8</i> 3	37		
		<i>f9</i> 34	34		
		<i>f10</i> 37	4		
<b>NO</b>		<i>f8</i> 5	11		<b>YES</b>
		<i>f9</i> 15	0		
		<i>f10</i> 12	3		
		<b>FAILURE</b>			

Figure 10: H5 frequency Quad-Chart

		<b>SUCCESS</b>			
		<i>f11</i> 24	15		
		<i>f12</i> 26	12		
		<i>f13</i> 11	21		
<b>NO</b>		<i>f11</i> 3	13		<b>YES</b>
		<i>f12</i> 4	14		
		<i>f13</i> 5	12		
		<b>FAILURE</b>			

**APPENDIX 3. CROSS-TABULATIONS**

This appendix contains cross-tabulations that illustrate the occurrence percentages for the frequency data in each case. As explained in section 3.2.1, the tables contain columns that separate the number of cases where the factor was present from cases where the factor was absent. The four sets of numbers inside of the enclosed boxes represent the number of cases, their row percentage, their column percentage, and their total percentage, respectively. The digits at the end of each column show the column totals and the numbers at the far right show the row totals.

**Factors within grouping H1**

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f1)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	5	33	<b>38</b>
	13%	89%	
	45.5%	73%	
	9%	59%	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	6	12	<b>18</b>
	33.3%	66.6%	
	54.5%	26.6%	
	10.7%	21.4%	
	<b>11</b>	<b>45</b>	

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f2)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	26	13	<b>39</b>
	66.6%	33.3%	
	72.2 %	65%	
	46.4 %	23.2 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	10	7	<b>17</b>
	58.8 %	41.1 %	
	27.7 %	35 %	
	17.8 %	12.5 %	
	<b>36</b>	<b>20</b>	

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f3)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	18	21	<b>39</b>
	46.1 %	53.8 %	
	85.7 %	60 %	
	32.1 %	37.5 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	3	14	<b>17</b>
	17.6 %	82.3 %	
	14.2 %	40 %	
	5.3 %	25 %	
	<b>21</b>	<b>35</b>	

**Factors within grouping H2**

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f4)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	16	23	<b>39</b>
	41 %	59 %	
	57 %	82.1 %	
	28.5 %	41 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	12	5	<b>17</b>
	70.5 %	29.4 %	
	42.8 %	17.8 %	
	21.4 %	8.9 %	
	<b>28</b>	<b>28</b>	

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f5)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	15	24	<b>39</b>
	38.4 %	61.5 %	
	55.5 %	82.7 %	
	26.7 %	42.8 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	12	5	<b>17</b>
	70.5 %	29.4 %	
	44.4 %	17.2 %	
	21.4 %	8.9 %	
	<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>	

**Factors within grouping H3**

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f6)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	12	27	<b>39</b>
	30.7 %	69.2 %	
	46.1 %	90 %	
	21.4 %	48.2 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	14	3	<b>17</b>
	82.3 %	17.6 %	
	53.8 %	10 %	
	2 %	5.3 %	
	<b>26</b>	<b>30</b>	

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f7)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	12	16	<b>28</b>
	42.8 %	57.1 %	
	46.1 %	53.3 %	
	21.4 %	28.5 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	14	14	<b>28</b>
	50 %	50 %	
	53.8 %	46.6 %	
	25 %	25 %	
	<b>26</b>	<b>30</b>	



**Factors within grouping H4**

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f8)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	3	37	<b>40</b>
	7.5 %	92.2 %	
	37.5 %	77 %	
	5.3 %	66 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	5	11	<b>16</b>
	31.2 %	68.7 %	
	62.5 %	22.9 %	
	8.9 %	19.6 %	
	<b>8</b>	<b>48</b>	

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f9)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	7	32	<b>41</b>
	17 %	78 %	
	31.8 %	94 %	
	12.5 %	57 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	15	2	<b>15</b>
	100 %	13.3 %	
	68.1 %	5 %	
	26.7 %	3.5 %	
	<b>22</b>	<b>34</b>	

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f10)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	37	4	<b>41</b>
	90.2 %	9.7 %	
	75.5 %	57.1 %	
	66 %	7.1 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	12	3	<b>15</b>
	80 %	20 %	
	24.4 %	42.8 %	
	21.4 %	5.3 %	
	<b>49</b>	<b>7</b>	

**Factors within grouping H5**

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f11)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	24	16	<b>40</b>
	60 %	40 %	
	88.8 %	55.1 %	
	42.8 %	28.5 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	3	13	<b>16</b>
	18.7 %	81.2 %	
	11.1 %	44.8 %	
	5.3 %	23.2 %	
	<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>	

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f12)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	26	12	<b>38</b>
	68.4 %	31.5 %	
	86.6 %	46.1 %	
	46.4 %	21.4 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	4	14	<b>18</b>
	22.2 %	77.7 %	
	13.3	53.8 %	
	7.1 %	25 %	
	<b>30</b>	<b>26</b>	

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Factor (f13)</u>		
	NO (0)	YES (1)	
<b>SUCCESS (1)</b>	18	21	<b>39</b>
	46.1 %	53.8 %	
	78.2 %	63.6 %	
	32.1 %	37.5 %	
<b>FAILURE (0)</b>	5	12	<b>17</b>
	29.4 %	70.5 %	
	21.7 %	36.3 %	
	8.9 %	21.4 %	
	<b>23</b>	<b>33</b>	

## APPENDIX 4: LIST OF 13 FACTORS

Table 8: validity of all the 13 peacekeeping factors

VARIABLE GROUPING	FACTOR NUMBER	CONCEPT	
H1	f1	The environment was secured before the deployment of the peacekeepers	Strong support for
H1	f2	The UN peacekeepers were targeted by the conflicting groups	Weak support for
H1	f3	The UN peacekeepers experienced casualties	Weak support against
H2	f4	The mission received appropriate equipment and technology	Strong support for
H2	f5	The personnel were paid fittingly to the degree of violence in the region	Weak support for
H3	f6	The mission received enough personnel to implement its aims	Strong support for
H3	f7	The personnel were appropriately trained and coordinated	Strong support for
H4	f8	The mission was deployed in a timely and effective manner	Weak support for
H4	f9	The mission held an appropriate mandate or amended it in case of change of situation	Strong support for
H4	f10	The peacekeepers were forced to withdraw by the request of the local government or due to disagreement at the UNSC	Weak support against
H5	f11	The mission operated in cooperation with non-UN external organisations (e.g. NATO, OSCE, AU, etc.)	Weak support for
H5	f12	Non-UN external professional military engaged in fighting in the UN mission's region	Weak support against
H5	f13	Non-UN external support acted independently from the UN	Weak support against

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