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## Global change research needs international collaboration

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


### Keywords

Arctic Council, boreal forest, climate change; diplomatic soft power, global crises, open science

### Abstract

Tackling the grand challenges of global climate change for the sustainability of ecological and societal systems requires data and expertise from Russia, the world’s largest country that has the longest Arctic shoreline and the largest forest biome, peatland and permafrost zones. Academic relations and scientific collaborations with Russian scholars and institutions must continue despite the ensuing geopolitical crisis since 2022.

26 Graphical Abstract



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29

## 30 **1. Collapsing scientific networks**

31 It is impossible to understand, forecast or mitigate the grand challenges of global climate change  
32 by ignoring the geographical entity and intellectual capacity of the world's largest country.  
33 However, international communication networks with scholars from Russia have recently  
34 started to collapse (Rees et al., 2023). While geopolitically justifiable as part of the response to  
35 Russia's military invasion of Ukraine, policy-driven constraints on open science are  
36 academically alarming because sustainability research into ongoing ecological and societal  
37 entanglements of anthropogenic climate change requires rapid action within and between all  
38 countries and NGOs. Despite their geopolitical relevance, the current sanctions affect peer-to-  
39 peer and institutional interactions, and further degrade Russian, and ultimately also  
40 international research infrastructure and knowledge.

41 Here, we advocate the continuity of ecological and meteorological observations and  
42 experiments, especially, but not exclusively, across Russia's high-northern latitudes. We argue  
43 that the Earth's biosphere and climate system cannot be understood, and protected, without data  
44 from the terrestrial (and marine) Arctic and sub-Arctic, of which more than half lies within  
45 Russian territory. We therefore emphasise the importance of uninterrupted, in situ, high-  
46 resolution investigations into the productivity and functioning of the boreal forest for  
47 understanding the causes and consequences of global warming to ensure the well-being of  
48 current and future generations.

49

## 50 **2. International research tasks**

51 With approximately  $812 \times 10^6$  ha, Russia accounts for circa 22% of all forested area on our  
52 planet, contains the world's biggest peatland, overlaps with the largest permafrost zone, and  
53 includes the widest taiga-tundra transition. Although a myriad of slow growing and very old  
54 trees in Siberia contribute to the world's main terrestrial carbon pool (Büntgen et al., 2019), it

55 is unclear whether the boreal forest will switch from a carbon sink to a net source (Kruse et al.,  
56 2022), due to remaining uncertainties about warming-induced permafrost thawing and  
57 vegetation-permafrost interactions. The ability to derive accurate, satellite-based, estimates of  
58 above-ground carbon storage in boreal locations is compromised by the scarcity of field-based  
59 calibration sites that are particularly rare in Russia (Schepaschenko et al., 2021). Further,  
60 anthropogenically-induced and herbivory-mediated disturbances of short- to long-term linkages  
61 between climate and vegetation are at least arguably stronger in Russia than elsewhere in the  
62 Arctic (IPCC, 2022). State-of-the-art Earth system models suggest that the active permafrost  
63 layer will become thinner across the terrestrial Arctic, where wildfires are likely to become  
64 more frequent under global warming (IPCC, 2022). Models also predict that the largest loss of  
65 permafrost over the 21<sup>st</sup> century will occur in northwest Russia (Karjalainen et al., 2019). In  
66 addition to unprecedented greenhouse gas emissions (Knobloch et al., 2018), thawing  
67 permafrost also releases subfossil wood, remains from the mammoth fauna, and possibly even  
68 ancient pathogens, as evidenced by the 2016 anthrax outbreak on the Yamal peninsula in  
69 northwest Russia (Hueffer et al., 2020). All these concerning issues emphasise the urgency for  
70 ongoing in situ data collection and continued access to previously acquired data. Risks to the  
71 comprehensiveness and integrity of datasets are posed both by limited access to existing  
72 records, and restricted prospect to maintain collaborations and develop new ones, undermining  
73 the ethos of sustainability.

74 For instance, annually resolved and absolutely dated reconstructions of Northern  
75 Hemisphere summer temperature variability significantly depend on tree-ring chronologies  
76 from Russia (Büntgen et al. 2020, 2021). Long-lasting and well-experienced laboratories in  
77 Krasnoyarsk, Ekaterinburg, Moscow, Abakan and Irkutsk have produced some of the world's  
78 longest and best replicated dendrochronological datasets. These laboratories also store unique  
79 proxy archives for advanced biochemical analyses that can be performed only in larger research

80 projects. Resuming scientific collaborations is further motivated by another 450–500 not yet  
81 freely available tree-ring chronologies that remain under researched. There are also about  
82 70,000 forest inventory sites, 18 ‘Eddy Covariance’ flux towers that measure carbon, water and  
83 energy fluxes between the biosphere and atmosphere ([www.fluxnet.org](http://www.fluxnet.org)), and 15 ‘Carbon  
84 Supersites’ from the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia that measure CO<sub>2</sub> exchanges  
85 and budgets ([www.carbon-polygons.ru](http://www.carbon-polygons.ru)). The expected launch of four new flux towers and  
86 seven new carbon supersites is likely to be affected by the current sanctions, and there is a  
87 severe risk to lose access to the invaluable measurements of almost 500 official meteorological  
88 stations that have operated continuously, at least since the collapse of the Soviet Union  
89 ([www.meteo.ru](http://www.meteo.ru)).

90 Due to significant warming since the 1990s, in tandem with the occurrence of extreme  
91 heatwaves (Figs. 1–2), boreal vegetation is likely to expand further into the tundra zone (Rees  
92 et al., 2020). This circumpolar trend underscores the relevance of continuous investigations into  
93 the complex relationship between climate and vegetation. Spatiotemporal quantification of  
94 Arctic ‘greening’ and/or ‘browning’ requires remote sensing measurements and ground  
95 validation of phytomass estimates (Callaghan et al., 2021; Schepaschenko et al., 2021). In situ  
96 field observations are also needed to disentangle the role natural (e.g., volcanoes and wildfires)  
97 and anthropogenic (e.g., mining, oil and shipping industries) forcing factors play for Arctic  
98 warming trends and carbon cycle dynamics (Kirilyanov et al., 2020; Rantanen et al., 2022).

99 The rate at which climate and vegetation in Siberia change is a powerful argument for  
100 continuing collaborative research with Russian scholars, as well as for supporting their  
101 challenging long-term monitoring networks across the vast taiga and tundra biomes. Climatic  
102 extremes and logistic constraints in many of the remote and often isolated parts of Siberia, and  
103 particularly the Russian Arctic, demand international partnership to ensure accurate and  
104 uninterrupted operation of high-precision ground measurements (Rees et al., 2020). Together

105 with the development and application of advanced processing algorithms, field data are  
106 essential to underpin satellite imagery and expand process-based understanding beyond local  
107 scales, though they have relied increasingly on international efforts (Schepaschenko et al.,  
108 2021). For example, physical and digital access to research stations in, and data from, the  
109 Russian Arctic has until recently been facilitated by the international INTERACT network  
110 ([www.eu-interact.org](http://www.eu-interact.org)). Restrictions on the use of all twenty-one bases in Russia since March  
111 2022, however, severely affect the integration of local expertise and indigenous knowledge into  
112 our understanding of the impacts of global climate and environmental change on the functioning  
113 and productivity of ecosystems and the well-being of societies. The situation is particularly  
114 alarming since the latest generation of climate models predicts the most significant rise in  
115 surface air temperatures and associated changes in precipitation regimes over parts of Siberia  
116 and the Russian Arctic (IPCC, 2022).

117 Not only aboveground vegetation dynamics, but also belowground soil properties,  
118 permafrost thawing and peatland degradation, must be included in an interdisciplinary (and  
119 international) approach to unravel the complex spatiotemporal interplay of biotic and abiotic  
120 responses to rapid warming (Figs. 1–2). The world’s largest peatland in the West Siberian  
121 Lowlands exhibits a substantial carbon sink that probably stores as much as 10% of the amount  
122 of CO<sub>2</sub> currently comprised in the atmosphere (Dise, 2009). Like many other ecosystems in  
123 Russia, peatlands are chronically understudied (Kirpotin et al., 2021), and secured access to  
124 places such as the Mukhrino carbon supersite ([www.carbon-polygons.ru](http://www.carbon-polygons.ru)) is currently at risk.  
125 Over the last few decades, in situ measurements of Arctic and sub-Arctic environmental  
126 processes in Russia have become increasingly collaborative and international. Exchanges of  
127 expertise and people, as well as data and equipment, including chemical reagents and grant  
128 money, have become essential to the conduct of basic and applied research. All this, however,  
129 has changed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The resulting deterioration of

130 Russian research infrastructure and lessening of Russian engagement with international peer-  
131 reviewed research will ultimately also affect the international scientific community.

132

### 133 **3. Diplomatic soft power**

134 Though scientific projects in Russia have always been challenging for political, organisational  
135 and cultural reasons (Büntgen, 2016), peer-to-peer and higher-level interactions are most  
136 important for the continuity of observations, experiments and datasets in the realm of global  
137 change research. The relevance of maintaining and fostering international relations has been  
138 recognised for several decades. The International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic  
139 (ISIRA) was established for this purpose by the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)  
140 three decades ago (Pavlenko et al., 2021). Joint research may also facilitate diplomatic soft  
141 power. For instance, Norway will shortly take over chairmanship of the Arctic Council from  
142 Russia (Rees et al., 2023). Since its establishment in 1996, the Arctic Council is a leading  
143 intergovernmental forum that promotes cooperation, coordination and interaction among states  
144 and peoples towards sustainable development and environmental protection. Its activities are  
145 currently suspended ([www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-](http://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine)  
146 [russias-invasion-of-ukraine](http://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine)), as are those of the Arctic Ministerial Meeting process. However,  
147 and associated with some sort of diplomacy, the transfer of Arctic Council chairmanship could  
148 be an opportunity to reset international relationships and to highlight the status of open science  
149 in an increasingly uncertain world. As the scientific community begins to prepare for the 5<sup>th</sup>  
150 International Polar Year, now only a decade away, this reset is increasingly urgent. Moreover,  
151 we encourage the agreement to, and establishment of international contracts to ensure scientific  
152 collaboration for tackling the grand challenges of global climate change – over environmentally  
153 relevant timescales and jointly across all nations.



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155 **4. Resuming scientific collaboration**

156 While national and institutional economic embargoes in responses to Russia's invasion of  
157 Ukraine are justified in a wider geopolitical context, the need for scientific cooperation is higher  
158 now than at any previous time, and we cannot afford these links to remain paralysed in a rapidly  
159 warming and increasingly unstable world. Understanding and mitigating ecological and societal  
160 effects of anthropogenic global warming and its potential effects on tipping points in the Earth's  
161 climate system are impossible without the inclusion of data and expertise, and action, from the  
162 world's largest country. We therefore advocate maintaining sensible scientific discourse with  
163 Russia despite the current political disorder. While this is still happening to some extent at  
164 personal levels with doubt and ambiguity, an exertion of upward pressure on international  
165 institutions and organisations is needed to resume dialogue with Russian scholars. Furthermore,  
166 we plead for an open attitude and long-term vision of funding agencies to rethink their current  
167 restrictions and restart the support of collaborative research in Russia to understand and mitigate  
168 the causes and consequences of global warming. It is a tragic irony that the 'Arctic  
169 Exceptionalism', in which the region has been effectively maintained as a zone of peaceful  
170 cooperation for at least the last quarter century (Kornhuber et al., 2023), is now threatened by  
171 the aggressive behaviour of an Arctic member state. We urge action to protect globally essential  
172 science from this risk.

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




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175 **Fig. 1.** (A) Near surface, air temperature anomalies with respect to the 1961–1990 period  
 176 calculated for annual, winter and summer mean, minimum and maximum values over the 60–  
 177 80°N and 30–170°E Russian landmass using 0.5° gridded CRU TS 4.06 data reveal the strong  
 178 warming trend since around the 1990s. (B) A meteorological station near Bilibino in northern  
 179 Chukotka, where instrumental weather measurements are rare. (C) Exposed carbon-rich soils  
 180 from the mammoth steppe-tundra along the Indigirka, one of the largest rivers in eastern Siberia  
 181 that drains yet undefined amounts of depleted organic matter and driftwood into the Arctic  
 182 Ocean. The annual temperature amplitude in northern Yakutia reaches almost 100° Celsius,  
 183 where slow growing larch trees (*Larix cajanderi*) can exceed ages of 1000 years, and where  
 184 warming-induced permafrost thawing affects biogeochemical fluxes, cycles and feedbacks.

185



186

187 **Fig. 2.** Air surface temperature anomalies of January–June 2020 with respect to the 20<sup>th</sup> century  
 188 and plotted over the Northern Hemisphere extra-tropics using 0.5° gridded CRU TS 4.06 data  
 189 show the extreme 2020 heatwave over central Siberia.

190

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194

195 **Author contributions**

196 U.B. and G.R. conceived the study and wrote the paper.

197

198 **Declaration of competing interests**

199 The authors declare no competing interests.

200

201 **Data availability**

202 No data have been used.

203

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