



UiT

THE ARCTIC
UNIVERSITY
OF NORWAY

Centre for Peace Studies

Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education

The portrayal of the Russian Revolution of 1917 in the Norwegian labor movement

A study of the editorials of the Social-Demokraten, 1915—1923

Anzhela Atayan

*Master's thesis in Peace and Conflict Transformation – SVF-3901
June 2014*



Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Kari Aaga Myklebost for helpful supervision with practical advice and useful comments, the Culture and Social Sciences Library, the Centre for Peace Studies and Ola Goverud Andersson for support.

Morgen mot Russlands grense

Jeg kommer fra dagen igår,
fra vesten, fra fortidens land.
Langt fremme en solstripe går
mot syd. Det er morggenens rand.

I jubel flyr toget avsted.
Se grensen! En linje av ild.
Bak den er det gamle brendt ned.
Bak den er det nye blitt til.

Jeg føler forventningens sang
i hjertets urolige slag.
Så skulde jeg også engang
få møte den nye dag!

Rudolf Nilsen

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction.....	1
1.1. Major terms and choice of period.....	1
1.2. Research questions.....	2
1.3. Motivation and relevance for peace studies.....	3
1.4. Three editors: presentation.....	3
1.5. The development of the Norwegian labor press: a short description.....	6
1.6. The position of the Norwegian labor movement in Scandinavia.....	7
1.7. Structure of the thesis.....	8
Chapter 2. Previous studies and historical background.....	11
2.1. Previous studies.....	11
2.2. Historical background.....	14
2.2.1. The situation in Norway.....	14
2.2.2. Connections between the Bolsheviks and the Norwegian left.....	16
Chapter 3. Conceptual framework.....	19
3.1. The Russian Other.....	20
3.2. The October Revolution in the eyes of European socialists.....	21
3.3. Europe in the eyes of Russians.....	23
3.4. A Russian European.....	25
3.5. Summary.....	26
Chapter 4. Sources and Methodology.....	29
4.1. The press' place among historical sources.....	29
4.2. Ways of using newspapers as historical sources.....	31
4.3. Selection of sources for the thesis.....	33
4.4. Summary.....	33
Chapter 5. Analysis.....	35
5.1. The editorship of Jacob Vidnes.....	35
5.1.1. The 1 st of May and the working class.....	35
5.1.2. Peace and disarmament as guidelines for a socialist policy.....	37
5.1.3. Revolutionary Russia.....	39
5.1.4. Radicalism.....	42
5.1.5. Summary.....	44
5.2. The editorship of Olav Scheflo.....	45
5.2.1. Bolshevism and the press.....	45
5.2.2. The World Revolution and Norway.....	48
5.2.3. Non-parliamentarian means of the working class' liberation.....	50
5.2.4. The International and the Party Split.....	53
5.2.5. Summary.....	56
5.3. The editorship of Martin Tranmæl.....	57

5.3.1. Bolshevism and Soviet Russia.....	57
5.3.2. Amsterdam International and Profintern.....	62
5.3.3. The United Front.....	65
5.3.4. The relations with the Comintern.....	66
5.3.5. The newspaper's name.....	69
5.3.6. Summary.....	69
Chapter 6. Conclusion.....	71
6.1. Reformist Jacob Vidnes.....	71
6.2. Radical Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl.....	72
6.3. The radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement.....	73
6.4. The self / other nexus: inclusion and exclusion of the Russian Other.	74
References.....	75

Chapter 1. Introduction

This Master thesis is devoted to the image of the Russian Revolution of 1917 as it was presented in the press of the Norwegian labor movement in the period 1915—1923. The main source for the current analysis is the editorials of the newspaper *Social-Demokraten*.

1.1. Major terms and choice of period

First of all, major notions used in the title and to be extensively applied in the thesis will be explained, namely the Russian Revolution, the Norwegian labor movement, the *Social-Demokraten* and the selection of the period 1915—1923.

The term the *Russian Revolution* has a narrow and a broad definition. The narrow definition refers to the events occurred in Russia in 1917. It embraces both the February Revolution, which dismantled tsarism and led to the formation of the Provisional Government, and the October Revolution which resulted in the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. The broad definition refers to the Bolsheviks, their policies and methods on the one hand, and to the Communist International (the Comintern) on the other hand as the latter is considered as a direct outcome of the Russian Revolution of 1917.

The term the *Norwegian labor movement* concerns a wide range of concepts. According to the first volume of a fundamental work on the history of the labor movement in Norway *Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge*¹, the term labor movement covers political and labor organizations which primarily consisted of employees in industries, crafts, transport and construction. Furthermore, the term refers to smallholders and fishermen, the self-employed, craftsmen, subordinate officials and intellectuals. Three notions – the Norwegian Labor Party (the DNA), the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, and the Social Democratic Youth League of Norway – are central when discussing the term the Norwegian labor movement. Nevertheless, in the bibliography on the Norwegian labor movement which was utilized for this thesis, there has not been mentioned a clear-cut distinction between the notions of the Norwegian Labor Party and the Norwegian labor movement.

The *Social-Demokraten*, which was directly controlled by the central leadership of the DNA, was an important press organ for the Norwegian labor movement. Initially the newspaper was established in 1884 and called *Vort Arbeide*. In 1886 it was renamed *Social-Demokraten* and

¹ Edvard Bull, *Arbeiderklassen blir til, 1850—1900* (Oslo: Tiden), 7-13.

bore this name until April 1923. The paper was founded by typographer Christian Holtermann Knudsen. By the 1890s the newspaper's circulation was around 7 000. From 1912 till 1918 the circulation nearly doubled, from 20 000 to 40 000. The *Social-Demokraten* became the biggest newspaper in Norway after *Aftenposten*.² The peculiarity of *Social-Demokraten* was that the newspaper was controlled by the Party's Central Committee, and its editor was assigned by the Party's convention based on political premises. In contrast, other DNA-newspapers were administered by the local divisions of the party, and the editors were employed by the regional section.³ Hence, *Social-Demokraten* could be assumed as the mouthpiece for the Norwegian Labor Party.

The choice of the period for this analysis was determined by embracing the editorship period of three *Social-Demokraten's* editors: Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl. The year of 1915 is taken as a starting point as it allows the author to trace possible changes in the attitudes towards Russia before and after the Revolution as well as involve the Jacob Vidnes' editorship. Furthermore, the year 1915 was marked with the arrival of one of the most influential Russian revolutionaries, Aleksandra Kollontai, to Norway. The period under focus involved such prominent events as the Russian Revolution, the DNA's convention of 1918 which resulted in the leadership of the DNA's radical wing, affiliation of the DNA to the Comintern, the Party split of 1921 which led to the establishment of the Social Democratic Labor Party of Norway. The studied period concludes by 1st April 1923, when the newspaper *Social-Demokraten* was renamed *Arbeiderbladet*. Moreover, the choice of the time span is determined by the fact that in the period 1915—1923 the labor movement in Norway was the strongest in Scandinavia and one of the strongest in Europe.⁴

1.2. Research questions

The focus of the thesis lies on the portrayal(s) of the Russian Revolution presented in the DNA's print organ the *Social-Demokraten* under the editorship of Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl and seeks to detect the influence of the Russian Revolution on the Norwegian labor movement in the period 1915—1923.

² Lars A. Døvlé Larssen, "En uforbederlig optimist": "*Social-Demokratens*"s utenrikspolitiske linje i Olav Scheflos redaktørtid 1918-1921 (Universitet i Oslo, 1996), 27-28.

³ Kai Arvid Køhler, "*Social-Demokraten*" og den russiske revolusjon: en studie i hvordan påvirkningen fra den russiske revolusjon på splittelsesprosessen i norsk arbeiderbevegelse kom til uttrykk i "*Social-Demokraten*" i tidsrommet mars 1917 til oktober 1920 (Universitetet i Bergen, 1969), 4.

⁴ See 1.6. The position of the Norwegian labor movement in Scandinavia.

The research questions of the thesis are:

What attitude(s) was / were expressed towards the Russian Revolution in the *Social-Demokraten*'s editorials in 1915—1923?

What attitude(s) was / were expressed towards revolutionary means in the *Social-Demokraten*'s editorials in 1915—1923?

How consistent were the portrayals of the Russian Revolution under the editorship of Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo, and Martin Tranmæl (until April 1923)?

How did the influence of the Russian Revolution manifest itself in the *Social-Demokraten*'s editorials in 1915—1923?

1.3. Motivation and relevance for peace studies

As a Russian student in Norway with a background in history, I contemplated making a research on the history of the relations between Norway and Russia. The countries have pursued relatively peaceful neighborly relations for a long period of time. But did Russia influence the development of the Norwegian labor movement which in turn played a crucial role in the political history of Norway? If yes, to what extent did it? These questions made me contemplate writing a thesis about the Russian Revolution and its impact on the Norwegian labor movement taking into account the solid position of the Labor Party in Norway. The labor movement in Norway was stronger than in other Scandinavian countries. The Norwegian Labor Party has been one of the biggest and most influential parties in Norway, which largely contributed to the creation of the welfare-state. The influence of the labor movement on peaceful conditions within Norway was considerable. It manifested itself in anti-war propaganda and the impact on the development of such values as equality, egalitarianism and democratic freedoms. Despite the fact that Russia / Soviet Union made a certain impact on the Norwegian labor movement, the latter has chosen its own path which sharply contrasted with the Bolshevik policies.

1.4. Three editors: presentation

As it has been mentioned above, in the period under study, the *Social-Demokraten* had three editors: Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl. In this paragraph their biographies and political standpoints will be described.

Jacob Vidnes (1875—1940) was born in the county Møre og Romsdal in Western Norway in the family of a farmer. Jacob Vidnes was an active member of the social democratic circles in Norway from his young days. In 1898 Vidnes began to work as an editorial secretary for the newspaper *Arbeiderbladet* in Christiania. A year later in 1899, when Vidnes was twenty-four years old, he started working for the *Social-Demokraten* first as a journalist and later as an editorial secretary in a political section. In 1900 he initiated the creation of the Social Democratic Youth League of Norway. Four years later he established its print organ *Det tyvende Aarhundre*. In 1912 he became an editor of the newspaper *Social-Demokraten*. He was one of the originators of the Norwegian Social Democratic Press Association, where he was a chairman until 1918. In March 1918 the radical wing of the DNA took leadership in the Party. Vidnes had to leave the position of editor on the 2 of April, 1918.⁵ In 1919 Vidnes joined the Social Democratic Opposition Group established in protest against the decision of the DNA's Central Committee to support the Party line on the revolutionary mass actions.⁶ After leaving the position of the *Social-Demokraten's* editor, Vidnes was appointed as a press consultant in the Norwegian Press Association. Jacob Vidnes represented the reformist wing of the DNA. Reformism in this context signifies a parliamentary strategy towards socialism.⁷

Olav Scheflo (1883—1943) was born in Steinkjer, the county Nord-Trøndelag. His father was a cab driver. Scheflo studied at Steinkjer commune school. Then he began to work as a seaman.⁸ At the age of twenty, he moved to Trondheim where he started writing for the newspaper *Ny Tid*. He worked there for five years. These years to a great extent determined the political line Scheflo would follow later. In 1910 he moved to Christiania where he started writing for the *Social-Demokraten*. In 1914 he became an editor of the newspaper *Arbeidet* in Bergen. And four years later, in 1918, when Kyrre Grepp and Martin Tranmæl's won a majority in the DNA, Scheflo was appointed as the editor for the *Social-Demokraten*.⁹ He was recognized as the most important journalist in the Party who expressed the views of the Party's radical wing utterly and completely. The Party members perceived Scheflo as "the

⁵ *Norsk Biografisk Leksikon*, s. v. "Vidnes.," 556.

⁶ Køhler, 5.

⁷ Jorunn Bjørgum, "Unionsoppløsningen og radikaliseringen av norsk arbeiderbevegelse," *Arbeiderhistorie* (2005), 33.

⁸ Inge Scheflo, "På nært hold," in *Olav Scheflo som politiker og menneske: 44 artikler og debattinnlegg av Olav Scheflo*, ed. Inge Scheflo (Oslo: Tiden, 1974), 33.

⁹ *Norsk Biografisk Leksikon*, s. v. "Scheflo.," 321.

most prominent advocate for the International's standpoints."¹⁰ In 1921 the editor position came over to Martin Tranmæl. Scheflo became the DNA's representative in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Furthermore, he was a representative of the Christiania Labor Party in the Parliament and the DNA's parliamentary leader until the Party split in 1923. In 1923—1927 shortly after the second split in the DNA, Scheflo became a member of the Norwegian Communist Party and the editor of its newspapers *Norges Kommunistblad* and *Arbeideren*. In 1929 he returned to the DNA and worked as an editor of the DNA-newspaper *Sørlandet* till 1939. Due to poor health Scheflo had to leave his job. In 1943 Scheflo died of heart attack.¹¹

Martin Tranmæl (1879—1967) is one of the most prominent figures in the Norwegian labor movement. He was born in Melhus in the Norwegian county Sør Trøndelag. In his early twenties, Tranmæl worked as a painter apprentice in the USA and became interested in revolutionary flows within the American labor movement. When he came back to Norway, he actively participated in the labor movement agitation.¹² In 1911 the Trade Union Opposition Group <*Fagopposisjonen*> was formed under Martin Tranmæl's leadership.¹³ The program of this group was to turn the trade union movement into the class struggle. The platform for the opposition was syndicalism which reached Norway through Sweden from the USA.¹⁴ Perhaps, Tranmæl's major contribution to the evolvement of the labor movement in Norway was his journalistic work. From 1913 to 1918 he worked as an editor of the newspaper *Ny Tid*. For twenty-eight years (1921—1949) he occupied a position of the editor in the newspaper *Social-Demokraten*, which in 1923 was renamed *Arbeiderbladet*. Tranmæl's possessed extraordinary declamatory skills which made him "the most effective orator among Nordic socialists."¹⁵ He had an ability to "express and utilize the revolutionary sentiments with a speech that had its starting point in people's everyday life, was connected to the place and the situation and was open to various interpretations"¹⁶. Martin Tranmæl was a member of the DNA's Central Committee from 1918 to 1963.

¹⁰ Per Maurseth, *Fra Moskvoteser til Kristiania-forslag: Det norske Arbeiderparti og Komintern fra 1921 til februar 1923* (Oslo: Pax, 1972), 34.

¹¹ Larssen, 33-34.

¹² *Store Norske Leksikon*, s.v. "Martin Tranmæl," accessed April 29, 2014, http://snl.no/Martin_Tranm%C3%A6l

¹³ Knut Langfeldt, *Moskva-tesene i norsk politikk* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1961), 10-11.

¹⁴ Per Maurseth, *Fra Moskvoteser*, 25.

¹⁵ Oddvar Høidal, *Trotsky i Norge: et sår som aldri gror* (Oslo: Spartacus, 2009), 52.

¹⁶ Finn Olstad, *Frihetens århundre: norsk historie gjennom de siste hundre år* (Oslo: Pax, 2010), 65.

1.5. The development of the Norwegian labor press: a short description

In order to ponder what place the *Social-Demokraten* occupied in the Norwegian press during 1915—1923, it is useful to look at the way the labor press in Norway was evolving in the studied period. This topic has been scrutinized in the book *Norwegian Press History*¹⁷ where Norwegian scholars have studied the history of the Norwegian press and pointed out the peculiarities of its development.

Newspapers began to play a central role in the activities of the Norwegian Labor movement shortly after 1860s when the working class started organizing itself in trade unions and established the DNA in 1887. Typographers were among the first groups in the labor movement who founded a strong and powerful trade union. In addition, the first editors within the DNA had a background in printing, as for instance, Christian Holtermann Knudsen who is referred to as the “father of the Norwegian labor movement”¹⁸. In the DNA-newspapers the connection with the Party was stronger than in the right-wing press. From the 1880s, when the press started being politicized and connected to the parties, the development of the Norwegian press took a new direction. It resulted in journalists’ politicization. In 1887, when the DNA was established, the journalists joined the Norwegian Social Democratic Press Association (later Labor Party Press Association). The political press organizations included both editors and journalists, whose career was to a large extent linked to the party press, and it was almost impossible for a journalist to shift position between the labor and conservative press. Until the early twentieth century the labor newspapers prevailed over conservative newspapers. According to statistics, sixteen newspapers belonged to the DNA while thirteen represented the right-wing parties.¹⁹

The heyday of the labor press took place from 1904 to 1917, the period when the greatest journalists started working in the field. In 1920 the organization *Arbeiderpressens Samvirke* was established for the purpose of ensuring the coordinated economic planning of all DNA-newspapers. At that time the DNA-press consisted of 33 party newspapers: fifteen of them were daily papers, twelve was issued three days a week, and six newspapers came out twice a week.²⁰ Nevertheless, the splits in the Party resulted in division of the labor press into two

¹⁷ Rune Ottosen, Lars Arve Røssland, and Helge Østbye, *Norsk Pressehistorie* (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 2002).

¹⁸ Olstad, 43.

¹⁹ Ottosen, Røssland and Østbye, 52-53, 59-60.

²⁰ *Parti, presse og publikum: 1880-1945*, ed. Rune Ottosen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2010), 37.

groups. As a result of the Party split of 1921, the Social Democratic Labor Party of Norway was left with four newspapers. After the DNA's split of 1923, the left faction of the Party created the Norwegian Communist Party and took control over eleven newspapers (some of them were highly influential, for example *Ny Tid*). Hence, the DNA was left with twenty-five newspapers. Nevertheless, the Party tried to compensate the losses and established new papers – *Bergen Social-Demokrat* and *Arbeider-Avisa*.²¹

Thus, the labor press in Norway was characterized by a strong connection between journalism and politics. In 1921 every third member of the parliamentary party group had a background in the press²². Hence, the studied period (1915—1923) could be referred to as the period of great politicization of the Norwegian labor press.

1.6. The position of the Norwegian labor movement in Scandinavia

In contrast to Denmark and Sweden, adherents of the radical course within the Labor Party in Norway won a majority already in 1918. The peculiarities of the DNA have been an issue that attracted researchers' interest. The question why the Norwegian labor movement was more radical than the labor movement in neighborly Denmark and Sweden has been discussed by a number of researchers. Three of them will be referred to in this paragraph, namely Edvard Bull sr., Jorunn Bjørgum and Einar A. Terjesen.

According to Edvard Bull, the greater radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement was connected to three factors peculiar to Norway. Firstly, the industrialization and its consequences which took place after 1905 – when unskilled laborers employed in construction became the mainstay of the new revolutionary course within the Norwegian labor movement. Secondly, the democratization of the Norwegian political system characterized by parliamentarism and universal suffrage, gave the Norwegian social democrats the opportunity to act independently. In other words, unlike Sweden, the social democracy in Norway was not forced to maintain the alliance with the Liberal Party (*Venstre*) and therefore did not have to change its politics to make such an alliance possible. Thirdly, the topographic conditions, according to Bull, have determined the greater extent of

²¹ Ottosen, Røssland and Østbye, 62.

²² Ibid.

decentralization and democratic structure within the Norwegian labor movement than in Denmark and Sweden.²³

Jorunn Bjørgum emphasizes that the dissolution between Norway and Sweden in 1905 is an important factor in the radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement. The aftermath of the dissolution of 1905 created specific opportunities for growth in Norwegian social democracy.²⁴

Einar A. Terjesen argues that in Denmark and Sweden the traditional conservative alliances among the army, nobility, high officials and upper-middle class were stronger than in Norway. It increased the resistance of central state authority to parliamentarism in Denmark and Sweden, and contributed to the longer democratization process in these two countries than in Norway. In both Denmark and Sweden there was a Parliament with two chambers with the purpose of conserving the upper-class' interests, while in Norway the parliamentary system was based on one chamber, which also facilitated quicker democratization. The success of the radical wing within the DNA, Terjesen has linked to the greater ability of central leadership in the labor movements in Denmark and Sweden (before 1914) to determine the ideology and policies of the movements.²⁵

Moreover, one of the major events that illustrates the radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement is the DNA's affiliation to the Third International or the Comintern. The DNA underwent two splits in 1921 and 1923 respectively – both times the splits were inextricably connected with the Comintern.

This thesis emphasizes the role of the Russian Revolution in the radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement. In the following chapter the research which has been done on the issue of the Russian Revolution's influence on the Norwegian labor movement will be discussed.

1.7. Structure of the thesis

The thesis is comprised of six chapters. The first chapter involves the problem statement, the research questions, the authors' motivation and relevance for peace studies, the presentations

²³ Bjørgum, 29-30.

²⁴ Ibid., 44.

²⁵ Einar A. Terjesen, "Demokrati og integrasjon. Sosialistiske og liberale partier 1890-1914," *Arbeiderhistorie* (2005): 78-80.

of the three editors, and the position of the Norwegian labor movement in Scandinavia. The second chapter refers to the previous studies done on this topic and historical background of the situation in Norway in the studied period and the relations between the Bolsheviks and the Norwegian left. The third chapter explains the conceptual framework for the thesis, namely the self / other relations. The fourth chapter is devoted to the source criticism and methodology issues. The fifth chapter is the analysis divided into three parts in accordance with the three editors' editorship. The sixth chapter is a conclusion.

Chapter 2. Previous studies and historical background

2.1. Previous studies

The topic of the influence of the Russian Revolution on the Norwegian labor movement has been addressed in the extensive research conducted predominantly by Norwegian authors. The framework of this thesis does not allow the author to mention all the researchers who one way or another have touched upon the connections between the Russian Revolution and the labor movement in Norway. However, few names should be mentioned in this regard – Per Maurseth, Åsmund Egge and Øyvind Bjørnson. Maurseth and Egge have examined the Comintern's influence on the developments within the DNA. Bjørnson has studied the history of the Norwegian labor movement in the period 1900—1920. Furthermore, three theses highly relevant for the actual analysis will be discussed in this paragraph.

Per Maurseth is the author of both the third volume of the *Arbeiderbevegelses historie i Norge*²⁶, a fundamental work on the history of the Norwegian labor movement, and the monograph *Fra Moskva-teser til Kristiania-forslaget*²⁷. In the latter Maurseth scrupulously examines the mutual relations between the DNA, the trade union and youth movements on the one side and the Comintern on the other side. He traces the developments within these two entities which starts with the “partial integration” and grows into “acute mutual crisis”.²⁸ Maurseth argues that the main issue in the conflict within the Party is concentrated on the Party's attitude towards the International.²⁹

Åsmund Egge has written a wide range of works³⁰ on the links between the Comintern and the DNA. Here, the monograph *Komintern og krisen i Det norske Arbeiderparti*³¹ and the article *Norsk arbeiderbevegelses forhold til Sovjetunionen*³² will be discussed. Egge focuses on the time span 1922—1923, which led to the second party split in November 1923. The

²⁶ Per Maurseth, *Gjennom kriser til makt (1920-1935)*, (Oslo: Tiden, 1987).

²⁷ Per Maurseth, *Fra Moskva-teser til Kristiania-forslag: Det norske Arbeiderparti og Komintern fra 1921 til februar 1923* (Oslo: Pax, 1972).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Åsmund Egge, “Den russiske revolusjon i 1917 – et resultat av krigen?,” *Nordisk Østforum* 3 (1992), 32-43; Åsmund Egge, “Aleksandra Kollontaj og norsk arbeiderbevegelse 1915-1930” in *Revolusjon, kjærlighet, diplomati : Aleksandra Kollontaj og Norden*, ed. Yngvild Sørbye (Oslo: Unipub, 2008), 55-82; Åsmund Egge and Sven G. Holtsmark, “Soviet diplomacy and the Norwegian left, 1921-1939” in *Caution & compliance: Norwegian-Russian diplomatic relations, 1814-2014*, eds. Kari Aga Myklebost and Stian Bones (Stamsund: Orkana akademisk, 2012), 101-112.

³¹ Åsmund Egge, *Komintern og krisen i Det norske Arbeiderparti*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1995).

³² Åsmund Egge, “Norsk arbeiderbevegelses forhold til Sovjetunionen,” in *Norge-Russland: naboer gjennom 1000 år*, ed. Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson, Jens Petter Nielsen (Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press, 2004), 336-346.

historian argues that the discord between the Comintern and the DNA was the principal reason for the split in the Party. Egge's study on the situation in the Party in 1922 is relevant for the paper as it to a greater extent represents the views of the Comintern on the developments within the labor movement in Norway. In other words, if Maurseth's analysis is directed at the representation of the situation from the DNA's standpoint, Egge's work demonstrates the situation presented through the Comintern's prism.

In the article *Norsk arbeiderbevegelses forhold til Sovjetunionen*, Egge provides insight into the relations between the Norwegian labor movement and the Soviet Union from 1917 to the early 1970s. Egge concludes that in Norway "the Soviet Union had more significance for the labor movement than in Denmark or Sweden". And in the interwar period the Soviet Union was perceived in Norway as a positive example.³³

In 2006 Åsmund Egge and Russian historian Vadim Roginsky issued a collection of documents which has been preserved in the Comintern's archive in Moscow. The publication demonstrates the relations between the Comintern and the Norwegian labor movement during the DNA's membership in the Comintern (June 1919 to November 1923).³⁴

Øyvind Bjørnson is the author of the second volume in the series on the history of the Norwegian labor movement *Arbeiderbevegelses historie i Norge*.³⁵ The last chapter of the volume *Krigskonjunktur og oppbruddstendenser* is particularly relevant for this thesis as it illustrates the situation in Europe with the focus on the revolutions in Russia and Germany and covers the Party Convention of 1918 when the radical wing obtained a majority.

In addition, the issues addressed in this paper have been scrutinized in several theses written by Norwegian authors. For the sake of convenience, the Norwegian titles of these works will be translated into English by the author. The focus of this paragraph lies in the discussion of three works.

The first work's substantial title is *The Social-Demokraten and the Russian Revolution: a study of how the influence of the Russian Revolution on the split processes in the Norwegian labor movement manifested itself in the Social-Demokraten in the period from March 1917 to October 1920*. The paper was written by Kai Arvid Køhler in 1969 and is highly relevant for

³³ Åsmund Egge, *Norsk arbeiderbevegelses forhold*, 337.

³⁴ *Komintern og Norge. DNA-perioden 1919-1923: en dokumentasjon*, ed. Åsmund Egge and Vadim Roginskij (Oslo: Unipub, 2006).

³⁵ Øyvind Bjørnson, *På klassekampens grunn 1900-1920* (Oslo: Tiden, 1990).

the given analysis. As the title indicates K hler's research question is close to the problem statement of this paper. K hler focuses on two issues. The first issue is what events under the Russian Revolution were represented in the newspaper as controversial. The second question is what views on these controversial events existed in the Party. He examines the opinions of the *Social-Demokraten's* editors in the period 1917—1920: reformist Jacob Vidnes and radical Olav Scheflo on the situation in Russia under the February and October Revolutions. These editors represented different wings of the Party and consequently had diverse opinions on the Norwegian labor movement's development.³⁶ Unlike K hler's thesis, this paper analyzes the editorship of the three editors Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranm el and focuses not only on the Russian Revolution's influence on the split processes within the Party, but also covers the three editors' views on the methods used by the Bolsheviks and their aspiration to apply these methods in Norway.

The second work, *Between reformism and Bolshevism. The Norwegian labor movement, 1918—1920: theory and practice*, is a dissertation written in 1983 by Odd-Bj rn Fure. The dissertation meticulously covers the period 1918—1920 with emphasis on the ideological radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement, the implementation of the new radical course after 1918, and the opportunities for the revolutionary practice in Norway. The latter problem statement is relevant for this Master thesis. Fure argues that the situation in Norway was not as escalated as in Russia or Germany, and that those factors that led to direct actions by workers in Russia and Germany were not present in Norway in the period 1918—1920. In theory the ideas of a revolutionary development of the Norwegian labor movement were common, but they were not implemented in practice.³⁷ In the given thesis the studied period covers nine years, 1915—1923, and refers to the radicalization of the labor movement through the prism of the newspaper *Social-Demokraten*, including the editorship of the reformist editor Jacob Vidnes.

The third thesis *A confirmed optimist: "Social-Demokraten"s foreign affairs' line in Olav Scheflo's editorship 1918—1921* was written in 1996 by Lars A. D vle Larssen. The goals of Larssen's thesis are to describe how the foreign affairs are expressed in the newspaper and to explain how the *Social-Demokraten's* focus on certain foreign affairs is connected to Scheflo's personal political opinions. This paper is of interest for the given Master thesis as it contains a

³⁶ K hler, 3, 110-111.

³⁷ Odd-Bj rn Fure, *Mellom reformisme og bolsjevisme: norsk arbeiderbevegelse 1918-1920: teori praksis* (Universitetet i Bergen, 1983), 4,5, 585.

chapter on the newspaper's attitude towards Soviet Russia and the Comintern.³⁸ The author's focus is placed on Scheflo's perception of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet society as a role model for the international working class. Larssen points out that the "solidarity with the Russian Revolution was one of the most notable features of the newspaper in this period"³⁹. Larssen argues that the greatest value of the Russian Revolution for Scheflo is that it set a start for a world revolution. Scheflo's main argument for the affiliation to the Comintern was the solidarity with the international revolution, not the solidarity with Soviet Russia.⁴⁰ My thesis also argues that the entry to the Third International was determined by Scheflo's aspiration to accelerate the world revolution. Nevertheless, in the current analysis the solidarity with Soviet Russia will be particularly emphasized as a common thread running through Scheflo's editorship.

2.2. Historical background

The following paragraphs describe the situation in Norway and refer to the connections between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Norwegian left under the studied period 1915—1923.

2.2.1. The situation in Norway

Norwegian workers had considerable sympathy for the October Revolution in Russia. A hard economic situation during the war, when the cost of living increased approximately by 140 %⁴¹, enhanced the revolutionary sentiments among workers in Norway.⁴² In the meantime, the Norwegian Labor Party became more radicalized. At the Party convention in 1918, the radical wing, or "the new direction" <*den nye retning*>, as it is called in Norwegian historiography, won a majority. Broadly speaking, the radical wing consisted of several groups: the group of the Trade Union Opposition Group of 1911 led by Martin Tranmæl, the Norwegian Social Democratic Youth League and The Social Democratic Student Association led by Olav Scheflo, Kyrre Grepp⁴³ and Eugene Olaussen⁴⁴. The radical wing of the Party to a

³⁸ Larssen, 5.

³⁹ Ibid., 140.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 181.

⁴¹ Fure, 17.

⁴² Jahn O. Johansen, "Norge," in *Kommunismen i Norden og krisen i den kommunistiske bevegelse*, ed. Åke Sparring (Oslo: Dreyers Forlag, 1965), 17.

⁴³ Kyrre Grepp (1879-1922), Norwegian politician, chairman of the DNA from 1918 to 1922 (*Store Norske Leksikon*, s. v. "Kyrre Grepp," accessed March 4, 2014, http://snl.no/Kyrre_Grepp.)

certain extent preserved the old reformist course. But there was no doubt that the “new direction” implied a course shift. The key positions in the Party were occupied by the representatives of the radical wing: Martin Tranmæl became a party secretary, Kyrre Grepp became a chairman, Emil Stang⁴⁵ – vice chairman, and Olav Scheflo was appointed the editor of the newspaper *Social-Demokraten*.⁴⁶ The DNA’s conventions of 1919 and 1920 indicated the radicalization of the Party regarding internal and international affairs. The mass actions were determined as a decisive means of the working class’ struggle and the course to revolutionary communism was confirmed. The DNA withdrew from the Second International⁴⁷ and affiliated to the Comintern.⁴⁸ In summer 1920 the Comintern elaborated the Twenty-one Conditions for the membership in the organization. These conditions required from the party-members act in conformity with the Soviet guidelines. The Comintern’s prerequisites were in contradiction to the views of the reformist wing. The latter principally disagreed with the Conditions. It led to the Party split in 1921 which resulted in the formation of the Social Democratic Party of Norway. The Comintern’s policy of the centralization and growing pressure from Moscow provoked debates within the DNA on withdrawal from the Comintern. However, for the Comintern, the DNA’s affiliation to the organization was important as the Party was one of the biggest sections in the Third International. The significance of this issue is also demonstrated by the fact that such prominent figures of the Comintern as Nicolay Bukharin⁴⁹ and Karl Radek⁵⁰ visited Norway in early 1923. Nonetheless, the DNA did not manage to avoid a new split. In November 1923 the Party

⁴⁴ Eugene Olaussen (1887-1962) Norwegian journalist and politician, editor of the newspaper *Klassekampen* from 1911 to 1921 (*Store Norske Leksikon*, s. v. “Eugene Olaussen,” accessed May 02, 2014, http://snl.no/Eugene_Olaussen.)

⁴⁵ Emil Stang (1882-1964), the lawyer and a member of the DNA since 1911 who later became one of the leaders in the radical wing of the Party. After the DNA’s split of 1923 he became a member of the Norwegian Communist Party. (Bjørnson, 531).

⁴⁶ Bjørnson, 471.

⁴⁷ Second International (1889-1916) is a federation of socialist parties and trade unions. It was founded at a congress in Paris in 1889. Unlike the First International, it was based on the membership of national parties and trade unions only. It was not a centralized organization, like the first, but rather a loose federation that did not set up an executive body, the International Socialist Bureau, until 11 years after its foundation. Its headquarters was in Brussels (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Second International," accessed May 02, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/290596/Second-International>.)

⁴⁸ Larssen, 19, 21-22.

⁴⁹ Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin, (1888-1938), Bolshevik and Marxist theoretician and economist, who was a prominent leader of the Communist International (Comintern). (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin,” accessed May 09, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/83953/Nikolay-Ivanovich-Bukharin>.)

⁵⁰ Karl Radek, (1885-1939?), communist propagandist and early leader of the Comintern. (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “Karl Radek,” accessed May 09, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/488384/Karl-Radek>.)

convention resolved to withdraw from the Comintern. The minority of the DNA created its own Norwegian Communist Party that remained the Comintern's section.⁵¹

2.2.2. *Connections between the Bolsheviks and the Norwegian left*

In this paragraph the connections between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Norwegian left in the studied period will be briefly discussed.

The radicalization of the DNA members manifested itself already during the Russian Revolution of 1905. The wider Norwegian population sympathized with Russian workers.⁵² In February 1905 the Social Democratic Youth League of Norway organized a collection of money in order to support the Russian Revolution.⁵³ In Northern Norway, where the DNA was particularly popular, Russian revolutionaries received help.⁵⁴ In the beginning of the twentieth century a group of Russian Marxist emigrants settled in the town Vardø, in the county of Finnmark. They were invited by the postmaster of the town and the representative of the Norwegian Parliament Adam Egede-Nissen. In 1906 the group established a publishing house *Pomor*. Until 1909, when the printing work was stopped, Vardø was a center of printing and smuggling of socialist, revolutionary literature to Russia. The smuggling of the literature continued till the outbreak of the First World War.⁵⁵

Despite the war, good neighborly relations between Norway and Russia were stable. From 1914 to 1916 the value of the Norwegian exports to Russia increased by nine times. Since autumn 1918 the Entente powers⁵⁶ exerted pressure on neutral Norway for the purpose of ending the country's relations with the Soviet government. As a result, since winter 1919 the official Norwegian connections with Russia were ceased.⁵⁷ In January 1920 the international blockade was abolished and measures to resume trade relations between the countries were taken. In January 1921 a provisional trade agreement was signed between Norwegian and Soviet governments.⁵⁸

⁵¹ Denis V. Fomin-Nilov, *Norvezhskaya rabochaya partiya: put' k vlasti (1887-1935)* (Moscow: Sobranie, 2010), 78-82.

⁵² Fomin-Nilov, 78-82.

⁵³ Langfeldt, 17.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁵⁵ Tor Sveum, "Smugling av revolusjonære skrifter fra Vardø til Nord-Russland," *Ottar* 192 (1992): 41.

⁵⁶ Association between Great Britain, France and Russia in the WWI.

⁵⁷ Andrej Zaszikhin and Konstantin Tsjudinov, "Revolusjon og borgerkrig i nord (1918-1920)," *Ottar* 192 (1992): 54, 56.

⁵⁸ Ole Martin Rønning, "Norsk-russiske forbindelser i mellomkrigstiden: noen trekk ved den norske virksomheten i Russland," *Arbeiderhistorie* (2002): 35.

When talking about the connections between the Russian and Norwegian labor movements, one should mention the representative of the Russian social democracy Aleksandra Kollontai. She came to Norway in 1915. At that time, her activity in Norway was linked to the anti-war propaganda and the youth socialist movement. She sought the Norwegian socialists' support of the Bolsheviks' opposition to the war. First of all, her influence on the radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement came through the personal connection with its leaders, including such prominent figures in the Youth League as Eugene Olausen and Arvid Hansen. She presented Lenin's view on the war for them. Kollontai was trying to get her Norwegian friends (as she called them) on the track of Bolshevism.⁵⁹

Between 1917 and 1940 a lot of unofficial communication between the countries was kept through the labor movement. These links were fostered both through the Comintern, the solidarity with the October Revolution and the new Bolshevik state. Many Norwegian trade union delegations were a tool to enhance a sense of solidarity among Norwegian workers.⁶⁰

In the 1920s there was particularly intense collaboration between the DNA / later the Norwegian Communist Party and the Comintern. The latter delivered confidential information from the Norwegian Parliament *Storting* and the government apparatus to the Comintern. Moreover, the representatives of the Norwegian left contributed to the fulfillment of Soviet Russia's foreign policy goals. The representatives of the trade delegation reported to Moscow on their participation in the DNA's decisions on the issues regarding the relations between two countries.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Åsmund Egge, "Aleksandra Kollontaj og norsk arbeiderbevegelse 1915-1930" in *Revolusjon, kjærlighet, diplomati : Aleksandra Kollontaj og Norden*, ed. Yngvild Sørbye (Oslo: Unipub, 2008), 55-57.

⁶⁰ Einar A. Terjesen, "Forord," *Arbeiderhistorie* (2002): 6-7.

⁶¹ Åsmund Egge and Sven G. Holtsmark, "Soviet diplomacy and the Norwegian left, 1921-1939" in *Caution & compliance: Norwegian-Russian diplomatic relations, 1814-2014*, eds. Kari Aga Myklebost and Stian Bones (Stamsund: Orkana akademisk, 2012), 102, 104.

Chapter 3. Conceptual framework

This chapter is devoted to the conceptual framework for the thesis – the self / other perspective. The latter has been examined by scholars in diverse fields within both the humanities, political and social studies. The focus of this chapter lies in the self / other nexus discussed by Norwegian researcher Iver Neumann and exemplified by the research carried out by two authors – Bruno Naarden and Vladimir Kantor. In the monograph *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European identity formation*⁶², Neumann emphasizes how Russia affected Europe in the process of European collective identity formation. The approach Neumann presents in his book is useful for analyzing how the Russian Revolution was portrayed in the Norwegian labor movement. In the following paragraphs the introduction to the main concepts discussed by Neumann will be made. The self / other dichotomy will be illustrated by using the European socialists’ perception of the Russian Other as an example. Finally, it will be reflected upon the image of Europe and its role in Russia’s debate with the reference to the nineteenth century.

There is a rich literature on the theme of identity formation, and Neumann is not the first scholar who has analyzed the self / other-subject. The author examines the role of Russia, or, in other words, how the Russian Other influenced the formation of European identity. Introducing the reader with the concept, Neumann delineates four ways of “theorizing on the theme of the Other⁶³, namely the ethnographic path, the psychological path, the Continental philosophical path, and the ‘Eastern excursion’. All of the aforementioned ways of considering ‘otherness’ have been scrutinized by the author with reference to such eminent scholars as Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim, Mikhail Bakhtin, Frederik Barth and others. Neumann refers to their research on the self / other relationship and concludes: “...the formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its others and that a failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the formation of the self...”⁶⁴ Hence relying on Barth’s reflections, Neumann asserts that “the creation of social boundaries is not a consequence of integration but one of its necessary a priori ingredients”. Therefore, researchers studying identity formation may be focused on

⁶² Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European identity formation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 35.

“how these boundaries come into existence and are maintained”⁶⁵.

Using the self / other nexus in the analysis of the portrayals of the Russian Revolution in the labor movement in Norway contributes to a better understanding of how the Revolution facilitated the formation of the identity of the Norwegian left and more importantly might give insight into why the Norwegian Labor Party did choose another, more peaceful path.

Neumann points out several guidelines for studying human collective identities. He writes that selecting only one type of a human collective (for instance, nations) would not provide a complete picture. Neumann states that collective identities are “multifaceted and must be studied like that”⁶⁶. He exemplifies his statement with the self / other relationship of two states pointing out that “those states are at the very same time involved in maintaining their collective identities vis-a-vis other types of human collectives – societies <...> or an organization of which they both are members”⁶⁷.

Thus, in this analysis it is important to pay attention not only to the differences which naturally led to diverse conditions both in Norway and Russia, but also to the similarities as the fact that both the DNA and the Bolsheviks were members of the same influential organization Comintern. Another aspect when one studies self / other relations emphasized by Neumann is the researcher’s awareness of what the analysis s/he carries out aims at – exclusion one from another or, conversely, inclusion; and *how* both of them arise. The thesis examines how self / other nexus manifested and reshaped itself in the editorials written by the three editors.

3.1. The Russian Other

Neumann refers to the Russian Other when analyzing the role of the East in the European identity formation. Who is the Russian Other and what impact has it made on the collective European identity?

The European image of the Russian Other has been projected throughout centuries. Looking at five centuries of Russian history (XVI—XX) and pondering how the perception of Russia affected the formation of European collective identity, Neumann concludes that Europeans have construed Russians as barbarians regardless of period of time and ruler; the barbarians

⁶⁵ Neumann, *Uses of the Other*, 35.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

that ought to be tamed if not by themselves then by Europeans. Neumann writes "...Russia stands out for its five hundred-year history of always *just* having been tamed, civil, civilized; just having begun to participate in European politics; *just* having become part of Europe"⁶⁸. The very notion of Russian barbarity has had a tendency to impose a feeling of threat among Europeans which is tightly connected to the view on Russia as a learner. As Neumann points out, Russia is often represented as a "learner of European economic and political practices"⁶⁹. If the idea of a learner is positively evolving and being supported by the Russian political course, then the feeling of threat gradually disappears. The other scenario, when the identity of learner changes into something else, accelerates the feeling of threat.

In Europe the first reactions to the February Revolution were mainly positive compared to the reactions to the October Revolution. As it was put by the British, now Russia could surmount her backwardness and "integrate into the world market"⁷⁰. With the introduction of the New Economic Policy⁷¹, the European world proclaimed the victory of capitalism. But shortly after, this perception was replaced by the version of "how the Revolution devoured its own children"⁷². As Neumann puts it, the Russian case was 'special' as Russia being a "revolutionary power and thus a potential threat" was characterized by "extraterritorial presence through the organized Communist movement"⁷³. The latter, commonly called the Comintern, exerted considerable influence on its party-members, including the DNA. The following chapters of the thesis will shed more light on this issue.

In the course of Neumann's discussions, two issues have seemed relevant for this analysis, namely the perception of the October Revolution by European socialists and the idea of Russia as a part of Europe.

3.2. The October Revolution in the eyes of European socialists

In order to look at the self / other perspective in practice, the work *Socialist Europe and Revolutionary Russia: perception and prejudice 1848—1923* may come in useful. It was

⁶⁸ Neumann, *Uses of the Other*, 110.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁷¹ New Economic Policy is the **economic policy** of the government of the Soviet Union from 1921 to 1928, representing a temporary retreat from its previous **policy** of extreme centralization and doctrinaire socialism. The **policy** of War Communism, in effect since 1918, had by 1921 brought the national economy to the point of total breakdown. (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "New Economic Policy (NEP)," accessed May 09, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/411387/New-Economic-Policy>.)

⁷² Neumann, *Uses of the Other*, 99.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

written by professor of Russian history Bruno Naarden. The author analyzes the European socialists' perceptions of Russia in the period between the Spring of Nations or the revolutions of 1848 and the formation of the USSR, or in other words, the period when the Russian revolutionary movement was established. Naarden pays particular attention to the images of Russia held by Europeans, but in contrast to Neumann, concentrates on European socialist movements and opinions of its supporters of revolutionary Russia.

Naarden refers to three major wars fought by European states against another European state where Russia played a role of a crucial ally. He underlines the indispensability of Russia as an ally in suppressing the growth of and obtainment of dominance by one European state as it occurred in 1815, 1918 and 1945 with France and Germany during the Napoleonic, First and Second World wars respectively. But as soon as the threat was overcome and the balance was established, Russia was seen by its European allies as a significant danger that could upset the newly established stability.

If the February Revolution was perceived by Europeans as a positive change for the further democratization in Russia, the October Revolution dispelled these hopes and changed the attitude to Russia considerably. The idea that the social structure in Europe could be undermined led to fierce and sometimes even hysterical reaction. The revolutionary sentiments in Russia were seen as a virus, as a severe contagious disease like the plague. And those who in every possible way opposed those ideas attempted to distribute what Naarden calls a "preventive medicine"⁷⁴.

After the armistice with Germany in November 1918, the reflections on the Soviet regime sounded increasingly militant. The European press and, not surprisingly, mainly the German right-wing press gave highly negative assessment of Bolshevism, branding it as "the greatest danger of the civilized world", "systematic murder and robbery", "barbarism", the "absolute rule of delinquency" etc. Conversely, German socialists attempted to abstain from severe critique of the Bolsheviks, but at the same time their attitudes could not be seen as an endorsement of Bolshevism.⁷⁵ Besides, the Western press did not predict the long existence of the Communist regime in Russia. Naarden provides the reader with an interesting observation: in the course of two years between November 1917 and November 1919 the New York Times mentioned and predicted the rapid fall of the regime in Russia ninety-one

⁷⁴ Naarden, 294.

⁷⁵ Naarden, 293.

times.⁷⁶ Ironically, the European left-wing in general did not support the Bolsheviks to the extent it may have been expected, although some of them “tried to show some understanding of the necessity for terrorism and absolute power in the special circumstances prevailing in Russia”⁷⁷.

3.3. Europe in the eyes of Russians

Another perception studied by Iver Neumann is the role of Europe in the formation of Russian identity. The analysis of the interaction between Europe and Russia has been presented by Neumann in the monograph *Russia and the Idea of Europe: a study in identity and international relations*. The author scrutinizes several periods in Russian history, starting with the eighteenth and finishing with the late twentieth century. Neumann points out that at the heart of the book lies the demonstration of “how Russians, when they set out to discuss Europe, also discuss themselves”⁷⁸. The emphasis of this paragraph is put on the time from post- First World War period to the formation of the Soviet Union. In other words, it covers the period relevant for this analysis, namely 1915—1923. Describing the internal Russian debate on Europe between 1915 and 1923 allows the author to create a broader picture of the relations between a self and other, and better understand how these constructs interact.

Neumann distinguishes two main ideas in the Russian debate on Europe from the period after the October Revolution until the beginning of the 1920s – Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik views. According to Neumann, the Bolsheviks dealt primarily with the dichotomy “true Europe” and “false Europe”, where the former represented the “European working movement, including the Russian one”, while the latter signified capitalist Europe, “tsarist technical personnel, Russian middle peasants, German petit bourgeois, Polish officers and so on”⁷⁹. Within the Bolshevik perception the author delineates two major focuses regarding “false Europe”. One of them is whether the Bolshevik proletarian state should align with the above mentioned “false Europe”. The other is what scale the class war between the proletarian state or progressive Europe and stagnant Europe should be followed. Accordingly, these two questions were underlined in the internal Russian debate on Europe and were presented by two views. On the one hand, there was emphasized the elimination of the inner enemy or

⁷⁶ Naarden, 294.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 297.

⁷⁸ Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: a study in identity and international relations* (London: Routledge, 1996), 1.

⁷⁹ Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, 96.

rather “the remnants of stagnant Europe” within the state, and only afterwards the accord with the rest of “true Europe”. This standpoint was basically supported by Vladimir Lenin. On the other hand, there was an opinion held by Nikolai Bukharin, a prominent Bolshevik and Marxist who later, in 1926, would take the position of chairman of the Comintern’s Executive Committee. He remarked upon the issue more resolutely asserting that the alignment with “false Europe” would be harmful for Russia. The only way of interaction with stagnant Europe is a struggle against militarism and imperialism.⁸⁰ Thus, this short description of the debate on Europe among the Bolsheviks illustrates the discourse, the categories that the Bolsheviks embraced.

The second view on Europe was non-Bolshevik or what Neumann calls the Romantic nationalist position. The Romantic nationalists had been epitomized by two ideological and political movements – *smenovekhovtsy* and the Eurasianists. Briefly, both of them consisted of a group of Russian emigrants – the intellectuals who had left Russia as a result of the October Revolution and who broadly speaking contemplated Russia’s fate and possible ways of her development. In other words, two coterie expressed their attitude towards Russia and its relationships with Europe. The name *smenovekhovtsy* derived from the publication called *Smena vekh* for which the members of the group (to mention the most prominent one, Nikolay Ustryalov) wrote articles. Ustryalov considered the size and therefore the ability to expand territorially as an important element for the well-being of the state. Imperialism, according to Ustryalov, ought to be a starting point in the Russian foreign policy.

As far as the second coterie is concerned, the name of Nikolay Trubetskoy should be mentioned. He argued that Russia ought to ally herself with Asia in a struggle against Europe illustrated as “the product of the history of a specific ethnic group”⁸¹. Trubetskoy referred to Europeans as Romano-Germans who considered themselves representatives of humanity and from whom Russia had to abstain.

Thus, both perceptions described above depict controversy, at times hostile confrontation, towards Europe. Both groups consisted of persons who were for one reason or another forced to leave their homeland, not least leave for Europe, which makes the whole discussion more precious and illustrative regarding ‘othering’ Europeans.

⁸⁰ Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, 107.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 112.

3.4. *A Russian European*

The perception of Europeans by Russians has played an important role in the understanding of the Russian self-identity. The self / other nexus has been a matter of considerable debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers⁸². Although the debate mainly took place in the nineteenth century, the relations between Europe and Russia have been considered through the prism of that particular discussion later on. Neumann has not put much accent on it. Accordingly, it is worth mentioning Vladimir Kantor, a contemporary Russian writer, philosopher, and lecturer, and his article *A Russian European as a task for Russia*⁸³. In the article the author reflects upon the debate on Europe among Russian intellectuals and upon a phenomenon called a Russian European.

Kantor finds a row of similarities between the Slavophiles and Westernizers despite that traditionally they have been set against one another. To reiterate, the debate took place primarily in the nineteenth century, but have been extrapolated to the twentieth century, the time when the Bolsheviks seized power. Interestingly, Kantor considers the October Revolution to be a result of the fusion of Slavophiles' and Westernizers' ideas. According to Kantor, Vladimir Lenin absorbed both Westernizers' views, such as hatred for the Russian Orthodox Church and for the so-called Oblomovism (oblomovshchina)⁸⁴, as well as Slavophiles' beliefs, that manifested themselves through the transfer of the capital from Saint Petersburg to Moscow and the proclamation of bourgeois West to be Russia's enemy.⁸⁵

The thought that Russia is something opposite to Europe became to a certain extent the starting point of the debate. Both Slavophiles and Westernizers were fearful of real threats and troubles that Europe was faced with. The European path seemed problematic for them. Therefore, they moved from the idealization of Europe to the idealization of themselves as holders, and more importantly performers, of the superior ideas created in the West, namely socialism and other forms of revolutionism.⁸⁶

⁸² Members of a nineteenth-century intellectual movement who emphasized Russia's common historic destiny with the West, as opposed to Slavophiles, who believed Russia's traditions and destiny to be unique.

⁸³ Vladimir Kantor, "Russkiy evropeec kak zadacha Rossii," *Vestnik Evropy* 1 (2001), <http://magazines.russ.ru/vestnik/2001/1/kantor.html>.

⁸⁴ A term derives from the novel *Oblomov* by Russian writer Ivan Goncharov with the eponymous character who epitomizes "the backwardness, inertia and futility" of the Russian society. (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "oblomovshchina," accessed October, 13, 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/423897/oblomovshchina>.)

⁸⁵ Kantor.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

Like Neumann, Kantor accentuates the romanticism of the beliefs shared by both Slavophiles and Westernizers. He contrasts them with a realistic look at Russia's and the West's fate held by Russian Europeans. The Russian Europeans are a cultural phenomenon. It is significant to realize that the discourse in the Russian debate on Europe was not painted in black and white colors as it is often presented, but depicted in various tones. The phenomenon that Kantor calls the Russian European represents the special attitude to and perception of Europe. According to Kantor, the Russian European is a person who realized that Europe had undergone disasters and catastrophes, such as wars, epidemics, and revolts. The Russian European understood that Europe still had not erased social contradictions. However, her greatest merit is that each time Europe attempts to solve them without putting the blindfold on her eyes.⁸⁷ Russian Europeans expected this attitude from the Russian people as well, instead of applying the ready European solutions for Russian problems. Hence, Kantor makes parallels with Bolshevism and writes "when cursing the West and denying the principle of individuality we try to adapt at least one of European ideas, it loses immediately its European essence. This is the phenomenon of Leninist-Stalinist Marxism which pulled Russia into the confrontation with the West"⁸⁸.

3.5. Summary

The self / other perspective provides a conceptual framework that looks into the relationships between Europe and Russia through the prism of debate and perceptions experienced by both sides. The understanding of Russian and European 'otherness' is an important aspect in studying the connections between Russian revolutionary events and the sentiments in the Norwegian left, represented by the DNA. Furthermore, the DNA perceived itself as the Party belonging to the West-European cultural sphere as well as the British political tradition. The Russian Bolsheviks, in contrast, culturally was placed between the East and the West and relied upon Marxist theories.

All in all, the way how both Europeans and Russians perceived each other in the studied period has been discerned. It has been underlined how meaningful those perceptions were for their self-definition. As far as Europe is concerned, the twentieth century along with the revolution of 1917, encouraged even left Europeans to abstain from the radical ideas which had been sowed in the Russian soil, though rooted in Europe, and reaped primarily by

⁸⁷ Kantor.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Russians. The repercussions of the October Revolution frightened Europeans and perhaps raised awareness of how different they were from Russians. As for Russians, the debate on Europe played a significant, if not an essential role in their identity formation. Although, the debaters took diverse positions, the fusion of their ideas among other things resulted in the October Revolution. Not least, the Russian discussion of Europe gave birth to a special cultural phenomenon called by Kantor the Russian European.

Chapter 4. Sources and Methodology

The importance of newspapers as a primary historical source has not attracted as much researchers' interest as their social significance. Needless to say, considerable research has been done on the press and its influence on the formation of public opinion, on its language etc. In this chapter the following issues with emphasis on the newspaper *Social-Demokraten* will be discussed: the press as a category of historical sources, the ways of reading newspapers as historical sources, and the selection of the editorials for the thesis.

4.1. The press' place among historical sources

Source studies are a discipline which focuses on the use of sources and their criticism. Historical sources are often divided in various groups dependent on their types. This discussion will focus on written, first hand historical sources, namely the press.

Soviet and later Russian researchers of source studies have paid considerable attention to the press as a source of historical data. The classification of written historical sources has been a significant issue in Soviet / Russian historiography. Already in the 1950s the printed media was distinguished as an independent historical source along with legislative acts, documentation and record keeping, personal narratives, publicist writings, literary works, and scientific works.⁸⁹ Each of the aforementioned types in its turn divided into subgroups. As far as the press is concerned, it may be presented in different forms – newspapers, magazines, bulletins, etc.; and include diverse genres – informative, analytical, and art-publicistic⁹⁰.

The informative genre in the newspaper *Social-Demokraten* includes accounts (a detailed description of an event with a minimal subjective evaluation), items (a statement of facts), reports (information from place where events occur, author's attitude is clearly expressed). The analytical genre is represented by articles (where emphasis is put on author's opinion on an issue), particularly by editorials, where the editor gives their opinion on an issue; and finally the art-publicist genre refers to causeries and feuilletons⁹¹. The thesis focuses on the information represented by an analytical genre as the latter accentuates attitudes of the newspaper towards the studied issues.

⁸⁹ Vadim Rynkov, "Periodicheskaya pechat: mesto v sisteme istoricheskikh istochnikov," *Otechestvennie arkhivi* 3 (2010), <http://polit.ru/article/2010/08/09/periodika/>.

⁹⁰ Igor N. Danilevsky et al., *Istochnikovedeniye* (Moscow: RGGU, Institut "Otkrytoe obschestvo", 2004), 621-622.

⁹¹ Danilevsky et al., 622.

However, in recent years the use of the press as a historical source has been revised. The question whether the press should be referred to as a distinct category of historical sources has been analyzed by Vadim Rynkov⁹². The Russian historian argues that the press cannot be considered as an independent historical source as the press is not a comprehensive source itself, but includes a variety of sources. So for example, a newspaper may contain both legislative acts, and literary works; consequently, the researcher suggests regarding *each* piece of writing published in the press as a source, instead of regarding a *whole* publication as a source.

In this thesis the press is referred to as a separate category of historical sources, while newspapers are seen as one of the forms of the press. The focus of this study is the *whole* newspaper *Social-Demokraten* which is considered as a historical source, as well as all the relevant content of the newspaper represented by the analytical genre.

One of the arguments for the use of the press as a source of historical data is its crucial role in both reflecting and shaping a society. They contain not only bare facts of what actually happened in any given time and place, but also people's interpretation of what has happened.⁹³

Thus, newspapers become more than a secondary source when one seeks to comprehend the public opinion or an opinion of a group of people.⁹⁴ They transcend the atmosphere of time and contain descriptions of prominent economic, social and cultural developments in the society.⁹⁵ They are a mouthpiece of political trends in a society which express not only political events, but also public reactions to them. Hence, the newspaper as a source is useful for studying how opinions are created and what affects those opinions.

Editorials are one of the principal components when reading newspapers as historical sources. Since the amount of the source material is quite substantial, the author decided to pay special attention to the editorials, as they express an attitude of newspapers' editors and as a rule are devoted to important domestic and foreign issues. Editorials are often considered to be

⁹² Rynkov.

⁹³ Jerry W. Knudson, *Late to the Feast: Newspapers as Historical Sources* (1993), accessed September 16, 2013, <http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/1993/9310/9310ARC.cfm>.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Hans Peter Clausen, *Aviser som historisk kilder* (Århus: Institut for presseforskning og samtidshistorie, 1962), 12.

representative not only of the editor's views, but also of the newspaper's views.⁹⁶ They are perceived as a voice of the newspaper's political and ideological position. The editor has responsibility for the political content particularly in editorials. Therefore, editorials are regarded as more thorough than the rest of the newspaper's material.⁹⁷ Furthermore, reading editorials may contribute to detecting the continuity in the newspaper's opinions.⁹⁸ Thus, editorials may be considered as a mouthpiece for an official opinion of the newspaper, which is a major factor in understanding attitudes towards Russia / Soviet Union.

The newspaper *Social-Demokraten* is available on microfilms in the library of University of Tromsø. The period of 1915—1923 is represented on thirty-three microfilms. The quality of the materials was primarily good apart from several issues which were blurry or unreadable, dark or, conversely, bright. However, the microfilm scanner program *ScanPro 2000* facilitated the easier reading of the materials providing the reader with a bar of different tools helping to adjust the articles for better use. The articles could be copied as PDF-files on the computer, a memory stick, or printed out.

4.2. Ways of using newspapers as historical sources

There are several ways of using newspapers as sources of historical data. The topic has been described by the Norwegian historian Hallvard Tjelmeland in the article *Newspapers as a historical source*⁹⁹.

The first way is to look at newspapers simply as a source of relevant information. In other words, to discover a piece of information that could be found only in this particular newspaper and that contains first- or second-hand observations on wide range of topics¹⁰⁰. This approach could be represented by various news items, in other words, statements of facts. The newspaper is filled by this type of news. An example of it may be a short piece of news on an agreement on export of wheat from Russia to France dated January 4, 1915.

Secondly, newspapers may be seen as a “remnant”. It means that a historian pays attention not only to the direct message (as for instance, an agreement on wheat export), but also to the way and reason why they are presented this way, in other words, the author's intention. In this

⁹⁶ Larssen, 13.

⁹⁷ Lene Sofie Brustind, *Nordnorske holdninger til Russland. En studie av Nordlys' og Finnmarkens dekning av Russland i perioden 1900-1918* (Universitetet i Tromsø, 2005), 19-20.

⁹⁸ Larssen, 14.

⁹⁹ Hallvard Tjelmeland, “Aviser som historisk kilde,” *Pressehistoriske skrifter* 3 (2004): 114-131.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 114.

case, it is more important to possess detailed knowledge of the newspaper the piece of information is taken from. Considering newspapers as a source for researching certain views and attitudes entails two aspects. The first aspect is that a historian may look at opinions expressed in the newspaper and regard it as an actor in the political race. The second aspect is more indirect and emphasizes how the newspaper through its statements reflects opinions present in the society. Hence, using newspapers as an expression of opinions and attitudes falls under the category of “remnants”.¹⁰¹ The thesis emphasizes both aspects. The focus is placed on the newspaper’s opinion on the Russian Revolution represented by the three editors’ views. This way signifies reading the *Social-Demokraten* as an opinion-maker.

Thirdly, newspapers could be examined as reality-makers. Newspapers do not only passively reflect modernity, they also create reality. In other words, newspapers may be a source of how the reality is being constructed. And newspapers have an ability to create unity among its readers.¹⁰² For instance, it may be expressed as unity within an ethnicity, within a region, or the unity between classes as it occurred in case of the *Social-Demokraten*. The newspaper became a mouthpiece for Norwegian workers and was supported by them. Finally, the fourth way is to study newspapers as a media product, not only as a relevant category of sources.¹⁰³ Hence, considering the newspaper through the prism of this approach will allow the researcher to find the place of the *Social-Demokraten* among other Norwegian newspapers under the studied period.

Thus, four ways of approaching newspapers as historical sources have been described. All of them are relevant for studying the *Social-Demokraten* as the focus of the paper lies in all the categories described by H. Tjelmeland. Firstly, the emphasis is placed on facts about the Russian Revolution, events that took place in Russia / Soviet Union and how they influenced the Norwegian left wing. Secondly, opinions, attitudes and evaluations of these events and their consequences are crucial for the research. Thirdly, detecting the way the author tried to influence the readers is important, and finally, the newspaper as a representative of the Norwegian labor press should be understood.

¹⁰¹ Clausen, 11.

¹⁰² Tjelmeland, 125.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 114-129.

4.3. Selection of sources for the thesis

The editorials of the newspaper *Social-Demokraten* have been selected in accordance with their relevance to the topic. The articles were considered relevant dependent on their content. The editorials devoted to Russia / Soviet Union politically, socially, economically and culturally have been taken into consideration. Such a wide range of criteria for the selection of relevant materials provides a broad spectrum of attitudes towards Russia / the Soviet government and allows the researcher to get a more accurate picture of the influences coming from there.

Special attention has been paid to the editorials as they are an important source when one attempts to understand the “official” position of a newspaper. Editorials frequently represent the editor’s point of view, which makes them a specifically valuable source when studying the newspaper’s political affiliations. During nine years, from 1915 to 1923, the newspaper *Social-Demokraten* had three editors, namely Jacob Vidnes (1912—1918), Olav Schefflo (1918—1921) and Martin Tranmæl (1921—1949)¹⁰⁴. Reading the editorials produced by the three editors might give knowledge not only of the editorial staff and their journalistic capacities, but more importantly also of a possible divergence of opinions on the Russian Revolution and its consequences.

In general 125 editorials have been collected. The author has divided them into eight groups in accordance with their topics. Although such a division of sources is rather tentative, it is still a useful tool to describe tendencies and patterns in the collected material. Thus, the eight categories include topics on Russian / Soviet foreign affairs; Russian / Soviet domestic affairs; connections between Norway and Russia; the situation of workers in European countries and labor movement in general; the activity of the DNA; the International; socialism, class struggle, social democracy; and other issues that have not fit any of the aforementioned categories. Hence, it helps provide a way to ascertain which categories prevail and therefore connect it to certain events, to the editor and his personal attitudes to these events; and as a result discover the change in newspaper’s “official” opinion, if it took place.

4.4. Summary

Using newspapers as historical sources implies applying a certain method for reading them. It is important to clearly define what one is seeking to find: bare facts, opinions / attitudes, or

¹⁰⁴ *Store Norske Leksikon*, s. v. “Dagsavisen,” accessed March 02, 2014, <http://snl.no/Dagsavisen>.

perhaps both. In this respect, the four ways discussed by Tjelmeland are useful. Besides, newspapers may include many types of information, which makes them a richer source. Accordingly, when using the press as a historical source we may risk collecting insufficient, rather than false data.¹⁰⁵

Newspapers as a phenomenon are exposed to bias, censorship, and inaccuracies. Nevertheless, the type of bias likely to occur in the press is more of “silence and emphasis rather than outright false information”¹⁰⁶. In the thesis the political bias expressed in the *Social-Demokraten* is a salient part of the analysis. The bias may affect newspaper’s main target audience by portraying certain events in a certain way. Moreover, the political bias in the *Social-Demokraten*’s editorials is the indicator of political will and ideological intentions of the editors.

¹⁰⁵ Robert Franzosi, “The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data: Issues in the Methodology of Data Collection from Newspapers,” *Historical Methods* 20:1 (1987): 8, <http://personal.psc.isr.umich.edu/yuxie-web/files/soc543/Franzosi1987.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

Chapter 5. Analysis

5.1. *The editorship of Jacob Vidnes*

This analysis is based on twenty-eight (28) editorials written by Jacob Vidnes in the period from 1915 to 1918. The editorials cover a wide range of topics. The following paragraphs are organized thematically. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate Vidnes' views on: the position of the working class and the day of the 1st of May, the issues of peace and disarmament, revolutionary Russia, and finally, the attitude to radicalism.

5.1.1. *The 1st of May and the working class*

In 1907 the Second International held a Congress in Stuttgart. It was declared that the social democratic parties must make a great effort to prevent the war. Norway was a member of the Congress. However, those attempts did not succeed – the First World War became a factum.¹⁰⁷

In the editorials Jacob Vidnes refers to the issue of workers' condition in connection with the First World War. The editor is consistent in evaluating the war – he considers it as an obstacle to the further development of the international labor movement. In the article titled *1915*¹⁰⁸, Vidnes underlines the significance of strong labor unions as a counterbalance to the forces seeking to suppress the working class and exacerbate its living conditions. These forces are epitomized by the upper class who takes advantage of the current circumstances at the cost of the working class. Vidnes' statements somewhat correlate with the course that had been taken at the Second International's Congress in Stuttgart. The parties came to an agreement to utilize the economic and political crisis initiated by the war in order to raise broad layers of population and thereby accelerate a fall of capitalism.¹⁰⁹

In addition, the editor emphasizes the importance of the working class in the international arena with the focus on the day of the First of May and its meaning for workers. This day was primarily an agitation day, when the labor movement came out into the streets to deliver its political message. Furthermore, it was a day when the labor movement could demonstrate its evolvment and growth.¹¹⁰ This topic has been discussed by Vidnes in the article *This year's*

¹⁰⁷ Bjørnson, 471.

¹⁰⁸ "1915," *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.1.1.

¹⁰⁹ Bjørnson, 472.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 239.

*First May Demonstration*¹¹¹. The 1st of May, in his opinion, is particularly important in this regard. It is the day when workers should gather, support the International and the class struggle against ‘capitalist exploiters’. According to Vidnes, the class struggle and socialism are the ground on which the working class should reconstruct the international fraternity undermined by the war. The author emphasizes the necessity to revise the International. For him the latter plays a crucial role not only for the working class, but also for the future and restoration of European culture¹¹². However, the editor sees the war as a catalyst for the spread of hate among nations. Therefore, he suggests developing a new international understanding with the help of the International. Perhaps, by the “new international understanding” Vidnes meant the new Zimmerwald-movement, which was established in 1915 in the eponymous town in Switzerland. The movement sought to strengthen the internationalist socialist movement after the war. In August 1918 Italian socialists initiated the conference in Swiss Zimmerwald with thirty-eight delegates from eleven countries. The left-wing of the conference proposed a principle according to which the socialists’ task was to lead the working class’ struggle against their own governments for the purpose of seizing political power.¹¹³

In 1916 in the editorial about the day of the 1st of May¹¹⁴, Vidnes asserts that socialist consciousness now has been awoken in all countries. He underlines the importance of the demand for peace among workers, and the struggle against militarism and capitalism.

One year later, in 1917, Vidnes devoted the article on the 1st of May¹¹⁵ to the demand for an eight-hour working day. He writes that this issue has been major among workers all over the world, not least in revolutionary Russia. He considers this demand to be a means of pushing forward workers’ needs and of seizing political and economic power in the society. Hence, to some extent he reiterates his opinion that on the 1st of May workers should demonstrate more actively against scarcity and arms policy.

The author also specifies which slogans workers should demonstrate with. They are struggle against military fraud and bread overpricing as well as the working class’ liberation from capitalism and militarism. Summing up the results of the year 1915, Vidnes in the eponymous

¹¹¹ “1. mai-demonstrationen iaar,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.4.29.

¹¹² “Internationalen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.6.8.

¹¹³ Bjørnson, 473.

¹¹⁴ “1. mai,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1916.4.29.

¹¹⁵ “1. mai,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.4.30.

article¹¹⁶ draws attention to the workers' situation. As he points out, the position of the working class has not been improved compared to other social groups who have enriched themselves during the year. He hopes that in the next year 1916 workers will gather in order to liberate the society from dismays, overthrow capitalism and "move forward to a new light socialist day"¹¹⁷.

Thus, the editorials on the working class and its position in the society have been one of the central themes in the period of Vidnes' editorship. Reflecting upon this issue, he refers to Russia and the Russian Revolution only once, in regard to the demand for an eight-hour working day. However, Vidnes' rhetoric is sympathetic towards the rhetoric of revolutionary workers in Russia, and is indicative of his deep-seated left-wing views.

5.1.2. Peace and disarmament as guidelines for a socialist policy

Most of the selected editorials written by Vidnes are connected to the subject of socialism and social democracy. For Vidnes it seems to be a matter of honor to defend the peaceful views of the Party from the insults hurled by the right-wing press. Vidnes calls the latter the "conservative military organs" and accuses it of cynicism. He often contrasts the *Social-Demokraten* with the right-wing press underlining the importance of peace particularly for the newspaper *Social-Demokraten*. For example, he emphasizes that unlike the party *Venstre* the social democrats demand social solidarity and seek to create economy where "no one feels aggrieved, where no one enriches themselves at the expense of other people's work and where no one who is willing to work feels lack of anything"¹¹⁸. In general, Vidnes considers social democracy as the best and the only means of peace. But the editor admits that international socialism has been too weak to prevent the First World War.¹¹⁹ Six months later in July 1915 he writes that international social democracy had quickly responded to the war but was not able to spread its influence among the masses.

The criticism of the Norwegian right-wing press has been also expressed in relation to the support of arms policy. The author analyzes the role of armament in Norway's politics in the article *Future of the Country*¹²⁰. He emphasizes the significance of peace and disarmament for social democrats stating that they are one of few coteries who advocate peace. However, a

¹¹⁶ "1915," *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.12.31.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ "Landets fremtid," *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.9.30.

¹¹⁹ "Konferansen i Kjøbenhavn," *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.1.22.

¹²⁰ "Landets fremtid," *Social-Demokraten*, 15.9.29.

year later, in 1916¹²¹, he slightly changes his argument stating that all political forces in Norway are interested in peace. Naturally, he discerns the leading role of the working class in this process, and appeals to the latter to be vigilant and capable of using the power and influence they possess to maintain the national and economic interests of the country and its people.

The topic of peace and disarmament constantly runs through Vidnes' editorials. For instance, he exemplifies the possible harm of armament by reflecting upon the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway in 1905. The editor concludes that if Norway possessed larger arsenal in 1905, the nation would have been involved in the war rather than reached the Karlstad agreement with Sweden. Vidnes believes that the arms policy contributes to an outbreak of war and leads to suppression of an independent state. He sets Russia as an example, where social democrats did not support the adoption of the state grant on war expenses. Reflecting upon this, Vidnes writes that this action "has shown that the spirit and existence of international socialism has not faded away, it is still in the world proletariat's heart"¹²². Vidnes highly praises Russian social democracy which, in spite of the upper class' enthusiasm for war and national chauvinism did what it was entitled to do, namely resisted the country's military build-up.

As early as 1915 Vidnes predicts the failure of tsarism. Being an ardent supporter of the termination of the war, Vidnes condemns the tsar for popularizing the war and states that "tsarism and its henchmen are and will be the same, they have learned nothing and they have forgotten nothing. Therefore they will facilitate their own dissolution."¹²³

Thus, the issues of peace and disarmament have been represented by Jacob Vidnes as crucial for international socialism in general and for the DNA in particular. The editor rigorously responds to the critique from the conservative press, asserting in most of the editorials that the working class is one of the few social groups who is willing to reach peace. As for revolutionary Russia, the author in the article *Social Democracy and Peace* dated 1917 positively evaluates her demands for a peace treaty and asserts that she has also raised a hope for peace in other countries at war.¹²⁴

¹²¹ "Arbeiderne og situationen," *Social-Demokraten*, 16.11.13.

¹²² "Duma-medlemmernes forvisning," *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.3.2.

¹²³ "Duma-medlemmernes forvisning," *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.3.2.

¹²⁴ "Social-demokratiet og freden," *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.5.3.

5.1.3. Revolutionary Russia

There is a series of editorials concerning revolutionary Russia. They are quite inconsistent regarding the assessments of events taking place in Russia as well as to the Bolshevik rule. On the one hand, the editor seems receptive to Bolsheviks politics, but on the other hand he may sharply criticize their actions.

Vidnes underlines the significance and indispensability of Russia as a member of the so-called socialist world in the editorial about the Stockholm conference¹²⁵. The initiative for an international socialist conference belonged to neutral Dutch and Scandinavian socialists with the official name the *Dutch-Scandinavian Committee* established in May 1917. The latter aimed at “bringing the parties of the belligerent countries together to see if common ground could be reached on a general socialist peace policy”.¹²⁶ The conference was postponed and later cancelled due to the Entente governments’ refusal to give out the necessary documents for the socialists who were going to the conference. Revolutionary Russia telegraphed that the representatives from Russia would be sent on the condition that the other international participants would be members of socialist parties. Emphasizing the role of Russia in the coming conference, the editor writes that “the international conference without affiliation of revolutionary socialist Russia definitely cannot be held”¹²⁷. This demonstrates Vidnes’ perception of Russia’s role in international social democracy.

In general, the attitude of Vidnes to the revolution in Russia appears to be positive. In the article *Reaction and Revolution*¹²⁸ dated 1917, the editor sharply criticizes the conservative French and English press for the support of militarism. The French newspaper *Martin* and the English *Times* have asserted that they hope that General Kornilov¹²⁹ will be able to stop the revolution in Russia. Vidnes calls such a statement a betrayal. He considers ‘saving’ the Russian Revolution to be the biggest task for the world democracy. If the revolutionary

¹²⁵ “Stockholm-konferansen,” *Social-Demokraten* 1917.9.17.

¹²⁶ David Kirby, “International Socialism and the Question of Peace: The Stockholm Conference of 1917,” *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1982): 709-710, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638753>.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 710.

¹²⁸ “Reaktioner og revolutionen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.9.18.

¹²⁹ Imperial Russian general, who was accused of attempting to overthrow the provisional government established in Russia after the February Revolution of 1917. (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “Lavr Georgiyevich Kornilov,” accessed May 02, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/322524/Lavr-Georgiyevich-Kornilov>.)

attempt in Russia does not succeed, he writes, the international reaction will put ‘its iron hand on people’¹³⁰.

At the same time, Vidnes is very cautious in his evaluations of the Bolshevik’s politics in Russia. In the editorial with the indicative title *Revolution’s Chaos*¹³¹ Vidnes on the one hand overtly denounces Kerensky’s¹³² policy as incapable of solving current problems in Russia. But on the other hand, he admits that Russia is not mature enough for socialism – few people in the country know what socialism is, not to mention Bolsheviks’ maximalist socialist theories, the editor writes.¹³³ Vidnes associates the considerable support of the Bolsheviks among the population with their demand for making peace with Germany. Hence, for Vidnes the peace issue appears to be a key element in the Bolshevik politics as only peace can save the revolution.

Despite the editor’s enthusiasm for Russia’s initiative to end the war, he is not as enthusiastic about the idea of a Russian separate peace with Germany. He presumes that the separate peace should be avoided by the Russian Bolshevik leaders represented by Vladimir Lenin and Lev Trotsky as it will be not only humiliating for Russia, but also contradicting the principles of peace which have been set by revolutionary Russia.¹³⁴

The February Revolution has been discussed by Vidnes briefly. In March 1917, the editor issues an article under the title *The Revolution*¹³⁵, where he draws parallels between the French, German¹³⁶ and Russian revolutions and concludes that the latter “looks more like a coup in a left direction rather than a revolution with a complete change of social and political systems as a goal”. He refers to the interview of Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government in Russia Pavel Milukov in *Social-Demokraten* in September 1916¹³⁷. As Vidnes puts it, according to this interview, liberal and ‘working Russia’¹³⁸ wish the dream about the Dardanelles to be fulfilled. In other words, Russian imperialist ambitions to take control of the strategically important strait towards the Black Sea named Dardanelles were still of current

¹³⁰ “Reaktioner og revolutioner,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.9.18.

¹³¹ “Revolutionens kaos,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.11.8.

¹³² Aleksandr Kerensky (1881-1970) moderate socialist revolutionary who served as head of the Russian provisional government from July to October 1917 (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “Aleksandr Fyodorovich Kerensky,” accessed May 02, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/315382/Aleksandr-Fyodorovich-Kerensky>.)

¹³³ “Revolutionens kaos,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.11.8.

¹³⁴ “Fredsförhandlingene,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.12.29. “Fredsutsigterne,” *Social-Demokraten* 1918.1.14.

¹³⁵ “Revolutionen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.3.17.

¹³⁶ The German Revolution is referred to the Revolution of 1848.

¹³⁷ “En russisk politiker om forholdene i Russland,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1916.9.20.

¹³⁸ The quotation marks belong to Vidnes and indicate his disagreement with Mulukov’s statement.

interest. Vidnes sees in such a statement the official position of revolutionary Russia which is disappointing for the editor. Nevertheless, Vidnes realizes that a real democratic rule of people is vastly different from the traditional tsar rule that the Russian people are so used to. Therefore, according to the editor, the appeal to democracy can fairly be called the Great Russian Revolution although there is still much to be done.

Over the years Vidnes' critical judgments on the Bolshevik policies become more definite. This tendency manifests itself mainly in the editorials written in 1918. Perhaps, the most radical critique of the Bolshevik government is expressed in the editorial *Gross Violations*¹³⁹. The violations are connected with the political course taken by the Bolshevik government. This course is described by Vidnes as Bolsheviks' brutal suppression of democracy, dissolution of the Constituent Assembly¹⁴⁰, arrests of the social democratic party leadership, suppression of the press, persecution of dissidents. These aspects of Bolsheviks' politics cause Vidnes' indignation expressed in a statement that Bolshevism undoubtedly is not going to be better than tsarism. It is a serious assertion taking into consideration the moderate support of Bolshevism having been lent by Vidnes previously. Interestingly, in the editorial under the title *Bolshevik Government*¹⁴¹ which was issued only four days before, Vidnes is more tolerant of the Bolshevik rule. He does not accept the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. For Vidnes it was the only authority that gained trust and that could evoke necessary respect for the republic among the population.¹⁴² He assumes that this step will not contribute to strengthening the power of socialism and peace in Russia. Furthermore, he believes that the possibilities of freedom, democracy, socialism and peace are considerably reduced in Russia.

But in spite of Vidnes' discontent with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, he is still receptive to this action. On the one hand, citing German General Hoffman, he does not deny that the Bolsheviks carry out military dictatorship. But on the other hand, he justifies it by speculating on what Trotsky could have replied to General Hoffman. The answer could have been that the military dictatorship is a temporary necessity present until people themselves would express their opinions.

¹³⁹ "Store brytninger," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.1.26.

¹⁴⁰ It was a popularly elected body that convened in Petrograd to write a constitution and form a government for post-revolutionary Russia. The Socialist Revolutionary Party won a majority in the new Assembly as their program was particularly supported by the peasantry. The Bolsheviks' reaction was not slow to come. They forcibly dissolved the Assembly since they could not control its decisions when the majority had been obtained by the socialist-revolutionaries.

¹⁴¹ "Bolshevikernes regjering," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.1.21.

¹⁴² "Er revolutionen i fare?" *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.2.21.

In addition, the editor criticizes¹⁴³ the newspaper *Morgenbladet*, which has stated that Russia and the revolution there pose a threat to Norway. Vidnes writes that the conservative press seeks not to miss the opportunity to be fearful of Russia <*russerfrygt*> because it justifies their will to get more militarized. Thus, Vidnes' assessments regarding revolutionary Russia are not consistent. On the one hand, he favors the revolutionary changes in Russia brought about by the Bolsheviks, as they have been contributing to the democratization of the Russian society. But on the other hand, he condemns the Bolsheviks' dictatorial ambitions.

5.1.4. Radicalism

As it has been demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, Vidnes steadily emphasizes the need for peaceful resolutions of the disputes between countries at war. He repeatedly underlines the importance of law and justice and the significance of respecting the will of people. In this regard, Vidnes considers monarchy as an obstacle and it becomes obvious how the aversion of constitutional monarchy in Vidnes' editorials comes to the fore. For example, in the article *The Revision of the Constitution or Revolution*¹⁴⁴, the author sees the roots of the war not in the disagreement among the state-participants, but in the fulfillment of the thirst for power among monarchs and the high command. Hence, the termination of the war Vidnes directly links to the abolishment of few people's rule in states and social structures. Such a statement apparently hints at the use of revolutionary methods.

As it has been mentioned above, the issues on peace and disarmament are central for Jacob Vidnes. So through the appeal for disarmament, the editor emphasizes the necessity to do away with constitutional monarchy by *all* means. He still underlines the importance of the peaceful path, namely the revision of the constitution. But if the revision does not occur, then the alternative solution will come up – revolution.¹⁴⁵ Vidnes does not refer to any concrete country, his argument mainly concerns the European countries involved in the war. Two years later (in March 1917), though, the critique of constitutional monarchy becomes less radical. In the editorial *The Revolution*¹⁴⁶, Vidnes even finds certain advantages in constitutional monarchy. The free Constitution, he writes, will play a major role in the future as with the help of the Constitution people may achieve required independence.

¹⁴³ "En ny russisk fare," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.1.3.

¹⁴⁴ "Forfatningsrevision eller Revolution," *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.6.2.

¹⁴⁵ "Forfatningsrevision eller Revolution," *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.6.2.

¹⁴⁶ "Revolutionen," *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.3.17.

Although Vidnes writes about a revolution as an alternative method for achieving the working class' goals in Russia, a similar way in Norway does not seem reasonable for him. He refers to this issue in the editorial *Rationing and the Workers*¹⁴⁷, where he describes a difficult situation due to the lack of flour and potatoes that Norwegian workers are faced with. In this regard, the editor refers to the Bolshevik experiences, such as creation of a workers' council which will possess all the power in the society. However, such a council would enormously reduce influence of the Norwegian Parliament – Storting – and commune authorities. Accordingly, Vidnes points out that the situations in both countries are completely different, therefore transferring to Norway revolutionary methods being used in Russia is not appropriate as it will “create chaos and confusion”. Thus, in practice Vidnes does not see the alleviation of workers' conditions in Norway by revolutionary means. In contrast, he acknowledges the supremacy of the Parliament and law.

The emphasis of the rule of law may be traced in the editorial titled *Party Split*¹⁴⁸. Vidnes demonstrates that the ideas supported by the radical wing of the DNA are unacceptable for the moderate party members. These ideas and beliefs are based on the rejection of parliamentarism and adherence to “anarchistic Bolshevism” – something that Vidnes repudiates. When writing about the radical wing of the DNA, the editor refers specifically to Olav Scheflo¹⁴⁹, who at that time was the editor of the newspaper *Arbeidet*. Vidnes denies Scheflo's statement that the newspaper *Social-Demokraten* is a principal opponent of revolution. “When have we said that we are the opponents of the Russian Revolution?”¹⁵⁰ Vidnes asks. He does not argue with Scheflo regarding revolutionary means in Russia. According to Vidnes, a Russian social order is more likely to be profoundly changed by means of a revolution. The core of the dispute, however, lies in the development of socialism in Norway. Vidnes insists that in Norway socialism ought to be evolved through the Parliament and trade unions.

Vidnes himself may appear unequivocal when he writes about socialism and its mission. Such sentiments are visible in the editorial *Be Loyal as a Rebel*¹⁵¹, where Vidnes draws unusual parallels between contemporary socialism and Jesus. He compares the resistance socialism meets today to the resistance Jesus met two thousand years ago. He assumes that through the

¹⁴⁷ “Rationeringen og arbeiderne,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.1.4.

¹⁴⁸ “Partisplittelse,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.3.1.

¹⁴⁹ “Den revolutionære hr. Scheflo,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.3.21.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ “Vær tro som opprører,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.12.29.

reforms of social order, socialists attempt to fulfill the fundamental ideas of Christianity. He underlines that a socialist has been seen as a rebel and apostate by rulers and the masses. Some part of the masses, he writes, has changed their opinions, but the rulers still adhere to this view. He poetically concludes that the day a socialist is no longer a rebel against the existing system – s/he becomes a traitor to the common cause. This editorial demonstrates how Vidnes perceives the socialist cause. Comparing socialism to Jesus, the author refers to the total dedication of and self-sacrificing attitude of the working class in order to change the unfair social order.

5.1.5. Summary

Four themes of Jacob Vidnes' editorship have been analyzed in this chapter – the working class's condition and the significance of the First of May, peace and disarmament, revolution in Russia and the Bolshevik rule, and radicalism and its expression in the studied editorials.

Perhaps Vidnes' greatest concerns are the restoration of peace, implementation a disarmament policy, and improvement of the working class's position. The opinions on these issues have been quite consistent.

But in the course of three years, from 1915 to 1918, Vidnes' perceptions on Russia and on the revolutionary situation in the country have been changed. Prior to 1917, Vidnes supports Russian social democrats primarily because of their view on the war, in other words, their peaceful intentions. Hence, the self / other nexus discussed in the chapter 3, at that period was more inclined to the inclusion of the Russian Other. The latter was not markedly different, as both Norwegian and Russian social democrats followed more or less the same direction – towards termination of the war. Moreover, before the revolution in Russia, Russian social democracy has been mentioned by Vidnes only in connection with promotion of peace with Germany and demands for disarmament.

However, after 1917 the perceptions of Russia have become more inconsistent and oriented to the exclusion of the Russian Other. Vidnes' editorials demonstrate that he is an outspoken opponent of tsarism. He sympathizes with the Bolsheviks demands contributing to democratic rule. Democratic values for the editor are crucial. Therefore, when he feels that these fragile values start being threatened by the Bolsheviks (the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly), his support turns into a severe critique. However, Vidnes still justifies the revolutionary means used in Russia during the February Revolution as he considers them as a real possibility of

changing the tsar rule. But he does not think such a means is appropriate for Norwegian workers.

5.2. The editorship of Olav Scheflo

This chapter is devoted to the editorship of Olav Scheflo which covered the period from 2^d of April, 1918 to 9th of May 1921. The analysis is based on fifty-three (53) editorials. Overall, the studied editorials embraced four topics relevant to the analysis: the Bolsheviks and the press, the world revolution and Norway, radical means of the working class' liberation, the Third International and the Party split. In the given analysis, these topics proved to be central under Scheflo's editorship. The following paragraphs are organized thematically.

5.2.1. Bolshevism and the press

At the convention of the DNA in April 1918, the radical wing of the Party obtained a majority. The parliamentary line the reformists had followed was breached by the radical wing's victory.¹⁵² Accordingly, previous reformist editor Jacob Vidnes was replaced with the new editor – radical Olav Scheflo. In April 1918, when Scheflo started working as an editor of the newspaper *Social-Demokraten*, his support of Soviet Russia did not manifest itself as much as it did later. In the article *The Labor Party's International Connections*¹⁵³, he accentuates the German social democracy's influence on the DNA, calling the former “a brother-party”. Scheflo is particularly sympathetic to the independent group within German social democracy led by Hugo Haase¹⁵⁴. Scheflo writes that the German Social Democratic Party is an adherent of Karl Liebknecht¹⁵⁵ and August Bebel¹⁵⁶, and that the DNA is proud to assert that the principles and tactics of German social democracy accord with the DNA's principles and tactics.

¹⁵² Bjørnson, 471.

¹⁵³ “Arbeiderpartiets internationale forbindelser,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.4.3.

¹⁵⁴ Hugo Haase (1863-1919), German socialist was leading the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The protest against the war led him to resign from the SPD and lead a splinter party dedicated to ending the war in 1917. (Michael Duffy, *Who's Who – Hugo Haase*, accessed April 30, 2014, <http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/haase.htm>.)

¹⁵⁵ Karl Liebknecht (1871-1919), German Social Democrat, who, with [Rosa Luxemburg](#) and other radicals, founded [Spartacus League](#), a Berlin underground group that became the [Communist Party of Germany](#), dedicated to a socialist revolution. (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “Karl Liebknecht,” accessed April 30, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/339854/Karl-Liebknecht>.)

¹⁵⁶ August Bebel (1840-1913), German Socialist, cofounder of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Germany and its most influential and popular leader for more than forty years. He is one of the leading figures in the history of western European socialism. (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “August Bebel,” accessed April 30, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/57832/August-Bebel>.)

Although Scheflo underlines the significance of German social democracy, the editorials on Soviet Russia and the Bolshevik rule occupy steadily more space in the newspaper's editorials. The support of Bolshevism becomes visible already in the early editor's articles and is expressed in a severe critique of the press which one way or another endorses the counterrevolution in Russia or criticizes the Bolshevik rule. Scheflo's critique is repeatedly directed not only at the "deliberately dishonest"¹⁵⁷ bourgeois press¹⁵⁸, but also at the eponymous Swedish newspaper *Social-Demokraten*¹⁵⁹. According to Scheflo, the Swedish paper condemns the Bolsheviks for the hunger and disorder in the country and predicts the victory of the counterrevolution. He calls it an agitation method and writes that it is "quite unworthy of a social democratic paper"¹⁶⁰. The Swedish labor movement was less radicalized than the Norwegian for a number of reasons briefly described in the introduction to this thesis. Hence, among Scandinavian countries the radical wing won a majority only in Norway. In Sweden the main print organ of the Social Democratic Party *Social-Demokraten* was led by reformists.¹⁶¹ Therefore, the attitude to the Bolsheviks was not as supportive as in the Norwegian *Social-Demokraten* under Scheflo's editorship.

Furthermore, the editor's critique of the bourgeois press concerns its inability to explain and comprehend what Bolshevism is.¹⁶² Scheflo refers to the definition of Bolshevism twice, without going into details. Firstly, in the editorial *Bolshevism and Socialism*¹⁶³, Scheflo describes it as a proletarian movement with "all the virtues of a proletarian movement" and considers that Bolshevism "deserves to have the place of honor among the working class as it carries out the class struggle with utmost energy. <...> We do not need to know more in order to make an opinion on Bolshevism". Secondly, he comments on the issue four months later in November 1918. Through the prism of the bourgeois press' view on Bolshevism, he writes that it is "a movement seeking to cause a conservative society's fall by means of violent, revolutionary actions beyond the Parliament."¹⁶⁴ Scheflo does not argue with this presumable definition, albeit he calls it incomplete. This remark is important as it indicates that Scheflo realizes which means the Bolsheviks use to achieve power, but is still supportive of them.

¹⁵⁷ "Arbeidspligt og arbeidstvang," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.10.20.

¹⁵⁸ "Revolutionen," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.28; "Norge og Russland," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.19.

¹⁵⁹ "Stillingen i Russland," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.6.24; "Den international situation," *Social-Demokraten* 1918.6.28; "Svensk "Soc.-Dem." og bolschevismen," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.7.3.

¹⁶⁰ "Den international situation," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.6.28.

¹⁶¹ *Svensk Uppslagsbok*, s. v. "*Social-Demokraten*, tidning," accessed April 30, 2014, <http://svenskuppslagsbok.se/71754/Social-Demokraten-tidning/>.

¹⁶² "Parlamentarisme og bolschevisme," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.5.

¹⁶³ "Bolschevismen og sosialismen," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.7.19.

¹⁶⁴ "Parlamentarisme og bolschevisme," *Social-Demokraten* 1918.11.5.

As far as the reactions on Bolshevism in Norway are concerned, Scheflo regrettingly states that in ninety percent of the Norwegian newspapers, the Bolsheviks are represented as “thugs who conduct the revolution only to quench their thirst for the upper class’ blood”¹⁶⁵. Scheflo does not agree with such a description, as for him the Bolsheviks and the Russian working class fight as “heroes <...> against the capitalist hydra <...>”.¹⁶⁶ As Lars A. Døvlé Larssen remarks, for Scheflo the formation of public opinion among the Norwegian workers for the purpose of supporting and collaborating with the Soviet government became a whole project.¹⁶⁷

Although Scheflo appears to be the Bolsheviks’ defender from the bourgeois press’ accusations, he admits their imperfections. Still, he justifies the Bolsheviks’ actions. In the editorial *The Russian Scandal*¹⁶⁸, Scheflo writes “the Bolsheviks are not angels <...> As most revolutionaries, they have executed many of their enemies, but most of these executions took place after the Allies’ intervention encouraged the counterrevolutionaries and made them more intimidating.” It is meaningful for the editor to distinguish the Norwegian newspaper *Social-Demokraten* from the European propagandist anti-Bolshevik press and the press which criticizes the Bolsheviks’ acts. In the editorial *Fabrications against Russia*¹⁶⁹, he accuses the English, French and German conservative press of organized anti-Soviet propaganda.

Scheflo assures the readers that the Soviet government’s position is firm and impregnable¹⁷⁰, despite all the bourgeois press’ predictions on the victory of the counterrevolution in Russia. In the editorial titled *The Revolution’s Status*¹⁷¹, Scheflo positively evaluates the development of the Russian Revolution, writing that its status “has never been better than now”. Furthermore, he writes: “The Bolshevik rule has existed more than one year. Their power has not been weakened. All reliable surveillance sources claim that their power grows and has maintained order, they are supported by eighty million people, it succeeds in solving economic problems, it promotes people’s sense for art, music and drama; it prepares a great plan for people’s education – in fact, it carries out normal functions of a government.”¹⁷²

¹⁶⁵ “Norge og Russland,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.19.

¹⁶⁶ “Aarsdagen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.11.7.

¹⁶⁷ Larssen, 152-153.

¹⁶⁸ “Den russiske skandale,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.12.16.

¹⁶⁹ “Løgntrafikken mot Russland,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.2.11.

¹⁷⁰ “Sammenbruddet,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.9.12.

¹⁷¹ “Revolutionens status,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.4.8.

¹⁷² “Den russiske skandale,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.12.16.

Accordingly, the editor is favorable to the Bolshevik rule, as he calls Bolshevism a common goal of all workers in Russia.¹⁷³

Thus, already in the beginning of Olav Scheflo's editorship, the newspaper *Social-Demokraten* appears to be a "Bolshevik friend"¹⁷⁴ and a 'haven of truth' about the Bolsheviks and their rule in Russia. Scheflo frequently reveals what he calls the bourgeois press' bad intentions to blacken the revolution in Russia and the Bolsheviks' activity. He persuades the readers that the Bolsheviks' actions are supported by the Russian working class and are accompanied with the class struggle which is vital for other European countries as well. In the next paragraph, Scheflo's expectations of the world revolution and Norway's role in it will be discussed.

5.2.2. *The World Revolution and Norway*

Olav Scheflo's editorials are a notable example of how ardently the radical socialist left in Europe awaited the world revolution. In 1919 Scheflo writes that "it is only a question of time and months when abusive Europe liberates itself from capitalism's rusty chains and fully enjoys its hard-earned freedom."¹⁷⁵ The Russian Revolution considerably contributed to such an expectation. It has shown that power can be seized by means of a coup.¹⁷⁶ "The events in Russia must necessarily have considerable effects on the whole world. Nothing is stronger than the power of an example and the speech of a fact", the editor writes.¹⁷⁷ Referring to the same issue in the editorial *Peace and Revolution*¹⁷⁸, Scheflo claims that the "Russian Bolsheviks have shown the world that a socialist revolution is no longer a beautiful dream, a utopia <...> but a real fact." Furthermore, in several European countries such as Hungary and Austria there were social disturbances and tendencies towards revolt¹⁷⁹, which denoted the inevitability of a revolution.

In particular, the hope for the world revolution appeared feasible during the German revolution of 1918—1919.¹⁸⁰ Scheflo is enthusiastic about the events in Germany. In this regard, he refers to the Russian Revolution "The German revolution has not performed its

¹⁷³ "Den store kamp," *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.8.25.

¹⁷⁴ "Rusland," *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.10.18.

¹⁷⁵ "Revolutionens status," *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.4.8.

¹⁷⁶ Fomin-Nilov, 73.

¹⁷⁷ "Ruslands nye forfatning," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.7.12.

¹⁷⁸ "Fred og revolution," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.12.24.

¹⁷⁹ Bjørnson, 480.

¹⁸⁰ Revolution in Germany.

historical mission before it comes at the level <*kommet i plan*> of the Russian Revolution.”¹⁸¹ He compares the revolutions in Germany and Russia and comes to a conclusion that the only difference between them is age – the Russian Revolution is one year older. In fact, there were more peculiarities in the course of events which led to the revolutions in Germany and Russia. Scheflo’s aspiration to portray both revolutions as similar demonstrates his approval of such a means of seizing power and indicates that two instances are harder to call an accident. In contrast to the conservative press, Scheflo characterizes the German revolution as Bolshevik. “The workers’ and soldiers’ councils have power – there is nothing to add”, the editor writes.¹⁸² In the events in Russia and Germany, Scheflo sees the stimulus to the similar developments in England and France.¹⁸³ Moreover, these events are significant for the editor as they, in his opinion, may accelerate the commencement of the period of socialism¹⁸⁴, which in turn is a “living condition for all countries”¹⁸⁵.

In this respect, Norway is not an exception – the country ought to be a part of a socialist world. Socialism for Scheflo is a synonym for “the economic and social liberation of the working class”¹⁸⁶. He repeatedly points out that the revolution in Norway is inevitable.¹⁸⁷ In the editorial devoted to the day of 1st of May, 1919¹⁸⁸, Scheflo claims the following regarding Norway, “We avoided the war, but we fortunately! do not avoid – the revolution. In this country the domination of the capitalist class will also soon be replaced with the society, where no one longer can live at a cost of other people’s work, but where everyone who *wants* to work may enjoy the fruits of common welfare.” A week later, the editor asserts that the capitalist world is about to collapse and that this collapse will embrace Norway. “Therefore the Central Committee of the Party suggests that the working class should prepare itself for eventualities that might occur before and during a revolution”¹⁸⁹. Odd-Bjørn Fure invokes the Convention’s resolution from May 1919 which concerns the main tendencies of the DNA’s politics in the period. The latter includes a thesis that the capitalist world is about to break down and that whole Europe is experiencing the transition from capitalism to socialism.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸¹ “For eller mot Rusland,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.3.5.

¹⁸² “Dette er bolschevisme,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.11.

¹⁸³ “Efter krigen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.12.

¹⁸⁴ “Nyt aar,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.1.2.

¹⁸⁵ “Socialismen et livskrav overalt,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.2.3.

¹⁸⁶ “Parlamentarisme og bolschevisme,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.5.

¹⁸⁷ “Valgene og revolutionen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.16.

¹⁸⁸ “Maidagen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.4.30.

¹⁸⁹ “Arbeiderpartiets taktik,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.5.8.

¹⁹⁰ Fure, 80-81.

Thus, according to Olav Scheflo, the world revolution is feasible in Norway in the nearest future, and the working class' commitment might enormously accelerate it. In addition, the revolution in Norway is a real opportunity to liberate the Norwegian working class. In the next paragraph, Scheflo's ideas of the means and ways of conducting revolution and profound changes in the Norwegian society will be discussed.

5.2.3. *Non-parliamentarian means of the working class' liberation*

One of the central issues for the given analysis is *by what means*, in Scheflo's view, the working class' liberation should be carried out as it may indicate the Russian Revolution's impact. In 1918, the editor writes that parliamentarian means would "naturally be the best"¹⁹¹. He continues, however, that if this way does not prove its value, the other path will have to be chosen, namely general strikes, mass actions, and dictatorship.¹⁹² The mass actions are considered by the editor as a decisive means.¹⁹³ These measures may be undoubtedly called radical and directly influenced by Bolsheviks' actions.

In the editorial *Revision of the Constitution or Revolution*¹⁹⁴, Scheflo invokes to reduce the age limit for voting from twenty-five to twenty-one years and provide conditions where each vote is equal. If these demands are not fulfilled, then non-parliamentarian ways or "more or less anarchist ways"¹⁹⁵ to achieve it will be considered. The editor highlights that the working class needs peace and order, which the current state of affairs as well as the society are not able to provide them with. Therefore, workers are willing to create a new society, which can be established "only by a revolutionary breach with the old conditions."¹⁹⁶

Scheflo's position on the means of achieving changes in the society manifests itself in the editorial *Social Democracy*¹⁹⁷. The editor asserts that such demands as universal suffrage, freedom of speech, the right of assembly, and parliamentarism are important. But they are not sufficient. The essential goal for Scheflo and his supporters is that working relations and living conditions are regulated by workers themselves, not by their "exploiters". And this goal is so vital that if all the rights mentioned above do not accelerate the changes favorable for

¹⁹¹ "Arbeiderpartiets taktik," *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.5.8.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ "Fagkongressen," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.7.10.

¹⁹⁴ "Forfatningsrevision eller revolution," *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.3.4.

¹⁹⁵ "Socialismen et livskrav overalt," *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.2.3.

¹⁹⁶ "Den offentlige orden," *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.3.28.

¹⁹⁷ "Det sociale demokrati," *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.4.23.

workers, they need to be sacrificed. Thus, Scheflo underlines the importance of freedoms and parliamentarism anew, but does not exclude their nullification.

Referring to the issue of parliamentarism, Scheflo expresses himself equivocally. According to the editor, parliamentarism is a form of rule applicable for a bourgeois society. Parliamentarism is “absolutely appropriate in the age of capitalism”¹⁹⁸ and should be applied as long as capitalism exists. Scheflo does not write directly that he is an opponent of parliamentarism. On the contrary, he articulates that the DNA does not seek to eliminate it. But at the same time, he admits that for a socialist society parliamentarism is inappropriate. And since Scheflo assumes that the working class irrevocably moves towards socialism, parliamentarism is “sentenced to death”¹⁹⁹. Scheflo’s statements on parliamentarism and its close demise are linked to the Party’s Central Committee’s decision on the Party’s strategy and tactics made in May 1919 and presented in the extraordinary Convention in June 1919. The Convention’s resolution was that mass actions became a decisive means of implementing socialism. This decision, according to Odd-Bjørn Fure, made the parliamentarian activity play a “secondary and supplementary role” in which the support of the non-parliamentarian actions and propaganda of the socialist ideas became major tasks.²⁰⁰

Consequently, there appears a relevant question – what form of rule, according to Scheflo, is suitable for a society undergoing the revolution? The answer is easy to find in the editorials. In the article titled *Parliamentarism and Revolution*²⁰¹, Scheflo argues that in revolutionary times the maintenance of a parliamentarian system is impossible. The only “natural and possible form of rule is dictatorship”²⁰². It is dictatorship that can contribute to promoting the public good.²⁰³ The editor explains what dictatorship is by contrasting it to parliamentarism and to the negotiations between contradicting parties. Scheflo puts forward that dictatorship as a form of rule is distinguished by the fact that those who mutually agree on the main issue, dictate their will to the rest of a population.²⁰⁴ However, the author underlines that dictatorship can be morally just only when it leads to the abolition of capitalism and liberation of the working class.

¹⁹⁸ “Vort parti og parlamentarismen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.6.27.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Fure, 82-83.

²⁰¹ “Parlamentarisme og revolution,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.6.23.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ “Klassemøtsætningerne tilspidses,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.5.11.

²⁰⁴ “Diktatur og demokrati,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.5.15.

As it has been mentioned before, Scheflo assumes that the working class in Norway is preparing itself for the class struggle and its liberation. In the editorial devoted to the 1st of May 1920²⁰⁵, Scheflo emphasizes the significance of workers' councils and socialization in Norway. The editor also suggests creating councils for peasants and fishermen. Such suggestions prove to be Bolsheviks' impact, since workers' councils played an essential role during the revolution in Russia.

Olav Scheflo does not conceal his fascination for Soviet Russia, Bolsheviks and their methods. The editor considers such means as general strikes, dictatorship and specifically mass actions to be appropriate for Norway. If in 1918 Scheflo denies the Norwegian conservative press' accusations against Norwegian socialists of receiving financial support from the Soviet government²⁰⁶, then in 1920 Scheflo does not deny that the DNA is ready to accept financial support from "other socialist parties" providing that the DNA needs it²⁰⁷. According to the numbers presented by Åsmund Egge and Terje Halvorsen, the Party apparently needed the other socialist parties' help. In August 1920 the DNA got 10 000 Swedish crowns from the Comintern. In December 1920 there was worked out a budget for 1921 in the amount of 180 000 crowns. In 1922 the Party asked the Comintern 130 000 crowns, but got around a half of the amount in gold rubles. In 1923 the DNA got 33 000 crowns.²⁰⁸

Scheflo reiterates the importance of maintaining communication with the Soviet government on the official level. Commenting on the diplomatic breach between Sweden and Russia, Scheflo is concerned over the affection of these events for Norway. He describes the Swedish and Norwegian policies towards Russia as "the same cowardice, the same falsehood, the same outright lies".²⁰⁹ Scheflo sees in the connections between Norway and Russia a considerable economic potential.²¹⁰ He writes the following "We should turn ourselves to the East, if we want to sell more than buy. We have to be in the Russian market. Those, who are not blind,

²⁰⁵ "1. mai," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.4.30.

²⁰⁶ "Norge og Russland," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.19.

²⁰⁷ "Russisk guld," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.8.28.

²⁰⁸ Åsmund Egge and Terje Halvorsen, "...kriteriet på en kommunist er hans forhold til Sovjetunionen' De norsk-sovjetiske partirelasjoner 1917—1991," *Arbeiderhistorie* (2002): 12.

²⁰⁹ "Avsløringen av aarsakene til bruddet med Rusland," *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.6.5.

²¹⁰ "Russisk guld," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.8.27.

must be able to see that there are great opportunities for the Norwegian economy in Russia. If we neglect these opportunities, the crisis will be imminently close.”²¹¹

Perhaps, even more enthusiasm regarding foreign policy line, Scheflo expresses towards Scandinavia. He accentuates the necessity to collaborate with the rest of the Scandinavian working class. He explains this necessity by stating that great changes cannot happen only in one country independently of others. Three Scandinavian countries ought to support each other and come to a new social order together.²¹²

Thus, Scheflo’s editorials demonstrate a direct impact of the Soviet government and its policies – the idea of workers councils and socialization, mass actions, general strikes, the abolition of parliamentarism in the future, and the establishment of dictatorship. However, not all the members of the DNA were willing to accept those changes, and the party was verging towards a split. In the following paragraph, Scheflo’s view on the split and the affiliation to the International will be discussed.

5.2.4. The International and the Party Split

In 1919, after the radical wing of the Party obtained a majority, the issue on the affiliation to the Comintern was resolved positively.²¹³ The first Comintern’s Congress managed to gather only thirty-five representatives. A year later in July-August 1920 the Second Congress was held in Moscow. It was more successful as it involved 218 representatives from 124 communist parties, 31 non-communist parties and 12 youth associations.²¹⁴ By summer 1920 the Bolshevik regime became stronger as the Bolsheviks had a leading position in the civil war against the White Army.²¹⁵ Thus, at the Congress the Bolsheviks were in a special position – they had many delegates and possessed considerable moral and political influence. They asserted that it was necessary for the whole working class to “take over the Bolsheviks’ experiences, their political strategy and tactics”.²¹⁶

There was a number of parties that affiliated to the Comintern, but in fact was too far from communism. Such a state of affairs troubled the Bolsheviks as the new parties could exert

²¹¹ “Norge og Russland,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.9.16.

²¹² “Arbeidernes skandinavisme,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.8.26.

²¹³ Egge, *Komintern og krisen*, 12.

²¹⁴ Maurseth, *Fra Moskvoteser*, 18.

²¹⁵ The Bolshevik government represented by the Red Army fought against anti-Bolshevik Russian forces called the White Army as well as against interventionist anti-Bolshevik armies. The Red Army won the civil war with tremendous losses for the nation. Thus the Bolsheviks finally seized power in Russia.

²¹⁶ Langfeldt, 29.

increasing influence on the Comintern's policies. Therefore, in order to prevent opportunists and centrists from having a considerable impact on the new Third International, the Twenty-one Conditions of admission to the Comintern were issued.²¹⁷ These Conditions primarily embraced the decisions made at the Moscow Congress in 1920 and as a result initiated inner conflicts within the DNA. For instance, the twelfth article of the Conditions declared that "the parties belonging to the Communist International must be built on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism"²¹⁸. This principle combined both democracy, which allowed free and open discussion, and central control, which ensured party unity and discipline.²¹⁹ The sixteenth article proclaimed that "all decisions of the Congresses of the Communist International and decisions of its Executive Committee are binding on all parties belonging to the Communist International"²²⁰. Finally, the last twenty-first condition is as follows: "those party members who fundamentally reject the conditions and Theses laid down by the Communist International are to be expelled from the party"²²¹.

Scheflo emphasizes the importance of the DNA's contact with international organizations. He writes that the social democracy isolated within geographic borders injures itself²²². Therefore, when there is raised a question on the DNA's affiliation to the International, Scheflo aims to give a positive answer. The editor claims that the DNA is willing to accept the decisions taken in the Moscow Congress. He also mentions that these guidelines will be adapted in accordance with the conditions in Norway. The Congress in Moscow played a considerable role in the further Party split. In 1920 Scheflo writes that the party members who want to "destroy the Parties' opinions must be withdrawn from the play and if necessary forced to leave the Party."²²³

Scheflo does not overtly support the principle proclaimed in the Third International concerning the role of weapons in the working class' struggle against capitalists. The International states that it is a necessary condition. Scheflo reflects upon the question whether this principle is applicable for Norway, and his answer does not appear to be transparent. But

²¹⁷ Langfeldt, 29.

²¹⁸ "Minutes of the Second Congress of the Communist International. Seventh Session, July 30," Marxists Internet Archive, accessed May 04, 2014, <http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch07.htm>.

²¹⁹ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "democratic centralism," accessed May 04, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/691998/democratic-centralism>.

²²⁰ "Minutes of the Second Congress of the Communist International. Seventh Session, July 30."

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² "Arbeiderpartiets internationale forbindelser," *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.4.3.

²²³ "De to Internationaler," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.1.

the editor does not conceal his willingness to let workers have the opportunity to carry weapons. The reason for Scheflo's standpoint is that the upper class has such an opportunity.²²⁴ Furthermore, Scheflo claims that it is the capitalist class who forces workers to protect themselves from the suppression by taking up arms.²²⁵

As far as the principle of democratic centralism is concerned, Scheflo supports it and points out that the Congress in Moscow dared to use the "sincere language" and attempted to speak directly.²²⁶ Meanwhile, it has been organized a conference in Brussels. It was "one of the first manifestations of activity in the new League of Nations, which called upon to study 'the financial crisis' and to seek remedies"²²⁷. Scheflo draws a bipolar picture of a current order in Europe. He writes that there are two alternatives for German, French and other European workers – either Brussels or Moscow. Brussels is represented by "financial misery, world bankruptcy, and a catastrophe", while Moscow is depicted as "liberation from a capitalist system, the construction of social fellowship through the social revolution".²²⁸ Besides, Scheflo sees at least two tasks for the Third International. The first one is to organize the international working class in such a way that allows the latter to prevent "a new world bloodbath" – it is possible only through the world revolution.²²⁹ The second task directly correlates with the first task – to exterminate world capitalism and to bring the world reaction down.²³⁰

Scheflo's attitude to the Third International and its principles evokes the conservative and the right-wing socialist press' accusations against the DNA's radical wing of a blind following of Moscow orders and of introducing the so-called system of Moscow dictatorship in Norway.²³¹ Scheflo denies such a critique and reiterates that the DNA agrees with the principles proclaimed by the Moscow Congress, but it is vital for the Party to adapt them to the conditions peculiar to Norway and the DNA.²³² Scheflo states that there is no intention to make the Party militarist, make the Party leadership rule over the other Party members, or that

²²⁴ "Med vaaben i haand," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.2.

²²⁵ "Partidiskussionen," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.15.

²²⁶ "Kongressen i Moskva III," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.29.

²²⁷ Richard S. Sayers, *The Bank of England, 1891-1944*, vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 153, <http://books.google.no/books?id=8hY9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA153&lpg=PA153&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

²²⁸ "Utgangspunktet," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.10.11.

²²⁹ "Verdensrevolution eller verdenskrig," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.10.27.

²³⁰ "Den levende Internationale," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.7.15.

²³¹ "Kongressen i Moskva II," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.28.

²³² "Historiske betragtninger," *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.10.5.

“the Executive Committee in Moscow decides the day and time of the revolution in Norway”²³³.

As early as in 1918, Scheflo demonstrates that there is a group of people in the DNA who is not particularly supportive of the working class’ actions in Russia. The editor writes “Even within our party there are still people who lack an understanding of the Russian working class’ fair struggle against the international reaction.”²³⁴ Scheflo considers the word split to be wrong for designating the situation in the Party. The word *shedding* <*avskalling*> is in Scheflo’s view more suitable.²³⁵ According to the editor, the DNA’s positions are stronger than they have ever been.²³⁶ The editor is sure that if the new Party is established, it will not be the *labor* party in its essence as the proletarian elements will be inseparable from the radical wing.²³⁷ Thus, Scheflo’s editorials in the studied period indicate that the editor shows solidarity with the principles proclaimed by the Congress in Moscow. He is willing to apply those decisions in Norway, despite the reformist wing’s dissent with them. Scheflo underlines that the principles should be adapted to Norwegian conditions and the DNA policies. But in general, he fully approves the line of arguments made by the Congress.

5.2.5. Summary

Four topics have been reflected upon in this chapter, namely the Bolsheviks and the conservative press, world revolution and Norway, radical means of the liberation of the working class, and the Third International and the Party split.

The analysis demonstrated that Olav Scheflo sympathized with the Bolshevik rule in Soviet Russia. He continually defended the Bolsheviks from the conservative press’ accusations, and supported the revolution in Russia and its slogans. In Scheflo’s view, the revolution in Russia and in Germany should advance the socialist revolutions in Europe. Norway is considered by him as one of the European countries where the working class actively prepares itself to carry out the class struggle and as a result decide upon social and economic conditions in the society. Therefore, the DNA’s affiliation to the Third International and the support of its principles are important for the editor. Such an organization as the Third International that united socialists under the guidance of Soviet Russia is seen by Olav Scheflo as a tangible

²³³ “Indstillingen,” *Social-Demokraten* 1920.11.1.

²³⁴ “Norge og Russland,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.19.

²³⁵ “Foran landsmøte,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.5.24.

²³⁶ “Oppositionen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.12.6.

²³⁷ “Oppositionen sprængt,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.11.9.

means to accelerate the working class' victory over injustices committed by capitalists. Moreover, the means by which this victory is meant to be achieved was close to the means used by the Bolsheviks – mass actions, general strikes and dictatorship. Thus, Schefflo's editorship demonstrates that the self / other nexus of the Norwegian radical wing within the DNA is directed at inclusion of the Russian Other and furthermore at adherence and justification of its decisions and means.

5.3. The editorship of Martin Tranmæl

This chapter is devoted to the *Social-Demokraten's* editorials written by Martin Tranmæl. He was the editor of the *Social-Demokraten* from 1921 to 1949. The focus of this thesis lies in the period until April 1, 1923 when the newspaper was renamed *Arbeiderbladet*. The analysis is based on forty-four (44) editorials. All the studied editorials were tentatively divided into two large topics – the editor's attitude towards Soviet Russia and the Comintern's influence.

5.3.1. Bolshevism and Soviet Russia

Twenty out of forty-four editorials selected for this analysis directly refer to the Russian Revolution, Bolsheviks, and Soviet Russia. This paragraph examines how the aforementioned issues are represented in the editorials in the period from May 1921 to April 1923.

For Martin Tranmæl the establishment of good neighborly relations with Soviet Russia appears important. The editor puts special emphasis on the trade links between Norway and Russia.²³⁸ For Tranmæl, the ratification of the trade agreement with the Soviet government by the Storting in October 1921 signifies a political recognition of Soviet Russia. He writes that such developments between the countries will inevitably lead to the normalization of their relations.²³⁹ Tranmæl underlines that the DNA has persistently fought for “reciprocity and understanding between Norway and Russia”, therefore, this agreement has proved that the Party's endeavors have not been fruitless.²⁴⁰

Another indication of the importance of the connections with Russia for the editor is the initiative proposed by the Norwegian Minister of Justice Otto B. Halvorsen. He suggested banning entry of the literature written by Vladimir Lenin in Norway. The editor calls such a proposition “idiotic” and characterizes it as a deliberate obstacle to workers' liberation created

²³⁸ “Norge og Rusland,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.7.13.

²³⁹ “Norge-Rusland,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.8.25.

²⁴⁰ “Traktaten,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.1.

by the powerful “exploiting class”.²⁴¹ In this regard, Tranmæl appeals to right-wing socialist leaders to stop reading anti-Bolshevik literature and draws their attention to Karl Marx and other socialist classics.²⁴² He reiterates that Europe cannot do without Russia. Therefore certain countries seek to restore commercial relations with Russia.²⁴³

Overall, the recognition of Soviet Russia appears to be a significant issue for Martin Tranmæl. When the leader of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) Samuel Gompers opposed the recognition of the Soviet government, Tranmæl criticized the AFL. The editor presumes that the AFL cannot be described as an organization for workers. The reason for such an assumption is that the members of the AFL should pay the affiliation fee from two dollars to three hundred dollars – which Tranmæl considers unacceptable. Moreover, the editor asserts that Gompers is “a tool for capitalist power and not at all a ‘worker’s leader’”.²⁴⁴

Another notable example of Tranmæl’s sympathy for the Bolsheviks is the case against social-revolutionaries taking place from 8th of June to 7th of August 1922 in Moscow. In spring and summer of 1922, this process was one of the most important events in Soviet Russia’s political life.²⁴⁵ The process was initiated by the Bolsheviks. The social-revolutionaries were prosecuted for the counterrevolutionary activity and the organization of terror attacks against Bolshevik leaders. There were two groups of defendants. The first group consisted of twenty-two people who did not confess. The second group consisted of people who became Communists by 1922 and had to ‘disclose’ crimes of the Socialist Revolutionary Party.²⁴⁶ Twelve out of twenty-two defendants were sentenced to capital punishment. However, the execution of the sentence was postponed until the next socialist revolutionary terrorist action.

²⁴¹ “Dommen over det frie ord,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.7.9.

²⁴² “Tilbake til sosialismen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.5.2.

²⁴³ “Genua,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.4.11.

²⁴⁴ “Gompers,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.5.3.

²⁴⁵ Aleksey Yu. Suslov, “Novaya publikaciya dokumentov sudebnogo processa nad socialistami-revolucionerami 1922 goda,” *Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i uridicheskie nauki, kulturologiya i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki* (2011), 2 (8), ch. 2: 183, http://gramota.net/articles/issn_1997-292X_2011_2-2_44.pdf.

²⁴⁶ Georgy Semenov and Lidiya Konopleva are one of the most conspicuous members of this group. Both of them organized a squad comprised of former socialist-revolutionary militants in Petrograd. In June 1918, one of the militants in Semenov’s squad assassinated prominent Bolshevik V. Volodarsky. Same year, Semenov started preparation for assassination of Lenin and Trotsky in Moscow. In August 1918 there was an assassination attempt of Trotsky, but it failed. In October 1918 Semenov was arrested. He was accused of the formation of the counterrevolutionary organization aimed at the overthrow of the Soviet authorities, espionage, use of dynamite, and armed resistance under arrest – which was more than enough for the execution by firing squad. However, in order to avoid the inevitable execution, Semenov and his associate Konopleva offered the Bolsheviks cooperation and promised to work in the social revolutionary organization as informers. In the court case against social revolutionaries in 1922, they actively witnessed against the former party fellows. (Nikolay A. Zenkovich, *Sobranie Sochinenii. Vol. 6: Pokusheniya i inscenirovki: Ot Lenina do Elcina*, (Olma-Press, 2004), 112-113.)

One defendant was executed one year later. Other members of the first group were sent to jail.²⁴⁷

The *Social-Demokraten's* editor approves the result of the case and calls it “the only fair and right”²⁴⁸ outcome. In Tranmæl’s view, the Soviet government “defends its fatherland from the obvious enemies and traitors to their country”²⁴⁹. Thus, the attitude towards the sentence is quite indicative of Tranmæl’s strong support of the Bolsheviks and their methods.

Referring to the Bolsheviks’ methods, Tranmæl’s opinion on parliamentarism should be mentioned. Tranmæl does not consider parliamentarism to be a logical continuation of the Norwegian political system. In contrast, the DNA attempts to make a principally new basis for a new society. At the heart of this basis lies work and fellowship. Accordingly, any work directed at stabilization of old conservative institutions should be undermined as the new society requires new institutions that meet the needs of workers’ fellowship.²⁵⁰ According to Tranmæl, parliamentarism in the current situation should be used as a mechanism for revolutionary preparations. The decisive means of struggle should be mass actions that have also been supported by previous editor Olav Scheflo.²⁵¹ Furthermore, the formation of workers’ councils as a basis for socialization is a major issue in the workers’ liberation process. The editor highlights the workers’ liberation must be fulfilled by the workers themselves.²⁵² The goal of socialization was to suppress an access to the economic exploitation of other people.²⁵³

From 1921 to 1928, the Soviet government applied the New Economic Policy (NEP). Tranmæl evaluates NEP as a temporary measure caused by the international situation. In spite of the conservative press’ statements on Soviet Russia’s abandonment of communism and its principles, the editor points at the Soviet government ability to admit the existence of temporary hardships. In particular, he refers to Vladimir Lenin, who “honestly and bravely points at all the mistakes having been made, faces all the truth first of all the most unpleasant, and admits all defeats...”²⁵⁴ Tranmæl does not doubt that the Soviet government will manage

²⁴⁷ “Sudebnyi process socialistov-revolucionerov (1922-1926),” Rossiiskie socialisty i anarkhisty posle Oktyabrya 1917 goda, accessed April 11, 2014, <http://socialist.memo.ru/photoalbum/gal5/preface.html>.

²⁴⁸ “Dommen over de socialrevolutionære,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.8.10.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ “Praktisk arbeide,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.20.

²⁵¹ “Hvad striden gjælder,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.9.20.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Maurseth, Gjennom kriser, 102.

²⁵⁴ “Russisk politik,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.1.

to gain a foothold in the future²⁵⁵ as long as it will be in a position to make a commercial deals with other countries.²⁵⁶ Tranmæl does not share the conservative press' opinion that the concession system²⁵⁷ in Soviet Russia means Bolshevism's failure. According to the editor, the concession policy is an illustration of "the pure practical politics".²⁵⁸

The editor is convinced that in spite of hardships, the state of affairs in the Soviet Russia is stable. In the editorial commemorating the fourth anniversary of the Russian Revolution²⁵⁹, Tranmæl emphasizes that the current position of the Russian Workers' and Peasants' government is impregnable. According to Tranmæl, the Soviet government has been forced to compromise by utilizing NEP in terms of economy. But in terms of politics its adherence to communist principles is solid. For the editor, Soviet Russia proves that the working class can govern a country. Therefore, Tranmæl unambiguously urges the Norwegian working class to "follow the Russian example" and "learn from Russians, from their mistakes as well as from their prudence". Furthermore, the editor insists that the Norwegian working class has not fully contributed to the Russian and world revolutions. The contribution ought to manifest itself in the "liberation" of Norwegian workers and in the work for creating conditions for the social revolution in Norway.²⁶⁰ Thus, the attitude towards revolutionary Russia is presented as a litmus test for being or not being antirevolutionary and antisocialist.²⁶¹ The editor claims that those who "cast doubt on such a struggling working class as the Russian, have positioned themselves in the class of workers' enemies and have to be treated accordingly."²⁶²

In general, Tranmæl's attitude towards the Bolsheviks' leader Vladimir Lenin appears highly respectful. In the editorial *Rosa Luxemburg against Lenin*²⁶³, the editor refers to the Junius Pamphlet²⁶⁴ written by Rosa Luxemburg²⁶⁵ in 1915 (i.e. before the Russian Revolution and

²⁵⁵ "Lenins tale," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.6.16.

²⁵⁶ "Russisk politik," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.1.

²⁵⁷ Concession policy signified that the Soviet authorities established a joint company based on foreign shares. The foreign shareholders had to pay a charge to the Soviet state. In return, they got an access to the economic activity. Both parties benefited from these agreements. Soviet Russia could develop industry and economy with the help of the foreign capital and technology. As concessions were time-limited, the Soviet government could afterwards take over these companies. (Rønning, 36).

²⁵⁸ "Bolshevismens fallit," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.7.28.

²⁵⁹ "Revolutions-jubilæet," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.5.

²⁶⁰ "5 aar," *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.11.7.

²⁶¹ "Internationale forbindelser," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.12.

²⁶² "Arbejderklassens samling," *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.1.21.

²⁶³ "Rosa Luxemburg mot Lenin," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.12.29.

²⁶⁴ Also called *The Crisis of German Social Democracy*.

²⁶⁵ Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), Polish-born German revolutionary and agitator who played a key role in the founding of the Polish Social Democratic Party and the Spartacus League, which grew into the Communist Party of Germany. As a political theoretician, Luxemburg developed a humanitarian theory of Marxism, stressing

the Bolshevik's seizure of power). According to Tranmæl, the pamphlet contains the critique of Lenin's tactics. And later, Rosa Luxemburg realized that the brochure would do more harm than good and therefore did not publish it. However, Paul Levi, Luxemburg's lawyer who was expelled from the German Communist Party, published the brochure out of revenge. Hence, Tranmæl attempts to demonstrate that the arguments set forth in the brochure disaccord with eventual Luxemburg's opinions. He concludes that the Russian Revolution "cannot be damaged by Paul Levi's villainy".²⁶⁶

Interestingly, in the editorial *Russians in Genoa*²⁶⁷ Tranmæl touches upon the self / other relations. The author disapproves 'customary' views on Russian barbarism and west European civility. The issue has emerged in regard to the disarmament question in the Genoa conference²⁶⁸. Tranmæl sarcastically points out that the "representative of 'bloodthirsty' barbarism" Georgy Chicherin²⁶⁹ openly advocated disarmament while the "proponent of civilization and culture" French representative Jean Louis Barthou considered Chicherin's idea ridiculous and was reluctant to listen to his speech.

In December 1922 Soviet Russia initiated a conference with representatives from Poland, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania in Moscow. The agenda of the Moscow conference²⁷⁰ was the reduction of arms. The editor underlines that the conference is also significant for Norway, since her neighboring country Finland participates in it. Tranmæl points out that the outcome of the conference will directly influence relations between Finland and Norway. In other words, if the Finnish delegation signs a peace treaty with Soviet Russia, then "good relations between Norway and Finland will be strengthened. If not, the Norwegian working

democracy and revolutionary mass action to achieve international socialism. (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Rosa Luxemburg," accessed May 03, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/352345/Rosa-Luxemburg>.)

²⁶⁶ "Rosa Luxemburg mot Lenin," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.12.29.

²⁶⁷ "Russerne i Genua," *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.4.15.

²⁶⁸ Conference of Genoa (April 10-May 19, 1922), post-World War I meeting at [Genoa, Italy](#), to discuss the economic reconstruction of central and eastern [Europe](#) and to explore ways to improve relations between Soviet [Russia](#) and European capitalist regimes. (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Conference of Genoa," accessed May 03, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/229227/Conference-of-Genoa>.)

²⁶⁹ Georgy V. Chicherin (1872-1936) is a diplomat who executed Soviet foreign policy from 1918 until 1928. (*Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin," accessed May 03, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/110616/Georgy-Vasilyevich-Chicherin>.)

²⁷⁰ The Soviet government proposed reduction the armies of the participating states by four times within one and a half to two years; dissolution of all irregular military units; limitation of military expenses to establishment of unitary budget allocations per servicemen applicable in all the participating states, and prohibition stationing of military units in border zones. Poland, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia refused to discuss a plan for reducing armaments. (*Bolshaya Sovetskaya Encyclopedia*, s. v. "Moskovskaya konferenciya, 1922," accessed April 12, 2014, <http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/bse/110902/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F>.)

class' mistrust of the current rule in Finland will be increased."²⁷¹ Such a presentation of the issue indicates how important the Soviet government and its actions were for Tranmæl.

Thus, Martin Tranmæl's supportive and favorable attitude towards the Russian Revolution, Vladimir Lenin, Soviet government and its actions has been demonstrated. The Soviet government is represented as a state seeking for peace with a firm, open and honest leader. The editor appeals to the Norwegian working class to be as decisive as the Russian working class and supports the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, non-parliamentarian methods and mass actions.

5.3.2. *Amsterdam International and Profintern*

In July 1921 the first Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern) took place in Moscow. The formation of the Profintern was initiated by the Comintern. The organization was supposed to be a counterbalance to the social democratic Amsterdam International. The Comintern's concern appeared to be quite reasonable, as in 1920 the Amsterdam International included twenty-three million members (in the following years the membership was considerably reduced).²⁷²

In the Constitution of the Profintern, the purpose to reduce affiliation to the Amsterdam International was specified:

"We have now to make clear the character of the Red International, and also to devise ways and means of mobilising the workers within the union movement of this country, who are willing to come under its banner for the purpose of winning the whole union movement and its central organisations away from the yellow Amsterdam International into the army of the revolutionary unions of the Red International."²⁷³

In this regard, the Comintern made an appeal for the Norwegian Trade Union Confederation to resign from the Amsterdam International and affiliate to the Profintern. This appeal manifested itself in the *Social-Demokraten*. In June 1921 the editor accuses the Amsterdam International of undermining the Profintern and splitting the trade union movement on the ground of its "aggressive behavior towards the revolutionary elements within the working class."²⁷⁴ The reinforcement of the working class Tranmæl sees in the offensive tactics and revolutionary basis.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ "Avrustningskonferansen I Moskva," *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.12.4.

²⁷² *Store Norske Leksikon*, s. v. "faglige internasjonaler," accessed April 15, 2014, http://snl.no/faglige_internasjonaler.

²⁷³ "Constitution of the Red International of Labour Unions," Marxists Internet Archive, accessed March 13, 2014, <http://www.marxists.org/history/international/profintern/1921/constitution.htm>.

²⁷⁴ "Amsterdam-Internasjonen." *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.6.14.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

The editor's attitude towards the Amsterdam International appears unambiguous. He appeals to the Norwegian trade unions to resign from this organization. Such an attitude is determined by Tranmæl's opinion that the Amsterdam International is completely insignificant and headed by reformists and social patriots.²⁷⁶ In the author's view, the latter are synonymous to traitors to international solidarity. Tranmæl characterizes the Amsterdam International first of all as a political and then as a trade union organization. In contrast to social patriotic spirit of the Amsterdam International, the Profintern's goal is to "gather all revolutionary trade unions in one international struggle organization <kamporganisation>". Hence, the organization has a "revolutionary-political intention" seeking to establish revolutionary socialism and communism.²⁷⁷

In spite of Tranmæl's desire to leave the Amsterdam International, there was some uncertainty in the DNA's leadership. The chairman of the Norwegian Trade Union Confederation Ole Lian and the chairman of The Norwegian Union of Iron and Metal workers Halvard Olsen doubted. One of the reasons for their uncertainty was that there were many social democrats in the Confederation who had just left the DNA due to the Party split and who most likely would not have liked the idea of affiliation to the Profintern. As a result, the Confederation's board resolved to postpone the discussion of this issue until the Congress in 1923. The Comintern's reaction was not slow to arrive. The Profintern sent a letter where the strong appeal for the DNA's affiliation to the organization was expressed. In addition, the Comintern urged the Party to impose sanctions against those members who voted for the postponement of the discussion on the Profintern's affiliation at the Confederation's board meeting. This letter evoked an argument in the Confederation. Consequently, in November 1921 the party delegation left for Moscow to negotiate on this issue with the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The importance of the negotiations was demonstrated by the members of the delegation: Martin Tranmæl, Olav Scheflo, Ole O. Lian and Halvard Olsen. The outcome of the negotiations was that the Confederation should have affiliated to the Profintern in a short time. But no deadline was indicated.²⁷⁸

The results of the negotiations were reflected on the *Social-Demokraten* pages. The issue of the withdrawal from the Amsterdam International is addressed in the editorials with renewed vigor. The editor reduces the discussion regarding the International to one question – Moscow

²⁷⁶ "Amsterdam-Internationalen." *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.6.14.

²⁷⁷ "Den faglige Internationale," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.9.2.

²⁷⁸ Egge, *Komintern og krisen*, 15-17.

or Amsterdam or in other words, for or against the social revolution? The communist mass parties can be established, according to Tranmæl, only through withdrawal from Amsterdam.²⁷⁹ He repeatedly underlines that workers can be united only on the basis of revolutionary socialism, namely communism. The role of the Profintern, according to Tranmæl, is being a “common denominator for all struggling trade unions in all countries.”²⁸⁰ One of the main drawbacks of the Amsterdam International for the editor is that it has not performed a consolidating function between classes. Furthermore, instead of contributing to workers’ international struggle on the unifying revolutionary ground, the Amsterdam International has sought to collaborate with the League of Nations.²⁸¹ Therefore, Tranmæl urges “class-conscious and revolutionary workers to oppose right-wing socialist associations, especially when they act under a furtive mask like the Amsterdam International.”²⁸²

In the editorial titled *Amsterdam*²⁸³ dated April 1922, Martin Tranmæl announces that the Trade Union Confederation voted for its withdrawal from the Amsterdam International with nine against four votes. Whether the Confederation affiliates to Moscow International will be decided at the Congress. The Confederation’s inclination to more radical developments is also illustrated by the unanimous decision taken at the Confederation’s last Congress regarding socialization. The policy of socialization signified that the means of production should be owned by the society, the economy based on rivalry and profit should be replaced with planned economy and distribution, the management of economy should be considerably democratized through the council system.²⁸⁴ In addition, the majority voted for a council system, the working class’ dictatorship, and mass actions as a crucial means in the struggle for socialization. Tranmæl frequently refers to the Confederation and its state of affairs as he considers it to be inextricably linked to the DNA. He states that the trade union movement and the Party work side by side in their struggle for actual revolutionary demands.²⁸⁵ The trade unions, according to Tranmæl, should act as a political and revolutionary factor of power.²⁸⁶

²⁷⁹ “Moskva-Amsterdam,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.2.

²⁸⁰ “Hvem splitter?” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.12.6.

²⁸¹ “Forskjellen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.12.22.

²⁸² “Amsterdam,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.4.

²⁸³ “Amsterdam,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.4.3.

²⁸⁴ Maurseth, *Gjennom kriser*, 102.

²⁸⁵ “Efter kongressen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1923.3.62.

²⁸⁶ “Hvad striden gjælder,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.9.20.

Thus, the direct influence from the Comintern on the DNA and the Norwegian Trade Union Confederation has been demonstrated. The editorials on the theme of trade union Internationals were closely linked to the Comintern's requests. In the next paragraph, the idea of the united front and the DNA's role in it will be discussed.

5.3.3. *The United Front*

In the editorials Tranmæl frequently refers to the issue of the working class solidarity and consolidation. But in the context of split processes in the Party, these notions have been impeded. The editor emphasizes that the DNA's task is to gather the working class. In order to fulfill this task, Tranmæl considers it necessary to purge the Party. The Party comprised of "heterogeneous elements and mutually hostile wings can never be a sterling solid party to be relied upon."²⁸⁷ Tranmæl addressed this severe criticism imbued with intransigence to the right-wing socialists in November 1921.

A month later Tranmæl's perception and rhetoric regarding right-wing socialists changed and it was linked to the theses on the united front sent out by the Comintern. The notion of the united front was spread out by the Comintern's Executive Committee in December 1921 and passed at the Committee's meeting in February 1922. The theory of the united front was based on the working class consciousness. The Comintern realized that there were workers in other parties who had a need for the fellowship and solidarity in their struggle. But they lacked an understanding of the working class' historical mission, namely seizure of power and creation of a socialist society. The Comintern comprehended that such groups of workers comprised a considerable part of the reformist Amsterdam International. Therefore, the idea of the united front came in useful since the demand for the unity in the struggle for the better standard of living among workers was increasing.²⁸⁸ Hence, the motto *To the masses!* became central. In such a manner, Communists attempted to underline that the class struggle was primarily concentrated no longer around the revolution, but around such daily demands of workers as a higher salary, eight-hour working day and the right to vacations. With the help of the united front, the Communist should have come out of isolation and led the working class away from the reformists.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ "Arbeiderklassens samling," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.11.

²⁸⁸ Maurseth, *Fra Moskvoteser*, 70-72.

²⁸⁹ Maurseth, *Gjennom kriser*, 264.

In January 1922 Tranmæl points out that there are no highly dissimilar opinions among workers on the international capitalist class.²⁹⁰ Hence, it might be a common ground for creating the united proletarian front. In connection with this idea, it was decided by the Trade Union Confederation to organize a common conference for both the Amsterdam International and the Profintern. According to the editor, pursuing workers' salary standard and an eight-hour working day, a struggle against imperialist military and war plans should have served as a common ground for both 'participants'. However, the Trade Union Confederation's initiative was declined by the Amsterdam International.²⁹¹

The idea of the united front brought out a new disagreement in the Party. As Per Maurseth points out, the argument on the united front in Norway primarily concerned how to adapt the united front idea to the Norwegian conditions. One group of the Party members sought to create a united front consisting of *all* workers on the basis of demands common for wage-earners and small manufacturers. So, the adaptation of the united front idea would manifest itself in appeal for the part of the electorate of the party *Venstre*²⁹². The other group sought to gather the real working class in the Confederation of Trade Unions and the DNA. As a result, there were held three meetings on the united front tactics within four weeks. And the decision was to support the Comintern's tactics over the united front.²⁹³ Thus, the Comintern's influence also manifested itself in the united front tactics.

5.3.4. *The relations with the Comintern*

A series of editorials under Tranmæl's editorship are devoted to the Comintern and the Twenty-one Conditions. The editor argues that the Third International gives the Norwegian labor movement a "stronger moral and political support than anything else."²⁹⁴

In March 1921, the DNA's convention resolves to be affiliated to the Twenty-one Conditions.²⁹⁵ However, it has implied certain objections and questions regarding the Conditions. One of them is the Comintern's requirement for abolition of the collective membership in the DNA. The majority of the DNA's member has been collectively affiliated

²⁹⁰ "Enhetsfront," *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.1.20.

²⁹¹ "Samling?" *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.4.8.

²⁹² The Party occupied a central position in the party system. It was not as conservative as *Høyre* and *Bondepartiet*, but at the same time it stood far from the Labor Party's revolutionary radicalism. *Store Norske Leksikon*, s.v. "Venstre", accessed April 26, 2014, <http://snl.no/Venstre>.)

²⁹³ Maurseth, *Gjennom kriser*, 268.

²⁹⁴ "Et skillende spørsmål," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.19.

²⁹⁵ Egge and Halvorsen, " '...kriteriet på en kommunist... ',10.

to the Party through trade unions. But the Conditions demanded that the party-members of the Comintern had to be based on the individual membership.²⁹⁶ This was quite a serious requirement for the Party taking into consideration links between the Trade Union Confederation and the DNA. Per Maurseth demonstrates close relations between these two entities comparing them to “conjoined twins”.²⁹⁷ In October 1921, Tranmæl writes that the potential DNA’s objections are immaterial in comparison to the unifying views on mass actions, the system of councils and dictatorship.²⁹⁸ A month later, he reiterates that there “is no shame to accept the guidelines from Moscow when they accord with the Congress’ decisions and are of benefit to the working class”.²⁹⁹

Tranmæl does not support the previous editor’s position on the guidelines coming from Moscow. For Scheflo, adherence to and following the Moscow guidelines seems to be reasonable developments of the party line. As for Tranmæl, he prefers consulting with the International instead of asking for guidelines.³⁰⁰

However, the editor approves the principle of democratic centralism. He writes that there appears a risk of reformist opportunism, if the Party is not strongly centralized. The editor realizes and admits that the Party’s collective understandings and opinions are above the individual’s understanding and opinion. Tranmæl calls such a perception “intellectual abdication”.³⁰¹ The principle of democratic centralism, according to Tranmæl, played a crucial role during the Russian Revolution of 1917. Without the centralized Communist Party, impregnable leadership and an audacious military coup initiative, the dictatorship of the proletariat would not be established.³⁰²

The relations between the editor of the *Social-Demokraten* and the Comintern become gradually more complicated. Tranmæl is disappointed by the Comintern’s interference in the inner affairs of the DNA. The interference has manifested itself in what is called by historians the *September letter* <septemberbrevet>. The letter dated September 23, 1922 contained the critique of the DNA. The Comintern criticized the Party for the lack of the Communist

²⁹⁶ Egge and Halvorsen, “ ‘...kriteriet på en kommunist...’, 10.

²⁹⁷ Maurseth, *Gjennom kriser*, 47.

²⁹⁸ “Politisk og faglig enhet,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.6.

²⁹⁹ “Internationale forbindelser,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.12.

³⁰⁰ “Diskussionen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.6.19.

³⁰¹ “Demokratisk centralisme,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.7.24.

³⁰² Ibid.

discipline and inadequate fulfillment of the Party reorganization.³⁰³ In particular, the newspaper *Social-Demokraten* and its editor Tranmæl have drawn strong criticism from the Comintern. Nevertheless, the editor seeks to smooth over different opinions and reach an understanding that will prevent a breach between the International and the DNA.³⁰⁴ However, Tranmæl is not ready to sacrifice what he calls “certain freedom of movement” in order to please the Comintern. He reiterates that the interference in the inner order of the Party by the Comintern will only diminish its reputation.³⁰⁵ Tranmæl insists that large, developed and determined national parties, in other words, parties that are beneficial for the Comintern, can only be established if they are built on the specific conditions for their countries and if they have certain freedom.³⁰⁶ The editor emphasizes that Norwegian workers desire to participate in the most important affairs instead of allow few selected persons to take decision for them.³⁰⁷

In autumn 1922, the Comintern held the Fourth Congress. The inner crises of the party-members of the Third International – French, Italian, and Norwegian – were on the agenda. The question on the crisis in the Norwegian Labor Party was prepared by the special commission led by Nikolay Bukharin. Meanwhile, the disagreement in the DNA continued: there were discussions both on democratic centralism and discipline.

In December 1922, Tranmæl claims that the DNA withdraws from the Comintern. The Party members have felt the direct threat to the DNA’s sovereignty in inner issues. The majority considers it as a damage to the Norwegian working class and therefore to the international workers’ movement. Furthermore, it is crucial for the editor and, as he writes, for Norwegian workers that the collaboration with the Comintern is “based on trust and reciprocity, not on the superior and subordinate relations”. Nevertheless, Tranmæl highlights that despite the DNA’s withdrawal from the Comintern, its political relations with Soviet Russia and the Third International will remain the same.³⁰⁸

Tranmæl accuses the right-wing socialists of having waited for the opportunity to split the DNA with as many supporters as possible. The Twenty-one Conditions have become a great

³⁰³ Egge, *Komintern og krisen*, 36.

³⁰⁴ “Internationalen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.14.

³⁰⁵ “En livsbetingelse,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.16.

³⁰⁶ “Enkelt og letvint,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.25.

³⁰⁷ “Organisationsspørsmålet,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.28.

³⁰⁸ “Stillingen til Internationalen,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.12.22.

opportunity for the reformists.³⁰⁹ He considers those who support the split to be capitalists. He urges workers to follow the Russian example and develop common behavior towards opponents.³¹⁰

5.3.5 *The newspaper's name*

From 1923 the contradictions between communism and social democracy started growing immensely. The two flows considered the way to socialism differently. Communists referred to the Russian example and were prepared to carry out socialism by means of revolution, abolishment of parliamentary democracy and the proletariats' dictatorship. Socialists, conversely, sought to parliamentary democracy based on universal suffrage.³¹¹

Gradually Tranmæl himself retreats from the designation *social democratic*, as in most countries social democratic parties are discredited. They betrayed the class struggle and the International. The actual revolutionary socialist, according to the editor, are referred to such a description as communist.³¹² The change of the newspaper's name is perhaps also connected to Tranmæl's perception that meaning of the notion social democratic is equal to the notion of a right-wing socialist.³¹³ The editor associates the newspaper, its content and target audience with workers who read Communist papers.³¹⁴ In this regard, the choice of the name *Arbeiderbladet (Workers' Paper)* seems to be reasonable. Furthermore, the Executive Committee of the Comintern demanded that such designations as *social democrat* and *democrat* to be exterminated from all the newspapers' names of the party-members.

5.3.6. *Summary*

The focus of this part of the chapter was placed on the *Social-Demokraten's* editorials written by Martin Tranmæl on the following topics – the attitude to Soviet Russia and Bolsheviks as well as the Comintern and its influence. Tranmæl expresses himself quite respectful and positive about the Soviet government, its decisions and leader. Tranmæl appeals consistently for the Norwegian working class to follow the Russian working class' example. Besides, the

³⁰⁹ "Nederlagenes parti," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.29.

³¹⁰ "Hykleri," *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.8.16.

³¹¹ Maurseth, *Gjennom kriser*, 22.

³¹² "Socialister-kommunister," *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.4.

³¹³ "Efter kongressen," *Social-Demokraten*, 1923.3.

³¹⁴ "Navneforandringen," *Social-Demokraten*, 1923.3.

connections with Soviet Russia are important for the editor. He reiterates that the commercial connections with the neighborly Soviet Republic are beneficial for Norway.

As far as the Comintern is concerned, Tranmæl's editorials are not unequivocal. He seems very supportive of the Comintern and is willing to collaborate with the organization. The editor appears convinced that this collaboration will be fruitful as the Comintern's decisions are directly referred to the working class' needs. However, the September letter, or in other words, the Comintern's interference in the inner affairs of the Party disappoints Tranmæl. He attempts to hold a contact with the Comintern until the Party's sovereignty and independence are put in the shade. Although he has argued for following the Russian example, with the course of time he claims that specific conditions in countries should first and foremost taken into consideration. He realizes that the Norwegian working class is not ready to take over ready templates from Russia and utilize them in Norway.

The self / other relations in this case are reshaping from the idealization of the Russian Other to its criticism. On the one hand, Tranmæl underlines the necessity of Russia for Europe and tends to inclusion of the Russian Other. On the other hand, when the Russian Other exercises its influence on the Party / Norway / Self, Tranmæl seeks to exclude it.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

The source material for this thesis, namely 125 editorials written by three editors Jacob Vidnes, Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl were analyzed in order to detect the portrayals of the Russian Revolution in the DNA's print organ, *Social-Demokraten*, and what influence the latter exerted on the labor movement in Norway.

6.1. Reformist Jacob Vidnes

The editors' opinions on the Russian Revolution in accordance with its broad and narrow definitions were diverse. In the editorials written by reformist editor Jacob Vidnes prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917, Russian social democrats including the Bolsheviks were portrayed in a favorable light. First and foremost, Vidnes' view was linked to the peaceful intentions of the Russian social democracy, its aspiration to end and prevent armament of the Russian army by protesting against the country's military build-up. All this was in line with the international left-wing socialists' perceptions of the situation; such a behavior was expected from other European socialists as it could lead to the end of the devastating First World War. In this regard, Vidnes treated Russia as a significant player on the arena of international social democracy.

He was supportive of the February Revolution of 1917 which resulted in the abolishment of monarchy. Vidnes claimed that it was the task of the world's social democracy to save the Russian Revolution as he expected a further development of democratic institutions in Russia. In 1917 he evaluated the conditions in Russia as a positive evolvment leading to profound democratic changes in the society. Therefore, the Bolsheviks as leaders of the revolution and speakers for democracy were favored by the editor. He accepted the Bolsheviks as carriers of a democratic development in the Russian society which had been oppressed by the absolute monarchy for centuries. But when the Bolsheviks seized power by the forceful dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, they became as unappealing for Vidnes as tsar Nicolay II – they were suppressors. Hence, when Vidnes remarked the dictatorial ambitions of the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution, his attitude changed considerably. He called the October Revolution a coup, not a genuine social, political, economic and cultural changes in the society. Nevertheless, shortly after Vidnes sounded less critical calling, for instance, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly a necessary measure.

Vidnes recognized that the situations in Norway and Russia were different. Therefore, his assessments regarding the use of parliamentary and non-parliamentary means in Norway and Russia were dissimilar. He concluded that for Russia the revolutionary means, in other words, profound changes in the society could be probably most effectively achieved only beyond the Parliament. Vidnes was not an opponent of revolution as a means of reformation in a country, but a revolutionary path was, in his opinion, not appropriate for Norway. According to Jacob Vidnes, the developments in Norway should be inextricably linked to the Parliament and its decisions, the rule of law was indispensable and the importance of the trade unions in the process of the improvement of the working class' positions was enormous.

6.2. Radical Olav Scheflo and Martin Tranmæl

Olav Scheflo's views on Bolshevism were positive and not only because it had peaceful intentions, but more importantly because it set an example of the working class' ability to rule the country. He was inspired by the Russian case and expected similar actions from Norwegian workers. Scheflo treated the Bolsheviks with considerable respect and called them heroes and friends. The editor admitted the regime's brutality towards its enemies, but justified it as a necessary action. He did not doubt that the Soviet government's position is stable, and believed that anti-Bolshevik propaganda in the conservative press could not shatter it. He approved parliamentary means of change, but only in a capitalist society. Scheflo claimed that the new fair society could be built only by the breach with the old institutions. If the Parliament was not able to introduce rapid positive changes for the working class' living conditions, it should be abandoned, as it was a political tool for capitalists.

He considered parliamentarism to be appropriate only under capitalism. In his opinion, socialist society required another political system – dictatorship. However, this statement was not unconditional. Scheflo justified dictatorship only if it led to the suppression of capitalism and the liberation of the working class.

Martin Tranmæl's attitude towards the Russian Revolution was also positive. He urged the readers to look at the Russian example and learn from it. He claimed that those who had any doubts regarding the Russian working class and its actions were the enemies of the international working class. He also underlined peaceful intentions of the Soviet government and was supportive of the New Economic Policy in Russia condemned by the bourgeois press as divergence from the socialist path. As well as Scheflo he was certain about a solid position

of the Bolshevik government that could not be undermined by the stinging criticism of the bourgeois press. Tranmæl considered parliamentarism as a tool for revolutionary preparations in Norway. But parliamentarism was not a logical continuation of the political development in Norway, in the editor's view.

Thus, according to the source material for this thesis the three editors' understandings and perceptions of the Russian Revolution were diverse. Nevertheless, there were common themes that went through the editorials of J. Vidnes, O. Scheflo and M. Tranmæl. Both Vidnes and Scheflo defended the Bolsheviks from the bourgeois press' criticism, required the revision of the Constitution or revolution (though Vidnes did not refer to Norway in this regard), and appealed to social solidarity. Vidnes and Tranmæl underlined a peaceful intention of the Soviet government and a prominent role of trade unions for the improvement of the working class' conditions. While both Scheflo and Tranmæl as the representatives of the radical wing of the Party emphasized the necessity to follow the example set by the Russian working class and the Bolsheviks, the significance of commercial relations with Russia, the adaptation of the Twenty-one provisions of the Comintern to Norwegian conditions, and the firm and stable position of the Soviet government. One of the clear distinguishing features in the editorials of Scheflo and Tranmæl was the role of the Comintern. Scheflo argued that following the Comintern's guidelines was a logical development of the Party, which would lead to the revolution in Norway, while Tranmæl considered that the Comintern should have been perceived by the DNA as a consulting organ, but not the organization whose guidelines had to be unquestionably followed by the Party.

6.3. The radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement

The Russian Revolution contributed to the radicalization of the Norwegian labor movement. It manifested itself in the editors' debates on non-parliamentarian ways of changes in the society as well as the Twenty-one Conditions and Comintern's interference in the Party's inner affairs. The impact of the Comintern which resulted in the Party split of 1921 and 1923 came through the debates on the issues of the working class' armament in its struggle against capitalism, withdrawal from the Amsterdam International and affiliation to the Profintern, the transition from the collective to the individual membership, tactics of the united front, change of the newspaper's name and the reception of financial support from the Comintern. The peaceful development of the Norwegian labor movement was among other things determined by the withdrawal from the Comintern in November 1923. The Comintern's interference in

the Party's inner affairs was unacceptable for the majority of the DNA-members who supported Martin Tranmæl's position on this issue and voted for the disaffiliation from the Third International. Furthermore, the greater concentration of power in Moscow and the demand for discipline scared those representatives of the Party who remained the members of the DNA after the split in 1923.

6.4. The self / other nexus: inclusion and exclusion of the Russian Other

In 1915—1923 the self / other nexus was changing and developing. It can be compared to a pendulum that swung either to the self-side or to the other-side dependent on the editor and his opinions. Prior to and during the February Revolution, the Norwegian Self appeared inclusive towards the Russian Other as the latter promoted the end of the war and democratic development in the country. The October Revolution and its brutality tilted the balance towards the exclusion of the Russian Other. In 1918—1921 the Norwegian self actively sought to the inclusion of the Russian Other. In 1921 there was a tendency to include the Russian Other. However, the dissonance between the Party and the Comintern led to its immediate exclusion.

References

Sources

- “1. mai.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.4.30.
- “1. mai.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1916.4.29.
- “1. mai.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.4.30.
- “1. mai-demonstrationen iaar.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.4.29.
- “1915.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.12.31.
- “1915.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.1.1.
- “5 aar.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.11.7.
- “Aarsdagen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.11.7.
- “Amsterdam.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.4.
- “Amsterdam.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.4.3.
- “Amsterdam-Internationalen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.6.14.
- “Arbeiderklassens samling.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.11.
- “Arbeiderklassens samling.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.1.21.
- “Arbeiderne og situationen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1916.11.13.
- “Arbeidernes skandinavisme.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.8.26.
- “Arbeiderpartiets internationale forbindelser.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.4.3.
- “Arbeiderpartiets taktik.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.5.8.
- “Arbeidspligt og arbeidstvang.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.10.20.
- “Avrustningskonferansen I Moskva.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.12.4.
- “Avsløringen av aarsakene til bruddet med Rusland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.6.5.
- “Bolschevikernes regjering.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.1.21.
- “Bolschevismen og sosialismen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.7.19.
- “Bolschevismens fallit.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.7.28.
- “De to Internationaler.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.1.
- “Demokratisk centralisme.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.7.24.

“Den faglige Internationale.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.9.2.

“Den international situation,” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.6.28.

“Den levende Internationale.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.7.15.

“Den offentlige orden.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.3.28.

“Den revolutionære hr. Scheflo.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.3.21.

“Den russiske skandale.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.12.16.

“Den store kamp.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.8.25.

“Det sociale demokrati.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.4.23.

“Dette er bolschevisme.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.11.

“Diktatur og demokrati.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.5.15.

“Diskussionen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.6.19.

“Dommen over de socialrevolutionære.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.8.10.

“Dommen over det frie ord.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.7.9.

“Duma-medlemmernes forvisning.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.3.2.

“Efter kongressen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1923.3.

“Efter krigen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.12.

“En livsbetingelse.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.16.

“En ny russisk fare.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.1.3.

“En russisk politiker om forholdene i Rusland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1916.9.20.

“Enhetsfront.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.1.20.

“Enkelt og letvint.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.25.

“Er revolutionen i fare?” *Social-Demokraten*. 1918.2.21.

“Et skillende spørsmål.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.19.

“Fagkongressen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.7.10.

“For eller mot Rusland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.3.5.

“Foran landsmøte.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.5.24.

“Forfatningsrevision eller revolution.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.3.4.

“Forfatningsrevision eller Revolution.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.6.2.

“Forskjellen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.12.22.

“Fred og revolution.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.12.24.

“Fredsforhandlingene.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.12.29.

“Fredsutsigterne.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.1.14.

“Genua.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.4.11.

“Gompers.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.5.3.

“Historsike betragtninger.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.10.5.

“Hvad striden gjælder.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.9.20.

“Hvem splitter?” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.12.6.

“Hykleri.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.8.16.

“Indstillingen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.11.1.

“Internationale forbindelser.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.12.

“Internationalen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.6.8.

“Internationalen” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.14.

“Klassemotsætningerne tilspidises.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.5.11.

“Konferansen i Kjøbenhavn.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.1.22.

“Kongressen i Moskva II.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.28.

“Kongressen I Moskva III.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.29.

“Landets fremtid.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.9.29.

“Landets fremtid.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.9.30.

“Lenins tale.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.6.16.

“Løgntrafikken mot Russland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.2.11.

“Maidagen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.4.30.

“Med vaaben i haand.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.2.

“Moskva-Amsterdam.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.2.

“Navneforandringen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1923.3.

“Nederlagenes parti.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.29.

“Norge og Russland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.7.13.

“Norge og Russland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.9.16.

“Norge og Russland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.19.

“Norge-Russland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.8.25.

“Nyt aar.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.1.2.

“Oppositionen sprængt.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.11.9.

“Oppositionen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.12.6.

“Organisationsspørsmålet.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.10.28.

“Parlamentarisme og revolution.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.6.23.

“Parlamentarisme og bolschevisme.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.5.

“Partidiskussionen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.9.15.

“Partisplittelse.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.3.1.

“Politisk og faglig enhet.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.6.

“Praktisk arbeide.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.20.

“Rationeringen og arbeiderne.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.1.4.

“Reaktionen og revolutionen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.9.18.

“Revolutionen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.28.

“Revolutionen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.3.17.

“Revolutionens kaos”. *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.11.8.

“Revolutionens status.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.4.8.

“Revolutions-jubilæet.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.5.

“Rosa Luxemburg mot Lenin.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.12.29.

“Russland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.10.18.

“Ruslands nye forfatning.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.7.12.

“Russerne i Genua.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.4.15.

“Russisk guld.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.8.27.

- “Russisk guld.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.8.28.
- “Russisk politik.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.11.1.
- “Samling?” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.4.8.
- “Sammenbruddet.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.9.12.
- “Social-demokratiet og freden.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.5.3.
- “Socialismen et livskrav overalt.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.2.3.
- “Socialister-kommunister.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.4.
- “Stillingen i Russland.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.6.24.
- “Stillingen til Internationalen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.12.22.
- “Stockholm-konferansen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1917.9.17.
- “Store brytninger.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.1.26.
- “Svensk “Soc.-Dem.” og bolschevismen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.7.3.
- “Tilbake til sosialismen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1922.5.2.
- “Traktaten.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1921.10.1.
- “Utgangspunktet.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.10.11.
- “Valgene og revolutionen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1918.11.16.
- “Verdensrevolution eller verdenskrig.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1920.10.27.
- “Vort parti og parlamentarismen.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1919.6.27.
- “Vær tro som opprører.” *Social-Demokraten*, 1915.12.29.

Literature

- Bjørgum, Jorunn. “Unionsoppløsningen og radikaliseringsen av norsk arbeiderbevegelse.” *Arbeiderhistorie* (2005): 29-47.
- Bjørnson, Øyvind. *På klassekampens grunn (1900-1920)*. Oslo: Tiden, 1990.
- Brustind, Lene Sofie. *Nordnorske holdninger til Russland. En studie av Nordlys' og Finnmarkens dekning av Russland i perioden 1900-1918*. Universitetet i Tromsø, 2005.
- Bull, Edvard *Arbeiderklassen blir til (1850-1900)*. Oslo: Tiden, 1985.

Bull, Edvard. "Scheflo." In *Norsk Biografisk Leksikon*, vol. 12, edited by Einar Jansen and Paulus Svendsen. Oslo: Aschehoug, 1954. 321-324.

Clausen, Hans Peter. *Aviser som historisk kilder*. Århus: Institut for presseforskning og samtidshistorie, 1962.

Danilevsky, Igor N., Vladimir V. Kabanov, Olga M. Medushevskaya, and Marina F. Rumyantseva. *Istochnikovedeniye*. Moscow: RGGU, Institut "Otkrytoe obschestvo", 2004.

Egge, Åsmund and Sven G. Holtsmark. "Soviet diplomacy and the Norwegian left, 1921-1939." In *Caution & compliance: Norwegian-Russian diplomatic relations, 1814-2014*, edited by Kari Aga Myklebost and Stian Bones. Stamsund: Orkana akademisk, 2012. 101-112.

Egge, Åsmund and Terje Halvorsen. " '...kriteriet på en kommunist er hans forhold til Sovjetunionen' De norsk-sovjetiske partirelasjoner 1917—1991." *Arbeiderhistorie* (2002): 9-32.

Egge, Åsmund and Vadim Roginskij, eds. *Komintern og Norge. DNA-perioden 1919-1923: en dokumentasjon*. Oslo: Unipub, 2006.

Egge, Åsmund. "Norsk arbeiderbevegelses forhold til Sovjetunionen." In *Norge-Russland: naboer gjennom 1000 år*, edited by Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzijakson and Jens Petter Nielsen. Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press, 2004. 336-346.

Egge, Åsmund. "Aleksandra Kollontaj og norsk arbeiderbevegelse 1915-1930." In *Revolusjon, kjærlighet, diplomati : Aleksandra Kollontaj og Norden*, edited by Yngvild Sørbye. Oslo: Unipub, 2008. 55-82.

Egge, Åsmund. "Den russiske revolusjon i 1917 – et resultat av krigen?" *Nordisk Østforum* 3 (1992): 32-43.

Egge, Åsmund. *Komintern og krisen i Det norske Arbeiderparti*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1995.

Fomin-Nilov, Denis V. *Norvezhskaya rabochaya partiya: put' k vlasti (1887-1935)*. Moscow: Sobranie, 2010.

Fure, Odd-Bjørn. *“Mellom reformisme og bolsjevisme: norsk arbeiderbevegelse 1918-1920 : teori praksis.”* Universitetet i Bergen, 1983.

Høidal, Oddvar. *Trotsky i Norge: et sår som aldri gror.* Oslo: Spartacus, 2009.

Jensson, Arnfinn. “Vidnes.” In *Norsk Biografisk Leksikon*, vol. 17, edited by Jonas Jansen and Øyvind Anker. Oslo: Aschehoug, 1975. 556-559.

Johansen, Jahn O. “Norge.” In *Kommunismen i Norden og krisen i den kommunistiske bevegelse*, edited by Åke Sparring. Oslo: Dreyers Forlag, 1965. 15-61.

Køhler, Kai Arvid. *“Social-Demokraten” og den russiske revolusjon: en studie i hvordan påvirkningen fra den russiske revolusjon på splittelsesprosessen i norsk arbeiderbevegelse kom til uttrykk i “Social-Demokraten” i tidsrommet mars 1917 til oktober 1920.* Universitetet i Bergen, 1969.

Langfeldt, Knut. *Moskva-tesene i norsk politikk.* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1961. Reprint, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972.

Larsen, Lars A. Døvre. *“En uforbederlig optimist”: “Social-Demokratens” utenrikspolitiske linje i Olaf Scheflos redaktørtid 1918-1921.* Universitet i Oslo, 1996.

Maurseth, Per. *Fra Moskvateser til Kristiania-forslag: Det norske Arbeiderparti og Komintern fra 1921 til februar 1923.* Oslo: Pax, 1972.

Maurseth, Per. *Gjennom kriser til makt.* Oslo: Tiden, 1987.

Naarden, Bruno. *Socialist Europe and revolutionary Russia: perception and prejudice 1848-1923.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Neumann, Iver. *“Russia and the Idea of Europe: a study of identity and international relations”.* London: Routledge, 1996.

Neumann, Iver. *“Uses of the other: “the East” in European identity formation.”* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.

Olstad, Finn. *Frihetens århundre: norsk historie gjennom de siste hundre år.* Oslo: Pax, 2010.

Ottosen, Rune, ed. *Presse, parti og publikum: 1880—1945*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2010.

Ottosen, Rune, Lars Arve Røssland and Helge Østbye. *Norsk pressehistorie*. Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 2002.

Rønning, Ole Martin. “Norsk-russiske forbindelser i mellomkrigstiden: noen trekk ved den norske virksomheten i Russland.” *Arbeiderhistorie* (2002): 33-51.

Scheflo, Inge. “På nært hold.” In *Olav Scheflo som politiker og menneske: 44 artikler og debattinnlegg av Olav Scheflo*, edited by Inge Scheflo. Oslo: Tiden, 1974. 33-49.

Sveum, Tor. “Smugling av revolusjonære skrifter fra Vardø til Nord-Russland.” *Ottar 192* (1992): 41-46.

Terjesen, Einar A. “Demokrati og integrasjon. Sosialistiske og liberale partier 1890-1914.” *Arbeiderhistorie* (2005): 73-101.

Terjesen, Einar A. “Forord.” *Arbeiderhistorie* (2002): 6-7.

Tjelmeland, Hallvard. “Aviser som historisk kilde.” *Pressehistoriske skrifter* 3 (2004): 114-131.

Zasjikhin, Andrej and Konstantin Tsjudinov. “Revolusjon og borgerkrig i nord (1918-1920).” *Ottar 192* (1992): 54-58.

Zenkovich, Nikolay A. *Sobranie Sochinenii. T. 6.: Pokusheniya i inscenirovki: Ot Lenina do Elcina*, Olma-Press, 2004.

Internet sources

“Aleksandr Fyodorovich Kerensky.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 02, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/315382/Aleksandr-Fyodorovich-Kerensky>.

“August Bebel.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed April 30, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/57832/August-Bebel>.

“Conference of Genoa.” *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 03, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/229227/Conference-of-Genoa..>

“Dagsavisen.” In *Store Norske Leksikon*. Accessed March 02, 2014. <http://snl.no/Dagsavisen>

“democratic centralism.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 04, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/691998/democratic-centralism>.

“Eugene Olaussen.” In *Store Norske Leksikon*. Accessed May 02, 2014. http://snl.no/Eugene_Olaussen.

“faglige internasjonaler.” *Store Norske Leksikon*. Accessed April 15, 2014. http://snl.no/faglige_internasjonaler.

“Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin.” *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 03, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/110616/Georgy-Vasilyevich-Chicherin>.

“Karl Liebknecht.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed April 30, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/339854/Karl-Liebknecht>.

“Karl Radek.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 09, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/488384/Karl-Radek>.

“Kyrre Grepp.” In *Store Norske Leksikon*. Accessed March 4, 2014. http://snl.no/Kyrre_Grepp.

“Lavr Georgiyevich Kornilov.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 02, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/322524/Lavr-Georgiyevich-Kornilov>.

“Martin Tranmæl.” In *Store Norske Leksikon*. Accessed April 29, 2014. http://snl.no/Martin_Tranm%C3%A6l.

“Moskovskaya konferenciya, 1922.” In *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Encyclopedia*. Accessed April 12, 2014. <http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/bse/110902/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F>.

“New Economic Policy (NEP).” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 09, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/411387/New-Economic-Policy>.

“Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 09, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/83953/Nikolay-Ivanovich-Bukharin>.

“oblomovshchina.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed October, 13, 2013. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/423897/oblomovshchina>.

“Rosa Luxemburg.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 03, 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/352345/Rosa-Luxemburg>.

“Second International.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed May 02, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/290596/Second-International>.

“*Social-Demokraten*, tidning.” In *Svensk Uppslagsbok*. Accessed April 30, 2014. <http://svenskuppslagsbok.se/71754/Social-Demokraten-tidning/>.

“Venstre.” *Store Norske Leksikon*. Accessed April 26, 2014. <http://snl.no/Venstre>.

Duffy, Michael. *Who's Who – Hugo Haase*. Accessed April 30, 2014. <http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/haase.htm>.

Franzosi, Robert. “The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data: Issues in the Methodology of Data Collection from Newspapers.” *Historical Methods* 20:1 (1987): 5-16. <http://personal.psc.isr.umich.edu/yuxie-web/files/soc543/Franzosi1987.pdf>.

Kantor, Vladimir. “Russkiy evropeec kak zadacha Rossii.” *Vestnik Evropy* 1 (2001). <http://magazines.russ.ru/vestnik/2001/1/kantor.html>.

Kirby, David. “International Socialism and the Question of Peace: The Stockholm Conference of 1917.” *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1982): 709-716. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638753>.

Knudson, Jerry W. *Late to the Feast: Newspapers as Historical Sources* (1993). Accessed September 16, 2013. <http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/1993/9310/9310ARC.cfm>.

Marxists Internet Archive. “Constitution of the Red International of Labour Unions.” Accessed March 13, 2014. <http://www.marxists.org/history/international/profintern/1921/constitution.htm>.

Minutes of the Second Congress of the Communist International. Seventh Session, July 30,” Marxists Internet Archive, accessed May 04, 2014. <http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch07.htm>.

Rossiiskie socialisty i anarkhisty posle Oktyabrya 1917 goda. “Sudebnyi process socialistov-revolucionerov (1922—1926).” Accessed April 11, 2014. <http://socialist.memo.ru/photoalbum/gal5/preface.html>.

Rynkov, Vadim. “Periodicheskaya pechat: mesto v sisteme istoricheskikh istochnikov.” *Otechestvennie arkhivi* 3 (2010). <http://polit.ru/article/2010/08/09/periodika/>.

Sayers, Richard S. *The Bank of England, 1891-1944*, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. <http://books.google.no/books?id=8hY9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA153&lpg=PA153&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

Suslov, Aleksey Yu. “Novaya publikaciya dokumentov sudebnogo processa nad socialistami-revolucionerami 1922 goda.” *Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i uridicheskie nauki, kulturologiya i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki* (2011), 2 (8), ch. 2: 182-184. http://gramota.net/articles/issn_1997-292X_2011_2-2_44.pdf.