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Female Bodies and Masculine Norms

Challenging Gender Discourses and the Implementation of Resolution 1325 in Peace Operations in Africa

Randi Solhjell (for the Training for Peace Programme) including a case
study of the African Union in Somalia, by Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik



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Executive Summary and Recommendations

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) was hailed as a pioneering step in acknowledging the varied roles of women in conflict and promoting their participation in peace processes and in peacebuilding. This report takes a critical look at the inclusion and exclusion of Res. 1325 in peace operations in Africa. It focuses on the meaning and importance of *gender perspectives* in these operations rather than “women’s perspectives.” Peace operations in Africa are clearly male-dominated, with on average 3% women in uniform (police and military), and about 17% women among the civilian staff. However, simply adding more women to peace operations is not sufficient in itself. Such an approach is based on essentialist assumptions of women and men and their assumed “innate potentials.” The report moves on to discuss some more qualitative aspects of gender perspectives in these operations: gender mainstreaming and gender units. The author examines, *inter alia*, the effects of equating “gender” with “women,” and the challenges involved in creating separate units to implement gender perspectives. Further, the report identifies and discusses the gender perspective at the core of many of these operations: one of militarized masculinity and state restoration. Recognizing the existence of these masculine discourses within such institutions (army and other state-building aspects), combined with the dilemmas of insecurity in the operative context, is central to analyzing and understanding the bottlenecks to gender mainstreaming and gender-sensitive approaches. Gender mainstreaming and implementation of Res. 1325 will remain at the rhetorical level unless major changes are made to the masculine, militarized architecture of peace operations.

Two case studies are chosen for deeper examination of the gender perspectives of peace operations. First, with the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the author considers the Gender and the Sexual Violence Units, and the impact of these units in MONUSCO. Also discussed are the peacekeeping innovations “Community Liaison Assistant” and “Joint Protection Teams,” and the aspects of gender in these practices. At the level of implementation and performance measurement, systematic disaggregated gender indicators and targets are still lacking. Further, it is argued, gender perspectives in the mission have usually been limited to very narrow and victimized approaches to gender as “particular” or “special protection for women” and “sexual.” This use of “gender” is problematic because it sustains the image of “natural” differences in gender attributes regarding

femininity and masculinity, and reduces women to being bodies and vulnerable sexual beings.

The second case study concerns the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and gender perspectives in the context of a heavily masculine and militarized approach to instability and insecurity. On paper, the AU has started to implement the agenda of Res. 1325, but there is still a long way to go before this figures prominently in the work of the AU and the mission in Somalia. Work on gender perspectives within the mission has been largely confined to achieving a more gender-equal representation of women and men in military as well as civilian roles. The gender unit is staffed by only one person, and there is a lack of resources to push for a gender-inclusive approach in the male-dominated field of conflict analysis, state restoration and security agendas. As to external work, the author argues that rather than seeking to cover on a wide range, AMISOM should focus on areas where its activities can have an added value, such as the work on women's political participation in Somalia and their inclusion in the sphere of peace and security.

Some recommendations include:

To the UN

- Integration of gender perspectives in Peace Operations needs to include a critical approach to male dominated arenas such as reforming the security sector or state restoration. Gender perspectives do not only mean adding women or gender units as an afterthought. Rather, it means to consider how actors inform and shape their surroundings (e.g. institutions) and vice versa and how this affects aspects of peace and security. Integrating gender perspectives needs to be a cross-cutting issue.

To the AU

- It is important that the integration of Res. 1325 in AU protocols and procedures are not only focused on protection aspect of women but also women's active participation in peace and security matters.

To MONUSCO

- MONUSCO could work more systematically and from a senior level on how to integrate gender perspectives both externally in mission work and internally in the organization. Gender perspectives concern the daily dealings between the peacekeepers (broadly speaking) and the local communities, including reporting of security issues, rebuilding better state-

society relations etc. Congolese men need to be engaged in what have been considered “feminine tasks” (e.g. fetching water and going to markets) in order to tackle some of the security risks that women and youth face daily. Peacekeepers can challenge gender roles in order to support security and stability for vulnerable communities.

To AMISOM

- It is recommended that AMISOM should increase collaboration and coordination with other international actors by identifying areas where AMISOM has a comparative advantage, such as working with the Federal Government of Somalia on women’s political participation, and encouraging stronger inter-organizational support.

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1.0 Introduction

Women are as much a part of war and conflict situations as are men, but their inclusion has traditionally been limited, if not neglected, in security assessments and in formal peace-building processes at the national and regional levels. Not only does this mean that important gendered security problems are excluded, but it also can seriously affect progress towards longer-term stability in conflict/post-conflict areas if only half of the population are consulted. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) was hailed as a pioneering step in acknowledging the varied roles of women in conflict, and in promoting their participation in peace processes and in peace building (Olonisakin, Barnes, & Ikpe, 2011). As noted by K. Karamé (2006, p. 8): “The ultimate goal of all peace efforts is a lasting, sustainable peace, and the use of a gender perspective represents a means to this end.”

The present study has been supported by the Training for Peace in Africa Program (TfP) financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The TfP has been a key part of Norway’s foreign policy in supporting peace-building in Africa, and more specifically UN and AU operations, by providing qualified personnel through pre-deployment and in-mission training. Since the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325 (henceforth Res. 1325) and the follow-up resolutions,¹ the Norwegian government has encouraged and supported the TfP partners² in implementing various aspects of women’s participation and gender perspectives in the training of peacekeepers, police and civilians deployed to international operations. All program partners receive Res. 1325- and gender-focused research, training and policy advice through the TfP. However, much still remains to be done, not least because of obstacles on the ground like “advocacy outweighs substance” (Olonisakin et al., 2011, p. xix). This study has emerged from the need to see how far we have come in research and implementation in training and peacekeeping operations in Africa, and to identify the

¹ These are UNSC Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010).

² TfP partners are the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria (ISS), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), as well as the supporting partners of the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) and the Norwegian Police Directorate.

remaining challenges to full implementation of Res. 1325, also regarding perceptions of Western normative hegemony.

The report draws attention to various areas of integrating the agenda of women, peace and security, as well as gender-inclusive approaches to peace operations in Africa. First, we examine the proportion of women and men in UN operations in Africa, noting that in many policy reports and indicators, the focus is on having women represented alongside men in various aspects of defining peace and security. This perspective is then problematized in the ensuing section on the limitations of such perspectives, including essentialist assumptions of women as “innately peaceful.” Thirdly, we turn to the issue of “gender mainstreaming” and the use of gender units to ensure that gender perspectives are included in the execution of the peace operation mandate. This is followed by a section on the core mandate of these operations, i.e. military presence and state restoration in war-torn countries, and how these areas are largely perceived as non-gendered, as they are male-dominated fields. We often find a tendency to *malestreaming* rather than gender *mainstreaming* (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007, p. 9). Chapters 3 and 4 discuss in detail two examples of peace operations—the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the AU mission in Somalia—and the inclusion of gender perspectives in the various parts of these operations. However, before starting the discussion on peace operations, let us take a brief look at Res. 1325 and what it means.

1.1 Resolution 1325 in brief

Res. 1325 came about as the result of a combination of international processes, especially the Beijing platform, and the work of international activists from both the North and South who were excluded from high-level, male-dominated negotiations even though they experienced the lion’s share of the impacts from war and post-conflict situations. The Convention on the elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, was seen as a breakthrough for women’s rights. The signatory states committed themselves to prevent any form of discrimination against women on the basis of gender. CEDAW provides the basis for equal status for women and men in public and private life. The 1994 UN conference in Cairo, which produced the Cairo Declaration on Population & Development, was central in relation to the rights of women to education as well as reproductive rights, including protection from unsafe abortions. In 1995 came the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which declared that “[w]omen’s empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of

equality, development and peace” and that “[w]omen’s rights are human rights.”³ The plan of action was followed up in the 2000 Beijing + 5 Declaration,⁴ where all the twelve areas of attention in the Beijing declaration were addressed, with a focus on achievements and obstacles. And then, in 2000, the UNSC adopted Res. 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, later followed by UNSC Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010). (See boxes 1.1 and 1.2 for further details on the content of the resolutions.)

However, many of the follow-up resolutions focus on women as victims of war and conflict and their need for protection.⁵ This may be seen as a set-back, since the initial conventions, declarations and plans of action specifically addressed the need to eliminate *all* forms of discrimination against women and to ensure their participation at all institutional levels, in the public and private spheres. These earlier documents stressed the equal status of women and men, and their active inclusion in decision-making processes. By seeing women solely as “vulnerable people” in conflict situations, the international community may ignore the root causes of their experienced vulnerability, and approaches to prevent this situation in the first place. These and other aspects will be further problematized in this report.

Res. 1325 was launched as a universally accepted norm of equal rights and opportunities. Moreover, it innovatively placed women’s position as regards global peace and security matters at the center-stage of international politics. In 2010, the UN Secretary General launched a “roadmap,” the Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding (2010) in order to operationalize the Women, Peace and Security agenda. It deals with the following issues, involving concrete commitments: (1) conflict resolution, (2) post-conflict planning, (3) peace-building funding, (4) civilian capacity, (5) governance, (6) the rule of law, and (7) economic recovery (Jenkins, 2013). The roadmap was launched in order to enable systematic changes to take place at headquarter and field-based levels in the UN system and the organization’s *modus operandi*. It is too early to conclude as to the overall outcome of the plan, which arguably entails a long-term process addressing all these areas.

³ Original document of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, downloaded 25 March 2013 from

<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf>

⁴ Resolutions A/RES/S-23/2 (2000) A/RES/S-23/3 (2000) adopted by the General Assembly, downloaded 25 March 2013 from

<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/reports.htm>

⁵ Note that SCR 1889 (2009) establishes the need for indicators to track the overall results in regarding SCR 1325.

Box 1.1 Four interrelated components of 1325 ⁶
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation – ensuring that women are included at all levels of decision-making, with local, national, regional, and international participation. This includes as police, soldiers, and state actors, in peace operations, in peace negotiations, and as UN special representatives.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection – ensuring that women and girls are protected from sexual and gender-based violence in emergency situations, e.g. in refugee camps.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevention – preventing violence through contributing to stronger international and national laws and rights for women, and supporting women’s participation in peace and conflict-prevention initiatives.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relief and Recovery – responding to international emergency crises with gender-nuanced perspectives so that the measures taken serve men and women, girls and boys.

Box 1.2 Follow-up resolutions to 1325 ⁷
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • S/RES/1960 (6 December 2010) requests the establishment of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence; calls for an annex (as a basis for possible sanctions) in annual sexual violence reports listing parties credibly suspected of bearing responsibility for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence; reiterates the UNSC’s intention to consider sexual violence as designation criteria in its sanctions committees; calls for information sharing between the Special Representative and sanctions committees and associated expert groups.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • S/RES/1889 (5 October 2009) determines that women’s protection and empowerment are to be taken into account in post-conflict planning; requests a set of indicators to track implementation of resolution 1325 at the global level.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • S/RES/1888 (30 September 2009) strengthens UN system structures to respond to sexual violence; establishes the mandate of the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • S/RES/1820 (19 June 2008) concerns sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations; enumerates measures for protection and for ending impunity; and expresses the Council’s willingness to employ sanctions against perpetrators of sexual violence in armed conflict.

⁶ UN Framework to track implementation of Res. 1325 (Kuonqui & Cueva-Beteta, 2011)

⁷ From the UN Security Council Report (2013), see bibliography for full reference

2.0 Gender perspectives in peace operations

This section will focus mainly on UN operations; the AU will be discussed more in the case study of Somalia. Women have increasingly entered the “peacekeeping family,” especially since the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. One reason is that the missions have been expanding, from purely military observers to integrated missions with civilian, police and military staff. There has also been a deliberate policy of recruiting more women, and sometimes solely female teams for particular tasks (see box 2.1).

Box 2.1 Female-only police unit in Liberia

The Formed Police Unit of the Indian contingent of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is the first all-female contingent to be deployed in a UN mission. Since 2007, their role in Liberia has mostly been to stand guard in front of the president’s office. As the *New York Times* put it, Liberia is a “modern laboratory for the rise of women making peace,” symbolized with the female head of mission in the country that has Africa’s first democratically elected female president. Critics have argued that being female does not automatically lead to good communication skills with the local population, or for that matter peace in the long term. In Liberia, many civilians see female peacekeepers as far more approachable than their male colleagues. But as Noonan (2012) argues “[i]t is not clear, however, whether this is due to something inherent in the female peacekeepers’ natures, or to the way that those peacekeepers are perceived. It is entirely possible that some people find female peacekeepers more approachable because of their own assumptions about gender, which lead



them to perceive the women as less threatening and less sexual than men, and comparatively more caring and maternal.”


Picture 2.1 UN Photo/Christopher Herwig

2.1 The numbers game: counting women and men in UN operations in Africa


All the figures below have been collected from the “gender-”disaggregated data (henceforth “sex” as it is biological gender that is in focus here) from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)⁸ and compiled by the author, extracting the figures for all *African-based missions*, including observer missions, from the same month (December) except for 2013 (the most recent available data at the time of the writing were from October). Collection of sex-disaggregated data started as recently as in 2006 for military personnel and in 2009 for police. The statistics below show solely the absolute numbers of women and men in peacekeeping, in addition to percentage charts of the individual groups and total personnel, and not their actual position in the military or police. The percentage charts can give a better visual indication, as absolute figures can be misleading, perceptually speaking. It is often stated that women in military and police roles serve at subordinate levels and rarely in high-ranking/decision-making positions. Moreover, women in the military frequently serve in traditional roles as nurses, secretaries and other minor logistical tasks. It is important for future research to identify what kinds of roles women have in the armed and police forces have and why there is a gendered barrier to women achieving higher positions.

⁸ Downloaded 16 December 2013 at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/gender.shtml>

Graph 1.1 Military experts in Africa-based missions, 2006–2013⁹




Average participation of military experts in Africa-based missions, 2006–2013




⁹ Absolute numbers show an average of 66 female military experts to an average of 1768 male per year.

Graph 1.2 Troops in Africa-based missions, 2006–2013¹⁰




Average troop contribution in Africa-based missions, 2006–2013




¹⁰ Absolute numbers show an average of 1168 female troops to an average of 55731 male per year.

Graph 1.3 Individual police in Africa-based missions, 2009–2013¹¹




Average percentage of individual police in Africa-based missions, 2009–2013




¹¹ Absolute numbers show an average of 672 female police to an average of 3856 male per year.

Graph 1.4 Formed Police Units in Africa-based missions, 2009–2013¹²




Average percentage of Formed Police Units in Africa-based missions, 2009–2013




¹² Absolute numbers show an average of 259 female formed police units to an average of 4836 male per year. The majority of the female formed police units are found in the UN missions in Liberia

Graph 1.5 Grand total, all units in Africa-based missions, 2006–2013¹³



Overall percentage of female and male police and military personnel in UN operations in Africa-based missions, 2006–2013



¹³ Absolute numbers show an average of 259 female formed police units to an average of 4836 male per year. Police data have been included only since 2009, and may give the impression of an increase in female personnel, although this is not necessarily the case. In general, there are usually more women in the police than in the military forces.

What the data overall show, unsurprisingly, is that the number of women is low in military and police positions deployed in peace operations in Africa. The figures appear relatively stable, but this is also a very limited timespan—only six years. From the UN's own records, for the 32 years from 1957 to 1989 there were only *twenty women* serving in uniform for UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁴ Despite some increases in the number of women serving, it can still be said that some of the core protection and security approaches are found within a masculine space. This means that the majority of the policing, patrolling, protection and reporting will be conducted by male personnel. Whether or not this is a real concern is another matter, but the overall policy on the part of the UN and donors like Norway is in line with the argument for increasing the numbers of women in these positions. Below, there will be a further discussion on the more qualitative aspects concerning this and other issues in male/female personnel serving in UN peace operations.

Civilian staff constitutes at least half of the overall missions, but access to sex-disaggregated statistics is more limited. According to the UN, female civilian staff at the level of peacekeeping operations and special political missions made up only 29% of international and 17% of national staff in 2012.¹⁵ In other words, on the whole, some 70% of international and 80% of national staff are male.

2.2 A critical look at “gender perspectives”: Women as innately peaceful?

What lies behind these figures, in terms of perceptions and purposes of these gender policies? Is increasing the number of women the right way to pursue gender mainstreaming? Do these women actually serve as role models for women in the host community? Will adding women to a predominantly male group reduce the problems of sexual misconduct against the local population? Importantly: are the women in decision-making roles? Do they have the same role as men in the military, or do they tend to deal with administrative tasks? These and many other questions can be asked in relation to the gender policy of increasing and counting number of women. Let us examine some of these question and the underlying assumptions.

First, the focus on increasing the number of women in security forces is what many feminist writers would dismiss as “add women and stir”—and understandably so. However, Res. 1325 does encourage the participation of women at all levels of peace operations as a goal *in itself*, so it could be argued that this is an inherent weakness in the

¹⁴ Official UN Peacekeeping Mission webpage, downloaded 11 April 2013 from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml>

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

resolution. As Jennings (2011, p. 1) has pointed out, we need “more systematic research [...] to examine the ways in which women peacekeepers contribute to the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, and how these contributions differ (or not) from the performance of male peacekeepers.” For instance, there is a tendency to make quick assumptions that simply adding women to the mix will make everything better, including curbing the sex trade and harassment problems. The very real dilemma of sexual exploitation and abuse is something that any intervening peace operation will be aware of and which is, at least on paper, firmly established as an act of misconduct.¹⁶ With the arrival of international staff in post-war societies comes the issue of unequal status and power relations. The “add women” approach builds implicitly on the view that men are unable to control themselves unless they have women around them, and that women in turn are inherently non-exploitive in power positions. In fact, however, it is likely that there will always be power-exploitation dilemmas in a post-conflict country (see for instance Andreas, 2008). This may involve exchanging food for sexual services, taking advantage of cheap labor, or generally taking advantage of the fact that most of the local people have no voice in relation to the peacekeepers and the international community at large. Discipline and a code of conduct must come from within—not only through adding women.

Moreover, the policy literature often presents assumptions around increasing the number of women in national forces through reform and training programs such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) as an immediate step towards gender equality and generally greater professionalization of the military or police (Baaz & Utas, 2012). In addition, there is the idea that, if women are added to the national forces, local women will be less intimidated by the agents of state security. As Baaz and Utas (2012, p. 5) argue, the topic of gender and SSR “is a field dominated by manuals rather than analytical discussions of gender and the possible ramifications of various conceptualisations.” This is a field over-represented in the normative policy sphere, but not backed by empirical case-by-case knowledge.

Secondly, there are good reasons why data on women and men in UN posts should also include an understanding of their position. As Res. 1325 is solidly based on the idea of participation and empowerment of women, we need to know not simply how many women, but what kinds of opportunities they have in the mission, and what may be blocking their access to decision-making roles. Assembling such data is more challenging, but should provide findings highly relevant for understanding the challenges to and potentials of

¹⁶ This goes at least for military personnel; the lines are more blurred regarding international civilian staff.

gender mainstreaming of the UN. Any data collection on this should be as norm-free as possible. It is important to consider both women *and* men, their positions and their access to decision-making roles, rather than simply assuming that women are subordinate.

There is also the issue of being role-models when women serve in UN operations. Depending on how successful the international staff is in the host country, this might have an effect on young girls, enabling them to see themselves as also breadwinners and not solely as wives and mothers. Carey (2001) found positive effects from the presence of female peacekeepers, in that local women find them easier to confide in, and that they are seen as behaving less hierarchically and more responsive. However, such views may be as much the result of gendered perception of women's roles, as Noonan (2012) has emphasized (see box 2.1).

As many (see e.g. Olonisakin et al., 2011) have pointed out, there is a real gap in research and knowledge as to whether gender policies from UN headquarters level are actually implemented at mission level. This is not only a problem of data, but more qualitatively, of what these various gender policies actually entail in the mission area. There are certainly no quick fixes to the many of the troubles in a post-war society, so we should ask whether these policies are feasible in the context of the operation. As Olonisakin (2010, p. 5) notes:

It is difficult to quantify the impact of changes in policy or approaches given that it can take a long period of time for gender-equality related ideas to percolate through organisations and society as a whole. It is nonetheless possible to identify qualitative shifts in attitude or organisational impact. Doing this in a consistent manner across national and regional settings is in itself a daunting task, and such studies in Africa or indeed globally are rare. This lack of empirical evidence makes it particularly difficult to state categorically the extent to which UNSCR 1325 has made a difference in the lives of ordinary women in Africa and other places.

2.3 Gender mainstreaming and gender units in missions

We need to look beyond the top leadership positions (...). We need to examine where women are in the overall architecture of peacekeeping missions.

Mavic Cabrera-Balleza, International coordinator,
Global Network of Women Peacebuilders¹⁷

As this quote makes clear, there is a need to look more critically at the overall qualitative aspects of participation of women and men in peace operations. Which voices are heard in which areas, and why? This section offers brief discussion of the more conceptual challenges of implementing Res. 1325 in peace operations, such as the understanding of gender and gender perspectives, as well as the more practical, operational implementation efforts in peace operations, including gender mainstreaming and gender units for support and implementation in these missions. The next section follows up by examining one of the largest, most gendered parts of missions: the military and the security apparatus.

The overall agenda on women, peace and security as set forth in Res. 1325 establishes a “language” for taking gender perspectives into peace and security matters. In many ways, it forms a normative universe and an imagined community of shared ideas (Whitworth, 2004, pp. 122-123). However, moving from ideas to practice in the UN bureaucratic universe is another thing. For instance, the UN may be very attentive to listening to women’s organizations in some settings, while remaining silent on precisely the bread-and-butter aspects of conflict, peace and security (ibid). Moreover, as Willett (2010, p. 142) notes, “resolution 1325 is not a treaty; consequently there are no mechanisms for ratification, compliance or verification. As such the resolution lacks the muscle that can compel states to comply with its provisions.” In many ways, the resolution places the responsibility on all parts of the UN bureaucratic apparatus, but with no sanctions against those unable or unwilling to comply.

A further challenge at the conceptual level of UN approaches is the fundamental problem of understanding *gender* as *women*. In many UN documents, “gender” is understood as *women’s* special needs for protection against sexual violence. In Res. 1325, the concept and explanation of “gender” is used interchangeably with “women/girls” (Henry, 2007, p. 75). This shows a lack of understanding of the interconnectedness of the lives of men and women, the power relations

¹⁷ Thalif Deen, “U.N. Urged to Practice What It Preaches on Gender,” Inter Press News, downloaded 7 November 2013 from <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/11/u-n-urged-to-practice-what-it-preaches-on-gender/>

of men and women in post-conflict situations—also men’s lives need to be understood in order to develop better policies for improving the conditions for women (ibid, p. 76). In relation to the implementation of gender perspectives in international peace operations, we find indications of a one-sided understanding of gender as referring solely to women, which in turn seriously restricts discourse and actions in the mission. As discussed below, issues of militarization and masculinity rarely feature in the discussion on gender and gender perspectives. Yet, with the armed forces in these missions, it is precisely the masculine discourses within such institutions and the dilemmas of insecurity in the operative context that are central to the analysis, and to identifying bottlenecks to gender mainstreaming and gender-sensitive approaches. Gender perspectives need to include how institutions (army, police, etc.) are informed by gender relations in society, and in turn how these relations facilitate or obstruct the outcomes desired (Baaz & Stern 2013, p. 3).

More broadly, it lies in the very nature of liberal approaches to post-conflict restructuring, peace- and state-building initiatives is that this is often seen as a rational, technical project and defined in masculine terms—competitive, self-interested, authoritative, independent, rational, profit-maximizing (see Carver 1996 in Reeves). Often, feminine characteristics are referred to as being the outside of the state, like “women and civil society organizations,” and belonging to a more emotional, private sphere. This is a major problem for the norms of “gender equality” and “women’s empowerment” in national peace and security affairs.

As to the operational side of integrating Res. 1325 in peace operations, a central term has been *gender mainstreaming*, emphasized in particular in the UN declaration of 31 May 2000, the *Namibia Plan of Action on “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations”* (DPKO, 2000). Gender mainstreaming is generally understood as a process for integrating gender perspectives at all levels of work, from gender analysis to gender-equal programs for greater involvement and participation of women and their perspectives. The ideas of gender mainstreaming first came in the agenda of development programs, where donors, NGOs and activists may hold the key to both closing and opening the doors for more gender-equal thinking on development.¹⁸ In the more recent era of peacekeeping, stemming from the views expressed in former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) and former Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s *We the Peoples, The Role of United Nations in the 21st Century* (2000), a discursive space opened up for topics such as

¹⁸ This refers in particular to the Women in Development (WID) agenda and later the Gender and Development (GAD) agenda.

gender mainstreaming in peace operations (see e.g. Väyrynen, 2004).¹⁹ Res. 1325 brought a norm change, with the focus on mainstreaming of women's interests and concerns in processes of conflict management, peace negotiations and peace building (Tryggestad, 2010, p. 159). Gender mainstreaming has since received considerable criticism for lack of success at the operational level. But, as argued by UN Women,²⁰ gender mainstreaming is a comprehensive process and not a goal in itself, so it is not possible to speak of overall failure. For instance, operational outcomes might be hampered by the lack of a gender-mainstreamed organizational culture (male-dominated management, lack of intersected work, disinterested leaders) in areas of intervention. Moreover, it is important to clarify at what levels one is talking about gender mainstreaming. This section discusses some of the key issues relevant in international peace operations.

Box 2.3 Gender mainstreaming in a nutshell ²¹
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender mainstreaming means integrating gender into all elements of policy and strategy development, from planning and benchmarking, through to indicator development and evaluation.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping missions involves identifying the various impacts of conflict on the lives of women and men, and on that basis proposing practical solutions to respond to the specific rights and needs of all.

As an attempt to gender mainstream all activities, the UN has established gender units and included gender advisors in several missions. In the above-mentioned Namibia Plan of Action (DPKO, 2000, p. 3), it is argued that “[a] gender affairs unit is crucial for effective gender mainstreaming and should be a standard component of all missions. It should be adequately funded and staffed at appropriate levels and should have direct access to senior decision-makers.” One of the indicators for the UN Framework (Kuonqui & Cueva-Beteta, 2011) to track implementation of Res. 1325 is measuring the percentage of peacekeeping and political missions with gender experts through these gender units. The first two gender units were established in 1999 in the UN mission in Kosovo and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor. Later on, gender units were

¹⁹ There were many other documents, forums and conferences that opened up a gendered and feminist discourse on security and peace-building, such as the Beijing Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. This section, however, deals specifically with gender mainstreaming in *UN peace operations*.

²⁰ UN Women webpage on gender mainstreaming, downloaded 23 October 2013 from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/gendermainstreaming.htm>

²¹ UN DPKO Gender Team Progress report (2010). Downloaded 19 November 2013 from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/gender_team_progress_report_2010.pdf

established in several other countries with a UN mission, like the DRC, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Liberia. According to the UN's own figures as of June 2011 (ibid, p. 14), "100 per cent of field missions managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have gender components, and 60 per cent of these gender components are headed by a senior gender expert. Of the field missions managed by the Department of Political Affairs (including regional missions), 46 per cent have gender advisers; the rest have designated gender focal points." However, it is not clear what "gender components" mean in practice, or how their impact is measured, beyond counting individual experts. It is also fair to say that the units have not been "adequately funded and staffed at appropriate levels" as they generally consist of one or two advisors who are set to cover vast areas of the operation. This is further discussed in the case studies of Somalia and the DRC.

Whitworth (2004, p. 131) has argued that there is a tendency for gender units or separate women's "offices" to liaise with local women's organizations, whereas other (often male) political actors liaise with the main UN sections in the missions—and thus the latter have better access to the head of mission. She notes that "[a] special but separate unit that ends up dealing with women's organizations (...), effectively marginalizes those organizations at the same time that it attempts to ensure they have some access to the mission they might otherwise not have had." Thus, one perspective is that the good intentions may in effect be a way of keeping organizations working on "women's issues" separate from the "real" political and security concern of the UN operation. As Schott (2013, p. 17) argues, "the dynamics of gender in security relations cannot be separated from the workings of economic, political or military institutions." On the other hand, if there were no gender units in place, gender mainstreaming might not form a significant part of *anyone's* daily agenda in the mission.

Given staff limitations and insufficient funding, should the gender unit and gender advisors devote all their attention to the country where they are working and their national/local representatives? Or should they work on sensitizing the UN as an institution? The limitations of gender mainstreaming within the various UN sections in missions may be the first step in reform. As long as there is a gap in understanding what gender means to the various sections and how it forms a part of their program goals, it will remain difficult to achieve any results on the ground. The way gender mainstreaming is operationalized in peace operation is usually as greater representation of women in conflict resolution and peace building, and training peacekeepers on *special* protection needs for women and children in conflict (Väyrynen, 2004, p. 137). Here, gender advisors face a major task.

An important criticism as regards gender mainstreaming is that it is viewed as a process to be fitted in with existing structures or institutions, rather than challenging these structures that have kept

silent on gender in the first place (Väyrynen, 2004, p. 138). As many feminist authors would argue, it is necessary to challenge state-centered peace operations and the masculine ways of conflict resolution and peace building (ibid): in a word, *malestreaming* (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007, p. 174). In the next section, we take a closer look at such malestreaming in conflict-resolution and security measures in international peace operations.

2.4 Militarization, state restoration and masculinity: Gender perspectives at the core of UN mandates?

Two key dimensions of peace operations usually involve military and police forces; and state restoration or state building. The scholarly literature regarding gender in this field is relatively large, although reflections among practitioners in peace operations seem less conscious. Male voices and masculine values are largely seen as “non-gendered” norms, and they form the key power structures within missions. Thus, the UN largely takes a malestreamed approach to gender perspectives. Gender mainstreaming as discussed above and implementation of Res. 1325 will remain at the rhetorical level unless major changes are made to the masculine, militarized architecture of peace operations (Willett, 2010, p. 143). In short: it is necessary to challenge the core power structures in the organization and the practice of international missions.


The scholarly debate has focused not so much on men being masculine in the military, and more on how men and women, girls and boys learn to become “masculine” by joining the military (Baaz & Stern, 2013; C. H. Enloe, 1980, 2000, 2007; Goldstein, 2003; Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007; Whitworth, 2004). As Sjoberg and Gentry (p. 174) argue, “masculinity is not a gender, it is the norm because (often unwittingly) gendered institutions, discourse and research present themselves as gender-neutral or gender-equal.” Precisely what appears to be “normal” is what many critical scholars wish to challenge and discuss.

Moreover, there are scholarly contributions that not only deconstruct the view of “gender-neutral” institutions and theories, but also engage in dialogues on women’s knowledge of these issues where masculine values are privileged (ibid). However, this debate seems absent in UN and African Union (AU) peacekeeping. Arguably, there are good reasons for this, as neither the UN nor the AU is mandated to reflect on these gender norms: their mandate is to prevent and protect civilians from getting killed, to put it bluntly. Nevertheless, this report will make an effort to link some of the scholarly debate, especially found within the field of feminist International Relations, with the way the UN and the AU respond to international crisis, especially when regarding the seemingly non-gendered areas of the military and state-building efforts, which often form the core of the mandate and

activities. Above we have focused on the problems of “gender efforts” being peripheral to missions, as with separate gender units, or gender perspectives as understood in quantitative terms, or the issues of essentialist interpretations of women as peaceful. It is time to view these core aspects of missions—military protection and state restoration—through gender-sensitive lenses.

First, in order to visualize peacekeeping on the ground and its participants from the police, military and civilian arenas, it is useful to look at Box 2.4, to understand the militarized interpretations of peacekeeping.

Box 2.4 The figures represents all UN missions and are taken from official UN official figures²²



Comparing this chart against the number of women and men presented in section 2.1, we see how global security is interpreted through a masculine and male-dominated approach: 84% of the contribution is found within the military and police. Even though conflict, peace and security will have an impact on both men and women, there is an interpretation of masculine protection towards the feminized victims of war. And it can be argued that this is the case with the *Realpolitik* of UN and AU peace operations (see picture 2.1 below illustrating this point).

²² Data compiled through the webpage downloaded 27 October 2013 from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>



2.1 UN Photo/Martine Perret

To understand these processes of peace operations as favoring masculine ideals, institutions and norms, we need to look more closely at what may be meant by “masculinity. Masculinity is not an easy thing to define, as it is here understood as something in flux—changing over time, across cultures, between communities and individuals—making precise and exclusive definition impossible. At the very basic level it both contrasts and depends on the concept of femininity, and vice versa. As Goldstein (2003, p. 252) argues, society forces not only individuals but also whole sets of objects and relationships into “masculine” and “feminine” categories. These two categories involve a power relationship. For example, there might be a subordination of feminine characteristics in the armed forces and a subordination of masculine characteristics in nursing. Of great interest to our discussion here are the militarized masculinities and the connections to violence. In many cultures men are expected to be potential warriors, and must undergo often very painful experiences of training and fighting. This can be the ultimate “test of manhood,” where any associations with the feminine—defined as weak, afraid, emotional—are avoided. If women enter this warrior club, they often need to prove that they are as manly as or even more masculine than their male counterparts. Masculinity is often association with the ability to win a war or to be able and willing to use armed force rather strategies such as conflict resolutions and diplomacy (Schjølset, 2013, p. 37). The main purpose of joining the military, as Whitworth (2004, p. 151) argues, is to create “men – and some women – who will be warriors, who are prepared to kill, to die, for the state.”

We will return shortly to the issue of the state and state-restoration in peace operations as a masculine field, but first there is a need to

elaborate a bit further regarding the *warrior* as well *protector* aspects of manhood and masculinity. Namely, there is also the expectation that being a man involves being a protector. As Enloe (2002 in Higate, 2012, p. 34) has noted, during violent crisis there is often the idea that “those who are feminine need armed protection.” This is in many ways an internal contradiction in masculinity. On the one hand, masculinity can at its most extreme be expressed as the warrior and in violent aggression such as sexual violence. On the other, and in order to tackle this problem, there is a need for a militarized response of masculine ideals to protect the victims or the feminized population. This inherent contradiction is rarely reflected upon in peace operation settings, where militarized responses might seem simply as a natural and/or technical response to protect civilians. However, there have been attempts by the UN and AU to combine both “hard” (masculine) and “soft” (feminine) methods in peace operations. This may be in the form of “Joint Protection Teams,” as seen in the case of the DR Congo, where there are representatives from the civilian section accompanied by the military peacekeepers to particularly vulnerable communities. There may also be changes to how peace operations are set up in the future, moving from military peacekeepers to smaller political missions. There will be a further discussion on the lessons from DR Congo in the next chapter.

Regarding the state-restoration aspect, which involves among other things reforming and re-building the security and justice apparatus, arranging democratic elections and assisting in infrastructure re-building, is often a main priority for UN operations. It also serves as the core “exit strategy” for the missions, with the assumption that “the state” will guarantee for its citizens conditions of peace, security, and stability. The aspect of state is related to the debate on nation-building in which many feminist scholars such as Yuval-Davis (1997, p. 3) has argued that “(...) [N]ations have usually been discussed as part of the public political sphere, [and] the exclusion of women from that arena has affected their exclusion from the discourse as well.” To simplify, women are often more accepted to form a part of the private sphere, such as the domestic household, whereas men can be generally more represented in the public sphere, such as the state institutions and as politicians. Though the topic of state and gender perspectives is a much debated field, one can argue state-restoration is a masculine arena as it belongs to a public sphere with male-dominated institutions such as the armed forces and the police.

To take an example, security sector reform (SSR) as a field of state-restoration often involves very limited gender perspectives. For instance, in order to reform the security apparatus (normally the police and the army), the interveners should have an understanding of the agents that may facilitate or hinder change in the organization, and should take into account the type of masculinities and femininities that constitute their institutions (Higate, 2012, p. 35). Instead, however,

SSR and other security reform programs may be interpreted again as an issue of technical facilitation—e.g. streamlining salaries, and providing basic training in custody, the use of weapons and human rights, to name a few. The basic training-courses in “gender” that often constitute a package in SSR and other reform programs are well-intentioned, but often end up focusing on how to help *women* in need of protection against gender-based violence.

As Baaz and Stern (2012, p. 38) found, the reform of the Congolese military (often associated with sexual violence) is that gender-sensitive reforms involves educating the soldiers on what is “good” and legal and “bad” and illegal (masculine) behavior, in order to teach them human rights, and women’s rights in particular. Though this is important, a better approach may be to challenge the security agents themselves to share how they perceive and confront gender roles in their institutions and towards the population. Key questions here could be how alliances are formed in their institution, and whether they approach different members of a community differently and why. In the case of Congolese soldiers, Baaz and Stern (p. 40) show how they already have certain gendered understandings and ideals of masculinity: as a provider, an affluent man working in an office, and not a Rambo soldier in the bush fighting for his own survival. This perception is very different from the way Congolese soldiers are portrayed in international policy documents and in journalistic articles.²³

Looking at the discourse of gender in UN documents and peace operation practice, it is easy to see that men are either not talked about or presented more passively as a background and not “gendered agents.” As Connell (2005, pp. 1805-1806) has argued, it is often implied in these policy documents that men in general are the power-holders (the advantaged group)—or potentially the perpetrators of violence against women. Representing men in this way makes it difficult to engage in a gendered discourse for handling the problems, interests and differences that exist among men and boys in any country. Superficial interpretations of “gender” also limits the potential of radical changes to power and inequality in a system (McMahon, 2013, p. 16). The simplified understanding of “gender” fails to engage with the construction and reproduction of masculine state institutions such as the army and the police, which are in focus in most peace operations. Furthermore, it is evident that UN policy documents place men and women in rather fixed categories, rather than using their own definition of gender as something socially constructed, differentiated

²³ See e.g. Gettleman’s (October 7, 2007) article “Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War” where it is argued that “[t]here used to be a lot of gorillas in [these forests, b]ut now they’ve been replaced by much more savage beasts.” http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/world/africa/07congo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

from biological sex, and changing over time and place. The language of confusing gender with women and the “special protection” for women against sexual violence constrains women into being defined by their body: the exact opposite of the conceptual understanding of gender constructions. This dichotomous and fixed categorization of men and women “reproduces a long history of gendered hierarchies that resist complexity, problematization, or modification,” notes McMahon (p. 20). True, in order to get documents such as Res. 1325 adopted in the first place, it is perhaps not feasible to go too far in challenging gendered power and hierarchies. Such documents may be branded by conservative, right-wing forces as too radical, and by left-wing activists as too conformist in trying to “co-opt” all women (see especially Baden & Goetz, 1997 for a historical view on the Beijing platform leading up to Res. 1325). Gender may often need to be depoliticized and rather reproduced through agreed-upon ideas of differences between men and women—like women as (the sole) victims of sexual violence and men as “always” on the more powerful end of the gender inequality equation. It is rarely the case that gender mainstreaming in UN operations entails a critical attempt to deconstruct, for instance, the patterns of gender inequality and subordination in the country of operation—or within the mission, for that matter.

In the following, the focus is on two selected peace operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Somalia, for examining in greater depth the integration of Res. 1325 and gender perspectives.

3.0 The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

We begin with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a case where the UN has played a significant role over the years, and where there is some awareness of the gendered aspects of warfare and peacekeeping. The empirical study for this section was conducted through fieldwork in September/October 2013 in Bukavu, South Kivu, in the eastern region, in addition to several previous field visits to the eastern DRC since 2008.

One gendered focus from the international community as regards the conflicts in the eastern DRC has been sexual violence, especially rape, as a weapon of war (see e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2002). Thanks to this focus, various measures have been taken, by the government of DRC and the UN operation and agencies, and not least civil society. However, the conflict analysis and approaches to stabilization by the international community rarely engage in a more gendered discussion, for instance regarding the linkages to the problems of sexual violence. This section gives a brief overview of the conflict situation and responses, using a gendered interpretation, before developing the case study of the responses to sexual violence.²⁴

First and foremost, the structural and root causes of war and continued instability in the DRC are related domestically to the weak state and the power vacuum after the Mobutu-Zaire period, the conflict over land rights in the provinces of Ituri, North and South Kivu, and the polarization of ethnicity and nationality in relation to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the influx of militarized and politicized refugees. The issue of competition for land is a complex one: briefly put, it was largely the average young Congolese male who was most negatively affected by the land disputes and the economic collapse of the Zairian economy (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004, p. 44). The elder chiefs continued to rule and make alliances that were unfavorable to many young Congolese men seeking to achieve their manhood ideals of being able to afford to marry, and finding regular employment. The main livelihood option was artisan mining in rural areas, which might mean fast money, but not necessarily. With the gradual depletion of economic assets of the Zairian state, informal channels of economic activity became the most sought-after. Here, women and youth became

²⁴ The conflict analysis manual by the Swedish Development Agency SIDA (2006) has been used for this purpose.

the chief actors in the formal economy (Reybrouck, 2011, pp. 217, 482). During war and in post-war DRC, women and youth have often been targeted as resource-strong assets for the armed groups and armed forces. The conflict is further fuelled by the ready availability of small arms and unemployed men and young boys, as well as the daily struggle for basic survival for the majority of the population.

The end of the second war in the DRC resulted in a power-sharing agreement between the warring parties and a UN observation mission to oversee the treaty signed 19 April 2002 (the Sun City Accords). It soon became evident, however, that the conflicts were still ongoing, and that the UN needed a more robust peacekeeping force to protect civilians. The UN mission as it stands today is one of the biggest in the world, with a total of 21,485 uniformed personnel and 4539 civilian staff (internationals, nationals and volunteers).²⁵ Res. 1325 has since 2003 gradually been introduced into the UN mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) mandate (UNWomen, 2012, p. 26). Since 2004, gender perspectives have also been included at mission planning level as regards Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), electoral support, and the legal and judicial sector reforms (ibid). However, at the implementation and performance measurement level of MONUSCO, there continues to be a lack of disaggregated gender indicators and target, apart from the area of electoral support. Both a Gender Office (since 2002) and a Sexual Violence Unit (since 2009) are in place, as discussed below.

In the recent MONUSCO mandate (S/RES/2098 (2013)), the Security Council allows for an intervention brigade to “neutralize armed groups.” This demonstrates the further militarization of borders between the DRC and its neighbors as an approach to security and stabilization. It is uncertain how this will affect the civilians and their daily security.


The chart in box 3.1 below gives a picture of the representation of women and men in MONUSCO as a whole.²⁶ Clearly, women are poorly represented in the organization, which also makes it understandable that a focus on “gender” will be attuned to raising women’s voices and security concerns. There is in the mission even a women’s focal point

²⁵ Figures compiled from MONUSCO’s official webpage 12 October 2013 at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml>

²⁶ Data compiled through Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (2013); figures include all personnel, both uniformed and civilian and national staff.

(Yewande Odia), dedicated to the task of equal representation within the mission.²⁷

Box 3.1



3.1 The Gender Office and gender mainstreaming in MONUSCO

The Gender Office of MONUSCO consists of 12 staff present in Kinshasa (HQ), in Goma, Bunia, Kisangani and Bukavu. In addition, the work of the Gender Units is supported by Gender Focal Points (GFAs) in some of the civilian sections (UNWomen, 2012, p. 13). However, as the UN Women evaluation team found, these GFAs were not considered in the staff Terms of Reference, resulting in the view of gender as an added issue vis-à-vis other core tasks. Moreover, the Gender Unit is affected by considerable staffing constraints. For instance, at the provincial HQ in Bukavu, South Kivu, there has been only one local assistant full-time in recent years, and no senior gender representative. Surely this limits the potential impact of such an office on the integration of gender aspects across sections.

The Gender Unit has an extensive mandate (see Box 3.2) which includes guaranteeing the inclusion of gender perspectives in mission rules and operation. The approach centers on two issues: gender-based violations committed by armed groups/civilians against women and girls; and women's participation in peace and security matters (Gender GenderOffice, May 2013 MONUSCO). The Unit also advocates for

²⁷ See *Echos de la MONUSCO* 4(25) for more on this:
http://monusco.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?link=MONUSCO+BROCHURE+Echo+25_pour+mail.pdf&tabid=11355&mid=14526&language=fr-FR

“gender parity” in MONUSCO, meaning a more equal representation of women as peacekeepers. Regarding gender-based violence, there is a major focus on protection against such violence, and also handling these cases in the security and justice apparatus within the DRC as well as MONUSCO. It was less clear to the researcher how well the Gender Office and the Sexual Violence Office cooperate and communicate, or whether there might be overlaps in their work.

Box 3.2 Objectives of the Gender Unit in MONUSCO
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To guarantee the incorporation of a gender perspective into MONUSCO’s rules and operations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To ensure linkage between women’s civil society organizations and governmental institutions in order to guarantee active participation of women in the peace process as well as in the post- conflict and reconstruction contexts
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To encourage research and surveys with a view to guiding MONUSCO strategies more effectively
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To promote communication and sensitization activities in respect of gender issues inside and outside MONUSCO

MONUSCO’s Electoral Division has received praise for its gender work together with the Gender Unit. As an example of gender mainstreaming in MONUSCO, the Division, with support from the Gender Unit, developed a five-pronged gender strategy in connection with the 2011 presidential elections. This included the establishment of gender and elections action clusters in all provinces in the DRC, *Pôles d’Action en Genre et Elections (PAGE)*. The focus was on identifying and overcoming some of the obstacles to women’s representation and participation in electoral processes. PAGE consists of Congolese women and a few men trained to reach out to the (female) masses as regards voting, women’s rights and participation. MONUSCO celebrated the fact that 20% of the candidates were female politicians. However, as was also pointed out during the field visit, this was not really the point: gender perspectives are not about adding women, but about challenging gendered norms and working on more inclusive approaches in, for instance, the restoration of the state.

Moreover, there has been a Gender Task Force in MONUSCO under the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) to review programs. Their focus, however, is to ensure “that women’s and girls’ particular needs in conflict zones are addressed appropriately, guaranteeing a better response to sexual violence threats.”²⁸ In other words, a very narrow and victimized approach to “gender” in the

²⁸ UN DPKO Gender Team Progress report (2010). Downloaded 19 November 2013 from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/gender_team_progress_report_2010.pdf

mission, interpreted as “particular” and “sexual.” As a general observation within MONUSCO, it seemed to be firmly acknowledged that the topic of sexual violence is a “gender issue,” and this was often used as an example of “special protection” needs for women.²⁹ Digging deeper into what “special” means, it became clearer that the assumption was that this was a form of violence and vulnerability that affected women due to their sex and gender role. This “special” concept is also used in Res. 1325, which has received substantial criticism from feminist writers both before and after the adoption of the resolution (see e.g. Cockburn, 1998). The concept of “special” is also adopted in the internationally supported *Police Spéciale pour la Protection de l’Enfant et de la Femme* (the Special Police for Children and Women) in the Congolese police structure in North Kivu. Applying terms like “special needs” and gender-based violence towards women only, or “womenandchildren” to quote Enloe, is problematic because it sustains an image of “natural” differences in gender attributes when it comes to femininity and masculinity and reduces women to being a body, a vulnerable sexual being. Gendered violence must be understood more as violence that is produced through gender norms in society.

3.2 The Sexual Violence Unit in MONUSCO

Due to the issue of sexual violence as a weapon of war in the conflicts in eastern DRC, the UN established as the first of its kind a Sexual Violence Unit (SVU) in MONUSCO. This unit consists of six staff-members present in Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu. They are responsible for the coordination of the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in the DRC, which includes the government, the UN agencies and mission as well as civil society representatives. The key focus areas of the Comprehensive Strategy are as follows: the fight against impunity; protection and prevention; multi-sectoral assistance to victims; security sector reform; and data and mapping. The Comprehensive Strategy has been recognized as “a large, top-heavy mechanism that is expensive to implement and lacks resources” (Hersh, 2013, p. 2). For instance, each pillar is to have coordinators at both national and provincial levels. In practice, the UN agencies in DRC cannot always afford to have these positions filled by senior staff, so they are either filled by a junior member or not filled at all (ibid).

The regional office in Bukavu, South Kivu, which the researcher has visited on several occasions, consisted until recently of one coordination officer and one UN volunteer.³⁰ The area of responsibility

²⁹ In various observations and discussions with UN staff during fieldwork in Bukavu, DRC, September/October 2013.

³⁰ The SVU officer left in November 2013; it was uncertain at the time of the writing of this report who would replace her and if there would still be one additional staff member, such as the UN volunteer.

covers South Kivu, Maniema and North Katanga – an area of approximately 300.000 km². It is an understatement to say that this is a difficult task for the small unit. The SVU in Bukavu has focused on capacity building of military and civilian colleagues (including Community Liaison Assistants, see below) in MONUSCO in addition to the Congolese army and the police. This training has provided a minimum understanding of do's and don'ts for reporting sexual violence and referral of survivors to medical and psychosocial support. Admirable, but the achievements as regards handling the issue of conflict-related sexual violence are still more on the reactive than the preventive side.

As SVU is a relatively new phenomenon in peace operations, the Bukavu branch was asked about its relevance, in MONUSCO and beyond.³¹ First, they argued that it had improved the reporting mechanisms concerning human rights violations, as this section in MONUSCO had been working with a more restricted approach to armed conflict violence. The SVU explained that by having joint missions with the Human Rights section in MONUSCO, they could develop better knowledge on conflict-affected communities that could be fed back to the mission. This was done through having different contacts in field and different perspectives that had been blind spots to the other section. Moreover, they argued that it had improved the understanding in the mission of how civilians were affected by war, as the Unit was able to raise awareness on this aspect on a daily basis. They feared that without an SVU, the topic of sexual violence would be limited to the reports of the UN country team.

The main office in Kinshasa also has the possibility of raising the issue at the top political levels—with the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children; in protection cluster meetings in MONUSCO, etc. However, research by Refugees International (Hersh, 2013) has identified serious coordination failures at this level due to institutional and personal differences. Further, there are severe limitations when it comes to two of the pillars in the Comprehensive Strategy: Security Sector Reform and Data and Mapping. The former is lagging behind at the national level, and there is currently no focal point for sexual violence concerns in the SSR process. In discussion with the DDR unit in MONUSCO, a branch that can arguably be said to fall under the broader SSR agenda, it became evident that there was not much awareness of gender mainstreaming in this process.³² The response was seen as rather technical, taking for granted that the subjects were young males and ignoring the fact there are “dependents” such as family of the soldiers and that girls and boys, women and men

³¹ Discussion with SVU representatives Chiara Oriti Niosi and Alejandro Sanchez, 7 October 2013, Bukavu.

³² Personal conversation with the head of DDR unit, 26 September 2013, Bukavu.

participate in armed groups to varying degrees. In addition, the lack of vetting procedures of human rights violators in the police and army does not contribute to a safer environment for civilians. Also, data and mapping are problematic due to lack of coordination and sharing between different institutions and interest groups, ethical standards and procedures, as well as problems of data duplication.

3.3 Gender perspectives in peacekeeping innovations: The role of Community Liaison Assistants and Joint Protection Teams

MONUSCO and formerly MONUC have had difficulties in reaching the communities and understanding civilian security threats at various levels—from women walking to market, to targeted village attacks affecting entire families. In the international humanitarian community based in North Kivu, for instance, MONUC/MONUSCO has had major legitimacy problems due to their support to and participation in military activities that have caused humanitarian catastrophes.³³ In order to be more proactive and effective in putting into practice the Protection of Civilians and state restoration mandate, MONUSCO has developed several innovations. Noteworthy here are the Community Liaison Assistants (CLA). These are Congolese staff with proficiency in English, French, Swahili and various local languages, who serve as a main link between local communities and MONUSCO. Although women are encouraged to apply for these positions, they still consist largely of men. There are many reasons for this, not least that Congolese women tend to have less formal education and hence fewer job opportunities than their male counterparts, as their role has generally focused on taking care of the family and the household (fetching water, subsistence farming, nursing etc.). Also, the researcher was told that it is more difficult for the UN to ensure the safety of female staff in the areas of operation. This seemed to indicate that the peacekeepers were less sure as to how to deal with attempts at sexual violence or harassment of female CLAs, or simply how to approach a female colleague at all, due to their interpretation of Pakistani customs—Pakistan being the main contributing country in South Kivu province with respect to peacekeepers.

There is one Gender Focal Point (GFP) among the CLAs in South Kivu. The Terms of Reference for this position focus on the security challenges that women and youth experience when they are responsible for most of the harvesting work, for fetching water and going to markets, which in turn exposes them to armed groups and Congolese armed forces. In order to deal with this, the objective of the

³³ This includes in particular the Kimia II process, where MONUC supported the Congolese army to fight off armed groups such as FDLR, with enormous humanitarian consequences.

CLA GFP is to establish in each peacekeeper base (COB) a network of women's associations to identify the challenges that women face and to suggest strategies and measures. The CLAs represented in the various areas then collect these perspectives and inform the Gender and Civil Affairs Section, in order to see how these protection measures can be fed into the overall peacekeeping response. From the documents available to the researcher on the GFP positions, it was evident that gender was understood as mainly women, and that dealing with women's concerns was best done through women's associations (see Box 3.3). It was less clear how the entire society could be actively involved in mapping and suggesting ideas concerning protection.

Box 3.3 Mandated tasks of CLA Gender Focal Point	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of Civilians: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Facilitate and ensure liaison and interaction between women, especially members of women's organizations and MONUSCO COBs ○ Define and carry out strategies to involve wives in protection issues ○ Initiate and sustain women's advocacy for their participation in local security meetings ○ Build confidence between women and MONUSCO contingents ○ Help to reinforce contingent's capacity on gender issues, for gender mainstreaming in the field of civilian protection. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict Management: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Initiate and follow up the implementation of gender mainstreaming in Civil Affairs conflict management project activities, ○ Facilitate the involvement of women in conflict management and resolution in accordance with UNSC Res.1325, in order to ensure gender equality in this field. 	

Furthermore, the researcher was able to attend a gender course for the CLAs as well as speaking with the GFPs within the CLA structure and in the Gender Unit in MONUSCO on their work and focus areas.³⁴ It became clear that the "gender staff" largely understood "gender" as *women*, and this was the view that was conveyed back to the CLAs. This perception of "gender-as-women" may have the effect of making the largely-male dominated staff think that gender (i.e. women) has nothing to do with their normal work. In practice, the CLAs are daily confronted with a range of gendered perspectives to security concerns: customary chiefs, the changing role of Congolese men due to the long-term conflict and situation of state decay, exploitation of children, and all the social, economic and political factors in villages exposed to roaming armed groups.

³⁴ 1 October 2013, Bukavu HQ, DRC.

When asked what they saw as gendered security concerns, the female CLAs explained how Congolese men have been left without education or job opportunities, so they simply stay in the house.³⁵ Their wives are thus forced to work even harder to feed their children. As they must walk long distances to earn small sums, they are often exposed to armed groups, soldiers, police and others who harass and intimidate them to gain information, money, sex and goods. Women have become walking targets. In a previous study, the researcher found that this topic is rarely reflected on by the male peacekeepers in MONUSCO, who generally prefer to speak to other men and avoid approaching women, due in part also to fears of being accused of sexual exploitation and abuse (Solhjell, 2013).

Asked what could be done about this insecurity for women, one female CLA answered that they needed to sensitize men into walking together with the women and stop the men from being so selfish in thinking only about their own security. The passivity of Congolese men may be due to fears of getting killed, or that it is hard to find work in line with their traditional masculine ideals, such as an office position or cattle ranching. In effect, one could say that Congolese men have over time been “de-masculinized”—unable to fulfill their roles as breadwinners and heads of household. There is a clear divide between what is accepted as men’s and women’s work. Women, youth and children usually have to walk long distances through what have become dangerous areas to harvest the crops, fetch water and charcoal, and go to the markets to sell produce. The CLAs seem well aware of these problems, but their insights could be further used to both discuss gender perspectives at security meetings as well as in discussions with local communities.

Furthermore, in order to improve risk analysis and put into effect the Protection of Civilians mandate, MONUSCO have established Joint Protection Teams (JPT), a project-based civilian–military cooperation aimed at protecting vulnerable communities. On average, there are two or three missions per month in the South Kivu region, lasting three to four days, with experts from various MONUSCO sections, like Child Protection, Human Rights, and Rule of Law. The JPT missions are intended to facilitate dialogue between communities affected by conflict, and to bring together MONUSCO armed forces and civilian staff in order to enable better peacekeeping and protection. Through this approach, peacekeepers responsible for the areas are made aware of particularly vulnerable communities facing problems such as child recruitment, roaming armed groups and gender-based violence. In practice, the “Protection of Civilians” concept often means creating

³⁵ In discussion with CLAs at MONUSCO HQ 1–2 October 2013, Bukavu HQ, DRC.

more awareness among international staff on what is going on in insecure areas.³⁶

The JPTs also rely on the CLAs for help in getting information on protection and security concerns as well as in establishing contact and facilitating meetings with the local communities. When the JPTs visit vulnerable communities, they identify the key stakeholders (similar to the work of the CLAs), including the state representatives and/or the customary chiefs, cooperatives for agriculture or mining activities, women's groups and civil society representatives. Importantly, a great many of the areas that the JPTs and the CLAs visit have hardly any state presence. An important support is thus to develop a Community Protection Plan specific to the community and shared only with the JPT team and the local stakeholders. The various stakeholders often exchange perspectives and collaborate, as deep mistrust between e.g. civilians and the army is common. Through the interchange and Protection Plan, it is possible to come up with solutions to matters like local land disputes.

MONUSCO's peacekeeping innovations—the CLAs and JPTs—are important elements in a more local and context-specific approach to communities facing enormous security challenges. In essence, the CLAs provide the missing link between peacekeepers and local communities: they are Congolese themselves, have excellent skills in communication and can work with both international staff and the vulnerable population. However, it is essential for the work of CLAs and the JPTs to take gender relations into account, both within the mission and in the local context where the peacekeepers operate.

In conclusion, I would hold that MONUSCO lacks sufficient senior leadership on pushing for gender perspectives across all UN sections and working systematically on this through e.g. JPT missions. If the views within an institution are limited to understanding gender perspectives as “also women,” the mission's mandate—protection of civilians and support to state restoration—will have less success, due to the failure to see how gender relations facilitate and obstruct wanted outcomes. At the local level, there is a need to challenge masculine and feminine roles in Congolese societies. Congolese men need to be engaged in what have been considered “feminine tasks”—fetching water and charcoal, going to markets, harvesting etc.—in order to tackle some of the security risks that women and youth face daily. Here, CLAs and JPTs can challenge gender roles in order to support security and stability for vulnerable communities.

³⁶ In conversation with MONUSCO staff, 28 September 2013, Bukavu.

4.0 The African Union and Res. 1325 in Peace Support Operations

Authored by Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik

This section focuses on the work of the African Union (AU) on the Women, Peace and Security agenda and gender perspectives in their peace support operations in Africa, and provides a case study from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The author conducted fieldwork in June 2013 at the AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu and at the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa; interviews were also held in Nairobi in various international organizations working on gender in Somalia. She also participated in AMISOM's strategic workshop on the mission's gender strategy in Nairobi in November 2013.

Compared to the UN, the AU is lagging behind as regards work on gender, an area which has not received its deserved focus, not even at the AU Commission level in Addis Ababa. It is still a challenge to ensure that a focus on gender and gender mainstreaming is an integrated part of the work and planning of the various sections, departments and programs in the AU. This is reflected at field level, where peace support operations (PSOs) such as AMISOM do not receive sufficient guidance or support from the AU Commission regarding gender considerations and gender mainstreaming within the mission itself and its work externally.

The AU has adopted several tools to fulfill the objectives of Res. 1325, including the *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa*, commonly known as the Maputo Protocol. The Maputo Protocol requires African governments to eliminate all forms of discrimination and violence against women in Africa, and to promote equality between men and women. However, many of the protocols and frameworks related to Res. 1325 have tended to focus on the protection side of the resolution and not the issue of women's participation in peace and security matters. The Maputo Protocol is highly oriented to human rights and protection; only one article (Article 9) refers specifically to women's participation in political and decision-making processes (AU, 11 July 2003).

In 2000, the same year as Res. 1325 came into being, the AU established its Women, Gender and Development Directorate. Since then efforts have been made to put together a framework on gender, peace and security within the AU. However, it took a full nine years before the AU's Gender Policy was adopted by the summit in 2009, and there is still no broader, overarching Gender Strategy on mainstreaming gender consideration into the PSOs' and AU's work in conflict and post-conflict settings (Kasumba & Lotze, 2013). The AU Peace and Security Council has held two meetings, one in 2010 and one in 2013, regarding gender mainstreaming in AU. As a result of the first meeting, the PSC developed an eight-point action plan for mainstreaming gender considerations into AU peace and security work (ibid). After the meeting in 2013, a new seven-point action plan was presented. The processes of adopting these necessary frameworks have been rather slow and it is worrying that during the three years between the two open sessions, little progress was made in relation to the eight-point action plan developed in 2010: "The absence of an implementation plan based on the 2010 session of the [Peace and Security Council], and the fact that all of the decisions of the 2010 session had yet to be implemented in 2013, are of concern" (ibid pp. 26-27).

The problems in implementing Res. 1325 in Africa in general were also a concern on the agenda of the high-level seminar on the promotion of women in peace and security in Africa organized by ACCORD in Durban in 2010. The seminar highlighted the persistent gap between the aspirations of the Security Council Resolution and the reality of women's continued marginalization in formal peace processes, the increased insecurity and high levels of violence against women and girls. The seminar adopted a range of decisions aimed at accelerating implementation of Res. 1325 in the context of the African Union Year of Peace and Security and the African Women's Decade 2010–2020 (ACCORD, 2010). One challenge identified by the AU Peace and Security Council is that gender perspectives were not incorporated sufficiently when setting up the missions. AMISOM's first troops went into Somalia in 2007, but a gender advisor was not deployed in Mogadishu until 2012 and the development of a mission-specific gender strategy started only in 2013. Hopefully, in future AU missions, these important components will be incorporated from the beginning.

A recent positive initiative that came about in 2013 is the Gender, Peace and Security Program (GPSP). This is an AU Commission flagship program which, together with the Peace & Security Gender mainstreaming strategy, will serve as a framework for AU Commission activities in the fields of gender, peace and security, women's human rights and protection during conflict and in post-conflict situations. The objective is to maximize intra-departmental collaboration and mobilize partners around the AU's work on these issues. Funding has been made available under the GPSP to support

gender components in PSOs such as AMISOM. All the same, the AU still has a long way to go when it comes to work on gender and gender mainstreaming. In order to justify declaring the current decade as the African Women's Decade, AU will have to devote far more attention and resources to gender and gender mainstreaming at AU Commission level and also at mission level.

We now turn to the AU peace support operation in Somalia and some current challenges in an integrated gender perspective.

4.1 The Somali conflict through gender-sensitive lenses

For many years, Somalia has experienced considerable turbulence, and during the last two decades a violent conflict has raged in the region. Not all areas have experienced the same level of conflict: Somaliland declared itself an independent state in 1991 and has been a relatively peaceful area since then; and Puntland established its own administration in 1998 as an autonomous state within the greater Somalia. The most conflict-ridden region has been South Central Somalia, often described as a "failed state" (see e.g. Menkhaus, 2007). However, in 2012 a new government came in place taking over from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Thanks to efforts of the Somali National Forces, AMISOM and Ethiopian troops, the security situation in South Central has improved, especially in the capital Mogadishu.

The conflict in the Somali region is characterized by inter-clan disputes over resources and power. Poverty, famine, natural disasters and a large population of internally displaced people are further challenges the area has been facing for years. The fact that men and women are affected differently by conflict is highly visible in Somalia. Women's access to justice is particularly limited, and many women are either excluded from decision-making and asset ownership or operate through a patriarchal filter (UNDP, 2011). During the field visit, a representative from a women's organizations based in Mogadishu argued that sexual and gender-based violence had increased during the war, becoming a sizable problem especially in camps for displaced persons.³⁷ This form of violence is a topic considered taboo in many areas. There is a need for better prevention mechanisms and access to rehabilitation, on which the UN as well as international and local NGOs are working. Despite being highly victimized as a result of war, poverty, famine and violence, Somali women have also been opportunities to undertake new roles in society, because of the conflict. As men are the ones directly involved in armed fighting, women take over as head of the household. Further, many women have stepped out of the


³⁷ Interview with a women's organization in Mogadishu and with an international researcher working on gender in Mogadishu, June 2013.

traditional gender roles, leaving the domestic sphere and starting up their own businesses in order to provide for their families. However, this strengthened economic position has not led to greater inclusion of women in politics and decision-making processes.³⁸ In these areas, women have remained sidelined.³⁹

4.2 The AU Mission in Somalia

The AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM, has been deployed in South-Central area of Somalia since 2007. AMISOM is a peace support operation with a major military component consisting of more than 17,000 military personnel. In addition the mission also has a police component with more than 500 police officers, and a civilian component with political affairs, civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, public information, gender and mission analysis and planning capacities. Below is an indicator⁴⁰ of the representation of uniformed women and men in AMISOM:

Box 4.1



The mandate of AMISOM is to conduct: “Peace Support Operations in Somalia to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the United Nations.”⁴¹ This is to be done by supporting

³⁸ Interview with a Somali women’s NGO in Mogadishu, June 2013.

³⁹ Meeting with Somali politician in Nairobi, November 2013.

⁴⁰ No official figures are available on female and male representation, so the data are based on a study conducted by Manjeza & Davier (2013).

⁴¹ Mandate downloaded from the official AMISOM webpage 1 December 2013, <http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate/>

dialogue and reconciliation, providing protection to Transitional Federal Institutions, assisting in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Program, providing technical assistance and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts, monitoring the security situation in areas of operation, facilitating humanitarian operations and protecting AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self-defense (ibid). AMISOM has had considerable military success, and the security situation in many areas has improved significantly in South-Central Somalia. This was an important factor when transitioning to a new government in 2012. Political developments and the military gains against the terrorist group al-Shabaab have provided the Federal Government of Somalia, the AU and the wider international community with a strategic opportunity to consolidate the political and security gains made thus far (AU, 2013). However, if these positive developments are to be sustainable, the Somali National Forces will need comprehensive capacity-building, training and resources.

The focus on gender in AMISOM is of recent date, with the first gender officer deployed in Mogadishu in 2012. She was the first gender officer to be deployed in any AU Peace Support Operation, potentially paving the way not only for gender mainstreaming in AMISOM but also in future AU operations, as noted by Kasumba and Lotze (2013, p. 29). AMISOM's Gender Unit aims to build a gender-sensitive organization and to facilitate and increase the focus on gender mainstreaming and Res. 1325 in Somalia. Although there is only one officer working on gender full-time, the Unit implemented several activities in the course of 2013, including gender training for troops and supporting the Somali government on gender-related issues, hereunder the process of drafting the government's first gender policy. AMISOM also started the process of developing its own gender-mainstreaming strategy, and in November 2013 a gender strategy workshop was organized in Nairobi, aimed at developing the first draft of the strategy. The strategy will be an important tool for AMISOM's continuing work on gender and will also serve as a guiding document for future AU missions and their approach to gender mainstreaming. It is important that the document provides realistic, concrete strategic guidelines that are operational in the setting of AU peace support missions and that it is followed up with a feasible implementation plan.

However, to be able to support implementation and reporting on developments and outputs on the strategy and the implementation plan sufficiently, the Gender Unit will need to be strengthened with more human and financial resources. The funding of the activities organized has not been regular, and in order to have a greater impact the more staff is needed. Here it should be stressed that gender advisors are intended to play a supportive role rather being *de facto* "gender responsible." That makes it all the more important for there to be a shared understanding that *all* mission staff, male and female, are

responsible for implementing the gender strategy in their everyday work. To this end, detailed guidelines and documents should be shared widely in the mission, and the various components should be provided with detailed checklists in order to mission personnel to incorporate a gender perspective in their everyday work. In addition, effective tools must be in place for monitoring and evaluation: gender-sensitive indicators, sex-segregated data, tracking systems, etc.

The Gender Unit would also benefit from closer support and backing from the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. Measures to bridge the significant gap between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, such as increased communication and frequent field visits, are important aspects to discuss in relation to the making and implementation of the gender strategy.

4.3 Gender mainstreaming within AMISOM

AMISOM's gender strategy is two-fold, addressing both gender mainstreaming in the mission *internally* and gender mainstreaming in the mission's work *externally*. First and foremost, the internal strategy aims at ensuring gender equality and gender mainstreaming within the mission itself. As mentioned elsewhere throughout this report, this is often taken to purely mean increased representation of women in uniform and in civilian roles. However, as shown in the provisional chart 4.1 above, only 1.5% of AMISOM's military personnel are women; the figure for civilian roles is not known (Manjeza & Davier, 2013). Uganda, which contributes the highest number of military personnel, has a percentage of 3.1 women in its forces deployed in Somalia, while the other contributing countries have less than one per cent (*ibid*). Even though AMISOM aims to increase the number of female staff, it is in the end the troop-contributing countries who decide who to send to Somalia.

There can be various reasons for the low number of female staff sent by troop-contributing countries to AMISOM. For one thing, there may simply be few female personnel in the armed forces in these countries. Moreover, women often serve at subordinate levels in supportive roles, and are rarely found in high-ranking/decision-making positions, also in peace operations (Solhjell, 2013, p. 21). An even more important factor is societal: norms and biases against women having active roles in combat. As Dharmapuri (2013, p. 13) explains: "[a] common thread (...) is the prevalence of social norms and behaviors that perpetuate inequality between men and women and act as barriers to women's full participation in the security sector." The armed forces are perceived and constructed as a male-dominated and masculine organization, with their norms and actions shaped by "typically masculine" characteristics such as warfare, protection and killing (see e.g. Goldstein, 2003). Enloe (1993, p. 52) has noted the strong correlation between being manly and being a potential warrior; women, by

contrast, are often understood as the opposite: peaceful and non-violent, not expected to be soldiers. The countries with most females in their armed forces are in the lead not only in having established national frameworks for gender integration in their forces, but also by dealing directly with the social norms and biases that serve to perpetuate gender inequality, as Dharmapuri (2013, p. 13) argues.

Although these challenges lie at the national level in the troop-contributing countries, AMISOM can still play an active role in challenging these countries' views on sending female personnel to Somalia. Crucial in that regard is a critical, gender-aware, analysis of the conditions for AMISOM troops which should not be limited to assessing the physical facilities as such (like separate facilities for men and women, and accommodating the different needs of male and female troops): more importantly, it should assess the level of gender equality, appropriate codes of conduct, issues of sexual harassment etc. This is relevant not only for the military and police components but also for the civilian component—which there is also a low number of female staff. However, as noted elsewhere in this report, increasing the numbers of female staff will not automatically lead to a more gender-inclusive mission. Integrating and mainstreaming a gender perspective in all parts and levels of the mission is essential, especially in a male-dominated mission such as AMISOM.

In relation to AMISOM's *external* work on gender and Res. 1325 in Somalia, two important questions arise:

1. What gender-related initiatives and activities can AMISOM realistically implement and achieve within its given mandate, capacity and resources?
2. What is AMISOM's comparative advantage/added value as regards work on gender in Somalia in general?

After more than two decades of violent and still-ongoing conflict, Somalia is a complex and challenging area to work in, with many challenges related to gender equality, gender mainstreaming and sexual and gender-based violence. In order for AMISOM to have a positive and productive impact while in Somalia, the external work on gender must be realistic in terms of what can be achieved within the current context, given the mission's mandate, capacity and resources. Many international and national actors are already implementing gender-related activities: instead of overlapping, it is essential to enhance collaboration and cooperation.

Also, rather than focusing on a wide range of activities, it should narrow down the scope of the work to areas where AMISOM has an added value, such as the work on women's political participation in Somalia. Res. 1325-related protocols and frameworks adopted by the

AU and other regional actors such as SADC and ECOWAS have been criticized for having too little focus on women's participation in peace and security matters (Olonisakin, 2010). This is despite several years of growing recognition of women's agency in peace-building, in Africa and elsewhere (see e.g. K. H. Karamé, 2004). AMISOM has already embarked on a positive process of supporting and encouraging the Somali government to ensure gender mainstreaming and women's participation in politics. The draft of the government gender policy highlights "safeguarding the promotion of national policies that guarantee women's quota in all government and private institutions" (Government of Somalia, 2013). In connection with the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012, there was a 30% quota for female representatives as Members of Parliament, which AMISOM actively supported. Quota systems for women have proven challenging in several post-conflict African countries, as many countries—including Somalia—also operate with clan quotas (Maina, 2012, p. 9). Ensuring clan representation is of greater political importance than ensuring female participation, and after the 2012 elections, 14% of the members of the new Somali Parliament were women. However, with AMISOM's previous and current engagement with the government on the inclusion of women in politics, the mission is in a position to provide useful support to these processes. Identifying and addressing the challenges related to the selection of women in the government, the barriers for women to become active in politics, and help in ensuring that there are suitable female candidates for the next election in 2016—these are all focal areas where AMISOM can make positive contributions.

5.0 Concluding remarks: towards more gender-sensitive peace operations?

In this report, we have sought to show some of the ideas represented in peace operations, the UN and the AU, as regards gender perspectives in peace and security matters. It is evident that there is a considerable focus on gender as women, and on having more women represented both within missions and in the field of operation. Statistics show that women are still very poorly represented in the structure of missions. However, having women as soldiers or civilian experts does not automatically lead to better peace and security or deeper understanding simply because of biological gender. That view builds on an essentialist approach to gender, one that sees women and men as somehow having innate roles, as peacemaker or warrior for instance. Though many of the policy documents and statutes have recognized “gender” as a concept that is flexible, changing over time and dependent on culture, this is still not the case in practice today.

Reflecting the ideas of simply adding gender perspectives to peacekeeping as it stands today obstruct a more critical approach that entails questioning the underlying assumptions of liberal interventions and state power and sovereignty as guiding principles. As shown in the discussion of militarization, state restoration and masculinity, it is evident that the *Realpolitik* of missions and the architecture of peace operations are in fact masculine and male-dominated. This area is rarely reflected on at a deeper level when it comes to gender perspectives in missions. Instead, the gender discussion remains limited to women (and children), “special protection,” and sexual violence (the vulnerable female body).

The two case studies presented in this report—the UN mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO) and the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM)—have been used as examples of how “gender perspectives” are practiced within peace operations. The case of the DRC is comparatively more developed in terms of integrating gender perspectives in the mission than is the case of Somalia. In the peacekeeper innovations of MONUSCO, such as the Community Liaison Assistants, there is at least a representation of gender advisors and courses run for the MONUSCO staff. There is also relatively good awareness on the issue of sexual and gender-based violence. However, both missions are affected by the above-mentioned essentialist perception that sees gender as categories of women and men, where women are the ones in need of protection

and are always on the losing side as regards gender inequality. A more critical approach to the gendered aspects of peace operations—especially military masculinity and separate gender units liaising with women’s organizations—are important for further work on gender perspectives in peace and security matters, and for the development and implementation of Res. 1325 in practice.

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