The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and regime theories

Abstract

Since the beginning of the atomic age, nuclear weapons proliferation has been on of the major security issues facing the international society, and a growing concern for the consequences of a potential spread of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of World War II led to the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The two main purposes of the treaty was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states, and for the five recognised nuclear weapon states to disarm and reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The NPT is the centrepiece of a network of interlocking, overlapping, and mutually reinforcing mechanisms and arrangements that are commonly referred to as the international non-proliferation regime . Since the first nuclear weapons were developed in 1945, nuclear proliferation has emerged as a significant international security relation’s problem in the international society. John F. Kennedy predicted in the early 1960s that 20 to 30 states would soon be in possession of nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons has become an important power tool in the nuclear age, and yet only a handful of states are today in the possession of what has been referred to as the “absolute weapon”. The NPT has, since it entered into force in 1970, become the most widely accepted international arms control agreement with 190 signatory members . Still, after the end of the Cold War, concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation has grown rather than subsided, and continue to be one of the major challenges to international order. The research conducted in this thesis has grown out from interest rooted in the failed prediction made by John F. Kennedy, meaning that why are one witnessing the nuclear weapons situation in the international society that one do today and how important have the role of the NPT been in states decision to forgo or acquire nuclear weapons.