Avoiding the cum hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: Comments and questions regarding Full Transfer Potential

Abstract

The scientific method is a process of conjecture (hypothesis generation), prediction and subsequent testing in an effort to gain greater understanding. By its very nature, then, it is a process where, much more often than not, theoretical contributions are destined to be wrong. Somewhat ironically, though, being wrong is essentially the goal. By initially assuming our theory – or the one(s) we are testing – is (are) wrong and providing clear predictions for falsification, we engage in the healthy process of elimination of otherwise reasonable conjectures. Failure to prove a theory wrong iteratively and with reliable replication, then, increases the odds that the original conjecture is less wrong than its competitors. Even in such cases, empiricism over time is likely to reveal imprecision in the original conjecture in absolute terms. The cyclical nature of the scientific method reveals the clandestine benefits of being wrong: each time a reasonable conjecture can be safely discarded we get closer and closer to ultimate understanding. In this sense, scientific inquiry and method parallel the structure and layer-by-layer peeling of an onion. Each underlying layer remains invisible to the naked eye before the peeling of the previous one. The emergence of (competing) new theories is, thus, stepwise in nature. The new departs from its predecessors having borne witness to – and thus benefitted from – the proverbial layers previously peeled. Progress too is stepwise, as all reasonable conjectures that were properly vetted empirically leave an indelible mark even as they are discarded.