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dc.contributor.authorMorreau, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-14T07:00:04Z
dc.date.available2020-07-14T07:00:04Z
dc.date.issued2020-07-08
dc.description.abstractSay a jury is going to decide who wins a competition. First, each member evaluates all the competitors by grading them; then, for each competitor, a collective grade is derived from all the judgments of all the members; finally, the jury chooses as the winner the competitor with the highest collective grade. This is <i>collective grading</i>. The grades that are used might typically be numerical scores, or evaluative expressions of a natural language, such as “good,” “fair,” and “bad.” They could be any signs at all, though, that come in a “top” to “bottom” order: thumbs up and down; happy, neutral, and sad emojis; or cheering, clapping, booing, and angry hissing at public events. Panels, boards, and committees throughout society evaluate all manner of things by grading them. Thus risks are prioritized, research proposals are funded, and candidates are shortlisted for jobs. Apart from acclamation in special cases, collective grading is not a usual way to pick winners in political elections.<p><p> This article takes up a question about the quality of judgments and decisions made by collective grading: under which conditions are outcomes likely to be right? An answer comes in the form of a jury theorem for <i>median grading</i>. Here, the collective grade for a thing is the median of its individually assigned grades—the one in the middle, when all of them are listed from top to bottom. Section III prepares the ground for this theorem by discussing different senses in which grades can be the <i>right</i> ones for things, or the wrong ones as the case may be, independently of which grades are assigned in the end. These notions of right and wrong are relevant to judgments of different kinds of things: risks, research proposals, job candidates, options in referendums and elections. The grading‐jury theorem in Section V identifies conditions on the grading competence of individual people under which median grades, and decisions that follow them, are likely to be, independently, right.en_US
dc.identifier.citationMorreau M. Democracy without Enlightenment: A Jury Theorem for Evaluative Voting. Journal of Political Philosophy. 2020en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1819154
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12226
dc.identifier.issn0963-8016
dc.identifier.issn1467-9760
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/18805
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Political Philosophy
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2020 The Author(s)en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Social science: 200en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Humanities: 000::Philosophical disciplines: 160en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Humaniora: 000::Filosofiske fag: 160en_US
dc.titleDemocracy without Enlightenment: A Jury Theorem for Evaluative Votingen_US
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


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