Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngve
dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek John
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-21T12:06:35Z
dc.date.available2010-06-21T12:06:35Z
dc.date.issued2010-01-11
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the three-firm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory.en
dc.format.extent603531 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationEconomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 4, 2010-1en
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 523295
dc.identifier.issn1864-6042
dc.identifier.otherhttp://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2010-1
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/2501
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_2248
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economicsen
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.subjectVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212en
dc.subjectR&Den
dc.subjectendogenous coalitionsen
dc.subjectasymmetric firmsen
dc.titleEndogenous technology sharing in r&d intensive industriesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen
dc.typePeer revieweden


File(s) in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following collection(s)

Show simple item record