dc.contributor.author | Tanyi, Attila | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-11-03T07:53:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-11-03T07:53:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-10-22 | |
dc.description.abstract | Morality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we find that moral theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be demanding. However, there is at least one moral theory – consequentialism – that is said to be beset by this demandingness problem. This calls for an explanation: Why only consequentialism? This then leads to related questions: What is the demandingness problematic about? What exactly does it claim? Finally, there is the question of what we do if we accept that there is a demandingness problem for consequentialism: How can consequentialists respond? The present chapter sets out to answer these questions (or at least point to how they could be answered). | en_US |
dc.description | Source at <a href=https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/bloomsbury-companion-to-analytic-philosophy-9781474236492/>https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/bloomsbury-companion-to-analytic-philosophy-9781474236492/</a>. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Tanyi A: Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism. In: Dainton, Robinson. Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy, 2015. Bloomsbury Academic p. 500-527 | en_US |
dc.identifier.cristinID | FRIDAID 1596634 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781474236485 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10037/27239 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Bloomsbury Academic | en_US |
dc.rights.accessRights | openAccess | en_US |
dc.title | Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism | en_US |
dc.type.version | submittedVersion | en_US |
dc.type | Chapter | en_US |
dc.type | Bokkapittel | en_US |