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dc.contributor.authorLabukt, Ivar Russøy
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-05T07:59:47Z
dc.date.available2023-06-05T07:59:47Z
dc.date.issued2019-03
dc.description.abstractAccording to common sense and a majority of philosophers, death can be bad for the person who dies. This is because it can deprive the dying person of life worth living. I accept that death can be bad in this way, but argue that most people greatly overestimate the magnitude of this form of badness. They do so because they significantly overestimate the goodness of what death deprives us of: ordinary human survival. I proceed by examining four philosophical theories of why human survival matters: (1) non-reductionism, (2) the psychological continuity view, (3) the continuity of consciousness view, and (4) the physical continuity view. I argue that all these theories fail to offer something that is both deeply egoistically important and found in ordinary human survival. In the final section, I discuss how we should think about preventing deaths from a policy perspective if death is a lesser personal evil than what is typically assumed.en_US
dc.identifier.citationLabukt IR: How Much Better than Death Is Ordinary Human Survival?. In: Gamlund E, Solberg CT. Saving People from the Harm of Death, 2019. Oxford University Press p. 243-254en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1802729
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0018
dc.identifier.isbn9780190921446
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/29345
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2019 The Author(s)en_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0en_US
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)en_US
dc.titleHow Much Better than Death Is Ordinary Human Survival?en_US
dc.type.versionsubmittedVersionen_US
dc.typeChapteren_US
dc.typeBokkapittelen_US


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Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)