• How Much Better than Death Is Ordinary Human Survival? 

      Labukt, Ivar Russøy (Chapter; Bokkapittel, 2019-03)
      According to common sense and a majority of philosophers, death can be bad for the person who dies. This is because it can deprive the dying person of life worth living. I accept that death can be bad in this way, but argue that most people greatly overestimate the magnitude of this form of badness. They do so because they significantly overestimate the goodness of what death deprives us of: ordinary ...
    • Is Logic Distinctively Normative? 

      Labukt, Ivar Russøy (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2019-07-01)
      Logic is widely held to be a normative discipline. Various claims have been offered in support of this view, but they all revolve around the idea that logic is concerned with how one ought to reason. I argue that most of these claims—while perhaps correct—only entail that logic is normative in a way that many, if not all, intellectual disciplines are normative. I also identify some claims whose ...
    • Some Problems for the Phenomenal Approach to Personal Identity 

      Labukt, Ivar Russøy (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2023-08-17)
      I present some problems for phenomenal (i.e. consciousness-based) accounts of personal identity and egoistic concern. These accounts typically rely on continuity in the capacity for consciousness to explain how we survive ordinary periods of unconsciousness such as dreamless sleep. I offer some thought experiments where continuity in the capacity for consciousness does not seem sufficient for ...