The Role of International Environmental Obligations in the Interpretation and Invocation of the Two-year Rule for the Approval or Disapproval of Plans of Work in the Exploitation Phase

Abstract

This thesis has begun its text by introducing the general importance of the Area and then explaining the general legal framework in international law. In particular, environmental obligations that have already existed in international law are introduced. These obligations have been considered between states and the ISA, aware of the fact that the prospective contractors are supposed to conduct activities in the Area, and therefore, their practice will be the source of risks to the Area. Hence, it is important to consider the obligations in a way related to contractors. This necessity has a precondition, and that is finding a legal basis, through which the obligations from states will be transferred to individual contractors. In international law, the two-year rule is the legal foundation that the basis can be based on. However, this rule has been vague and subject to different interpretations. Since then, it seems that it has introduced other bases rather than the LOSC without clarification. In order to solve the case and find a legal clarification, this thesis tries to adopt a new analytical approach towards the two-year rule in such a way that the concept of obligation plays the leading role. This approach has a legal reason, and that is the enforcement of contracts. The thesis perceives that the application of the two-year rule is supposed to end up in the drafting of contractual obligations in the form of a legal agreement between the ISA and the prospective contractors after signing exploitation contracts. Hence, the ultimate result of the two-year rule is the production of obligations for such contractors. Based on the exploration regulations that are already in force, the ISA has adopted the obligations that have already been recognised in international law and given them contractual status. Moreover, on the one hand, states have a due diligence obligation to enforce contractors’ obligations; on the other hand, the obligations and the legal basis are not clear. This thesis, with the presumption that all RRPs are of a provisional nature and therefore Section 1(15)(c) cannot be interpreted in a way that it is implied that a new sort of RRP is introduced, explains the reason why the Implementation Agreement has deployed the `norms` and `principles` alongside the RRPs and what may be their contents. Since, first of all, contractors are not members of the LOSC, and secondly, in the case that no RRPs are adopted, the legal gap for the conclusion of the contracts should be filled by another legal basis, which is desirably by the Section is the direct invocation of international obligations in the name of norms and principles. This conclusion is in line with exploration regulations that carry the same international environmental obligations as discussed earlier in this thesis. In this regard, in the case that the RRPs are not adopted and application of Section 1(15)(c) can be justified, the form of the legal basis may be transformed from RRPs to norms and principles, but the content should remain the same. This means that these so-called norms and principles are the legal basis for transferring international obligations to contractors through contracts. Hence, the legal implication of the two-year rule would not make any changes to the positive or negative decisions of the ISA and would not necessarily force the ISA to approve. Concerning this, even so, the similarity of the text of Article 160(2)(f)(ii) with Section 1(15)(c) has been considered in order to show that from the two bases in Section 1(15)(c) texts, only one intention can be expected. I believe that there is a non-legal reason behind the inclusion of norms and principles as a legal basis to bind contractors, and that is to provoke the states interested in the environment and the ISA to adopt the RRPs as soon as possible. However, this presumption will be correct if I believe that Section 1(15)(c) does not make any changes to the decision-making process regarding the RRPs and does not seek any other sorts of RRPs than what is meant by the LOSC.