Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining

dc.contributor.author	Clark, Derek John
dc.contributor.author	Pereau, Jean Christophe
dc.date.accessioned	2014-06-30T09:04:23Z
dc.date.available	2014-06-30T09:04:23Z
dc.date.issued	2012
dc.description.abstract	We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution conforms either to the non-intergrated or fully integrated structure from standard models of successive monopoly.	en
dc.identifier.citation	Economics Bulletin 32(2012) nr. 3 s. 2522-2529	en
dc.identifier.cristinID	FRIDAID 943446
dc.identifier.issn	1545-2921
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10037/6443
dc.identifier.urn	URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_5922
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Economics Bulletin	en
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess
dc.subject	VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210	en
dc.subject	VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210	en
dc.title	Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining	en
dc.type	Journal article	en
dc.type	Tidsskriftartikkel	en
dc.type	Peer reviewed	en