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Why potential entry may increase platform sponsors' profit
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-09)
In this paper we analyze the incentives for platform sponsors to open
up their networks for independent rivals. We show that open access may
increase the platform sponsors’ profit levels and enhance quality improving
investments.
Excess entry in vertically related markets
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2003-12)
This paper considers the problem of excess entry in vertically related markets
when the regulator can regulate market structure and access charges.
The endogenous access charge introduces an asymmetry between firms which
affects the degree of excess entry. I find that the excess entry result of Mankiw
and Whinston (1986) does not generally carry over to vertically related markets.
It is shown ...
Regulation and foreclosure
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2003-12)
The paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges, and the
effect such regulation has on incentives to foreclose downstream rival firms.
I show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against
rivals by means of non-price measures, optimal access charges must be set
higher than in the case when no discrimination is possible and will always
provide a positive ...
Regulation of a vertically differentiated duopoly
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2003-12)
This paper focuses on the optimal quality regulation of vertically differentiated
duopolies in the presence of asymmetric information. In the model
presented there are cross-effects on the information rent. Contrary to standard
single-agent models, the production levels are distorted in favour of the most
efficient firm, whose production level is increased under asymmetric information
relative ...
Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-01)
This paper investigates a market with strictly complementary inputs, with
a particular emphasis on how efficiency can be implemented when the productive
firms undertake unobservable effort. It is shown that simple linear sharing
rules cannot implement socially optimal effort, but a modified linear sharing
rule can implement the first-best outcome and a restricted linear sharing rule
can be used ...
Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-06-26)
This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric
firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by
their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively
and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition
outcome is one between the two most ...
Do incumbents have incentives to degrade interconnection quality in the internet?
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2003-12)
In this paper we analyze the interconnection incentives for firms that have
an installed base of customers and that also compete for new customers. We show that the
small firm may be harmed in the competition for new customers if the customers in the
installed bases are charged a high price, since this makes the large firm more aggressive. It
is also shown that the price charged to the installed ...