Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorNyseth, Fredrik
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-05T12:59:26Z
dc.date.available2018-07-05T12:59:26Z
dc.date.issued2017-01-18
dc.description.abstractThis paper is a response to a paper by Marcus Giaquinto in which he argues that lexical meaning is moderately indeterminate and that this poses a problem for the linguistic view of a priori knowledge. I argue that accepting the moderate indeterminacy thesis as he presents it is perfectly compatible with both the linguistic view in general and the specific suggestion that some <i>a priori</i> knowledge can be explained by appealing to synonymy. I also argue that, in fact, Giaquinto's considerations speak in favour of the linguistic view rather than against it. The general lesson is that, contrary to what might be suspected, the linguistic view does not presuppose an implausibly simple and tidy conception of lexical meaning.en_US
dc.descriptionSubmitted manuscript version. Published version available at: <a href=http://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819116000632> http://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819116000632 </a>en_US
dc.identifier.citationNyseth, F. (2017). Semantic Facts and a Priori Knowledge. Philosophy, 92(2), 297-304. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819116000632en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1542708
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0031819116000632
dc.identifier.issn0031-8191
dc.identifier.issn1469-817X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/13163
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US
dc.relation.journalPhilosophy
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.subjectVDP::Humaniora: 000::Filosofiske fag: 160::Filosofi: 161en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Humanities: 000::Philosophical disciplines: 160::Philosophy: 161en_US
dc.titleSemantic Facts and a Priori Knowledgeen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


File(s) in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following collection(s)

Show simple item record