The future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. nuclear weapons policy

Abstract

This thesis addresses the viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT for short – in light of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Acknowledging the unique position and influence of the United States, the thesis sets out to assess whether U.S. nuclear weapons policy is compatible with a strong and effective NPT, in what ways U.S. nuclear policy underpins the role and strength of the NPT, how this policy could be detrimental to the viability of the treaty, and whether U.S. nuclear weapons policy should and could be changed in order to align with the NPT. Based on the acknowledgement that nuclear disarmament is the key venue for U.S. impact on the NPT, the thesis seeks to answer the research questions by analysing U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the so-called “Thirteen Steps” for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In short, the thesis concludes that current U.S. nuclear weapons policy is incompatible with a strong and effective NPT because this policy undermines the bargain that lies at the heart of the NPT: states without nuclear weapons agreed to forsake them; states with nuclear weapons agreed to eliminate them. In order to mediate harmful aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, the United States should actively recommit itself to nuclear disarmament.