Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek John
dc.contributor.authorKundu, Tapas
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-06T09:11:38Z
dc.date.available2021-08-06T09:11:38Z
dc.date.issued2021-05-18
dc.description.abstractZhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, based upon active contest participation by all types of the informed player. We allow some informed types to exert no effort in the contest, showing how this (i) can increase the applicability of the previous results, and (ii) in some cases, can change the type of information disclosure.en_US
dc.identifier.citationClark DJ, Kundu T. Partial information disclosure in a contest. Economics Letters. 2021;204en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1911239
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109915
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.issn1873-7374
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/21964
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.journalEconomics Letters
dc.relation.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176521001920
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2021 The Author(s)en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210en_US
dc.titlePartial information disclosure in a contesten_US
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


File(s) in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following collection(s)

Show simple item record