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dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek John
dc.contributor.authorNilssen, Tore
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-07T13:05:10Z
dc.date.available2022-01-07T13:05:10Z
dc.date.issued2021-07-23
dc.description.abstractCompetition between heterogeneous participants leads to low-effort provision in contests. A principal can divide her fixed budget between skill-enhancing training and the contest prize. Training can reduce heterogeneity, increasing effort. It also reduces the contest prize, making effort fall. We set up an incomplete-information contest with heterogeneous players and show how this trade-off is related to the size of the budget of an effort-maximizing principal. A selection problem arises implying a cost associated with a win by the inferior player. The principal has a larger incentive to train the laggard, reducing the prize on offer.en_US
dc.identifier.citationClark, Nilssen. Fatter or fitter? On rewarding and training in a contest. Economic Inquiry. 2021en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1927284
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ecin.13021
dc.identifier.issn0095-2583
dc.identifier.issn1465-7295
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/23627
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.relation.journalEconomic Inquiry
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2021 The Author(s)en_US
dc.titleFatter or fitter? On rewarding and training in a contesten_US
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


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