A thematic analysis of Norway's strategy of deterrence and assurance towards Russia during the war in Ukraine

Abstract

Norway has sought a balancing strategy towards Russia since joining NATO in 1949. Deterring measures through NATO has been followed by assuring measures to ease tensions between both Norway and Russia, and NATO and Russia. During Russian aggression, most notably the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Norway sought greater integration with NATO, and has shifted towards a greater focus on measures of deterrence. Still, Norway has managed to maintain bilateral cooperation with Russia during these periods. This thesis seeks to examine how Norway positions itself between its membership in NATO and its wish for a stable, predictable, and friendly relationship with Russia. My thesis concerns itself with how this is done by Norway when tensions between NATO and Russia is at an all-time high, and with an ongoing war in Europe. My research question is therefore, has Norway changed its strategy of deterrence and assurance, and if so, how? My theoretical framework is Joseph Nye’s theory of smart power which is the mixed use of hard and soft power to achieve one’s goals. To answer the research question, I have conducted document analysis and thematic analysis of publicly available documents presented by the Norwegian government. The documents include two strategic documents published before the war from the Department of Defense and the Department of Foreign Affairs explaining Norway’s ambitions for its security and relationship with Russia. These are then compared to press releases showing the reactionary measure taken by Norway during the first six months of the war. I have divided each type of document into two main themes: hard and soft power, with their respective sub-themes.

Keywords: Norway, Russia, Ukraine, deterrence, assurance, smart power