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dc.contributor.authorAanesen, Margrethe
dc.contributor.authorArmstrong, Claire W.
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-19T09:14:27Z
dc.date.available2014-03-19T09:14:27Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractOne aspect of ecosystem-based management is to include new stakeholders. When an environmental NGO (ENGO) gets a say in the fisheries management, this will affect the authorities' optimal regulation. Combining a principal-agent model and a steady-state bioeconomic model, we show that under symmetric information the authorities will moderate their use of regulation as a response to the ENGO's increased influence. However, the aggregate of the authorities' and the ENGO's regulations will be stronger. On introducing asymmetric information, the regulation of the high-cost fishers relative to the low-cost fishers is weaker than under a single principal.en
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 169(2013) nr. 2 s. 320-338en
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1037136
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245613X13620416111245
dc.identifier.issn0932-4569
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/5964
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_5652
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherMohr Siebecken
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Agriculture and fishery disciplines: 900::Fisheries science: 920::Resource biology: 921en
dc.subjectVDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920::Ressursbiologi: 921en
dc.titleStakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulationsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen
dc.typePeer revieweden


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