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dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngve
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-18T07:08:54Z
dc.date.available2007-04-18T07:08:54Z
dc.date.issued2003-12
dc.description.abstractThis paper focuses on the optimal quality regulation of vertically differentiated duopolies in the presence of asymmetric information. In the model presented there are cross-effects on the information rent. Contrary to standard single-agent models, the production levels are distorted in favour of the most efficient firm, whose production level is increased under asymmetric information relative to full information. The first-best outcomes can only be achieved if both firms are of the most efficient types. The optimal degree of vertical differentiation is also discussed. Furthermore, some extensions to the model are examined (the presence of cost complementarity, quality as complements etc.).en
dc.format.extent438544 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/917
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_728
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Tromsøen
dc.publisherUniversity of Tromsøen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series in economics and management, 2003, nr 7en
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.subjectvertical differentiationen
dc.subjectasymmetric informationen
dc.subjectduopolyen
dc.subjectregulationen
dc.subjectqualityen
dc.titleRegulation of a vertically differentiated duopolyen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.typeArbeidsnotaten


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