dc.contributor.author | Sirnes, Espen | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-04-18T09:06:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-04-18T09:06:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005-10 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper a difficult question is answered with a surprisingly simple answer.
A monopolist who possesses nested information can earn money from
selling it at different levels of precision to investors. The problem is to maximize
profits by choosing the optimal distribution of information among the
investors. I show that, the optimal distribution is to give all informed investors
the same level of precision. The model belying this result is a continuous
version of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). | en |
dc.format.extent | 266042 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10037/924 | |
dc.identifier.urn | URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_743 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Universitetet i Tromsø | en |
dc.publisher | University of Tromsø | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working paper series in economics and management, 2005, nr 8 | en |
dc.rights.accessRights | openAccess | |
dc.subject | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213 | en |
dc.subject | distribution of information | en |
dc.subject | finance | en |
dc.subject | asset pricing | en |
dc.title | How to distribute information | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |
dc.type | Arbeidsnotat | en |